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**2000 Review Conference of the Parties  
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons**

1 June 2000

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**Main Committee III**

**Summary record of the 2nd meeting**

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Reimaa . . . . . (Finland)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.*

### **Exchange of views** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Barretto** (Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that, with the help of slides, he would like to give the Committee an overview of the Agency's technology transfer activities, which had been an essential part of its function since its creation, under its Statute. The Agency had developed a "One-House Approach" to technology transfer, supported by three pillars: safety, technology and verification.

2. The Agency had two mechanisms for technology transfer, its regular programme and its technical cooperation programme. Under the regular programme, funded by mandatory contributions, the Agency pursued its technology transfer work on four different fronts. It developed standards, codes of practice, guides and seminars; in that area, it held about 400 meetings and 10 to 14 conferences each year and produced approximately 170,000 publications. Another aspect of the regular programme involved research contracts concluded with outside scientists. The number of such contracts had steadily increased. Currently there were some 3,600 scientists participating in research with IAEA. Also under the regular programme, the Agency operated two laboratories, the Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco and the Seibersdorf Laboratory in Austria, concerned chiefly with analysis in connection with safeguards, but also with scientific services, research and development, and training of scientists. The Agency was also in partnership with the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy, where it sent many people for training.

3. The bulk of the Agency's technology transfer activities, however, were carried out under its technical cooperation programme. Of the 98 member States receiving technical cooperation, 22 were least developed countries; 50 had a small-to-medium atomic energy infrastructure; 17 already had operating nuclear power programmes; and half a dozen were in the planning or construction phase of creating a nuclear power programme.

4. Programme priorities were set by the member States themselves. The technical cooperation priorities of States with nuclear power programmes were radiation and nuclear safety; waste management; nuclear power operation and maintenance; human

health; environmental protection; and sustainable energy options. For States without nuclear power programmes, the priorities were radiation and waste safety; food and agriculture; water resources management; human health and nutrition; human resources development; environmental protection; and industrial applications.

5. In 1999, the technical cooperation programme had comprised 815 operational projects in 98 countries. Counting experts recruited from member States to assist other member States, scientists on fellowships or scientific visits and participants in training courses, the technical cooperation programme had mobilized some 10,000 people in 1999. Equipment had also been provided. The value of the cooperation actually delivered to the countries, excluding IAEA administrative costs and in-house technical support, which were covered by the regular budget, was \$64 million.

6. The bulk of the funds, 92.2 per cent, came from the Technical Cooperation Fund, with much smaller amounts from extrabudgetary resources, the United Nations Development Programme and cost-sharing by the recipient countries. Since contributions to the Fund were strictly voluntary, they were also unpredictable. Moreover, since 1985 both pledges and income to the Fund had fallen well below the target set by the General Conference of IAEA, averaging only 85 per cent of target over the last 15 years.

7. A breakdown of disbursements by programme area showed that the smallest percentage of the funds, 4.1 per cent, went to nuclear power as such. Disbursements on safety (19.9 per cent) and human health (21.2 per cent), for example, were far higher. Broken down by component, 41 per cent of disbursements were for equipment, 23 per cent for experts' services, 19 per cent for fellowships and scientific visits and 17 per cent for training courses.

8. To receive technical cooperation, a State must be a member of IAEA and must enter into a two-part agreement, comprising the Revised Supplementary Agreement as well as the model in INFCIRC/267, whereby it committed itself to use the assistance only for peaceful applications, to adhere to the Agency's safety standards, to respect the Agency's safeguards rights and responsibilities and to provide for physical protection of any nuclear facilities, equipment or materials.

9. To sum up, the Agency's large technical cooperation programme was well-defined, simple and non-controversial and was guided by the priorities of the recipient States. Unfortunately, it had limited, voluntary and therefore non-assured resources. Although it derived from the Agency's own Statute and not from its safeguards responsibilities under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it did have mechanisms to address non-proliferation concerns.

10. In response to the question from the representative of Nepal, he would be happy to supply a list of the 22 least developed countries receiving technical cooperation, many of which were in Africa. In the Asian region, Bangladesh and Mongolia were recipients.

11. **Mr. Othman** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that it had been in the expectation of enjoying the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in such fields as agriculture, medicine and industry, that the developing countries had joined with the nuclear-weapon States in agreeing to an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Article IV of the Treaty stated clearly that all Parties, without discrimination, were entitled to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and that all Parties would work to facilitate exchanges of materials, equipment and information to that end. It appeared, however, that some Parties, having obtained the indefinite extension of the NPT that they had wanted, were placing obstacles in the way of the implementation of article IV by, for example, denying the necessary training to scientists from developing countries or charging exorbitant fees for providing it.

12. The Syrian Arab Republic, for its part, had cooperated fruitfully with IAEA in the area of training in radiation protection, agricultural and industrial applications and non-destructive testing, in line with the Agency's mandate to propagate atomic energy for exclusively non-military purposes. The developed countries should provide much more funding for such technical cooperation programmes, instead of focusing so strongly on safeguards, important as that system was.

13. Yet some countries, while placing severe restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon Parties, were simultaneously lavishing nuclear technology, both secretly and openly, on Israel, the only State in the Middle East that had not

acceded to the NPT, in flagrant disregard of United Nations resolutions calling upon it to do so. As a result, Israel had acquired a nuclear weapons capability, with which it threatened its neighbours. The possibility that peaceful nuclear facilities might be attacked or threatened with attack, especially by States that were not parties to the NPT, was a source of concern, in view of the potentially harmful, even lethal, consequences of such an attack for human beings and the environment. Accordingly, the international community should put pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA, for the sake of the universal application of the Treaty, the creation of a climate of confidence and the enhancement of the peace and security, not only of the Middle East but of the world as a whole.

14. **Mr. Tyson** (Australia) said that facilitation of the peaceful application of nuclear energy was one of the central tenets of the Treaty, but it depended on the existence of a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. The non-proliferation objective and the peaceful use objective were essential parts of the balance of rights and obligations States assumed under the Treaty.

15. The two components underpinning the stability of international trade in nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes were the international safeguards system and the nuclear-export controls regime. Australia had long regarded the strengthening of the safeguards system as a priority. It had been the first State to ratify an additional protocol with IAEA and the first to host an IAEA complementary access visit. It was an active participant in the work on integrated safeguards.

16. As the country with the world's largest uranium reserves, a major uranium exporter and a significant participant in technology exchange, Australia was a strong supporter of export controls to ensure that its exports remained exclusively in peaceful use. It participated actively in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, which served to reinforce the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. The existence of an export controls regime contributed to the expansion of trade and cooperation by making nuclear suppliers more willing to export because of the assurance a regulated framework provided.

17. His Government's commitment to its obligations under article IV of the Treaty was demonstrated by a number of concrete measures. It paid its pledged contribution to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund in full each year, in the conviction that the Agency's work enabled many countries to reap the benefits of nuclear technology in human health, industry, resource management and food and agriculture. His delegation supported the Agency's efforts to make technology transfer more effective, while bearing in mind the need to ensure that available funding was not exceeded. In addition, his country participated in a lively exchange of information and experts, particularly within the region of Asia and the Pacific, and was a substantial contributor to a radioisotope project under the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology. Australia's nuclear-related agencies regularly provided experts for IAEA and bilateral projects and met with regional counterparts.

18. He expressed his staunch support for the international legal framework underpinning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Adherence to internationally accepted standards of nuclear safety was a key factor for successful development. All trade in nuclear materials should be conducted in accordance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT and the physical protection conditions contained in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. His delegation would like to see physical protection standards extended to domestic activities. Australia had been an active participant in the first review of the Convention on Nuclear Safety; it also had signed and was preparing to ratify the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. He urged States which had not yet become parties to those instruments to do so as quickly as possible. The primary responsibility for preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials lay with States themselves, but IAEA could make a major contribution to international security by coordinating the development of national systems for nuclear accounting, monitoring and protection under its existing mandate.

19. While most efforts to strengthen the international legal and institutional framework for nuclear cooperation and commerce focused on the interests of States engaged in nuclear research or power generation, a far greater number of countries had an

interest in ensuring that peaceful nuclear activities were carried out in accordance with the highest international standards of safety and security. In particular, the countries of the South Pacific region were concerned at the risks entailed in the maritime transfer of nuclear materials and expected shipping States to promote the safety of such materials and to guarantee compensation for any industries harmed in the event of an accident. In that regard, his Government hoped that the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage would soon enter into force in order to enhance the existing framework for compensation by establishing a global liability regime.

20. **Mr. Listre** (Argentina), speaking on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and, in addition, Bolivia and Chile, said that all parties to the Treaty had an inalienable right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Treaty guaranteed the right of States parties to economic and technological development through international cooperation. He therefore attached great importance to the IAEA technical cooperation programme. As recipients under that programme and, in some cases, exporters of nuclear material and technology, the MERCOSUR countries were in favour of the exchange of materials, equipment and technologies for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was important that IAEA should ensure an adequate balance between its function of promoting technical cooperation and its role as regulator of nuclear security. Accordingly, the Review Conference should transmit to the negotiations currently in progress in Vienna a clear signal of the need to provide adequate funding for the technical cooperation programme for the period 2000-2005.

21. Nuclear export control regimes, the purpose of which was to ensure that nuclear energy was used solely for peaceful purposes, played an important role in promoting cooperation. He stressed the importance of transparency and the need to meet international standards for nuclear safety as a means of protecting the environment and thereby gaining public acceptance of the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In particular, he called for cooperation to strengthen the guidelines regulating the maritime transport of radioactive waste.

22. **Mr. Miranda** (Peru) recalled that article IV of the Treaty affirmed the right of all States parties to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes, while at the same time committing States to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, past debates on article IV had been based more on principle than on the practical effects of those provisions. The group of global suppliers who controlled the transfer of dual-purpose technology to other States parties to the Treaty should be expanded to allow developing countries to participate in the adoption of decisions on technology transfer. Continued discrimination towards those countries could lead only to greater suspicion concerning the real motives for the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear technology.

23. His Government believed that the role of IAEA should be strengthened to enable it to serve as the principal conduit for the transfer of nuclear technology. To that end, it was necessary to ensure that the resources for cooperation projects were adequate, predictable and assured. His delegation encouraged cooperating States to pay in full and on time their contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA.

24. At the same time, new challenges and realities made it necessary to review the future role of IAEA in such areas as physical protection of nuclear waste, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and verification in nuclear-weapon-free zones. The 2000 Review Conference should encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to regulate international maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

25. Peru had benefited from IAEA assistance in a number of fields in accordance with the priorities set out in its medium-term plan for the uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear technology had been used to improve child nutrition, to control and eradicate insect plagues and to study the water balance in Lake Titicaca, among other projects. In addition, the control of radiation sources stemming mainly from medical and industrial applications had been enhanced. Mention should also be made of the Agency's willingness to support the consolidation of the peace agreements between Peru and Ecuador. He drew attention in that regard to the Agency's initial support for two water projects and one medical project which would be of major benefit to the frontier populations.

26. His Government, as a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, had participated in the first review meeting held in Austria in 1999 and had submitted a report on the measures taken to comply with its obligations under the Convention. Moreover, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the 1997 Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management were in the final stages of approval by the legislative branch. Lastly, he drew attention to the signing in March of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and Peru, which would enhance the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to fulfilling the objectives of the Treaty.

27. **Mr. Suh Dae-won** (Republic of Korea) said that his country had established itself as one of the largest generators of nuclear power in the world. Currently, 16 nuclear power plants were in operation, providing 44 per cent of the country's total electricity supply, and four more units were under construction. To meet the growing electricity demand, his country had developed the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant, in which safety and reliability had been upgraded. His country was redoubling its research and development efforts in the area of small and medium-sized reactors to be used for co-generation and desalination.

28. His delegation attached particular importance to ensuring the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. More benefits should be provided for non-nuclear-weapon States which complied fully with their NPT obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such States were entitled to acquire nuclear technologies and know-how, including a stable supply of nuclear fuel. On the other hand, strict sanctions should be imposed on States which remained outside the Treaty or did not fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.

29. Nuclear safety and environmental management must be of the utmost concern in future planning for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Every country should maintain the highest possible levels of nuclear safety through national measures and international cooperation. Every country should take concrete steps

to allay public concern about the operational safety of nuclear power plants and the disposal of radioactive waste. All countries should redouble their efforts to implement standards and guidelines in the accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the successful outcome of the first review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in April 1999. Recognizing the importance of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, his delegation looked forward to its early entry into force. It called upon those States which had not yet done so to accede to all relevant conventions as soon as possible. In view of the important role of IAEA in the transfer of nuclear technology and development assistance, his delegation shared the view that the Agency should be given greater authority and responsibility and provided with the necessary financial and human resources to carry out its tasks.

30. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that he associated himself with the working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) and, in particular, with the paragraphs relating to articles III, IV, V and IX of the Treaty.

31. Paragraph 19 of decision 2 (“Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”), adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32/Part I, annex), stated that every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA had the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. Implicit in that principle was the need for IAEA activities to give equal emphasis to technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

32. Since 1995, substantial progress had been made in the area of safeguards through the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement and in that of nuclear safety through the adoption of the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Regrettably, however, the issue of funding the Agency’s technical cooperation

programme through predictable, assured resources remained unresolved.

33. Although the method by which technical cooperation should be provided was not made explicit in the Treaty, it was generally recognized that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund played a key role in that regard. However, the degree to which the Fund’s resource targets had been met had varied widely during the past decade. His delegation considered that the unpredictability of funding and the ever-growing imbalance between the promotional and regulatory activities of IAEA were due largely to the concept of “voluntary” contributions to the Fund, despite the fact that the target figures for such contributions had been agreed to unanimously by the General Conference of IAEA. While the Fund had grown significantly, the number of States requiring technical assistance and cooperation had also increased in recent years. Moreover, there had been an average gap of 20 per cent between target and actual contributions during the past five years and, even taking into account additional funding from extrabudgetary and other sources, there had been a 15 per cent shortfall in funding for projects to meet the needs of developing States.

34. He thanked donors that had contributed in excess of their assessed contributions to the Fund and stressed the need to explore all voluntary, negotiated and extrabudgetary funding sources. His delegation was also in favour of creating a mandatory technical cooperation fund, managed by IAEA, to supplement the voluntary Fund. The International Atomic Energy Agency Department of Technical Cooperation should also be assured of adequate funding under the Regular Budget.

35. While Malaysia had once been almost exclusively a recipient under the IAEA technical cooperation programme, it was currently assisting other developing States in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Technical cooperation was an important means of promoting transparency in national nuclear programmes, thereby deterring the misuse of nuclear technology or its diversion for non-peaceful purposes. National nuclear technology programmes could not be developed in isolation from international institutions; he therefore urged the strengthening of links between developing States through the IAEA mechanism for technical cooperation among developing countries.

36. Lastly, his delegation believed that the rising cost of implementing additional safeguards measures would soon affect the voluntary financing of technical cooperation. It was therefore following with interest the development of a proposal to establish a nuclear arms control verification fund, particularly the option paper on financing that was being prepared by the Director-General of IAEA. He hoped that assessed contributions for the funding of such disarmament verification measures would be weighted towards the nuclear-weapon States so as to minimize negative repercussions for voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

37. **Ms. Laohaphan** (Thailand) noted with satisfaction the significant progress made in the technical cooperation activities of IAEA, despite its lack of predictable and assured resources. Her delegation commended IAEA on its role as a key mechanism for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for technology transfer to its developing member States. Her delegation also believed that that effort would yield more tangible results if the States concerned lived up to their funding commitments. The role of IAEA should be expanded; in that regard, her delegation welcomed the Agency's effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its activities. Emphasis should be placed on international cooperation for the promotion of nuclear safety standards, radioactive waste management and security of nuclear materials.

38. Her Government was strongly committed to the provisions of the Treaty and had done its best to pay its contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA despite the economic difficulties which Thailand was facing. It believed that the Fund, while voluntary, should be viewed as a political commitment consistent with a country's Treaty obligations. The Fund must have predictable, adequate and assured resources; her delegation therefore urged the member States of the Agency to pay their contributions to the Fund in full.

39. Under the Treaty, States parties had an inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Accordingly, any unjustified restriction on the export of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries was inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. Export controls for the purpose of promoting non-proliferation should be implemented in a transparent and realistic

manner within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all States parties concerned.

40. Her delegation agreed that there was a linkage between peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation. States parties were thus obliged to ensure that cooperation would not pose any risk or contribute to nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, the promotion of non-proliferation must not impede technical cooperation and technology transfer. Her delegation would find it unacceptable if nuclear non-proliferation under article I of the Treaty was pursued by nuclear-weapon States at the expense of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by compliant, non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States had a responsibility under the Treaty to ensure that their nuclear materials and technology did not fall into the hands of non-compliant States without passing on the costs of such measures to compliant non-nuclear-weapon States.

41. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria) expressed his delegation's full support for the statement made by the representative of Portugal on behalf of the European Union, and for paragraphs 14 to 19 of the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted in 1995. Austria had always maintained that nuclear power did not contribute to sustainable development and should not play a key role in future energy policies.

42. Preferential treatment in cooperation activities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States which had concluded and were implementing IAEA safeguards agreements. IAEA played a key role in assisting developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its efforts to enhance the effectiveness of its technical cooperation programme were commendable. Resources for IAEA technical cooperation activities must be assured, predictable and adequate; his delegation therefore urged Member States to make their contribution to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time. Austria was participating in the IAEA technical cooperation programme in the areas of non-power applications and safety. As host country of IAEA, Austria offered training in such fields as radiation protection, nuclear medicine, agriculture, basic physics and radio chemistry and had seconded scientists to developing countries to give training courses or practical advice on scientific projects. Moreover, Austria regularly made its pledged

contribution early and in full to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

43. Transparency in export controls was directly related to cooperation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The acceptance of export controls depended largely on the establishment of clear and predictable criteria, developed in an atmosphere of cooperation and dialogue. In that connection, it was vital to heed developing countries' complaints about industrialized countries' unwillingness to cooperate in technical assistance programmes owing to stringent and unpredictable export policies. His delegation commended the work done in the past five years to improve transparency, including two seminars organized by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, at which both supplier countries and non-aligned countries had expressed their views, and the work of the Zangger Committee, often referred to as the NPT Exporters Committee. In that connection, he drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/17.

44. In addition to its position on nuclear power, Austria attached particular importance to the protection of health and safety at existing nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. Of crucial importance was an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiological protection and waste management for the peaceful application of nuclear energy. National efforts should be supplemented by international cooperation in those areas. His delegation strongly supported IAEA activities to strengthen nuclear safety in the operation of power and research reactors and welcomed increased international cooperation to that end. It also welcomed the First Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in Vienna in April 1999, which had demonstrated a high level of awareness of nuclear safety at both the national and international levels as well as the merits of peer review and peer pressure. It hoped to see improved reporting by Member States at the next meeting, particularly in areas where safety had been found to be deficient. It also urged all States, particularly those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors, to become parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and called for a voluntary extension of the Convention beyond the operation of power plants, for example, to research reactors.

45. His delegation welcomed the conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and hoped that it would soon enter into force. It urged States which had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention and stressed the importance of applying the Convention's standards for civil activities to the military. He commended IAEA for its waste management activities and hoped they would be strengthened. In particular, he endorsed IAEA programmes to help Member States with regard to safety standards, peer reviews and other technical activities.

46. The application of proper physical protection standards by recipients of nuclear material and other radioactive substances was a prerequisite for cooperation. Austria was participating in IAEA efforts to improve the existing Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, whose scope was too narrow and should be extended to domestic use, storage and transport. A newly structured Convention should also provide guidance to Member States on setting up a national system for physical protection.

47. **Mr. Mayor** (Switzerland) said that his delegation attached great importance to its inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including with regard to the choice of nuclear fuel cycle. Since, like other non-nuclear-weapon States, Switzerland had already made a major concession by acceding to the NPT and adopting its Additional Protocol, his Government expected stronger implementation of article IV in return. It was also keenly aware of its duty to guarantee the safety of the civilian nuclear cycle at all times. In that connection, it noted with satisfaction that, contrary to certain predictions, illicit traffic in nuclear material had not attained the volume expected. Given that 2 billion people currently lacked access to electricity, that population was expected to increase by 3 billion during the next decade, not to mention the limited fossil fuel supplies and the need to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, the importance of maintaining the nuclear option to provide for energy needs was self-evident.

48. His Government's commitment to the NPT was demonstrated by its regular contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, its involvement in various programmes designed to increase the safety of nuclear reactors, its participation in IAEA committees and its secondment of specialized experts to various parts of the world.



49. Switzerland was legally and structurally prepared to implement both the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it had ratified in 1996, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which it had ratified in 1999 and whose drafting group had been chaired by a Swiss professor. Fine-tuning national regulations on the elimination of radioactive waste was the only remaining step to be taken in Switzerland's implementation of the latter Convention. Lastly, Switzerland participated actively in IAEA discussions on whether to amend the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and extend it to nuclear power plants.

50. **Mr. Lilland** (Norway) said that his delegation was strongly committed to the nuclear non-proliferation obligations set out in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. The NPT Exporters Committee, later known as the Zangger Committee, had since its inception in 1971 established a common understanding on how to implement that article with a view to ensuring a consistent interpretation of the obligations contained therein. As a member of the Zangger Committee, his Government implemented the basic understanding of the Committee in its national export control policy. His Government urged other countries not members of the Zangger Committee to adopt the IAEA trigger list and full-scope safeguards as a minimum requirement within their national export control system.

51. Article III, paragraph 2, had certain limitations; for instance, it did not include technology, or dual-use items, nor did it explicitly require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. With a view to better promoting the nuclear non-proliferation efforts, his Government had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and abided by the collective policy agreement of the member States. Paragraph 17 of the "Principle and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference stated that transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue in cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty. Since 1995 NSG had, in addition to its ongoing outreach activities, strengthened its dialogue with non-members in 1997 and 1999, it had organized international seminars on the role of export controls and nuclear non-proliferation.

52. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, drew attention to the Non-Aligned Movement's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) and, in particular to its position as outlined in: paragraph 2, on the non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipment and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and paragraphs 13 to 18, on the inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy; the need to remove unilaterally enforced restrictive measures on peaceful nuclear development; undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and States parties' strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use IAEA technical cooperation programmes as a tool for political purposes; the responsibility of nuclear supplier States to developing countries with regard to the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes; comprehensive and universal norms and standards prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses; and measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel.

53. **Mr. Issa** (Egypt) said that while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was one half of the issue, the other half was technology transfer and technical cooperation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as the NPT itself stated. The placing of arbitrary obstacles in the way of such transfer and cooperation, in an effort to hinder non-nuclear States parties, especially in the developing world, from obtaining nuclear know-how, was a clear and unjustifiable breach of article IV of the NPT. It would be more relevant to restrain nuclear cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty and did not abide by its provisions, instead of rewarding such States for their rejectionist attitude.

54. The IAEA technical cooperation programmes relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in accordance with articles II, III and IV of the NPT, were admirable and benefited all concerned. All the more reason, then, for States to pay their assessed contributions for the Agency's work in full and on time.

55. Nuclear safety was a fundamental component of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and consequently the IAEA was rightly seeking to enhance the

effectiveness of nuclear safety measures relating to reactors and fissile materials. A nuclear accident would inevitably have far-reaching effects on public health and the environment, not only within the borders of the State in which it occurred, but far beyond them. The Tokaimura nuclear accident in Japan had been a spectacular recent example, and there were bound to be others. The question arose: if an accident could occur at a scrupulously managed and safeguarded site such as Tokaimura, how much more of a risk must an unsupervised and unsafeguarded nuclear facility represent, especially as it approached the end of its useful life? Consequently, it was to be hoped that the IAEA safeguard and supervision regime would soon extend to all nuclear facilities worldwide.

56. The IAEA was playing an important role in opening up new and broader horizons for economic development and the welfare of the world's peoples through the strengthening and promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. An effective system of safeguards was a necessary part of that role.

57. Egypt fully supported the working paper submitted by the Group of 77 and China on technology transfer and technical cooperation activities in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy under the auspices of the IAEA, and had submitted a working paper of its own on the same subject, in token of its importance.

*The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.*