

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME VI

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1982

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. NATI
Ms. H. TOUATI

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIE-MORITAN
Ms. N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NCIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. R. DEHAINOV
Mr. MIKAILOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU LINGJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG
Mr. LI WEIMING
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. L. STAVINOMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERRELE
Mr. P. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. T. TOTH

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM

Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C. GATHERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHERAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENIAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSALIYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. N. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. M. BICHIU
Mr. T. PANAIT
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. S. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. R.H. TIMMERBAYEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN
Mr. V.L. GAI

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America: Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela: Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia: Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire: Ms. E. EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 177th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda, "Chemical weapons".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, the United States of America, Romania, Poland, Belgium and Indonesia.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, we are very pleased to see you, the representative of a great and friendly African country, assume the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament at this crucial juncture of its work. Your vast diplomatic experience and skill assure us that we shall achieve optimum results in our proceedings during the current month.

May I also express out deep appreciation to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who, during the closing stages of our spring session, brought into play his acknowledged competence and comprehension to ensure that the Committee made a meaningful contribution to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Datcu of Romania in our midst. He brings with him considerable experience in the field of security and disarmament, experience from which we shall all greatly benefit. At the same time, it is a sad duty to bid farewell to Ambassador Yu Peiwen of China and Ambassador Valdivieso of Peru who have both made important contributions to the work of this Committee.

The 1982 session of the Committee is resuming in the aftermath of the failure of the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament to achieve agreement on any of the important issues it considered. The irony, and indeed hypocrisy, involved in some of the blithe "conclusions" adopted at the end of the session will not pass unnoticed. It is important that in this Committee we do not participate in deluding ourselves about the gravity of the setback to the hopes and aspirations reposed by so many peoples and nations in the special session.

The special session did serve to focus public attention on the threat posed by the arms race. No one who witnessed the massive public rally in New York on 12 June can be in any doubt that disarmament is an aspiration which will, sooner rather than later, become irresistible. We sincerely hope that the World Disarmament Campaign, launched at the special session, will contribute to arousing universal public support for disarmament.

It is obvious that the failure of the special session must be placed in the perspective of the persistent deterioration in the international situation during the past four years. This was acknowledged in the conclusions approved by the special session. In this context, it is particularly relevant to remember the call by Mr. E. Rostow, the head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in his address to this Committee on 9 February this year, that "we move promptly and effectively to restore Article 2 (4)" -- i.e. the obligation not to use or threaten

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

to use force in international relations -- "as part of the living law of international politics". Today, in addition to the festering crises existing at that time, we are also confronted by the brutal Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the misery which this has brought to millions of innocent people. Thousands of Arabs and Palestinian men, women and children have been massacred and hundreds of thousands have been uprooted from their homes. The slaughter continues in full view of a world whose conscience appears to have been numbed by decades of Zionist propaganda and the sheer audacity of the aggression. As the President of Pakistan noted in a letter addressed to the Heads of State of the five permanent members of the Security Council, "the future of our civilization depends on whether we are capable of being stirred by such an appalling spectacle".

The obvious lesson of what has happened in the past few years to Lebanon, to Afghanistan and to Kampuchea, is that the lack of a credible capability for self-defence is a mortal sin for the small and weak nations of the world. Yet we must all recognize that, in the nuclear era, if the logic of security through military strength is espoused by the more than 150 nations, it will ultimately lead to disaster. Let us hope that sooner, rather than later -- and I quote the words of the distinguished representative of India -- "the illusion of political and military pre-eminence which is associated with the accumulation of armaments" will be discarded in favour of security through disarmament. The majority of non-aligned countries have demonstrated, most recently at the special session, their desire to ensure their security through a genuine and balanced process of disarmament. It is no accident that it is these States which are the most disturbed at the failure of the second special session.

The Pakistan delegation considers it particularly regrettable that the special session was unable to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This was to be the centrepiece of the session. Negotiations on the CPD broke down on the question of nuclear disarmament and, more specifically, over the issue of a nuclear test-ban treaty. It is no secret that during the negotiations the non-aligned countries demonstrated extraordinary flexibility which was, unfortunately, not matched by the positions of certain other groups. I say this not by way of recrimination but merely in order to set out the conditions in which negotiations on the CPD can be resumed. Before the Working Group begins consideration of the CPD, perhaps early next year, we must have an indication from certain major powers that they are prepared to respond positively to the numerous and reasonable compromise proposals submitted during the special session on the central elements of the CPD.

My delegation intends to participate energetically in the negotiations in the Ad hoc Working Group on a nuclear test ban. The experience of the special session and subsequent developments have, however, raised strong doubts in our mind about the prospects for this endeavour. The dissociation of one of the nuclear powers from the proceedings of this Working Group can hardly raise expectations that we are moving closer to a nuclear test ban. We also find it difficult to square the consensus for creation of this negotiating forum with the recent statement reportedly made on behalf of one of the major nuclear powers that "we're going to need testing, perhaps even testing above the 150 kiloton level, for a long time to come." Nor do we wish to see the exercise utilized for the purpose of clarifying bilateral verification problems arising in the context of international agreements to which we are not a party and about whose objectives we entertain serious doubts.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The Ad Hoc Working Group has been asked to define, through substantive examination, the issues relating to the verification of a test ban-treaty. In our view, the first issue relating to verification is the scope of the test ban. In other words, is it our intention to prohibit "all nuclear tests in all environments for all time" -- as stated in relevant General Assembly resolutions -- or do we seek a prohibition of only nuclear weapons testing? The verification requirements of either alternative will be substantially different. If we choose the latter alternative, as the trilateral negotiators apparently did, what arrangements are to be envisaged for "peaceful nuclear explosions" and their verification? We would also be interested to know what verification and compliance measures can be envisaged to arrest the continued qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons through laboratory tests or simulation techniques that have reportedly been developed by some of the nuclear-weapon States. Some other relevant issues are also enumerated in the list of questions addressed by the Group of 21 to the trilateral negotiators last year in document CD/181.

The reticence of some of the nuclear-weapon States regarding the nuclear test-ban treaty also implies a shift in their position regarding the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. If these weapons are to be progressively reduced and ultimately eliminated, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, they do not need to be tested "for a long time to come". If indeed we are correct in this evaluation, if indeed nuclear deterrence and the possession of nuclear arsenals is foreseen for the indefinite future, it will have profound consequences for the pursuit of disarmament. It is unreasonable to believe that for the foreseeable future, the non-nuclear-weapon States will agree to the existing and significant asymmetry in the distribution of world power denoted by the possession of nuclear weapons by five States. To discard the goal of nuclear disarmament will inevitably involve discarding the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and the two, taken together, will create a situation that is vastly more dangerous and unstable than even the nuclear precipice on which we stand today.

I would, therefore, urge those States which have so far persistently blocked the proposal to set up a working group on nuclear disarmament to reconsider their positions. My delegation believes that the elaboration of the process of nuclear disarmament as envisaged in the proposal of the Group of 21 in document CD/180 provides a reasonable basis for beginning the consideration of this subject. This exercise will not prejudice the positions of any of the nuclear-weapon States; it may, on the other hand, lead to the evolution of a meaningful consensus which could provide impetus for both multilateral and bilateral negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament.

Some States have emphasized the importance of the so-called START and INF negotiations being held currently in this city. We do not wish in any way to denigrate the importance of these negotiations. We must, however, express the legitimate hope that the objectives of the parties to these negotiations are indeed to bring about important reductions in their strategic and other nuclear arsenals, rather than mere posturing to play with public opinion which has manifested itself so categorically in recent months against the nuclear menace. This Committee also has a right to expect that it will be kept fully informed by the parties, individually or collectively, of the progress in these talks.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The consistent interest exhibited by my delegation in promoting effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons requires no reiteration. Yet we must admit that work on this item has reached an impasse. Before we adjourned for the special session, the Group of 21 issued a statement in document CD/280, which inter alia expressed the view "that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear-weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement." The Group of 21 therefore urged "the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session..." At the special session, there was no response at all to these concerns of the Group of 21 from two of the nuclear-weapon States concerned. My delegation of course noted the evolution in the French position at the special session. This is now almost identical with the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom and unfortunately suffers from the same shortcomings that arise from the unilateral declarations of those two countries on the subject.

At the special session, we also noted and welcomed the unilateral declaration made by President Brezhnev that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Apart from its other implications, this declaration also seems to connote a shift in the Soviet position regarding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation will study these implications most carefully and return to the subject at a later stage.

In the meantime, we consider that the non-first-use declaration made by the Soviet Union together with the similar declaration which was made by China more than a decade ago and reiterated at the special session offer an avenue to decrease the danger of a nuclear conflict. We have some difficulty in understanding the position of those who dismiss the Soviet non-first-use undertaking as being merely declaratory and unverifiable while they ask the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept at face value the unilateral declarations they themselves have made on the question of "negative security assurances". We can, of course, appreciate the difficulty encountered by some nuclear-weapon States which rely on nuclear deterrence to match the non-first-use undertaking at the present time. My delegation considers that the goal of an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons should be pursued in tandem with measures to eliminate the prevailing perceptions of imbalance in conventional weapons between the East and the West.

As in the case of "negative security assurances", it is obvious that the difficulties involved in the negotiations relating to the radiological weapons

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

convention are fundamental in nature. Unless the scope of the proposed radiological weapons convention is substantially broadened, it will be a meaningless instrument designed to prohibit a non-existent and unlikely weapon. Therefore, negotiations on the item should be left in abeyance at least until next year. Nevertheless, as we have stated on several occasions, the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities is a matter of immediate concern and worthy of independent treatment. My delegation reserves the right to raise the matter in an appropriate context.

The negotiations under way in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the guidance of Ambassador Sujka provide the most promising aspect of our current work. The contact groups established to examine various elements of the draft convention and to list all possible or compromise options could lead the Working Group to structure a comprehensive framework for the commencement of definitive negotiations on the text of the convention next year. This is an opportunity which we cannot afford to lose.

It would be only fitting if the Committee on Disarmament, in conjunction with the convening of the Second United Nations Conference on Outer Space, could take some meaningful steps to avert the danger of the arms race spreading to this environment. As a first step, this Committee could propose the universal endorsement of the concept of outer space constituting "the common heritage of mankind". Pakistan shares the view that the Committee should create a working group on this item with an appropriate mandate.

In the wake of the failure of the second special session, this Committee indeed constitutes the single and only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. Its responsibilities, like its functions, are singular and onerous. It is here that we must seek to build the framework for a process of real and comprehensive disarmament. It is here that the reaffirmation by all States of the Final Document of the first special session will be put to the test.

The Pakistan delegation will participate in any efforts that are deployed to improve the effectiveness of the work of this Committee. Yet, we should all be clear in our minds that the failure of this Committee to make any substantive progress in negotiations during the past four years has little or nothing to do with the shortcomings, if any, in its machinery. Our failure, like that of the second special session, is due to the lack of the one factor essential for any negotiation -- the political will to reach agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time I am taking the floor at this session, let me begin my remarks by congratulating you on your assumption of the Chair as we reconvene the Committee for its 1982 summer session. Your skills and wisdom are well known to my delegation, and your vast experience in disarmament and effectiveness as a Chairman assure us that our work will be productive and efficient. I would also like to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, to note with regret the departure of Ambassadors Yu Peiwen of China and Valdivieso of Peru, and to bid farewell to our departing colleague and friend, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who will be leaving us next week to take up his new post in Beijing. All of our good wishes go with him. Finally, Sir, I would be remiss indeed if I did not pay special tribute to the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, for his outstanding leadership of our Committee in the hectic final days of the spring session. His great wisdom and calm demeanour not only enabled us to complete our work here in Geneva but set a fine example for us as we took up our challenging responsibilities in New York.

A number of speakers have begun their remarks by commenting on the recently concluded second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. A number of assessments have been rendered. I would like to say from the outset that I do not count myself among those who seem to believe we limped back from a disaster with our tails between our legs. Certainly, no one can argue that the special session was a resounding success. Indeed, it failed to achieve even our minimal expectations in so far as those expectations were couched in terms of achieving dramatic advances on specific issues. But let us assess the results of the second special session in pragmatic terms. We should not be surprised or shocked by the result in the light of world events which have occurred during the brief four years since the first special session. In point of fact, was it credible to believe that we could repeat that success? Probably not. Nor, indeed, could we expect to resolve contentious issues which we have been unable to resolve in this smaller, more expert body. As our venerable colleague from Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, pointed out last week, "the necessary prerequisites to reach beyond the ... Final Document simply did not exist."

My delegation had hoped to join in an effort in New York to develop a realistic assessment of our efforts over the past four years and the impact of nations' behaviour upon the efforts for disarmament. However, even this was not to be. Our efforts were thwarted by those who wanted us to ignore their actions and sought to deflect us with simplistic propaganda proposals presented as the solution to all of the disarmament dilemmas which have plagued us for decades. But we do not live in a vacuum. Success eluded us in New York, not because of any failure of political will, but rather because the present deterioration in the state of international affairs

(Mr. Fields, United States)

has thoroughly corroded the confidence of nations in their security. It is a problem which will not be solved by rhetoric, but by a return to the principles of the United Nations Charter. In his appearance before the special session, President Reagan challenged us all with these words:

"I have come to this hall to call for international recommitment to the basic tenet of the United Nations Charter -- that all Members practice tolerance and live together in peace as good neighbors under the rule of law, forsaking armed force as a means of settling disputes between nations."

Article 2, paragraph 4, of that Charter is an obligation for every Member State, only when we take that obligation seriously will disarmament become possible. If we are committed to disarmament, we must accept President Reagan's challenge and "finally make the Charter live."

Yet, we were unable to agree on even a factual accounting of recent events, a similar fate befell our efforts to chart a realistic course for our future efforts by concluding a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Everyone seems to be willing to agree on measures which do not affect their own interest. But success in this effort can only come through the realization that disarmament is a shared responsibility.

What do these sobering events mean for the future work of our Committee? Some have pointed out that in the four years of its existence, the Committee on Disarmament has failed to produce a single treaty. This is attributed to various causes. But in the view of my delegation the real lesson of the second special session is that this negotiating body cannot confine itself to a narrow view of the world. If it does, it is certainly in danger of becoming irrelevant to its true objective. We must draw on the experience of the special session and return to the main purpose of this body -- to negotiate concrete measures of disarmament. And in this regard, the future organization of our work is extremely important.

A number of speakers have given their views on the priority items before this Committee. Let me briefly set forth my delegation's views.

We believe that negotiating meaningful measures of nuclear disarmament is the most urgent task before us. The United States is currently engaged, together with the Soviet Union, in talks designed to eliminate on both sides the most threatening intermediate-range nuclear forces, and to make deep and substantial cuts in the levels of our respective strategic nuclear arsenals. More than any other measure, the successful conclusion of these negotiations will represent meaningful progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons -- a goal which certainly we all seek. My Government continues to hold a comprehensive test ban as an ultimate objective, although we believe that the present time is not propitious for the negotiation of such a ban. We have come to this session prepared to participate actively in the Working Group on a nuclear test ban which will deal with the vital issues of verification and compliance. We believe this Working Group can make a useful contribution to the work of our Committee. I wish also to note our continued dedication to work in the Group of Scientific Experts which opened its session yesterday. We believe that the Group should continue to develop procedures for an international data exchange system to the maximum extent that modern technology will allow.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

A great deal of effort has been invested in, and progress made toward the conclusion of a treaty banning radiological weapons. In fact, this measure is nearer completion than any other before this body. At our last session, the able Chairman of the radiological weapons Working Group devised a method of work which seemed to my delegation to offer hope for the conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty. My delegation has been among those which have questioned the necessity of entering into negotiations on the protection of nuclear facilities -- and we have been critical of delegations which have blocked our progress on the conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty pending the resolution of the nuclear facilities issue.

The time has come to assess this situation with more realism. We believe that the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons is in our interest, and in the broader interest of mankind. At the same time, we fully understand the concern of those who have advocated negotiations on the further protection of nuclear facilities. We, therefore, have come to this session prepared to participate vigorously and constructively in discussions on this issue. We remain unconvinced of the linkage between radiological weapons and the nuclear facilities issue. But we are prepared to engage ourselves seriously on the merits of the issues, and will not stand in the way of any reasonable procedure which facilitates substantial progress.

At this session, some have advocated the establishment of a working group to deal with the issue of outer space. Many among these advocates confess limited knowledge of this complex and highly technical subject and see the working group as a means to educate us. My delegation supports an examination of the outer space issues by this Committee. Substantive discussions can serve to focus the issues and provide an informed basis for any future consideration. Only minimal discussion of the outer space issue has taken place in the Committee and we have not even heard preliminary views from some delegations.

My delegation remains unconvinced that the establishment of a working group would be the wisest course for us at this time. We would, however, strongly support a number of formal or informal plenary sessions being devoted to the subject of outer space. Only after a full airing of all delegations' views and a great deal of substantive preparation can we begin to focus our efforts.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been meeting since 20 July. My delegation has participated actively and energetically in the chemical weapons deliberations, and we will continue to do so. We place an extremely high priority on the achievement of a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons, as evidence continues to mount regarding the use of prohibited toxin weapons in South-East Asia and chemical warfare against freedom fighters in Afghanistan, it is imperative that major emphasis be placed on making progress in this field, especially in defining and agreeing upon the necessary measures of verification and compliance.

My Government listened with interest to the statement by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union at the second special session regarding verification of a chemical weapons convention, and we have carefully scrutinized the draft proposals which he laid before that body. We hope the Soviet Union will explain what lies behind some of the very general language which it has presented. Unfortunately,

(Mr. Fields, United States)

that has not as yet been done, we have been disappointed by the reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to engage in serious discussions, or to respond to substantive inquiries with respect to their proposals. I will speak at our Thursday meeting in more detail regarding chemical weapons and intend at that time to elaborate further on our views as to how rapid progress can be made toward the achievement of a convention.

I have not spoken about all the issues before the Committee, not because of any wilful neglect, or lack of interest, but rather for the sake of brevity, I shall, in future statements set forth my delegation's views on other issues and amplify my remarks today.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Romania, His Excellency Ambassador Datcu.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French): My statement today will be devoted to the subject of chemical weapons which, according to the programme of work we have adopted, is the topic for our discussions this week.

The work which has been done in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons since 20 July 1982 and the meetings held, with the participation of experts, on certain selected topics prompt some comments from my delegation on the present stage and the future prospects of our negotiations on this topic.

I should like first of all to stress the fact that our discussions have revealed a general desire to achieve results on the subject of this terrifying weapon of mass destruction which exists in the military arsenals of certain States.

In addition to the compilation of concrete suggestions in this connection contained in document CD/CW/WP.33 we now have the constructive proposal submitted by the Soviet Union (in document CD/294) for the Basic Provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Furthermore, other concrete proposals are constantly being put forward by various delegations, in the form of working papers or suggestions made in the course of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

We believe that at this stage of our negotiations, we should concentrate our efforts on reaching at least broad agreement on the basic provisions of the future convention.

Since, as the recent special session of the General Assembly indicated, a certain political will towards this end exists, since there is no lack of concrete proposals and since substantial preparatory work has already been done over recent years, we believe that the necessary conditions exist for bringing to the United Nations General Assembly real results in the matter of the elaboration of a convention outlawing chemical weapons.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

We ought therefore to give particular attention to the main areas of disagreement.

With your permission, I would like to dwell today on the question of the purpose of the future convention, one of the difficulties we are facing in our negotiations.

As you know, my delegation has always favoured the conclusion of a convention having a broad sphere of application and offering the best guarantees for the exclusion of chemical weapons from the arsenals of all States. It is this basic position which has guided us in studying the proposals for the inclusion of the non-use of chemical weapons and the concept of chemical warfare capability among the prohibitions which are to form the subject of the convention.

I do not wish to put forward any new arguments for or against these ideas, and in any case, I believe that the time for doing so is past. The delegations concerned have already done so. I would simply like to submit a few comments on them on behalf of my delegation.

The idea of prohibiting chemical warfare capability is obviously prompted by the desire to achieve a broad and effective prohibition -- a concern shared by my delegation, as indeed, I believe, by all of us. This idea nevertheless raises certain difficulties, both from the conceptual point of view and as regards its practical verification. We believe that thinking of it in terms of future application, after the convention has been in force for a certain time, might perhaps offer a solution.

As for the use of chemical weapons and their express prohibition in first Element of the future convention, we believe that the opposing views are too well known to need repeating here.

As we see it, however, two points have been emphasized by all delegations. The first is that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the convention we are now negotiating are two legal instruments linked by the very fact that they both deal with chemical weapons. The second is that any use of chemical weapons will clearly constitute a violation of the convention we are negotiating, which will prohibit the parties from developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring chemical weapons and at the same time require them to destroy stocks and dismantle facilities.

My delegation believes that these two points offer a basis for reaching a compromise between the contrary views expressed, so permitting us to move forward in our work.

One possible way of proceeding which we would like to put before the Committee for its consideration is the following:

(a) To complete the first Element of the convention without including a reference to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons;

(b) To include in the preamble to the convention a paragraph referring to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reaffirming the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, and to include in Element VII another reference to the Geneva Protocol stating that the convention should not be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States on the basis of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; and

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

(c) To introduce a new article into the convention recognizing that any use of chemical weapons constitutes a violation of the convention and that therefore the provisions concerning verification of the future convention will apply also to such situations.

As I said, this is a possible way of proceeding; if delegations could accept it, I think that it would provide a solution to a very important problem that is as yet unresolved.

My last comments concern technical matters, which are playing a larger and larger part in our work. The consultations with the participation of experts which took place last week on technical questions relating to the determination of the toxicity of certain chemical agents and verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons were useful in providing clarifications and precisions which will facilitate our work.

With regard to the application of the toxicity criterion to other harmful chemicals it seems to us that the consultations have shown fairly clearly that there are at present no adequate methods for determining incapacitating and other harmful effects. This being so, we believe that for the purposes of the future convention the best solution might be to draw up a purely illustrative list of some chemical agents falling within this category.

We have still not succeeded in formulating a satisfactory definition of the "precursors" of chemical agents. In view of the difficulties of applying the toxicity criterion in this case, we believe that here again, the drawing up of a list of the "principal precursors" is a solution to be considered.

Obviously, the technical problems relating to monitoring of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons are extremely complex. As the consultations with the participation of experts made clear, we are only at the beginning of this process. As negotiations in the Working Group proceed, with the help of the experts, further efforts with a view to elaborating the technical methods needed in this area are proving to be necessary.

Those are the observations my delegation wished to make at this stage of our negotiations on chemical weapons, and the suggestions we wanted to put before the Committee. I would like to assure you again, Mr. Chairman, as also your colleague, Ambassador Sujka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that as in the past the Romanian delegation will spare no effort to contribute to the progress of our work.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Polish delegation I welcome you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament. I am fully convinced that under your able and skilful guidance this Committee will use all the opportunities offered to make a step forward in the fulfilment of its responsible tasks which the whole international community is closely following. I should like to assure you on behalf of my delegation you can count on our full co-operation and assistance in your responsible task.

For your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Yoshio Okawa of Japan, I have always had very sincere respect -- and I am happy to repeat it at this moment again -- for his valuable contribution to the work done by the Committee at its spring session.

It is also my great pleasure to welcome among us the representative of a brotherly socialist country and my immediate neighbour at this table, Ambassador Datcu of Romania.

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, this week is to be devoted to the subject of chemical weapons, my intervention today will be concentrated mainly on this particular agenda item.

My delegation has followed with great interest all the interventions in plenary meetings of this Committee devoted to chemical weapons. With the same undiminished attention we shall follow interventions which are going to be pronounced on the said agenda item. It is encouraging to note that all delegations which took the floor before me declared their readiness to recognize the priority character and primary significance of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I would like to express my conviction that these very favourable declarations will be followed by concrete contributions to the elaboration of compromise formulations in the quite many controversial issues which the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has on its negotiating table. The Committee on Disarmament being at present the only forum for negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, it has an exceptional role to play if both members and non-members alike have the will to reach an agreement on a complete elimination of this weapon of mass destruction as early as expected by the international community and as early as necessary in order to remove this weapon from military arsenals and from scientific laboratories.

The question of the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons is clearly stated in the Group's mandate the pertinent portion of which I should like to quote once more: "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc Working Group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date ...". Numerous resolutions of consecutive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly are equally clear in their letter and spirit in this respect. A strong note on the earliest possible elaboration of a convention resounded during the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. If we take into account the above on the one hand and the growing danger of a chemical arms race, also a qualitative one, on the other, we must realize that we find ourselves at a crossroads from which one way leads to an accelerated chemical arms race. We do not want to follow it. But there is another way, the way of peaceful, quite negotiations on the cessation of the arms race in chemical weapons and the

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destruction of their stockpiles and means of their production. This is the way we want to follow. I am persuaded that the Soviet proposal entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" shows such a way. It is, therefore, only natural that the Soviet "Basic provisions" have been universally recognized as a considerable impulse to the acceleration of serious negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In our considered view, the Soviet document covers all existing proposals and, at the same time, goes further to make very many new ones; it also dispels doubts that have been heard, inter alia, in this Committee. In other words, we have at present great possibilities for gaining momentum in the negotiations and, responding to the appeals for the elaboration of a convention, we ought to use this opportunity to have its draft elaborated.

It is exactly to this end that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its regular meetings on 20 July and continues its work with quite an intensive pace.

As this year's Chairman of the said Working Group, I wish to emphasize, first of all, the excellent atmosphere which is maintained by all delegations participating in the work on a convention at the present stage. I am glad to inform this Committee that in the more than 10 meetings which the Chemical Weapons Group has held between 20 July and today, we have been able to discuss in considerable detail, on both a formal and an informal basis, practically all questions and issues on the future convention. Very many more consultations were held by six informal contact groups which are continuing their efforts to elaborate specific compromise provisions. In addition to the above, consultations of the delegations with the participation of experts, on certain technical issues related to a chemical weapons convention were held over the last full working week. To complete the description of the Group's activities, let me inform the Committee that the six informal groups I have just mentioned are doing their homework in the following spheres of the future convention:

The question of the inclusion or not of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons;

Definitions of numerous technical terms to be used in the convention;

General provisions on verification;

Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production;

Declarations of possession of stocks of chemical weapons and means of their production; plans for their destruction or diversion for permitted purposes and time-frames as well as forms for making such declarations;

Other remaining issues, inter alia, the convention's preamble, its relationship with other treaties, international co-operation in the implementation of the convention and its entry into force, as well as many other legal aspects.

The open-minded informal discussions on the complex problem of verification machinery for a future convention have revealed that the Working Group would favour the elaboration of one article containing general provisions on verification

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

to be followed by several others providing all necessary details on the procedures, provisions on national and international verification measures, national technical means, establishment of a consultative body, etc. Equally frank and useful discussions have been and still are being conducted on the question of the inclusion or not of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. This controversial problem of great juridical and political significance still, as is well known, divides the members of the Committee. However, some optimistic signs can be found here and there in the statements by some delegations of their willingness to consider several possible solutions which are under discussion. We have just heard in the statement of the Romanian Ambassador about these possible solutions.

Having gone through the preparatory work at the end of July, the Working Group is now entering a most intensive as well as most important phase of its work this session. Having the possibility of holding three meetings a week, I hope that, through the collective effort of the whole Group, it will be able to report to the Committee at the end of this session considerable progress achieved in all spheres of the future convention. Therefore, while thanking all delegations for their warm words of encouragement and assistance, I appeal for their forbearance and understanding in giving their staff members the necessary time for active participation in the discussions of numerous -- as we call them -- informal homework groups. At the same time, I encourage the leaders of the delegations to take direct and personal interest in the Group's proceedings. In practical terms, this is how I understand the priority nature of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, quite rightly emphasized by very many delegations. Responding to that, in a sense, I for my part would like to point out that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons provides an adequate and necessary framework for all the delegations, facilitating the transformation of their declarations in this respect into deeds.

Some delegations have already considered it just and right to jump to conclusions and have made pessimistic prophesies about our present efforts. This is premature, to say the least. I am all for intensive work which could lead us to reaching our target. I do realize that we shall not be able to elaborate a uniform draft text of a convention during this session. But certainly, possible texts for very many elements seem to be a realistic target for this session. And all of us should do all we can for the Group to reach this target. Personally, I am persuaded that working to reach a determined target is a stimulating factor in our endeavours.

Let me now make a few observations on the most urgent and important issues considered in this Committee: nuclear disarmament and a complete ban on nuclear tests. How many words, how many speeches have already been pronounced to denounce the nuclear arms race and to protest against this most brutal dilemma of the present generation. Again and again we repeat these words also in this chamber. Yet neither the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, nor the countless resolutions of that body and of many other organizations and conferences, including this Committee, have yielded any specific, promising results. Yet it is our duty to continue to denounce the gravity of the situation caused by the arms race and particularly the nuclear arms race. With ever-renewed efforts we must continue to seek possible, negotiated solutions to stop this race. We do have enough bold, imaginative proposals for negotiations, enough bold and imaginative examples to follow. I would like to mention at this

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

moment only one: the Soviet initiative of historic, political significance -- a unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This initiative of our Soviet ally -- the most important initiative announced from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament -- has been generally and universally accepted by the international community as a further step towards a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons. It cannot but be disquieting and disturbing, therefore, to read the contents of an article by prominent West German authors on the question of the use of nuclear weapons. The publication, at the time of the second special session, of such an article advising "... the first use of nuclear weapons by the Western Alliance ...", even if the authors call this use "defensive" and, furthermore, expressing the opinion that "... a credible renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons would, once again, make war more probable ..." must be seen as something more than a political credo; it must be considered as a confession of the political aims and aspirations of some of the prominent members of the "Western Alliance". The fact that the text of this article was distributed to delegations of the Committee on Disarmament after the Soviet undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, after the second special session and just before the opening of this Committee's session, clearly shows who wants, if I may be permitted to quote the same West German authors again, "... to make war probable ...". I should add that the article referred to above contains polemics with American authors who discuss the possibility of the assumption of such an obligation by the United States.

While I have the floor I would also like to touch upon one more question which in the short history of this Committee has been giving rise to many lively discussions: the efficiency of the Committee on Disarmament. I do not want, at this moment, to recall and repeat the many ideas that have already been expressed in numerous documents including the ones reflecting the views of the Polish delegation. In fact, I wish to touch upon only one specific aspect of this urgent problem: how to make more efficient the present structures which are at our disposal in accordance with the Committee's rules of procedure?

The subsidiary bodies which have already been or will in the future be set up by the Committee should, indeed, become the forums of real negotiation processes. But, as experience shows, they are still not. In this connection, I would suggest the holding of several well-prepared plenary or informal meetings of the Committee devoted exclusively to the elaboration of adequate and clear recommendations on the work of its subsidiary bodies. Such recommendations should definitely take into account the present state of the negotiation process in each particular Group. The groups, for their part, should have the possibility of reporting to the Committee on the state of their work more often than they have done up to now, and of putting before the Committee their difficult, sometimes maybe even very narrow questions in order to obtain perhaps some advice and/or guidelines from the plenary Committee. Furthermore, it would be advisable, particularly in the intensive negotiation process, for the subsidiary bodies not to consider their formal meetings as the only way of working. It seems, indeed, that they should look for all possible ways of reaching agreement through informal consultations, particularly consultations by those delegations which have different views on a given specific matter. In other words, it would be worthwhile to think about how to ensure the indispensable flexibility of methods and forms of action of the subsidiary bodies. In my view, this would constitute one of the possible levers permitting an intensification of work and thus increasing the efficiency of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium, His Excellency Ambassador Onkelinx.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I do not think it would be very useful in this Committee and at this stage of our work, to make a statement which would seek to establish responsibilities and to draw general lessons from the situation which prevailed at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Nevertheless, I think that the possibilities offered by multilateral negotiations on disarmament matters are now clearer, as compared with the multilateral deliberative approach which, it must be recognized, has produced virtually no concrete results apart from the hardly won and, in a sense, fragile achievement of 1978. Since the resumption of our session we have heard many statements, some of them polemical and at times aggressive in tone. We do not think that the latter constitute useful contributions to our work. It is more imperative than ever that each of us, far from engaging in polemics, should ask himself what is the best way of advancing our discussions, particularly on the priority items on our agenda.

For it is of the utmost urgency that the Committee on Disarmament should demonstrate its capacity to negotiate and to produce concrete results.

Negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons -- the item recommended for our discussions in plenary this week -- constitute, for the immediate future, the most appropriate way of making such a demonstration, for the following reasons:

The problem is a vital one, affecting the security of all;

The Committee is unanimous in its will to draft such a convention, and we have just heard Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Working Group, give us his views and tell us of the good atmosphere which is at present prevailing in his Group;

The various parameters for such negotiations have now been clearly defined; and

New proposals have been made, particularly by the USSR, which deserve careful study.

My country attaches great importance to the speedy conclusion of these negotiations, and we hope that the Committee will be able to make the necessary procedural arrangements for devoting all the time necessary to this work, if need be going beyond the closing date of this session.

Several important conceptual problems remain to be settled. One of them, to which I would like to limit my statement today, concerns whether or not the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons should be included in the scope of the convention. It was to this same subject that Ambassador Dacu devoted a large part of his statement, and I listened to him with interest. He knew the arguments relating to the two theses, and I shall not repeat them.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The Working Group has certainly made progress in its attempt to find alternative formulas to these two approaches. In conducting this exercise we have been able to see the close link that exists between the scope of the convention we are elaborating, the prohibitions set forth in the Geneva Protocol, and verification of compliance with the prohibition of use.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol was the basis of a lengthy undertaking aimed at the complete prohibition of all chemical and bacteriological weapons. In the provisions of the Protocol itself, the prohibition of use was intended to cover all chemical and bacteriological weapons. A problem would be created if a new regime relating to use were introduced solely for chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons being left aside. In this connection it is noteworthy that the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons carefully avoided saying anything about the prohibition of use, merely recalling, in its preamble, the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. Furthermore, a certain symmetry has been observed so far in the elaboration of measures aimed at the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Thus, after a period of joint negotiation on the two questions, the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons prescribed, in its article IX, the continuation of the negotiations only on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction. There is no reference in the article to the prohibition of their use. We have to bear this symmetry in mind if we wish to organize the regime of prohibition emerging from the Geneva Protocol in the broadest manner possible.

Verification of compliance with the prohibition of use also raises a number of questions. We think that the development of such a mechanism, both for bacteriological and for chemical weapons, would meet a requirement felt by the international community, since its absence has been the cause of many disputes and of much friction between States over the past decades. The modalities of such verification must be specific to the matter prohibited. Thus the provisions in this respect must be different from those relating to verification of the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling, as well as those relating to destruction. It is also becoming apparent that, in view of the interrelationship between the subjects and the symmetry between the regimes for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, this type of verification should be aimed at ensuring compliance with the prohibition of the use of both categories of weapons at the same time.

The link between scope and verification in the context of a single instrument is also something to be thought about. For it would be difficult to include in a convention on chemical weapons a system of verification which would apply to prohibitions not explicitly mentioned in the convention.

These are the main considerations which underlie the initiative taken by Belgium at the special session when it submitted a memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We are now submitting this text to the Committee in document CD/301/CD/CW/WP.39, in the hope that this initiative will help us in our joint effort to find a solution to the problem of the use of chemical weapons.

I shall refrain from describing the contents of the document. I should simply like to emphasize its basic objectives.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The first objective is to make good the gaps in the 1925 Protocol by proposing a verification mechanism which would apply to all situations of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in combat. We would at the same time also settle the debate on the scope of the Protocol by providing that the prohibition relating to use covers all chemical and bacteriological weapons, not only in time of war but more generally in combat.

The second objective is to resolve the problem posed by the question of use with respect to the convention on chemical weapons.

And lastly, the third objective is to provide for a flexible mechanism which could be agreed on quickly and enter into force even before the convention on chemical weapons. The composition of the proposed advisory committee (at the present stage all the States parties to the 1925 Protocol and to the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons) and the conditions for entry into force (a very small number of ratifications, we believe) as we envisage them, are such as to permit the system very quickly to begin functioning.

The mechanism we have in mind could take the form of an instrument sui generis, whose links with existing instruments -- the 1925 Protocol and the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons -- as well as with the ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons, could be clearly and easily described.

I have expressed the hope that this initiative will in particular, help us in our joint efforts in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We hope in this way to stimulate the search for an option which may be able to satisfy the supporters of the two opposing theses and which may also prove useful at the level of international law.

My delegation will, of course, be ready to provide, particularly in the Working Group, any clarifications which may be desired with regard to this document.

I have deliberately chosen to confine this statement to one particular item on the Committee's agenda out of a desire to help advance our work. The Committee's effectiveness would gain much if all delegations were to refrain, in future, from reaffirming political positions known to everyone, from making accusations, and from resorting to charges of ill faith.

Our work must not at any time be transformed into a mere forum for impressing the outside world. The international community would probably be more convinced of the role of the Committee on Disarmament if the Committee were to give it more often some evidence of the real efforts which we are all willing to make to try to reach concrete agreements.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Sutresna.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, I would like at the outset to extend the congratulations of my delegation to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of August. We are confident that your wise counsel and vast diplomatic experience will contribute to the furtherance of the Committee's

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

work. It is of particular pleasure for me personally as head of the Indonesian delegation to welcome to the Chair of our Committee, you, Sir, the representative of Kenya, a country with which Indonesia has entered recently into a new stage in its bilateral relations, heralding a more concrete and mutually beneficial co-operation between our two countries.

I also wish to express the appreciation and gratitude of the Indonesian delegation to your predecessor, His Excellency Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for his commendable chairmanship of the Committee during the preceding period. The skill, perseverance and dedication that he exhibited, particularly at the time just prior to the conclusion of the Committee's work in the spring session in the view of my delegation greatly contributed to the reaching of the stage in which our Committee finds itself today.

To His Excellency Ambassador Dăscu of Romania, I wish to join previous speakers in offering a welcome to the Committee. My delegation looks forward to continuing co-operation with his delegation.

Our present session was, exactly one month ago today, preceded by the unfruitful conclusion of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Distinguished representatives who have spoken before me have addressed themselves to this most regrettable episode in the multilateral disarmament process. The inability of the second special session to produce meaningful results has compelled us, each and every member of the Committee on Disarmament, to engage in deep reflections and assess the present state of affairs regarding our joint disarmament efforts. We believe it is incumbent upon all the members of this Committee to develop new approaches as well as to find ways and means with a view to ensuring a more effective functioning of the Committee on Disarmament, lest we fail in our duty and responsibility. Much has been said on how and why the special session did not accomplish the task that was set before it, both at the end of that session and in the plenary meetings of our Committee. My delegation gave its own assessment of the matter at the conclusion of the special session. I need hardly emphasize that the most serious obstacle to the success of the second special session was, among other things, the increasing suspicion and distrust prevailing in the relations between the major powers, and in particular between the superpowers. The special session turned out to be another arena for furthering their antagonism towards each other in this regard, which frustrated the legitimate demand of the international community for the establishment of world peace and security through real disarmament measures. My delegation submits, with all sincerity and humility, that in order to prevent such a situation from recurring, it is necessary for those States to show by real and concrete deeds their commitment to existing obligations and agreements. Otherwise, if such a situation constitutes a trend and permeates all other international forums including this sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, then I am afraid that the raison d'être and the viability of this body will be put to a serious test.

It is the Indonesian delegation's considered view, however, that the second special session should not be judged only by its failure and shortcomings. We should look at the meagre results achieved there in their proper perspective, that is, with the knowledge that the road to reach our ultimate goal of a general and complete disarmament is indeed very complex and arduous, and requires constant and imaginative thinking and rethinking on our part in our endeavours to give expression to our reaffirmation of the Final Document.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

This is where the importance of this session of the Committee on Disarmament lies. We are entering a stage where new efforts should be made with more vigour, while at the same time far-sightedness coupled with objectivity should be our guide. Our summer session will be a relatively short one. It is imperative, therefore, that the Committee should work with a deep sense of urgency and priority.

Progress should not be unduly hindered or jeopardized by the misuse of the notion of consensus on procedural questions. The Indonesian delegation is of the view that the Committee should immediately start its real work on the highest priority item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", by setting up a working group. We strongly believe that nuclear disarmament is not the concern solely of those who own nuclear weapons and arsenals, but is indeed the major concern of mankind as a whole. This has been amply demonstrated by the increasingly manifest world opinion shared by growing numbers of people in many parts of the world. It is certainly incorrect to believe that the fate of mankind should be subjected to the political expediencies of certain powers. The working group, when it is established, will have a useful document contained in CD/116 dated 9 July 1980 proposed by the Group of 21, on the basis of which it could start its work. In this connection, the Indian proposal on the prevention of nuclear war, in the opinion of my delegation, is indeed of the utmost importance inasmuch as its thrust has a direct bearing on our common survival. This subject could well be taken up as a priority item in the proposed working group. We feel that it is already time to abandon the practice of dealing with item 2 of our agenda through informal meetings. Experience has shown us that this procedure is inadequate and leads us nowhere.

Another important item that the Committee should focus on during the summer session is that of chemical weapons. The work done by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the two weeks before the start of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament under the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland deserves our appreciation. Through informal working arrangements and by dealing with each of the elements of the package under discussion in different small groups, assisted by the positive atmosphere prevailing in the discussions, the Working Group has made some progress that could lead the Group to proceed further towards the objective of drawing up a draft convention on chemical weapons. It is certainly our common duty and responsibility to ensure that during this summer session the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be able to make further headway so that it may live up to our expectations. And one way of doing this is by encouraging small groups and informal consultations which have proved to be useful during the pre-session consultations as I indicated earlier.

One of the important results of our spring session is the establishment of the Working Group on a nuclear test ban. Needless to say my delegation, for one, is anxious to see the Working Group commence its substantive work as soon as possible. We all have to make serious efforts to overcome the difficulties that seem to stand in the way. The findings which have been made so far by the seismic experts Group should, in the view of my delegation, contribute to the solution of the problems in the matter of verification. But the most important thing is how to translate these technical findings into a political consensus. In this connection it might be useful to recall the statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that "all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve agreement" (CD/86).

(Mr. Sutrasna, Indonesia)

Another important item with which our Committee should deal during the summer session is that of the prevention of the arms race in outer space. Indonesia has been and will remain committed to the established legal principles concerning the peaceful uses of outer space. Indonesia is an active member of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The "creeping" use of outer space for non-peaceful purposes by certain space powers, despite the existence of appropriate international legal instruments against such activities, has raised serious concern on our part, as well as, I believe, on the part of the majority of the community of nations. My delegation is of the view that the Committee should agree on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on outer space. In order to facilitate its work on this item, the Committee may consider the possibilities of co-operation and co-ordination with the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Our Committee might also deem it appropriate to take advantage of and to benefit from the Second United Nations Conference on Outer Space (UNISPACE II) now taking place in Vienna.

I have just highlighted certain important issues on which the Committee, we believe, should focus during the summer session. The fact that I have not made any mention of other important issues should not be construed as implying that there is a decline of interest in them on our part.

The failure of the second special session to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament does not in any way change our conviction that the CPD should also be given equal priority in the work of our Committee. My delegation holds the view that after we have all given to it the seemingly needed time for deep reflection, with the imagination of all members of the Committee, it should be possible to arrive at agreement that the CPD should not in any way undermine the Final Document but, on the contrary, should clearly reflect it and advance therefrom. For practical purposes, however, I consider it appropriate for the Committee to have decided that the recently re-established Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles, will not resume its formal substantive work until early next year. In this connection I wish to submit that we agree with the understanding that has been reached that the distinguished Working Group Chairman may utilize to the maximum the present summer session for informal consultations for the purpose of finding ways and means to ensure the more effective functioning of the Working Group when it takes up substantive issues early next year. On other remaining important issues, e.g. negative security assurances and radiological weapons, we also share the view expressed in this Committee that these matters might be more effectively dealt with after further reflection.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to submit that it is of overriding importance that we, each and every one of us, in embarking on our work during this summer session, should demonstrate with real deeds the assertion to the effect that we were not discouraged by the disappointing results of the second special session. Let us all try more seriously to recapture and re-enliven the momentum of the pursuit of peace and security through multilateral disarmament negotiations. For as you rightly pointed out in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament, precisely because of what has not been achieved at the second special session, is now confronted with a challenge that we individually and collectively should meet.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 12 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria

Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN

Ms. N. NASCIBENE

Australia:

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. TELLALOV

Mr. SOTIROV

Mr. DEYANOV

Mr. MIKHAYLOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. J. GAUDREAU

Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mr. YU MENGJIA

Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG

Mr. SUO KAIMING

Mr. YU ZHONGZHON

Cuba:

Mr. SOLA VILA

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIML

Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. d'ABOVILLE
Ms. L. GHAZERIAN

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. G. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. HIDAYAT K.

Iran:

Mr. J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. M. BICHIR
Mr. T. PANAIT
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. R.M. TIMMERBAYEV
Mr. S. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN
Mr. V.L. GAI

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee continues today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Burma, the United Kingdom and India.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, at the plenary session on Tuesday I emphasized the importance my Government attaches to the subject of chemical weapons. On 8 February of this year President Reagan stated that "the ultimate goal of US policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons". Today I wish to comment on the current status of our efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a chemical weapons ban and also to give the views of my delegation as to what is required if progress is to be made. I will also outline the general points which we believe should form the basis of a chemical weapons convention.

Our meeting today is one of the two plenary meetings dealing with a chemical weapons ban. Since the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has already been in session for more than three weeks, it provides a good opportunity to take stock of the Committee's efforts to elaborate a chemical weapons convention. And, since a significant amount of time remains this summer for further work, we have the opportunity to check our progress and make mid-course corrections, if necessary.

Although my delegation is disappointed at the over-all pace and organization of our work, the chemical weapons Working Group is entering upon a more intensive and productive phase. The decision to resume discussions on chemical weapons two weeks before the Committee itself reconvened was clearly a wise one. It enabled the members of the Working Group to devote more time and energy to the subject than is possible once the regular session begins. A certain momentum was achieved under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka during those two weeks, which my delegation hopes will continue through the entire session.

For the first time, the Working Group has acted to deal with some of the key problems which must be resolved if a convention is to become a reality. The creation of so-called "homework groups" to discuss specific problems and to identify possible approaches to overcoming them is a step in the right direction. Also, for the first time the consultations with technical experts have tackled some of the major technical issues related to verification. I had the pleasure of attending one of their sessions on verification and destruction and found the interest high and the proceedings business-like.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

A number of delegations have made important and interesting proposals regarding a chemical weapons ban in the Committee this year. Last spring, the delegations of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany presented detailed working papers on the subject of verification (CD/244 and CD/265). The Soviet document containing "basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention (CD/294) is potentially useful in our discussions.

These are the positive elements. However, much remains to be done, and my delegation is not entirely satisfied with the Committee's work on chemical weapons so far this summer.

My delegation came prepared to do serious business. This has been difficult because a number of delegations, including several particularly influential ones, apparently wish to avoid dealing with the key obstacles to the elaboration of a convention. Although most delegations are pressing to come to grips with the fundamental verification and compliance issues, a few still try to divert attention to less important questions. Unless this difficulty can be overcome and the Committee can proceed to deal with the key verification and compliance issues in a concrete, task-by-task manner, as I proposed here last March, we will not get very far.

Serious business has also been frustrated because the position of the Soviet delegation on verification and compliance issues remains unclear. We have heard that their delegation has new flexibility regarding on-site inspection provisions, an area crucial to real progress in this Working Group. We have been looking forward to receiving a clear explanation of how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in meeting the verification concerns expressed by my delegation and many others. We were disappointed that such elaboration of the Soviet position was not presented when working paper CD/294 was tabled. But we are hopeful that such explanations will be forthcoming soon, so that the Committee can take them into consideration in its work this summer. For our part, we are ready to deal seriously with any and all constructive proposals regarding verification, whether from the Soviet delegation or any other.

Finally, our work has been hampered because of the complexity of the Committee's agenda. For many delegates, the subject of chemical weapons is only one of many issues with which they must deal. We can understand and sympathize with these delegations but we must utilize the time available for work on chemical weapons in the most efficient manner. We are prepared to explore new procedures which will allow the work on a chemical weapons ban to proceed as rapidly as possible.

As a specific suggestion, my delegation believes that more effective use should be made of technical experts. For example, the most recent series of technical consultations has demonstrated that attempting to compress the consultations into one week is ineffectual. Since most experts are in Geneva for at least two weeks, consideration should be given to scheduling adequate time for in-depth discussion of issues directly relevant to the efforts of the Working Group. We should expect concrete results from these discussions.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

This morning, as I have done on other occasions, I want to emphasize the serious attitude of the United States toward achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. I have in the past stressed the importance which is attached to such a ban at the highest levels of our Government.

We are active in all aspects of the Working Group's efforts. We have augmented our delegation. We have brought a number of specialists to Geneva for the consultations with technical experts. And we have made and will continue to make creative proposals for dealing with the important verification questions. But in this day and age of inflated rhetoric some scepticism apparently remains about our true intentions. Our goal should be clear to all. It is the goal established by President Reagan -- to achieve a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons.

Let me outline now some general points which we believe should serve as a basis for an effective agreement.

The scope of any future agreement should prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of chemicals, munitions and equipment for chemical weapons purposes. Certain other activities and capabilities which contribute to an offensive chemical weapons capability should be prohibited. In addition, the agreement should ban any assistance or encouragement to others to obtain or produce chemicals or munitions for chemical weapons purposes.

In our view, the agreement should cover super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, and other harmful chemicals, and precursors of such chemicals. We do not believe it necessary to include herbicides or riot control agents.

A general purpose criterion should be incorporated in the agreement, along with specific toxicity criteria to supplement such a criterion.

One of the key disputes in the Working Group is whether or not to include a ban on the use of chemical weapons. The United States supports in principle the banning of any use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. At the same time we believe that care must be taken to avoid undermining the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Therefore, we believe consideration should be given to including in a convention a reaffirmation of the Protocol and of supplementary undertakings. Furthermore, we believe that the verification and compliance provisions should allow for a fact-finding inquiry into alleged uses of chemical weapons.

Let me turn now to issues relating to the declaration and elimination of stockpiles and facilities. The declaration of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production and filling facilities should provide base-lines for monitoring purposes. Thus, any agreement should mandate prompt, detailed declaration of any chemicals, munitions and specially designed equipment in chemical weapons stockpiles. The agreement should also mandate prompt and

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

detailed declaration of any facilities designed or used for the production of any chemical which is primarily used for chemical weapons purposes or for filling chemical munitions. Such facilities should be declared even if they are or were dual-purpose facilities designed or used in part for other purposes, such as civilian production. Declarations of stockpiles should include the chemical name and quantity of agent, munitions, equipment possessed, and the exact stockpile location. Declaration of production and filling facilities should include the nature of each facility, its capacity and exact location.

In this area the agreement should also provide for confirming declarations of stocks and facilities, for immediate and verifiable closure of facilities, and a ban on construction of any new facilities. Declared stockpiles and facilities should be destroyed over a ten-year period according to an agreed schedule and agreed procedures.

The agreement should also provide for agreed controls under which the declared chemicals with legitimate peaceful applications could be used for such purposes.

As the Committee is already well aware, my Government places particular emphasis on effective verification provisions. To be acceptable to the United States, the verification provisions of a chemical weapons convention must provide confidence that other parties are complying with all provisions of the convention. For the foreseeable future such confidence cannot be obtained by national technical means alone. In some situations, mandatory, extensive and carefully-specified on-site inspection will be needed. A chemical weapons convention will therefore require a verification system based on a combination of national and international measures. Included in international measures must be provisions for systematic international on-site inspection.

In particular we believe that there should be agreement in advance in the convention that the following activities, as a minimum, shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification:

Destruction of declared stockpiles, on a continuous basis until destruction is completed;

Disposition of declared production and filling facilities, under agreed procedures, until the facilities have been destroyed;

Permitted small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes, under agreed procedures, for as long as a facility is maintained for that purpose.

Furthermore, the agreement should provide for the creation of a consultative committee of parties with verification responsibilities.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

Agreed procedures should be included for a fact-finding investigation under the auspices of the treaty parties in the event that suspicious activities were reported. A more practical arrangement than a meeting of the full consultative committee should be provided for initiating and carrying out such an inquiry.

We believe that the complaints procedure should incorporate the obligation to co-operate in resolving compliance issues expeditiously. This should include an appropriate right of on-site inspection at subject sites. A means for redress if the issue is not satisfactorily resolved should also be provided.

The agreement should include constraints specifically designed to reduce monitoring difficulties, and should contain effective confidence-building measures. Further, there should be provisions for exchange of information on the production and use of specific commercial chemicals, including precursors, which might be diverted to chemical weapons purposes.

Finally, and this is a particularly important point, there should be effective provisions for dealing with the possibility of undeclared stockpiles and facilities.

At our spring session, I noted with sorrow that the Committee's efforts to ban chemical weapons were taking place under the long and dark shadow of the use of chemical weapons in current conflicts. I wish I could today report that this heinous practice had ceased. Unfortunately this is not the case. The use of prohibited toxin weapons and lethal chemical agents in south-east Asia and chemical warfare in Afghanistan continue. As President Reagan said when he addressed the second special session:

"The Soviet Union and their allies are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. There is conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has provided toxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea, and are themselves using chemical weapons against freedom fighters in Afghanistan. We have repeatedly protested to the Soviet Government, as well as the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, their use of chemical and toxin weapons. We call upon them now to grant full and free access to their countries or to territories they control so that United Nations experts can conduct an effective, independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors".

There is an important lesson for the Committee to be drawn from this dreadful experience. Any new agreement must have effective provisions for ensuring compliance. The existing chemical weapons and biological weapons conventions do not have adequate verification and compliance provisions. They are being violated. We must not succumb to any temptation to conclude a convention which does not ban these weapons completely, effectively, and verifiably. We simply must never make that mistake again.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to congratulate you on your assumption of the responsible post of Chairman of the Committee. Under your able guidance a large number of the organizational questions have been expeditiously solved. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for the useful work done during the concluding days of the Committee's spring session. It is a pleasure to welcome among us Ambassador Dacu, the representative of Romania, a country which is a good neighbour and ally of Bulgaria.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, and with the understanding of my colleagues, I would like, before addressing the question of chemical weapons, to touch briefly upon some other issues on the agenda, since I have not had the opportunity to take part in the two meetings set for general discussion.

The summer session of the Committee on Disarmament is being held at a time that is crucial for the future of international relations. Actions have been undertaken which have caused a deterioration in the international situation and created an atmosphere of confrontation and militarism in international life. Suffice it to mention the decisions adopted by the NATO summit meeting held on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly, the series of belligerent statements made by high-ranking opponents to détente, as well as the declared intention of a leading Western State of provoking subversive actions in the socialist countries. The attempts to disrupt normal economic and trade relations between States have been continued. The implementation of the programmes for the production and deployment of new, highly destabilizing "first strike" nuclear weapons, which form the basis of the doctrine of "limited nuclear war", have been confirmed and further developed. The international community is deeply worried also by the flagrant acts of aggression and genocide on the part of Israel against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples.

An important event, most closely related to the tasks assigned to the Committee on Disarmament, was the second special session on disarmament, which continues to be the object of various assessments by the world public and by governments. I do not intend now to analyse the reasons that prevented the special session from concluding with the results which all peoples in the world had rightly expected from it. It is most regrettable that the leading States of NATO, aiming at military superiority and global domination, once again blocked the reaching of agreement, which could have contributed to the solution of the most urgent problems of disarmament, and particularly those of nuclear disarmament.

The question of the prevention of nuclear war was the central problem at the special session and remains vital for the whole of mankind. Numerous initiatives and proposals designed to solve it effectively were submitted to the special session by socialist, non-aligned and neutral countries. My own country also presented, on behalf of the socialist countries, a working paper on that subject.

The solemn unilateral undertaking by the Soviet Government contained in President Brezhnev's message to the special session offers a viable way for averting nuclear war. If all nuclear-weapon States undertake a similar obligation, this would in practice become equivalent to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Apart from eliminating the risk of nuclear war, such a measure would substantially contribute to building confidence among States.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

It is highly regrettable that the opportunities offered at the second special session to open the way to resolving the complex of questions related to nuclear disarmament have once again been let pass by. The problems, however, remain, and the urgent tasks ensuing from them should be dealt with on the basis of the intensification of efforts in the field of disarmament negotiations.

The Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms can make a decisive contribution to achieving the final goal of nuclear disarmament. We welcome the readiness of the Soviet Union to agree as of now on a quantitative freeze of the strategic arms of both the USSR and the United States, as well as on limiting the modernization of these systems.

An early agreement in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe would be a substantial contribution to the success of the efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat from the European continent. We are worried, however, by the fact that instead of responding positively to the constructive proposals and unilateral steps undertaken by the Soviet Union, the American side continues to mark time around its "zero option", thus dooming the talks to a "zero result".

The unanimous reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document adopted in 1978, along with the renewed obligation of States to abide by the priorities set forth in the Programme of Action in which nuclear disarmament was accorded the highest priority, was an important outcome of the second special session. This fact undoubtedly has a direct bearing on the work of our Committee. We share the view expressed on 3 August by the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, Mr. de Souza e Silva, and others that this is a renewed commitment on the part of all Member States to the immediate start of multilateral negotiations on measures of nuclear disarmament.

Now more than ever the Committee on Disarmament has the task of making a meaningful contribution to the elaboration of concrete measures on the item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". It is inadmissible if the Committee continues not to be allowed to fulfil its primary responsibility.

We welcome in this regard the observations made by the delegations of India, Mexico, Pakistan and many others concerning the problems of nuclear disarmament. The Bulgarian delegation fully supports the setting up of an ad hoc working group on item 2 within the current session of the Committee.

The implementation of the proposal of the Soviet Union for the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage realization of a programme of nuclear disarmament on the basis of the parameters suggested in the Soviet memorandum at the special session would be in full conformity with paragraph 50 of the Final document. This idea could be considered in the context of the examination of the aspects of nuclear disarmament by this Committee.

Many questions relating to nuclear disarmament have already been piled up on the negotiating table of the Committee on Disarmament. This applies to the elaboration of a treaty on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the elaboration of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the drawing up of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron nuclear weapons, etc. My delegation intends to offer its specific comments on some of these issues, as well as on the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space, at the forthcoming meetings of the Committee.

(Mr. Tzellalov, Bulgaria)

The question of outlawing chemical weapons and of their destruction remains one of the focal points in the field of disarmament. It is generally recognized that we have reached an important crossroads. Now it is up to us to take a well-defined course towards the elaboration of the convention by resolving the outstanding issues on the basis of a realistic and effective approach and harmonizing our views on the necessary political and technical decisions.

The other way would take us into a labyrinth whose meanders are named "all-embracing scope", "100 per cent verification", "round-the-clock on-site inspections", etc. Like every labyrinth this one should have an exit, too, but when we finally reach the end of the tunnel we shall most probably be confronted by a different set of problems caused by technological advance and weapons development. I have in mind, of course, the binary types of chemical weapons, whatever the efforts to minimize their negative impact on the negotiations.

We listened with interest and satisfaction to the statement at our last meeting of the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. It is our hope that under his able and energetic leadership it will be possible to realize the goal of elaborating optional -- and why not in some cases, agreed, -- texts of the elements of the future convention. This would be in accordance with the priority given to this item on our agenda, and even more so with the demands and the wishes of the international community. In this line of thought, I wish to render the full support of our delegation to the idea of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union Ambassador Issraelyan, who, while presenting the new major Soviet initiative, "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", suggested at the opening meeting of the Working Group that a tentative deadline for the final elaboration of the draft convention should be agreed upon.

Today I would like to offer some observations on the relationship between national and international measures of control and verification. With a view to the solution of numerous issues in this complex domain, including the cost-effectiveness of these procedures, it seems necessary to discuss and outline in more precise terms at least the following aspects of this relationship:

The utilization to the maximum extent of the possibilities of national control, supplementing national mechanisms with international measures when and where an agreed necessity exists.

The correlation of national and international measures should be determined in every specific case depending on the nature of the relevant provisions of the convention with a view to constructing the most efficient and at the same time least cumbersome system of control and verification.

An evaluation of the role of confidence-building measures in the context of the over-all approach to the problems of control and verification. Of particular importance in this respect would be the fact that the different kinds of declarations envisaged in the convention will provide valuable and indispensable information, guaranteed by the authority of the respective State party to the convention.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

We offer these considerations guided by the thought that the cornerstone of any system of control and verification must be rationality, rationality coupled with realism and objectivity. The national and international measures of verification should be organically combined, rather than doubling each other. What we suggest is not to lose the over-all picture when concentrating on the elaboration of particular areas of the future convention.

Here I would like to remind you of the experience of the early stages of the discussion of technical aspects of the verification of a test ban treaty. Initially, our predecessors in the disarmament negotiations, more than 20 years ago, were considering the establishment of dozens of internationally operated seismic stations all over the globe, involving huge costs and creating numerous technical and human problems. A much simpler and rational solution was generally accepted eventually, as all of us are aware, that is, the utilization of national seismic stations. This is only one example of applying rationality to the genuine requirements for verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

I would like to stress once again that the elaboration and the implementation of a convention to ban and destroy a most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction would be a major achievement in the efforts to curb the arms race. The socialist countries have on more than one occasion contributed in a substantive way to the course of negotiations. The latest Soviet proposal is another milestone along this road. Let us hope that the final goal is not too far away.

The important and responsible tasks set before the Committee highlight the necessity of taking practical measures for increasing its effectiveness. This could be best achieved by the setting up of additional subsidiary bodies on priority items and by the possible extension of the duration of the work of some of the existing ones. When organizational matters come up for discussion we intend to present our views and ideas in a detailed way.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency Ambassador van Dongen.

Mr. VAN DONGEN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to express its satisfaction to see the chairmanship of the Committee on the opening of our summer session in such capable and experienced hands as yours. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has amply demonstrated that the climate for disarmament can hardly be called favourable; all the more do we stand in need of wise and tactful leadership, and we are confident that you, Mr. Chairman, will provide it. Warm thanks are due to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan. His was far from being an easy task; it demands not merely the diplomatic gifts we have come to expect from the delegation of Japan, but equally inventiveness and stamina. In so far as we concluded our previous session in an orderly manner and produced the report expected by the General Assembly, it was in no small measure due to Ambassador Okawa's dedication to our duties.

Many previous speakers have given us their views on the whys and wherefores of the failure of the second special session to produce something better than the token result embodied in its concluding document. On this subject, I shall be brief. Most of the second special session is best speedily forgotten. The lack of results is deplored, but at least no irreparable harm was done to the multilateral disarmament process. In this context, the Netherlands attaches great value to the

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

fact that the consensus-principle was upheld, since this principle is a pre-condition for the process to be serious and credible. As a result, we are dissatisfied but not discouraged, nor are we unduly surprised by the final outcome of the second special session. In fact, the general lack of expectations may itself have contributed to it by playing the role of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Looking back to the second special session is useful only in so far as it is directly relevant to the future; trying to apportion blame for its shortcomings is largely, as Hamlet would have it, "stale, flat and unprofitable", and I do not intend to indulge in this kind of gamesmanship.

If, therefore, I prefer looking ahead to looking backward, I also stress that in the Committee on Disarmament we should concentrate on negotiations on subjects that may yield some practical results rather than continue talking about disarmament in general terms. The latter is best left to deliberative bodies like the General Assembly and it would be my guess that few of us could stomach many more ringing appeals and more rhetoric, however beautifully done. We should also bear in mind that on some subjects, results in this multilateral forum can only be achieved once the pre-condition of at least a measure of progress in the bilateral discussions between the two major nuclear-weapon powers have been fulfilled. This does not imply that we should have to remain entirely silent, let alone be obliged to acquiesce passively in whatever the two nuclear giants may work out between themselves, but rather acceptance of the fact that theirs is of necessity the leading role. The same realism makes it possible for the Netherlands delegation to accept a temporary halt in the negotiations concerning a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Plans as ambitious as the CPD can only come to fruition in a favourable climate; efforts to force decisions through can only lead to ambiguity or other inner weaknesses for which we would eventually pay the price.

Let me now turn to the subjects that do lend themselves to useful discussion; the comprehensive test ban, outer space and chemical weapons. The Netherlands Government is convinced that during this summer session the Committee on Disarmament should try to carry out with priority the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 of the Committee's agenda, a nuclear test ban. On the basis of the progress report to be submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group before the conclusion of the 1982 session, the Committee will have to take a decision on subsequent courses of action, as the last paragraph of the agreed mandate stipulates. There is thus little time left for the execution of even the present limited mandate. I intend to submit a working paper outlining a possible programme of work for the Ad Hoc Working Group at the next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 17 August, and I trust that agreement on the chairmanship of this Ad Hoc Working Group can be reached without further delay.

Another item the Committee should come to grips with during this summer session is that of arms control in outer space. The Netherlands was one of the sponsors of resolution 36/97/C requesting the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. The General Assembly also requested the Committee to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems, as an important step towards the fulfilment of the above objectives. After the preliminary exchange of views during the spring session, the Committee should now establish the required infrastructure to deal with this agenda item in a businesslike manner. I listened with great interest to what my distinguished colleagues from Brazil, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the United States and the

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

USSR recently had to say on this matter. The General Assembly resolution I referred to a moment ago provides suitable elements for the mandate of an ad hoc working group under item 7 of the agenda.

The third main object of our efforts should be item number 4 of our agenda: chemical weapons. The importance the Netherlands Government has attached over the years to this subject is amply borne out by the time, energy and resources we have made available to the multilateral efforts aimed at achieving an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban. We believe that the Ad Hoc Working Group is on the right track to make the best possible use of the elements produced last year under its new mandate which warrants full negotiations. Now that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR seem likely to remain suspended for the near future, the role of the Committee on Disarmament is all the more crucial. The "Basic provisions" submitted by the Soviet delegation I shall come back to in a moment. We pledge our full support to the Ad Hoc Working Group and hope that at the conclusion of the summer session success can be achieved in producing a composite paper which could serve as a basis for drafting the chemical weapons convention next year.

Verification issues related to compliance with a chemical weapons convention have rightly become a focal point in the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Today I will introduce two contributions on verification issues, one also on behalf of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Before going into the details, I believe it is proper for me to refer briefly to the general philosophy of The Netherlands with respect to verification. Adequate verification is, in our view, not identical with a set of measures that would be perfect in isolation. Rather would we consider verification measures to be adequate if, measured against a well-defined scope of the treaty and a credible system of protection measures, the advantages of compliance with the convention would outweigh the tremendous disadvantages and risks of maintaining a chemical warfare capability for retaliation purposes.

On behalf of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and my own, I would now like to introduce document CD/308, dated 10 August 1982. This document contains a list of questions that our respective authorities believe to be of relevance for a continuation of the efforts in the Ad Hoc Working Group, having studied document CD/294 -- CD/CW/WP.35 dated 21 July 1982 submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union. It is the hope of our two delegations that this document, which supersedes and elaborates upon the set of questions put forward by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group a few weeks ago, will facilitate the further clarification which the delegation of the Soviet Union undertook to present in due course. I would like to make it clear that our respective authorities have considered with interest the Soviet draft "Basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention. It is the hope of our two Governments that unambiguous answers to the questions contained in CD/308, in conjunction with subsequent in-depth discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group, will provide fresh ground for speedy agreement on an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

In 1977 the Netherlands delegation tabled document CCD/533, a working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants. In the last paragraph of that paper it was announced that further work would be carried out, inter alia, to investigate the applicability of the procedure in case of binary nerve agents systems.

Working document CD/307, which I am pleased to introduce today, contains the results of the announced further scientific work in my country.

Allow me to say a few words to refresh your memories as to what working paper CCD/533, now reissued as document CD/306, is about.

The scientific method described in CCD/533-CD/306 concentrated on a militarily highly significant class among the supertoxic single purpose agents, i.e. the nerve agents. It was defined with a view to contributing to the elaboration of international measures of verification of a chemical weapons ban, with emphasis on the non-production of these agents, including binary weapon systems -- measures that would be, in order to be acceptable to all States, of as non-intrusive a character as reasonably possible.

The method was developed under the direction of Dr. A.J.J. Ooms, well known to most delegations in the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, who is director of the Prins Maurits Laboratory of the Netherlands Defence Research Organization. This highly sensitive method is based on an analysis of waste water downstream of chemical production plants, with a view to detecting a phosphorus-methyl bond the presence of which is common to most of the known supertoxic nerve agents. It is very stable towards chemical reactions and can be used as -- and I think the comparison is comprehensible -- a "fingerprint". As the possible presence of the compounds at issue may also be due to the natural or industrial background, a reference sample upstream of the chemical production plant should be analysed in addition to a downstream sample. Only if the analysis is positive with respect to what I call the "fingerprint", pointing to the presence of decomposition products or starting materials in waste water, recourse may ultimately be had to more intrusive measures, such as a visit to the suspected plant to reveal the identity of the product manufactured.

Having explained this much about document CCD/533 (now reissued as document CD/306), I can venture to elaborate on our new working document CD/307. First of all, it contains positive results of research with respect to the applicability of the "fingerprint" method to binary nerve agents. After stating that it is safe to assume that one of the two precursors of the binary agent does

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already contain the fingerprint bond before reaction with the other, the paper goes on to say that the validity of the analytical method for two distinguishable types of precursors has been tested with success. Thus the entire range of the most toxic binary G-agents as well as binary VX has been covered.

Research was also carried out to get acquainted with the occurrence of compounds containing the fingerprint in water from natural or industrial origin, since the findings in this respect could theoretically affect the applicability of the verification method. To our satisfaction it was found that the phosphorus-methyl procedure was sensitive even in heavily polluted water. The environmental background levels do not affect the maximum distance of a few hundred metres downstream where samples could be taken. Thus the originally foreseen degree of non-intrusiveness can be maintained.

The advantage of the system is obvious. It gives a simple yes or no answer to the question whether compounds related to chemical warfare nerve gases containing the "fingerprint" are present or not. The method is equally relevant for binary weapon precursors. The chemical analyses of the waste water can be performed by many laboratories in the world. The method is highly sensitive and can best be illustrated as follows. In many languages a particularly difficult fact-finding mission is metaphorically described as "looking for a needle in a haystack". The staff of the research institute was so tempted by this metaphor that they decided to compare the relative values of weight for needle and haystack with the values found for the fingerprint in a corresponding volume of waste water. It was found that the needle value was indeed matched.

Our research in this field will continue, but already at this stage we can safely recommend the method described as at least one valuable building block in a set of interacting components of a verification system to be agreed upon. We would very much hope that other delegations will carry out comparable research. In this context my delegation would like to express its respect to the delegation of an observer-State, Finland, for the impressive and laborious work that has been carried out in Finland over the years, of which the latest so-called "blue book" is yet another reflection. It is our sincere hope that thus the technical basis for verification will already have been established when the time is ripe for a final breakthrough in the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of a chemical weapons ban.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, my intention today is to deal briefly with agenda item 4 concerning the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. In my statement during this year's spring session I dealt extensively with the problem of verification of the provisions of a future chemical weapons convention. Now I would like to address mainly some problems arising in connection with the emergence of binary weapons and some other aspects with regard to the scope of prohibition.

The General Assembly, at its second special session on disarmament, unequivocally reaffirmed the prohibition of chemical weapons as an item of exceptionally high priority and called for an early conclusion of a convention on that subject. It is up to our Committee, the only multilateral body negotiating on disarmament, to cope with this task and to exert all efforts to elaborate a chemical weapons convention in the nearest future. We firmly believe that after years of negotiations, with many proposals and numerous conceptual material gathered; a solid basis exists for a fruitful continuation of our work.

This, let us say, optimistic approach is based on the presumption that a broad convergence of views exists as to basic aspects of the future convention. This optimism is also considerably backed by the document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" submitted by the Soviet Union at the second special session. I have already had the opportunity to stress the importance my delegation attaches to this document and to voice our full support for it. Now I would simply like to add that we regard the "Basic provisions" as an example of a constructive approach whereby the proposals and views of negotiating partners are considered and taken into account. That is exactly what the negotiating process is about. It is therefore fully justified and fair if we expect other major powers to display similar good will and a compromise approach.

One of the problems which is seriously hindering the elaboration of a draft convention is the decision to produce and commission binary weapons and ultimately to station them on the territories of other countries. This decision is contrary to United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/96B, which, inter alia, "calls upon all States to refrain from ... production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present". And let it be recalled that no more than one delegation at the General Assembly last fall found it necessary to vote against this resolution.

My delegation completely fails to understand how the programme of modernization and chemical rearmament undertaken in the United States of America goes together with the sincere interest to negotiate and to achieve the prohibition of chemical weapons professed in this room by the United States delegation. Moreover, we do not think that the term "modernization" reflects fully what is going on. Many delegations have already stressed, and we deem it necessary to

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emphasize once more, that the full-scale production of binary weapons would amount to the commencement of a qualitatively new round in the chemical arms race since these weapons represent a new generation of chemical weapons. My country has one more reason to oppose the production and proliferation of binary weapons since the prospect of having thousands of units of binary ammunition stationed in our immediate western neighbourhood is a matter of grave concern to us. The stationing of these weapons in Europe is not just a remote possibility. We have heard of numerous statements of high United States officials and strategists in this respect.

The introduction of binary weapons into the arsenals of States would also significantly complicate the solution of the basic difficulty in the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention, namely, that of separating commercial chemicals from those which can be used for chemical weapons. Consequently, the extremely difficult task of defining chemicals for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons would arise. Thus, the implementation of many aspects of the future convention would be seriously complicated, e.g. the obligation not to transfer chemical weapons and other obligations related thereto. The process of the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons would also be seriously hampered. The emergence of binary weapons would also significantly facilitate possible covert stockpiling and storage of chemicals for binary weapons purposes and for developing chemical weapons under the guise of commercial production. There is no need to elaborate extensively on the grave consequences this would have for the relevant verification procedures, both national and especially international. We do not think it feasible to apply to binary weapons such verification methods as are based upon the extreme toxicity of the chemical agents used in traditional types of chemical weapons. We have heard some arguments to the contrary. However, we consider those arguments rather oversimplified.

At the same time we reject most emphatically all attempts to suggest that the future convention should ignore or somehow circumvent the problem of binary weapons. The agreed provisions on the scope of prohibition contained in the joint Soviet-United States report to the Committee on Disarmament of 1980, which we still consider valuable, clearly encompass binary weapons as well. Should the programme of binary weapons production be undertaken, these positive results would be seriously undermined.

There are also other, both immediate and long-term effects the production of binary weapons would have on the elaboration of and compliance with a chemical weapons convention. I am not going to deal with all of them, since the group of socialist countries referred to these effects in detail in document CD/258 of 9 March 1982. The deliberations in the Committee both last year and during this year's spring session clearly demonstrated that virtually all delegations paid special attention to the question of binary weapons and considered that these weapons should be prohibited in the future convention. Apart from the statements by the socialist countries we noted the views of the delegations of the United Kingdom, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden as well as the statements of other western delegations and the Group of 21 members.

It is well known that as yet we have not reached full agreement on what should be encompassed by the prohibition in the future convention. We should spare no efforts in trying to reach agreement on this subject since it undoubtedly has a direct bearing on all other provisions of the future convention. It is important to harmonize our views and to overcome persisting differences of opinion in this regard as early as possible, be it with respect to the problem of the definition

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of the term "chemical weapons", the question of the sphere of activity to be encompassed by the prohibition or the much discussed problem whether the prohibition of use of chemical weapons should be included in the future convention. The problem of the use of chemical weapons has been widely discussed in the Committee in recent years and numerous arguments have been raised both supporting and opposing its inclusion. I do not believe that going through all those arguments once again would serve any purpose. However, at this stage when we are, hopefully, about to embark on the formulation of a composite draft text of a chemical weapons convention, my delegation would like to record here briefly its position on the subject.

As far as the use of chemical weapons is concerned, Czechoslovakia considers it clearly and unequivocally prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We maintain that the Protocol is an important international instrument which has since its adoption played a positive role. In connection with the proposals to strengthen the Protocol by including the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the future chemical weapons convention, we do not share the view that by doing so we can strengthen the Protocol whatsoever. Quite the contrary, for the doubled prohibition of the use of chemical weapons would inevitably lead to the weakening of the Protocol and to the creation of an unnecessary precedent. All our efforts should be aimed at the achievement of and ensuring compliance with a convention which would leave no chemical weapons in the arsenals of States. If this is achieved, and we deem it feasible, no question of use can arise.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, in accordance with its programme of work the Committee on Disarmament is today discussing an issue which requires particular consideration and attention on the part of all delegations represented here. The exceptional importance of the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons is self-evident.

The times are past when the danger represented by chemical weapons was, as it were, overshadowed by the horror and dread that nuclear weapons inspired in mankind. For who today is not aware that modern chemical weapons also have a frightening capacity to sow Black Death on earth? Chemical weapons are, moreover, particularly barbaric because they endanger above all the unprotected civilian population. There is a real and growing threat of the widespread use of chemical weapons. Thus the question is whether we are going now, immediately, to put a stop to the chemical arms race orgy, or whether we are going to miss the opportunity, perhaps irrevocably.

The Soviet Union is decisively in favour of the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons. As President L.I. Brezhnev said in his message to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, "Everything must be done to ensure that chemical weapons have no place on earth. The Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of this goal. We are prepared to reach an agreement without delay on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks of such weapons". The Soviet Union confirmed that this was its approach to the matter by putting forward the "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction".

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The Soviet delegation has distributed the text of these "Basic provisions" as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament and also of its Working Group on Chemical Weapons (document CD/294/CD/WP.55). Today we wish formally to introduce this document.

The Soviet document was prepared taking into account the results of the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons between 1976 and 1980 and of the negotiations that took place in the Committee on Disarmament during that same period and subsequently. While it naturally reflects the Soviet position on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, it incorporates many valuable and sound proposals of other States and with respect to a number of the most important aspects it takes into account the positions of our negotiating partners.

If the essence of the Soviet document were to be summarized in a few words, it could be said that what it amounts to is a translation into the language of the provisions of a convention of the desire of the USSR to achieve the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons and so far as possible to remove the obstacles to the adoption of a convention by putting forward for consideration on the really crucial, and I repeat crucial, but controversial aspects of the convention, flexible solutions which take account of the various points of view and, we believe, make it possible to reconcile them.

Allow me to go into the Soviet document in somewhat greater detail. First of all I should like to emphasize that this is not a comprehensive text of a future convention, but rather its basic provisions. In other words, the Soviet draft offers possible formulations or what appear to us to be mutually acceptable approaches to the formulation of the principal provisions of the future convention. It is not designed to provide answers to many questions concerning details of the future convention. It aims primarily at helping to resolve key issues -- the scope of the prohibition, confidence-building measures, verification of compliance and other questions. Unfortunately, as you all know, there has not up to now been any general agreement on these. It seems to us that the draft text we have submitted provides a basis for the achievement of consensus precisely on the key aspects of the convention.

I would remind you that the Soviet draft proposes that the future convention should consist of four main sections -- on the scope of the prohibition, declarations and confidence-building measures, ensuring compliance with the convention and the concluding provisions of the convention. Allow me now to touch upon some matters relating to the various sections of the Soviet draft.

I shall not enumerate them, for they are probably well known, the more so since, as I have already said, in many cases they reflect a common standpoint -- they reflect the positions of the Soviet-American joint proposal. It was no surprise to us, therefore, that the statement by the United States delegation indicated certain positions which are in fact also reflected in the Soviet draft basic provisions. What is there to say about the scope of the prohibition? What do we want to emphasize in this section of the future convention?

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Scope of the prohibition. Here we believe it is particularly important that the future convention should include a prohibition of weapons with binary or multi-component charges, as referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of chemical weapons under section I of the Soviet draft. We attach particular importance to this matter as we consider that the appearance of binary chemical weapons will represent a qualitatively new stage in the chemical arms race, a stage which could vitally affect the entire prospect for the prohibition of this type of weapon. We have talked about this a number of times already, and our views are shared by many other delegations. These views were confirmed, moreover, by the consultations with technical experts, which made it clear that by contrast with the production of supertoxic weapons in factory conditions, in which the traditional types of such weapons are manufactured on the basis, as a rule, of the same chemicals of known composition, in the development of binary systems of chemical weapons their production may involve new chemicals of various classes and in a wide variety of combinations. The uncertainty from the standpoint of the detection of compliance or non-compliance with the convention becomes many times greater as a result of the possibility of the appearance in the future of various kinds of binary weapons in addition to supertoxic lethal systems. Furthermore, binary systems of chemical weapons make it difficult to monitor their production and stockpiling by groups of States belonging to military blocs. Some members of a bloc may in the future be parties to the convention while others may not, and the provisions of the convention would thus not apply to the latter.

It is obvious that the development of the production of any type of binary weapon will bring new generations of chemicals into the range of chemical substances capable of being used as the components of such weapons, and States parties to the convention will be confronted with the extremely difficult problem of how to set a limit distinguishing chemicals for commercial purposes from chemicals which could -- and I repeat could -- be used in binary systems of chemical weapons. It cannot be excluded that this problem might arise in connection with other substances in addition to organophosphorus compounds.

It must also be pointed out that the components used in binary systems constitute a special kind of precursors. They differ from the precursors used in industrial conditions chiefly in that they are not simply the raw materials for obtaining lethal chemicals but practically already prepared chemical weapons when they are in combination with special devices or constructions.

Thus, it must be recognized that binary varieties of chemical weapons based on the latest advances in science and technology represent an incomparably more serious danger and create incomparably greater difficulties in the determination of the scope of the prohibition as well as in the monitoring of compliance with that prohibition, than do so-called unitary chemical weapons.

It is obvious that there is no way around these problems and the only thing to do is to tackle the solution of them in a serious manner. What kind of a convention would it be if it were to deal only with obsolescent types of chemical weapons that are being removed from arsenals and ignored the more modern types of such weapons which are

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being developed by at least one State? We have heard repeated assurances from the United States delegation and a number of other States that binary weapons will be subject to absolute prohibition under the convention. These are fine words. But they are still not enough. It is essential that the problems arising in connection with binary weapons should be resolved both in the process of the consultations with technical experts and in the Committee as a whole.

The participants in the consultations, and no doubt all members of the Committee also, have obviously noted that we, the Soviet delegation, are interested, for example, at the practical level, in the problem of the prevention of the concealed manufacture, either in the guise of commercial manufacture or via a "division of labour" among States, of components of binary systems, special-purpose additives for such systems, including catalysts, and also devices and constructions specifically intended for binary systems. We have raised the question how to identify for the purposes of the convention those areas of chemistry and chemical technology where the emergence of new, as yet unknown systems of binary weapons is possible; and how to devise methods for the detection of stockpiles of binary weapons that might already exist if, that is, in defiance of the General Assembly's decision States had embarked on the production of binary weapons? We have not received answers to these questions from any delegation, including that of the United States.

With regard to the section on the scope of the prohibition, I should like to draw attention to the fact that there are no provisions on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the Soviet draft, for a simple reason: the use of chemical weapons is unconditionally and absolutely prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stocks will deprive States, so to speak, of the material basis for violating the 1925 Protocol inasmuch as they will not even have any chemical weapons. We therefore believe that if there is a real rather than a feigned desire to strengthen the regime for the non-use of chemical weapons established by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, then the fundamental thing to do is to direct all efforts towards the speediest possible conclusion of the convention we are working on. Let us suppose that, with a convention in existence, suspicions arise concerning the use of chemical weapons. This will automatically give rise to a suspicion of the violation of one or of several of the obligations entered into by States under the convention, namely, the obligations not to develop, produce, transfer or retain chemical weapons and to destroy all stocks thereof. In short, it seems to us that this question, which has been posed and blown up in a rather artificial and unjustifiable manner, becomes all the more complicated when it is proposed in the context of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to solve questions relating to other international agreements. This merely further complicates a task that is already complicated enough.

The second main section of the Soviet draft, entitled "Declarations and confidence-building measures", reflects the great importance which the Soviet Union attaches to ensuring implementation of the convention on the basis of international co-operation. I do not intend now to dwell on all the declarations and confidence-building measures we have proposed; I should simply like to stress that they are all closely linked with the verification measures and should be viewed as forming a

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whole. I should like merely to draw attention to the undertaking by States parties that is provided for in our draft to submit appropriate notifications three months before the initiation of the implementation of each stage of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and of each stage of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons, and not later than 30 days after the completion of such operations to submit statements to that effect also.

I wish also to draw attention to the provision providing an undertaking by States parties to the future convention to submit annual declarations concerning basic categories of chemicals produced, diverted from stocks, acquired or used. This important provision is, of course -- and I should like to stress this -- stated in the Soviet draft in general terms, and needs to be elaborated, but we believe that at the present stage we should agree on such undertakings in a broad way and go into the details of the actual provisions later.

The Soviet draft also provides for the drawing up through collective efforts of lists of chemicals and precursors which represent a special danger from the viewpoint of their possible diversion to use for chemical weapons purposes. It also proposes that notifications should be submitted concerning transfers by one State party to another of chemicals which could be used as components for binary weapons, and so forth.

As is clear from the foregoing few examples, all the measures we propose are aimed at giving the parties to the convention the assurance that it is being complied with.

Allow me now to dwell on questions of verification. I should like once again to reiterate our conception of the matter of the monitoring of implementation of an international agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are in favour of strict and effective but not intrusive verification. We are in favour of a verification which gives States the assurance of compliance with the convention but which will not at the same time engender mutual suspicion or in any way lead to a worsening of the relations between States.

As we have already stated more than once, we consider that effective implementation of the convention can be ensured by national monitoring, by national technical means of verification, supplemented by certain international procedures including on-site inspections on a voluntary basis or what some call challenge verification. However, in view of the decisive importance of the destruction of stocks, and wishing to provide for ourselves and for all other future parties to the convention, an additional assurance that no party is committing a violation of this most important undertaking, in the end, in some measure and simply to accommodate the positions of many of our partners in the negotiations, we considered it necessary to provide for the possibility of carrying out systematic international on-site inspections, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota, of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities.

We have also provided for a special verification procedure for the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals at a specialized facility. This is on the understanding that such a facility will continue to exist even when total chemical

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disarmament has been accomplished and no chemical weapons as such remain on earth. In those circumstances, it would of course be extremely dangerous if someone should attempt to abuse the trust of other States and use that facility for the secret production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

The Soviet "Basic provisions" provide for a very wide range of possible actions by States parties to the convention for the purpose of establishing confidence between them on the matter of the implementation of the convention and the monitoring of compliance with the obligations flowing from it, such as: a declaration by States as to whether or not they possess chemical weapons; the declaration of stocks of such weapons and capacities for their production, and of plans for their destruction or diversion to permitted purposes and plans for the destruction and dismantling of facilities, stating the location of the facilities; information concerning progress in carrying out the declared plans with notifications prior to the start of each stage of their implementation and also following the completion of the operations concerned. According to the Soviet provisions, such measures would be carried out by national verification bodies, by national technical means, if they possess such means or, in the case of other States which have an agreement to that effect, on the basis of information received through the use of those means, and lastly by the international verification body with the conduct of on-site inspections on the basis of a documented request as well as of systematic international inspections carried out, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota as I mentioned earlier. Our approach ensures confidence in the implementation of the convention while at the same time it is not burdensome.

In connection with the matter of the verification of the destruction of stocks at a specialized facility, some delegations have put forward proposals, firstly, for permanent on-site inspections (with international inspectors staying at the facility day and night throughout all the years during which stocks are being destroyed), and I believe this was referred to today in a statement, and secondly, for the installation at the facility of so-called "black boxes" which would collect and process information and transmit it by radio telecommunications.

Let us suppose for a moment that such a verification system had been established. There would be inspectors permanently stationed at the facility concerned, who could not leave it even for a second; there would be "black boxes" in every corner, and the people working in the facility would be stumbling over them; but let us suppose that this had been done. It would then be necessary seriously to ponder the question of what would be the results of the most meticulous and thorough verification of the progress of the destruction of stocks at a specialized facility if a State had not made a full declaration of its stocks. Or supposing a State after declaring the stocks that are to be destroyed at a specialized facility, then proceeds to conceal part of the stocks and does not submit them for destruction at the facility, or pretends that it has destroyed them?

Would it not be simpler to assume that, if it has such dishonest intentions, a State will merely fail to declare that part of its stocks which it does not intend to destroy, and no amount of day and night permanent inspection will be of any avail whatsoever.

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No other method of international verification except inspection on grounds of suspicion in such a case will help to establish the truth. We should also reflect on how to take account, for our purposes, in the drawing up of measures for verifying the destruction of stocks, of the fact that any specialized facility of such a kind must have its own strict and clear technological regulations, specific parameters for the entry of chemicals and output of the products of their destruction, its own extensive range of devices for process management and control, and so forth.

In short, while appealing for a greater objectivity in the work on the provisions of the future convention relating to verification, we are gratified to note that some delegations are beginning to seek more realistic approaches. To mention just one example, the document on verification submitted by the delegation of Canada (CD/167) contains a whole series of interesting points, one of which says in effect that in the drawing up of various control measures the starting point should be minimum levels of intrusiveness in the internal affairs of States. It is to be hoped that in the positions of all delegations a spirit of realism and constructiveness will in the last resort prevail.

Mr. Chairman, in connection with the submission of the Soviet draft basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a number of delegations have requested us to answer some questions. We consider this an expression of interest in the Soviet document and express our gratification and thanks to those delegations for that interest. We have repeatedly explained our position on key questions of the convention, including, we hope, at today's meeting.

The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, in its document of 26 July, referred to our working paper CCD/539 of 3 August 1977, which stated that the main purpose of monitoring the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons should be to establish: (a) the fact of the destruction of an agent of a certain type; (b) the quantity of the agent destroyed; and (c) the quality of this agent. The delegation asked us: are the systematic international on-site inspections designed to achieve these goals?

We answer this question in the affirmative. It should be explained that in our 1977 document the principle of national verification is taken as the basis, but we see no reason for opposing national verification to international verification. We are in favour of a harmonious combination of the two types of verification.

We have also been asked, and not only by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, to explain what is meant by an "agreed quota". In the "Basic provisions of a convention", the carrying out of international on-site inspections at specialized facilities (of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes) on the basis of an agreed quota is proposed as one -- I repeat, one -- of the possible forms of such inspections. This does not mean that we are not prepared to consider other possible forms too. Obviously when agreement has been reached on procedures which are acceptable to all, we shall then have to work out in detail together the contents of such procedures. On a number of other specific issues the Soviet delegation intends to give a reply in the Working Group during the consideration of the relevant provisions of the future convention. I will say, however, at once, that in our opinion many questions call for joint answers, especially when they concern such matters as systematic international on-site inspections, on which in the past many different proposals have already been put forward by quite a large number of States.

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We prefer the method of bilateral and multilateral consultations with interested delegations in a joint search for answers to the questions which arise in the course of negotiations. For the information of members of the Committee I will say that the Soviet delegation has already conducted a series of such extremely useful bilateral consultations, in the course of which we ourselves asked questions and we answered the questions of our partners, and we intend to continue this practice. We think that this is far more effective than something more like a quiz game -- you know: question, answer, question, answer. Anyone really interested in finding joint answers will find a constructive partner in the Soviet delegation. I repeat, we are ready to search for answers to any questions which arise in the course of the negotiations, including those concerning the Soviet draft.

I should like to refer to another matter. Every now and then an attempt is made to steer negotiations into the labyrinth of secondary questions at a time when agreement has not been reached on the major questions. Take, for example, these problems of verification. While there is quite a high degree of agreement on the question of scope and, as we believe, the outlines of possible formulations on the scope of the prohibition are emerging, this is not yet the case with regard to verification issues. Nevertheless we sometimes get bogged down in a discussion of highly specialized aspects of verification. We propose that agreement should be reached on basic approaches, where this is possible, of course, and then on the basis of such agreed approaches -- general approaches -- we can work out the details.

The Soviet draft "Basic provisions", whose significance has been acknowledged by almost all delegations in the Committee, are a demonstration of the Soviet Union's interest in the speediest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and evidence of its goodwill. At the same time, we should also like particularly to stress the fact that we are hoping -- we are very much hoping -- for a demonstration of goodwill from the other side also.

This refers in particular to the United States delegation, which the other day, and also today, expressed in the Committee its "disappointment" because, allegedly, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries do not wish to take part in serious discussions. The slightest acquaintance with the work of the Committee, of its working groups and contact groups, would suffice to arrive at quite the opposite conclusion. It would seem that some members of the Committee are judging others by themselves. We, for example, are not in the habit of agreeing, on the one hand, to the setting up within the Committee of a working group on a priority aspect of disarmament -- a nuclear-weapon-test ban, in this instance -- and then of stating bluntly that the time is not yet ripe for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Judge for yourselves: who takes a serious approach to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and who does not?

We should like to ask the United States delegation a simple and direct question, which certainly does not call for the assistance of experts: how does it see its own path towards the achievement of mutually acceptable solutions, and its readiness to take account of the position of other participants in the negotiations, including the Soviet Union? Negotiations can be successful if all those taking part in them strive for mutually acceptable solutions -- we repeat, mutually acceptable solutions.

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At the end of his statement, the representative of the United States, referring to the need to ban poisonous substances, could not resist the temptation to employ a peculiar type of poisonous substance -- falsehood and calumny -- right in the middle of our meeting; even the reference to the President does not in any way alter the fact that a poisonous cloud was released in this room. We regret this, as once again the assertions by the United States of its attachment to chemical disarmament were placed in doubt by the United States delegation itself. The reasons for this importunate repetition of lies are well known. One of them -- and probably the main one -- is to justify the United States' policy of chemical rearmament. It is enough to mention a single fact: the United States document (CD/264) speaks openly of the advantages of binary weapons, which the United States is today proceeding to produce on a large scale.

I should like to say, finally, that the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is an urgent and priority task. All delegations have tirelessly repeated this. We want to go further, and to propose concrete steps towards the fulfilment of this priority task.

In the first place, we consider it essential that the activity of the Working Group, under the able guidance of our friend, Ambassador Comrade Sujka, should not be suspended for almost six months (i.e. from practically the beginning of September, when the Committee's session is to end, until the end of February, when the Group will in effect be able to resume its work. We are opposed to this long interval. We are ready to agree to any generally acceptable arrangement. The Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons could continue its work now; it could resume work after a short interruption, or, lastly, it could resume its work at the beginning of next year, as happened this year in the case of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

In the second place, we consider that it would be useful to establish a date, even if only an approximate one, for the completion of work on the convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. In this connection it should be borne in mind, inter alia, that the chemicals industry is developing today not daily but literally hourly. A few years ago, the problem of the prohibition of binary chemical weapons did not exist; no one was talking about it. It has now arisen in connection with the well-known decision of the United States Government, and this has greatly complicated the negotiations. This, too, has been mentioned today by all speakers with the sole exception, I believe, of the first speaker. Who, I ask, can guarantee that while we are squandering precious time, and discussing sometimes doubtful problems, new and still more dangerous types of chemical weapons will not appear, and all the work we have done so far will have been in vain, will come to naught.

We are pressed for time, gentlemen, on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, this present session of the Committee on Disarmament, following in the wake of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and in view of what happened there, is very much in need of fresh impetus and new initiatives in order that our work will be more productive. In offering our congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to add that we count on you to guide our work so that the groundwork can be laid during the few short weeks we have at our disposal to enable us to achieve more substantial results when we meet again next year.

At the end of the Committee's spring session, the summing up of the work during the years following the first special session and the submission of the report to the second special session was quite a formidable task. However, the late night meetings during the last week of the spring session were not in vain, for the Committee was able to submit a credible report to the General Assembly at its second special session. To a great extent, this was made possible by the able chairmanship of Ambassador Okawa, to whom we would like to express a word of thanks.

Before going into the substantive part of my statement, which is general in nature, and since Ambassador Venkateswaran will be leaving us soon, I should like to take this opportunity to bid farewell to him, through the distinguished representative of India, and to wish him well for the future.

The international community had great hopes and expectations of the second special session. However, those hopes and expectations were not realized. It is hardly any wonder that the delegations of the Group of 21 as well as other delegations have expressed their feelings of disappointment at the inability of the second special session to produce the most modest of results. This situation highlights the state of affairs of the disarmament negotiations which have been going on in this as well as in other forums for the past years. The Committee on Disarmament was formed with specific terms of reference as embodied in the Final Document. The Committee exerted its best efforts in drafting texts, submitting proposals and adopting appropriate procedures with a view to achieving agreements which, in the final analysis, are the yardsticks by which we can measure its success. A comparison can be made between this state of affairs and the preparation of an elaborate meal when the table is laid out with the best china and silver but the essential ingredient that would make the meal a success is missing, and that is food. Similarly, in this Committee, we are being starved of positive achievements of a substantive nature which are necessary for the success of the work of the Committee. No amount of skilful drafting nor procedural manoeuvres nor the best of proposals are likely to produce any disarmament agreement if the degree of the political will of States is not sufficiently strong enough to want them.

The reaffirmation of the Final Document by the second special session confirms the validity of the principles embodied therein which must continue to serve as guiding principles for the drawing up of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, although a fresh approach and method appears to be necessary as the work during the previous session has ended in an impasse. A time for contemplation, reflection and consultation appears to be necessary during the short time we have at our disposal to prepare for more substantive action when we meet again next year.

Several ideas are now being advanced for the effective functioning of the Committee on Disarmament and the letter dated 3 August from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of this Committee contains some useful suggestions made during the second special session. There are several aspects of the matter to be considered. With regard to how long this Committee should meet during its annual sessions, our view is that the time does not appear to be ripe for expansion of the duration of the

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meetings over a longer period than at present. It is certainly not for lack of time that the Committee has been unable to make much headway in its work. Future consideration could be given to the question of the duration of annual sessions on the basis of the volume of work of a substantive nature.

For reasons already well known, the summer session of the Committee will be of a shorter duration than is usual and it is not expected that we can do much in so short a time. However, it is encouraging to see that the Committee has managed to adopt its programme of work within a shorter time than usual, and this, to our mind, is a good augury.

There is universal consensus that general and complete disarmament should be the ultimate goal if we are to eradicate for all time the twin threats that most seriously menace mankind, namely, the scourge of war and the threat to human survival posed by nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no greater task for this multilateral negotiating body than to have as the foremost item on its agenda a programme for the ultimate attainment of general and complete disarmament. For this reason, the comprehensive programme of disarmament must continue to be the means through which the goal of general and complete disarmament must be reached. Our past inability to draw up a comprehensive programme is, without doubt, due to the fact that we have not been able to reconcile our views as to the principles on which the programme should be based. We therefore feel that a meeting of minds with regard to the principles of stages, time-frame, measures and commitment must be reached before we can carry out the next round in the drafting exercise.

With the rapid rate of advance in the development of space technology, the arms race now threatens to enter the realm of space. It is, therefore, urgently necessary to prevent outer space being used for warlike purposes before it is too late, as the consequences of such use are likely to have a destabilizing effect on earth itself. This delegation, therefore, supports the consideration of this item within a working group as first suggested by the delegation of Sweden during the last session.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons which met in advance of this summer session made a good start under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland. There are indeed ample grounds for optimism that progress can be made even in the short time we have during this summer session. It is important to note that in dealing with chemical weapons we are dealing with a real disarmament measure on weapons of mass destruction the use of which could have devastating consequences on the civilian population also. Negotiations in the past have made considerable progress on the scope and definition as well as the nature of the convention. We hope that there will be a narrowing of differences between the two sides on the issue of verification and compliance in the light of fresh developments at the second special session, and this is a hopeful sign.

Limitations of strategic armaments have suffered a severe set-back with the setting aside of the SALT II Agreement. New concepts and doctrines are being advanced which appear to make it permissible to use nuclear weapons by underrating the possible outcome of their use. Despite the seriousness of the situation, this Committee is still unable to deal effectively with measures on nuclear disarmament, and efforts for the creation of a working group have not been possible as the rule of consensus is being used in a spirit that was not intended. No doubt, bilateral discussions are necessary between the great Powers which possess an overwhelming preponderance of these weapons. But at the same time the multilateral aspects of dealing effectively with them should not be ignored. The nuclear menace is a matter of universal concern and as such needs to be dealt with from the point of view of its multilateral aspects

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by this Committee. There are, indeed, several cogent reasons why the problem of ridding the world of nuclear weapons should be the concern of all States, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. For it is an undeniable fact that all of us share a common destiny, for none of us are immune from the threat of nuclear annihilation. An issue of survival of all mankind must necessarily be the concern of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.

There is also another valid reason why a universal approach is necessary. The prevention of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons is an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. This would involve the mutuality of obligations on the part of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear alike. It is therefore necessary to deal with this issue on a bilateral basis within this forum.

One of the basic principles of disarmament as embodied in the Final Document is to enhance the security of States at a reduced level of armaments that would finally lead to their complete elimination. The initiation of the process of halting the nuclear arms race followed by progressive reduction are logical steps towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. However, there is one school of thought among the nuclear-weapon Powers which says that the nuclear arms race cannot be halted before nuclear arms can be reduced. This logic defies rational concepts embodied in the Final Document. It is now more urgent than ever to halt all aspects of the nuclear arms race, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and draft proposals presented at the second special session merit careful consideration during the next regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.

While efforts are being made on nuclear disarmament, parallel efforts should be conducted on practical measures to prevent a nuclear war. Developments indicate that this is one area which is politically ripe for solution. For this reason we would support the proposal made by the delegation of India to set up an ad hoc working group under item 2 of the agenda.

The establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group makes it possible to deal with the parameters involved in the test ban issue. No doubt, the mandate of the Working Group falls far short of what is required, which in our opinion should be the conduct of full negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Despite this shortcoming and despite the recent disquieting indications, hope springs eternal in the human breast and there is no alternative but to hope that this first step will make it possible to take further steps towards comprehensive negotiations on a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests for all time.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Burma for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair.

Distinguished delegates, we have now exhausted the time available to us for the meeting this morning.

If there is no objection, I propose that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. We would then listen to those remaining representatives inscribed to speak today and, immediately afterwards, I will convene an informal meeting of the Committee to consider some organizational questions. If there is no objection, we shall proceed in that way.

The meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 178th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. As agreed this morning, the Committee will continue to listen to those speakers inscribed for today's plenary meeting. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Middleton.

Mr. MIDDLETON (United Kingdom): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should first like to join those who have welcomed you to the Chair of the Committee for the month of August; my delegation shares the pleasure of other delegations at seeing the Chair occupied by a delegate who has such a distinguished record in the field of disarmament, particularly when he represents a State which is a fellow member of the Commonwealth. I should also like to extend our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, who guided the Committee so skilfully through the period leading up to the General Assembly's special session on disarmament.

I propose today to devote my statement entirely to the current item of our agenda, the prohibition of chemical weapons, a topic to which the British Government has attached great importance over a number of years. My delegation believes that of the subjects before us at present, that of chemical weapons perhaps offers the best prospects for progress in the near future. We therefore welcomed the early resumption of the Chemical Weapons Working Group and we are pleased that work is now aimed at identifying what options there are for bridging the gaps between the divergent views of delegations on many specific issues. We hope that we shall make substantial progress in this direction so that by the end of the session we shall have a clearer understanding of the possibilities for solving several of the key issues of a convention.

Before discussing certain issues in some detail, I would like to turn briefly to the consultations with technical experts which the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Group has just held. Some delegations have expressed the view that the discussion of technical issues was complicating our work, and might delay progress towards agreement, since many issues required political rather than technical decision. But in order to take political decisions we need to be aware of the range of technical possibilities for resolving particular problems. It is an unwillingness to make substantive contributions to the discussion of such technical issues rather than the technical discussions themselves which will delay our progress. My delegation accordingly attaches great importance to the continuation of the Chairman's consultations. The consultations with technical experts should, however, be given a precise mandate by the Working Group. The mandate drawn up for the experts' meeting this session produced, in our opinion, a more fruitful discussion than in the past, and we hope that this precedent will be followed for the next meeting.

In examining the report of the experts' meeting, I would like to reiterate the view which my delegation expressed at the spring session that the work on toxicity criteria has now been taken as far as is useful for the present, although at a later stage in our work it will be necessary to return to the protocols prepared during the spring session to see whether they meet the needs of the convention. We would suggest that work should now focus on the other topics mentioned in the report, that is, on the technical methods for verification, and we hope that experts will come to the next meeting ready to contribute to the discussion.

I should now like to offer views on some substantive aspects of a convention on chemical weapons, and in particular on the question of the declarations which will need to be included in such a convention. As work on the convention has evolved over

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the last few years, it has become clear that the filing of detailed declarations by States parties will have a key role to play in ensuring confidence in the treaty regime. Without detailed declarations, adequate verification of the convention will be almost impossible, since it is clear that checks cannot be made, for example that all chemical weapons have been destroyed, unless we first know what chemical weapons a State holds.

In our view, declarations will fall into three categories. The first category will comprise those declarations which should be made soon after the convention enters into force. Such declarations should cover the following key areas:

(a) Whether or not a State possesses chemical weapons and facilities for their production;

(b) The stocks of chemical weapons and facilities for the production and filling of such weapons held by States;

(c) Plans for the destruction or, where appropriate, diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons;

(d) Plans for the destruction, dismantling or, where appropriate, conversion of declared facilities for the production and filling of chemical weapons.

These declarations should be detailed and accurate, and should include information on, inter alia:

The number and location of stockpiles;

The number and location of production facilities for both chemical agents and munitions, as well as munition-filling facilities;

The quantity of individual agents held and their concentration categorized by named agents;

The type and quantity of munitions, including any stocks of empty munitions specifically designed for chemical charges;

The capacity of production facilities and the agents or munitions which they produce.

The above declarations should, in our view, cover both single-purpose chemical agents, and dual-purpose chemical agents above a certain level of toxicity, together with key precursors, including those for use in binary munitions. If stockpiles of dual-purpose agents are held for commercial rather than military purposes, the commercial purpose should be stated. In addition, it will be necessary to declare in detail the plans for the destruction or diversion of stocks and production facilities.

The second type of declaration, which will need to be made at periodic intervals until all stocks and production facilities have been destroyed, will contain progress reports on the destruction process, and should give details of the timing of destruction programmes, the place where the destruction will take place, the quantities of munitions and individual named agents to be destroyed, and so on.

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The third type of declaration will be required throughout the life of the convention, since a number of activities will continue to require monitoring. These declarations should cover any production of supertoxic agents for permitted purposes such as medical and protective measures. Details should be given of the quantities of specific agents produced, the location, capacity and capability of the production facility, and the purpose for which the agents are intended. Declarations will also need to be made about the production for civilian purposes of dual-purpose agents above a certain level of toxicity, giving details of the number, location, capacity, capability and turnover of production facilities for such dual-purpose agents. If possible, details of transfers of these agents should also be given, together with declarations on the number and nature of commercial research programmes into toxic agents for peaceful purposes. States must, of course, protect the interests of the commercial industries, but it would build confidence if parties had some idea of the research taking place in other countries.

I should now like to offer some preliminary comments on document CD/294, tabled at the beginning of the session by the Soviet delegation. My delegation welcomes this serious contribution to our work, and appreciates the detailed exposition of the ideas contained in it which was given to us this morning by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. We should, however, like to place on record some of the points which occurred to us in studying this document.

Firstly, on the section entitled "Scope of the Prohibition". Whilst recognizing that toxicity parameters have yet to be set for the various categories of agents, I should record here our view that irritant agents intended primarily for civil law enforcement should be excluded from a convention. There would then be no need for declarations of annual production as proposed in section II, paragraph 7, or for the negotiation of a ban on their transfer to non-States parties. To attempt to cover these materials in this Treaty would, we believe, complicate the discussion excessively and reduce the prospect of agreement.

On another point of detail, paragraph 2 of the section entitled "Elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which provide capacities for production of chemical weapons" does not make clear that all chemical weapons production facilities, except those authorized for permitted production, should be made inoperative for production purposes soon after the treaty comes into effect for any State. For practical reasons there will, however, be a time-lag between the cessation of production and the destruction or dismantling of the production facilities. My delegation would therefore ask the Soviet delegation what arrangements it envisages for the mothballing of all chemical weapons production facilities, apart from those intended for the destruction of stockpiles, until their final dismantling or destruction takes place.

My delegation would also welcome clarification from the Soviet delegation of the verification provisions included in CD/294, since some of the ideas contained in this document have not previously been put forward by the Soviet Union. Delegations will no doubt recall the detailed paper on verification and the monitoring of compliance tabled by the United Kingdom delegation in the Committee on Disarmament on 18 February. This document, read in conjunction with similar papers tabled by the

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delegations of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, outlines many of the detailed procedures we consider necessary in order adequately to ensure the compliance of States with a chemical weapons treaty.

Although this subject is not addressed in our own paper, the United Kingdom can certainly accept the setting up of national committees to oversee internal compliance as proposed in document CD/294 but a decision to set up such a committee would in our view lie with each State party. We would also reiterate our view that greater emphasis should be put on international verification measures controlled by the consultative committee. The text of a convention should emphasize in this connection the need for effective measures for systematic inspection of the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities. The Soviet draft mentions quotas for such inspections. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union touched on this point this morning, but my delegation would still welcome further clarification. It seems to us that depending on circumstances, representatives of the consultative committee may need to maintain a permanent presence at destruction sites and a "quota" may not be sufficient. Furthermore, we believe that a convention should provide for challenge inspection of general industrial chemical facilities which have a capacity for chemical weapons production, even if they are not declared as chemical weapons plants, and also for measures to check the declared volumes of accumulated stockpiles. It would also, in our view, be necessary to agree on the machinery by which States parties could assess, within the framework of the consultative committee, whether the explanations of an accused party which declines on-site inspection were sufficiently convincing.

As outlined in our own paper on verification, we consider that the consultative committee should be a permanent body established at the entry into force of the chemical weapons convention. Such an arrangement would help to ensure early investigation by the Committee of alleged contraventions of the treaty. We note that the Soviet Union has refrained from elaborating on many of the functions and powers of the consultative committee. It is, for instance, not altogether clear from document CD/294 whether, in cases of suspected violations, requests for information and for on-site inspection can be made to the consultative committee itself, so that its representatives might carry out inspections on behalf of one or more States parties, or whether the role of the Committee would be limited simply to passing on bilateral requests for such visits. In our view, only after the consultative committee has itself been directly involved in making at least one request for on-site inspection, and these requests have been refused, should the matter be taken to the Security Council of the United Nations.

I apologize if my remarks have seemed to some delegations excessively technical, but my delegation believes that we have reached the stage where detailed discussion of such points is appropriate and necessary if the progress we are all seeking is to be achieved. My delegation would welcome comments on our own ideas and look forward to a response from the Soviet delegation to the comments we have made on its paper. We shall also study with care the detailed statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union this morning. We look forward to a further exchange of views in the Working Group.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor to make a brief statement for the purpose of introducing document CD/309 submitted to the Committee on behalf of my delegation. I believe that copies of the document in English have been circulated this morning by the secretariat.

In its statement before the plenary meeting of the Committee on 3 August, my delegation put forward a proposal for the setting up of an ad hoc working group under item 2 of our agenda, on the prevention of nuclear war. We are grateful to those delegations which have come forward in support of our proposal.

It is in order to enable the Committee to come to a quick decision on this proposal that my delegation has now put forward the text of a possible mandate for the proposed working group for consideration by members of the Committee. It is a simple and straightforward formulation. The task of the ad hoc working group would be to reach agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives on this urgent and most vital issue.

As Ambassador Venkateswaran stated on 3 August before this Committee, all States have agreed on the urgent need to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war, which would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind. Survival is a matter of universal concern and we venture to hope that there is consensus in this Committee to embark seriously and earnestly on negotiations on practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. If we fail to agree even on this modest proposal, it would display both cynicism and lack of sensitivity in this Committee with regard to the deep concern and anxiety that countries and peoples all over the world feel on this vital issue. Let us reassert the relevance of this Committee to the most pressing concern of the peoples of the world. Let us grasp this opportunity to offer some hope and encouragement to those thousands upon thousands of ordinary people from all walks of life, who in unprecedented public demonstrations and statements have appealed to us to respond to their genuine fears and anxieties and take urgent action to prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

Mr. Chairman, may I request you accordingly to convene as soon as possible one or more informal meetings, as may be necessary, to discuss the proposal for setting up an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war and its proposed mandate so that an early decision may be taken on it. The matter is urgent and we need to get down to substantive work without delay.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a brief statement in my capacity as the current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. As you are aware, at the beginning of our session I wrote to all heads of delegations asking their guidance on how to proceed on the subject-matter. Since that time I have received quite a few replies, many of them comprehensive and complete, which is heartening; I feel generally encouraged by that response. Many delegations have not yet replied, however, and I have taken the floor to urge them to forward their replies to me, perhaps within the next week. I intend to start a process of informal consultations with delegations on the basis of the replies received as of 20 August.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

May I suggest that we now hold a short informal meeting to consider some organizational matters. We would later resume the plenary meeting and take action on any decisions that might be necessary in the light of our discussions at the informal meeting. If there is no objection, we will proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

The plenary meeting was suspended, at 4.15 p.m. and resumed at 4.20 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 178th plenary meeting of the Committee is resumed. May I put before the Committee for decision the appointment of Ambassador Curt Lidgard of Sweden as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee appoints Ambassador Lidgard for that position.

There is no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I extend to Ambassador Lidgard my congratulations and those of the whole Committee for his appointment to such an important position. I wish him success in the complex and vital questions to be considered by the Working Group. His outstanding qualities as a diplomat will provide the necessary leadership to achieve successful results. But he will also need the co-operation of all the members of the Committee to achieve that objective and I appeal to all to co-operate with him earnestly.

Does any delegate wish to take the floor?

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleagues around the table here for the confidence they have shown in me in appointing me to this task, and to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the very kind words you have expressed to me. I cannot hide the fact that the Swedish delegation has accepted this important task after a good deal of hesitation. Firstly, we would have preferred to have had the opportunity to prepare ourselves more carefully than the short notice we have been given has allowed us to do.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

Secondly, we consider the question of a comprehensive test ban as of very great importance. We have for a very long time done everything within our capacity in order to promote its early negotiation and achievement. The decision on the mandate for the Working Group must by all accounts be considered as insufficient for the purpose of genuine negotiations on a CTB. However, we have accepted it as the only possibility within reach for at least starting a negotiation process. We hope that our work will speed up the political process which will lead to a decision by the nuclear-weapon States to engage in negotiations on a CTBT. We also hope that we shall be able to prepare the ground in order to facilitate the future negotiations on verification measures and thereby shorten that part of the negotiations.

I want to emphasize that we have accepted this task on the specific condition that the two major nuclear-weapon powers will co-operate in earnest to achieve what can be achieved within our mandate. I envisage that we shall therefore make a real effort to examine substantially the verification aspects of a CTB. The verification issues can, however, not be examined in the abstract. We have to be in agreement at least on a working hypothesis as regards the scope of the treaty. My own assumption is that for this purpose what has to be verified is a prohibition of all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time to come. Finally, I want to make clear that my appointment to the Chairmanship in no way changes the previously announced intentions of the Swedish delegation to submit, at an appropriate time, a revised version of the draft treaty which Sweden submitted to the CCD in 1977.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, the Chinese delegation would like to make a statement on the question of the Working Group on a comprehensive test ban.

We fully understand the desire of many non-nuclear-weapon States to set up in the Committee on Disarmament a working group on a CTB with a view to curbing the nuclear arms race. It is precisely out of this consideration that we do not object to the setting up of a working group on a CTB and to its activities.

However, we have consistently held that a nuclear test ban is only one aspect of nuclear disarmament, as is also affirmed in paragraph 51 of the Final Document which states that "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind". In fact, when the Superpowers possess huge nuclear arsenals, a mere cessation of nuclear testing would not lessen the threat of nuclear war, let alone eliminate it. The cessation of nuclear testing must be carried out in conjunction with substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals. This is the way which would be conducive to the lessening of the nuclear threat and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Here, I would like to refer to the "proposal on the essential measures for an immediate halt to the arms race and for disarmament" put forward by the Chinese delegation at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The main contents of this proposal in respect of nuclear disarmament are:

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

All nuclear-weapon States should reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Pending this, the nuclear-weapon States should each undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones and not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other at any time or under any circumstances.

The Soviet Union and the United States should cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacture of any kind of nuclear weapons and reduce by 50 per cent their existing nuclear arsenals, including all types of intercontinental, medium-range and other tactical nuclear weapons as well as their means of delivery. Thereafter, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake to cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacture of their nuclear weapons and reduce their respective nuclear weapons and means of delivery according to a reasonable proportion and procedure to be agreed upon.

This proposal is predicated on the present state of nuclear armaments. It underscores the special responsibility the Superpowers should assume. It also spells out the corresponding obligation which my country is prepared to undertake. This is China's basic position on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban.

Based on the above consideration, the Chinese delegation will not, for the time being, participate in the Working Group on a CTB.

Mr. DE BEAUSSE (France) (translated from French): I do not intend to make a long statement. I simply want to remind members of the Committee that my delegation's position on the subject just raised by the distinguished representative of China was explained in detail by Mr. de la Gorce at the plenary meeting held on 5 August; and, as the Committee knows, we too shall not be participating in the work of the Working Group the constitution of which you have just announced.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the last two statements with great interest and for the time being I would like to put on record that this seems to be the first time that we are facing such a situation, when two important member States of this body, nuclear-weapon States, are dissociating themselves from participation in a subsidiary body which was created after long and strenuous efforts, to solve one of the priority items on our agenda, item number 1, the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Since this is the first time that we are being confronted with such an attitude, it would certainly be premature to try to draw conclusions from this fact. That is why I would merely like to say at this juncture that, taking into account these declarations, we will certainly have to reflect on what impact such an attitude might have on the consideration of this item, in particular with regard to the newly established Working Group -- the establishment of which we welcome wholeheartedly, and for the creation of which we have undertaken so many efforts in the past.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I would like to place on record the disappointment and regret of my delegation on learning that the delegations of two nuclear-weapon States will not be participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, on the establishment of which we so laboriously negotiated at the spring session.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In connection with the statements of the representatives of France and China, declaring that those delegations will not participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, the Soviet delegation reserves its right to define later its attitude to the situation thus created, which is unprecedented in the work of our Committee.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): While we regret the announcement made by our distinguished colleagues from China and France with regard to their non-participation in the work of the NTB Working Group, we would like to place on record the fact that the present situation in the world has created what I would describe as "nuclear apartheid". I am not going to try to guess the reasons for the decision of the Chinese and French delegations, but in my own estimation the present situation in the world, in regard to the attitude of some nuclear-weapon powers, is to create a sort of nuclear apartheid whereby they are regarded as being so responsible that they can possess and multiply nuclear weapons while others cannot. I do not think that makes for democracy; I do not think it makes for logic, and I do not think it makes for the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue.

Mr. SARAN (India): First of all, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We would like to wish him all success in his assignment and pledge to him the full co-operation of our delegation.

In response to the statement made by Ambassador Lidgard on his appointment as Chairman, as also by other delegations, I would like to place on record the consistent position of my Government concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon testing. It is our view that the aim of a treaty on a nuclear test ban is the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come. Our delegation's approach to the work of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban will be determined by the consistent policy of our Government.

Mr. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the head of my delegation will have an opportunity to offer you our congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for this month at the next plenary meeting. I have asked for the floor in order also to congratulate Ambassador Lidgard on his unanimous election as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban which was established by the Committee at its spring session this year. Like the Indian delegation, the delegation of Cuba will participate in the work of the Working Group bearing in mind the whole range of issues involved in a general and complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests. I should also like to take the opportunity to support document CD/309 submitted by the delegation of India with respect to the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war, and to express my delegation's regret at the situation that will be created for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban if two nuclear-weapon States do not take part in it.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I would also like to congratulate at the same time as thanking Ambassador Lidgard for taking charge of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. As a matter of fact, I think this Working Group should normally be chaired by a member of the Group of 21, and, in the view of my delegation, in the Group of 21 there is no one better qualified than Ambassador Lidgard to assume that office. May I add that I should like to place on record the disappointment of my delegation at the decision that we have just heard from our distinguished colleagues from the People's Republic of China and France. I reserve the right of my delegation to revert to this subject at a later stage.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, this is a rather unique situation that for the first time my delegation is confronted with. On the one hand, I have just noted with great pleasure and satisfaction the fact that our colleague and dear friend from Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, has graciously accepted the great responsibility of exercising the function of Chairman of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. On the other hand, I cannot hide my feeling of profound regret and disappointment that two nuclear-weapon States have just declared their unwillingness to participate in the work of that particular Working Group. I thought, as I believe did many others around this table, that the activity of the Working Group could lead to the furtherance of the work of the Committee relating to disarmament. My delegation also reserves the right to address this question in greater detail in due course.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, since I explained the position of my delegation with regard to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban at some length very recently, at the Committee's 175th meeting, held on 3 August, I can be very brief today and simply say that our position remains unchanged. As regards the declarations we have heard today and which my delegation deplures -- the declarations of the distinguished representatives of China and France -- my delegation hopes that this situation will not be used as a pretext for nullifying or slowing down the negotiations that will, we hope, be conducted seriously in the Working Group towards the goal of the cessation of nuclear weapon testing, which is stated in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and reaffirmed in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is implicit in article VI of that Treaty. We venture to hope that if the Working Group is successful in its undertaking, even if with the participation of only three nuclear-weapon powers, it would be very difficult for the other two to continue their refusal.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. May we now turn to another subject? As I noted earlier, at the informal meeting, the first meeting of the Working Group will be held tomorrow, Friday, 13 August, at 3 p.m. The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the time-table for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for next

(The Chairman)

week. The time-table is, of course, indicative, as usual, and subject to change, if need be. That applies particularly to the possibility of scheduling, if necessary, informal meetings of the Committee. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the time-table for next week.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 17 August, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV
Mr. SOTIROV
Mr. DEYANOV
Mr. MIKHAYLOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. LI WEIMING
Mr. SUO KAIMING
Mr. YU ZHONGZHON

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. d'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. G. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India: Mr. S. SARAH

Indonesia: Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM

Iran: Mr. J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Sweden: Mr. C-M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. S. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Ms M. WINSTON

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA .

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERESATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 179th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 2 of its agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Nigeria, Italy, the Netherlands, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, China, Australia and Norway.

First of all, allow me to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Vaernø, a diplomat of wide experience and for a long time associated with disarmament matters. Ambassador Vaernø has been since 1977 special adviser on disarmament matters to the Foreign Ministry of Norway and since 1978 Director-General of the Ministry's Department of Policy Planning and Research. He was the leader of the Norwegian delegations to both the first and the second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and Chairman of the 1980 Review Conference of the Convention banning biological weapons. Ambassador Vaernø is also Chairman of the Foreign Ministry's Advisory Council on Disarmament and Arms Control.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Nigeria, His Excellency Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation to see you -- the representative of a brotherly non-aligned African country -- presiding over the meetings of this Committee for the month of August. From the competent way you have conducted the Committee's affairs, you have demonstrated your wealth of experience and diplomatic skill, and I pledge the co-operation and support of my delegation in the accomplishment of your difficult task. My good friend and colleague, Ambassador Okawa, also deserves our gratitude for a job well done during the spring session. My hearty words of welcome go to our new colleague, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, and I look forward to working closely with him. We say farewell to our versatile and amiable friend, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who leaves Geneva finally at the end of this week.

Sixteen years ago, I had the honour of sitting in this hallowed chamber representing my country in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. My feeling then was that the arms race was a symptom of an underlying disease and that if we could cure that disease the symptom would go away. All good physicians, I know, make a distinction between a disease and its symptoms, and in general their prescriptions aim at curing the disease and not the symptoms.

After the unqualified failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, I am more convinced by this line of reasoning regarding the arms race and disarmament negotiations than I was sixteen years ago. If I may paraphrase the words of my distinguished Chinese colleague, to catch a fish you don't climb a tree; you go to the river.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Depending upon one's angle of vision, the failure of the second special session can be attributed to many factors. To my mind some of these factors are:

- (i) First, the sense of unrealism which has provided the basis of some of the theoretical abstractions that have evolved in this Committee; and
- (ii) Secondly, the lack of political will on the part of the big military powers represented in this body. In this connection I wish to recall that a distinguished member of this Committee reminded us during the spring session that political will is not manufactured here in Geneva. It is brought from home. In other words, what can be achieved in Geneva depends largely on the assessment of the international situation by our respective Governments and the security requirements called for by such assessment.

I wonder if one can talk seriously about disarmament without attempting to answer the question, what are the causes of the arms race or why are nations, on the whole, unwilling to disarm? Some of the statements that have been made in this hall since the beginning of the spring session seem to point at the correct answers. The distinguished representative of China, Minister Tian Jin, has already advised us against looking for a fish on top of a tree. Mrs. Inga Thorsson, leader of the Swedish delegation, in her statement on 3 August, gave reasons why we fared better at the first special session than at the second. She acknowledged the fact that the first special session took place "at a time when international relations, and relations between the two Superpowers in particular, were infinitely better than now." Still on the same point, Ambassador Louis Fields of the United States said on 10 August that "the CD has failed to produce a single treaty. This is attributed to various causes. But in the view of my delegation the real lesson of the second special session is that this negotiating body cannot confine itself to a narrow view of the world. If it does, it is in danger of becoming irrelevant to its true objective." To my mind, this is a profound statement not only because of the graphic way it has been put, but also because of the relevance of the message it contains.

It can be shown that most agreements in the area of disarmament negotiations have taken place during periods of an agreeable international climate. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the Salt agreements which were signed in the era of détente are examples of progress in disarmament negotiations made under a favourable international climate.

If it is possible to establish a relationship between success in disarmament negotiations and a favourable international climate, will it not be worth our while to make serious efforts at improving the international climate while at the same time working hard on disarmament negotiations? I am not going to suggest that a working group be set up here or elsewhere within the United Nations system to monitor the observance of the United Nations Charter by member States with particular reference to Article 2, paragraph 4. If such a group were set up, its work would have a catalytic effect not only on the programme of disarmament but on disarmament negotiations generally.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Today we are all witnesses to the ever-increasing arms race by the Superpowers and other nuclear-weapon States, a sad reflection of the disorder and lawlessness in international affairs. This race, and the competitiveness it breeds, have had their spill-over effects in other regions of the world, especially the third world where, as we all know, all the wars since 1945 have taken place. This has brought untold hardship to millions of people in the third world and hindered, in no small measure, the process of economic development.

My delegation is convinced that the time is overdue for this Committee to devote some informal meetings to discussions on the close relationship between disarmament and development, and we hope that at its 1983 session the Committee on Disarmament will allocate time for this important agenda item.

Permit me now to comment briefly on the Committee's work programme for this session. My delegation agrees that the short period available to us this session compels us to be selective and deal only with matters of the utmost urgency and priority on our agenda. We therefore support the immediate convening of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We are of the view that the limited mandate, with all its pitfalls, should not close the door to further proposals and initiatives that would make more realistic the present sketchy terms of reference. My delegation welcomes the unanimous election of Ambassador Curt Lidgard as the Chairman of the Working Group. While regretting the decision of two nuclear-weapon States not to participate in the work of the Working Group, I believe that their action reflects the degree of uncertainty in the international climate. My delegation is of the opinion that the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to abide by the provisions of Article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty has created a situation of nuclear apartheid which does not help in solving the nuclear problem.

My delegation regrets that the credibility and effectiveness of this Committee continue to be jeopardized owing to its failure to embark upon multilateral negotiations on the urgent and priority question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The spontaneous enthusiasm that "peace movements" have so far manifested has demonstrated the world-wide conviction of the unacceptability of the nuclear-weapon option.

We fully agree with a nuclear freeze option, a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, and a halt to the further manufacture of nuclear weapons.

We again request that the Group of 21's proposals contained in document CD/180 be tabled immediately before the Committee for a decision. My delegation agrees with the Indian delegation that there is enough material in the replies of all States, and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to the Secretary-General's Note in response to General Assembly resolution 36/81 B, for this Committee to devote time to discuss measures on how to prevent a nuclear war. We also support the Indian proposal for the setting up of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war.

While welcoming the Geneva bilateral talks on intermediate-range nuclear and strategic arms, we hope that in future the scope will be broad enough to cover all weapon systems. We also join the call that this forum should not turn into a

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

secret cult with a deliberate news black-out. Indeed, this Committee and the entire international community have the right to be informed of the state of the negotiations.

The prevention of the arms race in outer space is another key issue on the Committee's agenda. We see its urgency in the over-all process of nuclear disarmament. The increased militarization of outer space manifests a more dangerous trend in the arms race, and my delegation stands firm in the conviction that outer space constitutes a common heritage of mankind to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. While we favour the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject, it is our view that the scope of the convention must be comprehensive enough to cover anti-satellite weapon systems.

The fact that at its second special session the General Assembly was not able to agree on a comprehensive programme of disarmament is both disappointing and frustrating, but my delegation is not discouraged. We still believe that a CPD with specific and concrete international measures of disarmament and a clear-cut order of priorities, to be implemented within a given time-span, provides hope for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. While agreeing that the Working Group should be kept in abeyance during the remaining part of the 1982 session to allow for reflections and informal consultations under the able leadership of Ambassador García Robles, we hope that this period of meditation will not be a pretext for dilatory tactics on the part of those delegations that want to see the programme permanently put away. My delegation maintains the same attitude with regard to the ad hoc working groups on negative security assurances and radiological weapons. The "cooling off" period should also provide sufficient time for rethinking especially among the nuclear-weapon States, whose political input has remained elusive in the course of negotiations. The informal consultations could perhaps succeed in providing compromise solutions to the problems.

My delegation welcomed the Committee's decision to concentrate negotiations during this summer session on chemical weapons. We believe that these weapons, next only to nuclear weapons, constitute the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. However, we are under no illusion about the hard bargaining necessary to achieve even modest success in this area, having regard to the fixed positions of the two major blocs. My delegation will, as usual, continue to co-operate actively with Ambassador Sujka of Poland, whom we are happy to see guiding the work of the ad hoc Working Group.

My delegation was one of those that listened with rapt attention to Ambassador Fields of the United States when he set forth, a few months ago, his country's approach to the achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. On that occasion, we were informed that the United States intended to modernize its chemical weapons warfare capability because a potential adversary had not joined the United States in reducing its own chemical warfare

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

capability and had also greatly increased its own chemical warfare capability, thus threatening the security of the United States, and as if this were not enough, this adversary had doubts as to whether it was complying with the Biological Weapons Convention. At that time, my delegation joined the delegation of Sweden in saying that the United States modernization programme would only start an irrational chemical weapons race that would further complicate the work of the chemical weapons Working Group. We still hold this view.

My delegation again listened with interest to the United States intervention on 12 August 1982, and we agreed with the view expressed that the verification and compliance arrangements of a future chemical weapons convention should be truly effective in order to ensure a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons.

We have stated on a number of occasions our position on the verification provisions of a future chemical weapons convention, and we would like to say once more that a chemical weapons convention should provide for a combination of national and international means of verification which should complement and supplement each other. Strict reliance on national verification measures in our view is not realistic and cannot generate international confidence in a chemical weapons convention. On the issue of verification, there are fundamental differences of approach and only by narrowing the differences can any real progress be made in elaborating a convention. My delegation therefore welcomes the USSR draft general provisions which obviously is a basis for further concrete work. At this juncture, we would only like to stress that we feel that the future chemical weapons convention must ensure the destruction of chemical warfare agents, munitions and devices, as well as the destruction and dismantling of chemical weapons means of production. While we have generally agreed that this should be completed within ten years after the convention has entered into force, we would support a mechanism to conclude this earlier, in order to ensure wider and quick adherence to the convention, which would enhance international confidence and contribute to the disarmament process. While the verification provisions are still a major hurdle to be crossed, the problem of the scope of the convention still deserves some attention. While my delegation noted the views expressed by the Soviet Union, we continue to hold the view that there is no legal difficulty in including a provision relating to use, since such a provision will strengthen the 1925 Protocol by adding measures of verification to it, and since even if a ban on the production of chemical weapons is immediate, the weapons will still be retained in the period between the coming into force of the convention and the time-frame for total destruction. All the same, only a significant change in the political will of certain States will ensure the required progress on this question. The important element for my delegation is that there should be an effective provision in the convention recalling the provisions of the Geneva Protocol that chemical weapons should not be used and for an effective mechanism for verification of the use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

The failure of this organ to record any significant progress since its inception continues to be a matter of paramount concern. Perhaps it is relevant now to take a second look at this machinery and see whether there exist any other ways by which the effectiveness of this multilateral negotiating body could be enhanced. Although we have no illusion in retaining the principle that there is no substitute for frankness and goodwill, our experience has shown that some of our organizational procedures need to be reviewed periodically for the Committee to be action-oriented.

The rule of consensus, and the way this has been used in the Committee to obstruct even straightforward issues like matters of procedure, clearly comes to mind. Rules are made for man and not man for rules. My delegation holds the view that this body is competent to review such rules as are found to be restrictive and obstructive rather than helpful.

Other proposals have been tabled concerning, for example, giving the ad hoc working groups a free hand to determine their working procedures, the possibility of the Committee's working for a longer period, and changing the name to raise the status of this negotiating body. All these are useful proposals that this Committee could examine and make appropriate recommendations on to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

The issue of expansion, however, needs a careful and objective consideration if the purpose is to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee. My delegation, while agreeing in principle that ample opportunity should be given to all States Members of the United Nations to participate as observers in the work of the Committee, nevertheless believes that the present number is adequate for the purposes of negotiation. This does not mean that we are opposed to a limited expansion of membership which must take into account geographical spread in addition to the positive contribution of non-members to disarmament efforts. It is only in this way that a balanced representation of the international community can be ensured.

These are specific issues, necessary preconditions for progress. We cannot afford to spend precious time in this beautiful chamber like Emperor Nero "fiddling while Rome burns". Mankind is witnessing trying times, unprecedented in history with the danger of nuclear catastrophe staring us in the face. I hope this Committee will be equal to the challenge!

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy, His Excellency Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the Italian delegation would like first to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee and to wish you every success in your work. The competent way in which you are guiding our work is yet another reflection of your great qualities as a diplomat and the worthy representative of a country with which Italy maintains fruitful relations.

My delegation would like to thank the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Okawa, for the exemplary manner in which he accomplished his task during a particularly difficult period in the work of our Committee.

I should also like to take this opportunity to offer a warm welcome to the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu, and to express my delegation's regret at the departure of an eminent member of this Committee, Ambassador Venkateswaran, the distinguished representative of India. Allow me also, Mr. Chairman, to associate myself with the words of welcome you addressed to Ambassador Vaernø of Norway.

As this session of the Committee is a short one, I feel that it would be more useful if I were to confine my remarks to a brief statement of my delegation's views on certain questions more directly related to our current work, namely, a nuclear test ban, chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, established as a result of very difficult negotiations, has finally begun its work under the dynamic and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard. The first meetings of this Group have taken place in a positive atmosphere, which makes us optimistic about the possibility of making a start, at this session, on the implementation of its mandate. We feel that the attitude of the United States delegation is particularly encouraging, and will allow the Group greater latitude in its work. Although the absence of two delegations is obviously regrettable, it should not, for the time being, prevent important and useful work from being done in the Working Group, which at present constitutes the only international forum dealing with the subject of a nuclear test ban.

Furthermore we are convinced that, in considering the problems connected with the verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban, the new Ad Hoc Working Group will not fail to take advantage of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Some degree of co-ordination between these two bodies would certainly be useful, and the question of a possible broadening of the mandate of the Group of Experts, which has been suggested by several delegations, should be given consideration.

It is in the matter of chemical weapons that the Committee most nearly fulfils its institutional role as a multilateral negotiating body. Our great appreciation goes to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Sujka. We endorse the objective of completing, by the end of this session, the elaboration of a document which can next year serve as the basis for the drafting of the text of a convention. The discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group clearly shows that the success of our efforts depends essentially on agreement on an adequate system of verification. In this connection, we would like to express our appreciation to the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands which have made very useful

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

new contributions in this area during this session. For the same reason, we share the interest aroused by the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The comments to which they have given rise and the replies awaited thereon could be of considerable assistance in our efforts.

On a specific point, that of the use of chemical weapons, I should like briefly to recall our position, which has already been explained in the Working Group: it is that a solution to the question of the use of chemical weapons should be sought within the framework of an adequate procedure for dealing with complaints. To this end, the future convention should include a clause expressly endowing the consultative committee with competence to investigate any complaint concerning the use of chemical weapons, and this, independently of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the validity of which should be explicitly reaffirmed. Such a clause should be based on recognition of the fact that any use of chemical weapons would necessarily imply the violation of one or more of the obligations included in the field of application of the Convention.

It is, however, essential that a rapid investigation into the use of chemical weapons should be possible. For this reason, provision should be made for the fairly automatic initiation of an investigation after the receipt of a documented complaint. The consultative committee's competence in this sphere should apply not only to cases of the use of chemical weapons by a State party to the convention, but also to cases of their use with the assistance of a State party. Last year, my delegation proposed a formula which is included among the comments on Element XIII, covering these two possibilities: we have noted that several delegations have expressed similar views this year; we therefore hope that our proposal can form the basis of a compromise to resolve this delicate issue.

I am pleased to note that the Committee seems determined henceforward to give the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space all the attention it deserves; some reservations expressed last spring appear to have been overcome. Proposals have been made for the establishment of a working group on this item of our agenda. We are in principle in favour of doing this. The real problem, however, is not whether or not to set up a subsidiary body, but how to proceed in this matter. It would be essential for the group to have an appropriate mandate, both because of the technical complexity of the subject and because we have no experience of negotiations on weapons control and disarmament in this area.

Without a mandate which provides a specific goal for our discussions, they are likely to prove aimless. My delegation has constantly drawn the Committee's attention to the urgent need to consider, as a matter of priority, questions concerning an effective and verifiable prohibition of anti-satellite systems. That in itself would be a sufficiently ambitious task. Although opinions in the Committee differ on this subject, we have noted with satisfaction some change in the way of thinking of certain delegations.

On the points to which I have referred, as well as on others which will be considered by the Committee, we should bear in mind the lessons of the second special session on disarmament. While it produced very little in the way of

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

concrete results, that session will nevertheless have taught us certain things. The negotiations on the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the main objective of the session, are proof of this. Although it did not prove possible to reach an agreement, these negotiations provided the international community with a unique occasion for a thorough consideration of all matters relating to disarmament and their interdependence. Thus the discussions will have led to a better understanding of the problems and respective positions, and this in itself is a worthwhile result.

My delegation is still very much in favour of the continuation of efforts towards the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The negotiations that have taken place so far have shown that there are basically two types of problem: problems relating to the structure of the programme and problems relating to its formulation. This is particularly true with regard to nuclear weapons. When we resume these efforts, we ought to try first to resolve the structural problems.

At a time when all mankind is in doubt about its destiny and we are powerless to prevent the multiplication of bloody conflicts and violations of the fundamental rules that should govern the life of the international community, it is our duty to ask ourselves what contribution the Committee on Disarmament can make to the cause of peace.

The General Assembly, at its second special session on disarmament, rightly devoted special attention to the prevention of nuclear war. The delegation of India recently put before the Committee a proposal in this connection. However, precisely because we are living in the nuclear age, our efforts ought to be directed towards the prevention of war in all its forms. We all live in fear that conflicts which begin with the use of conventional weapons may, by accident, error or miscalculation, reach the nuclear threshold. That is why respect for the Charter of the United Nations and for international law are crucial to the success of disarmament; similarly, conventional disarmament is a fundamental aspect of all efforts aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war. This is in part because of the growing sophistication and lethality of conventional weapons and the increasingly frequent use of such weapons in various regions of the world.

In my delegation's view, these considerations should form the basis of any contribution which the Committee on Disarmament may decide to make to the cause of preventing a nuclear conflict.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency Ambassador Van Dongen.

Mr. Van Dongen (Netherlands): For many years, the Netherlands has stressed over and over again the need for a vigorous pursuit of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Within this context no one will deny the close relationship that exists between the two aspects of nuclear arms control, i.e. between nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the maintenance of a non-discriminating and credible non-proliferation regime by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other hand. As we have stated before: "unrestrained vertical proliferation could increase the danger of a widening proliferation in a horizontal sense".

(Mr. Van Dongen, Netherlands)

My Government therefore attaches the utmost importance to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament currently taking place in Geneva between the United States and the USSR which indeed, in conformity with paragraph 48 of the Final Document, bear a special responsibility in this matter, being the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals.

This does not mean that one should now rely solely on these negotiations and forego other approaches towards nuclear disarmament.

The Netherlands has consistently held that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty is long overdue. During two decades, a CTB has been a priority item on the international disarmament agenda. But even so, nuclear testing continues.

A complete and verifiable prohibition of tests of nuclear explosive devices in all environments and for all time will hamper considerably the development of new nuclear weapons, either by nuclear-weapon States or by non-nuclear-weapon States. A comprehensive test ban would strengthen the security of all States, create conditions for a gradual de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and draw closer the goal of undiminished security at a progressively lower level of armaments. Moreover, a universal agreement to cease nuclear testing would enhance confidence between States.

Consequently, it is a matter of serious regret to the Netherlands Government that under the present circumstances the trilateral negotiations will not be resumed.

We also regret that not all nuclear-weapon States will participate in the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 of the Committee's agenda.

We are fully aware of the argument advanced by China and by France, that is that the envisaged CTB treaty would tend to freeze the situation in favour of the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. We do not contest it, but we should like to point out that this argument applies even more pointedly to the non-nuclear-weapon States possessing the industrial and scientific capability of providing themselves with a nuclear armoury. The danger of nuclear weapons is such that we have difficulty in accepting the thesis that for some States, further testing to enhance their nuclear capability remains necessary before a halt can be considered. Moreover, we are convinced that a successful outcome of the above-mentioned bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR -- which we ardently hope for -- might help other nuclear-weapon States to overcome their reservations as to the test ban under negotiation here.

Even if the parameters of the ban under consideration here do not fully meet the national requirements of all States, all of them would be served by the establishment of an adequate integrated international monitoring system which would verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty. That is exactly what we are going to try our hand at this summer and we would therefore welcome the active participation of both China and France.

The appeal I made just now should not be conceived as indicating that we are entirely satisfied with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group as it stands. We do attach the greatest importance to adequate verification as is well known, but we do not consider verification to be an aim in itself.

(Mr. Van Dongen, Netherlands)

Paragraph 31 of the Final Document states that the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Verification requirements can vary substantially, depending on the decision whether the envisaged ban is going to prohibit all nuclear tests in all environments or only nuclear weapons testing. We should, we believe, aim at a combination of two items: first, a good definition of scope -- in the view of the Netherlands Government this would mean that the envisaged ban would also apply to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions -- and secondly, an adequate and reasonable system of verification. In this context I may perhaps repeat what my predecessor had to say on 2 April 1981: "We should not overreach ourselves when dealing with each of the separate elements of the draft convention. We should not become prisoners of perfection."

For a sensible discussion of verification, the question of scope will have to be addressed. In this respect we endorse what the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Inga Thorsson, had to say at the 175th meeting of the Committee, on 3 August 1982: "The Working Group now established should be utilized to the full to investigate all relevant aspects of a CTBT."

The subject of verification in the nuclear field transcends, of course, the mere test ban. Eventually, however far away this may seem, it will come into play when a halt in the production of nuclear warheads and the destruction of stockpiles are being considered. Compared to the intrusive verification measures needed for these purposes, those necessary for an effective and adequately verifiable test ban are in all likelihood modest in scope.

There would be a less direct, but in the end probably effective way of halting the production of nuclear weapons, i.e. by the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This idea, first proposed by the late President Eisenhower, has always been attractive to the Netherlands, primarily because a cut-off is one of the few nuclear arms control measures for which an international verification system has already been worked out in principle: I refer, of course to the IAEA safeguards.

But let me now turn to the tools presently available to handle the subject in hand.

It is a matter of satisfaction to the Netherlands delegation that thanks to your good guidance, Mr. Chairman, the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 of the Committee's agenda has started smoothly on its course of action. We are happy to see our distinguished and respected colleague Ambassador Kurt Lidgard of Sweden chairing it. We trust that under his dynamic leadership the Ad Hoc Working Group will accomplish whatever its present limited mandate allows for. We also welcome the announced participation of Dr. Ulf Ericsson as a special adviser.

(Mr. Van Dongen, Netherlands)

The present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group requests it to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test ban. Before the conclusion of the 1982 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group has to report to the Committee on the progress of its work. Thereafter the Committee on Disarmament will take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard.

It is clear that we have to act with some speed to carry out this mandate in time. We would therefore suggest that the Ad Hoc Working Group be accorded as many meetings as it needs, irrespective of meetings of other ad hoc working groups.

Netherlands working document CD/312 which I have already briefly presented in the Working Group and which I take pleasure in introducing now to the Committee, contains a draft programme of work for the Ad Hoc Working Group's activities.

The first part contains some general observations indicating our approach to agenda item 1. We believe that the paramount importance of a nuclear test ban lies in its effective contribution towards stopping both vertical and horizontal proliferation. A nuclear test ban would thus be an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

The test ban to be agreed upon should be comprehensive and of worldwide application. Given this scope, the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 should certainly draw on the reports of the trilateral negotiations, but should not take those negotiations as the only basis of its work. With respect to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, we contest that they can be distinguished from non-peaceful ones. They should be covered by the test ban, but we might eventually be willing to consider dealing with them in a separate protocol.

The establishment of an international monitoring system should be envisaged. If it is to be comprehensive, it should be an integrated monitoring system, comprising both atmospheric and seismic detection methods.

The second part of our working document contains an outline of a draft programme of work for the Ad Hoc Working Group. We suggest that the Working Group would start with the consideration of institutional aspects of an integrated international monitoring system.

We have found no justification for any departure from the division into three main topics to be considered under this item as defined in document CD/95 submitted on 22 April 1980 by Australia. The Working Group could usefully draw on the illustrative list of subjects contained in that paper.

(Mr. Van. Dongen, Netherlands)

A second activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group would be the elaboration of the technical prerequisites for the establishment of an integrated international monitoring system by acting upon the work performed under its traditional mandate by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events and the integration of atmospheric detection methods into the envisaged monitoring system.

Provisions relating to compliance with the test ban are identified as a third item on the programme of work as we see it.

The final item on the draft programme is the obvious category of final clauses to a comprehensive test ban. If, and I admit that it is a big if, a programme of work as outlined could be completed, conditions would be ripe for the conclusion of a multilateral CTBT.

It follows from the outlined programme of work that the Ad Hoc Working Group would be in need of expert advice. The work of the seismic experts would have to continue and an advisory body on atmospheric detection methods could probably not be dispensed with.

In the third and last part of our working document we suggest that this aspect be adequately dealt with by an enlargement of the mandate of the presently functioning Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to include advice on atmospheric detection methods. The name of the new body would have to be readapted accordingly. To avoid unnecessary loss of time, this new Ad Hoc Group of Experts should be established as a subsidiary organ of the Ad Hoc Working Group and report to that body. It would, of course be master of its own procedures; it might decide e.g. to establish two or more subsidiary bodies, one consisting of seismologists, thus not disrupting the present fruitful co-operation in the seismic group.

I may perhaps add one specific remark about the co-operation of the seismologists. So far the expert Group has not been able to absorb all relevant technological advances made in the recent past. In our view, particular attention should be given to setting up procedures which would ensure that all stations in a global network would be equipped with modern digital recording devices and that computers with adequate capacity for handling the seismometer recordings should be installed and linked to an international communication system.

This concludes my presentation of our working document, CD/312. But before leaving the floor, I should like to underline once again that my Government considers a comprehensive test ban to be a key element of the process to bring nuclear armaments under control and will, therefore, continue to contribute towards its realization.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Today this Committee takes up item 2 of our agenda -- the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. I would like to address this subject in the first part of my statement. Afterwards I should like to dwell upon some questions concerning the newly established Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

In view of recent developments, especially the adoption of long-term plans for the intensification of the nuclear arms race by one nuclear-weapon State, steps by the Committee on Disarmament to come to grips with item 2 are more necessary than ever before. The need for urgent measures to curb the nuclear arms race has again been underlined by reports about new efforts undertaken by the United States to justify a nuclear war and to make such a war winnable.

The International Herald Tribune of 16 August published on its page one an article stating that "on the orders of the Reagan administration, the Pentagon has completed a strategic master plan to give the United States the capability of winning a protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union". According to this press report the plan is to supersede the ill-famed Presidential Directive 59 approved by the former administration. The plan is said to have much more of a fighting stance and is more detailed in its advocacy of nuclear warfare than that directive and other relevant United States documents. The report quotes an article published in 1980, one of the authors of which was recently appointed as an adviser to the United States Government. The authors specified that 20 million United States fatalities would represent a "compatible level" in a nuclear war. But no conclusion was drawn with regard to possible fatalities in the region of my country in the case of a protracted nuclear war, in Central Europe, where there is a great concentration of people and where in one country the biggest density of nuclear weapons in the world exists. Who could dispute that the casualties in this region, in the case of a protracted nuclear war would be significantly higher? Thus, in the light of the growing danger of a nuclear war, nuclear disarmament should play a central role in the activities of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee must give this question the priority it deserves. It is a matter of satisfaction that this view was expressed at the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament and in our recent debates here by the overwhelming majority of States.

My delegation continues to favour the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2. This would be a clear and encouraging indication that this Committee will live up to its responsibilities. Unfortunately, now as before, such a step is being blocked by some nuclear-weapon States.

It was with great interest that my delegation on 10 August listened to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States in which he declared: "We believe that negotiating meaningful measures of nuclear disarmament is the most urgent task before us". But unfortunately no conclusion was drawn concerning the role of the Committee on Disarmament in this regard. My delegation would be very much interested to know if the United States delegation, in view of the above-mentioned opinion, is ready to review its position and agree to the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2. On 5 August we noticed with pleasure that the People's Republic of China expressed its support for the establishment of such a working group.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

During our previous deliberations the argument was advanced that a working group on item 2 was not necessary in view of the ongoing bilateral negotiations. These negotiations, of course, are very important and we wish them success. It is our hope that meaningful results can be achieved on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

But bilateral and multilateral negotiations by no means exclude each other. As was stated in document CD/4 tabled by the socialist group in 1979, the preparation and conduct of the negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them should not be to the detriment of bilateral negotiations, nor should they impede the achievement of bilateral agreement.

The aim of multilateral negotiations on item 2 should be the development of a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament. This could support negotiations in other forums. In recent years a body of proposals was assembled which could be taken up in a more organized and systematic manner in an ad hoc working group. In this regard we have in mind inter alia:

The proposals made by the Soviet Union at the second special session on disarmament on the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme;

Proposals on a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons submitted at the second special session by India, Mexico, Sweden and Ireland;

The Canadian "Strategy of suffocation" as well as the proposal by Australia and Canada on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes (CD/90).

This is only an illustrative list. Working documents CD/171 and CD/293, prepared by the secretariat, show that there is enough material to be processed and transformed into a nuclear disarmament programme by an ad hoc working group on item 2.

Closely connected with item 2 is the question of the prevention of a nuclear war. Although the General Assembly underlined in its report on its second special session that the prevention of nuclear war remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day, it was not possible at that session to come to an agreement on urgent measures in this regard. Some delegations were only virtually ready in the last hours of the second special session to agree to set up a subsidiary organ to deal with this matter.

We deem it is now time for this Committee to continue the work started at the second special session. My delegation, therefore supports the proposal made by the Indian delegation on 12 August for the establishment of a working group to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Such a group should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives. In this connection, the obligation by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is of particular importance.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Recent events again underline the urgent need to proceed to negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

According to press reports the United States is now preparing the production of a third type of neutron warhead. It was reported that a large part of the 23,000 nuclear warheads which the United States envisages producing in the next 10 years are to be neutron ones. There are more and more signs which prove our concern, many times expressed in the Committee on Disarmament, that the introduction of neutron weapons into military arsenals would lower the nuclear threshold. This is inter alia confirmed by the fact that leading military figures in the United States are thinking of "some form of delegated clearance" to use tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe. A recent American study pointed out that 5-20 neutron nuclear warheads could be used to destroy one tank division of the other side. Here, again, military planners seem to look upon this weapon as if it was a special kind of conventional arms, thereby fully disregarding the devastating results the use of such nuclear weapons would have in Central Europe and in other parts of the globe. Not to speak about the world-wide implications connected with the role of neutron weapons as a trigger to an all-out nuclear war. In the view of the military planners mentioned above the neutron weapon is the ideal weapon for the so-called integrated battlefield or "conventional-nuclear-chemical-biological-electronic battlefield". Taking into account all these developments, my delegation would like to reaffirm the proposal of the group of socialist countries that the Committee on Disarmament should create the necessary organizational conditions to negotiate on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons. The best framework for such negotiations would be the establishment of an appropriate working group.

Having discussed questions connected with item 2, I would like to associate myself with the proposal that you, Mr. Chairman, should go ahead with your consultations to develop a common approach on the Committee's future course of action concerning item 2. We hope that you will soon be in a position to report to the Committee on those consultations so that we may take the appropriate decision. In the view of my delegation the holding of some informal meetings on item 2 would not be sufficient.

The approach outlined above would be a real means to support "the Committee on Disarmament as an institution", as Ambassador Sadleir of Australia put it on 5 August. I hasten to add "as an institution for negotiations", since mere discussions, technical debates or even "educational exercises" would not suffice.

This also fully applies to the activities of the Ad hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban which had its first meeting last week. With regard to the work of this Group my delegation would like to stress the following:

Firstly, in its work, the Group should proceed from the principle that the scope of prohibition of a given disarmament agreement determines its modalities of verification. This principle was reaffirmed in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. Therefore, my delegation agrees with the view expressed on 10 August by the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan that, "the first issue relating to verification is the scope of the test ban". Only on the basis of a clear understanding on the scope of a CTBT can the Working Group proceed to the discussion and definition of questions of verification. In the view of my delegation the scope of such a treaty should be the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests by all States for all time to come.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Secondly, the discussion and definition of verification issues should take place in a practical and rational manner, having in mind that it is the aim of this Committee to elaborate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Group should therefore concentrate its work on the main political and legal questions of verification connected with such a treaty but not hold academic discussions on verification in abstracto. At this session, which is actually the first phase of its work, the Group should take up all relevant proposals and define the issues which would constitute the basis of a verification system. Next year, on the basis of a new mandate, the Group could then proceed to the actual drafting of the treaty as a whole.

Thirdly, my delegation will resist all attempts to convert the Ad Hoc Working Group into another technical group. In our view, the Group is not the right place to discuss the administrative, financial and legal aspects of a so-called international seismic monitoring system. These undoubtedly important questions can be solved when there is an agreement on the basic provisions of a CTBT. Then an appropriate body for these highly organizational and technical issues may be set up. To go the other way round would mean to put the cart before the horse. What can be discussed in this regard if we do not know what will be the scope of the treaty and which countries will take part in it and provide data for the international exchange? Moreover if, owing to the position of some countries the treaty is concluded only in the distant future, technology will have further developed and today's technical and organizational considerations may be obsolete.

Fourthly, there should be a clear understanding that a perfect, foolproof verification system is not and will not be possible. Here as in other cases one should not look for the wishful verification system but for the system which is attainable and will provide sufficient assurance that clandestine tests will be detected. Existing technical means of verification, an international exchange of seismic data as well as some procedures of international co-operation, including verification by challenge, make the likelihood of the detection of such tests very high. It is the considered view of my country that the threat caused by the absence of a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests far outweighs the low risk posed by a not-foolproof verification system.

Before concluding my statement I cannot but express again the concern of my delegation on the position of France and the People's Republic of China towards the NTB Working Group. It is our hope that they will reconsider their position and take an active part in this Group. It was also with deep regret that my delegation on 10 August in the plenary and on 13 August in the Working Group heard the reaffirmation of the United States position that a CTBT was only an "ultimate goal" and that the present time was "not propitious" for negotiations on it.

Moreover, on 6 August, the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, a responsible figure of the United States Administration declared that the United States will continue to test nuclear bombs and may increase the size of weapons tested.

In view of this, one may ask what purpose the NTB Working Group will serve. In this regard we share the doubts expressed by the Swedish delegation on 3 August concerning the attitude of the nuclear-weapon State mentioned above.

Time and again we have stressed that verification discussions should be related to the practical needs of disarmament agreements but should not become a cover for the lack of political will to agree on certain measures of arms limitation and disarmament. It would be a bad service to this Committee and the cause of disarmament if the Group just established is intended by one side to be used to this end.

As far as my delegation is concerned, we are prepared to play an active part in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on the basis of the above-mentioned considerations.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor for the first time at a formal plenary meeting, I wish first of all to associate myself with the congratulations that have been expressed on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for this unusually difficult month of the session. I take this opportunity also to express my delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for his very valuable contribution to our work in the crucial month which preceded the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Anybody who has been around this Committee for a long enough time, has to get accustomed to the fact that as time passes one good colleague after the other disappears from our midst. This month we are sad to note the absence of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden, Ambassador Yu Peiwen of China and Ambassador Valdivieso of Peru, to whom tribute is to be paid for their work in the Committee. This expression of sorrow, however, is suppressed by the feeling of pleasure in welcoming among us our old friend, Ambassador Ion Datcu of Romania, whom I wish success in this new job.

In conformity with our programme of work, and fully in accord with the priorities, long established and only recently reconfirmed, I wish today to deal, first and foremost, with questions related to the first two items on our agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and a nuclear test ban. These are, in fact, the questions that were in the focus of attention all through the second special session, which ended only a few weeks ago.

The special session was taking place in particularly difficult and disquieting international circumstances, in a period which had been considered and also proved to be unfavourable to efforts aimed at curbing the arms race and promoting genuine disarmament. Nevertheless, the delegation of Hungary, like those of the great majority of the member States, went to the special session fully determined to do everything possible to contribute to the removal of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, the halting of the arms race, especially in its nuclear aspects, and the promotion of concrete measures of disarmament.

The special session, though unable to arrive at specific conclusions and recommendations, has clearly expressed "its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war", and declared unambiguously that the prevention of a nuclear disaster "remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

The peoples of countries like mine, which have suffered the horrors and devastations of two world wars, which are living in the shadow of unprecedented accumulations of weapons of mass destruction, have fully recognized that if they want to survive, if they want to live in peace and security, nuclear war must be prevented and the nuclear arms race must be brought to an end.

It was against this background that the Hungarian delegation, together with those of the overwhelming majority of member States, approached the fundamental issues of the special session. It was against this background that the representatives of non-governmental organizations and a world-wide movement of public opinion gave an unprecedented support to the efforts of those delegations. It was against this background that they all welcomed the solemn commitment of the Soviet Union concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and urged the other nuclear-weapon States to assume similar obligations, that is, to live up to the special responsibility they must bear for the future of mankind.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation is fully convinced that the undertaking of such an obligation by all the nuclear-weapon powers would reduce to a large extent the danger of a nuclear war, would strengthen confidence among those powers, as well as the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in them, and would in fact be equivalent to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. Such a turn of events would create the necessary atmosphere for further steps towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

A great number of statements delivered during the first four meetings of this session have convinced my delegation that the majority around this table are ready and willing to start meaningful negotiations on questions of top priority like the prevention of nuclear war, as well as various aspects of nuclear disarmament. We welcome that sign of readiness, and are all set to engage actively in such negotiations. At this point I wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation with the working paper presented by the delegation of India at the previous meeting -- document CD/309 -- concerning a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group to be established under item 2 of our agenda. Having been advocating the establishment of such a working group for many a year, the Hungarian delegation welcomes this new initiative. Together with several other members of the Committee my delegation is requesting you, Mr. Chairman, to start immediately urgent consultations on that proposal. Informal meetings of the Committee on the same subject could be convened without much further delay.

The world community of nations, including of course the peoples of our own countries, have shown indignation at the lack of any tangible results in the previous years of disarmament negotiations. Criticism is mounting, expectation is growing, and the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament as a whole and that of its members is greater now than ever before. At the special session certain delegations obstinately defied the wish and determination of the great majority, even the popular masses of their own countries, and stubbornly blocked every effort aimed at reaching agreement on the most burning questions. Now the pressure is upon this Committee, and that pressure is clearly mounting. If we want to avoid world-wide criticism and condemnation for failure to live up to our task, we must start concrete negotiations on the priority questions of our agenda. One of the priority items, as I have just tried to indicate, is the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. The other such question, in fact the very first item on the agenda, is a nuclear test ban.

The complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests is a task of particular urgency. This is a problem the solution of which is long overdue. The head of the Hungarian delegation in his statement at the special session gave evidence of a certain measure of optimism, and a large amount of expectation, when he said the following:

"It is heartening to note in this respect the decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament last April in Geneva to have a working group start consideration on these items soon. We shall do our best to ensure that the working group contributes to the earliest possible cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests." (4/8-12/PV.9, p.31)

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Committee at the last meeting, and congratulates Ambassador Curt Lidgard of Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1. We can assure him of our full support and co-operation.

In April my delegation acted in a spirit of co-operation and compromise when it joined the consensus on a mandate for that Working Group. We considered and continue to consider the compromise formula as a basis on which concrete work towards the negotiation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests can and must be started. We fully endorse the interpretation of the provision of that mandate given by Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic in his statement on 21 April, and the Hungarian delegation will participate in the activities of the Working Group in conformity with that interpretation. My delegation fully shares the views expressed in connection with the work of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban by my colleague from the German Democratic Republic who preceded me.

In the context of agenda item 1, the Hungarian delegation feels it necessary to express its regret and resentment concerning the attitudes of China and France with respect to their non-participation in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We certainly hope that their negative posture will not last long.

The alarming news reports concerning the United States position on nuclear-weapon testing, and the United States Administration's open refusal to resume the trilateral talks on a comprehensive test ban, have come as a slap in the face to all those who are eager to start negotiations on that top priority issue. The prospect that the United States may even increase the size of the weapons tested, as indicated recently by one of the high officials in Washington, is a valid reason for concern and anxiety not only to members of this Committee but also to the whole of mankind.

The Hungarian delegation, therefore, is eagerly awaiting a detailed and unambiguous statement from the delegation of the United States, clarifying the intentions of its Government on that very important subject.

There is yet another item which I want to deal with today. During the spring session of the Committee the Hungarian delegation welcomed the adoption of a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, allowing it to accelerate the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. We deem it essential, as we emphasized also at the special session, that renewed efforts should be made towards the early elaboration and conclusion of such a convention. We must keep in mind that certain decisions concerning the manufacture and deployment in Western Europe of a new type of chemical weapons, binary weapons, are likely to initiate a new surge in the arms race. It is, therefore, especially justified and urgent to demand the active contribution of all member States to the work that has been under way since 20 July in the Working Group under the able and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The best example of such an active contribution is the "Basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention submitted by the Soviet Union at the special session, and tabled also here as document CD/294. That document, having received overwhelming support from delegations, is capable of giving a major impulse to accelerated and serious negotiations on a draft convention, given similar will also from other sides.

The Hungarian delegation is of the view that the Working Group has made substantial progress in its deliberations -- and here one must not forget to mention the useful activity of the experts on chemical weapons -- at least enough for the elaboration of a composite draft text of a convention. Containing already agreed provisions as well as alternative texts for provisions where agreement may not be reached within the short time now at our disposal, the composite text would make it possible not only for us but also for the General Assembly at its forthcoming session to assess the progress achieved, and would then serve as a useful basis for our negotiations next year.

I cannot conclude this statement without giving strong expression to the deep concern and rightful indignation of my Government and of public opinion in Hungary over the brutal Israeli aggression against Lebanon, the Palestinian people and the peoples of the whole region. We have strongly condemned that genocidal attack and the imperialistic motives behind it, and continue to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon and other occupied territories.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today I would like to dwell upon the question of banning chemical weapons. This question has all along had its important place in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and has attracted particularly the attention of the people. This is because, on the one hand, the people of the world are abhorrent of such inhuman weapons, and on the other hand, the threat of chemical war is growing unabated. One Superpower, faced with charges of its use of chemical weapons, is refusing any international investigation, while the other Superpower, in disregard of opposition at home and abroad, is engaged in the renewal of its chemical arsenal with binary chemical weapons. The side which has gained an edge in chemical warfare capacity tries to preserve it, while the losing side attempts to recover its lost superiority. Thus, the two sides are vying with each other in expanding their respective chemical armaments. These facts and also what has transpired in some of the local conflicts since the Second World War serve to remind us that we must not relax our vigilance against the grave consequences of the possible use of chemical weapons. The Committee on Disarmament has the responsibility to eliminate this horrible threat and to reach agreement as soon as possible on the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons.

We have scored some progress after several years' efforts. The devotion and ability of the successive chairmen of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the goodwill and co-operative spirit displayed by many representatives as well as the efforts made by the experts -- all these have made it possible for us to enter into a new stage of elaborating provisions of a future convention. In this regard, document CD/CW/WP.33 submitted at the end of the spring session is of help in our further negotiations.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

Now I would like to offer some observations on the following questions:

1. On the scope of the prohibition:

We have maintained all along that the use of chemical weapons should be included in the scope of the prohibition in a future convention, and we have repeatedly reiterated our position both at plenary meetings and at meetings of the Working Group. Together with four other delegations, we put forward at the spring session an alternative text on this issue. In the discussions since 20 July, the importance of this question has gained more attention. Here I would like to express our thanks to the Romanian representative for his useful work as co-ordinator of the consultation group on the question of "scope of prohibition". He has provided us with a list of possible solutions on this question which will facilitate our further discussions.

2. On declaration:

Declaration is one of the key elements in a future convention. A declaration should include detailed and accurate items and contents in its provisions; otherwise, the effectiveness of the convention could not be ensured. In this connection, I would like to point out that in annex II of document CD/CW/WP.33, it is laid down that the contents of declarations should include the capacity and location of chemical weapons production facilities. We consider this very necessary. We are also of the view that the production facilities for chemical weapons referred to here should comprise both factories set up solely for producing chemical weapons as well as specialized facilities affiliated to other chemical industry enterprises (such as a chemical weapons workshop set up within a civilian chemical industry enterprise).

The delegation of the Soviet Union put forward recently the "basic provisions" of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall study them further. The Soviet paper contains provisions relating to declarations and confidence-building measures. According to those provisions, a country might postpone its declaration to the international community of the location of chemical weapons production facilities till seven years after it becomes a party to the convention. We feel that it is rather difficult to understand such a prolonged postponement. It is our view that the adherence of a State to a convention means that it is willing to undertake the obligations laid down in the convention; consequently, the location of production facilities to be dismantled should not be kept secret for such a long time. Otherwise, it would run counter to the purpose of the confidence-building measures.

3. On verification:

Verification is another key element in a future convention. Strict and effective verification would serve as an important guarantee that the convention may not become a mere scrap of paper. In this regard, suffice it to refer to the historical lessons of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is precisely because the Protocol lacks the necessary verification provisions that over the past 50 odd years since the signing of the Protocol it has not been possible to conduct any fair international investigations into complaints about the use of chemical weapons, including complaints and reports on chemical warfare in Afghanistan and south-east Asia in recent years. This state of affairs cannot but jeopardize the authoritativeness of the Protocol.

Therefore, we hold that emphasis should be put on international verification and, in particular, necessary on-site inspection. In fact, many States have advanced constructive proposals. Document CD/CW/WP.33 also embodies a number of very good provisions. However, there are also evident shortcomings, i.e. no on-site investigation is provided for in regard to complaints or reports on the use of chemical weapons. We deem it indispensable to include such a provision, if we are to attempt to elaborate a credible convention for the international community.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

We have noted that the Soviet Union, in submitting the "basic provisions", has accepted the principle of on-site inspection. In the "basic provisions", reference has been made to the possibility of carrying out on-site inspection in two kinds of situation. Some representatives have made comments in this regard. As I mentioned earlier, we will study the Soviet proposal further. However, I would like to offer a preliminary observation. We feel that to ensure the effectiveness of the convention, more necessary on-site inspections are required, such as on-site inspection on the dismantling of production facilities and on allegations of the use of chemical weapons, etc.

Since the start of the summer session, the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has adopted some flexible approaches, setting up a number of informal consultation groups to engage in intensive consultations on some major issues of a future convention. We welcome this useful attempt. We also hope that consultation will be conducted on the basis of the results already achieved, which are reflected in document CD/CW/WP.33.

During the Second World War, the Chinese people also suffered from the harm of chemical weapons. In order to eliminate forever the danger of chemical war, the Chinese delegation sincerely hopes that a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons can be concluded as soon as possible. To this end, we pledge to make efforts together with other delegations.

Mr. STEBBE (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor today to react to the announcement by the delegations of France and China that they will not participate in the work of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Australia has for many years stressed the priority in disarmament negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, and has consistently played an active role in international forums on this question. We have always held that such a ban should be genuinely comprehensive and should prohibit all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. A comprehensive test ban must, by definition, be capable of attracting universal adherence. It goes without saying that the prospects for this would be vastly better if all those States involved in nuclear testing participated in work on the treaty from the outset. While it is true that the Working Group established by this Committee is not, for the time being, empowered to begin negotiations on a CTB, it does have the opportunity to make an invaluable contribution to that end. Indeed, the fact that the Working Group does not have a negotiating mandate is all the more reason why no delegation should abstain from participation.

Australia can feel only regret and disappointment that two of the nuclear-weapon States have seen fit not to join in this endeavour. The Australian public has long been concerned at continued nuclear testing, particularly in our region. It will not be an easy task for the Australian Government to explain why two States, both having excellent relations with Australia, have declined to join in discussions aimed ultimately at a halt to such testing. Australia hopes that France and China will reconsider their positions and at an early date take up their rightful place in the nuclear test ban Working Group.

Australia similarly hopes that the negotiations between the other three nuclear-weapon States may be resumed at the earliest possible date.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 157th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway, His Excellency Ambassador Vaernø.

Mr. VAERNØ (Norway): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to thank you for your kind introductory welcome and also to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. In view of the close co-operation between Kenya and Norway, it is a great pleasure for me to address the Committee while you are in the Chair. Personally, I should also like to recall our close collaboration at previous conferences to which you always made important contributions.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament must necessarily take on added significance, convening as it is just after the conclusion of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Like other governments, the Norwegian Government shares the disappointment felt as the second special session failed to adopt more substantive and far-reaching documents. It did not achieve what we had hoped for. On the other hand the second special session was not held in vain. A balanced analysis will have to take into account a number of considerations.

First, the second special session provided yet another opportunity for all Members of the United Nations to address themselves to the global issues of arms control and disarmament in a detailed and thorough-going manner. The management of armaments in our contemporary world is certainly a question which deserves the attention of this world body in a way which only a special session can provide.

Secondly, the second special session did carry out a review of the implementation of the decisions, or the lack thereof, of the first special session. Whereas no unanimous conclusion was reached in this respect, the session did reaffirm the Final Document of the first special session. It must be emphasized that the commitments undertaken at that time are still valid, including the Programme of Action.

Thirdly, it should be recognized that during the second special session, a number of ideas and proposals were put forward. To the extent that these contributions will facilitate negotiations toward balanced and verifiable agreements, the session will indeed have been valuable.

We should not, however, underrate the problems which might arise from the possibility that large sectors of public opinion, disappointed and disillusioned by the lack of tangible results from the second special session might increasingly come to distrust and turn away from all multilateral disarmament negotiations. The limited achievements of the special session have underlined the vital role of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. In this perspective the restoration of public confidence in the whole process of multilateral disarmament negotiations is also at stake. Here it seems to us that multilateral negotiations in the sense of producing militarily significant agreements are becoming more important than ever. It is urgent that this process now be speeded up. It is in this spirit that my delegation today intends to table two working papers, which we hope might constitute a modest contribution to this process.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Important follow-up work remains to be done both by the Committee on Disarmament and by the General Assembly as a result of the second special session. To the extent possible, we intend to take an active part in this follow-up process.

We still attach importance to the comprehensive programme of disarmament and are pleased to see that the Ad Hoc working group on a CPD has been re-established under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles. Norway intends to participate in the CPD Working Group when it resumes its work in 1983.

In addition to the follow-up of Nordic proposals in the fields of disarmament and development and on non-proliferation policies, Norway would like to see a number of issues in the institutional field acted upon both by this Committee and by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. I draw the attention of members of the Committee to our own proposals regarding the Committee on Disarmament, UNIDIR, and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. As regards the Committee on Disarmament, it is the hope of my Government that the Committee will be able to present a unanimous recommendation to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session concerning the expansion of the Committee's membership, consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness. My delegation was pleased to note that suggestions in this respect received wide support during the second special session.

The theme of this morning's meeting -- the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- is a priority item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

It is certainly of importance to the Committee that the bilateral talks begun in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons should lead to results which can facilitate nuclear disarmament. As regards the other priority item, the comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Norwegian Government welcomed the decision taken at the close of the first part of the 1982 Session of the Committee on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban. We are pleased that Ambassador Lidgard, the distinguished representative of Sweden, has been elected Chairman of this important Working Group.

Since its establishment in 1976, Norway has participated in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Norwegian participants are scientists at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR). A Norwegian scientist from NORSAR is scientific secretary of the Ad Hoc Group. Another Norwegian scientist is co-convenor of the study group on format and procedures for the exchange of level 2 data.

During the past 10 years, Norwegian scientists have conducted extensive studies and completed large-scale research projects relevant to the problem of the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions. Experts from many countries have participated in the research activities at NORSAR. This has resulted in improved methods for distinguishing the signals of explosions from those of earthquakes. NORSAR also publishes a monthly seismic bulletin, which is distributed in more than 20 countries.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Under the able chairmanship of Dr. Ericsson of Sweden, the Group has proposed the establishment of a global seismological network to assist in the verification of a potential CTBT. The Ad Hoc Group is pursuing its work by elaborating in detail how such a global system should be operated. A problem of particular importance in this regard is how to achieve rapid, reliable exchange of the large volumes of seismic data which would be accumulated. In the years that have gone by since the Ad Hoc Group first proposed the global system (in 1978 in document CCD/558), there have been rapid technological advances with respect to computer and data communication technology. This has opened up new possibilities to improve the effectiveness of the global data exchange, and Norway considers it important that the work of the Ad Hoc Group take advantage of this new situation.

As a Norwegian contribution to the work of the Group, a low-cost computer system has been developed for the purpose of rapid international exchange of seismic data. The system would be suitable as a prototype which could be further developed for future installation at any station in the global seismic network.

In this connection I have the honour to introduce the Norwegian working paper contained in document CD/310 on a prototype system for the international exchange of seismological data under a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a prototype has been developed by scientists at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) as a result of a research project which was initiated in 1980 under the sponsorship of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This afternoon a demonstration of how such a system functions will be staged by representatives of NORSAR.

It is our hope that this national contribution will prove to be of value to the further studies of the seismic expert Group and the negotiations in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which in its first phase will focus on verification.

As we have pointed out before, the Norwegian Government is prepared to make NORSAR available as a monitoring station within a global seismic verification system. With this in mind, Norway will continue to take an active part in the seismic expert Group. We shall also participate in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban as an observer.

According to the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its regular sessions, the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Norway welcomed the decision taken at the beginning of this year's session on a revised mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Based on document CD/CW/WP.33 and under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Sujka, the negotiations are now entering a new phase, aimed at reaching compromises on the main outstanding questions. In this regard, Norway has with interest studied the proposals concerning verification contained in the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention which were introduced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union during the second special session.

The Norwegian Government is of the opinion that a ban on chemical weapons is one of the most important issues on the international agenda for disarmament.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Today, I have the pleasure to introduce document CD/311, which is a Norwegian working paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention. The working paper is based on a research programme on sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions. This research programme, which is also sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was initiated in 1981 as a Norwegian contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The working paper contains a summary of the research report. The full report is annexed to the English version of the working paper.

This working paper describes the results of field experiments of sampling and analysis of supertoxic nerve and mustard agents under winter conditions. Field experiments have been undertaken in order to avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory set-up. The samples were left outside in the prevailing weather conditions of changing temperature, wind and relative humidity, which are hard to simulate in a laboratory exercise.

Within the framework of the research programme we have studied the various factors determining the loss of chemical agents, in order to evaluate the probability of making a negative or positive conclusion. We have also investigated the penetration and diffusion of the chemical agents in snow, problems of the utmost importance for sampling procedures. In addition, we have looked into the problem of transporting samples from the field to an internationally recognized laboratory. The field experiments showed that identification of chemical agents can be made by analysis of snow samples taken as long as two weeks, and in some cases even more than four weeks, after possible use. Verification of nerve agents such as Vx and Soman can be achieved over a longer period than is the case for Sarin and Tabun.

In the last part of the working paper we have made some concluding remarks concerning the consultative committee to be established within the framework of the convention.

The committee should be authorized to conduct on-site inspections in order to fulfil its responsibilities. In our view, the committee should establish a pool of well-qualified international experts from whom a multilateral team of experts could be selected in each case.

As soon as possible after its establishment, the committee should adopt verification procedures flexible enough to take account of any new scientific achievement. In elaborating the procedures for on-site inspection it is necessary to take into account the time element.

In the second phase of the Norwegian research programme which will take part during the winter of 1983, we intend to study problems related to storage of samples until they can be analysed by an internationally recognized laboratory. We shall also investigate the behaviour of other agents such as irritants and precursors. Efforts will also be devoted to the possibility of using the decomposition products of chemical agents under winter conditions as additional evidence of identification, since this may significantly extend the possibility for drawing firm conclusions for a long period after possible use.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegate wish to take the floor?

As the Committee is aware, several proposals have been advanced in connection with item 2 of our agenda. In our timetable for the present week, we left open the possibility of holding an informal meeting next Thursday, 19 August, in the afternoon. We have already had one comprehensive informal consultation on all these matters. It now remains for us to hold an informal meeting in this chamber, in conformity with our established practice. I suggest that we hold an informal meeting on 19 August at 3.30 p.m. to consider these proposals, i.e. those in documents CD/180, tabled by the Group of 21, CD/259, submitted by the German Democratic Republic, CD/219, tabled by a group of socialist countries, and CD/309, tabled by India. There may be some others too. We could also continue our exchange of views on document CD/272 submitted by Mongolia under item 7 of the agenda, i.e. the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

If there is no other suggestion, we will proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to inform the Committee that I have requested the Secretariat to circulate in the delegations' boxes a communication received from the Chargé d'Affaires of Senegal requesting participation in the work of the Committee under rules 33 and 35 of the rules of procedure. I intend to put before the Committee a draft decision concerning that request at our plenary meeting next Thursday.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV
Mr. SOTIROV
Mr. DEYANOV
Mr. MIKHAYLOV
Mr. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG
Mr. SUC KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. d'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. G. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India: Mr. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran: Mr. J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. M. BICHIR
Mr. T. PANAIT
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Sweden:

Mr. C.M. HYLTEMIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms M. WINSTON
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VHRUNEC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 180th plenary meeting of the Committee on disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 2 of its agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the Committee's work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mongolia, Brazil, Romania, Venezuela, India, Cuba and Mexico.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Mongolia, His Excellency Ambassador Erdembileg.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. We should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Okawa of Japan for his great contribution to the work of the Committee during the final stage of the first part of this session of the Committee.

The Mongolian delegation sincerely welcomes the new representative of Romania to the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador I. Dăcu, and wishes him success in his responsible tasks. I should like once again to express our feelings of sympathy and friendship towards Ambassador Venkateswaran of India who is leaving his present post to take up a new appointment.

As many speakers have rightly observed, this summer part of the session of the Committee on Disarmament is marked by the fact that it is taking place just after the recently concluded second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many of us here are asking ourselves whether that most representative international forum, whose meeting was accompanied by a new surge of the powerful anti-war movement in the United States, Europe and other parts of the world, lived up to expectations of the peoples.

In this connection, I should like to refer to the Final Document of the first special session, whose historic significance is now growing steadily greater. In one of its paragraphs, it is particularly stressed that "in order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreement". The results of the second special session clearly proved that that was a sound conclusion. Opposition to this recommendation has developed, as the facts show. For it is not at all by chance that crisis situations have been created and aggravated in the south-western Atlantic, the Near East and other areas. On the eve of the second special session, the NATO countries met in Bonn at the highest level -- and this again was not an accident. The tragic events in Lebanon were the result of the criminal aggression of Israel, with the connivance of its protectors, which has provoked angry condemnation throughout the world and **resolute demands for an immediate end to the piracy, barbarism and genocide being perpetrated against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples.**

These are some links in the chain of the obstructionist policy and actions of the opponents of peace, détente and disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembilig, Mongolia)

The reason why the second special session was unsuccessful was, precisely, such policies and actions on the part of certain circles in NATO countries and their followers. They created obstacles to the adoption by the special session of the necessary decisions and recommendations.

In spite of this, the second special session was an extremely significant event which marked the continuation of the start of a new stage in United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament.

It should be emphasized that at the second special session the question of averting a nuclear war was regarded as being of paramount importance.

In this connection, a new Soviet initiative of historic significance deserves to be singled out. From the rostrum of the second special session, the Soviet Union solemnly proclaimed its unilateral assumption of a commitment not to be first to use nuclear weapons. This commitment on the part of the Soviet Union, which came into force immediately upon being proclaimed, met with the support and approval of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations. They are now waiting for the other nuclear-weapon powers to do likewise and give the same undertaking. These expectations of the peoples should be met, and this would create real conditions for averting the threat of a nuclear war.

The Soviet Union's constructive approach to the question of the prevention of nuclear war and to the urgent problems of disarmament was again demonstrated in its Memorandum entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race". In this connection I should like to stress the importance of the Soviet proposal for the freezing of nuclear weapons at their current levels.

This new peace-loving action of the Soviet Union and the important documents presented by the USSR have met with the warmest approval and full support in the Mongolian People's Republic.

I should also like to mention the energetic efforts of the delegations of India, Mexico, Sweden and other States which put forward at the second special session a number of important ideas and suggestions on the questions of the prevention of nuclear war, the freezing of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their use. As you know, they submitted draft documents on these matters which should be carefully examined at the next regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.

While on the subject of the results of the special session of the General Assembly, I cannot fail to mention the hope which was expressed that the World Disarmament Campaign would make a further contribution to the mobilization of public opinion in support of efforts for disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee has this week begun discussing one of the highest priority items on its agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Next week it will discuss the question of a nuclear test ban.

At the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as at the start of the Committee's summer session, almost all speakers expressed serious concern at the continuing nuclear arms race and the growing threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. It is scarcely necessary to say that in the present situation the senseless arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race, is a direct threat

(Mr. Erdembilig, Mongolia)

to world peace and security. There is no doubt, therefore, that the struggle to preserve peace and avert the threat of a thermonuclear disaster is a key issue, a burning question, and a paramount obligation for all States without exception.

Moved by a sincere desire to avert the threat of nuclear war, the peoples of the world sincerely welcome and support the Soviet Union's undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is our belief that in this unilaterally assumed commitment by the USSR lies the cardinal solution to the problem of averting nuclear war. If the other nuclear-weapon powers were to undertake a similar commitment, then a reliable defence will have been created against nuclear war, and the use of nuclear weapons will in effect be prohibited. In this connection, the Mongolian delegation considers that the Committee on Disarmament should display a serious and constructive approach and devote itself without delay to the consideration of matters relating to the prevention of nuclear war. Like many others, our delegation fully supports the proposal for the earliest possible establishment of an ad hoc working group to proceed immediately to negotiations with a view to the drawing up of an agreement on this subject. In our opinion, the draft mandate on this issue put forward by the delegation of India and the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons presented by it to the second special session of the General Assembly and circulated as an official document of the Committee could serve as a sound basis for work in this field.

It is generally agreed that the task of averting nuclear catastrophe largely depends on the solution of problems in the field of the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The best way to achieve success in this matter, we suggest, is to begin negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament within the Committee, which is the single multilateral negotiating forum for working out concrete international agreements on the curbing of the arms race and disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation urges, as it has done in the past, that questions relating to the nuclear arms race should be considered on a priority basis. To speak in practical terms, we are in favour of the establishment without delay of an ad hoc working group on agenda item 2 and the starting of real negotiations in that working group. Members of the Committee are well aware of the specific proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries concerning the questions to be considered by such a working group. However, I should like to draw attention to a new point of interest. The memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament contains a proposal for the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme, as well as agreement, in response to the wish of many States, that one of the first stages in the programme should be the cessation of production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of various types of nuclear weapons.

We consider that the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and of strategic weapons as a whole are of great importance. For its part, the Soviet Union is deploying persistent efforts and a constructive approach with a view to achieving success in these negotiations.

In the complex measures for the limitation of nuclear weapons and the averting of the nuclear threat, an important place should be given, inter alia, to the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The decision taken by the Committee at the end of its spring session on the setting up of an

(Mr. Erdenbilig, Mongolia)

ad hoc working group on agenda item 1 aroused the hope of the Mongolian delegation that it would be possible to begin concrete negotiations on this question. However, in view of the new circumstances, doubts arise as to the sincerity and reality of the intentions of certain nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee and their willingness to embark on genuine negotiations.

This applies in the first place to the recent decision of the United States Administration not to resume the trilateral negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, which they had broken off, as well as to another of its decisions — the decision not to ratify the bilateral Soviet-American agreements signed in 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is perfectly obvious that the United States does not wish to show willingness to negotiate with a view to drawing up an international legal instrument on a total nuclear weapon test ban. This is the only explanation for the attitude of the present United States Administration on this question.

The recent formal declarations by France and China of their refusal to participate in negotiations in the new Ad Hoc Working Group have caused general concern. The positions adopted on this issue by certain other States are also well known to us. Thus, on this question a situation is emerging which is quite familiar to us from the past.

We should like to believe that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban will be able to do some useful work during the short time that remains at this session. We consider that in future this Group should deal seriously more with questions of substance. In this connection, the practical and business-like participation of all nuclear-weapon States without exception is necessary.

It is well known to all that the Soviet Union and other socialist States, as well as many non-aligned and neutral countries are in favour of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests by all States, in all environments and for all time.

We take as a starting point that it is not only important to strengthen the 1963 Moscow Treaty, by making it more universal, but also urgently necessary to elaborate and implement a comprehensive solution in this field.

The Mongolian delegation shares the opinion of the majority of the members of the Committee, including a number of western delegations, that the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on questions, verification and compliance should not focus purely on the technical side of the issue, but should be aimed at achieving a political and legal solution in order to facilitate the drawing up of an international agreement on a complete and general nuclear test ban. This is precisely what we see as the major goal of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

Allow me now to make some comments on behalf of the Mongolian delegation on agenda item 4.

During the second part of its current session, the Committee on Disarmament is paying particular attention to the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, one of the most pressing tasks in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. First of all, I should like to refer to the vigorous activity of the Working Group under the able and energetic guidance of the Ambassador of Poland, Comrade B. Sujka. A considerable number of formal and informal meetings and many consultations have been held, and in addition eight working contact groups have been

(Mr. Erdembilig, Mongolia)

set up in which intensive work is being done. In a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, two weeks ago, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group held consultations with experts on a number of technical questions, in which 35 specialists from 23 countries took part. All this bears witness to the priority importance which delegations attach to the speediest possible solution in the Committee of the question of the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

My delegation does not intend at this stage to sum up the present state of the work in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. I should like merely to refer to something which we consider very important. As has frequently been observed here, as a result of the careful and thorough consideration of chemical weapons problems, there now exist all the conditions for real progress in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We believe that various things have contributed to this situation, foremost among them being the submission by the Soviet Union of a new document entitled, "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", which contains quite a number of new elements relating to the solution of the most complicated issues. The Mongolian delegation would like to express the hope that the other partners in the negotiations will also take responsible steps towards the accomplishment of this difficult but vitally necessary task in the sphere of genuine disarmament.

In view of the pressing and urgent need to achieve agreement in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons, and of the signs of progress which are becoming apparent in the negotiations, the Mongolian delegation supports the proposal that agreement should be reached on an indicative date for the conclusion of the drafting of the convention. We also consider that at this stage the Ad Hoc Working Group could conclude its work on the preparation and submission to the Committee of a composite text of a draft of the future convention by the end of this session. We believe that for this purpose the Working Group should be given the necessary additional time to enable it to conclude its work with the best possible results.

In conclusion allow me to make some comments concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

According to its programme of work, in the fifth week of this part of its session, the Committee on Disarmament will proceed to discuss agenda item 7.

During both the spring and the summer parts of the Committee's session, almost all delegations have spoken in favour of the creation of an ad hoc working group. There was a general understanding in the Committee on the setting up of this subsidiary body. In order to facilitate the speediest possible adoption of a formal decision on this question, during the first part of the session the Mongolian delegation formally submitted a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group for consideration by the Committee and proposed that consultations should be held with a view to reaching agreement on the text.

As you know, so far no specific comments have been made on the draft mandate we put forward, nor have any amendments or additions to it been suggested.

(Mr. Erdenbilig, Mongolia)

Last week the United States delegation expressed doubts as to whether the establishment of such an ad hoc working group would be the best course at the present stage. It advocated the holding of a certain number of plenary meetings, either formal or informal, on the subject of outer space.

As I stated earlier, the Committee has already decided to devote its plenary meetings on 31 August and 2 September to a consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. If the Committee decides in addition to hold some informal meetings for the discussion of this question, the Mongolian delegation will have no particular objections.

Such an organization of the work should not rule out the possibility of continuing the consultations and exchanges of views already begun in the Committee on the draft mandate, but should on the contrary stimulate them. The Mongolian delegation is thus in favour of the Committee's using all possible methods and forms of working so that it can reach agreement on the text of a mandate as soon as possible.

We do not see the need to postpone consideration of a mandate for this group until the conclusion of the Committee's discussion of the substantive side of the question at this part of its session. If one delegation does not agree to the setting up of the working group, that is a totally different matter.

The Mongolian delegation appeals to the members of the Committee on Disarmament to pursue intensive consultations so that before the end of the summer part of its session the Committee can take the necessary decision for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil, His Excellency Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, in the four years during which this Committee has been in existence, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have invariably been inscribed as the top priority items on its agenda. We have together agreed that the danger of a nuclear war must be averted, and that nuclear disarmament is the only way to ensure that mankind will be spared its devastating consequences. The history of mankind's concern over the existence of such formidable means of destruction goes far back to the first and so far the only time when nuclear weapons were used to ensure military victory. So far, the number of nuclear weapon powers has remained at the present five; fortunately, since then, the vast majority of nations have been concerned with putting an end to the threat of extinction by striving for nuclear disarmament while not exercising their sovereign right to a nuclear military option. They have consistently argued that the existence of a handful of nations claiming exclusive

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

right to maintain and develop nuclear arsenals is in itself a situation that breeds unacceptable insecurity, since the whole world is held hostage to the state of relations among them. Indeed, the two most powerful nations on earth have been engaged in confrontation for almost forty years. To claim, as we have often heard, that the existence of nuclear weapons must be credited for the precarious peace that has prevailed during those forty years in one part of the world is, from the point of view of the rest of humanity, a gross misconception. That claim betrays the narrowness and selfishness of the underlying motives to perpetuate imbalance and discrimination among nations.

No greater disservice can be done to the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both in its vertical and horizontal aspects, than the attitudes and policies of the nuclear-weapon powers themselves. Their stubborn refusal to recognize the genuine interest of the non-nuclear nations in vital security matters is a part of their attitudes and policies. At the opening meeting of this summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, Mrs. Inga Thorsson put the question in its true perspective when she asked the nuclear-weapon powers whether they were prepared to accept the full responsibility for their inaction and insensitivity. It is a question that the leaders of the nuclear-weapon powers and particularly the two superpowers, should think over very carefully with their security advisers and military planners when taking decisions that cannot but affect the security options of the non-nuclear-weapon nations.

At the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, we heard some of those leaders, at the highest possible level, speak on behalf of their Governments, while on the streets their peoples chanted a rather different message. No doubt, in other parts of the world, other peoples would send the same signals to their own leaders, if their opinions could be freely expressed. In either case, however, the ears to which the message was addressed have remained deaf. The special session ended in frustration and weariness, by approving a lacklustre document in which commitments accepted four years ago, but hitherto unfulfilled, were "solemnly" reaffirmed. But the nuclear-weapon powers' behaviour in this multilateral forum is still in stark contradiction to the professed objectives to which they committed themselves four years ago and which they reaffirmed last July.

The Committee on Disarmament is still barred from taking any concrete steps with regard to item 2 of its agenda. Nuclear matters, we have been told several times, are too complex and too sensitive to allow for multilateral treatment. After almost forty years of the existence of nuclear weapons, can the nuclear-weapon powers point to any example of success in their on-again, off-again attempts to discuss in closed quarters their nuclear differences? Has their mad race to gain decisive military advantage in any way been slowed or reversed?

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

For the last couple of years, the Group of 21 has tried unsuccessfully to obtain consensus for its proposal on the establishment of a working group on item 2. At the same time, new nuclear missiles were being deployed in eastern Europe at the rate of one every five days, while the rival alliance reached a decision to go ahead with plans to replace its nuclear forces with a new generation of missiles and warheads. Doctrines predicated on the actual use of nuclear weapons are still the mainstay of the strategic thinking in both confronting camps. Can the nuclear-weapon powers and their allies expect non-nuclear nations to remain forever on the sidelines, when their own vital security interests are also at stake?

A new proposal has been tabled by the delegation of India to establish a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. We support the Indian proposal and hope that quick agreement can be reached on the wording of a mandate. My own delegation was among the original sponsors of resolution 36/81 B, adopted by consensus, which asked the nuclear-weapon powers to submit concrete proposals and suggestions on that question. Consideration of the matter of preventing nuclear war was, however, effectively blocked at the second special session. Some nuclear-weapon powers not only delayed until the last few days of the special session their answers to the Secretary-General, but also utilized procedural manoeuvres to make sure that no serious work could be undertaken on that item. By the sheer display of lack of interest on anything but the immediate propaganda benefits, in one case, or by linking the prevention of nuclear war to the wider problem of war itself, in the other case, they in effect precluded, for all practical purposes, the consideration of the question at the second special session; moreover, by equating nuclear war with the broader question of war in general, they further reinforced the concerns that they consider nuclear weapons as a legitimate means for use in war.

The prevention of nuclear war can hardly be argued as pertaining exclusively to the province of the nuclear-weapon powers, since, by the very nature of the nuclear weapon, the consequences of nuclear war will affect nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations alike. The two superpowers have, in the past, arrived at a few agreements on precautionary measures to avoid nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, and at the second special session one superpower announced its intention to approach the other with further proposals of this kind. We hope that negotiations between them for that purpose will soon start. That should not, however, prevent the Committee on Disarmament from establishing a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. The existing agreement on the matter between the United States and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war, signed at Washington on 22 June 1973, and further measures designed to avoid nuclear war by accident and miscalculation, could provide a starting point for further discussion and solution of related problems in a multilateral perspective. The aforementioned 1973 bilateral agreement, for instance, recognizes that "nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind". It seems only natural that the views of those who stand to be devastated be considered in future agreements. In matters involving survival, there can be no appointed trustees. Whatever new agreements may be arrived at, let it be clear that they cannot and must not be taken as a substitute for nuclear disarmament, which is the ultimate effective guarantee against the outbreak of a nuclear war. In reducing

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

the possibility of accident or miscalculation, the nuclear-weapon Powers must not proceed under the assumption that the wilful use of nuclear weapons is in any way to be regarded as an acceptable option.

An important declaration regarding the non-first-use of nuclear weapons was made at the second special session by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Just before the opening of the special session, the NATO meeting at the level of Heads of State also made a far-reaching declaration on the alliance's policy regarding the use of its forces. Such unilateral declarations should be regarded as statements of intention, which by their very nature do not have the status of contractual obligations that can be verified. They should, however, constitute building blocks for further efforts of a binding character instead of being dismissed as mere propaganda. The seriousness of the attitude of the nuclear-weapon Powers to the objective of preventing nuclear war must also be measured against their willingness to explore in good faith all promising new opportunities for progress. A third nuclear-weapon power committed itself, many years ago, not to be **first to use nuclear weapons**. Now, one of the superpowers has followed suit. Would this not open the way for all five nuclear-weapon powers to engage in serious efforts to agree on the total ban of the use of nuclear weapons?

May I take this opportunity to touch briefly upon item 1 of our agenda, on which my delegation reserves its right to intervene again. The start of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban last Friday is a landmark in the history of the multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament. My delegation welcomes the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden to the chairmanship of the Working Group, and wishes him success. No one, in our view, is better qualified than Ambassador Lidgard to lead the Working Group in the task facing it.

The fulfilment of that task must respond to the will of the international community, so often and so unmistakably expressed. My delegation can only deplore the attitude of the delegations of China and France, which chose to ignore their responsibilities and the wishes of the international community as a whole. It took almost twenty years from the inception of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for China and France to abandon their policy of aloofness with regard to that body and its successors. But it sufficed that a Working Group be established to deal with some aspects of a nuclear test ban for those two nations to refuse to lend their support and co-operation to the common endeavours of the other members of the Committee on Disarmament, thus creating an equivocal situation for the Committee as a whole. We fail to understand their attitude, since the mandate of the Working Group certainly creates no binding obligation for the cessation of the testing on which those two nations continue to engage. Another nuclear-weapon power decided recently that its continued testing of nuclear weapons is necessary "for a long time to come", in order to continue

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

improving and developing its arsenals. Can such a stand be considered to be compatible with commitments undertaken in international treaties that require from their signatories the achievement of a complete ban on nuclear-weapon testing? Yet another nuclear-weapon power has declared, as we read in the press, that it "does not necessarily agree" with the decision taken by its superpower ally. Should we draw the conclusion that the continuation of testing is not indispensable for the credibility of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, on which both allies base their military posture?

Only two years ago, the trilateral negotiators reported to the Committee on Disarmament, after repeated requests, that they considered such negotiations as "the best way forward" toward the achievement of a lasting and comprehensive nuclear test ban. Since then, one superpower announced its decision not to resume the trilateral negotiations, together with its intention to seek the review of existing bilateral instruments on the matter. We note that the continued insistence of that superpower on the examination of verification aspects does not preclude, in its view, the Working Group from dealing with the scope and other aspects of the treaty, and we are confident that its delegation will contribute constructively to the discussion, even if it considers the achievement of a CTBT as a "long-term goal". We also agree with the expressed view that a CTBT must be multilateral and aim at universal adherence. But its contention that the time is not "propitious" for the negotiation of a test-ban treaty continues to elude our understanding. The argument seems too vague and subjective to be credible at face value, except by drawing the conclusion that that superpower has in fact decided to postpone indefinitely any agreement on a nuclear test ban.

Such developments are certainly not good omens for the work we have just started on a nuclear test ban. A better understanding of the objective and direction of the exercise we are about to start, an understanding that can be acceptable to all, is a necessary condition for such an exercise to have any significance at all. For too long now this Committee has been reduced to the role of playing witness to the whims of the nuclear-weapon powers and seeing the fate of serious multilateral negotiations sway at the mercy of the fluctuations of their bilateral relationships or of their shifting strategic perceptions. We have yet to see one single instance in which the narrow perception of a nuclear-weapon power gave way to broader considerations of a global nature. The 25 years of the history of attempts to reach a CTBT are full of examples of the attitudes that have contributed to making such a treaty less attainable now than it was in 1963, when the three "Original Parties" to the Moscow Treaty committed themselves to achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". Ascertaining the intentions of the nuclear-weapon powers is crucial for the significance of our work on this item.

Whether additional nations decide to invoke, in the pursuit of security, the same arguments so far used by the nuclear-weapon powers, or whether, on the contrary the international community can proceed toward a common objective of security through nuclear disarmament, is a choice that depends heavily on the attitudes and policies of the nuclear-weapon powers themselves. It is they who ultimately must accept the full responsibility for the consequences of their own choices.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French): My intervention today is dedicated to items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban.

On 5 August, the Romanian delegation presented our Government's views and positions of principle to the Committee, together with a number of proposals submitted by our country to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Today, therefore, I should like to dwell on some more specific aspects of these top priority items on our agenda.

We fully share the conclusion of the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons published by the United Nations that nuclear weapons constitute the most serious threat to national security. One of the reasons is that henceforward nuclear arsenals will exert a decisive influence on the course of politics and international relations. A serious accident or even a devastating war could be caused by nuclear weapons systems themselves and the tangible threat that they represent for each other. In an extremely tense situation in particular, such a war could be triggered by a preventive strike or by an escalation of conventional to nuclear warfare. It is imperative, therefore, for Governments and responsible circles to make every effort to attain the fundamental objective of halting the nuclear arms race and putting into effect as soon as possible concrete measures of nuclear disarmament. As my country has emphasized in its statements in the United Nations General Assembly, in this Committee, in other forums, and just recently in the working paper issued as document CD/296 of 28 July of this year, nuclear problems as a whole must be approached by measures designed to: prohibit the use of nuclear weapons; halt their development and testing; halt the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for military purposes; gradually reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and lastly, outlaw nuclear weapons. This set of successive measures could, we believe, form the elements of an authentic strategy for putting a stop to the nuclear arms race.

The excellent study published this year by UNIDIR, "Risks of unintentional nuclear war", reveals the huge and terrifying dangers represented by an unintentional nuclear war, as regards its causes and origins and in particular the cumulative risk, which should be given very serious consideration. I should like to quote the following passage:

"By contrast to the usual assumption that two risks are twice as dangerous as one risk and three risks are three times as dangerous, the logical structure of cumulative risks, upon a closer examination based on probability theory, rather suggests that a sequence of risks unexpectedly piles up a deadly threat."

The real risk implied by the existence of gigantic nuclear arsenals and the disturbing development of strategic doctrines has provoked a more and more marked trend in favour of urgent measures to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons -- that is to say, to prohibit the use of force in its most brutal and murderous form. In the study "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance", published by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith in Foreign Affairs this year, the conclusion of the authors, all well-known and highly respected for their activities and competence in this field, was as follows:

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

"Given the appalling consequences of even the most limited use of nuclear weapons and the total impossibility for both sides of any guarantee against unlimited escalation, there must be the gravest doubt about the wisdom of a policy which asserts the effectiveness of any first use of nuclear weapons by either side. So it seems timely to consider the possibilities, the requirements, the difficulties and the advantages of a policy of no-first-use".

We believe that any other approach, envisaging the use of nuclear weapons, not only implies the gravest responsibility as regards the possible destruction of humanity but in addition is contrary to international law. For, in its 1961 Declaration (resolution 1653 of 24 November 1961), the General Assembly of the United Nations ruled that "The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations", and, a little further on, that "Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization".

While, of course, being conscious of the immense complexity of the problem and the multiplicity of factors involved, we wish to emphasize the ever-widening acceptance of the idea that action must be taken as soon as possible to avert the growing threat of a devastating nuclear war. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, several praiseworthy initiatives were taken. The Soviet delegation, for example, presented the very important pledge by the USSR "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons". Similarly, the People's Republic of China, in its proposals on the essential measures for an immediate halt to the arms race and for disarmament, proposed that all the nuclear-weapon States should undertake "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other at any time or under any circumstances". To these should be added the favourable replies of other States to the request of the United Nations Secretary-General on the basis of resolution 36/81 B. In this context, the Indian delegation's proposal concerning the mandate of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war (document CD/309) has my delegation's full support.

Of course, the adoption by the Committee of a decision to set up such a working group should not prejudice the widely recognized need for a structure for dealing with all the problems connected with the halting of the nuclear arms race. The fact that we now have the impressive number of more than 300 specific proposals on nuclear disarmament, as can be seen in document CD/293 which was compiled by the secretariat, clearly proves both the complexity of this field and the interest that States attach to this top priority question. I should like to mention just a few of these ideas, such as the halting of the production of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for military purposes, the prohibition of the neutron bomb, a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals, and so forth. That is why my delegation considers it more than ever necessary for the Committee to embark on the negotiation process with respect to nuclear disarmament, starting with the discussion stage and proceeding to actual negotiations. The proposals made in this connection by the Group of 21 in document CD/180 are still entirely valid.

Romania welcomed the agreement of the Soviet Union and the United States of America to start negotiations on strategic nuclear arms problems. We sincerely hope that, despite the differences between the proposals put forward, the negotiations will lead to an agreement in the interest of all peoples. At the same time, in view of certain

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

ideas expressed here, we wish to repeat today Romania's position of principle, namely that it is the duty of all States to make a contribution to the fundamental objective of putting a stop to the nuclear arms race. They all have this duty and this responsibility. This belief of my delegation, of my country, is based on the fact that in present circumstances we are all objects of the direct and devastating threat of nuclear weapons, and while some countries possess these weapons, the rest are in danger of becoming nuclearized as the potential and innocent victims of a thermo-nuclear conflict in which there will be neither victors nor vanquished. That is why the Romanian delegation attaches such great importance to the establishment of a subsidiary body on item 2 of the agenda. We think the time has come to tackle nuclear problems in this Committee in a structured and organized way. Although I do not want to dwell on this subject any longer I should, nevertheless, like to say, as our colleague the Ambassador of Brazil did a few minutes ago, that we are opposed to any theory tending to endorse here the supposed exclusiveness of the competence of certain powers. Such theories are totally unacceptable to us, if only because they are totally contrary to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter as regards the duties and obligations of all nations, which should negotiate here on a footing of equality.

I should now like to pass on to the subject of the prohibition of nuclear tests, for which we now have an Ad hoc Working Group under the chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Curt Lidgard.

The Romanian delegation believes that, despite the limited mandate it was possible to agree on, the discussions in this Group should be such as to facilitate the initiation of negotiations on the subject of nuclear tests. We share the view that a broad understanding on the scope of the prohibition is needed before we can begin discussing questions of verification.

With regard to the discussions on verification, we should like to make the following observations:

First, our discussions should concentrate on underground tests, since a prohibition has been in operation in the other areas since 1963 without any complaints being formulated, so far as I know.

Secondly, we believe it has already been proved that it is technically possible to establish an effective monitoring system for detecting possible violations of an agreement banning nuclear weapons tests throughout the world. The methods for the detection of nuclear explosions that now exist, namely, the collection of samples of radioactive waste, the recording of seismic, acoustic and hydro-acoustic waves and the radio signal method, together with recourse, if necessary, to on-site inspections, are entirely adequate for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

The third observation I should like to make concerns the substantial amount of work that has already been done in the field of verification. Starting with the 1958 Conference of Experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests, up to the last report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events, there is a goodly number of technical and scientific studies available to us.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

For all these reasons, we are inclined to consider that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should not start from the beginning again and rediscover things that have already long since been discovered. It ought rather to review the activities that have been carried out and decide whether, at this stage, we have available what is needed to set up a system for the verification of compliance with an agreement on the halting of nuclear tests, taking account of its field of application. We believe that the delegations of the nuclear-weapon States taking part in the Group's work should play not only an important but also a very active role in this process, given their technological capacity and their experience.

Lastly, we should perhaps remind ourselves that while we are talking, an ever more powerful and threatening infernal war machine is functioning efficiently at the same time, adding day by day and minute by minute to the monstrous edifice of terror and destruction. It is vital for us to respond to these dangers in a more tangible and urgent fashion and with greater solidarity. In the face of the reality of the production of ever more efficient means of destruction, this Committee seems to be making no headway -- engaging in debates rather than in real negotiations. We should remember that a new nuclear weapon is being produced in the world every three minutes. The gulf between the results of our deliberations and **the ever-increasing magnitude** of the arms race becomes daily more alarming, more inexplicable. In these days of grave dangers, the time has perhaps come for us all to set our watches right -- for the hour is already late.

Mr. RODRIGUES NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me to begin my statement by saying how pleased my delegation is to see you presiding over the Committee on Disarmament during the month of August. We are confident that your wise judgement will be of great benefit to us in our work.

I should like also to express my gratitude to Ambassador Okawa of Japan for the skilful and efficient way in which he carried out his work during the final stage of the spring session. I should like to offer a warm welcome to Ambassador Datcu of Romania who has joined the Committee.

My delegation would also like to express its gratitude to Ambassadors Yu Peiwen of China, Valdivieso of Peru and Venkateswaran of India for their very positive contributions to the work of this complex and demanding body, and to wish them success in their new activities.

The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament held the attention of the world from the start and all **the peoples of the world**, without distinction as to race, beliefs or culture, placed great hopes in it because they realized that it represented one of the most important efforts ever made in the sphere of disarmament.

That is reason enough not to overlook or ignore the significance of the event and therefore to make a brief comment on it.

(Mr. Rodrigues Navarro, Venezuela)

As my country stated at the plenary meeting held on 9 June 1982: "The second special session devoted to disarmament is held at a time when the critical tensions of recent times make even more acute the need to continue exploring ways in which to achieve concrete results in the negotiations and to conclude specific agreements on priority matters."

We stressed that "the General Assembly's principal task is to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Moreover, it must examine and evaluate the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament.

"The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be conceived with the idea of proceeding, on the basis of a renewed commitment of the wills of peoples and Governments gathered together here, towards the goal of global disarmament on conditions and terms proposed in response to the general principle of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

It was my Government's view that the programme should provide the necessary framework for the conduct of substantive negotiations on disarmament, with a view to achieving the implementation of a balanced and ordered set of as many concrete disarmament measures as possible to be carried out in a number of stages. These measures should remain interrelated and should be carried out in such a way as to guarantee the security of all States.

Unfortunately, the hopes of the majority of countries for an instrument of a kind which would imply a solemn and, if possible, binding commitment were disappointed. That was due not to any lack of effort on the part of the developing countries and other neutral States which do not belong to any military alliance and of certain well-intentioned developed countries, but to the unwillingness of certain nuclear powers to make certain particular concessions and adopt a flexible approach which would make it possible to ensure permanent survival for all mankind.

It is with this reasonable objective in view that paragraph 63 of the Final Document of the last special session states that the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament should be returned to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the item. Furthermore, the Committee is requested to submit a revised version of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Fortunately, it has already been decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, so that it can start its work at the beginning of next year. We are pleased to know that it will again be presided over by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, who has all the qualities needed for the accomplishment of this difficult task, namely, knowledge, experience and patience.

(Mr. Rodriguez Navarro, Venezuela)

We hope that the results of this new stage will exceed expectations, to the benefit of all.

Agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons", is another of the topics to which we should give special attention during this short summer session.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which has been meeting since 20 July, offers fairly encouraging prospects since a minimum degree of consensus has been reached on some points on which there were diverging views.

Working document CD/220, submitted by the Chairman of the Group, has given rise to comments and specific proposals from countries which are active in the discussions on the revision of the Elements (document CD/CW/WP.33).

This stage is a positive one in the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, in that connection, it must be borne in mind that the future convention should not merely be a tenuous supplement to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, but an instrument which extends the scope of its content and eradicates once and for all the inhuman use of such weapons. At the same time, it should be an agreement which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and/or transfer of chemical products for military purposes. In addition, it must provide effective machinery for the elimination of existing stocks and installations for non-peaceful purposes.

With regard to the controversial aspect of verification of the implementation of the provisions of the future convention and subsequent compliance with its provisions, my country considers it appropriate to provide adequate means for national measures of verification using modern methods selected by the sovereign State. Provision should be made for scientific international verification where necessary, provided that this does not prejudice the security of any State and that it forms an element of international aid and co-operation in ensuring strict compliance with the convention by the nations which adhere to it, in the cause of peace.

At this crucial and difficult stage of the work of the Ad Hoc Group on Chemical Weapons, we must not allow any dilution of the results already achieved and, more important, political will must not be allowed to be conspicuous by its absence in these decisive discussions.

Another area of concern to my country is the militarization of outer space and the placing of satellites in synchronous geostationary orbit, to the point of saturation, for purposes that are not exactly peaceful. This directly affects the security of all countries and particularly that of the equatorial countries.

(Mr. Rodrigues Navarro, Venezuela)

In this connection, it should be said that the world is well aware of the enormous advantages of those countries which have advanced space technologies and which, without considering inequalities, use satellites for military purposes in their disputes with other nations. They thus give free rein to their strategies, paying no heed to the tragic consequences resulting from their use of satellites. In this context, it is sufficient to recall what happened recently in the south Atlantic in order to draw objective conclusions on the matter.

My country shares the views of those delegations which consider it appropriate to establish an ad hoc working group on outer space to identify and consider the problems of its militarization and thereby establish the competence of the Committee on Disarmament in this area.

Agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", is also a matter of concern to my country, the more so, despite the fact that almost 20 years have passed since the partial test-ban treaty was signed and this very important international legal instrument is therefore in force, nuclear explosions have increased in intensity and magnitude, with the result that fulfilment of the commitment by the parties to negotiate and conclude an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests is becoming increasingly unlikely.

As for the arguments in support of the various opinions concerning verification, we have to admit that they are very weak and insubstantial in their content.

As my delegation has stated on an earlier occasion, verification and confidence are not the same thing; the first is mechanical whereas the second is human. But confidence has the valuable property of being able to achieve -- to create if you like -- the desired solutions, which cannot be partial solutions because that would imply not so much progress as restrictions on the scope of progress, which would needlessly conflict with the demands of reason.

That is why, as we see it, the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban is basically unsatisfactory to the Group of 21, which would like to see a mandate that would permit the drafting of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests, which would mean obligations and responsibilities on the part both of nuclear-weapon States and of non-nuclear-weapon States.

I shall conclude by repeating that the best defence of the peoples of the world will be one that is built by the leaders, statesmen and scientists of the nations, on the basis of a healthy conscience combined with an altruistic political will, directed towards peace and freedom for all, equally.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, His Excellency Ambassador Venkateswaran.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, as diplomats we ought to be immune to the fact of transience which rules our lives. For no sooner does a glimmer of understanding begin to dawn concerning the subject-matter of one's assignment, no sooner does one begin to enjoy close and personal rapport with one's colleagues than it is time to bid farewell. Work relating to this Committee has been only a part of my responsibilities here as Permanent Representative of India. However, I have all along entertained a deep and abiding interest in the activities of the Committee on Disarmament and learnt to respect and admire the diplomatic skills and personal qualities of all the representatives whom I have had the good fortune to work with during my all too short assignment in Geneva.

This Committee is a unique body. Its responsibilities are immense. But what is encouraging to us all is the talent and dedication with which the cause of disarmament is being pursued within this Chamber. In the final analysis, we are all constrained by the policies of our respective Governments. But we, too, have an influence on those policies. We, too, contribute to that over-all perspective within which our own national policies are framed. The intimate web of close and personal relationships which tie us together here without regard to our political persuasions or ideologies is the best guarantee for success in our common endeavours. On the eve of my departure from Geneva, may I wish all my close friends and colleagues round this table great success in those endeavours. I shall carry with me to my next post fond memories of our association and a continuing preoccupation with the tasks that we have laboured together to accomplish in the past two years. May I also express my gratitude to those who have expressed their good wishes for success in my new assignment as India's envoy to China.

Since I spoke last, several delegates have referred to the results, or should I say lack of results, from the recently concluded second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Some of our colleagues have tried to minimize the grave implications of the failure of that session. It has been suggested that perhaps we went to that session with far too many expectations and that the failure to live up to those expectations need not be assessed as being in any sense evidence of the failure of the multilateral process. Once again, we have heard members calling upon us to be realistic and pragmatic. We are admonished to avoid rhetoric and ringing appeals. Instead we are asked to concentrate on what is practical and feasible.

In the past my delegation, along with many others, has had occasion to question the so-called realism and pragmatism which are extolled by some members here as virtues essential to success in disarmament efforts. We have all heard of the phenomenon referred to as the revolution of rising expectations. In the last 20 years, the cause of disarmament has in fact witnessed what may be called a veritable revolution of declining expectations. In 1962, the great powers themselves were negotiating treaties on general and complete disarmament which would have resulted in the total elimination of armaments and armed forces within a period not exceeding 10 to 12 years. In contrast, we are told today that to attempt to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament as even a mere framework for disarmament negotiations is too ambitious a task. Representatives of the same delegations were arguing in the early 1960s that it was precisely

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because of the continuing stress and strain in the international situation that it was necessary to engage in intensive disarmament negotiations. Today, they are again the ones who call us unrealistic because in the face of a tense international situation we call for the only rational course of action available, that is, the path of dialogue and negotiation.

I would like to ask a fundamental question. Who determines what is realistic and practicable? For the majority of delegations represented in this room, it is the reality of the continuing threat of a nuclear holocaust which needs to be given the most priority attention. Again, for an overwhelming number of delegations here, it is nuclear disarmament which ought to be the focus of our collective negotiating effort. This realization stems from the indisputable fact that nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction whose use would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind and threaten our very survival. How, then, can we be accused of being unrealistic or impractical? The truth of the matter is that it is the great powers supported by their allies who are attempting to reserve to themselves the exclusive privilege of determining what is realistic and what is practical. Any delegation which expresses a viewpoint that is different is immediately branded as being unrealistic or worse, as engaging in rhetoric. As the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka pointed out in his thought-provoking statement of 5 August 1982:

"This attitude of some powers, in our view, stems from their conviction that disarmament, particularly work on nuclear disarmament, is best restricted to bilateral or at most trilateral negotiations. It signifies their determination to treat States that are not militarily significant as of marginal value, at best, in disarmament negotiations. Their attitude stems from a mistaken notion that the wielding of nuclear weapons power gives them an exclusive right to determine how, when, where and to what extent disarmament will be negotiated."

This, I submit, is really the crux of the problem we face today here in this Committee.

Several delegations have emphasized the importance of building confidence and mutual trust among States as the basis for progress in disarmament. There is an aspect of confidence, however, which needs to be clarified here. To us, international confidence implies a certain consistency and predictability in the approach which States take on the question of disarmament. We have been told time and again that disarmament is a complex business which will take a long time to achieve. This is all the more reason why we need to have confidence that a certain strategy adopted by consensus by the international community will continue to hold good over a period of time. This is not to argue for a static concept of disarmament; rather it is to argue for a multilateral approach which would ensure that any changes in the strategy are the result of prior and mutual consultations among States.

This is not merely an academic question. In the early 1960s, a certain unambiguous approach to disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, was put forward by some of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. This approach consisted of freezing the actual armament situation as it stood at a particular point in time and then gradually working towards zero armaments. In putting forward this philosophy the United States delegate in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee stated in 1962:

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"Fundamentally, it is that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it progressively to zero, always keeping the relative military positions of the parties to the treaty as near as possible to what it was at the beginning." (ENDC/PV.23)

Many agreed with this approach. It was felt that while we are engaged in negotiations on disarmament, the problem itself should not be allowed to become more complicated. In a spirit of serving the larger good and the interests of the international community, many countries accepted restraints which were discriminatory and unequal. In fact, India itself put forward as early as 1964 a proposal for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We stated that the international community should immediately adopt as an urgent measure an agreement which would, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, but at the same time freeze the arsenals of nuclear weapons of the existing nuclear-weapon States. This would still have left the nuclear-weapon States in possession of enormous quantities of nuclear weapons which would be capable of destroying mankind several times over. We were, however, prepared to accept such a situation in the hope of giving an impetus to the process of nuclear disarmament. But this was not to be. Why? Because some of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies interpreted non-proliferation as implying a freeze only on those who had no nuclear weapons to start with, without accepting any corresponding obligations or responsibilities on the part of those who did possess such weapons.

It was the same approach to disarmament which had earlier led to widespread support for concepts such as the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. Here again, it was argued that the process of nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States would somehow be assisted by agreements among States in those regions of the world where there are no such weapons at present not to acquire or accumulate nuclear weapons.

This approach could be summed up in a graphic manner by quoting what was said by the representative of Canada in a statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:

"Between the phase of the building up of armaments and the hoped-for phase of reducing armaments, there has to be a point of time at which you stop -- like changing the movement of a motor-car from forward to backward".

The international community was persuaded that this was the correct approach to disarmament. Several agreements were accordingly concluded on the basis of this general philosophy of a freeze. One wonders what happened to the enthusiastic espousal of freeze proposals which were made in the 1960s. Is that earlier enthusiasm to be explained by the fact that the freeze approach, as applied by its original advocates, would confirm and perpetuate the division between a handful of militarily powerful States on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other? Have our fears been confirmed that the militarily powerful States and their allies insist on one set of rules for themselves and another for the rest of us?

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The freeze approach is a logical one. But it has been applied selectively to ensure that limitations apply only to those who do not possess significant military potential. Over the last two decades, the nuclear-weapon States and their allies have accepted no restraints on their own military potential. While the vast majority of the countries of the world have either signed the NPT or unilaterally declared that they will not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, this has not led to any limitation or reduction in the nuclear arsenals in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States. Similarly, the creation of more nuclear-weapon-free zones is being actively encouraged, while in Europe, where the highest concentration of both nuclear and conventional weapons exists, the accumulation of nuclear arms continues at an accelerated pace. If I may quote a distinguished predecessor of mine, the efforts of the major powers so far have been mainly directed at disarming the unarmed without accepting any restraints on themselves.

It was the same philosophy of freezing the existing situation before tackling the question of the reduction and elimination of weapons that led to the question of a nuclear test ban being accorded the highest priority in disarmament negotiations. India was itself an early and consistent advocate of the early conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. It was the late Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru who called for a stand-still agreement on nuclear testing by the nuclear-weapon States as early as 1954. We recognize that the conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban will not result in any reduction in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons. It may not even result in the slowing down of the accumulation of nuclear armaments. However, in line with the general philosophy that the international community has accepted concerning its approach to disarmament, we consider a nuclear test ban desirable because it would bring to a halt the further qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and at the same time serve the important purpose of preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The unequal situation which is inherent in the present division of the world between a handful of nuclear-weapon States possessing the means of global destruction on the one hand and the non-nuclear rest of the world on the other, would nevertheless remain. We have been prepared to accept this situation on the assumption that this will be only a temporary state of affairs before the achievement of nuclear disarmament and eventually the cherished goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In the light of these self-same considerations, we also welcomed the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963, even though it was limited in its application.

It is strange therefore that today efforts are being made to reject this consistent approach to disarmament outlined in the earlier part of my statement precisely by those who have been its most enthusiastic advocates over the past two decades. The United States, for example, has announced that it no longer considers a nuclear test ban as a priority issue but regards the conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban as a long-term objective which must be part and parcel of the process of achieving nuclear disarmament. France and China have also regrettably expressed the view that a nuclear test ban can only be achieved within an integrated programme of nuclear disarmament and, more specifically, only

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after substantial reductions have been achieved in the existing nuclear weapon arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States. While we welcome the setting up of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban within the Committee on Disarmament, we cannot fail to point out the inherent limitation on our work in this regard in view of this negative approach that is being taken by the United States of America and by France and China. It is a matter of particular regret to us that the delegations of France and China are not prepared even to participate in the work of this Ad Hoc Working Group despite the fact it has such an anaemic and limited mandate. The arguments that they have put forward are not convincing and our delegation agrees with the view expressed by the Netherlands Ambassador in his statement of 17 August when he said:

"We are fully aware of the argument advanced by China and by France that the envisaged CTB Treaty would tend to freeze the situation in favour of the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. We do not contest it. But we should like to point out that this argument applies even more pointedly to the non-nuclear-weapon States possessing the industrial and scientific capability of providing themselves with a nuclear armoury. The danger of nuclear weapons is such that we have difficulty in accepting the thesis that for some States, further testing to enhance their nuclear capability remains necessary before a halt can be considered."

Similar arguments have been put forward concerning the process of nuclear disarmament. To our mind, the international community had accepted by consensus that the process of nuclear disarmament must be carried out in stages which correspond to a certain logical sequence. This logical sequence is set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. It also incidentally corresponds to the philosophy of disarmament espoused by the delegations of the United States and its allies in the early 1960s, namely, that there has to be a cessation of the nuclear arms race followed by a process of reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It was on this basis, for example, that the United States proposed a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in 1964. During the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, however, and later, at the second special session itself, it became clear that for the United States and some of its allies this approach was no longer valid. We were in fact told that significant reductions in nuclear-weapon stockpiles should come first. We were also informed that a freeze on existing levels of nuclear weapon arsenals could not be accepted because this might result in a freeze on existing military imbalances which must be rectified before disarmament could be contemplated.

The question arises then as to what are the implications of this new approach to questions of nuclear disarmament. If all States followed the same logic inherent in the approach put forward by the United States and that declared by France and China, then disarmament would no longer be a credible goal. Each one of us could then insist to the extent possible on acquiring military power at least as awesome as the most powerful amongst us before embarking upon the course of disarmament. My country does not accept this logic and would urge others, too, to reject this approach as untenable and to

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return to the only sane and rational course possible in the circumstances, namely, that which looks upon the achievement of disarmament in well-conceived phases and which must commence basically with freezing the situation as it exists today with respect to nuclear weapons.

If a few countries are not willing to accept what they regard as the freezing of perceived inequalities, then the rest of the countries of the world would need to review whether there is any point in their accepting the present inequalities which apply to them for the sake of an elusive goal of disarmament. The acceptance of the present inequality is rendered tolerable only and only if the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament continue to be a credible one.

This brings me back to the point with which I began the argument -- the issue of confidence. Today we are faced with a situation where the most powerful States think nothing of changing the terms of reference within which multilateral disarmament negotiations must be pursued. By making unilateral and drastic alterations in their approach to the most urgent and sensitive issue of disarmament, they undermine the very basis of confidence among States. If we cannot have any degree of certainty concerning the parameters within which we pursue disarmament, how can nations accept any restraints on their decisions concerning armaments? Each one of us in that case would be obliged to plan our security on the basis of multiplying mistrust of the intentions of other States; and the result would certainly not be conducive to the achievement of disarmament.

I would now like to turn to the vital issue of the prevention of nuclear war. We have been gratified by the positive response from several delegations to our proposal for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war. Indeed, this is a matter which deserves our close and urgent attention. The distinguished Ambassador of Italy, in his statement at the plenary meeting of our Committee on Tuesday, 17 August, while referring to our proposal, underlined the need for preventing all wars, whether nuclear or conventional. He also argued that in many cases, conventional wars could escalate to a nuclear threshold and therefore we must take this into account in dealing with the problem of preventing a nuclear war.

To call for practical measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war is not tantamount to encouraging wars using conventional weapons. Certainly, my delegation has never suggested that measures to prevent a nuclear war should somehow transcend the prohibition on the use of force contained in the United Nations Charter. Does a prohibition on chemical weapons, which we are all trying to achieve agreement upon, imply that the use of all other weapons is somehow legitimate? Do the prohibitions accepted by the international community on the use of certain inhumane conventional weapons imply that the use of other weapons is thereby sanctioned? No. I am afraid that those who use such arguments against giving adequate consideration to measures for the prevention of nuclear war are being both inconsistent and contradictory.

The Ambassador of Italy referred to conventional armed conflicts that could escalate into nuclear war. We share his concern. Let us discuss the problem.

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It has consistently been our view that the respective roles of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard need to be clarified. Conflicts in the developing world could be avoided and contained if the great powers resisted the temptation to use the developing countries as pawns in their power game. Equally, developing countries need to steer clear of great power rivalry and confrontation. All this may be relevant to the prevention of nuclear war and we, for our part, are willing to discuss the problem in its entirety. We do have the impression, however, that some of our colleagues seem allergic to the very mention of the prevention of nuclear war. Each time we speak of the dangers of nuclear war, they counter with assertions that conventional wars are also terrible. Did we ever claim that conventional wars are not terrible? Did any one of us here say that the prevention of nuclear war gives a licence to engage in conventional wars? However, one terror is not cancelled out by another. Nuclear war is not less terrifying because conventional wars are also terrifying. Nuclear war is not less of a threat to the survival of mankind merely because conventional wars have been more frequent in the recent past. Try as we may, we cannot get away from the simple and stark reality that any use of nuclear weapons would probably mean the end of humanity and civilization as we know it. What we are therefore asking this Committee to do, is to face up to this reality and come up, hopefully, with some practical remedies. To those who would accuse us of being impractical and unrealistic in making proposals that could contribute to the cause of the survival of mankind, we would answer by referring to Ambassador Okawa's statement of 5 August 1982, in which he said:

"My delegation, and I hope many other delegations, listened carefully to the fervent pleas of the Japanese NGO representatives who spoke from their personal experiences in the atomic bombings of 1945. I trust that their simple and stark messages were registered deeply in the minds of their audience.

Surely these appeals should be constantly borne in mind by us, as members of the Committee on Disarmament, when we pursue our duty of accomplishing ... effective disarmament measures -- notably nuclear disarmament measures -- and we must endeavour to achieve what progress we can during this short session in moving forward in that direction."

No one can doubt the extreme urgency of dealing with this problem. Just a couple of days ago we learnt that at least one nuclear-weapon State is reportedly planning to be prepared to fight and win a so-called protracted nuclear war. That nuclear-weapon State may draw up such doomsday strategies exclusively in the context of its rivalry with its perceived nuclear adversary. But it is all of us also who will perish if a full-scale nuclear war breaks out. Do the potential victims have no say at all in this matter? India is a country of 700 million people. We have a democratic system of Government with a Parliament of freely elected representatives. Supposing tomorrow a representative asks the Government what steps it has taken to ensure the safety and survival of the Indian

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people in case a nuclear war breaks out; what should the response of my Government be? Are we to start digging tunnels at this stage to shelter 700 million people in case a nuclear war breaks out? Or should we also acquire a so-called deterrence capacity to threaten others with annihilation in an illusory pursuit of our own security? I ask those who oppose our proposal to set up an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war, to tell us what answers they expect our Government to provide to our elected representatives. After all, they too have democratically elected Governments and should thus be in a position to appreciate our dilemma. It is intolerable that our survival should be hostage to the whims of a handful of powerful States. And yet it is the democracies of the world which deny us the opportunity to determine our own destinies — which I was taught to believe was and is a fundamental principle of democracy.

We are glad, therefore, that this afternoon these and other matters will be discussed in an informal meeting of this Committee. It is my hope that the considerations I have put forward in all sincerity and frankness will permit us to reach a quick agreement on a procedure to deal with this vital and urgent issue. A positive decision on our proposal to set up an ad hoc working group to negotiate practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war would be clear evidence of the relevance of this Committee as a multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. It would re-establish the Committee's credibility in the eyes of the international community.

Before I conclude, I would like to join other speakers in this Chamber who have condemned Israel's brutal aggression against Lebanon. There can be no conceivable justification for the appalling loss of lives of innocent men, women and children caused by the indiscriminate use of military power by Israel in Lebanon. Those who have consistently called for a strict observance of the principle of the non-use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter as a precondition for progress in disarmament seem to make a glaring exception in the case of the Israeli terrorist adventurism in Lebanon. India joins others in calling for an immediate and unconditional end to Israeli aggression in Lebanon and the early restoration of the inalienable right to nationhood of the Palestinian people.

Mr. Chairman, the time comes now for me to bid farewell to you and through you to all the distinguished representatives round this table. It has been both an honour and a privilege to serve as part of this august body and I have been fortunate to enjoy the best of relations with all my colleagues here. I would in particular like to express my deep gratitude to Ambassador Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary to this Committee, for his valuable advice and guidance. I hope that the Committee will continue to benefit from his vast experience and diplomatic skills in the fulfilment of the crucial tasks that lie ahead.

In saying farewell, I must also express my warm appreciation to members of the Centre for Disarmament who have been always ready to provide support and assistance whenever required. I am sure my successor will continue to enjoy the same excellent relations with all our colleagues in this Committee and the members of the secretariat that I have myself been fortunate enough to enjoy.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair. I understand that Ambassador Venkateswaran has addressed the Committee today for the last time, before leaving us for a new and very important assignment. I wish him, on my own behalf and, I am sure, that of the whole Committee, a very successful mission, and all the best in his personal life. We have all appreciated his outstanding human and professional qualities and we will certainly miss them both in our midst. He has played a major role in this Committee representing his great country. This is perhaps the best compliment that a diplomat may receive. We are sorry to see him leave but we are equally happy in learning that his Government is giving him a position of particular responsibility.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba, His Excellency Ambassador Solá Vila.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for my delegation to congratulate you, on seeing you presiding over the work of the Committee on Disarmament during the opening month of our summer session of this year. It has fallen to your lot, Ambassador Gatere Maina, to direct the work of this negotiating body on matters of disarmament just after the conclusion of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to this subject, and I should like to assure you that you can at all times count on my delegation's support.

I should also like to congratulate your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, on the outstanding way in which he guided the Committee on Disarmament during the closing phase of the last session, and for the important decisions adopted under his chairmanship, as well as his personal efforts for the success of our work.

I should like to welcome Ambassador Dăcu of Romania, and bid farewell to those colleagues who have already left or will be doing so shortly, Ambassadors Yu Peiwen of China, Valdivieso of Peru and Venkateswaran of India, with whom we have worked in close co-operation over the last few years.

Bearing in mind that only two of the Committee's working groups are meeting at present, those on the prohibition of chemical weapons and a nuclear test ban, I shall make a few brief comments on the various items on our agenda.

In their statements at earlier plenary meetings, a number of speakers referred to the recently concluded second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I do not intend, for my part, to make an assessment here of the results of that session because I did so in my last intervention in New York, last July. Moreover, history has given its own assessment. When I left the United Nations building in New York, on the closing day of the second special session devoted to disarmament, on the Plaza in front of the building, many citizens from all over the world were seated beside lit candles, keeping vigil at the burial of the hopes of mankind for concrete measures of disarmament. We can but hope that no one one day will have to keep vigil at the burial of mankind because of the attitude of maniac warmongers.

I wish simply to say that the special session was not able even to reach the level of the provisions of the Final Document adopted by consensus in 1978. We cannot say that it did not go further. It did not even get as far as the Final Document because there were delegations which tried to revise, discard and

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distort the principles, priorities and objectives which had been clearly laid down for the disarmament negotiations, thus proving, despite their later disclaimers, that they did not share the views enshrined in that important document.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has speeded up its work and seems likely under the skilful guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, to give us concrete results.

We must remember, however, that there are still important issues on which it has not been possible to reconcile opposing views, in particular the scope of the prohibition and questions of verification.

It may be recalled, in order to have a clearer picture of realities and the present situation, that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons began its work with an inadequate mandate. When at last those States which had opposed the broadening of its mandate agreed to its reformulation, there came the decision to start manufacturing new chemical weapons systems, which placed a new obstacle in the way of negotiations on this important topic and jeopardized all that had been achieved in earlier years.

It must be recognized that the advent of binary weapons, as many experts in the various groups of States have said, particularly complicates the two aspects of determination of toxicity and verification, which must be dealt with in any agreement.

As far as verification is concerned it is obvious that, in the first place, it cannot be talked about in general and abstract terms. It must necessarily be linked to the scope of any prohibition. In the case of chemical weapons, the prohibition must be broad enough to take into account the enormous range of lethal and supertoxic chemical substances, as well as other harmful substances and their precursors, the range of which has been considerably expanded with the advent of binary weapons.

Similarly, we must not allow ourselves to be distracted by the sterile debate which opposes national means and international forms of verification. Every verification measure applies to a concrete agreement, and both national means of verification and the international system of verification that is to be established should be taken into account. The two things should be interrelated, and this idea must be accepted if we are really interested in making progress in our work.

The situation with regard to a nuclear test ban is in some respects similar.

From 1979 onwards, the Committee on Disarmament was unable to establish a working group to deal with the first item on its agenda because two States (the United States and the United Kingdom) were opposed to its doing so.

When it finally succeeded in establishing a working group, and all the indications were that we were about to begin consideration of this item, it was suddenly claimed that negotiations could not be initiated for the time being, thus removing all credibility and effectiveness from the Group's work.

Moreover, it should also be recalled that the Group of 21 accepted the present mandate only conditionally, and that its views as to the best way of dealing with the item are set forth in document CD/181. While we are disappointed in the present mandate, we should also be dissatisfied with any other action short of negotiations.

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At this moment, one nuclear-weapon State has affirmed that there will be no negotiations on a nuclear test ban for the time being, and another two have declared that they will not take part in the work of the Working Group that has been set up. This undoubtedly creates an unprecedented situation in this Committee's work and jeopardizes the attainment of tangible results and their universal application.

On this item, too, the problem of verification arises; and here again, verification must be seen in relation to the scope of the prohibition, and national means of verification and an international verification system must be interrelated. It must be recognized, however, that there is a danger that when we are all ready to embark on actual negotiations on a nuclear test ban, we must have to reconsider everything that has already been achieved with respect to verification because we are confronted with new techniques that are differently applied. Hence the absurdity of talking solely about verification instead of seriously considering the real measures of disarmament that the international community demands.

Turning to the other items on our agenda, on which no working group is in existence for the time being, I should like to refer to the question of the so-called "negative security assurances".

In a recent document, CD/280, the Group of 21 stated that the declarations made in this connection by certain nuclear-weapon States contained limitations, conditions and exceptions which reflected their subjective approach and that they were based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

In the same document, the Group of 21 urged the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

An analysis of what happened at the second special session increases our disappointment still further.

Far from revising their policies, these States added still more subjective elements concerning a possible use of nuclear weapons; in fact, they "sanctified" nuclear deterrence thereby greatly increasing the danger of the use of nuclear weapons and the outbreak of nuclear war. In connection with this item, my delegation welcomes the unilateral declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This declaration and the similar declaration made by the People's Republic of China are regarded by my delegation as strengthening the so-called "negative security assurances", and if this course was followed by all nuclear-weapon States the prohibition of these weapons would be considerably facilitated.

As regards the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons, it would appear that the Working Group set up on that item is for the moment at an impasse because of differences of views on some important questions.

We have noted with satisfaction that the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, has started consultations with all delegations in order to find an acceptable solution which will enable us to complete our work in this field successfully. In my delegation's opinion, the present situation should not prevent the reaching of an agreement on the so-called "traditional" aspect of radiological weapons. One solution might be for the Convention on radiological weapons to provide explicitly for the initiation of urgent negotiations on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations for peaceful purposes. That would be well received by the international community and would open up new possibilities for this Committee's work.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

With regard to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the decision has already been taken to re-establish the Group under the skilful chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles, and it will begin working next year.

We wish merely to reaffirm our position of principle that, in order to attain its objective, the programme to be adopted should constitute a set of specific disarmament measures, logically interrelated, to be applied in successive phases over a specified period of time. These phases, as the members of the Group of 21 have pointed out, should be flexible in order to take into account new situations which may arise.

I should like to say that, in our view, the reasons why it did not prove possible to adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament in New York last month were the same as those which caused the failure of the special session: quite simply, the attempt to repudiate the principles, priorities and objectives established for negotiations on disarmament, by consensus, in 1978.

Such behaviour is logical only in those who are unwilling to enter into serious negotiations on disarmament and are therefore opposed to a programme which would lay down the guidelines for it; thus, if we want to make progress in this area, we must first of all reaffirm not only with words but also with deeds the validity of the Final Document of 1978. This is the lesson that should be borne in mind next year.

Since the last session of the Committee on Disarmament we have been considering the item on the prevention of the arms race in outer space. The time has come to set up a working group on this subject so that it can be guaranteed that no type of weapon, however it may be called, will be installed in outer space.

My delegation supports the proposal made in the Committee concerning the setting up of such a working group and considers that any mandate for the group should recognize that outer space is part of the heritage of mankind and must be used solely for peaceful purposes, and that the introduction of weapons into that region and its militarization must be prevented.

In conclusion, it remains only for me to support the establishment of a working group to consider item 2 of our agenda, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. At the last special session on disarmament, specific proposals were made in this connection, among which the most important were the freezing of weapons at present levels and the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. In my delegation's opinion, we should proceed to the establishment of the working group without further delay.

Similarly, my delegation supports the Indian proposal, in document CD/309, on the establishment of a working group on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war.

At the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-aligned Countries, held in Havana some days before the start of the second special session on disarmament, the General Assembly was urged, at the special session, to adopt concrete measures for the prevention of nuclear war. This appeal was the outcome of an objective analysis of the present situation. We have before us a challenge to start urgent negotiations in this Committee to prevent nuclear war, and we cannot ignore it. Unofficial exchanges and informal meetings are not enough, for they are only delaying measures.

In view of the urgency of the matter, it is essential for us to take a decision at a plenary meeting of the Committee and to adopt concrete measures as soon as possible.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

At this moment, there is being held, at the request of the movement of non-aligned countries, a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Palestine. Once again, the State of Israel, with the support and complicity of the United States, is engaged in aggression against the Arab world and in particular against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. All efforts in the field of disarmament and peace will be in vain if there is no appropriate response to the Israeli aggression. Either the United Nations must play its fundamental role of preserving peace and preventing war, or the law of the jungle will prevail in international relations. Our Committee must work out and negotiate concrete measures of disarmament which will allow us to contemplate a world of peace and progress for all.

The CHAIRMAN: We have exhausted the time available to us during the morning. Consequently, I suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. After listening to those speakers who are listed to make their statements at this plenary meeting, we shall then move to the informal meeting that the Committee agreed to hold today on proposals tabled under items 2 and 7 of the agenda. If there is no objection, I will suspend the plenary meeting.

The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1.10 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 180th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): According to the programme of work we have approved for this week, the subject to be discussed at today's meeting is one of the two highest-priority items on our agenda: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

From the outset, the Mexican delegation has given this item all the attention and interest it merits. Suffice it to recall that between 1979 and the present date we have devoted many statements to it, the last of them on 4 March of this year.

(Mr. Garofa Robles, Mexico)

Although it involves repetition, I believe it is necessary to stress once again since this is essential to a correct approach to this subject, that, as is stated in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons":

"It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably that of the two superpowers."

This is something that must always be borne in mind in considering the question I am referring to. This was made clear by the Group of 21 when, in its important working paper document CD/130, which was circulated more than a year ago, it stated emphatically:

"The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary, weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States."

Thus, the peoples of the entire world, whose vital interests are at stake, have long been hoping for effective measures that will ensure the attainment of what is proclaimed in this agenda item, and the elimination once for all of the threat of nuclear war. The recipe for this, it seems to us, is very simple: all that is necessary is to take seriously the provisions adopted by consensus in 1978 and embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that document which the General Assembly itself, failing anything better, "unanimously and categorically reaffirmed" at the second special session on disarmament held recently.

If we had to choose out of the many provisions of the Final Document those which are the most relevant in this case, we would without hesitation pick the well-known provisions of paragraphs 47 and 50. To contribute to their implementation, the delegation of Mexico submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament a draft resolution, co-sponsored by the delegation of Sweden, in which, as a practical procedure for putting into effect without delay the system provided for in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, it was proposed that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, should be urged to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear arms freeze which would be a first step towards nuclear disarmament. The freeze would include a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles, the complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles and of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, and, finally, a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. The freeze in question would be subject to all the relevant procedures and measures of verification already agreed upon by the parties in the cases of the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, as well as those accepted in principle by them during the trilateral negotiations held in Geneva from 1977 to 1980.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Naturally, this freeze, as is expressly stated in the preamble to the draft resolution, should not be regarded as an end in itself but rather as an effective means of creating a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, while at the same time preventing, the continued increase in and qualitative improvement of the vast array of nuclear weaponry already existing, during the period in which the negotiations were taking place.

The document also drew attention to the present propitious conditions for putting the proposed freeze into effect, since the United States and the Soviet Union are now equivalent in nuclear military power. The "superiority" allegedly enjoyed by one of the superpowers, which is the pretext most frequently used to oppose a freeze, is an argument that to any objective observer is totally lacking in validity. This was noted at the 31st Pugwash Conference held in Banff, Canada, last October, which said that "in general there is parity between the two superpowers as regards nuclear military capacity"; it was repeated by the Palme Commission in an identical conclusion included in the report that was unanimously adopted in Stockholm on 25 April 1982; it was also maintained by Leslie H. Gelb -- who from January 1977 to July 1979 was in charge of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs of the State Department -- who said, on 27 June last, in the New York Times, after a detailed comparison of the land, sea and air nuclear weapons of the two superpowers, and their respective systems of command, control, communication and intelligence, that, and I quote his own words, "the conclusion of the experts who analyse all these factors is that there is a draw" between the United States and the Soviet Union as regards nuclear forces. It was also explained with a multitude of irrefutable data and arguments by Professor Hans H. Bethe in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, on 13 May 1982.

This distinguished academic began by summarizing his curriculum vitae, which seems to me impressive and which I should like to quote verbatim, as I shall also some of the most important paragraphs of his testimony. This is the summary I referred to:

"I have been a professor of physics at Cornell University since 1935. In 1967 I was awarded the Nobel Prize for studies of nuclear reactions in the stars. I was leader of the Theoretical Division of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory from 1943 to 1945 when that laboratory developed the first atomic bomb. I have consulted for the Los Alamos Laboratory at least once a year. I was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee from 1957 to 1960, and remained a member of its Strategic Military Panel until 1969 when the panel was dissolved. In 1958, I participated in the Experts Conference in Geneva which discussed the verification of a ban on nuclear weapons tests, and led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. I am testifying on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists of Cambridge, Massachusetts, but the ideas expressed in my testimony are my own."

The first paragraphs of the testimony ran as follows:

"Several members of the Government have stated repeatedly that we are inferior to the Soviet Union in strategic weapons, and that we need to build up our weapons. In my opinion, there is no such inferiority. We have more nuclear warheads than the Russians, and I consider this to be the most important measure of relative strength. In addition, as Dr. Kissinger stressed many years ago, at the present level of strategic armaments, superiority in number or megatons has no meaning.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"We are told that there is a window of vulnerability because the Russians might use their large ICBMs to destroy our land-based ICBMs. It is generally agreed that this is not possible now, but with the improving accuracy of Russian missiles it might become possible in a few years. Leaving the question of the technical feasibility aside, I claim that such a first strike would give no significant military advantage to the Russians.

"The reason is that ICBMs make up only one-fourth of our strategic nuclear forces, as measured by the number of warheads. One-half of our force is on invulnerable nuclear-powered submarines, and another one-fourth is on bombers, many of which can take off from their widely dispersed airfields in case of an alert. We would therefore have ample striking force left even if all our ICBMs were destroyed."

Further on, Professor Bethe continued his exposition as follows:

"It is also often claimed that the Russians have introduced many new weapons of great power, such as the SS-13, SS-19 and SS-20, while we have done nothing. The latter statement is not true. While the outer envelope of our Minuteman ICBM has remained the same, we have progressed from Minuteman 1 to 2 to 3, and in the latter we have introduced MIRV, a development which the Russians imitated, and which led them to their great striking capability. More important, on our submarines we have progressed from the Polaris warhead to the Poseidon, and then to Trident I. The latter represents very significant progress. The range of Trident I is 4,000 miles, compared to about 2,000 for Poseidon. This permits our submarines to operate over most of the North Atlantic, and to still hit Russia. Submarines at sea are very difficult to find. Now that they can roam over such a vast area of ocean, they are far more elusive. This greatly enhances their invulnerability. The US has not stood still in nuclear weapons deployment.

"The most important addition to our arsenal is the cruise missile, which is being deployed on our B-52 bombers. The cruise missile can penetrate into the Soviet Union. No defense system against it exists. The elaborate and costly Russian air defense system has been made obsolete by the cruise missile, 3,000 of which are to be installed on our bombers. In short we have, and will continue to have into the foreseeable future, two completely independent and essentially invulnerable strategic forces."

As a conclusion to the foregoing arguments, and others which I am omitting in order not to take up too much time, the distinguished scientist whom I have been quoting said quite unequivocally, and I return here to his own words:

"We are not inferior to the Russians in strategic armaments. But we, the Russians and Western Europe" -- and here let me make an addition to what Professor Bethe said; I think he should have added "and the rest of the world". I continue with what he said -- "are severely threatened by the possibility that the enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons on both sides may some day be used"

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"To summarize:

- Our strategic forces are, if anything, superior to the Soviets';
- Our national security, and that of our allies, is most threatened by the grotesque size and continuing growth of both nuclear arsenals.

"These are the basic facts. Once they are recognized, the essential features of a sound national security policy become apparent."

That is all I intend to quote from Professor Bethe, who was awarded among other distinctions the Nobel Prize.

Returning to the draft resolution 'co-sponsored by Mexico and Sweden' I referred to a moment ago, I should add that at the request of its sponsors it has been transmitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-seventh session. We are convinced that its approval by the General Assembly and the implementation of the freeze proposed in it would help the Disarmament Committee in the fulfilment of those tasks which, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, it should carry out with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which form item 2 of its agenda.

We are likewise still convinced that for this purpose it is becoming daily more urgent to set up an ad hoc working group to undertake the necessary negotiations, as **the Group** of 21 has been suggesting for the past two years. We also support the Indian proposal, for the establishment of an ad hoc working group which, as is stated in document CD/309 of 11 August 1982, would be responsible for undertaking "negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war".

I cannot conclude a statement such as this, devoted to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, without stressing the surprise I felt on reading the article published three days ago in the International Herald Tribune under the title, "Pentagon Plan Methods of Winning Protracted Nuclear War", which states, among other things:

"Administration insiders report that the new strategic master plan is more detailed in its advocacy of nuclear warfare than the annual Defense Department guideline. More significantly, it would carry the imprimatur of the President and his National Security Council, whereas the annual guidance plan is an internal Pentagon document."

This article in the Herald Tribune refers also to another article. This other article, which I read some time ago, was published in the summer of 1980 -- I may say in passing that it was in the review Foreign Policy and not Foreign Affairs, as erroneously stated in the Herald Tribune. It was published in this review, I repeat, by two members of the staff of the Hudson Institute. I read it without attaching more importance to it than to any other of the dozens of "scenarios" that the so-called "think-tanks" of the United States are so fruitful and imaginative in producing. But I confess that I should be deeply alarmed if, as seems to emerge from the newspaper article I quoted, there should now be a tendency to convert such

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

theories, that are as dangerous as they are unfounded, into a prime element in the nuclear policy of none other than one of the two superpowers. We venture to hope that this is not the case, and that we shall soon hear in this room a statement by that country's delegation that will allay our fears.

For my delegation is firmly convinced that, as is stated in the last report of the Secretary-General on nuclear weapons which I have already quoted, a nuclear war would represent -- in the words of the report -- "the highest level of human madness", and that all the calculations and forecasts made in that respect should have as their sole inspiration that -- as the Secretary-General said -- "there should never be a nuclear war".

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the Indonesian delegation has on previous occasions stated its position regarding chemical weapons. However, in view of the importance Indonesia attaches to the item, and after listening to the statements made on this item in the plenary in the last few days, my delegation wishes to express its views on certain important aspects of the problem of chemical weapons.

First of all, my delegation shares the views expressed by many delegations that the Committee should give priority to this item and that further serious efforts should be made in order that the Committee can make substantial progress in elaborating a convention on chemical weapons. It is needless to emphasize the magnitude of the devastation and harmful effects caused by the use of chemical weapons, as history has clearly indicated. It is all the more so if we take into account, and add, the impact of technological advance to that magnitude. The alleged use of chemical weapons in armed conflicts in certain parts of the world have further generated serious concern in my country. The magnitude of the devastation and damage these weapons inflicted on human beings and other elements of the living world has strengthened my delegation's conviction that the Committee will make an invaluable contribution to mankind if it could make substantial progress in the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons. In this connection I should like to express our appreciation to the delegation of the Soviet Union for having presented a proposal on the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention which will be useful to our joint efforts.

As regards the general elements of the convention, we take the view that documents CD/220 and CD/CW/WP.33 constitute sound bases for our further efforts. In the plenary we have expressed our views with regard to the method of work for dealing with those elements and my delegation has made serious attempts to make the necessary contributions in various "homework groups". I wish to take this opportunity to express our views on certain elements of the convention. Frankly, I was surprised when I listened to the statements made by a few delegations in this plenary, not only questioning, at this stage of our work, the validity or the legitimacy of the arguments in favour of the inclusion of a provision in the scope prohibiting the use of chemical weapons but also saying that the effort to include such provision will complicate reaching agreement. To support their views, they have contended that since the convention will prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons and the means of production of such weapons, then the proposal to include a prohibition of use is baseless and unnecessary. They have contended further that such inclusion will undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

Other delegations, including my own, have put forward valid arguments in favour of the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the convention. For this reason, I do not want to go through those arguments again. I believe, however, that it is of great importance for this Committee to note that there is no logic in the argument that since the development and production of chemical weapons are to be prohibited by the convention, it will not be necessary to prohibit their use. Statements made in this Committee at previous sessions as well as at this session have clearly indicated the inadequacy of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, caused among other things by its limited scope of application, the lack of a verification régime and the apparent built-in mechanism which renders the use of conventional weapons a possibility. Those weaknesses were in fact and in part due to the rapid development in technology which now has confronted us with new imperatives, and had nothing to do with the goodwill of the parties concluding the Protocol. And it is precisely because of those shortcomings that we are attempting to elaborate a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons. As to the contention that a prohibition to develop, produce and stockpile will subsume a prohibition to use, my delegation would like humbly to submit the following. First, the Convention we are elaborating will certainly not be applied in a vacuum. It will be applied in a situation where some countries will already have stockpiles and arsenals of chemical weapons. Under this circumstance, before a State party could destroy such chemical weapons, for practical reasons, there will be a time lapse during which that State, for reasons of national security, could probably use the chemical weapons at its disposal legally, simply because there is no provision in the convention which bans or prohibits their use; hence the 1925 Geneva Protocol mechanism will operate. This is a legal lacuna which we want to avoid and overcome. Secondly, since it is generally agreed that the scope would include a prohibition to acquire chemical weapons, and since actually it could also be said that prohibition to develop, produce and stockpile chemical weapons will subsume the prohibition to acquire, my delegation can not understand why certain delegations treat the question of non-use differently from the question of non-acquisition by opposing the inclusion of non-use. On the relations between the proposal to include prohibition of use in the scope and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, we would like to take this opportunity to assure those delegations that we have no intention whatsoever to undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which Indonesia itself is a party.

My delegation has indicated in its statement in plenary of its appreciation of the developments in the informal consultations concerning various elements of the convention, including the scope. While we are taking a firm position in favour of the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the scope, we are prepared to study alternative approaches which could generate a consensus. In this connection, we are also prepared to include in the "package solution" a provision in the convention which will ensure that a convention which includes a provision on the prohibition of use will not undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Our position on the question of non-use is motivated simply by fear and anxiety created by the destructive effects of chemical weapons on living structures as well as by the fact that modern technology has been developing in such a way that it has lowered the threshold for the production and use of chemical weapons.

Another important element of the convention is definition. We take note of the positive developments reported informally to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the progress of informal consultations on this matter. It is my delegation's view that we should work out a comprehensive definition of chemical weapons which

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

will best serve the basic purpose of the convention, namely, a total ban of chemical weapons in all their forms and methods of use. It is necessary, therefore, that the definition should include environmental warfare agents, including herbicides. Indonesia is a developing country whose economy depends primarily on agriculture. The use of such chemical agents would no doubt adversely affect our livelihood as well as the ecological balance.

Useful informal consultations have also been carried out on another element of the convention, namely, the element concerning destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion. General understanding seems to be developing on various aspects of the element. It is not my intention, of course, to prejudge the report on these informal consultations yet to be made. I would simply like to reiterate the need to separate the obligation to destroy chemical weapons from the possibility of diversion for peaceful uses. It is also important to stress that international co-operation would be required for finding simple destruction methods to be used not only for destroying chemical warfare agents but also for destroying industrial wastes which have increasingly inflicted harmful effects on the environment, especially in developing countries.

It is generally agreed that any convention prohibiting chemical weapons will not achieve the desired effect if it does not contain adequate provisions on verification. We consider that the verification regime constitutes one of the most essential elements of the convention. It is our duty to elaborate a regime which will include a viable and effective verification system and mechanism. They should reflect a balance between national and international verification. The verification regime should also include a verification mechanism for every important stage of implementation of the obligations under the convention, including the verification of declarations of possession or non-possession of chemical weapons as well as the verification of non-use.

Finally, as time does not permit me to express my delegation's views on all the other elements of the convention, my delegation reserves its right to state its views on those elements if and when it deems it appropriate.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I take the floor today for personal -- yet relevant -- reasons. Our plenary meeting today is a nostalgic one for us all, for it is the last one which we shall share with our distinguished colleague and esteemed friend, Ambassador Venkateswaran, who now departs from our midst for new diplomatic vistas.

He represents a country noted for, among other things, gurus and has, in many respects, been a guru to us. Although he modestly shuns that title, Ambassador Venkateswaran has diligently sought to lead us toward worthy goals. He has injected into all of our deliberations, as well as in our personal and social contacts, that infinite wisdom usually associated with Indian gurus. Centuries of intellectual and cultural development form the well-spring of his sagacity. We have all been enriched by his contributions, and will be diminished by his departure. To his wisdom, he added the sparkle of his wit. A storyteller in the great tradition of his cultural heritage, he has enlivened our debates, as well as our social contacts. If I may compare him to a wellknown philosopher from my country, Ambassador Venkateswaran is India's diplomatic answer to Will Rogers -- a man with a rare gift of relating truth and wisdom through humour. Indeed, the loss of his humour will leave us a more sombre and unleavened body.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Certainly, my delegation has had frequent, and significant, differences with our distinguished Indian colleague, but we have never had any reason to doubt his sincerity or commitment to the causes which he so eloquently championed here. Differences will always line our path along the thorny road we tread. His wit and wisdom have helped us avoid some of the brambles, and the rose-coloured glasses which he frequently wears have made him impervious to many of the brambles which remain in the path. He has accepted our differences with grace and frequently with understanding -- a trait which is becoming in a diplomat and bears emulation.

Thus, we reluctantly relinquish the bonds which have linked us to our departing colleague but we wish to remind him that those bonds forged by our official relations will surely remain indefinitely in our personal regard.

We all wish him Godspeed and success in his new post, an important and challenging one. Moreover, we send with him our affection, respect and assurances of the bonds of friendship which we have formed in our brief time together.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I think Ambassador Venkateswaran will not be able to forgive himself when I tell him about the very warm and flattering tributes which have been paid to him by Ambassador Fields; I think he would have enjoyed the privilege of being here in person to listen to these very warm sentiments. However, I think I would be interpreting his feelings accurately if I extended to Ambassador Fields our very deep appreciation and warm gratitude for the generous tribute that he has paid to the head of our delegation and the very kind remarks that he has made about our country.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement.

Members will recall that I announced at our plenary meeting last Tuesday my intention to put before the Committee today a draft decision concerning a request by Senegal to participate in the work of the Committee. That draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 72. ^{1/} It follows the practice adopted in the Committee in the past in the case of previous requests. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have requested the secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the coming week. I have been informed by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban that the Working Group will meet tomorrow at 3 p.m. here in the Council Chamber and that, on that occasion, he intends to consult with the Working Group on its programme

^{1/} "In response to the request of Senegal (CD/317) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Senegal to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1982 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the second part of its session, the representative of Senegal is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Senegal".

(The Chairman)

of meetings for the coming week. As usual, the time-table is simply indicative and we will adjust it as we proceed, if necessary. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, you will this morning have received a copy of a book published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research which is circulated to the members of the Committee as a courtesy from that Institute. I wish, on your behalf, to thank its Director for making available to us the results of the work done on the important questions dealt with by that group. I thought it would be useful to recognize what they have done in circulating that book.

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting may I recall that, as agreed by the Committee at our last plenary meeting, we will hold an informal meeting this afternoon to continue our consideration of proposals submitted under items 2 and 7 of the Committee's agenda.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA--MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV
Mr. SOTIROV
Mr. DEYANOV
Mr. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA
Mr. J. JIRUŠEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. d'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. G. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mr. G. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR

Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU...

Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. T. PANAIT

Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Mrs. JONANG

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN

Mr. V.L. GAI

Mr. V.L. KOTJUKANSKY

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VHRUNEC
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. O. GNOK

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES

Senegal:

Mr. A. SENE

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 181st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

In connection with item 1 of the agenda, may I draw the attention of the Committee to document CD/318, entitled "Progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the fourteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events", which has been circulated today for consideration by the Committee. In addition to the statements that members might wish to make on the report, it is the practice of the Committee to make some time available for questions which members wish to address to the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. I will therefore invite Dr. Ericsson at the end of this plenary meeting to answer any questions addressed to him in connection with the progress report.

Before we start our business for this plenary meeting, I wish to note that we need to continue our consideration of proposals made under items 2 and 7 of the agenda of the Committee. Members will recall that we started our discussion on those proposals at our informal meeting on Thursday last. In accordance with the programme of work for the present week, we reserved this afternoon for an informal meeting. We should therefore continue our exchange of views this afternoon at an informal meeting. In connection with the time reserved for an informal meeting on Thursday afternoon, may I suggest that we devote that meeting to the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Committee. We will proceed accordingly, if there is no objection.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Mexico, Sweden, Japan, Australia and Senegal.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, it is a particular pleasure to greet you, the representative of a non-aligned, friendly African country as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament and to assure you that my delegation will do its utmost to facilitate the difficult task that stands before you.

I would also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who had the particularly delicate and difficult task of concluding the session of the Committee on the eve of the second special session.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to greet the new representative of friendly and neighbouring Romania, Ambassador Datcu, whose experience will be important for the work of our Committee, and to wish much success in their future duties to our colleagues who have left us, Ambassadors Yu Peiwen of China, Valdivieso of Peru and Venkateswaran of India.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

Our summer session is taking place under the direct impact of the unsuccessful conclusion of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many previous speakers have spoken about this, giving various assessments as to the causes of such a conclusion. We share the views of the great majority who have said that the failure of the special session must be placed in the perspective of the persistent deterioration in the international situation during the past four years. However, differences also exist with regard to the causes that have led to such a deterioration in the international situation, and there are even greater differences with respect to the way out of the present difficult situation.

The continuation of the arms race, which is irreconcilable with the goals and principles of the United Nations, is surely the main cause and consequence of such a state of affairs.

The theory and practice which aspire to present the appearance of new weapons as an imperative of national defence interests and a way to seek political and military balance, in reality represent an attempt to justify the arms race and as such are unacceptable, both from the standpoint of world peace and international co-operation as well as from the standpoint of the national security of any State. The arms race is inevitably the consequence of power politics, the exercise of pressure, interference in the internal affairs of countries and the expansion of spheres of interest. All this generates distrust, insecurity and instability, which lead to a constant deterioration in international relations and constitute the most concrete and most dangerous threat to peace and the security of countries and hinder socio-economic development in the world. Such a situation has unfortunately been going on for too long a time. Its harshest aspect is the increasingly frequent aggressions against non-aligned countries of which the most recent example in such a series of events is the genocide carried out against the unarmed civilian population of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples on the part of the exceptionally aggressive Israeli war machine. It is particularly disquieting that the Israeli aggression, which equals in its atrocities the one to which the populations of many countries were exposed during the Second World War, including the Israeli people themselves, is taking place without particular protest from many countries which otherwise follow very closely and with considerable publicity the violation of individual human rights in some countries.

We consider that the way out of the present situation must only be sought in the creation of a new system of international political and economic relations. As regards politics in particular, a change in the international behaviour of the big Powers must be sought, while they must bear the full responsibility in all this for the state of international relations as well as for their own concrete behaviour. Parallel to this, negotiations should be conducted on the settlement of the most urgent issues. The thesis that the precondition for disarmament negotiations is the improvement of the political climate and, in that connection, the resolving of political hotbeds of crisis and other problems in general, particularly in the relations between the big Powers, is not convincing. For us, it has only relative significance, all the more so since the arms race itself is the source and consequence of mistrust and crisis in relations. In other words, the overcoming of the present unfavourable international relations can only be achieved through parallel efforts in the political, military and economic spheres. Only political means can efficiently pave the way for disarmament, just as practical disarmament measures, as modest as they initially may be, can contribute substantively to the promotion of the political climate and to confidence in the success of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

The existence of mutual confidence would, no doubt, lead to the strengthening of political will which, in turn, proceeding from the existence of global and approximate parity of power, could call for practical measures of military disengagement and the reduction of armed forces and armaments. When stressing that the requisite condition for peace, security and confidence in the world is the existence of a balance between the big military Powers, it is often overlooked that the process of the arms race only worsens even more the existing lack of balance between the big Powers and the rest of the world, especially to the detriment of the countries which do not belong to any alliances and primarily small countries. The interest of these countries, among which Yugoslavia also finds itself, is therefore geared towards a taking of measures as urgently as possible to reduce the level of armaments, in order to ensure the right of every State to security.

In such a situation the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, is the most appropriate forum which should make particular efforts to attenuate the unfavourable situation in the field of disarmament. We share the opinion of all those who have assessed the Committee as being capable of achieving if even an insignificant degree of success in its work. Of course, any success will depend both on reinforced efforts and even more on the resoluteness, i.e. the political will to achieve it. The programme of work we have adopted offers such possibilities, especially in connection with some priority issues on the agenda. I shall dwell very briefly on the work of some working groups and, in that respect, the problems that we must solve.

First, my delegation considers that one of the most mature issues is the ban on chemical weapons. In the course of a decade of the Committee's work on this issue, much has indeed been done to bring near the completion of the text of an international convention. Yugoslavia has always accorded the greatest attention to the prohibition of this type of **weapons** of mass destruction and will continue to give its contribution through the participation of its experts. So far, Yugoslavia has submitted several working papers relating to particular elements of the convention such as verification, the definition of chemical warfare agents, medical protection against nerve gas poisoning and in relation to the destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion of warfare agents and their means of production. We believe that the Ad Hoc Working Group can make further significant progress in this year's work and can embark next year upon the elaboration of the final draft of the convention.

Secondly, even after four years the Committee on Disarmament is still not conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament which is the first priority adopted by consensus on the part of all States at the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament and confirmed again at the second special session held in July this year. The many people who rightfully demonstrate in the streets of many cities, calling for the prevention of the nuclear threat, probably do not know that this Committee has never even started to negotiate about these weapons with which only a few States keep the entire world hostage. To be truthful, it is possible to deliver speeches on nuclear weapons in this Committee every day and occasionally obtain a response from some of the nuclear-weapon Powers as to why it is "unrealistic" to negotiate in the Committee and outside it as well. However, instead of negotiations, the utmost is being done to convince the rest of the world how imperative it is to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as this can lead to an uncontrolled situation and possible use of nuclear weapons by "irresponsible" countries. At the same time, these very countries are reinforcing their own nuclear armament "in order to restore the disrupted balance", and the like, as if the present frightening situation in which one learns daily of new plans to win a protracted nuclear war were not enough.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

My delegation, which has persistently been asking that the Committee on Disarmament start negotiating on nuclear disarmament, deems positive the proposal of India to establish a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. This could be a significant contribution in the framework of the complex consideration of issues relating to the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The starting basis for the consideration of this issue in the Committee could be the existing agreement between the United States and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war signed in Washington on 22 June 1973.

In this connection, we assess as a positive contribution the declaration regarding the non-first-use of nuclear weapons made at the second special session on disarmament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Such a statement was also made several years ago by the People's Republic of China and we hope that other nuclear-weapon Powers will also follow suit, which would be the best proof that they really want to prevent a nuclear holocaust in an efficient manner.

Thirdly, my delegation thinks that it is of outstanding importance that, after long-standing requests, the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has been created by the Committee. We would like to extend a particular greeting to its Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador Mr. Lidgard of Sweden, a long-standing and consistent champion of general and complete disarmament who we know will successfully lead this Group. Although this Group starts to work with a limited mandate that satisfies us only in part, we consider that the present mandate could still allow for the consideration of a programme of work which should not be too narrow and limiting in nature. A good basis for such consideration is contained both in the draft outline of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban submitted by its Chairman and that submitted by the distinguished Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic. What is important at this stage is to make as clear guidelines as possible, leading to the final goal, that of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. My delegation considers that such a treaty should prohibit all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all times by all States and should be based on a verification system that is non-discriminatory and universal in nature, which would guarantee equal access for all States and would attract universal adherence to the treaty.

It is with regret that my delegation learned that the delegations of the People's Republic of China and France will not take part in the work of this Group. We, like other non-aligned countries, have always maintained that all nuclear-weapon States must participate equitably in the entire work of this Committee and have sincerely welcomed this when it came as the result of the first special session. It is our conviction that all States, and especially the nuclear-weapon States, have responsibilities with regard to the consideration and contribution they ought to give in the area of nuclear disarmament. No one is better capable of giving proposals on the prohibition of particular types of weapons or can better understand the value of similar proposals by the other party than the one who possesses this type of weapons himself. It is difficult for non-nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the non-aligned countries, to participate fully in the efforts to progress towards nuclear disarmament if all the nuclear-weapon Powers do not make an active contribution to that effect, all the more so since participating in the work of the Group does not impose any unilateral binding obligations. My delegation expresses the hope that the delegations of the People's Republic of China and France will reconsider their decisions and take part in the Group's work as soon as possible.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

Fourthly, our Committee has before it the proposal for the creation of a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, based on two resolutions tabled at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly to the effect that it is imperative to take timely steps to prevent the possible taking of such actions. We have listened to the arguments presented by some States which consider that there is no room for the creation of this group before many uncertainties have first been elucidated, since only two States are so far capable of transferring the arms race into outer space and that many members of the working group would be incapable of understanding the technical aspect of the problem. Admitting to a certain extent the validity of these arguments, we think that we are primarily dealing with a political issue and the decision to adopt an international instrument that will prevent certain activities in outer space, without entering into complicated technical details at all.

Fifthly, for reasons that were cited in this Committee, my delegation accepts that the work of the working groups on negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament remain in abeyance until the end of this year. Nevertheless, we think that this short period of rest should be used not only for informal consultations but also to make the most solid preparations possible for the continuation of the work of these groups.

For anyone who participates in the work of this Committee and follows its activities for a longer period of time it becomes increasingly clear how complex the issues it faces are and how it is increasingly difficult for it to fulfil its voluminous programme of work. This gives rise to the need to periodically re-examine the organization of its work as well. The task with which the Committee is faced now is not easy in this respect, since it also encompasses the issue of a possible extension of its membership, on which there are differences of opinion in the Committee. In view of the fact that this is the single multilateral negotiating body whose importance is growing by the day, we consider that any premature solution could bring more harm than benefit. In order to ensure a broader and more thorough exchange of views, one that would also include other members of the United Nations, we think that consultations should be continued during the General Assembly as well and appropriate solutions be proposed only after solid preparations have taken place. I would like to point out that we view sympathetically the increased interest of States in actively participating in the work of the Committee. This is a positive sign that there are more and more countries that wish to take part in solving disarmament problems. We think first of all that the existing rules of procedure of the Committee should be adjusted in such a way as to accord all Members of the United Nations the automatic right to speak in the Committee and submit appropriate proposals.

As my leaving Geneva also brings my mandate as head of the Yugoslav delegation to the Committee on Disarmament to an end, permit me to express in conclusion some of my personal impressions.

When the Committee on Disarmament was created after the first special session, Yugoslavia, the non-aligned movement and many other countries as well as the world public as a whole, saw in it a new, big chance. The increasing threat to peace and security and the increasingly difficult problems of socio-economic development in the world inevitably call for the arrival at last of that historical turning point when the arms race will stop and a genuine process of disarmament will begin. No such reversal has been produced during the past four years. On the contrary, all hopes have been betrayed. The big Powers, the blocs and even the rest of the world have further strengthened and added

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

to their armaments. This is happening in a situation when the world has never wanted peace and needed co-operation more but has never been more divided and threatened; when differences between the rich, developed and poor, underdeveloped world in which millions of people are hungry every day have never been so great; when the world was never so interdependent and aware of the need for peace and development, while at the same time being so armed and directly threatened by the danger of total nuclear destruction. These dilemmas have no alternative. The world can only survive in peaceful coexistence that should proceed from general and complete disarmament and universal international co-operation for the development of all countries.

Although we all agree on this in theory, we do not, however, implement it in practice. I am deeply convinced that the solution for the way out of the present dangerous situation can only be found in the sustained support by all countries and on every occasion of the fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence, collective security and equitable co-operation which are embodied in the United Nations Charter and for which the non-aligned movement is wholeheartedly striving. It is only in the genuine realization of these principles that every country can find its place under the sun, ensure its security, freedom, independence, human rights and development. This is the only way to overcome relations based on power politics, domination and hegemony, to prevent the jeopardizing of independence by spheres of interest and interference in the internal affairs of particular countries which alone have the right to decide about the form and way of their life. Only through equitable international relations and the establishment of the New International Economic Order is it possible to build a world of confidence, peace and friendship between all peoples and States of the world.

Such a general political climate must also be maintained by the Committee on Disarmament in order that it may accomplish its important tasks. Without this, the Committee will continue to mark time, listen to calls being repeated and to rhetorical speeches, hold innumerable meetings with no results at a time when the world has an increasing number of problems, conflicts and weapons every day. Its work will continue to yield no results if we are not capable of creating conditions that will ensure that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, becomes the true forum for negotiations on disarmament. The work of the Committee has always encouraged me because of the prevailing spirit of co-operation, tolerant discussion, equitable relations and a generally existing aspiration to progress and fulfil the task before us. I think that this spirit should today be preserved so that tomorrow, when common sense, confidence and political will finally prevail, these conditions will ensure genuine, productive and successful work by the Committee on Disarmament. I regret that I have not witnessed that "tomorrow"; however, I am deeply convinced of it. And not only because of the spirit that prevails here but also because we have no other alternative.

I can assure you that my country, continuing Tito's policy, will always do all that is in its power to support the Committee on Disarmament in continuing its work in this spirit and to fulfil the historical tasks for which it has been created.

I would like to thank all delegations for their active, constructive and friendly co-operation and the secretariat and particularly Ambassador Jaipal, for their highly professional work. I wish for all of you that you may arrive as soon as possible at that historical turning point from armament to disarmament, which is so eagerly awaited by the great majority of mankind and which would pave the way for a new era of freedom, prosperity and well-being for all.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

I am sure that all members of the Committee share my feelings in learning that Ambassador Vrhunec will be leaving us soon. He has contributed much to the work of the Committee with his outstanding diplomatic skill and his tact and wisdom. I wish him success in his new assignment where, I am sure, he will continue to serve his great country with distinction.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, our statement today will be devoted to the questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear tests.

It is not by chance that these questions are the first on the Committee's agenda. They are in truth the main, the central issues in international life.

Furthermore, there is every reason for saying that they are becoming more and more urgent and acute. This stems from the fact that the United States is intensifying, on a growing scale, its material and technical preparations in the nuclear sphere, as also the aggressiveness of its military and strategic concepts. A nuclear war is now viewed by the United States as possible and, in certain circumstances, expedient, and practical preparations for it are under way with the aim of winning a victory. Hence particular emphasis is placed on creating a first-strike potential, on reducing the striking distance, on efforts to move the nuclear menace created by such a policy as far away from United States territory as possible. All this leads to a sharp destabilization of the strategic situation in the world.

Following upon these doctrines, based on the admissibility and even acceptability of a nuclear conflict, we learned literally a few days ago that the Pentagon had completed a "strategic master plan" which is to provide the United States, according to the press, with "the capability of winning a protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union".

I do not think that it is necessary to explain in detail to such a competent and qualified body as our Committee to what extent the calculations about winning a victory in a nuclear war are insane. The Soviet Union, like the overwhelming majority of States, bases its approach on the indisputable fact, decisive in the present international situation, that should a nuclear war begin it could mean the destruction of human civilization and perhaps an end to life itself on earth.

This view is also shared by the majority of military experts. It is shared in particular by such a high-ranking American military leader as General D. Jones, who has just retired as Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is reported to have warned that preparations for fighting either a limited or a protracted nuclear war would be throwing money into a "bottomless pit". "I see great difficulty", he said, "in keeping any kind" --- I would emphasize, any kind -- "of nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States from escalating."

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed that our military doctrine is purely defensive in character. This general defensive orientation of Soviet doctrine has been and still is reflected in the military-technical policy of our State. I should like to stress this fact.

Faithful to the principles of its nuclear policy, the Soviet Union has taken the unprecedented step of giving a unilateral pledge that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This pledge, which became effective at the moment when the message from the head of the Soviet State, Leonid Brezhnev, was read out from the rostrum of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is our concrete contribution to the efforts of the international community to avert a nuclear war and to curb the nuclear arms race.

At the request of the Soviet delegation, the message from Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament has been circulated as an official document of the Committee.

We wish to stress that the Soviet unilateral pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons means in practice that the task of preventing a military conflict from developing into a nuclear one will be given even greater attention in the training of Soviet armed forces, and this task in all its complexity is becoming a permit part of our military activities. As was stated by Marshal D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union, this imposes an even stricter framework on troops and staff training and the determination of the weapons complement, and requires the organization of even more rigid control in order to rule out reliably the possibility of any unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic.

Attempts to belittle the importance of this Soviet action by labelling it "propagandistic", "declarative" and so on, are not likely to convince many people, and will certainly not be successful here in this Committee whose members are experts in disarmament matters. We are grateful to the distinguished representatives of fraternal socialist countries members of the Committee, as well as to the distinguished representatives of Pakistan, Brazil, Yugoslavia and other countries, who have praised the Soviet initiative.

The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the initiative of the Soviet Union will be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear-weapon States. If the other nuclear-weapon Powers also undertake an equally precise and clear obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether, which is what the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world demand.

Questions relating to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war should be considered by our Committee as a matter of priority, and we support the Indian proposal that negotiations should be undertaken on "appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war". We would recall that it was on the initiative of the Soviet Union that the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session adopted the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, which has won high moral and political recognition.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Parallel to urgent measures to avert the growing nuclear threat it is essential for the Committee to proceed to the elaboration of measures which would really bring the nuclear arms race to a halt and lead to nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet delegation would like at this point to stress primarily our positive attitude to the idea of a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and, finally, to their complete elimination. This has been declared from the rostrum of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is a global one, and we are in agreement with the great majority of delegations which have offered an analysis of this problem. While we attach great importance to the present negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, and while we express the hope that these negotiations will lead to speedy and positive results, we would like at the same time to stress with the utmost firmness that the problem of nuclear disarmament should be considered in all its scope by the Committee and that the Committee as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating organ should concretely and productively contribute to the solution of this problem.

Nuclear war, if it should break out, will spare no one; it will affect every State on earth. That is why all States, including, certainly, the non-nuclear-weapon States, have not only the right but the duty before humanity to do everything in their power to help solve the problem of nuclear disarmament.

Striving, for its part, to contribute constructively to the achievement of this aim the Soviet Union, in its memorandum on "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race", submitted at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, advocated the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme, and proposed concrete parameters for this programme on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session.

It is our view that such a programme could include the following:

Cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons;

Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons;

Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and of their delivery vehicles;

Gradual reduction of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles;

Total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear arms limitation and reduction should include all nuclear means, and primarily strategic armaments and medium-range weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As can be seen from our list of possible nuclear disarmament measures, one of the first stages of the programme could be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of various types of nuclear weapons -- something which very many other countries also have advocated. The Soviet Union is ready to examine this matter in the over-all context of the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race.

It goes without saying that during the elaboration of nuclear disarmament measures it will be necessary to agree upon appropriate methods and forms of verification which would satisfy all parties concerned and promote the effective implementation of the agreements reached.

We would particularly stress that the resources released at each stage as a result of nuclear disarmament would be totally allocated to peaceful purposes, including the provision of assistance to developing countries, excluding, in other words, the reallocation of those resources to the production of what are known as conventional armaments.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in all this work. It is now the turn of the other nuclear-weapon Powers and in particular of the United States, to state their position.

The USSR memorandum has been circulated today at the request of our delegation as an official document of the Committee, and we hope that it will help us in our work.

The Committee on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for the conduct of negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and we consider that it is extremely important for the Committee to set up immediately an ad hoc working group on this item.

That is the position of the Soviet Union on the questions of the prevention of nuclear war and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In this connection I should like to say frankly that the statements made by certain delegations in the Committee cause us, to say the least, perplexity, for by putting the blame for the deadlock in the negotiations on these priority issues on the so-called "Superpowers", lumped together, they do not perceive, or do not want to perceive that the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States differ in principle. This applies in particular to the delegation which, on the one hand constantly reiterates its support for the positions of the developing countries and on the other hand, by its refusal to participate in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, has set itself up in opposition to the majority of the Committee. Such contradictions, whether deliberately or not, mislead public opinion and can only damage negotiations on disarmament. We appeal to these delegations to adopt a correct approach to the position of the USSR, in particular on the basis of the documents which have been distributed.

I should now like to speak about the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Although the vital importance of this problem is widely admitted, in view of recent United States Administration decisions in this sphere which deny the primordial importance of this issue, I wish briefly to explain here the Soviet approach of principle to the problem of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The complete and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is one of the most important problems in the general complex of measures aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war. Its solution would mean setting up a real obstacle in the way of the further improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types and systems of such weapons. It is known, too, that tests are used for verifying combat readiness and for increasing the efficiency of existing nuclear munitions. The cessation of further tests would impede this process and thus really contribute to a lowering of the military efficiency of nuclear weapons, which would lead to a decline in the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and an increase in the stability of the strategic situation both on a regional and on a global scale.

We are glad that many delegations share this point of view. As the representative of the Netherlands rightly put it at the Committee's meeting on 17 August, "A comprehensive test ban would strengthen the security of all States, create conditions for a gradual de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and draw closer the goal of undiminished security at a progressively lower level of armaments. Moreover, a universal agreement to cease nuclear testing would enhance confidence between States".

Bearing all this in mind, we think that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an important measure for the limitation of the nuclear arms race. It would, at the same time, strengthen the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime since it would deprive States seeking to possess nuclear weapons of the possibility of carrying out tests, which is an indispensable stage in the production of such weapons.

Acting in accordance with this approach, the Soviet Union has consistently made efforts -- and will continue to do so in the future no less persistently, in spite of the endless zigzags in the positions of the United States and certain other nuclear-weapon-Powers -- to secure the conclusion of a CTBT. That is our steadfast position. I believe that the consistency of our approach and our numerous constructive initiatives and proposals on this problem are obvious to everyone.

The President of the United States recently announced his decision not to resume the trilateral talks on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom which were broken off by the United States. At the same time the decision was taken not to ratify the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which were signed respectively in 1974 and 1976.

Obviously, there is no need to assess these decisions. World public opinion as well as many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have already given a due assessment of them. In fact in the United States itself a number of political figures of high standing whom we all know well, former directors of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and heads of United States delegations at negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, colleagues of ours such as William Forster, Gerald Smith, Paul Warnke, Ralph Earle, Adrian Fisher and Herbert York have stated their refusal to support the United States Administration's decision which, they have stressed, "casts doubt upon the sincerity of the United States in the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva and in other arms control negotiations".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Two other nuclear-weapon Powers, too, France and China, have made their "contribution" to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests, in announcing a few days ago, that they would not participate in the negotiations on this issue in the Committee on Disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has started its meetings in this -- to put it bluntly -- not very favourable situation.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we are ready, in spite of this situation, to participate constructively in the activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is of course in the first instance required to define, in relation to the subject under consideration, "issues relating to verification and compliance", as the Group's mandate states. Verification cannot be considered in a vacuum, abstractly. There should be a clear understanding that the issues relating to verification and compliance will be examined as applying to a treaty which would prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, would be of unlimited duration, would provide for a solution acceptable to all parties of the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and would include among its participants all nuclear-weapon States.

The future work of the Group will show how serious the other nuclear-weapon States are in their approach to its work. Even now, in view of the recent decision of the United States Administration on the subject of nuclear weapon tests, a question arises, and we put it to the Committee: will not the United States try to use our Committee and the negotiations being started in it on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as a screen to deceive world public opinion while at the same time speeding up such tests?

The Soviet delegation would like to state very clearly that we have no intention of tolerating a situation in which the Committee on Disarmament is used for such improper purposes.

Those were the comments the Soviet delegation wished to make on the two first items on our agenda. These observations were prompted by the Soviet Union's basic policy which aims at the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of the further sophistication of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated. The outstanding importance of these items is especially evident now, when the international situation in the Middle East has suffered a new and serious deterioration. In this region Israel, encouraged by a nuclear-weapon Power -- the United States -- is carrying out a policy of genocide against the Lebanese people and against the Arab people of Palestine. This aggression has caused profound indignation on the part of the Soviet people and of all people of goodwill. We decisively condemn the aggressive actions of Israel and its protectors, which are a threat to world peace. Particular alarm is caused by reports that the Israeli militarists are using on a large scale barbarous phosphorus shells against the peaceful inhabitants of Lebanon. This is a matter relating directly to the competence of the Committee on Disarmament, and we believe that it should not ignore these facts.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement.

May I note the presence among us for the first time of the new representative of Peru, Ambassador Peter Cannock, who is replacing our esteemed former colleague, Ambassador Valdivieso. Ambassador Cannock joins us after having served lately in a position of high responsibility in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a member of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister dealing with special questions. His diplomatic experience will be a welcome addition to this Committee. I welcome him and I wish him, on my own behalf and that of the Committee, a very successful mission in Geneva.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, with reference to the announcement by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec, of his imminent departure, I should like to say that I fully share the feelings you expressed, both as regards the outstanding contribution our colleague has made to the work of this Committee ever since its initiation and as regards the well-deserved success we are sure will be his in his new assignment. I also fully endorse the warm words of welcome you addressed to Ambassador Peter Cannock, who is with us today for the first time.

In resolution 36/84 adopted on 9 December last year, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to bear in mind that "the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee", and also to support the creation of "an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests". We hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group which the Committee set up on 21 April of this year in connection with item 1 of its agenda entitled, as we all know, "Nuclear test ban", will keep very much in mind in the discharge of its functions the objective set by the General Assembly in the resolution to which I have just referred, for that objective alone is fully in keeping with the commitments entered into in the 1963 and 1968 Treaties to which reference is so often made in our discussions.

My delegation considers that it would be pointless once again to review here the background to this question, which stretches back over more than a quarter of a century: it was in 1954 that Nehru for the first time raised the question of ending nuclear-weapon tests. The preamble to resolution 36/84, which I mentioned at the outset and which is included in the annexes to the Secretary-General's letter reproduced in document CD/231 of 2 February 1982, contains a summary, no less significant for being condensed, of the salient aspects of that background. Furthermore, the position of my delegation, which has on countless occasions considered this item both in Geneva and in New York, essentially coincides, as I have said a number of times but will repeat once more today, with the views expressed by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1972, when he stated before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement ...

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification ... it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban ...

"The potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests."

Bearing the foregoing in mind, I believe that the best I can do in this statement -- and what I shall do in the remainder of it -- is to quote from some testimony, chosen from among the enormous number of statements which have been made by prominent persons in the United States, the only nuclear Superpower which has for some time been showing clear signs of unwillingness to abide by the undertaking unequivocally set forth in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty. The testimony which I shall read out dates from the same period as the views of the Secretary-General which I have just recalled, and is taken from the United States Senate official records of the hearings of the relevant Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign relations Committee in 1971 and 1972.

The first testimony which I shall quote is that of Dr. Jerome Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as it was the first in the hearings. He said the following:

"It is indeed good to hear that Senator Edmund Muskie, as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, will be holding hearings on the underground test question -- the first since 1963.

"At that time, as Science Advisor to President Kennedy, I participated in the decisions leading up to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Important as a first arms control measure, this treaty was nevertheless a compromise made necessary by the inability of the Soviet Union and the United States to reach agreement on the number and mode of on-site inspections required to monitor an underground test ban. Actually, there was no technical reason why we should not have concluded a comprehensive test ban treaty at that time. We now know that only political considerations on both sides prevented reconciliation of the minor differences that existed at the time.

"Today, the feasibility of an underground test ban is even greater. It was recently announced that a scientists' panel at a test detection conference of the Advanced Research Project Agency of the Defense Department concluded that progress in seismology now makes it possible to distinguish all but the smallest tests from earthquakes. A test ban agreement without on-site inspection, therefore acceptable to the Soviet Union and practical to implement, would now appear possible.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"It is increasingly recognized, moreover, that there is no longer real reason for these underground explosions -- if there ever was -- since the ABM warhead for which the tests are chiefly designed may already have been made obsolete by changes in United States policy ...

"At the same time, progress in test detection techniques make serious East-West talks on an underground test ban a priority. Already, public pressure for this treaty seems to have increased the credibility of our position at the SALT talks. I hope these hearings will serve to stimulate a new United States initiative toward this imperative measure of arms control. We desperately need to bring the arms race under control. We need to concentrate our hopes, energies, and resources more on constructive things and less on fear-motivated, hopeless weapon systems such as the ABM. Here is an opportunity for our nation to exercise judgement, restraint, and leadership through a modest but important step toward a more rational world."

That is the end of what I want to quote from the statement by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The second testimony from which I should like to quote, which is dated 14 July 1971, is that of Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, who was for several years the alternate representative of his country to the United Nations in New York, and from 1958 to 1960 none other than head of the United States delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held in Geneva. I have selected from that testimony the paragraphs which I shall now read out, because they appear to me to be of particular interest for this multilateral negotiating body:

"Speaking both on behalf of a distinguished group of citizens who have organized the Task Force for The Nuclear Test Ban, and from my own experience as Chief of the United States Delegation to the Conference on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Geneva from 1958 to 1960, I fervently hope that these hearings will at long last put us back on the road to a comprehensive East-West test ban and thus signal the end of the nuclear arms race.

"There is increasing evidence that the security of the nation will not be strengthened through further development of nuclear weapons. Underground testing, therefore, may and should become obsolete.

"However, it is hardly necessary to warn that severe opposition must be expected -- and not chiefly from the Russians ...

"I can testify that President Eisenhower was dedicated to the goal of a ban on all nuclear tests. Several times during my years at Geneva, it seemed the test ban agreement with the Russians could be concluded. Each time, however, obstacles arose which even the President, with all the power of his office, could not overcome. I believe the following brief analysis of the tactics used by the opposition could serve to alert us to the hurdles we should be prepared to surmount, as once more a test ban agreement is in sight.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"Naturally, since the United States insisted on the need for on-site inspection, the Soviet resistance to inspection presented a continuing difficulty in the negotiations. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the discussions at the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958, United States scientists said they were impressed with the sincerity of the Soviet delegation ...

"In my view, our difficulties in reaching a test ban arose in part from within, not from without. The principal opposition originated from that complex of defence establishment agencies, including the Atomic Energy Commission, which are responsible for the United States weapons programme. It was clear that the military elements of the executive branch were thoroughly opposed to the treaty ...

"In August 1958, the Conference of Experts at Geneva, including both the Western and the Soviet delegation, completed their 'technical' report. The American technical delegation believed that for the first time they had obtained Soviet agreement to the principle of international inspection and to a control system which would make a test ban feasible. At that point, our anti-ban forces immediately went to work. AEC scientists produced 'new data' on high-altitude tests, decoupling, and the 'big hole' theory. Eventually, their exaggerations were proved invalid. Nevertheless, their delaying tactics succeeded. Our East-West agreement was postponed and a new conference convened to consider the revised data ...

"By March 1960, it appeared once more that the talks to devise an effective detection system had been successfully concluded. The two Western leaders, Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower, had agreed to join the Russians in a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, policed by the system of 180 control posts devised at Geneva. Clandestine underground tests down to the level of 4.75 seismic magnitude would be detected through a system of seismic instruments and a quota of on-site inspections. There would be a joint moratorium on all small tests below this 'threshold', since they could not be easily identified. Moreover, the two leaders did not believe clandestine tests of this size could produce results which could have a major effect on either nation's strategic posture. A joint research project to discover detection methods for these small tests would be initiated.

"Only the final details of the agreement remained to be worked out at the 'summit' meeting planned for May 1960 in Paris. Since I knew at first hand the strength of the opposition to the test ban, I was concerned that plans for the 'summit' should go forward without interruption ...

"After all the delays ..., however, it appeared all efforts to delay the agreement would fail, and as the date for the 'summit' approached, there was widespread expectation that a test ban would be concluded. Just two weeks before the 'summit', you will recall, an American U2 spy plane was shot down by Soviet rockets. In the resulting confusion of mutual suspicions and recriminations, hostility replaced the pre-summit détente. Khrushchev left Paris after one meeting, denouncing President Eisenhower, the summit collapsed and the treaty was postponed again.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The central mystery, which the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could not solve, remained. Why were the provocative U2 flights continued at a sensitive period when the capture of the plan could rupture chances of a détente? ...

"As far as our Joint Chiefs were concerned, the issue of effective inspection was a smokescreen. Continuation of an aggressive underground test programme was, for them, a prerequisite. Ultimately, they prevailed.

"It is on the basis of this personal experience that I believe the public must have all the facts if we are to end the arms race. I am reassured that the Congress is conducting these hearings. Despite the record of the past, by being alert to the tactics of those who oppose a nuclear test ban, I believe that their opposition can be overcome.

"Inaccurate evidence will no longer be acceptable as a basis for decision. The true reasons for the objections will be recognized. The evaluation that American weaponry is already sufficient for defence, that a test ban can be agreed without endangering American security, and that the risks involved are now acceptable, is of overriding public interest".

That is the end of my quotation from the statement made at the hearings before the United States Senate by Ambassador James Wadsworth who, as I said at the beginning, was none other than head of the United States delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held in Geneva.

To conclude these quotations, I am going to read some paragraphs chosen from the statement made by someone whom, I am sure, many of my distinguished colleagues will well remember for, apart from playing a prominent part in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the 1960s, he was head of the United States delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1977 and 1978 and to this Committee in 1979 and 1980. I am referring to Ambassador Adrian S. Fisher who, in May 1972, said the following:

"My testimony is directed primarily to the political significance of a comprehensive test ban. I do not believe, however, that we are dealing with a situation in which we have to rely on political assets to overcome military liabilities because I am persuaded, on the basis of expert testimony, that from the point of view of weapons development, a test ban is, on balance, advantageous to the United States. The experts with whom I have consulted, and whom you have heard, have made it clear that, even allowing for the possibility of some cheating in relation to small underground tests, the relative position of the United States to the USSR would be more favourable under a comprehensive test ban, monitored solely by national means, than it would be under the present circumstances which permit testing through a much wider range of yields.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The political advantages of a comprehensive test ban are considerable. As this committee is aware, the United States in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by President Kennedy, pledged itself to continue negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons test explosions. This commitment was reaffirmed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiated under President Johnson and ratified by President Nixon. Thus, three administrations have undertaken this commitment.

"It is clear to me that other countries of the world take this commitment of ours quite seriously. In the particular context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty I have grave doubts that it will have any success in persuading certain potential powers to seriously consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty as long as we are conducting an extensive series of underground tests ...

"We have heard a good deal about verification and doubtless will hear more. But let's put things in proper perspective: verification of a comprehensive test ban has always been only a part of the problem. The main question which existed in 1958 and exists today, 14 years later, is really this one: do we want to continue testing nuclear weapons? Is our over-all security better with a comprehensive test ban even though there is some risk of a few small clandestine tests, or without a ban, which allows the Russians to test at all yields, encourages additional nations to acquire nuclear weapons and continues indefinitely the arms race? If we decide that it is in our best interest to ban tests, I do believe that our present capability to distinguish earthquakes from explosions at very low magnitudes should be satisfactory to permit us to move toward a comprehensive test ban treaty ...".

That is what Ambassador Fisher said in 1972 at the Senate hearings.

The Ad Hoc Working Group which has just been set up will undoubtedly be able to find in the testimony that I have just reviewed a rich source of inspiration, which will help it to carry out its work in such a way as to ensure that it is in keeping with the aims which have been pursued in vain by all the peoples of the world since the middle of this century. Those statements may also help members of the Group to have a clear understanding of the need to ensure that the question of verification is not used as a "smoke-screen", as it was put in one of those statements, and also of the need for the United Nations General Assembly and world public opinion to be fully informed of developments on this issue to which, quite rightly, for so long now "the highest priority" has been attached among the various nuclear disarmament issues.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I have the honour to introduce today document CD/318, containing the fourteenth progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Ad Hoc Group met from 9 to 19 August 1982, under the chairmanship of Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. Experts from twenty countries took part in the session.

The Ad Hoc Group considered the draft chapters for its third formal report on a global system for a seismic data exchange, designed to assist States to monitor a nuclear test ban.

The Group considered a number of national investigations on seismographic stations and networks, and the extraction of data from the stations, on the world-wide transmission of such data through the WMO Global Telecommunication System, on the transmission and use of whole records (so-called Level 2 data), and on the tasks of international data centres designed to assist participating States in analysing all the data seismologically.

As before, the Ad Hoc Group enjoyed excellent co-operation with the WMO and plans further experimental transmission over the WMO network. In order to obtain full efficiency in such a transmission, the WMO has advised the Ad Hoc Group that arrangements could be made to send the Ad Hoc Group's transmissions on a regular basis. I understand that this advice is essentially an offer of even further co-operation, and I think that use should be made of this generous offer. I also understand that the distinguished representative of Japan will speak on the substance of this matter today.

In preparing its progress report in March this year the Ad Hoc Group had difficulties in finding a way to report on national investigations on the exchange and use of so-called Level 2 data (i.e. of whole records). Recent advances in computer and telecommunication equipment have made it possible to exchange, without much effort, many more Level 2 data than was foreseen in the two formal reports submitted by the Ad Hoc Group in 1978 and 1979. In addition, recent advances in scientific understanding have made it possible to exploit Level 2 data also in the analysis foreseen for international data centres, thereby significantly increasing the quality of their calculations. These were initially foreseen to be made only on the basis of Level 1 data (i.e. bulletin-like extracts from the records). This latter result, based on national investigations in Sweden and elsewhere, is still under debate in the Ad Hoc Group with respect to the manner of reporting on it. I am confident that a constructive outcome of this issue will be found in due course.

The other matter -- how to report on modern possibilities for the exchange of Level 2 data has, however, been resolved -- a good omen for the third formal report of the Ad Hoc Group, expected to be submitted next year.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has told me that he is very satisfied with the clear and business-like manner in which the quite difficult matters concerning Level 2 data have recently been discussed in the Group.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The Ad Hoc Group proposes that its next meeting be held from 7 to 18 February 1983.

With these words, Mr. Chairman, I formally propose that the Committee takes note of the progress report contained in document CD/318.

Finally, I want to say that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, is prepared to report in more detail and to answer questions, if any, in the same manner as has been customary in the past.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement.

As I noted at the beginning of this plenary meeting, the progress report by the Ad Hoc Group has been circulated for consideration by the Committee. Before I give the floor to the following speaker on my list, may I inform the Committee that the delegation of Japan has submitted document CD/319, which has been circulated today and deals with one of the questions contained in that report. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan, His Excellency Ambassador Okawa.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, we have once again received a progress report from the chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. My delegation wishes to thank Mr. Hyltenius, the distinguished delegate of Sweden, for introducing this report and, of course, Dr. Ericsson, the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group for its preparation.

My delegation has followed with interest the progress of work in the five study groups established within the Ad Hoc Group two years ago. A Japanese expert is one of the co-convenors of the third study group dealing with the "format and procedures for the exchange of Level 1 data through WMO/GTS". We have been encouraged by the two trial exchanges of Level 1 seismic data which took place in 1980 and 1981 through the GTS of the WMO. We note the statement in the new progress report that the Ad Hoc Group sees the need for additional tests in order to obtain further experience. My delegation would like to know how many such additional tests are going to be needed before the global system of seismic data transmission on the WMO/GTS can be consolidated.

I have taken note of a sentence in the new report which says that the Ad Hoc Group "noted the advice of the WMO that significant improvements in transmission could be expected only if the Ad Hoc Group were to use the GTS on a regular basis". This sentence appears towards the bottom of page 2 of the progress report.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that the trial exchanges over the GTS that I have just referred to were conducted only under provisional arrangements with the WMO. I drew the attention of the Committee to this fact in my intervention of 16 March 1982 when I suggested that the Committee on Disarmament should formally request the WMO to co-operate in the global transmission of seismic data by authorizing the use of its GTS for that purpose. As the distinguished Chairman has just announced, my delegation has tabled today a Committee document setting forth the background to the Ad Hoc Group's relationship with the WMO and explaining why this relationship needs to be formalized.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

With regard to the exchange of Level 2 data, I referred in March to the considerable progress achieved in recent years in the technology for data exchange of this sort and said that efforts should be made to apply such new technology to the exchange of Level 2 data. We welcome the progress reported from the Ad Hoc Group in this regard. Last week, the Norwegian delegation demonstrated a prototype system for seismic data exchange initiated by the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) and we are grateful to the Norwegian experts for showing us how wave-form or Level 2 data can be rapidly transmitted under their system. We also thank them for their document CD/310. We hope that consensus may be achieved in the Ad Hoc Group on the application of agreed procedures for analysing Level 2 data in the context of the envisaged global exchange.

The new progress report once again refers to the third report of the Ad Hoc Group, the completion of which seems to be postponed from year to year. Again we are told that the Ad Hoc Group will need to conduct additional work before submitting a full, complete report in compliance with its present mandate.

It should be recalled that the Ad Hoc Group was set up by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976. In the ensuing six years we have been provided with two valuable reports which are contained in documents CD/558 of 9 March 1978 and CD/43 of 25 July 1979. While looking forward with anticipation to receiving the third report of the Ad Hoc Group, my delegation, as a member of this Committee, would like to know how the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group sees the prospects of his Group's work in the future. In my layman's mind, I cannot quite grasp the extent of the work that remains to be done and how much longer it is going to take; and whether the Ad Hoc Group's work is not being overtaken by the yearly progress in technology, and whether this does not mean that the Ad Hoc Group will need to be in permanent session simply to catch up with such technological progress. I simply hope that at each stage in the Ad Hoc Group's labours the results can be put to practical application without seeking further sophistication; and that additional technological advances can be taken up and incorporated into the exercise as they become available.

While hoping that Dr. Ericsson and the distinguished experts of his group will forgive me for these rather probing remarks, I do wish to reiterate my delegation's deep appreciation to them for the most valuable work they have been conducting over the years.

Before concluding this speech, I would like to say how pleased we are to learn of the arrival of our new colleague from Peru and my delegation wishes to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Cannock. I must also say how sorry we are that ambassador Venkateswaran of India and Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria are no longer amongst us and that Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia is also about to leave us. On behalf of my delegation I wish to pay high tribute to these distinguished colleagues of ours for their contributions to the work of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. Document CD/319 suggests that a request be addressed to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization by the Chairman of the Committee, so that the necessary arrangements might be made to enable the Ad Hoc Group to continue to utilize the Global Telecommunication System on a regular basis for the transmission of seismic data in order to detect and identify seismic events. On the basis of the request contained in document CD/319, I intend to put before the Committee for consideration and decision, at our plenary meeting next Thursday, a draft communication to the Secretary-General of WMO. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Australia, Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEELE (Australia): Mr. Chairman, the Australian delegation welcomes the progress report on the fourteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and considers that the Committee on Disarmament should take note of this useful document, CD/318. It is more evident than ever that international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events are of direct importance to our work. Now that the Committee on Disarmament has established an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, this relevance will become apparent to all. The Chairman of that Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard, and his adviser, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, have already emphasized this. Dr. Ericsson, as Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts, continues to oversee an activity deserving of our fullest support; he himself similarly earns our appreciation.

I would like to draw the Committee's attention to a number of important points in document CD/318, but before doing so I wish to remind the Committee of the consideration it gave to the previous progress report, as recorded in CD/PV.164 of 18 March. Differences of opinion, not reflected in that progress report, were aired in our March debate over the issue of how far the Group of Scientific Experts was able to apply to its work, within the terms of its mandate, many startling related technological advances, including those being demonstrated in national experiments. Those differences of view to some extent remain but they are being frankly acknowledged and addressed, and compromises sought. Proof of this can be found in document CD/318 itself, which was put together without great difficulty. Although paragraph 7 of that document concludes by noting certain matters not yet resolved, it is clear that the issue in question will be thoroughly considered in future and the results of this consideration will be brought to the Committee's attention.

National investigations are a fundamental aspect of the Group's further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system envisaged for use in international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. At the fourteenth session Norway put on a display of hardware, impressively flexible and low in cost, which could form the basis of an international data centre. Norway has shown how Level 2 data (i.e. detailed records of wave forms) can be readily transmitted and has invited participation in an experimental multilateral exchange of such data by, for instance, telephone-linked computers. This experiment deserves support.

Other valuable work relating to the use of Level 2 data at International Data Centres has been done by Sweden and the United States. This remains controversial or at least unresolved. Nevertheless, if vastly more information can

(Mr. Steele, Australia)

now be used by data centres than was envisaged when the expert Group's mandate was first framed, it is time for that mandate to cope with such a development: this may or may not in itself require formal revision.

The Ambassador of Japan has today pointed out to the Committee that there is a need to formalize the exchange of Level 1 data over the World Meteorological Organization's Global Telecommunications System, for example by a request from the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament to the Secretary-General of WMO. In this connection he has taken this initiative and tabled document CD/319. Australia is co-convenor with Japan of study group 3 considering data exchange over the WMO/GTS and strongly urges that steps be taken to follow this proposal through. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts itself in paragraph 7 of document CD/318 notes the benefits of a more regular basis to the Ad Hoc Group's relationship with the WMO/GTS. It sees "the need for additional experiments using the WMO/GTS to test other aspects of the possible international exchange of data". We can therefore anticipate some large-scale experimentation in 1983 of data exchange over this system. The urgency of the matter is apparent.

The concluding paragraph of document CD/318 envisages that the Ad Hoc Group's third report will be submitted during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation welcomes this first specific indication of a date for the report and hopes that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will have no difficulty in adhering to it. There is no doubt that the Committee as a whole would greatly benefit from a detailed account next year of the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement.

I would now like to invite members to address questions to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ericsson.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Japan has, I think, put some very interesting and probing questions to Dr. Ericsson, and I think that the Committee would benefit by hearing his response to those questions.

Dr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): There were four questions put to me by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan. The first question relates to the experiments which the Group of Scientific Experts has been performing on the WMO network and the question is: "My delegation would like to know how many such additional tests are going to be needed before the global system of seismic data transmission on the WMO/GTS can be consolidated."

I take it that a final consolidation of what the data exchange system should be, in detail, would have to wait for thorough experience on the WMO lines on a regular basis. The WMO world-wide network is a patchwork of national parts; each country operates the part on its own territory, from neighbour to neighbour. This makes the

(Dr. Ericsson, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

reaction time of that system to changes rather long. We have, in the past, asked for permission to transmit on these lines some three months before the actual test and that has proved to be insufficient to obtain a complete, positive reaction from the whole system. If ever we obtain a regular transmission situation then we would obtain full operation in regard to our needs in, let us say, 6 to 9 months and that would then be, I would not say final, but a very major step towards a final understanding of how the system would work.

Here, and also in response to the second question, I would like to say that the Group of Scientific Experts now meets twice a year and produces its results at a certain pace. So far, that pace has been faster than that of the nuclear test ban so there is, all the time, ample room for improvement while waiting for political developments. The second specific question of Ambassador Okawa was: "My delegation would like to know how the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group sees the prospects of his Group's work in the future", and he went on to add questions about the extent of the work that remains to be done and how much longer it is going to take, and whether the Ad Hoc Group is not being overtaken by the yearly progress in technology. As I said, so far, we think that we have been faster than the test ban. If we sit and wait, then there will be a gap. Science does not develop very quickly; technology however, does, especially in the aspects of telecommunications, where development is very rapid. There we have simply been overtaken, since 1978, by the progress of technology and this is why we have devoted some years of effort to finding out how we could best accommodate these new developments. The matter of Level 2 data, of how to deal with complete records, is first of all an important and difficult technical question. It is also a question of whether participants are in a position to exploit these possibilities. It is a very rapid development and it is understandable that these developments proceed at a different speed in different places on this globe. The positions of participants, therefore, to take advantage of these developments right now, say today, are very different indeed. On the other hand, it is quite clear that this kind of new technology, in due course, will penetrate, I would say, all countries. This then makes it necessary that the system of global data exchange which the Group of Scientific Experts is exploring, describing and investigating, should contain a feature of renewal, a feature of taking into account the new significant developments in science and technology. Again, this is an important aspect of any system which we might propose to you, and it is certainly our responsibility to see to it that some suitable feature of renewal is included also. This is why we have taken our time in preparing a third report, because it is this very question which is before us in this discussion on what we call in jargon Level 2 data. I hope that this is a sufficient answer to the questions posed by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan.

The CHAIRMAN: We have exhausted the time available to us this morning and I propose that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it this afternoon at 3 p.m. when Dr. Ericsson will answer a few more questions and we shall proceed to hear the last speaker on my list. Upon the adjournment of the plenary meeting we shall move to the informal meeting that the Committee is to hold today on proposals tabled under items 2 and 7 of the agenda.

If there is no objection, I will suspend this plenary meeting now.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 181st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

May I invite those members of the Committee who wish to address questions to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ericsson, to do so.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, through you, I would like to thank Dr. Ericsson for the clarifications he gave, particularly in response to the very pertinent questions which were raised by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, but I must confess that my delegation was a little distressed by a couple of remarks that were made by Dr. Ericsson during his statement. He seems to suggest that in fact the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is maintaining a very, shall I say, commendable progress in its work but that the political negotiations on a nuclear test ban seemed to be going very slowly, and he appeared to suggest that in fact the delay had been on the political conclusion of a nuclear test ban and that therefore, in the intervening period, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would continue to take into account the latest developments in science and technology. Somehow I got the impression that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts was in no hurry because negotiations in the political sphere on a nuclear test ban were in any case not going to be concluded for some time. This is really something which my delegation is a little worried about because this I think involves us in one of those "chicken or the egg" arguments. Is it that the political negotiations on a nuclear test ban are being delayed because the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is unable to arrive at any definitive conclusions on the setting up of a global seismic monitoring network, or is it that the global seismic monitoring network can in fact be elaborated some time in the distant future because in any case the negotiations on a nuclear test ban do not seem to be leading anywhere? As far as my delegation is concerned, there is a very close relationship between political negotiations on a nuclear test ban and the kind of work which is being carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and we have always been given to understand that the political negotiation of a nuclear test ban would be considerably facilitated by the early conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. We are in fact now being told that this is somehow a parallel exercise which may not have very much to do with the political negotiation of a nuclear test ban. For my delegation, the very rationale of such a group, the Group of Scientific Experts, is that it serves the interests of the early conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. It has no other rationale for its existence, and if my delegation becomes convinced that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is somehow conducting an exercise in a vacuum -- conducting an exercise which has very little to do with negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban -- then I must say that my delegation would have to review its whole attitude towards the further functioning of this Group of Experts. This is for us a very serious matter and therefore I would like the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to perhaps clarify this point. I do not think that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts can operate on the assumption that its work is quite open in this way and that it can continue to take into account every technical or scientific advance which is being made, as long as there is no prospect for a nuclear test ban, or we shall then come to political negotiations on a nuclear test ban in which our colleagues will ask us: how can we have a nuclear test ban treaty when problems of verification have not been resolved? This is not the kind of

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situation that we would like to face and we would be very glad if the Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts can give us an explanation as to what is the assumption on which his Group is operating. As far as we understand it, there is a certain assumption of a global seismic monitoring network which was drawn up, I think, when the Group itself was established, and I think that in document CCD/558 there are very clearly laid out terms of reference stating the objective of the Group of Experts. How far away is the Group of Experts from achieving that objective? That is a very simple question to which a very simple answer can be given, and I think we should not enter into this argument that if there is no nuclear test ban in sight then the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts can take all the time in the world to do its work.

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): Well, I would like to thank the distinguished representative of India for his significant question. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is now operating on a mandate which was given to it in 1979 and which is contained in document CD/46. It says that the Committee on Disarmament decides that the Ad Hoc Group should continue its work on such measures which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data, and it goes on to say that this work should include, inter alia, further elaboration of detailed instructions for an experimental test which is foreseen as further development of the scientific and technical aspect of the global system as well as co-operation in the review and analysis of national investigations, which have also essentially proved to be directed towards new aspects and improvements in scientific understanding and technological possibilities. We are, therefore, certainly now in a phase where we attempt to improve the system which we described and proposed to the Committee in our reports CCD/558 and CD/43 and our mandate is formally open-ended in that respect. Certainly, the work of the Group of Scientific Experts is organized in such a way that we meet twice a year here in Geneva, and between these times a number of experts undertake to communicate with their colleagues and put together the results of investigations, drafting chapters towards the report. If a nuclear test ban were to enter into a stage of foreseen implementation, then certainly the Group of Scientific Experts could step up its work; I see no difficulty in that. The Group has already in the past recommended the measures to be taken for a global data exchange system, in the reports I mentioned. However, the material in those reports is in a few respects -- certainly not in every respect, but in a few respects -- now outdated by the surprisingly fast developments in technology as well as some developments in science. It therefore stands to reason that we should try to include these new results in a forthcoming report. This is now being done at the pace which I just described, but if a politically-generated demand for a very fast result were to arise, then I am quite sure that those States which supply the experts to co-operate in this Scientific Group could instruct them to devote much more of their time than they do now to this task. Perhaps I should say that a few delegations do have experts who devote themselves full-time to this work. Other countries do not supply scientists to that extent. These scientists participate only part-time in these investigations. This, I think, describes the situation which, to my understanding, would in no way hinder, from the verification point of view, and as far as the tasks of the Ad Hoc Group are concerned, the conclusion of a nuclear test ban.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, before asking some questions, I would like to join other members in expressing admiration and gratitude to Dr. Ericsson for the work he has been conducting on our behalf for so many years, as well as for the clarity and precision with which he answers our questions on such occasions. In fact, I have two questions.

Firstly, now that the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban is established and at work, some delegations have addressed the issue of what should be the formal relationship between the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and the NTB Working Group, and various suggestions have been made. Obviously, the essential point for all is that the Group of Scientific Experts should be able, when requested, to give advice on technical matters and that a correlation in substance should be achieved. Dr. Ericsson, did this question come up during your recent meeting and what ideas on the relationship -- an optimum relationship -- would you and your colleagues have at hand?

Secondly, when replying to Ambassador Okawa this morning, you pointed out the rapid technological developments in the Level 2 data domain and you stressed the immense potential that these new developments have. But you also pointed out that the capability of countries to draw the full benefits from Level 2 data would vary according to their own development. Now, Dr. Ericsson, we know that both during the spring session and during this session, the way in which Level 2 developments were to be reflected in the report caused considerable controversy and it is quite noticeable that in contrast to the original report text proposed, a number of amendments were moved by one particular country group, tending to downgrade the importance of Level 2 data, or rather even to discard it. We all know that your Group had a difficult time arriving at the consensus text which we now see. My question is the following, Dr. Ericsson: What is the impression of yourself and your colleagues, as experts, of the reason for the obvious reluctance to treat the Level 2 data for what they are worth? Would you think that it is due to a less advanced technical structure in the country group which has made these amendments, or is it rather due to an instinctive reluctance to use the potential of Level 2 data because it offers such immense potential for an advanced international verification system in this domain?

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): Your first question was on the relationship between the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Group of Scientific Experts. The main relationship, certainly the one that the Group of Scientific Experts has set up, is to deliver consensus reports on the specific matter of data exchange to assist countries in monitoring a nuclear test ban. This does not cover the whole field of verification of a nuclear test ban, but is only part of it. As I said a while ago, the circumstances in the last few years have brought forth a certain mode of operations, a certain pace of delivering results and that job is still there. If, as envisaged, we are able to provide the Committee on Disarmament with a third report recommending a number of improvements in the system as seen originally, then I hope that we do a good job, contributing at least one element of the verification complex for a nuclear test ban. The pace of work is rather slow, so if you think that the Group as a whole might respond to questions from this body or its Working Group, then the question of how -- if I am extremely formal -- could be put before the Group only in February, because that is

(Mr. Ericsson, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

when it meets, so it is not, from that point of view, extremely practical. On the other hand, the existence and the activities of the Group, have, I think, generated a set of experts who know the test ban verification question rather well by now. There are some 20 to 25 national experts in this field in the Group and I think that, at present at least, the optimal way of using that expertise would be if delegations here, or their Governments, simply exploit the potential of their own experts. That, to me, under present circumstances, would be the best way of using that potential. That was in answer to your first question. In your second question, you asked, essentially, why we have this difficulty with the Level 2 data. There are several reasons for that, and it has been to me, personally, of much concern to understand, because the difficulty is obviously very great, and in my present understanding there are several elements. There are two elements which I mentioned earlier today. First of all, some of these developments are simply new, quite startling, and it takes some time even for a scientist -- a technologist -- to get acquainted with the possibility. Secondly, the access to these technological possibilities, which exist in principle, is rather different in different countries. It is very much a question of national organization, how they are or could be made available. And these methods are, quite apart from our work here, simply not settled in all countries. In a few countries like Norway, this technology happens to be very readily available. This is also the case in my own country. Other countries have not yet decided on how to do it and this generates a genuine difficulty in our work. We are a Group which should give a consensus report on questions on which a consensus is really very hard to find. Secondly, and that was a result which we obtained during our present session, it turned out that States participating with experts in the Group of Scientific Experts have rather different views on how they intend to exploit the data exchange, and this was made very clear during the present session. That, to me, is an explanation of why it was very difficult in the recent past to obtain agreement on how these possibilities would be exploited when such a data exchange system would operate under a nuclear test ban. It turned out for some countries simply to be a political matter. That is something which we must respect and we have to wait until political decisions, if any, are taken so that the discussion can go forward. Whether this will be the case or not, I cannot know. I notice, however, this year, and this was reflected, I think, in a statement by Mr. Hyltenius of Sweden this morning, that the discussion of these rather delicate and difficult matters was very business-like and to-the-point in the Group of Scientific Experts and that gave me very much satisfaction. I also think that there is some hope that we will be able to resolve these matters, in due course, in a constructive way.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I have read the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, and listened with great interest to Dr. Ericsson's responses to questions put to him. The United States participants during this 14th meeting of the Ad Hoc Group have reported to me that, as always, Dr. Ericsson's patient and firm hand in guiding the work of the Group has been an element essential to its progress. My delegation therefore offers him our congratulations. We have also been pleased to see Dr. Ericsson serving as an adviser to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, and are confident that his participation will reinforce the work of both groups.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

My delegation believes that the Committee should take note of the Ad Hoc Group's progress report. It is encouraging to me that so many States have participated, and that a number of significant contributions have been submitted reporting on the work being carried out in the various study groups. The valuable participation of the World Meteorological Organization has also been reflected by the presence of a representative of that body during the course of the meeting. Would it not, Dr. Ericsson, facilitate the work of the Ad Hoc Group if more States, especially those represented in this Committee, were to participate in the Group? It seems to my delegation that greater participation would not only broaden the geographical coverage, but expand the scientific expertise, thereby enhancing the over-all effectiveness of the Ad Hoc Group. We would value your views on this matter, Sir.

Members of this Committee will recall that last March I expressed concern that the Group was having some difficulty in preparing its third report to the Committee because of disagreement as to what is permitted under its mandate. At the same time, I noted that there was no notable disagreement among experts with regard to matters of a purely scientific nature. Consequently, my delegation notes with pleasure that this progress report contains a more complete description of recent developments in seismic and data-transfer technologies. These have been made available to the Group from a number of national contributions. Unfortunately, the experts have, as yet, not reached agreement concerning the relevance of these developments for the important functions of the international data centres envisaged under a world-wide system of exchanging seismic data.

My delegation continues to believe that our mandate to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, wherein it directs "further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system", intends that advances in relevant fields of science and technology should be fully taken into account in order to ensure that the international exchange of seismic data might be as efficient and productive as possible. This is a view which I believe is shared by most delegations present here. Do you share this view, Dr. Ericsson?

I might add at this point that, at this session, the Committee has benefited from an impressive demonstration of the rapid transmission of large quantities of seismic data over long distances. Thanks to the Norwegian Government, which significantly contributes to the work of the Ad Hoc Group, an inexpensive portable data terminal was set up here in the Palais des Nations and data were exchanged over international telephone circuits, including satellite links. These data included actual seismograms, referred to by the Ad Hoc Group as Level 2 data, from both the United States and Norway. The information was displayed on a television monitor to a number of delegates and simultaneously stored in a mini-computer. There can be no question that we can share waveform data on a wide scale. Do you not agree, Sir?

It is of vital importance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament that these advances be fully reported to us in the anticipated third report of the Ad Hoc Group. The report should include, if necessary, a description of those points on which consensus agreement among the experts was not possible.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The Committee will, I think, have to give further thought to the future activities of this Ad Hoc Group. Some delegations have already begun to address this question both here and in the Working Group dealing with nuclear test ban verification and compliance issues. The third report of the Ad Hoc Group will provide a basis for bringing these considerations into focus, if this has not already been achieved before its publication.

In conclusion, let me say again that my delegation welcomes the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group, and we look forward to continuing our support of the Group's further work.

We would appreciate Dr. Ericsson's answers to the questions I have put. Let me thank Dr. Ericsson for his answers to the questions put to him by other delegates, and also thank him in advance for his answers to my questions.

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): Well, the first question of Ambassador Fields was: would it not facilitate the work of the Ad Hoc Group if more States, especially those represented in this Committee, were to participate in the Group? The question was put in the context of co-operation with WMO, but I take it that it is more general. Certainly, from the physical point of view, increased geographical coverage, especially of the southern hemisphere, is quite important, so the Group of Scientific Experts would really welcome more participating countries from that part of our globe. Increased participation from members of the Committee on Disarmament and other States would certainly expand the scientific expertise available for our discussions. Here I would like to remind you that ever since the beginning, a number of States not members of the Committee have sent experts to these talks, and in the Group of Scientific Experts they are on a perfectly equal footing with everyone else. Norway is one example of such a country which is, as you know contributing. There is also a third aspect of participation. In my opinion what we are doing in this scientific Group is on the borderline between applied science and the political considerations which go into a test ban. So, from that point of view, increased participation, especially from the States in the Committee on Disarmament, would be a welcome addition to our understanding of where the political limitations to our scientific experiments are. This then, is really an affirmative answer to the distinguished Ambassador of the United States.

The second question Ambassador Fields asked me was whether I shared the view that advances in the relevant fields of science and technology should be fully taken into account in our recommendations. The answer is, yes, of course; but there again, the insertion of such advances is very difficult, because it is not only science that we are engaged in, it is science limited by or conditioned by political purposes and conditions, as I said in response to the question of the distinguished Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The third question was whether I agreed with the statement: there can be no question that we can share waveform data on a wide scale. Certainly there is no question that this is, in principle possible; the technology is known and understood, and is being made more and more available. Here I would like to give a clarification on this Level 2 discussion. As far as the exchange of Level 2 data is concerned, the Group of Scientific Experts has been able to reach an understanding on how to report. This understanding came in the recent session, and therefore remains to be implemented in our report.

Finally, Ambassador Fields said that the third report should also include, if necessary, a description of those points on which consensus agreement among the experts was not possible. In the present progress report, there is a formulation which points

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out that there are significant areas of discussion or investigation on which a consensus has not yet been reached and this, I think, points to the possibility that if necessary, similar statements could be expected in the third report. I hope not; I hope that everything will be complete and without such reservations, but I now see the possibility that with regard to certain items, such reservation could be made in the report. This concludes my response to the questions of Ambassador Fields.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, through you I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ericsson for the clarifications he has given to some of the questions I raised. I must confess that what he has stated, in fact, has confirmed some of the suspicions that we had to begin with. From what Dr. Ericsson has stated, it would appear that progress on the elaboration of a global seismic monitoring system has been held up precisely because of the lack of political will on the part of certain States -- that if there was a genuine desire on the part of these States to conclude a treaty on a nuclear test ban, the work of the Group would be brought to a conclusion with a greater sense of urgency.

The second comment I would like to make concerns the incorporation of recent technical and scientific advances in the work of the Group of Experts. It would appear from what Dr. Ericsson has said that technical advances in this field in fact make the results achieved obsolete at a rather rapid pace and it would appear to us that this creates a situation where the better may become the enemy of the good. As far as we are concerned, all that we require is a system which is adequate for our purposes, that is, adequate to verify compliance with a treaty on a nuclear test ban. I think that the Group of Experts, if they are to operate within clearly defined limits, must have a rather good idea of what the Committee on Disarmament considers adequate, because if we do not have this kind of clearly defined limit, the work of the Group will become open-ended in character and I must say that my delegation does not agree that the mandate of the Group in fact gives this kind of an open-ended character to its work. If this is the kind of interpretation which is given to the mandate of the Group, then this Group would in fact not be one which is elaborating international co-operative measures for the detection and identification of seismic events, but rather a Group which is keeping a watching brief on scientific and technical developments in the seismic field, and if the latter is what it is doing, then my delegation sincerely and very seriously would doubt the value of such a Group to our negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

The CHAIRMAN: I suggest that, after further consideration of the progress report at the next plenary meeting, we adopt the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts at our plenary meeting on Tuesday, 31 August, i.e. in a week's time.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 130th plenary meeting, I will now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Senegal, His Excellency Ambassador Sene. Before doing so, I wish to extend to him a warm welcome in the Committee as the representative of a brother African country. His vast diplomatic experience in several important posts as well as his distinguished political career, during which he held several cabinet positions, will undoubtedly contribute substantially to our work. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you warmly on your accession to the chairmanship of this august Committee. It gives me personally a great and legitimate satisfaction and you can imagine what a source of pride it is for an African like myself to see a worthy son of our continent, a citizen of a country that is a friend of my own, directing the work of this unique multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. In this connection, the heavy task that is yours today is significant in more than one respect. It is a sign of the growing awareness in the international community of the need to associate all States, large and small, in the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament. And my delegation cannot but see it also as a very promising sign of a genuine disarmament process, undertaken and pursued with the support of all the Members of the United Nations.

I should also like to congratulate the distinguished representative of Japan who preceded you in the Chair. I am certain that, like him, you will acquit yourself brilliantly in the tremendous task you have inherited.

Lastly, I should like to thank all my fellow Ambassadors, members of the Committee and their delegations, who have graciously agreed to my country's participation in the work of this body. You may be sure that we shall do our best to deserve this mark of confidence in us.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament is being held just after the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the results of which were disappointing in more ways than one. The comprehensive programme of disarmament, the adoption of which ought to have been the logical sequel to the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, has been sent back to the Committee on Disarmament with perhaps even more "square brackets" than it had before it was considered by the General Assembly. This is proof of a serious failure. A failure which should not be taken too lightly, lest we lose sight of the adverse consequences that might ensue if vigorous steps are not taken to give new impetus to the negotiations on disarmament.

One of the causes to which the failure of the second special session on disarmament is usually attributed is without any doubt the deterioration in the relations between the great Powers and the increased resort to force in international relations.

This evaluation is not without foundation, since the arms race, as a number of speakers here have said, is the symptom of a disease -- a disease of our time. It is the expression of conflicts, political tensions, power struggles, and also of the economic inequalities and violations of human rights in the world. For, as was so often recalled during the second special session, disarmament measures cannot take place in a political vacuum. In fact, it would be unduly optimistic to expect great progress in disarmament when armed aggression, intervention, occupation, racism, colonialism and economic exploitation still prevail in international relations. Moreover, one lesson which can be drawn from the disappointing result of the second special session is the need to examine ways and means of strengthening international security while disarmament measures are in progress. It seems to my delegation that it is essential for us to review our approach to this subject. It is because détente between the great Powers is in a state of crisis that, for example, the North-South dialogue is today blocked. Similarly, given the frequency of armed aggression and of wars by proxy in the third world, disarmament negotiations

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must inevitably suffer the negative repercussions of this situation. It is therefore urgently necessary for the members of the international community, and particularly the great Powers, to make greater efforts to strengthen the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and actively to promote the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

In this connection, my delegation believes that the approach of establishing a link between disarmament, security and development should become part of the disarmament negotiating process.

Senegal has always adopted this approach, and ever since it became independent has worked tirelessly to try to help improve the international climate so that peace, security, co-operation and economic progress for all peoples should become the rule.

Taking as its inspiration the values of our black African civilization, such as dialogue and tolerance, Senegal has joined in the efforts of the international community to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes, in particular by taking part in several peace-keeping operations and by working with neighbouring countries to promote a climate of confidence, mutual understanding and regional co-operation.

For we believe that the disarmament process would be greatly facilitated if, simultaneously with the global negotiations which take place here, the States of a particular subregion or region tried to overcome their differences in order to work together for the sake of the economic and social progress of their peoples. That is why we have tried, through a subregional and regional approach, to contribute to the relaxation of tension in the western part of Africa to which we belong, and the creation of an atmosphere of trust and peace conducive to the consolidation of our young States' independence and their economic progress.

At the same time, the adoption of a regional approach to arms limitation matters has not made us lose sight of the essentially global character of disarmament problems. On the contrary, we are convinced that both approaches must be pursued with equal vigour if we hope one day to eliminate the nuclear danger.

The reason why, in our evaluation of the results of the second special session, we have emphasized the link between disarmament, security and development, is that we hope thereby to contribute to the adoption of an approach which will make it possible to give a new impetus to the disarmament negotiations and to reaffirm the importance of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. In our view, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was held at a truly unfavourable time, although the delegations present made huge efforts to bring it to a successful conclusion.

There is no doubt that the recrudescence of tensions between the Superpowers prevented any real progress in this direction. Today, it is more important than ever, after the failure of the Second Review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1980, and after the second special session devoted to disarmament, to dispel the impression that the principal nuclear Powers have no intention of fulfilling the commitments they undertook vis-à-vis the international community to enter into serious negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

For the degree to which existing arms limitation treaties and undertakings are fulfilled will be decisive as regards the conclusion and signature of new agreements. By carrying out their own obligations, the Superpowers would be in a better position to persuade the other nuclear-weapon Powers to join in the disarmament process and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thus, the session of the Committee on Disarmament is taking place at a crucial moment in the disarmament process. Now more than ever, the great Powers must demonstrate their determination to fulfil the undertakings they gave at the first special session and to co-operate actively in the conduct of the negotiations envisaged.

The sphere in which the Superpowers can best show that what happened in New York last July was purely accidental is that of nuclear disarmament.

For since the adoption of the Final Document nuclear arsenals have grown much larger and the arms race has continued unabated.

The arms race has resulted today in a fantastic accumulation of weapons, with a constant increase in their terrifying destructive power. This last aspect is by far the most important. The qualitative arms race pursued by the great Powers is the real motive force of the arms race itself. It is based on the use of technical progress to manufacture ever more deadly weapons, as is stressed in the United Nations report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, in the following words: "The six main military spenders not only account for three fourths of world military spending, but for practically all military research and development and for practically all experts of weapons and military equipment. All significant developments in armaments originate here and spread from here to the rest of the world, with greater or lesser time lags." Starting from a nucleus of a few great Powers, the arms race is spreading to all regions and all natural environments.

Because it is inadequate for the requirements of our time, the arms race can only have negative consequences. On the one hand, contrary to what is claimed, it increases insecurity in the world, thus constantly endangering international peace and security, and, on the other hand, it causes an immense waste of resources at the very time when mankind is faced with vital development problems.

Clearly, the existence of the thousands of nuclear warheads possessed by the Soviet Union and the United States creates a permanent risk of nuclear war for the world, the more so as these warheads have the explosive power of 1.3 million Hiroshima-type bombs and can destroy the world several times over.

At the present time, this massive accumulation of weapons is the fragile basis of the so-called "balance of terror" that has safeguarded the nuclear peace of the postwar period. It is not difficult to show how precarious this peace nevertheless is. Furthermore, it is no secret to anyone that the thousands of missiles so light-heartedly deployed by the Superpowers could easily be subject to a technical failure that could lead to a nuclear war by accident. And that is no mere speculation. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute there have been 125 nuclear accidents in the last 30 years, that is, one every few months. Thus, the fate of mankind seems to be hanging by a very thin thread, at the mercy of the slightest technical failure.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Moreover, the balance of terror, which has, when all is said and done, so far prevented the outbreak of armed conflict between the great Powers, is in the process of being destabilized by the dynamics of the arms race and the appearance of a new doctrine, that of the partial or limited use of nuclear weapons. The restraint apparent up to now as regards the use of nuclear weapons was connected with the certainty of mutual destruction.

Nuclear war was indeed unthinkable so long as a potential aggressor knew for certain that the adversary, even if he was struck first, could always strike back and destroy the main industrial centres and cities of the aggressor State. But that certainty is in the process of disappearing today because the latest advances in the matter of the precision of delivery vehicles gives them an accuracy of within 10 metres, thus making possible the annihilation of the enemy's strike-back capability by destroying the silos containing ballistic missiles. These prospects thus make a preventive nuclear war -- I will not say likely, but certainly possible. We do not want it, but the probability exists.

However, the accuracy of delivery vehicles is not the only element contributing to an increase in the probability of nuclear war. There is also, alas, the emergence of new doctrines regarding limited nuclear warfare. Thus, some news reports indicate that one Superpower is seriously contemplating making preparations for a protracted nuclear war. Certainly, if such reports turn out to be true, this could drastically lower the threshold for the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. In addition, a danger of nuclear war may also arise through the acquisition of nuclear technology by isolated colonialist, racist regimes.

For who can guarantee that the regime of Pretoria, which is endeavouring to acquire nuclear weapons, will have any scruples about using them or threatening to use them one day? That regime's obstinacy in maintaining its odious system of apartheid in itself suggests that the possession of atomic weapons might encourage it to try to freeze the situation in southern Africa. It is true that it would merely be deceiving itself since no new weapon can stop the course of history. However, the international community should be vigilant in this regard. If the racists of Pretoria were to be allowed to possess atomic weapons, the result would be an unprecedented threat to the strategic heart of an entire region which in fact only wants to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The African countries voiced their anxiety in this respect at the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly. In the Final Document of the first special session, the General Assembly requested the Security Council to take effective steps to prevent South Africa from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. We hope that the Security Council will make every effort necessary to prevent that dangerous possibility from occurring, in particular by prohibiting any collaboration in the nuclear field that would enable South Africa to acquire the ultimate weapon.

It is these risks of nuclear conflict that I have mentioned that make the adoption of effective measures to prevent nuclear war so urgent. In this connection, my delegation supports the Indian proposal for the setting up of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. In fact, several important proposals have been made recently by the nuclear-weapon States. My delegation has

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

noted with interest the proposals of the Soviet Union and China on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, such unilateral declarations are not enough to resolve the problem. We hope, however, that these proposals will be studied carefully by the other nuclear-weapon Powers so as to permit the adoption of specific recommendations on the limitation or prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons are the gravest threat to the survival of mankind. And yet, despite a decade of negotiations between the Superpowers, there has been no real progress in the matter of arms reduction. It is vital, therefore, given the growing risks of nuclear catastrophe, that negotiations should be started on the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the progressive reduction of stockpiles of such weapons. This is why my delegation supports the proposal of the Group of 21 for the establishment of a working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

This is not to say that we do not appreciate at their true worth the negotiations being carried on at Geneva by the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, we believe that nuclear disarmament cannot be the exclusive province of the nuclear-weapon States. For in fact, a multilateral negotiating process in which non-nuclear-weapon States participate will still be necessary, given the universality of the nuclear peril which threatens the whole planet and the entire human race.

My country, as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would also like to stress here that the nuclear-weapon States have still not provided adequate assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States which could be the victims of a nuclear threat or attack. Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 is clearly unsatisfactory in that in it the permanent members of the Council undertook no obligations other than those already contained in the Charter, nor did they provide for any special procedure. For we know that the effectiveness of a security assurance is a function of its capacity to prevent aggression rather than to remedy it. My country believes that the Committee on Disarmament should continue to study the problem of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States at a time when the risks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons are greater than ever. In this connection, my delegation has taken careful note of the declaration by France on the subject. This is a positive step towards the adoption of measures providing adequate negative assurances by all the nuclear-weapon Powers.

However, the only effective assurance against the use of nuclear weapons is their prohibition and destruction. In the meantime, effective steps must also be taken to halt and reverse the arms race. In this regard, my delegation believes that the time has perhaps come to begin to implement paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which would end the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, has been under consideration for nearly a quarter of a century.

The reasons for such delay defy all common sense when we know, on the one hand, that the continuation of nuclear tests does not enhance the security of the Superpowers, and on the other, that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, as Mr. Ericsson said a few minutes ago.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

It is, moreover, difficult to understand how, 20 years after their undertaking to ensure the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, the three depositaries of the partial test-ban treaty are still in the negotiating stage. After several years of trilateral discussions these Powers, despite their undertakings, adjourned their talks sine die. It is greatly to the credit, therefore, of the other members of the Committee on Disarmament that they should have proposed the setting up of an Ad Hoc Working Group whose limited mandate should not impede the consideration, at the appropriate time, of matters such as the scope of the treaty. Verification is, of course, an important matter but it should not make us forget that the essence of the problem is primarily political.

As the report prepared in pursuance of General Assembly decision 34/422 states, verification of compliance with a complete prohibition of nuclear tests no longer seems to be an obstacle. It is necessary, therefore, in my delegation's opinion, that the question of verification, the importance of which is recognized, should not be used as a pretext for failing to fulfil certain commitments solemnly undertaken before the international community. The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has this kind of priority and it would be politically dangerous to delay it any longer.

Of course, it would have been desirable for all the nuclear-weapon States to take part in the work of the Working Group. The international community knows where the responsibility lies for the delay in the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We hope, however, that as progress is made in the drafting of the treaty, all the nuclear-weapon States will find it possible to take part in the work of the Working Group.

Another major problem on our agenda for this session which has drawn our particular attention is the following. It is the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction which, according to paragraph 75 of the Final Document, is one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.

It is, to this end, essential that the negotiations which have been going on for so long should culminate in tangible results. My delegation has noted in this connection that the Ad Hoc Working Group set up by the Committee has received new proposals which have given new impetus to the negotiations. We hope that a satisfactory solution will soon be found to the problems relating to the inclusion of a clause prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and verification of the prohibition of use.

Undoubtedly, we cannot but be sensitive to the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, for they have been used during the last two decades against peoples struggling for their national liberation in Africa and Asia.

The draft convention should therefore be sufficiently wide in scope to take account of the main problems raised by chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

In paragraph 80, the Final Document states that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

The risks of the militarization of outer space have become greater with the appearance of anti-satellite systems. Given the important role that satellites can play in international co-operation in such fields as communications, meteorology and navigation, it is essential for steps to be taken to prevent outer space from becoming an area of military confrontation.

Here again, the lack of any results from the bilateral discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States has left the matter in the lap of the Committee.

The proposal to set up a working group on outer space seems to us a sound one, since such a group could help the Committee in its consideration of the question of the negotiation of effective agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

I cannot end my statement without referring to the question of the colossal resources that are swallowed up in the arms race and the negative consequences of this for development, particularly that of the most needy countries.

This question is not on the programme of work for the Committee's 1982 summer session but it is undoubtedly on its agenda.

Indeed, the volume of the resources devoted to armaments presents a sorry contrast to the amount spent to meet the world's urgent needs.

A few figures will give a better illustration of this waste. In 1982 world military expenditures, according to the SIPRI Yearbook, totalled \$600-650 billion. This figure is equal to three-quarters of the aggregate income of all the poorest peoples of the earth.

Since the end of the Second World War, the arms race has absorbed more than \$6,000 billion, the equivalent of the aggregate gross national product of the entire world in 1975. These fabulous financial resources are being swallowed up in a vain quest for security at a time when 570 million people are suffering from malnutrition, 2.8 billion people have no safe drinking water and 1 billion human beings are without proper medical care. The absurdity and the tragedy of the wastage caused by the arms race is all the more evident when we remember that the World Health Organization spent \$83 million over a period of 10 years to eradicate smallpox from the world. That sum, according to the United Nations' report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, would not be enough to buy a single strategic bomber.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Taking our analysis further, we note that the wastage of resources is not confined to financial resources. A considerable proportion of skilled manpower is diverted into largely unproductive activities. Military research absorbs about 40 per cent of research and development funds throughout the world and employs some 400,000 engineers and scientific and technical specialists. Nor is the environment spared: new military techniques, such as saturation bombing and incendiary and chemical weapons, when they have been used, have done irreparable damage to the ecology. Moreover, the arms sector is responsible for an exorbitant share of the consumption of non-renewable resources. A single example will illustrate my thesis: world consumption of liquid hydrocarbons for military purposes is about 700-750 million barrels a year, or twice the annual consumption of the whole of Africa. This wastage is largely accounted for by a fairly small number of countries. In 1977, the military expenditures of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries represented 71 per cent of world expenditures, while those of the Third World were 14 per cent. Although it is true that the military expenditures of the latter group are unfortunately tending to rise, thus diverting precious resources from economic development, the expenditures of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries have nevertheless not declined.

The effects of the arms race on international trade, development assistance and the transfer of technology are still more negative. In fact, the strategic considerations underlying the thinking of the military Powers lead to restrictions and discriminations in international trade. Thus raw materials, advanced technologies and goods of prime importance are called strategic products and ipso facto subject to restrictions. Such practices are obviously incompatible with the establishment of a New International Economic Order based on freedom of access for all countries without discrimination to capital, raw materials and technology markets.

Another field in which the negative effects of the arms race are felt is that of development. The development assistance of the military powers has been hampered by strategic and political considerations and so has been inadequate. The amount of money devoted to development assistance is only one fourteenth of world military expenditure and has remained static for years. The target of 0.7 per cent of GNP laid down in the Development Strategy is far from having been attained. Yet a contribution of a mere 5 per cent of their military expenditures would have meant a rise in the development assistance of the market-economy countries from its present level of 0.32 per cent to the target figure of 0.7 per cent.

These considerations have been presented in detail in the United Nations report on disarmament and development. The report shows, inter alia, that the continuation of the arms race can lead only to a cycle of confrontation, to

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

declining prospects for mutually advantageous co-operation and to a contraction of the development possibilities of all nations. On the other hand, policies aimed at promoting development would expand the basis of détente and would place the North-South dialogue in a more promising and more appropriate framework. The benefits would thus inevitably be both political and economic.

In conclusion I should like to say a few words about increasing the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that the Committee in its present form is more democratic than the one that existed before 1978. Nevertheless, the fundamental question remains the same. Are the Superpowers ready to allow all countries, large or small, to participate in the disarmament negotiations in accordance with paragraph 26 of the Final Document? As long as they do not change their attitude on this point, the struggle for democratization must go on. The Committee on Disarmament will only be able to play its proper role if the principle of the democratization of the disarmament process is recognized and applied by all. Since disarmament is a political process, it must be approached from the political angle, and we must not yield to the temptation to believe that if we place the primary emphasis on questions of a technical nature, we shall succeed in solving the fundamental political problems that exist.

We consider that it is on the basis of the right claimed by the non-nuclear-weapon States to express their views on the disarmament negotiations, as the representatives of Sweden and India have already argued, that the question of enlarging the Committee should be considered, taking into account the real points on which the Committee's effectiveness is blocked.

In conformity with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, General Assembly resolution 36/97 J and paragraphs 55 and 62 of the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly, the proposals for a limited expansion of the membership of the Committee have received wide support.

We therefore hope that the Committee will be able to make an appropriate recommendation in this connection, taking into account, of course, the principle of a fair geographical distribution.

In the past, the participation of members of the non-aligned movement in the disarmament negotiations has made possible the emergence of a new spirit, a softening of the attitude of confrontation inherent in the bloc system, and above all it has inspired continued devotion to the cause of disarmament. This moderating influence of the non-aligned and neutral countries should continue to be exerted through their increased participation in the disarmament negotiations.

The vision of a world freed from war has haunted mankind from earliest times and goes back to the dawn of creation. Today, this vision is the goal of our debates and activities in this Committee, where we seek, through negotiation and dialogue, to find a way of assuaging present confrontations in order to ensure the future survival of the human race. My country, for its part, undertakes to mobilize all its inventive capacities in an effort to make a small contribution to this joint endeavour, which is the essential condition for the survival of mankind and his continued presence in the future both on earth and in the universe, amid the prodigious discoveries of science and technology which have been achieved over the centuries through the genius of man and have enriched the cultural and universal heritage of the human race.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Senegal for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I have a small technical matter to raise, putting a question through you to the secretariat. My query relates to documents CD/314 and CD/315 which were distributed today, 13 narrowly typed pages. As is readily visible and as was explained to us by the speaker introducing these documents, they are verbatim extracts from the extensive speech of that same delegation at the second special session. Now it struck me that we all have these texts before us; we all have them on file; they are at our fingertips if we want to read them. And the question has also struck me what advantage is being sought by distributing them again, as I am told there are close to 1,000 copies in various languages. I am asking the question because we are in a period of particular budgetary stringency of the United Nations and the delegation which has circulated these papers is most adamant in insisting on the zero growth of our budget. It is not, of course, the slightest intention of mine to contest the right of any delegation to circulate the papers it wishes to circulate, but I would like to have personal clarification from the secretariat, a small calculation, of the eventual cost if all 40 delegations here were to redistribute our speeches at the second special session here in the Committee. In order to show that I do not want to make any controversial matter out of this, I would be perfectly happy if the reply is given privately to my delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and I would encourage the secretariat to take up the last suggestion. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru.

Mr. CANNOCK (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first occasion on which I am formally participating in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, allow me first of all to say what a pleasure it is for the delegation of Peru to see you, the distinguished representative of a country to which my country feels very close, guiding our work during the month of August. I have learned that during the part of this summer session that has already gone by, my colleagues have been able to appreciate the competent and constructive way in which you have been presiding over the Committee's work, and that you have been seen as a most worthy successor to Ambassador Okawa, whose merits are well known to the Peruvian delegation.

I should like first, in my statement, Mr. Chairman, to express my gratitude to you for your kind words of welcome, which were echoed by many of my new colleagues, whom I would also like to thank. I was already aware that the Committee on Disarmament was an unusual forum within the family of international bodies, and I am glad to have been able to begin to appreciate that for myself today, feeling as I do the climate of personal cordiality in which it carries out its work. I have not the slightest doubt that such an atmosphere is the most favourable framework possible for a group of persons trying to find formulas for reconciling a series of diverging interests.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

For my part, I have every intention of carrying out my functions as head of the Peruvian delegation to this Committee in a way which is in keeping both with the high intellectual level of its members and with the competence of my predecessor, Ambassador Felipe Valdivieso, on whose behalf I wish to express thanks for the kind words of members of the Committee upon his recent departure. I shall endeavour to ensure that Peru's contribution to the cause of general and complete disarmament continues to be one both of action and of principle, in accordance with a tradition of its foreign policy which is based on defence of the law and censure of arrogance.

On the other hand, I am aware that the Committee is passing through a difficult period, in which its very identity has been called into question, both within the Committee itself and outside it. The glaring lack of positive results from the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has only helped to foster such questioning, and a situation seems to be emerging in which not only do we not know exactly what we are but also we do not know what we wish to be.

What is really at stake behind these uncertainties is the negotiating capacity of the Committee, which we all recognize as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", but which during these four long years has not managed to bring a single topic of negotiation to a successful conclusion, and has not even been able to start negotiations on the issues with the highest priority that are within its purview.

It is not surprising, although it is disturbing, that there continue to be obstacles to the setting up of working groups on priority, important topics; nor is it surprising that there are other items which are included in our agenda but have not even been introduced into the discussion, such as "disarmament and development" or "conventional disarmament". In this context, it is likewise not very surprising that three of the working groups set up by the Committee have decided not to work during the present session, or that today negotiations worthy of the name are under way on only one issue.

In these circumstances, my country's participation in the Committee will be directed primarily towards defending the Committee's negotiating power, in other words its essence, and to actively promoting conditions which will make it possible for effective negotiations to be held on major issues within the Committee.

We are happy to know that our efforts will take place in this atmosphere of personal warmth to which I have referred, which distinguishes the Committee's work and offers, I believe, the most favourable background for encouraging future negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Cannock for his statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair.

Before I adjourn the plenary meeting, may I recall that the Committee will hold an informal meeting in five minutes' time to continue its consideration of proposals submitted under items 2 and 7 of the agenda.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| <u>Algeria:</u> | Mr. TAFFAR |
| <u>Argentina:</u> | Mr. N. NASCIMBENE |
| <u>Australia:</u> | Mr. T. FINDLAY Miss S. BOYD |
| <u>Belgium:</u> | Mr. A. ONKELINX Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE |
| <u>Brazil:</u> | Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE |
| <u>Bulgaria:</u> | Mr. TELLALOV Mr. SOTIROV Mr. DEYANOV Mr. PRAMOV |
| <u>Burma:</u> | U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN |
| <u>Canada:</u> | Mr. D.S. McPHAIL Mr. G.R. SKINNER |
| <u>China:</u> | Mr. TIAN JIN Mr. YU MENGJIA Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. SUO KAIMING |
| <u>Cuba:</u> | Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA |
| <u>Czechoslovakia:</u> | Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. L. STAVINOHA Mr. J. JIRUSEK |
| <u>Egypt:</u> | Mr. I.A. HASSAN |

Ethiopia:
Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. d'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HEIDER
Mr. G. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. V. ROHR

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. HARYONATARAH
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. DAMANIK
Mr. HILAYAT

Iran:
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:
Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:
Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. T. TAKAHASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:
Mr. C. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK
Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. T. PANAIT
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mrs. JONÄNG

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN
Mr. V.L. GAI

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Mr. M. WINSTON

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES

Ireland:

Mr. F.M. HAYES

Mr. P. McDONAGH

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 182nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". However, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so.

At the outset, may I recall that at our last plenary meeting the delegate of Japan submitted document CD/319 concerning a request addressed to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the utilization of the Global Telecommunications System. As I announced on that occasion I have requested the secretariat to circulate, for the Committee's consideration and decision, a draft communication to the Secretary-General of WMO in connection with that matter. That draft is contained in Working Paper No. 73. We will take up the working paper at our next plenary meeting together with the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Belgium, China, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America and Ireland.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, first of all allow me to express my regrets that we are losing another colleague, Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia, a good and old personal friend of mine and delegate of a socialist country that Czechoslovakia has very good relations with. We say goodbye with regret and wish Ambassador Vrhunec all the best in his future activities.

Item 1 of our agenda, on a nuclear test ban, is indeed a question of the highest priority, being in the focus of attention not only of this main international body for multilateral disarmament negotiations but also of the whole international community. Its importance has been emphasized by numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions including such an important international document as the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the validity of which has been reaffirmed by the General Assembly at its second special session.

The so-called Moscow Treaty of 1963, banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which became a useful instrument in curbing nuclear weapon developments as well as a necessary step aimed at the protection of the environment, does not encompass underground nuclear-weapon testing. Moreover, two nuclear-weapon Powers until now have not found it necessary to join this Treaty. It is therefore quite understandable why the peoples of the world and the majority of States have been for many years striving to reach an unconditional prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. It is hardly necessary to explain in this forum that the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests would represent an important step towards curbing the arms race, create a barrier to further improvements of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear war. Its conclusion would also strengthen the principles of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by not giving States aiming at acquiring nuclear weapons the possibility of carrying out nuclear explosions, which represent an indispensable stage in their production.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Czechoslovakia pays special attention to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Its representatives already in 1958 took part in the first conference of experts at which the feasibility of detecting violations of a possible ban on nuclear explosions was discussed. Already then the experts came to the conclusion that it is possible to create a practical and effective system in this regard.

Both in the Committee on Disarmament and in its preceding bodies we have fully supported all proposals aimed at the early elaboration and adoption of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests for all time in all spheres and with the participation of all States, including, of course, all nuclear-weapon States. We have always added our voice to that of those who have called for the initiation of business-like negotiations in this respect and for the creation of a working group on this subject.

We welcome the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has started its deliberations. However, it is the considered view of our delegation that the mandate of the Group is not wide enough. And we note that this view is widely shared in this room. We believe that it would not be wise to unduly restrict our discussions and to focus only on some particular aspects of the given problem. An approach to the mandate of the Working Group whereby other vitally important aspects than those of verification and compliance would be completely ignored could become a serious obstacle to our work. It seems rather obvious that verification and compliance cannot be discussed in isolation from other related aspects, in particular the scope of the prohibition. Our approach to the activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban is based on the assumption that anything the Group will deal with must contribute to the early elaboration of a draft agreement on a nuclear test ban. It would be highly useful if the Committee on Disarmament could adopt measures which would ensure the elaboration of such an agreement in all its aspects

Our opinion as to the orientation of the Ad Hoc Working Group's activities under its existing mandate is expressed in the document of the group of socialist countries introduced on 16 August of this year by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. We consider that the seven items proposed, namely:

National technical means of verification;

International exchange of seismic data;

Committee of experts;

Procedures for consultation;

On-site inspection;

Procedures for complaints, and

Possible relevance of arrangements between two or more parties,

create a logical and complete structure which could serve as the basis for effective and fruitful negotiations.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

For several years the Ad Hoc Working Group of Scientific Experts has been dealing with technical aspects of international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Our experts have been taking part in the work of this Group from the very beginning. The experts have done a lot of useful work for the effective solution of the problem of the identification of seismic events by national means. The detailed reports in documents CCD/558 of 1978 and CD/43 of 1979, containing instructions for the exchange of seismic data, testify to the fact that there are no basic, insurmountable difficulties for the elaboration of a realistic system, based on existing possibilities of seismological practice.

Permit me in this connection to make a few remarks on the relation of a possible test ban to the technical assurance of verification. We all agree that seismological detection and identification would be an effective instrument of the verification system of a future nuclear test ban. However, from the purely technical point of view it is quite clear that 100 per cent reliability of detection is not attainable. Hence, all debates about the so-called threshold of detection and efforts to define it with maximum precision might be interesting but at the same time they do not serve the purpose. One cannot avoid taking into account that seismological methods do not represent the only way of verification and that verification and compliance will be ensured through a set of various procedures. We also proceed from the understanding that the verification of a nuclear test ban should be carried out by national technical means. An international exchange of seismic data should also be ensured in such a way that each member State would have access to seismic data, while the identification of events would be undertaken by member States through their own national means. International data centres will have to be built in order to ensure the smooth, reliable and prompt exchange of seismic events data. The functions of these data centres are now under detailed discussion.

The results achieved so far by the Group of Experts demonstrate that the system of international exchange of seismic data obtained through national means has reached a high level of reliability with some of its aspects being tested on the basis of international experiments. These results also support the opinion that each verification system must be in accordance with the technical capabilities of all States parties to the future treaty with the equal rights and obligations of all ensured. We consider this a very important aspect if we are to create a realistic and effective system. And let it also be noted that even where some technical problems persist, it is always possible to overcome them provided that all parties concerned exert good will and readiness to find an acceptable solution.

Present developments lead unequivocally to the conclusion that the technical aspects of verification must be subject to an overall concept of the future agreement in all its aspects. We cannot decide on verification before we know what the scope of the agreement will be, without knowing whether it will be unlimited in duration or whether all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, will participate in it. The needs of verification and compliance can only be derived from a thorough consideration of the future agreement in all its aspects. Even if we wish to abide strictly by the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group it is hardly possible to discuss verification and compliance with any seriousness in isolation from other basic provisions of the future ban.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Two years ago, after we studied the tripartite report to the Committee on Disarmament (document CD/130) we were able to note the progress achieved at the tripartite negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on a nuclear test ban. We were also able to take into account with satisfaction that the tripartite negotiators were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion" (paragraph 25 of the tripartite report).

Recently, however, we have witnessed a dangerous shift in the United States approach to this priority question. It deeply concerns us, since what is at stake is either the continuation of the nuclear arms race or its effective curbing, the strengthening of international peace or its further undermining. The decision of the United States President Reagan not to resume the trilateral negotiations, the refusal to ratify the agreements on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on peaceful underground explosions signed in 1974 and 1976 respectively, efforts by the United States to continue an extensive programme of nuclear-weapon tests exceeding the agreed limit of 150 kilotons and other concrete measures contrary to the demands of the peoples of the world for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war can hardly assure anybody that the United States is considering seriously the possibility of the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty, be it now or later.

It is thus not very encouraging to note that out of all the nuclear-weapon States there is just one expressing the political will and readiness to take part actively in the elaboration of a nuclear test ban both within the multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and by resuming the trilateral negotiations. We regret that the United States and the United Kingdom are prepared to tackle only verification and compliance aspects. We also deem it highly regrettable that two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, do not find it necessary to take part in the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group, the creation of which had been sought by the majority of member States for quite some time. Whatever their own assessment of the present situation, all States represented in this body should exert maximum efforts to contribute to the adoption of measures aimed at curbing the arms race, especially in the nuclear field. We can therefore fully agree with Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands who stated on 17 August that "danger of nuclear weapons is such that we have difficulty in accepting the thesis that for some States further testing to enhance their nuclear capability remains necessary before a halt can be considered".

In conclusion I would like to express the conviction that the Committee on Disarmament with all five nuclear-weapon States represented in it can undoubtedly play an important role in solving the problems with respect to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, the political will of all States, and primarily of the nuclear-weapon States, to take an active part in this exercise is an indispensable prerequisite for success.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I am today going to make a statement on the question of a nuclear test ban in my capacity as acting head of the Swedish delegation.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty would be one of the most important steps in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. It has for many years been Sweden's persistent policy to do everything within its capacity to promote this goal. To us a comprehensive nuclear test ban retains its full importance both as a means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a demonstration of the interest of the nuclear-weapon Powers finally to enter into an era of mutual nuclear restraint.

As part of its efforts to achieve such a treaty, Sweden in 1977 tabled a draft CTBT (CCD/526/Rev.1). It is the intention of the Swedish delegation to submit a revised version of this draft, hopefully during the spring session of 1983. In reviewing our existing CTBT draft we will take into account the developments that have occurred since 1977. One of the politically important factors is the conduct of trilateral negotiations on this matter. Sweden deeply regrets the recent decision by one of the parties not to resume these negotiations.

In July 1980, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom presented their latest report from the tripartite negotiations. Even if that report gives us some interesting information, we feel that a more comprehensive account of these discussions could provide the Committee on Disarmament with valuable background material for negotiations within this body on a nuclear test-ban treaty. Sweden therefore urges the trilateral parties to present to the Committee on Disarmament as soon as possible a full account of what was achieved and of the remaining obstacles.

The questions of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons concern all countries of the world. If a test ban is to be effective, it must be designed to attract universal adherence. Agreement in this Committee on a future treaty will offer a reasonable chance of attracting such adherence. The Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body is indeed the proper forum for negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

Like many other countries, Sweden sincerely regrets that China and France do not participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group. We hope that they will reconsider their position on this matter.

As to the scope of a future test-ban treaty, our goal is to achieve a comprehensive treaty that prohibits all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time. This goal might be achieved in one step or in several steps. As to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the necessity of achieving a CTBT must, in the opinion of the Swedish delegation, take precedence over possible future benefits of such explosions. My delegation is prepared to consider all serious proposals in this connection.

It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation that consensus was at long last reached in this Committee on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. The mandate is, in the view of the Swedish delegation and many other delegations, clearly unsatisfactory for the purpose of genuine negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and should, therefore, be improved. For

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

the time being, however, it offers the only possibility within reach for at least initiating a negotiating process. A determined effort should be made to examine substantially the aspects of verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban, as outlined in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group. It is our hope that it will prove possible to cover some ground in the Group in preparation for real negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

In his intervention in plenary on 12 August, after having accepted the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard said, among other things, the following: "I want to emphasize that we have accepted this task on the specific condition that the two major nuclear-weapon powers will co-operate in earnest to achieve what can be achieved within our mandate". I hardly need to underline further the importance of this assumption. It is only with the active co-operation of all participants, and in particular the leading nuclear-weapon Powers, that it will be possible to make progress in the Working Group.

Some countries have repeatedly claimed that the lack of adequate verification methods is the main obstacle to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This is the time and place to start resolving these important verification issues in a multilateral context. My delegation therefore expects that all countries are now willing to undertake sincere discussions of these matters.

I should now like to dwell upon some important aspects of the questions regarding verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban, which in the view of my delegation should be dealt with under the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

One of the matters of verification to which my country attaches great importance is the question of an international verification system. It is the right and duty of all parties to participate in the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty. Countries might, however, owing to their geographical locations, available technical means and other circumstances, have quite different technical possibilities to monitor a treaty by national means alone.

The purpose of an international verification system is to even out such differences and to assist all parties in the monitoring of a treaty. By providing easy and rapid access to compiled and pre-analysed data and to recordings obtained on a global basis, an international verification system gives all parties essentially the same possibilities of monitoring a treaty. To fulfil these general requirements an international verification system must have a capability of providing information, data and recordings sufficient as a basis for verifying the treaty. An international verification system should, therefore, be an advanced and modern system having technical equipment and capabilities which are not inferior to those available to individual countries. The international verification system must also have a capacity to provide information and data in a form which is useful to all parties.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Most global verification systems are likely to produce such a large amount of basic data that, for most countries, the handling and analysis of all such basic data would be an unreasonably heavy and expensive task. There are, further, no political or technical reasons why these basic and standardized analyses — necessary in any case — should not be carried out at international data centres (IDCs). A few such centres will be needed in order to give all countries a fair chance to monitor a nuclear test ban. The analyses at IDCs, therefore, have to take advantage of the most recent technical and scientific developments and be based on all data produced and made available within the international verification system. Any limitation of the data to be used at IDCs would considerably reduce the efficiency of the international verification system. For those countries which are dependent on the services of IDCs such discrimination within the international verification system would hardly be acceptable.

On several occasions the Swedish Government has stated its readiness to establish, operate and finance an international data centre in Sweden. As part of the national research work in Sweden on test-ban verification, an experimental data centre has been established with the aim of further developing methods and procedures to be used at IDCs. Detailed presentation of the results of this work has been given to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

Co-operative seismic measures to be part of an international verification system have been considered in depth by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. In the view of the Swedish delegation, the work of the expert group will provide a good basis for the design of the seismological part of an international verification system. It is, however, most important that recent scientific and technological developments and results be taken fully into account in all the components of the global system. A further modernization of the global seismological system is thus an important task for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts within its present mandate.

Last spring Sweden raised the question of whether an international verification system should include also a network for the global detection of airborne radioactivity, supplementary to seismological means, to look for clandestine nuclear explosions in the lower atmosphere (CD/257). Such explosions, which are prohibited under the partial test-ban treaty of 1963, have so far been monitored by national technical means alone.

Sampling atmospheric radioactivity is the obvious method for detecting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, and it is also a method which should very much benefit from international co-operation, as it is difficult for any nation to establish by itself a network with sufficient, global coverage. The Swedish delegation, therefore, feels that the possibilities of establishing a global network for the detection of airborne radioactivity, similar to that for seismological detection, should be explored. Such a network would give all parties essentially the same capability of detecting radioactivity in the atmosphere from nuclear explosions.

Other technical means can provide additional valuable information for test-ban monitoring, for example, recordings of low-frequency sound and gravitational waves in the atmosphere, electromagnetic measurements similar to those conducted to record strokes of lightning, and hydroacoustic measurements of soundwaves in the deep oceans. Such hydroacoustic recordings might also improve the capability to monitor underground explosions in oceanic areas where few seismological stations exist.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The introduction of verification measures in addition to the generally recognized seismological means should not be looked upon as an attempt to prolong the verification discussion or to make the verification issues more difficult to resolve. The purpose is merely to explore potential benefits from all technical means of verification and to make such means, if deemed useful, available to all parties to a future test-ban treaty and not only to a limited number of well-equipped countries.

Finally, I would like to briefly touch upon some institutional aspects of verification and compliance.

In the implementation of a treaty, a number of political and technical issues will arise, and it is, therefore, important to have a mechanism that can handle such issues at appropriate levels of authority and competence. In addition to arrangements for bilateral and multilateral consultations between parties, two committees with a common secretariat should, in the Swedish view, be established.

One of the committees would be a technical committee entrusted with the task of overseeing the operation of the international verification system and of solving any technical problem that might arise in the operation of that system. It should also follow the scientific and technical developments within fields of relevance to the international verification system. Further, it should be entrusted to propose the technical modernization of that system. Another task would be to provide a forum for technical discussions of observed events, about which countries might seek further clarification. The Committee could also be responsible for the technical conduct of on-site inspections.

The other committee, to be entitled the consultative committee, would be a political body entrusted with the task of overseeing the operation of the treaty as a whole. That committee would be a forum for political discussions of issues related to the implementation of the treaty, including its verification. It would in this respect, inter alia, receive requests for and results of on-site inspections. It would also supervise the work of the technical committee. The consultative committee could also plan and prepare for necessary review conferences.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize again that the Swedish Government will continue to make every effort in the Committee on Disarmament, its Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to contribute to progress toward a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Sweden hopes that all countries, and especially the nuclear-weapon States, are now prepared to fulfil their responsibilities and international obligations in this regard. Time is a crucial factor. Therefore, a serious and concrete treatment of this important matter must not be further delayed, even if we, so far at least, have to operate under a less than satisfactory mandate.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I shall devote my statement today to item 1 of our agenda, Nuclear test ban, a subject to which my Government continues to attach the highest priority.

At the inaugural meeting of the Working Group, I said how important it was for this new body to seize the opportunity offered to it of defining courses of action leading to the negotiation of a nuclear test ban. The more so despite, or perhaps because of, a number of apparently unfavourable factors, especially the interruption of the trilateral negotiations, but also the fact that certain nuclear-weapon States say that they cannot, at this stage, discuss the circumstances of their possible adherence to a test ban agreement.

The regret that might be felt in such circumstances would be vain if it were to weaken our determination to implement the Committee's decision to "facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban".

Similarly, the restrictive nature of the Working Group's mandate should not be an obstacle to the progress we are hoping for in this field. It would be pointless at this stage to start a discussion on the nature, interpretation or future development of this mandate.

The recent experience of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has shown that it is possible to do useful work within the framework of a limited mandate.

In any event, a certain flexibility must prevail in our way of approaching the work of this new Group. In this connection, we are encouraged by the first statements made on this subject, in particular that of the United States delegation.

What seems to us most important, however, is that the mandate goes to the heart of the matter of a test ban, namely, the questions of verification and compliance. The solution to these problems was never more than sketched out in general terms during the trilateral talks and, whether we like it or not, they are still the key to a possible international agreement on a test ban.

The Secretary-General's report containing the study on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, rightly states that "the problems of verification of a comprehensive test ban necessarily differ in important respects from those of the partial test ban Treaty signed in 1963".

It seems to us, therefore, entirely justified that we should devote all our attention to these problems during the initial phase.

The effectiveness of our work will depend to a large extent on the basis from which we depart. For this preliminary stage, it is important that we should agree, without prejudice to the positions of States -- and I repeat, without prejudice to the positions of States -- on a working hypothesis, which can only be that of a total and complete prohibition of all nuclear tests.

This approach has the merit of credibility since it corresponds to the objective laid down in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of 1978.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

It also has the advantage of not diverting our attention to the discussion of matters that the Committee is not in a position to settle for the time being. I am thinking in particular of the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Such an approach would mean setting out at once to determine the requirements for the verification of a total absence of nuclear explosions. This verification is essential since clandestine tests could give the country carrying them out an unacceptable military advantage.

I should like here to make a parenthetical comment which my colleagues will not find in the text of my statement that has been distributed. I wish to express my regret at the delay in the adoption of the Working Group's programme of work. It is a pity that all delegations could not have evinced, on a matter which ought, after all, to have been regarded as secondary, sufficient flexibility to have made it possible to embark on the substance of the discussions sooner. At least three meetings of the Working Group have been wasted, whereas adoption of the document prepared by the Swedish Chairman would in no way prejudice national positions on the various subjects under discussion, and I should like to make an appeal for negotiations, consultations, to be carried out rapidly today so that tomorrow, when the Working Group meets in the afternoon, we shall not again be obliged to waste time on a discussion which I myself consider entirely secondary. We ought as soon as possible to get down to the essence of the subject, that is, to discussing the points proposed by the Swedish delegation.

My delegation also considers that we should base our work on a political and legal approach rather than go into pseudo-technicalities which would not help us at all and would give rise to pointless discussions, for example on the acceptable level of verification. Experience has shown that, in this area, the level of verification becomes established at some intermediary position after negotiations but not before them.

The Group of Scientific Experts on the detection and identification of seismic events clearly provides the necessary technical support for our work. Relations between this expert group and the Working Group ought to be close but flexible, without any need for one group to be subordinate to the other. The participation of the Chairman of the Group of Experts in the discussions of the Working Group -- a participation which we all welcome -- should be enough to ensure the co-ordination of the two bodies' activities.

As I have already said, verification requirements for a complete ban are naturally more stringent than those for a partial ban.

The Secretary-General's report to which I have already referred states, that, in the case of a comprehensive ban, "it may not be possible to obtain, through the parties' own means alone, assurance that the prohibition is being observed. Provision for verification by both national and international means must therefore be made".

Verification by national technical means might possibly, in a given case, satisfy the nation which possesses them. But that is rather an optimistic hypothesis, as we know. Furthermore, States which did not possess such national means would then be reduced to resorting to the judgement of a third party. Lastly, the use of these national means is hardly compatible with detailed international co-ordination, since

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each State would have the sovereign right to make such use of them as it saw fit. Generally speaking, therefore, we can confine ourselves, in an international convention, to agreeing that the parties may use national means and mutually undertake not to interfere with the use of such means. Provisions relating to access by third States to information collected by national means could also be the subject of possible agreements. But no provisions of this kind can ever replace an international system of verification. Such a system at present appears essential. For, assuming that there is a complete ban on tests, it will no longer be possible to substitute underground nuclear explosions for explosions in other environments, as was the case after the adoption of the 1963 Treaty. The latter did not in fact provide for any international system of verification, mainly because of the high cost of concealment and the risk of the detection of clandestine explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. But a complete ban on explosions will have to be verified, and precise measures of international verification, including the possibility of on-site inspection, will be essential at all stages, both for routine checking and for the determination of the facts in cases of doubt or suspicion.

Obviously, seismological verification will be one of the key elements in a global system for verifying compliance with a ban on underground tests. In this connection, we attach the greatest importance to the activities of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, of which Belgium has been a member from the outset. One of our first concerns, when Belgium became a member of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, was to strengthen the links between the Committee and the Group of Experts. This resulted in the informal meeting of the Committee on 18 July 1980 with the participation of the members of the Group of Experts.

As regards the work of the Group of Experts, it seems to me essential that the value of international data exchanges should be verified further by experiment. We therefore hope that it will at last be possible to carry out a global data transmission experiment, with the widest possible participation by States.

The forthcoming Congress of the World Meteorological Organization ought also to provide an opportunity for clarifying the role which that organization -- and particularly its global telecommunications system -- could play in the matter of an international data exchange. The document submitted by the Japanese delegation that was recently circulated contains useful suggestions in this connection and we believe that the Committee should take a decision on them as soon as possible.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The distribution of the seismological stations which would participate in the data exchange network is another matter to which we should continue to give the utmost attention. Here, too, we have noted broad agreement in favour of the widest possible geographical representation, bearing in mind in particular the insufficiency of seismological stations in the southern hemisphere, but also the political advantages of associating a large number of States with an international verification system. We realize, however, that the attainment of this objective will pose considerable problems as regards access by States to the requisite technology, particularly in respect of the automatic extraction of seismic parameters.

The status of the exchange of waveform -- or level 2 -- data, also needs to be clarified.

Since the new techniques now available for the extraction of such data make it easier to identify the location, depth and magnitude of seismic events and thus make these data as necessary as the level 1 data, that is the basic parameters of detected seismic signals, ought we not to contemplate the routine transmission of level 2 data rather than their transmission merely "on request"?

We ought likewise to give thought to the "international" status of the national seismological stations participating in the network as well as that of the international data centres.

Document CD/95 submitted by Australia could form a useful basis for consideration in this connection.

But it is possible that seismological verification is not sufficient to meet the needs of international verification. This is something which we should try to determine.

Ought we, for example, to provide for additional methods of verification, such as surveillance of atmospheric radioactivity?

Is such surveillance capable of identifying with certainty radioactive emissions in the atmosphere resulting from underground explosions?

Would this method be effective in the event of the miniaturization of explosions?

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Ought we perhaps to reserve this means of detection for the discouragement and verification of possible clandestine atmospheric explosions or the clearing up of doubts such as those surrounding the incident of 22 September 1979 off the coast of South Africa?

Our attempts to give a preliminary answer to questions of the kind I have just mentioned will inevitably have implications for a review of the mandate of the Group of Experts as well as for the expansion of its membership, if the use of other methods of detection in addition to the seismic method is deemed to be necessary.

Further methods could also be contemplated, if they would make verification more credible without, however, rendering the provisions of an international agreement needlessly complicated.

For example, the difficulty of distinguishing between small nuclear explosions and large chemical explosions could perhaps be overcome through a process of prior notification and verification of the latter.

On-site inspection is another essential aspect of international verification. Political attitudes in this regard seem to have evolved in recent years. The Protocol to the 1976 Soviet-American Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes marked an important development in that respect.

Other indications of this development have recently been given to us in other fields, in particular in respect of chemical weapons and the verification of the civilian part of the nuclear fuel cycle.

On-site inspection should form part both of routine control procedures and of the procedures for the determination of the facts in cases of doubt or suspicion.

Here again we shall have to specify these procedures in detail while paying heed to what appears to be a new and useful principle in respect of verification, that of the minimum necessary degree of intrusiveness.

In concluding this statement, I should like to express the hope that we shall not waste the opportunity we have created for ourselves in establishing the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Our first task should be to identify the problems. Now that I have mentioned a number of them here, it seems to me that they are many and complex. We shall then have to suggest solutions, and subsequently to try to harmonize them.

It is in this way, I believe, that the Committee will be able to contribute best to the attainment of the essential objective of a nuclear test ban.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today, I wish to make a few observations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which is of universal concern.

But first of all, in the name of the Chinese delegation, I would like to extend our warm welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Cannock of Peru. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to our colleagues who have left us or are going to leave us for their contributions to the work of this Committee, and to wish them much success in their future duties. I refer to Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria and Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia.

In recent years, the intensification of the nuclear arms race between the Superpowers and the acceleration of their preparations for a nuclear war have placed the people of the world in the dark shadow of a grave nuclear threat. People urgently demand that the nuclear disarmament issue be dealt with on a priority basis and effective measures taken to prevent nuclear war. The large-scale, mass anti-nuclear campaigns that have taken place in some regions of the world reflect the strong desire of the people of all countries to safeguard peace and security and their strong opposition to nuclear war. Regrettably, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which attracted world-wide attention, failed to meet public expectations. But even so, a number of reasonable proposals and recommendations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament put forward by many countries during the special session deserve our attention and further consideration.

Innumerable facts have demonstrated that the nuclear arms race, nuclear monopoly and the threat of nuclear war have all emanated from the rivalry for hegemony by the two Superpowers. At the second special session, some non-aligned countries proposed that the two major nuclear Powers, the USSR and the United States of America, should proclaim the immediate cessation of the testing, manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. This proposal, pinpointing the characteristic of the present state of nuclear armaments and underscoring the special responsibility the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should assume in nuclear disarmament, rightly demands that they immediately halt their nuclear arms race. It deserves serious consideration. In order to lessen the danger of nuclear war, the USSR and the United States should not only cease the testing, manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons but also substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals. The Chinese delegation has specifically proposed, in this regard, a reduction of 50 per cent on all categories of nuclear weapons by the USSR and the United States. Since both already possess such gigantic nuclear arsenals, such a reduction will not in the least impair their security. After they have taken action to narrow the enormous gap between them and other nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States should then cease their testing, development and manufacture of nuclear weapons, and reduce and ultimately completely destroy them.

Some countries propose that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament. We endorse this proposal. We hold that if all nuclear-weapon States undertake an obligation not to use nuclear weapons, the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war can be reduced to some extent. However, we should

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not ignore the fact that, with the nuclear armaments of the Superpowers already at the dangerous level of overkill capacity, a mere prohibition of use obviously cannot eliminate the nuclear threat. Especially at a time when the Superpowers are still stepping up nuclear arms expansion and continuously updating and deploying new types of nuclear weapons, how can the small and medium-sized countries feel secure and free from apprehension?

In view of the above-mentioned reasons, we hold that prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be linked with their reduction and destruction. Moreover, at the same time as nuclear disarmament is being carried out, sufficient attention should also be given to conventional disarmament. Only this can truly contribute to world peace and the security of States and to the reduction of the threat of war facing mankind.

On the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, we are of the view that this is one aspect of the over-all question of nuclear disarmament. The cessation of nuclear tests will contribute to slowing down the nuclear arms race. But only when it is carried out in conjunction with other nuclear disarmament measures can it help to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The two Superpowers have already conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests of various kinds and possess a great number of nuclear weapons of high accuracy. They ought, in response to the demands of the people of the world, immediately to cease all nuclear tests and the nuclear arms race and to conduct negotiations on a genuine and drastic reduction of nuclear weapons so as to achieve nuclear disarmament at an early date. If they were really to act in this way, the other nuclear-weapon States would be willing to cease the testing and production of nuclear weapons and to reduce them. In addition, this would also help to dissuade those States with potential nuclear capability from developing nuclear weapons. However, reality runs counter to the wishes of the people. One Superpower has openly declared that in order to recover its lost superiority, it cannot stop nuclear testing at the present stage. The other Superpower, while paying lip service to nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, is in fact intensifying its nuclear tests. In 1979, it set a record by conducting 29 nuclear tests within one year. This figure exceeds the total number of nuclear tests conducted by the other nuclear-weapon States combined in that year. Its nuclear tests in 1980 and 1981 also outnumbered those of other nuclear-weapon States. How can one believe that this Superpower is really sincere about the cessation of the nuclear arms race and about nuclear disarmament?

China's limited nuclear capacity is a self-defence measure necessitated by the existence of grave external threats. As a developing socialist country, China needs to accelerate its economic development, and does not wish to use its resources on nuclear weapons. However, confronted by the Superpower military threat, we cannot but maintain the necessary defence capability while engaging in construction efforts. The head of the Chinese delegation to the second special session on disarmament reiterated once again that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons and that China undertakes unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State. This testifies fully to the fact that China's very limited nuclear capacity serves the sole purpose of self defence against foreign aggression. China is also prepared to undertake

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the obligation of nuclear disarmament. Once the two States with the largest arsenals take the lead in ceasing the testing, improvement and manufacture of nuclear weapons and reduce their nuclear weapons by 50 per cent, China will undertake the commitment to cease the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons and will join them in the reduction and eventual total destruction of nuclear weapons. The Chinese people, like the people of other countries, hope that this day will come at an early date.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence if my intervention touches upon several items and does not concentrate solely on today's main subject. By contrast, it will be brief.

It is preoccupying for my delegation that the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban is still trying to agree on its work programme, and that the prospects for consensus formulations are not as good as we would wish. For our part, we welcome the new text of a work programme which has been informally discussed in various groups, on the basis of consultations and contributions by several delegations. In our view it is imperative that an agreement on this text be achieved by 27 August, in order to allow at least a minimum amount of time for an initial reading of the various topics to be discussed. If an agreement is not achieved we should clearly establish the responsibility of those who, for ulterior motives as we must then presume, withhold their consent. All delegations know that the mandate of the NTB Group is limited. To many, this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. But however delegations feel, the only constructive way of showing the alleged deficiency of the mandate would seem to be to complete the present work assignment as quickly as possible. Once it is completed, requests for a future broader mandate would certainly become more persuasive.

At its plenary meeting of 24 August, the Committee had an occasion to discuss the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. The report, and the supplementary information so readily provided by its competent Chairman, Dr. Ericsson, have done much to show the Committee where the Group stands in its work. My delegation, as others, is particularly indebted to Ambassador Okawa for his probing and incisive questions as to where the Group should direct its further endeavours. I would like to join many other delegations who refuse to see the work of the Group go on forever as a purely academic exercise. My delegation would encourage the experts to terminate their next progress report as early in 1983 as they can, preferably by springtime. At the present juncture, the seismic experts have accumulated a wealth of written material. They are lacking on the experimental side. Especially in view of the work the NTB Working Group is now embarking upon, this Committee should give serious thought to enlarging the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and rendering it more precise. Such an amplified mandate should, in our view, contain such assignments as the following:

All aspects of an international seismic data exchange system should be investigated experimentally with the aid of every available scientific and technical method;

Within a time-frame to be specified, the automatic and/or interactive extraction of all Level 1 parameters over a test period of at least two weeks;

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The transmission of this complete set of parameters via the GTS/WMO system on the basis of an official recognition of the Group of Experts by WMO;

Examination, by practical tests, of the possibility of the transmission of Level 2 data over WMO lines as well as other data channels; the elaboration of standard formats for this purpose;

The development and experimental verification of analytical procedures in data centres, using modern evaluation methods, and leading to a comparison of results of Level 1 and Level 2 data respectively.

I would like to stress that a more experimental orientation of the work of the experts would provide results which would be particularly valuable for those countries which are not seismologically equipped themselves and which could use the exchange system as a basis for their own verification efforts in the field of nuclear testing. In any event, my delegation feels that both the work of the Group of Experts during this year and our debate in plenary on 24 August have demonstrated the necessity of building into the mandate the assumption that all participating countries are politically and technically prepared to apply the most recent insights of science and technology, and make the fullest conceivable use of them.

Turning now to the field of chemical weapons, I would like to voice the satisfaction of my delegation over the mode of work which the Ad Hoc Working Group in that field has adopted. The present negotiating method of launching a number of small, spirited groups without a precise mandate has turned out to be quite successful. This is an experiment in multilateral negotiation from which we may wish to draw our lessons for other endeavours as well. We should commend Chairman Sujka for having introduced this flexible negotiation scenario; for the first time, our chemical weapons negotiators have gone beyond the mere juxtaposition of the positions of individual country perspectives. They have now started to evaluate the difference between their views and to agree, increasingly, on common positions.

Earlier during this session my delegation commented upon a particularly important feature of the current negotiating session: the new language on international verification offered in New York by the Soviet delegation and reintroduced here. We have tried to move the negotiation along constructively by asking the Soviet delegation some questions on aspects which we thought would need further clarification. These questions were put forward in document CD/CW/CRP.63. In order to make our list of questions even clearer, and to

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facilitate responses by the Soviet delegation, we joined forces a few days later with the Dutch delegation to reformulate our small questionnaire and to structure it more logically. I am grateful to Ambassador Issraelyan for having supplied some initial answers to our first series of questions in his statement on 12 August. At that juncture it was quite obviously impossible to have replies ready on all our questions. We all recognize how complex this subject matter is. Yet, reiterating the high interest of my delegation in the Soviet Union's views, I would like to state that my delegation continues to hope for a full formal response to our queries at the appropriate time. The Soviet Union has been particularly articulate in stressing the urgency of an early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. Since it appears that the clarifications in the international verification realm which my delegation seeks would be important for rapid progress in our negotiation, we can confidently assume that early replies to our questionnaire would help to advance the course of our negotiations. I would also like to remind the distinguished Soviet delegate that my delegation was immediately ready to supply answers to similar questions in the verification field which were directed to us after the circulation of our working paper CD/265. I myself addressed these questions in a detailed statement in plenary on 15 April, and my delegation took an opportunity to elaborate our replies and elucidate additional aspects in direct contact with our Soviet colleagues. Some degree of reciprocity would certainly be welcome.

In conclusion, may I make a brief statement in my capacity as the current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. In response to the letter circulated at the beginning of our session on 3 August, I have received full replies from 13 delegations, and one reply from the spokesman of a regional group, purporting to speak for its eight members. That makes replies from about half the members of the Committee. I am particularly grateful to those who have responded. In the next few days I would be pleased to be available to those who prefer oral communications and to those who would like to elaborate on their written replies. I would ask those delegations to contact me at the earliest possible point. A formal meeting of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons will be held in the afternoon of 2 September. I intend during that session to report on the views expressed to me and to make suggestions for the further course of work.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I associate my delegation with the words spoken by yourself and other colleagues noting with some regret but great appreciation the work of our two departing colleagues who have left since my last intervention, the distinguished Ambassador of Yugoslavia, Dr. Marco Vrhunec and Ambassador Anisse Salah-Bey of Algeria. We wish both of these colleagues God speed and success in their new endeavours. Likewise, I wish to associate my delegation with the many kind words of welcome extended to our new Peruvian colleague, Ambassador Peter Cannock and we look forward to a pleasant, long and fruitful association; we are delighted to have colleagues from our hemisphere participate with us, and we look forward to that.

At our plenary meeting last Tuesday, this Committee was provided with two examples of statements that, unfortunately, contribute to hindering, rather than advancing, the vitally important work of the Committee. Rhetoric designed to mask rather than to illuminate the real issues we face does not serve any helpful purpose. I do not believe that statements such as these, which attempt -- through selective quotation from free statements made by free men in a free press -- to lay blame where blame clearly does not lie, advance the true cause of a more peaceful world.

The two statements to which I am referring were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Mexico. The Soviet statement was one to which all delegations can attribute certain motives. The second can only be understood as an attempt at creating a narrow, and biased, view of history in order to show, or attempt to show, that the position of my Government on the question of a nuclear test ban is somehow unfaithful to the true national security interests of the United States.

I should like briefly to respond. For any United States administration, the most fundamental issues it must address -- both for the American people and for the entire world -- are issues involving nuclear weapons. So long as threats to the security of the United States and its allies exist, in particular nuclear threats, the United States has no choice but to rely upon a strategy of deterrence. This strategy which holds that our strategic arsenal must be adequate to deter any deliberate attack on the United States or our allies, has been endorsed by every United States President since President Eisenhower. It is inconceivable that the United States would take unilateral steps to weaken that deterrent. But at the same time, the United States will pursue in good faith through negotiations effective measures to reduce those threats, and ultimately to eliminate them. It is clearly in our interest to do so.

Our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Garcia Robles, treated us to a highly selective history lesson. Three quotations from distinguished Americans, speaking as private citizens some 10 years ago, were used to illustrate his view of history. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, has sought to use the same tactic by citing contemporary reports from the press. A quick search through the lengthy and readily available public record in the United States would yield quotations from equally distinguished Americans who held, or hold, other views.

I will not undertake counterquotes, as our time is too valuable to be used in such idle pursuits. Moreover, such an exercise would miss the point. It would obscure the realistic perspective which guides the actions of my Government. Let me say a few words about this perspective. In June 1946, the United States, then the sole nation possessing nuclear weapons, boldly took the initiative by offering to place these weapons under United Nations control. Mr. Bernard Baruch, in proposing the plan which bore his name, said poignantly, "We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead". The Baruch plan was endorsed by a majority of the United Nations, but effectively blocked by a Member Nation which was a short

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time later to launch the nuclear arms race. The acquisition by the Soviet Union of nuclear weapons and its behaviour led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a regional collective defence body permitted under the terms of the United Nations Charter. This perspective embodies many patient efforts that have been made over the past quarter of a century by the United States to control nuclear weapons. These include: the limited test-ban Treaty of 1963, the outer space Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed Convention, and the strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. This perspective embodies also the extensive efforts made by my Government to make available throughout the world the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and its support for the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its essential system of international safeguards. Our perspective has another side as well, and that is the record of behaviour of the Soviet Union. We recall the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. Our perspective is coloured by Soviet acquisition of enormous quantities of nuclear and conventional weaponry in the 1970s at a time when the United States was exercising restraint during the so-called period of détente. We are also cognizant of the Soviet development of an anti-satellite weapon, and their consistent pattern of adventurism and aggression, most recently by their brutal invasion of Afghanistan.

Given this perspective, what position would any reasonable person expect the United States to take? Are we to react by disarming unilaterally? By putting our faith in the goodwill of the Soviet Union and throwing caution to the winds? No responsible American official could ever contemplate such actions.

But mutual reductions in the levels of armaments -- both nuclear and conventional -- are clearly in the interest of the United States. These reductions can free economic resources for better purposes in the world. Our economic systems -- given the opportunity -- can create great benefits for the world at large. The requirement to sustain a contest with the Soviet Union in the military arena is most certainly not a welcome one. Bullets do not feed children or build hospitals.

Let there be no question about the commitment of my Government to nuclear arms control and nuclear arms reductions. No delegation in this chamber can be oblivious to the fact that two vitally important negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are under way to achieve these ends. Let there be no question about the commitment of my Government to the achievement of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Let there be no question about the willingness of the United States to pursue the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations under way in Vienna. And let there be no question about the commitment of my country to its international obligations, under agreements to which it is a party, in particular the non-proliferation Treaty. In the light of the strategic arms reduction talks and the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces -- efforts for which the United States took the initiative -- I fail to see how any Government could argue that my Government somehow considers Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty to be a dead letter, as some delegations have asserted here during our 1982 session. With regard to the issue of a nuclear test ban, we have consistently declared it as a long-range objective but one which must be considered in the broad range of nuclear arms control measures, and the over-all security interests of the United States. My delegation is prepared to participate actively in the work of the NTB Working Group, and I join our colleagues who have spoken this morning in urging early agreement on a programme of work for that body.

It is regrettable that some delegations seem to approach the work of this Committee as a game -- as political theatre where the objective is to make debating points and embarrass those who take opposite positions. My delegation certainly does not share that view. Whether popular or unpopular, this delegation will continue to take positions which are based on serious national interests and a realistic view of the world in which we live.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 176th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland, His Excellency Ambassador Hayes, to whom I extend a warm welcome in the Committee.

Mr. HAYES (Ireland): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you in particular for your kind words of welcome.

Let me begin my remarks by congratulating you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. We would wish to associate ourselves with the many -- and well-merited -- compliments that have been paid both to you and to your distinguished predecessor from the floor of this Committee.

It is a great honour for me to participate as observer in the Committee on Disarmament during its consideration of item 1 of the Committee's agenda which is before today's plenary meeting. As you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Committee are aware, Ireland is a candidate for membership of this body. If our candidature is successful, as we hope it will be, we are convinced that the particular question of a comprehensive test ban will be one of the most important questions we will have to address as a member of the Committee.

All who have followed this particular question are aware of the importance which the Irish Government attaches to a comprehensive test ban in the context of the international community's efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Year after year we have expressed our views at the General Assembly and have joined with other States in co-sponsoring resolutions on this question.

Looking about us we see that while efforts are made to negotiate disarmament measures in the nuclear area, all too often those efforts are unable to keep pace with the advance of technology and they thus fail to slow down the nuclear arms race. A comprehensive test ban could fulfil a vital function. It would help to curtail the qualitative competition among the nuclear-weapon Powers by limiting technological advance in nuclear weapons. While the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and the more recent threshold ban Treaty were important psychologically, they have not been very effective in limiting the improvement of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that something much more is needed. There is no alternative to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban of the kind to which the parties to the partial test ban of 1963 committed themselves on that occasion.

Successive Irish Governments have emphasized the need for action to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1959, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland tabled a resolution on this question in the United Nations. In the years that followed, we persistently pursued our initiative, gradually obtaining increased support until the non-proliferation Treaty was finally concluded in 1967. We feel that that Treaty has made a valuable contribution to the efforts of the international community to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The acceptance by the nuclear-weapon Powers of a complete ban on all nuclear tests would be a magnificent boost to international efforts to maintain and strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty. Ireland and others which support the Treaty argue that it

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should be universally accepted and call on the States in a position to acquire nuclear weapons to refrain from doing so in the interests of all. Agreement now by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to end testing would show that they, too, are willing to accept restraints and would give great encouragement to those of us who want to see a non-proliferation Treaty firmly established and accepted by all. In the words of the Palme Commission, a comprehensive test ban "would enhance the acceptability and credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty".

In view of the great importance which the Irish Government attaches to agreement on a comprehensive test ban, it is for us a matter of great regret that the prospects for reaching agreement have not improved in recent months. The trilateral talks to which we attach great importance have not resumed and recent reports are somewhat pessimistic regarding the prospects for an early resumption. However, we are confident that the last word has not been heard on this and we, for our part, continue to hope for an early resumption. It is our view that concrete discussion between the nuclear-weapon States principally involved is essential if the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament are to be crowned with success.

Those outside the Committee on Disarmament have watched your efforts within the Committee in recent years to come to grips with this most important question, including your efforts to agree on the establishment of a working group. We are, of course, aware that you did decide in April of this year to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and that you agreed on the mandate which would be given to that Group. I must confess immediately that the mandate which was agreed on would not have been the one which we would have suggested. I would add that in our view the discussion should involve all the nuclear-weapon States.

I would recall that on 29 February 1972 the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, speaking to the CCD, the predecessor of this Committee, regarding a comprehensive test ban, stated: "I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement." The problem of verification has, of course, been closely linked over the years with discussion of a comprehensive test ban. However, it seems to my delegation that what the Secretary-General said in 1972 is certainly true today. The quest for an infallible verification method may prove to be a very long one, but the margin of error in verification is being constantly reduced by scientific developments in detection and identification. We must be prepared to seek a balanced solution. That, of course, is what the Secretary-General meant in 1972 when he expressed the view that only a political decision was now necessary in order to achieve final agreement.

From what I have said it will be clear why my delegation has had some initial reservations regarding the mandate of the new Ad Hoc Working Group. However, this does not mean that our attitude to it is a negative one. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group allows the Committee to start work on this most important subject. We are also encouraged by our experience of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons which originally had what we might describe as a somewhat limited mandate. In spite of that limited mandate it has been able, as we know, to do extremely useful work. We would hope that in the light of that experience the Ad Hoc Working Group which has now been established to deal with the subject of a comprehensive test ban will be able to carry out similarly useful work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ireland for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mrs. GONZALEZ (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor in order to reserve my delegation's right to exercise its right of reply to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States of America when my delegation has examined in detail the content of that statement.

The CHAIRMAN: The secretariat has circulated, at my request, an informal paper containing the time-table for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, the time-table is indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I adjourn the plenary meeting, may I recall that at our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, I will put before the Committee for adoption the schedule of work contained in paragraph 10 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as contained in document CD/318, as well as the draft communication in Working Paper No. 73.

May I also recall that the Committee will hold this afternoon at 3 p.m. an informal meeting to consider the remaining proposals submitted under items 2 and 7 of the agenda, as well as the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Committee on Disarmament.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 31 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

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