
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. **Baali** (Algeria)
later: Mr. **Alemán** (Vice-President) (Ecuador)
later: Mr. **Baali** (President) (Algeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate

1. **Mr. Monteiro** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey, and, in addition, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, said that they supported wholeheartedly the objectives set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and were committed to the effective implementation of the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The 2000 Review Conference should confirm the Treaty's fundamental role in strengthening international peace and security, pursuing disarmament and promoting the global non-proliferation regime. It must take stock of what had been achieved in those fields over the past five years and identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future.

2. The European Union noted with satisfaction that, since 1995, nine additional States had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and called on the four States that had not yet done so, in particular the three that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to take steps to become parties to the Treaty. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan were a cause for deep concern. The European Union appealed to countries in South Asia to make every effort to prevent a nuclear arms race, which would be detrimental not only to stability and security in the region, but also to international efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It welcomed the readiness of India and Pakistan to participate in negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and called on those countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It urged Pakistan to follow India's lead in establishing nuclear-related export controls.

3. The Union remained committed to the full implementation of the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It continued to support efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and appealed to the only State in the region that had not yet done so to

accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The European Union called on Iraq to comply with Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate with IAEA and to implement fully the agreement that it had concluded with the Agency.

4. The European Union looked forward to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would take place following its ratification by 44 States. The States members of the Union, all of which had signed and ratified the Treaty, were actively promoting universal adherence to that instrument. They therefore welcomed the announcement that the State Duma of the Russian Federation had approved the Treaty for ratification. However, the delay in its ratification by the United States of America was deeply regrettable. The European Union wished to underscore the need to provide adequate financial support for the establishment of the international monitoring system envisaged in the Treaty.

5. The Union called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and urged all States to cease production of such material. It would continue to encourage nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and promote the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It welcomed the steps taken in that direction and towards the application of the principle of irreversibility in the fields of nuclear disarmament and arms control and considered increased transparency an important confidence-building measure.

6. The approval for ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) by the State Duma of the Russian Federation was an important step towards enhancing global stability and security. The European Union called for the prompt entry into force and timely implementation of the Treaty and its protocol and urged an early start to the negotiations on a third strategic arms reduction treaty. It also wished to see non-strategic nuclear weapons included in the framework of arms reduction efforts. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) was a pillar of strategic stability, which should be maintained.

7. The security assurances provided by the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and the unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States that were a means of addressing the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by assuring them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The European Union stood ready to consider further steps, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

8. The Union welcomed the progress made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were a valuable complement to the Treaty, and it strongly supported the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols for those zones. Another positive step was the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

9. The existing system of IAEA safeguards must be strengthened and the Agency's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activity enhanced in order to address successfully the proliferation challenges that lay ahead. The European Union called on all non-nuclear-weapon States to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency, in accordance with article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and urged all States that had safeguards agreements with IAEA to conclude an Additional Protocol. It appealed to nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under appropriate international safeguards and physical protection.

10. There must be international cooperation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States participating in such activities must be mindful of their responsibilities to use sensitive materials, equipment and technology in a way that did not jeopardize the non-proliferation regime. The establishment of an appropriate system of export controls should be regarded not as a hindrance, but as an essential element for furthering close cooperation in the use of nuclear energy and generating confidence among suppliers, recipient States and the international community that nuclear materials, equipment and technology would be used only for

peaceful purposes. There was a need for greater transparency in the field of nuclear-related export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee were to be commended for their efforts in that direction.

11. The European Union called on all States with nuclear materials in their territories to maintain or improve, as appropriate, their arrangements for nuclear materials accounting, safety and physical protection and urged all States that had not already done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, introduce relevant physical protection and safety standards, and adopt and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. Lastly, it also wished to emphasize the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to enhance nuclear safety, waste management and radiological protection.

12. **Ms. Green** (Mexico), speaking also on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, said that while the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had produced a renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament, it was regrettable that little progress had been made to date. In an effort to provide some fresh impetus, Mexico and the six other countries were putting forward a flexible, realistic programme of action in a working paper entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda". The essential requirement in that connection was a clear commitment by the nuclear States to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

13. The international community aspired to a world free of nuclear weapons, and the International Court of Justice had ruled that anything short of total nuclear disarmament would be unacceptable. Accordingly, it was for the nuclear-weapon States to rise to the challenge by reducing their arsenals. That would be a major stride towards the common goal, and it would also spur the international community to greater efforts. The trend in the previous five years had rather been in the opposite direction: two States that were not parties to the NPT had tested nuclear weapons, while one non-party State had continued to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and had not renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons. Moreover, the two main nuclear-weapon States had hardly set a persuasive example. The general picture had been one of complacency and indifference.

14. Worse yet, it was clear that nuclear weapons continued to play a central role in strategic planning; and that the possibility of waging nuclear war continued to be contemplated, despite the fact that the situation which had originally given rise to proliferation no longer existed. The attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons would require common action by all States, but the United States of America and the Russian Federation would have to display leadership in that connection. The Russian Federation's recent ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) was welcome, and the United States should complete its ratification procedure as soon as possible. All nuclear-weapon States should join in a process aimed at eliminating all their nuclear weapons, a process that should be characterized by the principle of irreversibility.

15. The total elimination of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly take time. In the meanwhile, nuclear-weapon States should adopt interim measures designed to reduce the risk of detonation, accidentally or as a result of a deliberate decision. The working paper "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World" set forth several such measures: nuclear-weapon States should adopt no-first-use policies vis-à-vis each other, and no-use policies vis-à-vis non-nuclear States; nuclear weapons should be taken off alert status, and warheads separated from delivery systems; the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be discontinued; and non-nuclear States should be given adequate security guarantees.

16. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been a fundamental step forward in the nuclear disarmament agenda. Those nuclear-weapon States that had not yet ratified it were urged to do so. A treaty on fissionable materials was also essential. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on the production of such materials for use in making weapons, and non-party States with nuclear facilities should immediately suspend the production of fissionable materials for that purpose.

17. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the extension of existing ones, would be positive measures, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be mandated to develop the effective monitoring procedures that a world free of nuclear weapons would

require. An international conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in accordance with a recent suggestion of the Secretary-General, would be a positive measure.

18. Although an overwhelming majority of States were parties to the NPT, the three non-party States that were operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and pursuing nuclear weapon development programmes were crucial to the attainment of the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should focus on them, encouraging them to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, and seeking to have their nuclear facilities made subject to IAEA safeguards. The NPT was at a critical turning-point. The working paper, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" offered a constructive means of achieving the common goal.

19. **Mr. Fasla** (Algeria) said that, by depositing its instruments of accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the eve of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Algeria had demonstrated its commitment to nuclear disarmament and promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There had been a number of important developments since the 1995 Conference, including the accession of a further nine States to the Treaty; ratification by 55 States, among them two nuclear-weapon States, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was fitting that on the eve of the 2000 Review Conference, the Russian State Duma had approved for ratification the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the START II Treaty. However, other developments, particularly the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia, had shown that much remained to be done to achieve the objective of general and complete disarmament.

20. While the NPT had proved to be an effective means of stemming horizontal proliferation, it had been less successful in checking vertical proliferation, which ran counter to its letter and spirit. Furthermore, the many initiatives taken since the Treaty's conclusion had been aimed more at the reduction of nuclear arsenals, than at their elimination. In the Middle East, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had been stymied by the nuclear capacity of Israel, which remained outside the system of international controls. Developing countries desiring to use nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes were faced with insurmountable obstacles. In that connection, the reduction of the resources provided to IAEA was a cause for concern. The security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States had been undermined by the selective and restrictive approach taken in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995). There had been little progress in the implementation of the Concluding Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and there was frustration at the slow pace of the multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament.

21. The 2000 Review Conference should reaffirm the validity of the decision on “Principles and objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” adopted by the 1995 Conference and examine means of achieving further progress in its implementation. The non-proliferation regime must be maintained. The agreements concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation were encouraging steps, but new reductions were necessary and the other nuclear-weapon States must take measures of a similar scope with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

22. Every effort must be made to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Algeria had signed that instrument in October 1996 and had already begun the ratification process. There was also a need for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for military use, under which existing stocks would be subject to effective international control. Algeria had proposed the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee for that purpose, as well as an ad hoc committee on disarmament. The security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States must be enhanced, must neither be open to interpretation, nor subject to veto and must be codified in a legally binding instrument. More must be done to realize the legitimate right of developing States to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and there must be specific measures to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas of tension.

23. Algeria had been the third African State to ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). No such zone had been established in the Middle East, which was a cause of deep concern

to Algeria given the close links between Africa and that region and its physical proximity. The adoption by the 1995 Conference of the “Resolution on the Middle East” had shown that that concern was shared by all the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the nuclear-weapon States. His delegation welcomed the decision to establish a subsidiary body during the Conference to consider the application of that resolution.

24. His delegation was convinced that nuclear disarmament must remain the absolute priority and that there must be a clear undertaking to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The subsidiary body established to consider the issue of nuclear disarmament during the Conference should examine the progress made in that area and the steps that remained to be taken.

25. The Conference must strengthen the political and moral authority of the Treaty and promote its universality. To that end, it must call on all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and to place their nuclear installations under the control of IAEA. As to the functioning of the review process itself, the preparatory process should focus on substantive issues. It was to be hoped that the decisions of the 2000 Review Conference would constitute genuine milestones on the path to attaining a nuclear-weapon-free world.

26. **Mr. Cowen** (Ireland) noted that of late there had been some positive developments in the area of nuclear disarmament: the United States of America and the Russian Federation had undertaken bilateral nuclear force reductions, and the Russian Federation had ratified both the START II Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The two nuclear Powers that had not yet ratified the CTBT should do so: nuclear testing had no place on the small planet known as the Earth.

27. The NPT had reached a crucial point: while 182 States had committed themselves to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, the total elimination of nuclear weapons remained a distant goal. But in accordance with the underlying bargain of the Treaty, non-nuclear States had refrained from the development of nuclear weapons in return for binding commitments by the nuclear States to eliminate their existing

arsenals. In response to that unsatisfactory state of affairs, Ireland and six other countries had put forward a working paper entitled “Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda” which was a realistic programme of action leading to a world free of nuclear weapons. It was premised on a new political undertaking by the five nuclear States to eliminate their nuclear weapons while engaging in an accelerated process of negotiation and measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

28. Such an initiative was necessary because the response to the NPT’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons had not been adequate to date: reductions in existing arsenals were being offset by modernization and research. The danger was that the NPT, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, would wither away through complacency and neglect. Nuclear weapons, intended to annihilate entire continents and cultures, had never had general moral acceptance, and the International Court of Justice had concluded that the indefinite possession of them would be indefensible. Accordingly, a complacent approach was inappropriate: the time to proceed, with serious intent, to rid the world of nuclear weapons was at once.

29. Three non-party States, India, Pakistan and Israel, were continuing to disregard the norms which States parties had adopted. In implementing their obligations under the NPT, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike denied legitimacy to any State embarking on nuclear weapons proliferation. Nuclear weapons were not a valid response to perceived threats to security. The danger of a nuclear Armageddon must outweigh all such considerations. It was therefore essential to take measures to ensure the continued vitality of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime, and to that end the approach outlined in the working paper “Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World” was eminently relevant.

30. A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons — a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) — would be an important preliminary step in the NPT regime for nuclear disarmament, as it would initiate a process of extending controls over all such materials. Negotiations on such a treaty should therefore begin without delay. The pace of those negotiations should not be dictated by the three States remaining outside the international consensus on nuclear disarmament.

Nor should inaction on the part of the members of that consensus be allowed to contribute to the development of the nuclear option by those States. One approach might be for the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the text of a draft FMCT and submit it jointly to the Conference on Disarmament for further elaboration and adoption as a multilateral instrument, while those five States themselves proceeded with the provisional application of its core provisions, pending its adoption.

31. The Conference’s review of the implementation of the NPT must address the issue of compliance with its purposes and provisions, as the application of safeguards and the right to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were among its core features. The adoption in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol to existent Safeguards Agreements had been an important demonstration of political will on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States to enhance non-proliferation assurances when required. The Irish Parliament was moving to ratify the Additional Protocol.

32. The review process for the NPT required strengthening, as the States parties had recognized at the 1995 Conference. It was clear, however, that the selected mechanism of a preparatory committee was inadequate for that purpose. It might be preferable to convene annual general conferences of States parties, with a view to a more systematic and regular review of implementation of the Treaty. The experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was instructive in that connection.

33. The NPT needed strengthening for the simple reason that the world must give up nuclear weapons as a factor in international security. Accordingly, it was essential for the Conference to agree, finally and definitively, on a common understanding of what the full implementation of the Treaty required, and what the participants’ peoples expected of them.

34. *Mr. Alemán (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

35. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that nuclear weapons were the only one of the three types of weapons of mass destruction that had not been banned, and in view of their unparalleled potential for large-scale annihilation, it was important to make the world safer by ridding it of them. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had determined that the Treaty

should be indefinitely extended, and that the review process should be strengthened. The task of the 2000 Conference was to ensure that those objectives were attained.

36. The intervening five-year period had not been auspicious: nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on those weapons in their strategic planning, there had been nuclear test explosions in South Asia, START II was moving slowly, there were proposals for a missile defence system in the United States, there were continuing difficulties in bringing the CTBT into force, and the Conference on Disarmament had not begun negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had not eliminated their arsenals of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States had not received effective security assurances, and the unencumbered transfer of peaceful nuclear technology had not been achieved.

37. To be sure, there had been positive developments as well: the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States continued to fulfil their obligations relating to non-proliferation, a number of States had acceded to the NPT, and the Russian Federation had ratified START II and the CTBT. The United States and the Russian Federation were carrying out bilateral nuclear arms reductions. Such reductions, however welcome, were not to be confused with nuclear disarmament; they had to do with cold war concepts of the strategic balance of power and the like. The five nuclear-weapon States should unequivocally undertake to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, a step that would enhance confidence in the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. It would also demonstrate the validity of the core bargain struck in the NPT, namely a commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States not to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons in return for the agreement of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament.

38. Other positive steps would be the full implementation of the START II Treaty and the beginning of substantive negotiations on START III, the integration of nuclear-weapon States other than the United States and the Russian Federation into the START process, de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and expansion of the nuclear arms reduction process on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, and application of the principle of irreversibility in all nuclear disarmament, arms reduction and arms control measures.

39. While the nuclear-weapon States certainly bore the primary responsibility for eliminating nuclear weapons, there were useful actions open to other States. For example, the three States — India, Israel and Pakistan — that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities should abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons development and accede to the NPT; the CTBT should be brought into force, quickly and unconditionally, and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should conclude its negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. Those and other creative measures were set forth in the “New Agenda” that had been introduced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico in response to a deep concern about the regrettable lack of progress towards the common goals of the NPT. The key features of that very welcome initiative were an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to a step-by-step process leading to that goal.

40. South Africa welcomed the steps that had been taken since 1995 to strengthen the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the conclusion of negotiations for an Additional Protocol. Universal implementation of the Additional Protocol was desirable; unfortunately, however, some 60 States parties had not yet taken the necessary first step of concluding a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. IAEA should make a special effort to help those States by guiding them through the process.

41. The Agency had acquired greater authority for exercising its responsibility in implementing international safeguards. At the same time, it was responsible for merging conventional quantitative safeguards and more recent, qualitative safeguards into an integrated safeguards system, one that would be flexible, effective, and above all cost-efficient. The task represented a major challenge. Certainly progress had been made, but it was clear that much remained to be done.

42. Non-nuclear-weapon States stood to benefit under the NPT in two major ways: they were relieved of the threat resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and they gained nuclear technology for peaceful applications in such fields as health, agriculture and industry. The Agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme was thus potentially valuable, and consequently it was regrettable that the Voluntary Technical Cooperation Fund had been unable to meet

the legitimate needs of developing countries. The previous 15 years, in fact, had been characterized by a widening disparity between needs and resources. It was important to find ways of making the Fund more stable.

43. **Ms. Albright** (United States of America) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was proving to be effective and, therefore, radical changes of course were not necessary. Bilaterally, and through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Treaty had fostered peaceful uses of the atom in such areas as cancer treatment, infant health, power supply, food production and clean water supplies. The Treaty had also facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation.

44. The Indian and Pakistani tests of May 1998, which had challenged the Treaty's ability to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, had been met with a firm international response in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). Her delegation continued to seek universal adherence, in South Asia and beyond, to the Treaty, which deliberately lacked provisions on new nuclear-weapon States. While her delegation was not opposed to discussing universal adherence in the Middle East, the Conference should be fair and balanced and understand that the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in that region depended on the broader peace process. In the Americas, Cuba stood alone as a non-party to the Treaty.

45. With regard to universal compliance with the Treaty, her delegation strongly supported the IAEA strengthened safeguards and urged all parties to adopt them. Also in the interest of universal compliance, it believed that Iraq should not be allowed to dictate the terms of its compliance with either its Treaty obligations or United Nations resolutions and welcomed the partial progress achieved in North Korea as a result of inspections under the Treaty regime.

46. Responding to claims that the five nuclear-weapon States were not making sufficient efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament under article VI, she noted the Russian State Duma's recent action on the START II Treaty and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which her delegation welcomed, and the United States Senate's overwhelming vote approving the Treaty several years earlier. President Clinton had dealt with concerns raised by missile defences openly and in consultation with both the United States Congress and the country's allies and other countries, including the Russian Federation and

China. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could easily be amended to reflect new realities. Moreover, the missile defence system in question, capable of repelling, at most, a few dozen incoming missiles, was not intended to degrade the Russian deterrent.

47. Since the end of the cold war, remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament had been achieved as a result of strategic negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation's ratification of START II would give fresh impetus to START III negotiations on reducing deployed strategic warheads by 80 per cent from peak cold-war levels. Progress towards continued strategic reductions would be a major goal of the upcoming summit between President Clinton and President Putin.

48. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had dismantled about 60 per cent of its nuclear weapons. The American taxpayer had already provided over \$5 billion towards the cost of nuclear disarmament programmes in the former Soviet Union, such as destroying missiles, securing fissile material, employing nuclear scientists for peaceful purposes and ending plutonium production for weapons. Moreover, since 1991, the United States had worked with its allies to reduce by 85 per cent the number of nuclear weapons within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All those achievements were summarized in a newly issued booklet on the United States' compliance with its obligations under article VI.

49. As for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be advising the Clinton Administration on how to respond to Senators' concerns with a view to building support for its eventual ratification. In the meantime, the United States would not resume testing and urged other nations to follow suit. It also continued to support the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In conclusion, she believed that, through solidarity, nuclear disarmament could be achieved gradually, by taking such familiar and achievable steps as adopting a fissile material cut-off treaty and adhering to the course charted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

50. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

51. **Mr. Sha Zukang** (China) noted that, even in the post-cold-war period, military alliances were being strengthened; State sovereignty was violated by

“humanitarian interventions”; and, in order to enhance its strategic superiority and establish its own absolute security, a certain country had stepped up the development, deployment and proliferation of its advanced ballistic missile defence system. It was regrettable that little substantive progress had been achieved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). His delegation urged the two South Asian countries responsible for the nuclear explosions of 1998 to honour their commitments to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests or from impeding the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

52. China had always been firmly opposed to nuclear proliferation; it did not lend assistance to other countries for the development of nuclear weapons, or to nuclear facilities outside IAEA safeguards. In addition to abiding by the three principles of nuclear exports, it had adopted Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Exports in September 1997 and Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technology Exports in June 1999. It had joined the Zangger Committee, an international nuclear-export control system, in October 1997 and participated in the negotiations of the “Programme 93+2” protocol. In December 1998, it had also signed an Additional Protocol to its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China.

53. At a time when advanced science and technology and the globalization process were facilitating nuclear proliferation, further efforts should be made to establish a favourable international environment, characterized by stability and the peaceful settlement of international disputes; abolish double or multi-standards in the field of non-proliferation; enhance cooperation; and discourage unilateralism. The nuclear-weapon States must faithfully implement their obligations. His delegation welcomed the recent ratification of START II by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and looked forward to its early implementation and the initiation of the START III negotiations.

54. Nuclear disarmament should be a comprehensive, irreversible and genuine process, not merely a reduction in obsolete nuclear weapons while nuclear capability was actually enhanced. Global strategic balance and strict compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 were prerequisites for global

nuclear disarmament. In 1999, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Chinese President Jiang Zemin had deplored the negative impact of the so-called missile defence programme on international security and stability and urged the international community to take the necessary steps to pre-empt it. Relying on its overwhelmingly superior economic, scientific and technological strength, a certain military Power, notwithstanding its large nuclear arsenals with overkill capability, was vigorously pursuing the development of a national missile defence system, which was tantamount to a nuclear arms build-up. Such actions seriously disrupted the basis for bilateral nuclear reductions by the United States and the Russian Federation and impeded the international nuclear disarmament process.

55. China used nuclear weapons only for the purpose of self-defence, had unconditionally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and had been one of the first States to sign the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. China would participate in nuclear arms control negotiations only if it felt secure about the global strategic balance and its own national security interests; its arms control policy would inevitably be affected by the determination of a certain country to develop a national missile defence system. While his delegation supported the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, it believed that the prevention of the weaponization of outer space was a more pressing task in view of a certain country’s determination to develop a missile defence system using outer space as a base.

56. The three major disarmament issues — outer space, nuclear disarmament and the fissile material cut-off treaty — should be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament in a reasonable and balanced manner. While certain transparency measures were necessary, not all nuclear-weapon States should be requested to take the same transparency measures at the same time. The transparency measures that countries were willing to take were directly related to their strategic security environment; the small and medium-sized nuclear countries could not be expected to take transparency measures while a super-Power rampantly intervened in other countries’ internal affairs, continuously improved its first-strike nuclear capability and spared no effort to develop an advanced missile defence system.

57. For the time being, the most rational and feasible confidence-building measures that could be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States would be to refrain from being the first to use nuclear weapons or from using or threatening to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. That would help to mitigate the discrimination inherent in the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime and ultimately lay the groundwork for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. China had signed cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with 16 countries, including the Russian Federation and France. It had provided assistance to developing countries in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear medical science and the application of nuclear technology.

58. At the multilateral level, China had cooperated with IAEA in the areas of nuclear power plant construction, nuclear safety, nuclear waste management and the application of nuclear technology. It had provided extrabudgetary resources to IAEA in addition to making its payments on time and in full to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund. China offered training to technical personnel from developing countries, dispatched its experts to provide technical services to transregional projects and give lectures at international symposia, and played an active role in cooperation in the field of nuclear science and technology in the Asia and Pacific region.

59. His delegation advocated the further strengthening of technical assistance to developing countries, the lifting of unreasonable limits on nuclear technology transfer to developing countries and active support for the efforts of those countries to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures would not only promote their economic development and improve their living standards but would also prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If, however, developing countries' needs with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were ignored under the pretext of nuclear non-proliferation, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would ultimately lack support. Therefore, there must be an end to double standards or multi-standards in that regard.

60. In conclusion, it mattered little whether the final document of the Conference was a single paper containing two parts, or two separate papers as long as it included an accurate evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty in the past five years and

set out practical arrangements for the coming five years.

61. **Mr. Ischinger** (Germany) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the foundation of his country's non-proliferation policy and the binding legal basis for nuclear disarmament. Over the previous 30 years, the Treaty had played a key role in safeguarding international peace and continued to do so. Its indefinite extension in 1995 had further clarified the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating them. Germany attached great importance to the documents adopted at the 1995 Conference, which, together with the Treaty itself, constituted a solid and indispensable basis for future work.

62. At the current Conference, all States parties must demonstrate their commitment to honour their undertakings under the Treaty. Developments over the past five years and future tasks must be evaluated on the basis of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed upon at the 1995 Conference. Since 1995, nine countries had acceded to the NPT, which meant that entire continents and regions were subject to it. Nevertheless, four countries continued to stand aloof, and no effort should be spared to ensure their accession to the Treaty.

63. The test explosions in South Asia in May 1998 had placed serious strains on the non-proliferation regime. Despite international criticism, the countries concerned continued their nuclear-weapon programmes. Given the rapid development of military medium- and long-range missile technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, there was an urgent need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In that connection, he stressed the obligation of all States parties to adopt and ratify Safeguards Agreements and to adopt safeguards under the Additional Protocol to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to identify illegal nuclear activities more promptly and efficiently.

64. The implementation of the principles and objectives agreed in 1995 was anything but satisfactory. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was of crucial importance. Germany strongly welcomed the recent approval of that Treaty by the State Duma of the

Russian Federation. The opening of long-overdue negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was equally important. The negotiating mandate drawn up in 1995 must not be called into question, and no country should further delay the early commencement of negotiations. It was hoped that the 2000 Review Conference would send a clear signal that the paralysis gripping the Conference on Disarmament would be a thing of the past.

65. The adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) provided the basis for long-term stability in Europe, which was crucial for further progress in nuclear disarmament. The bilateral progress initiated by START I must be vigorously pursued. Germany particularly welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and strongly hoped that formal negotiations on START III would begin soon. Individual nuclear-weapon States had announced and partly implemented significant unilateral disarmament measures relating to transparency and irreversibility. He hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would follow suit.

66. The progress towards consolidating existing and creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones was commendable since they played an important part in maintaining regional stability and peace. In that connection, the concerns expressed by States parties in the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted in 1995 had lost none of their relevance. The States members of the European Union had reached a consensus on the nuclear proliferation and disarmament challenges that lay ahead. The Union had risen to the task of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Germany would continue to work long and hard in that area.

67. **Mr. Yamamoto** (Japan) said that, given the increasing concern over nuclear proliferation, it was essential to ensure that the basic framework for nuclear non-proliferation was as strong as possible. Japan firmly supported the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had made a tremendous contribution to international peace and security.

68. The achievements of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had given the international community reason to hope that concrete measures for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament would be

taken through the active and concerted efforts of all States parties to the Treaty, and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States. That hope had been bolstered by the adoption in 1996 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the 1997 agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to effect deep reductions in their stockpiles of strategic nuclear warheads and the unilateral decisions of France and the United Kingdom to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals.

69. Recently, however, nuclear non-proliferation had been set back by the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia, the delay in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the failure to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the launching of missiles by a number of States. Given those adverse trends, the 2000 Review Conference was a touchstone to determine whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty could preserve and even enhance its credibility and universality. Japan strongly reaffirmed the need for the early realization of the principles and objectives that had been decided upon at the 1995 Conference and intended to submit proposals to the States parties on a number of specific points that were essential to the full and expeditious implementation of the principles and objectives and to full compliance with the Treaty. In order to consolidate the Treaty regime, the review process should be strengthened in accordance with the decision adopted by the 1995 Conference. In the light of the failure of the Preparatory Committee to achieve satisfactory results, the Conference should consider ways of enhancing the effectiveness of that Committee's work. Japan also intended to present a specific proposal on that subject.

70. As the sole country to have suffered the devastating effects of atomic bombings, Japan's policy of promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been motivated originally by the harsh experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Its commitment to the Treaty, which was the basis of Japan's national security, enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Japanese people. The fact that, every year since 1994, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for nuclear disarmament demonstrated that the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons had been accepted around the globe as a common goal of humankind.

71. The nuclear tests recently conducted by India and Pakistan had awakened the world to the reality that nuclear proliferation had reached a new and dangerous stage. Those tests had not only altered the security landscape in South Asia but also posed a grave threat to a Treaty regime that had been a cornerstone of international security for the previous 30 years. The tests could not be condoned and underscored the need for a redoubling of global efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. States parties to the Treaty should call upon those States that had not yet acceded to it to do so at the earliest possible date. It was also important to ensure that all States parties fully complied with the Treaty's provisions by accepting the full-scope IAEA safeguards in all respects and increasing the universality of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements.

72. It was only natural, however, that those States that had abandoned forever the option of possessing nuclear weapons should demand that nuclear-weapon States make more vigorous disarmament efforts. Japan recognized the difficulty of pursuing disarmament while maintaining strategic stability in a dramatically changing security environment. Nevertheless, given their special responsibilities, nuclear-weapon States should take a number of measures. The recent ratification by the Russian Federation of the START II Treaty was an encouraging step, and the United States should commence negotiations on START III at the earliest possible date while working towards the full implementation of START II. The unilateral reductions in the nuclear arsenals of France and the United Kingdom were also welcome and should be made irreversible. Lastly, as long as nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Russian Federation continued, the other nuclear-weapon States should further reduce or at least refrain from building up their nuclear arsenals.

73. Japan had sent high-level missions to those States that had not yet signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in an attempt to persuade them to do so as early as possible. It had also urged like-minded States to undertake similar initiatives. Global efforts in that area had been rewarded by the recent ratification of the Treaty by Bangladesh, Chile, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. In addition, the State Duma of the Russian Federation had adopted the previous week a bill for the

ratification of the Treaty. Regrettably, key countries, including the United States of America and China, had not yet ratified it. Japan called for a continued moratorium on nuclear tests pending the entry into force of the Treaty.

74. It was also a matter of regret that, despite the agreement of the 1995 Review Conference, little prospect existed for the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention, which was expected to become an important pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The States concerned should show maximum flexibility and a spirit of compromise so that negotiations could begin without further delay. Japan also hoped that all nuclear-weapon States and States that had not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards would observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Japanese Government had promoted the development and use of nuclear energy in order to secure a stable energy supply and to reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions. In so doing, it had committed itself to maintaining as far as possible transparency in its nuclear-fuel cycle policy and, in particular, its use of plutonium.

75. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be further expanded and the international non-proliferation regime strengthened. It was therefore a matter of regret that only eight countries, including Japan, had thus far ratified the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements. Work must be accelerated to integrate the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol into the current safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and tangible steps, such as the elaboration of an international action plan, should be taken to promote universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol. As the new century dawned, Japan remained firmly committed to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan. It would continue to contribute to world peace and prosperity by working relentlessly for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with the ultimate goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

76. **Mr. Robson** (New Zealand) said that, despite the lack of progress to date, New Zealand was committed to pursuing in good faith and bringing to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. It had been a very active participant in international

efforts to consolidate peace and had been proud to take its place among the peacemakers. Nations must take advantage of the opportunities that were available to prevent a new nuclear arms race, work for disarmament and secure the peace. He commended those States that had turned back from the nuclear path and taken instead the path to national and regional security as non-nuclear-weapon States. His was a vision of a southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons that consolidated the achievements of members of existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and built on the initiatives of other Governments.

77. Even though it had not yet entered into force, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a major achievement for multilateral disarmament. New Zealand gave practical support to the Treaty through the stations that it contributed to the International Monitoring System. It welcomed the recent decision by the State Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify START II, the initiative on fissile materials that had been taken by the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA, the reduction by the United Kingdom of its nuclear arsenal, the dismantling by France of its nuclear test facilities in the South Pacific and China's continued policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the IAEA safeguards provided in the Additional Protocol offered a new benchmark for verifying that non-nuclear-weapon States were keeping their part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain.

78. There were, however, many gaps and negatives in some of those achievements. Among them were the lack of progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty and towards the introduction of negative security assurances; continuing concerns that a few non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty were not fulfilling their obligations thereunder; nuclear doctrines that were still embedded among nuclear-weapon States and gaining new currency with the so-called re-rationalization of nuclear weapons; the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, despite the positive commitment of the President and his Administration, and the fact that some countries had not yet signed and many had not yet ratified the Treaty; and, lastly, concerns over the ageing of nuclear stockpiles and over current modernization programmes.

79. While the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan were not in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they flew in the face of the commitments made

by the States parties thereto. New Zealand did not agree with the proposal that the Treaty should be adjusted to the so-called new realities and the international non-proliferation regime organized around those who challenged its norms. It was also a matter of real concern that another State not party to the Treaty, namely, Israel, operated facilities that were not subject to safeguards. New Zealand supported the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Conference and hoped that the current Conference would give a clear message that the Resolution should be fully implemented. Those States that had chosen the nuclear option would discover that it harmed their security and that they had embarked upon a very dangerous road. Others had seen and understood that and had turned back.

80. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was fundamental to non-proliferation and to disarmament, and States parties had made commitments to each other in their own vital interests, both national and collective. Those interests could be advanced by completing the work in progress, including reinforcement of the norm established under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adoption of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements, launching negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty and encouraging States that were not parties to accede to the Treaty.

81. The spectre of failure indicated the distance still to travel from a history of war to a culture of peace. That gap did not lie in the performance of the 182 non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty, nearly all of which were meeting their commitments in full. Nor was it explained by the actions and ambiguities of the few States that were not parties to the Treaty, despite their attempts to challenge the foundations of the Treaty's success. The core concern was the absence of enough evidence of success in the key component of the Treaty, namely, disarmament. Other causes of concern were the fact that the nuclear-weapon States, which were under obligation to eliminate their arsenals, sounded too tentative when describing it as an "ultimate" goal; claims that nuclear weapons were required for security into the "indefinite" future; the new pressures being placed on the machinery for the management of nuclear weapons and materials; the increasing difficulty encountered in attempting to gain wide support for new measures to underpin collective security; and the fact that breaches of the Treaty could not be stopped.

82. The 2000 Review Conference should provide the occasion for all States parties to renew their determination to meet their Treaty commitments. The indefinite extension that States parties had supported in 1995 was not a permit for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. In order to finish the job, the five nuclear-weapon States should give an unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process should also move ahead with all five nuclear-weapon States joining a process aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

83. **Mr. Hain** (United Kingdom) said that, as a nuclear-weapon State which fully complied with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, his country wanted to see the Conference take a further step forward to curb the current threat of a new nuclear arms race and pursue the ultimate objective of a nuclear-free world. The United Kingdom fully supported the statement made on behalf of the European Union, particularly with regard to the crucial subjects of universality, non-proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament. The current Labour Government had transformed his country's role in the nuclear disarmament process, having made an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and taken significant practical steps in that regard.

84. He very much welcomed the Russian State Duma's decision to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and looked forward to its early formal ratification by the Russian Federation. India and Pakistan, however, had exploded nuclear devices and, along with North Korea, had still not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). That was extremely disappointing and he urged all three States to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay. Similarly, the United States Senate's vote not to ratify the CTBT against the President's advice was a disappointment. His country would continue to press for ratification by the United States as soon as possible, together with that of China, Israel and all other States that had signed the Treaty, but whose ratification was still necessary for its entry into force. Efforts must also continue to establish the verification system to ensure that the CTBT was fully operational in time.

85. The United Kingdom had pressed constantly for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty and was

deeply frustrated that the position of other States had thwarted the achievement of that objective. Nuclear disarmament would simply not be possible without the verification arrangements on reprocessing and enrichment facilities under such a treaty. Accordingly, he urged all States that were members of the Conference on Disarmament to set aside their differences and begin negotiations at once.

86. The United Kingdom had been making systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. The United States of America and the Russian Federation had been making very significant reductions under the START I Treaty, had made considerable progress on issues relating to fissile material, and had successfully pursued the negotiations leading to the conclusion of a START II Protocol and various ABM Treaty-related agreements. His country was delighted that the Russian Duma and Federation Council had approved the START II Treaty and hoped that that would open the way for negotiations on a START III treaty for further cuts in nuclear arsenals.

87. Consideration of a national missile defence system by the United States had been prompted by growing concerns about the acquisition of long-range ballistic missile capabilities by some countries that did not form part of established deterrence relationships. Those concerns needed to be addressed. Nevertheless, active missile defence raised complex and difficult issues. His delegation welcomed the fact that the United States had made it clear that in taking decisions on such a system, it would take into account a number of important considerations, including the need to preserve strategic stability. Those matters should be addressed bilaterally with the Russian Federation through calm, measured dialogue. For that reason, the United Kingdom had welcomed the announcement in June 1999 that those two countries would begin discussions on a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) and on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). Despite the obvious differences, it was hoped that agreement could be reached.

88. The United Kingdom had been very active in working to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons. It had signed and ratified the CTBT and had worked hard to establish the Treaty's verification system. His country had pressed hard for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and had ensured that its enrichment and reprocessing operations were under EURATOM safeguards and subject to IAEA inspection.

The United Kingdom had also explicitly stated that, when it was satisfied with progress towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons, it would ensure that British nuclear weapons were included in negotiations.

89. His country had also been reducing its nuclear forces by dismantling all its air-delivered nuclear weapons, relying on a submarine-based delivery system only. Work had also begun to develop expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, and a paper on those issues was being circulated. The United Kingdom had published an initial report on past production of fissile material for defence purposes and was circulating a summary paper on its main conclusions and the role of such work in nuclear disarmament. His Government had been transparent about the size of its nuclear material stocks and had declared nuclear material excess to its defence requirements.

90. In spite of the progress made in disarmament since the end of the cold war, in some ways the planet had become even more dangerous. States such as Iraq had acquired or were seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. India and Pakistan continued to develop their nuclear capabilities. Israel's potential nuclear capabilities were seen by non-nuclear States in the region as a factor in the Middle East peace process. There was almost universal agreement on the need for a united and vigorous response to tackle the problems of global insecurity and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty must remain the cornerstone of collective efforts to bring that about.

91. **Mr. Wibisono** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the Movement's position was based on the decisions taken at the 1995 Review Conference. He introduced a working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that were parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which addressed the issues set forth in the preamble and articles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and made specific proposals. The paper expressed the belief that the Treaty was a key instrument for halting proliferation and seeking a fair balance between the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and proposed the establishment of an open-ended inter-sessional standing committee to follow up on recommendations

for implementing the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

92. The working paper called for strict observance of the Treaty to stem further proliferation and reaffirmed the commitment of the non-aligned countries to its full implementation, expressing concern about the availability of nuclear technology to States that were not parties to the Treaty. The Movement called upon the parties concerned to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. The paper confirmed the role of IAEA as the competent authority to verify compliance with obligations under the Treaty and urged States to place their nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards.

93. The Movement reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and called for the removal of unilaterally enforced restrictive measures beyond safeguards which prevented peaceful nuclear development. The paper emphasized the need to take into account all the provisions of the CTBT and refrain from conducting all types of tests. Citing the dangers posed by nuclear armaments to mankind, the Movement called for a reversal of the nuclear arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. The Movement was also concerned over the negative implications of the development of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the weaponization of outer space and called for compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The paper expressed support for the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and emphasized the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's universality.

94. On the question of security assurances, the Movement urged States to negotiate a legal instrument to protect non-nuclear States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons and expressed the view that the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" was an integral part of the package that had been adopted. The Movement was committed to its full implementation, including the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, he called upon the other States parties to consider carefully those proposals and demonstrate the same flexibility that the Non-Aligned Movement had shown in its preparations for the review conference.

Organization of work

95. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the proposed programme of work set out in document NPT/CONF.2000/INF.2.

96. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.