
**2000 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

9 June 2000

Original: English

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 5th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 8 May, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki (Poland)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent *within one week of the date of this document* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **The Chairman** invited the Committee to begin consideration of the Chairman's draft of the Report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/...). The draft was a starting point which took into account all views that he believed would be generally acceptable. He urged delegations to continue consultations with him and other delegations and in the informal open-ended meeting in order to arrive at an acceptable text. He suggested that delegates first give their comments on the text in general, after which the Committee would examine the draft item by item.

2. **Mr. Coelho** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, welcomed the draft report as an excellent basis for discussion. He recalled the points raised by his delegation in introducing working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.10 on behalf of the European Union and stressed that the European Union and its States members were committed to a successful outcome for the Committee's deliberations.

3. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia), speaking also on behalf of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, welcomed the draft report as a good basis for discussion. He noted that the draft referred to both backward-looking and forward-looking elements at various points and suggested that, if those notions were retained in the final version of the document, care should be taken to organize the text in such a way as to clearly distinguish between the two categories. He expressed satisfaction that the draft reaffirmed the importance of the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995.

4. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and in his capacity as Chairman of the Movement's working group on disarmament, welcomed the draft report as a good basis for discussion. The Non-Aligned Movement's official position would be presented the next day.

5. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that the draft report was an excellent basis for discussion which reflected the delegations' various positions. The document was somewhat long however, and could be shortened, for example by eliminating the list of documents.

6. **Mr. Lee Kie-cheon** (Republic of Korea) said that the draft did a good job of taking into account the various working papers, key issues, relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the views of delegations. As such, it was an excellent starting point.

7. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that he associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Australia and stressed the importance of reaffirming the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

8. **Mr. Nederlof** (Netherlands) said that he supported the statement made by the representative of Australia and felt that the draft report was an excellent basis for discussion. Some elements might require redrafting, for example in the specific action-oriented recommendations beginning in subparagraph 45, the language did not always seem especially action-oriented or forward-looking and those paragraphs might therefore require revision.

9. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia but, with reference to the section on export controls reiterated that his delegation was not in a position to discuss that issue on the basis of the current draft.

10. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq) regretted that the draft report did not seem to take into account a number of the points raised by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of Arab States, including points raised by the representative of Egypt. Nor did it refer to the Resolution on the Middle East and the need for Israel to immediately implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty, abandon its nuclear arsenal and subject its nuclear facilities to the safeguards regime. He took exception to the reference in paragraph 6 of the conclusions and recommendations to Iraq's alleged non-compliance with its safeguards agreements. He stressed that the Committee was not the appropriate forum to discuss implementation of Security Council resolutions on such questions and warned against attempts by the United States and the United Kingdom to involve the Committee in matters which did not concern it. Those delegations were simply trying to cover up their own violations of Security Council resolutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

11. The United States continued to provide material and technical assistance to Israel and other countries and maintained large stockpiles of nuclear warheads. The use by the United States and the United Kingdom of depleted uranium weapons in 1991 had caused a human catastrophe in Iraq, and the IAEA verification and monitoring teams had been used to spy on Iraq. The aerial attacks on Iraq's civil and military infrastructure since 1998 were a violation of Iraq's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, guaranteed by all relevant resolutions, and the United States and the United Kingdom continued to use Security Council resolutions to perpetuate the inhuman embargo against Iraq, which had led to the deaths of some one and a half million Iraqis.

12. In 1994, IAEA had removed all weapons grade nuclear materials from Iraq in accordance with the appropriate safeguards and had reported in August 1997 that Iraq had never had any real nuclear weapon potential. In October 1998, the Director-General of IAEA had reported to the Security Council that there was no reason to believe that Iraq had any real capability of producing nuclear weapons. In addition, in March 2000, IAEA had reported that Iraq was in compliance with the safeguards regime and, in a letter dated 10 April 2000 (S/2000/300) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the IAEA Director-General had said that, during a verification visit from 22 to 25 January 2000, Agency inspectors had verified the nuclear material subject to safeguards and that the Iraqi authorities had cooperated with the inspection team. In that context, he supported the contents of the working paper presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran on safeguards and export controls (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14), in particular paragraph 1, concerning the sole responsibility of IAEA for verifying compliance with the NPT and the need for IAEA to verify any allegations of non-compliance.

13. **The Chairman**, noting that the sub-headings would not be included in the final version, invited comments on the "conclusions and recommendations" section of the draft report (paragraph 7, subparagraphs 1-58).

14. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) proposed that in subparagraph 3, the words "and dialogue" should be deleted. In the second sentence of subparagraph 4: the words "only the" should be inserted before the word "universal", the words "is the best way to" should be

replaced with the word "can", the word "all" should be replaced with the words "the four", and the words "unconditionally and without any further delay" should be inserted after the words "accede to it". The last sentence of subparagraph 4 should be deleted. In subparagraph 5, at the end of the second sentence, the word "energy" should be replaced with the word "material"; in the fourth sentence, the words "States parties that have" should be replaced with the words "Any State party that has". In subparagraph 7, after the first reference to "IAEA", the words "and after the decision by the Board of Governors" should be inserted.

15. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed that, in subparagraph 1, the words "and article VII of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5-7 and paragraph 1 of the Principles and Objectives, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East" should be added at the end of the sentence. The Non-Aligned Movement supported the amendments to subparagraphs 3 and 4 proposed by Egypt, although it favoured the words "without delay" rather than "without any further delay" in the proposed amendment to subparagraph 4. In the first sentence of subparagraph 4, the word "spread" should be replaced with the word "proliferation". The Movement agreed with Egypt that the phrase "nuclear material" was more appropriate in subparagraph 5. The first sentence of subparagraph 5 should form a separate subparagraph, and the words "are a fundamental pillar of" should be replaced with the words "is an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with". He would be submitting a final version of the proposed separate subparagraph in writing.

16. **The Chairman** explained that he had merely sought to group all the proposed references to the importance of IAEA safeguards within the one paragraph.

17. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran), fully endorsing the amendments proposed by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed, in addition, that subparagraph 7 should be deleted. The relationship agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) already governed the access of its Director-General to the principal organs of the United Nations.

18. **Ms. Jorge** (Mexico) said that her delegation agreed with the amendment to subparagraph 1 proposed by Indonesia.

19. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq) proposed that the references to Iraq should be deleted from subparagraph 6.

20. **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that her delegation fully supported Indonesia's proposed insertion, in subparagraph 1, of a reference to the Resolution on the Middle East, as well as Egypt's proposed amendments to subparagraphs 3, 4 and 5. She also agreed that subparagraph 7 should be deleted, since it was not the appropriate place to refer to Security Council resolutions.

21. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that in subparagraph 5, the words "nuclear energy" should be retained to reflect the language adopted in the Principles and Objectives, especially since that decision was cited in subparagraph 1.

22. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries proposed that the following sentence should be added at the end of subparagraph 5: "Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA".

23. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that he endorsed all the amendments to subparagraphs 1 and 5 proposed by Indonesia. His delegation wished to know why no reference had been made in subparagraph 6 to the report of the inspection mission to Iraq in January 2000.

24. **The Chairman** said that the Committee might consider including such a reference in subparagraph 6.

25. **Ms. Jorge** (Mexico) said that her delegation agreed with the additional amendments to subparagraph 5 proposed by Indonesia.

26. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia), referring to subparagraph 7, said that the concept of access of the Director-General of IAEA to the Security Council was vital. He accepted the point made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the existence of a relationship agreement, however no interference with

the modalities of that agreement was intended. The question of measures to be taken in case of breaches of the "nuclear peace" was a central element of the verification system, as was the undisputed role of the Security Council as the ultimate keeper of that peace. In view of the explanatory note provided at the beginning of subparagraph 6, detailed discussion of that subparagraph was premature. It would, however, be unusual not to refer to the work of IAEA in Iraq, given that it had played an important role in the verification process over the past five years.

27. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) said that his delegation supported the amendments proposed by Indonesia, particularly in regard to subparagraph 1.

28. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) proposed that at the end of subparagraph 3, the word "international" should be deleted to take account of bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation. His delegation was in favour of retaining the original wording of subparagraph 4. However, if the suggestions of other delegations were to be reflected, the reference to "full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements" could be incorporated into the second sentence as appropriate. His delegation also wished to associate itself with the comments made by the Russian Federation on subparagraph 5.

29. **Mr. Elgweri** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his delegation agreed with the position regarding the unnecessary reference in subparagraph 6 to Iraq in connection with Security Council resolutions.

30. **Mr. Markram** (South Africa) said that his delegation supported all proposals made by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

31. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that his delegation was not in favour of deleting subparagraph 7, since the provision on non-compliance and the submission of reports to the Security Council made the International Atomic Energy Agency distinct from other organizations of the United Nations system, as reflected in the Agency's Statute (article III, B.4) and in the agreements between the Agency and States in connection with the Treaty. In the third line of subparagraph 7, after the words "safeguards agreements", the word "and" should be deleted and the following text inserted: "in accordance with article XII.C of the Agency's Statute and paragraphs 18 and 19 of INFCIRC/153, thus". In subparagraph 4, the

words “bring into force” should be replaced by the word “implement”; and the words “as soon as possible” should be inserted after the word “agreements”. In the second sentence of subparagraph 5, the word “only” should be inserted before the words “competent authority”.

32. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, with regard to subparagraph 7, his delegation felt that the Committee should not use wording that failed to respect the authority of the Director-General of IAEA. The Director-General had to be mandated by IAEA to appear before United Nations bodies like the Security Council. He therefore proposed the deletion of that subparagraph. In subparagraph 3, the word “international” was essential. Although it was not known how many bilateral instruments there were, international legal instruments were binding on the international community.

33. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that her delegation had serious reservations about the proposal to delete subparagraph 7 and sought clarification about that proposal. The paragraph embodied a very important concept which needed to be preserved; and the enforcement capacity of the Security Council was an important aspect of the integrity of the safeguards regime. It seemed that there was some scope to reinforce what was meant by “access”. Her understanding was that the Director-General should be able to bring issues to the attention of the Security Council and provide briefings to it.

34. The suggestions made by the representative of Greece seemed acceptable on first hearing. Her delegation stressed the importance that it attached to the concepts in subparagraph 6. With regard to subparagraph 5, New Zealand did not favour the proposal to change the word “pillar” to “essential element” since that suggested a reduction in emphasis on safeguards. Lastly, she sought clarification on the reasons for the proposal to delete the word “dialogue” in subparagraph 3; if cooperation was desirable, dialogue should be desirable too.

35. **Mr. Thiebaud** (France) said that his delegation was fully in favour of retaining subparagraph 7, which should specify that the Director-General of IAEA would transmit information to the Security Council in accordance with article 12 (c) of the Statute. His delegation had difficulties with the language of subparagraph 6, since it placed two different situations

on the same footing: the situation in Iraq was a matter for the Security Council and its resolutions, while the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was an issue between that country and IAEA. That subparagraph therefore needed to be re-drafted. His delegation could agree to some of the proposals made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard to subparagraphs 4 and 5, but had questions about other proposals, such as the proposed separate subparagraph based on the first sentence of subparagraph 5.

36. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that his delegation did not support the deletion of the word “international” in subparagraph 3. If the Committee did not specifically refer to international legal instruments, there would be loopholes, because some countries might try to use their own legal norms as a basis for resolving disputes. That would be likely to lead to double or even multiple standards.

37. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that, with regard to subparagraph 7, it was important to retain a reference to the ability of the Director-General of IAEA to draw to the attention of the Security Council concerns about non-compliance with safeguards agreements. There could be a reference to the need for a prior decision by the Board of Governors, or to the role of the Board of Governors in accordance with the comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and article 12 (c) of the Statute. Referring to the proposal that, in subparagraph 5, the word “energy” should be changed to “material”, he pointed out that the term “nuclear energy” was used in paragraph 9 of the Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and in article III of the Treaty.

38. **Mr. Nederlof** (Netherlands) said that his delegation agreed that subparagraph 7 should be retained, and supported the proposals made by the representative of Greece. With regard to subparagraph 7, it believed that access to the Security Council was an essential part of the verification system, since the Security Council was the only body in the United Nations which could monitor and act on the peace and security implications of breaches of the Safeguards Agreements. It was difficult to understand the objection to retaining a paragraph which accorded entirely with the Statute of IAEA.

39. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that his delegation associated itself with the view that subparagraph 7

contained a very important concept which should be retained in the text. With regard to subparagraph 5, he believed that the first sentence contained a very important element, which should be retained, and agreed with the rationale put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom for retaining the phrase “nuclear energy”. His delegation felt that it was very important to retain the last sentence of subparagraph 4. If the sentence was deleted for the sake of logical consistency, it should appear somewhere else in the document. Canada could accept the other proposals concerning subparagraph 4. Those points were covered to some extent by the inclusion of the words “without delay” in subparagraph 49.

40. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that, with regard to subparagraph 3, his delegation was in favour of deleting the words “and dialogue”, because mere dialogue was not enough: what mattered was enhanced cooperation, which, of course, could be preceded by dialogue. He could agree to the use of the word “energy” in subparagraph 5 for the sake of consistency, but would understand it to mean material.

41. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that his delegation reserved the right to revert to some points, such as the proposal to delete certain sentences in subparagraphs 4 and 5. If those sentences were restored elsewhere in the text, his delegation could be flexible. Japan associated itself with the delegations which had expressed support for subparagraph 7. It felt that IAEA was the basic mechanism and should not be changed. The concerns expressed about the IAEA decision-making process could be addressed at some point. His delegation would make specific comments about the references to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in subparagraphs 6 and 11 at a later stage.

42. **Mr. Coelho** (Portugal) said that his delegation supported the retention of subparagraph 7, and of the first sentence of subparagraph 5.

43. **The Chairman** said that the suggestions made by delegations should be viewed in the context of the entire report; some of them were already covered in the last section of the report.

44. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the section on safeguards (paras. 8-18) was too long and was inconsistent with other parts of the draft report. There was also a certain amount of repetition.

45. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that since subparagraph 8 referred to States parties to the Treaty, the word “parties” should be added after the word “States” in each case. In the second sentence, it should be specified that the safeguards were the 1995 safeguards. Moreover, the safeguards did not help strengthen collective security, but strengthened trust among States. The words “reaffirms the conviction” should be changed to “considers”.

46. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the members of IAEA consisted of States parties and States which were not parties to the Treaty. While non-States parties had Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, they did not cover all nuclear facilities. It was therefore correct to refer to “States”.

47. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia) said that Safeguards Agreements with States which were not parties to the Treaty were important for security and mutual confidence. The reference to States in subparagraph 8 was therefore appropriate.

48. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed that, in the first sentence of subparagraph 10, the phrases “the continued pursuit by States parties of the principle of” and “parties in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved” should be deleted; and that the words “peaceful nuclear activities” should be changed to “sources of special fissionable materials”.

49. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that the first sentence of subparagraph 10 was somewhat repetitive and should be reworded to read: “The Conference reiterates the call of the States Parties that safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.”. The text would then correspond to paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

50. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that the long sentence at the beginning of subparagraph 10 had been put together from various texts. He would prefer to follow the wording of paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and delete the phrase “once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved”, which changed the meaning of the paragraph. The

deleted phrase could be added at the end of subparagraph 20.

51. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries regarding subparagraph 10. The language of that subparagraph gave the impression that States parties supported the principle of the universal application of IAEA safeguards, but that was not the case. The Committee must reaffirm the call made at the 1995 Conference for universal application of safeguards. Any radioactive or fissile materials that a State possessed, anywhere in the world, must be subject to the safeguards regime. That objective could not realistically be related to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, since it was not known when that would be achieved. All materials and facilities must therefore be subject to international safeguards and IAEA monitoring. Any other formulation would perpetuate discrimination between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, which was unacceptable.

52. **Mr. Twist** (Ireland) proposed that, in the first sentence of subparagraph 10, the Conference should call for the universal application by States parties of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States.

53. **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that her delegation wished to associate itself with the views expressed by the representative of Egypt. Subparagraph 10 was discriminatory. The second footnote to the subparagraph referred by name to the States parties to the Treaty that had yet to conclude Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, but there was no mention of Israel, which, although it was not a party to the Treaty, had a large nuclear arsenal and had not concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

54. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that, as a result of the juxtaposition of language from various texts, the meaning of the first sentence of subparagraph 10 was at odds with its purpose. The proposal by the representative of Japan was a satisfactory solution to that problem. With regard to the comments by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, he said that the application of safeguards by States not yet party to the Treaty was a separate issue.

55. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that his delegation supported the proposal by the representative of Japan and agreed with the representative of the United

Kingdom that it would not be practical to address all the issues in one subparagraph.

56. **Mr. Pinel** (France) expressed support for the Japanese proposal, which was clear and logical.

57. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that it must be made clear that subparagraph 10 was concerned solely with non-nuclear-weapon States parties, which were required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. As the representative of Japan had stated, the application of safeguards by nuclear-weapon States was a separate point, which was, in fact, dealt with elsewhere in the text.

58. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that her delegation supported the wording proposed by the representative of Ireland, but agreed that the Japanese proposal was also an acceptable solution. She noted that the need which the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic had emphasized for States not yet party to the Treaty to conclude Safeguards Agreements with IAEA was covered in subparagraph 49. Indeed, many of the problems raised had less to do with the substance of the draft report than with its structure, which was encouraging.

59. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that he agreed with previous speakers that the first sentence of subparagraph 10 was open to misinterpretation and should be simplified. He proposed that the Conference should reaffirm the need to move forward with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, in accordance with the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

60. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the statements by the representatives of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic.

61. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation), referring to subparagraph 12, said that it was not clear why paragraph 11 of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" had not been cited in full. If there was agreement that the new measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol would enable the Agency to

detect undeclared nuclear activities, the subparagraph must contain a statement to that effect.

62. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) expressed concern that, in a number of instances, the draft report cited provisions of the decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” without reproducing the exact wording. The decisions of the 1995 Conference were not open to amendment. To avoid any confusion, subparagraph 1, in which the Conference reaffirmed that decision should be retained and, if necessary, the text of the decision should be reproduced in full.

63. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that subparagraph 14 gave too much weight to the decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors on safeguards-strengthening measures, implying that they had the same status as Safeguards Agreements, which were legally binding instruments ratified in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the domestic legislation of the signatories. Indeed, he had a number of questions with regard to the authority under which the strengthening measures had been introduced, which he should like to put to the representatives of IAEA.

64. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) proposed that the second sentence of subparagraph 14 should contain only a general reference to strengthening measures, rather than a list that included some measures, but omitted others. Such an amendment would also be consistent with the objective of producing a streamlined text.

65. After a discussion in which **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan), **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran), **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece), **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) and **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) took part, **the Chairman** suggested that delegations with questions regarding the strengthened safeguards measures referred to in subparagraph 14 should meet informally with the representatives of IAEA before the Committee’s next meeting.

66. **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany), supported by **Mr. Delhaye** (Belgium) and **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria), said that he was not convinced of the need to retain subparagraph 14, since the strengthening measures referred to had become less relevant with the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and the steps taken to integrate safeguards.

67. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that, on the contrary, the implementation of the strengthened safeguards measures, which had been introduced under comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, remained vital, particularly in those countries that had yet to conclude additional protocols to their Safeguards Agreements.

68. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation fully supported the statement by the representative of the United States. The authority under which the strengthening measures had been introduced was not an issue.

69. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) welcomed the clarification provided by the representative of the United States. Subparagraph 14 should be reformulated so as to emphasize that the strengthening measures were being implemented under the authority conferred upon IAEA by existing comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

70. **The Chairman** suggested that those delegations that continued to have questions regarding subparagraph 14 should hold informal consultations with IAEA and that the Committee should revert to the issue at its next formal meeting.

71. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.