

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME V

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
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COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLenary MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yeshio OKAWA

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. BELKAID
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss de CLERQ

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
Mr. J. LUIS GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:
Mr. E.A. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:
Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. VILLETTE

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:
Mr. A. VENKATESWARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK
Mr. A. BAHRIN

Iran:
Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:
Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:
Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIR
Mr. J. MURIU KILBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. van DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. E. RUSSIN
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
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Mr. L. MIDDLETON
Mr. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mrs. M.E. HOINKES
Miss S. BURKE

Venezuela:

Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 170th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Before I take up the list of speakers, I would like to draw your attention to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat this morning on the timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As you know, Monday is a holiday and, therefore, there will be no activities. That means that we will have approximately one week to complete the work of the Committee if we wish to conclude our deliberations on 20 April. Since the Working Groups have not yet submitted their reports, they will have to do so during the coming week and we will probably need to hold plenary meetings on Monday, 19 April, and Tuesday, 20 April, to consider and adopt the special report to the General Assembly. Under these circumstances, I see no alternative but to increase the number of meetings of the subsidiary bodies next week and also to use all the time available for the consideration of the draft report. In that connection, you may note that we will not be holding a plenary meeting on Tuesday, since no delegations have expressed the wish to speak on that particular day. We can use the time thus made available to hold an informal meeting at 10 a.m. on 13 April to discuss the subjects included in the timetable.

After that, hopefully, we can proceed to the consideration of the draft report. You will recall that it was agreed that the Committee would establish an open-ended drafting group to consider the draft report to the General Assembly. I suggest that we try to hold the first meeting of this drafting group after the informal meeting on Tuesday. This drafting group will meet in Conference Room I.

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the timetable.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Secretariat for again submitting such a very precisely worded timetable. However, knowing that delegations are quite adverse to having concurrent meetings, I would like to point out the following: on Tuesday, 13 April, at 3 p.m. time has been set aside for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. In view of the way the work in that Working Group is proceeding, that meeting may not be necessary and I will be in touch with the Secretariat to find out whether and at what time we can cancel the meeting so that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons can have the main room allotted to it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Wegener for this useful information.

May I take it that the Committee agrees to the adoption of the timetable, tentatively, I would say, for the coming week?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: According to our programme of work, the Committee should have started its consideration of item 8 of its agenda today. That item deals with the consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies and the consideration and adoption of the special report to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, as members know, the reports of subsidiary bodies are not yet available for consideration by the plenary and the Committee has agreed that an open-ended drafting group should deal with those parts

(The Chairman)

of the draft report of the Committee which have been made available by the Secretariat. Therefore, members may wish to make full use of rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, according to which members wishing to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of India, the United States of America, the Netherlands, Mongolia, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Egypt, the United Kingdom, China and Belgium.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of India, His Excellency Ambassador Venkateswaran.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you, the representative of a brotherly country from Asia, as Chairman of our Committee for this crucial month of April. Members of the Committee are already familiar with your dedication to the cause of disarmament and your impressive qualities of sincerity and wisdom. I have no doubt that, during this month when the Committee must above all agree upon its report to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, our work will benefit from your patience, skill and guidance. May I on behalf of my delegation pledge to you our fullest co-operation in the discharge of your duties and wish you every success?

The Secretariat has circulated to all Committee members the text of a note (document CD/273 of 6 April 1982) transmitted by the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and containing the views of the Government of India on the substantive issues related to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as suggestions for the prevention of nuclear war.

Paragraph 18 of the Final Document of the first special session states unequivocally and I quote: "Removing the threat of a world war-- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

The question of human survival must clearly, therefore, take precedence over narrow conceptions of security of individual nation States or groups of States. The use of the nuclear weapon, which is a weapon of mass destruction, would recognize no national or regional boundaries, lead to indiscriminate destruction and loss of life and endanger the very continuation of the human species itself. On what basis then can any State continue to insist that it has the right to seek its security through the espousal of pernicious doctrines that are predicated on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons? We cannot and must not allow this state of affairs to continue.

Today the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war has become even more ominous than ever before. It is no mere coincidence that, in several countries of Europe, a continent which is already over-saturated with nuclear and conventional weapons of the most destructive kind, popular mass movements against nuclear weapons are gathering greater momentum each day. More recently, in the United States of America, there has been similar rising popular concern and anxiety over the grim reality of nuclear war, leading to bipartisan resolutions being introduced in the United States Congress, for urgent measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. The first resolution of this kind introduced in the United States Senate by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield states in its preamble and I quote:

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

"Whereas the greatest challenge facing the earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design,

Whereas the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that would be humanity's final war, and

Whereas a freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems is needed to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of the nuclear war".

And this preambular paragraph was followed by a solemn call upon the United States and the Soviet Union "to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems".

India cannot but agree with the philosophy and approach expressed in the preamble to this resolution of the United States Senate. As the Committee is aware, India has, in its note to the Secretary-General, specifically called for a complete freeze on nuclear weapons as a step towards nuclear disarmament. Our approach, of course, is more comprehensive in nature and consists of two inseparable elements, namely, (i) a complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and (ii) a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Once this is achieved, international safeguards, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, could be applied to all nuclear facilities of all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

The idea of a freeze is not new. In 1964, the United States itself proposed in the ENDC "a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles". This proposal was put forward on the basis of a generally accepted approach to disarmament. I can find no better words to describe this approach than to quote from the statement made by the representative of the United States in the ENDC on 31 January 1964. He said and I quote: "This proposal (the proposal for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles) is patterned after measures which have **already** been successfully negotiated, measures having a common general philosophy. This philosophy is that a logical first step is to freeze things where they are and thereby remove future obstacles to disarmament".

In recent years, however, this generally accepted approach to disarmament has been abruptly set aside in favour of the dangerous approach which, in effect, flies in the face of the facts and is that the road to disarmament lies through a build-up of armaments. It should be clear to anyone that such a policy of negotiating from so-called positions of strength can only lead to a further escalation of the arms race and increase the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The argument frequently used in favour of an arms build-up as a prelude to disarmament is that it would give one's real or potential adversary an "incentive" to seek disarmament. The history of the arms race proves the contrary, namely, that such an approach, far from being a prelude to disarmament has in fact been a prelude to successive and ever more dangerous spirals in the arms race. No State can be frightened into accepting disarmament but, on the other hand, it can, of course, be frightened into undertaking a matching or even greater arms build-up of its own.

In any event, when one is dealing with weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, notions of superiority and balance or deterrence have little meaning. The over-kill capacity of existing nuclear arsenals makes numbers meaningless. In the

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

opinion of the great majority of military strategists, there will be little or no effect on the so-called nuclear balance, even if existing nuclear arsenals are reduced by 50 per cent or more. Surely, no one would then be able to deny that an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons would achieve little more than a freeze of the existing so-called nuclear balance, which is claimed to be a key element in the prevention of nuclear war.

We totally reject the notion that disarmament can be pursued only on the basis of so-called parity or balance. If we were to accept this notion, then the vast majority of us which are non-nuclear-weapon States would, in fact, have to reassess our renunciation of the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear arsenals of our own. For only then, by this self-same logic of the major nuclear-weapon Powers, would we be in a position to persuade others to undertake nuclear disarmament. Any acceptance of the notion that the road to disarmament lies through pressuring others with a build-up of more armaments could only result in such absurd conclusions being drawn.

India has put forward its proposal for a freeze of nuclear weapons in response to United Nations General Assembly resolutions 36/81 A and B pertaining to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is our sincere hope that the nuclear-weapon States will respond to the appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 36/81 B, which was adopted by consensus, and submit without further delay "their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war".

The situation that we face today is extremely critical. Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament can no longer wait or be a hostage to the capricious state of relations between two major nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The time has come to recognize that the danger we all face from a possible nuclear war, either by accident or design, is truly global in character and demands a global solution. Partial measures which deal with only certain aspects of this grave problem facing mankind can never offer hope of enduring success.

Before I conclude, I would like to touch briefly on the question of chemical weapons. Until now, we looked upon the progress achieved in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons of this Committee with a degree of optimism and encouragement. However, this optimism has been marred by recently announced decisions to commence what is in effect a new and more dangerous arms race in chemical weapons. Here again, the curious logic which has been used to justify the undertaking of the development and production of new and more destructive types of chemical weapons, particularly binary weapons, is that the so-called adversary must be given an "incentive" to engage in disarmament.

We cannot accept this strange premise which flies in the face of the facts. If we are to make progress in achieving an early prohibition of chemical weapons, it is absolutely necessary for every State to display a degree of caution and restraint in its conduct. It is our earnest hope that, at least at the second special session devoted to disarmament, if not earlier, all States possessing chemical weapons and those which have the potential further to develop their chemical weapons capability will undertake not to build up further their arsenals of these weapons and at the same time to refrain from the development, production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons. We are concerned that, unless early and effective action is taken to check this new trend of justifying an accelerated arms build-up on the ground that it will help towards negotiations on disarmament, the cause of disarmament itself will remain a mere mirage with its consequential dangers.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Busby.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, although Ambassador Fields has already expressed to you the congratulations of the United States delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship, I would like to take this opportunity to express my personal pleasure at seeing you in the Chair and to wish you every success in your difficult and demanding job.

My purpose in asking for the floor today is to introduce document CD/271-CD/CW/WP.32 co-sponsored by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States and entitled "Technical evaluation of 'Recover' techniques for CW verification".

The achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a goal which ranks near the top of the Committee's agenda. The Committee's discussions of general approaches to verification of a future CW prohibition have demonstrated that fundamental differences exist on verification issues. If meaningful progress is to be made on a chemical weapons convention, it is clear that progress must be made in resolving these issues.

Because of the variety of verification tasks to be dealt with in a CW prohibition, there can be no simple formula which can be applied in all cases. A variety of techniques, tailored to particular situations, will be required. Finding solutions to them will require active co-operation, imagination and expertise from all members of this Committee. It is in this spirit that my delegation has sponsored two briefings on the concept of remote continual verification ("recover").

The recover system is a unique global sensor-monitoring and data collection network being developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency for use primarily with regard to nuclear safeguards. However, it appears to the co-sponsors that the technology involved may have wider applicability. In particular, it is our view that the recover techniques may have potential application as one component of a broadly based CW verification system.

Document CD/271-CD/CW/WP.32 describes the remote continual verification concept and suggests a framework within which a technical evaluation of recover could be conducted under the auspices of the Committee. The results of such a technical evaluation would be used to determine the applicability of recover as one component of a CW verification system.

It is clear that the lack of agreement on issues in the area of verification and compliance is the principal obstacle to successful completion of this Committee's work on a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons. Document CD/271-CD/CW/WP.32 suggests a technical evaluation which could assist us by taking another step towards overcoming this obstacle. It could also serve as a confidence-building activity in which States would co-operate to develop and evaluate improved monitoring arrangements. For these reasons, we seek favourable consideration of this proposal and intend to propose the inclusion of this item in our work programme for the summer session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency Ambassador van Dongen.

Mr. van DONGEN (Netherlands): I should like to avail myself of the provision of rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure to refer to agenda item 7 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Netherlands welcomes the decision of this Committee to put this item on its agenda. We hold that the time is more than ripe to take up this subject; further delay would only increase its complexity, which is, even now, awesome. In his statement of 2 February 1982, Ambassador Fein outlined our approach to it. Having listened attentively to the arguments put forward by certain delegations, we acquiesced in its absence from the programme of work for the Committee's spring session. At the same time, we welcomed the decision to hold informal meetings to consider item 7; I hope that, on that occasion, I made our constant interest in the matter abundantly clear.

We are of course aware that a few nations play a preponderant role in the exploration and the use of outer space and that, for other members of this Committee, many of the technical aspects are hard to grasp. At the same time, the fact that possible arms competition in outer space would directly affect the military balance and therefore our joint security confers on us the right and even the duty to speak out.

When I do so today, my primary objective is to encourage further discussion and continued awareness that the major contribution can only come from the two great Powers and that a lasting solution is feasible only if the two of them can come to agree with one another.

The military use of outer space seems to have three main aspects:

(a) Military satellites are increasingly being used to fulfil functions of direct military relevance such as observation, navigation, communications and crisis monitoring;

(b) As a result, the same satellites are becoming high-priority military targets, since their elimination will directly affect the adversary's military capabilities. This has resulted in increased research, development and, in some cases, even tests of so-called interceptor satellites in orbit;

(c) Increased research in the field of directed-energy weapons, both high-energy laser and particle-beam weapons, has made it conceivable that they may be used both for space-based ballistic missile defence and as anti-satellite weapons.

We are, of course, aware of the fact that, since the 1960s, a number of international agreements have been concluded restricting the military use of outer space; of these, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, deserves special mention. This Treaty prohibits the placing in orbit around the earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies and the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner. It also calls for the complete demilitarization of the moon and other celestial bodies. Though it is an important step forward, the Outer Space Treaty leaves room for a variety of military activities in outer space. I note by way of illustration that none of the three ways of militarizing outer space which I outlined earlier is prohibited by the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

How can we fill this gap? There is, of course, the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. We have, however, stated on several occasions that it is our considered opinion that this draft treaty does not meet our requirements. On the one hand, it seems that the complexity of arms control in outer space calls not for one comprehensive treaty, but, rather, warrants several instruments dealing with specific subject-matters. On the other hand, the Soviet draft treaty seems to allow for dangerous and inadmissible a contrario arguments that could undermine the provisions of the draft and indeed those of treaties already in force. The verification provisions will have to be scrutinized for their adequacy. Furthermore, the draft contains some baroque ornaments that have no place in a legal text.

For example, draft article 3 raises many questions about the character of the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. It seems to leave open the possibility of disabling space objects of other States parties if such objects are not placed in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of the draft treaty. Furthermore, the prohibition applies only to the space objects of other States which are parties to the treaty. These restrictions, together with the wording of article 1, paragraph 1, referring only to stationing, mean that the Soviet draft treaty does not prohibit the development, testing or production of "objects carrying weapons of any kind" or even their use under certain circumstances.

Another important point in this connection is that a clear definition of the term "weapon" is lacking.

With regard to the verification provisions of this draft treaty, it can be asked why the verification of the implementation of this treaty should be left exclusively to so-called "national" technical means of verification. These means were recognized for the first time as a legitimate method by the United States and the Soviet Union in the SALT agreements. However, what is adequate in a bilateral context is not necessarily adequate or acceptable in a multilateral context. And since we are talking about a multilateral draft treaty, it should in any case leave open the possibility of the further internationalization of the verification of this treaty.

Another observation with regard to the proposed verification régime is that it does not provide for recourse of any kind to international bodies in case of doubts or complaints about compliance or non-compliance with the treaty.

I would like to make some further observations on this subject.

First of all, in our view, the military uses of space by satellites can, thus far, on balance, be described as rather of a stabilizing nature. When we consider possible further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, we can therefore not ignore developments in the elaboration of anti-satellite weapon systems, which should be regarded as a serious danger because of their destabilizing effect on international peace and security. The more satellites are used as the eyes and ears of modern military forces, the more crippling will be their loss through attacks with anti-satellite weapons. It is therefore entirely justified that General Assembly resolution 36/97 C, in addition to the provisions I referred to earlier, requested this Committee to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems as an important first step.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

We are aware of the fact that anti-satellite weapons systems are now being developed and even tested. Achievements in the field of ballistic missile defence may also serve for the development of an anti-satellite capability. Is this not then the right moment for endeavours towards further arms control in outer space? Conversely, must we fear that the possibilities are diminishing or have already ceased to exist? To find the answer, we must investigate the rationale for developing an anti-satellite capability.

Two main arguments are usually put forward. One stems from a competitive and reactive concern: to deter the use of anti-satellite weapons by the other side and to prevent an imbalance in military capabilities. The other stems from a concern of the first party with the growing use of satellites by the other side with a view to enhancing its military capability; the growing use of satellites is then perceived by the first party as constituting a sufficient threat to justify an anti-satellite programme.

It seems to us that a verifiable agreement banning anti-satellite weapons altogether will constitute a durable solution for averting arms competition in outer space only if each side's anti-satellite programme is commensurate with, not a reaction to, the other's, whether real or anticipated. We would then be dealing with the question whether we should opt for mutual satellite vulnerability or for mutual satellite invulnerability.

The choice in favour of the former, the anti-satellite weapons option, could lead to a very expensive arms race in outer space with no guarantee for increased stability, probably quite the contrary. As I mentioned before, present research efforts in the field of directed-energy weapons, both high-energy laser and particle-beam weapons, have already made it conceivable to use these new weapons for space-based ballistic missile defence. It stands to reason that such developments will have serious implications for the present international situation.

As to the question of the priority to be given to the elaboration of a prohibition of anti-satellite weapons, it is our firm belief that the prerequisites for an agreement seem to exist: no State yet seems to possess a commanding lead in the relevant technology.

In choosing the option to ban anti-satellite weapons, one would have to consider that such a ban would be a step in the right direction from an arms control point of view, but that, at the same time, it would offer protection to satellites fulfilling vital military functions. I must admit that we have to think further about that side of the coin and decide whether a mutually acceptable solution can be found. Another complicating aspect is that satellites for observation, communications, navigation, meteorology, etc. can be used both for military and for civilian purposes. We are well aware that this dual-purpose character of satellite technology does not simplify our complicated task.

These are the observations I should like to limit myself to at this stage. We hope that the results of the informal discussions that are taking place can be evaluated during the period in May and June when the Committee on Disarmament does not meet. During the summer session, the Committee on Disarmament could then deal more formally with agenda item 7 and consider setting up an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The problem of preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space, that relatively new sphere of human activity, occupies an important place in the set of problems relating to the halting of the arms race and to disarmament.

In the past quarter of a century, since the start of the space era, the international community has been making unceasing efforts to ensure that space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the social and economic progress of peoples.

The Soviet Union's initiative concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space therefore received wide support at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Representatives of a large number of States, both in the First Committee and at plenary meetings of the General Assembly, expressed serious concern at the real threat that might be created unless a barrier to the spread of the arms race to outer space was erected in good time. In this Committee, too, many speakers have stressed the timeliness and importance of the Soviet proposal aimed at removing that danger.

In approving by an overwhelming majority resolution 36/99, which was submitted by Mongolia on behalf of the group of socialist countries, the General Assembly recommended the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

In its statement in the First Committee, the Mongolian delegation clearly and succinctly expressed its position on this question. During the past twenty or more years, a whole system of treaties and agreements, both multilateral and bilateral, has been established prohibiting the stationing in outer space of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

I should like to name the most important among them. They are, first, the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, approved by the General Assembly in 1979; the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, and many others.

However, we are regretfully compelled to note that, according to reports in the western Press, including that of the United States itself, an extensive programme is being developed for the creation of a whole series of systems of weapons to be used in outer space, such as systems of anti-satellite weapons, the deployment of anti-satellite mines, laser weapons and the development of huge anti-missile defence systems based in outer space, etc. Particular attention is being devoted in this connection to reusable vehicles of the "Shuttle" type.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

According to the United States review "Aviation Week and Space Technology", reusable spacecraft have been given the role of a connecting link between military centres on Earth and orbital operational stations, programme development for which has already entered the final stage.

From Press reports it transpires that the Pentagon strategists have also assigned the "Shuttle" programme a substantial role in the activation of military reconnaissance from space. Use will be made for this purpose of artificial satellites placed in orbit by a remote manipulator.

In short, there exists a real danger of the unleashing of an arms race in space. The world community naturally cannot remain indifferent in the face of such an escalation of activity to implement plans for the militarization of outer space designed to undermine the existing military balance and to initiate yet another spiral of the arms race including space weapons.

It should also be pointed out that the stationing of new types of weapons in outer space would have the most negative effect on co-operation among States in the exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes, the fruits of which the international community is enjoying on an ever-increasing scale. In that connection, I should like particularly to emphasize the great importance of the results of the activities of socialist States within the framework of the "Interkosmos" programme.

A year ago, there occurred an event of special significance in the life of the Mongolian people -- the joint Mongolian-Soviet space flight, as a result of which successful scientific research of exceptional importance to Mongolia's national economy was carried out.

In the light of the foregoing, the Mongolian delegation considers the Soviet Union's proposal to be timely and appropriate to the demands of the existing situation.

In saying this, I should like to stress that, in our view, this proposal pursues, inter alia, the important aim of halting the arms race as regards its main trend, that of the further qualitative refinement of weapons through the use of scientific and technological progress.

As is known, the General Assembly also approved resolution 36/97 C, which includes, inter alia, a request to the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of conducting negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, in particular, the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

In that connection, my delegation shares the view of those who have expressed a wish to examine the question of anti-satellite systems in the context of other measures aimed at an over-all solution of the problem of preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space. That question is, moreover, taken into consideration in article 3 of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space as submitted by the Soviet Union and referred to in General Assembly resolution 36/99.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Committee on Disarmament, taking into account the aforementioned recommendations of the General Assembly and the desire of the international community to create a reliable barrier to the transformation of outer space into an arena of the arms race, has included a new item on this question in the agenda of its 1982 session.

We have the impression that there is in the Committee broad understanding and agreement concerning the commencement, during the second part of the Committee's 1982 session, of concrete negotiations with a view to adopting effective measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space through the conclusion of an appropriate international treaty. The Mongolian delegation is in favour of an immediate start to such negotiations, and proposes the establishment of an ad hoc working group within the framework of the Committee. In that connection, I should like to recall that the group of socialist countries proposed the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question in document CD/241.

We consider that the Committee could take a decision to establish the group, preferably before the completion of the work of the first part of the present session. In order to facilitate the speedy establishment of the ad hoc working group, the Mongolian delegation has submitted for the Committee's consideration working paper CD/272 containing draft terms of reference for the ad hoc working group, as follows:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the second half of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group for the purposes of conducting negotiations on item 7 of the agenda, 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space' and agreeing on a text for a corresponding international treaty, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives in that respect.

The ad hoc working group shall submit a report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament before the completion of the second half of the Committee's 1982 session."

The draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space submitted by the Soviet Union, which could serve as a good basis for negotiations, is before the Committee.

We believe that in the continuing discussion of item 7 at informal meetings of the Committee, parties' positions are emerging. This may later facilitate preparations for the start of negotiations on this question at the Committee's summer session.

The Mongolian delegation is prepared to engage with interested delegations in consultations and exchanges of views on the elaboration of appropriate terms of reference for the ad hoc working group on the basis of document CD/272 with a view to reaching agreement on this urgent issue.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, I was born on 9 April and I believe that good things always happen to me in April. One of the good things that I see happening this month is the fact that you are presiding over our deliberations at this crucial period. I am convinced that your well-known commitment to the cause of disarmament and that of the friendly country that you diligently represent, as well as your unassuming personality, will be an asset to this Committee as we prepare to round up the spring session in readiness for the first major event of the Second Disarmament Decade -- the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I pledge the full co-operation of my delegation in the accomplishment of your difficult task.

Your predecessor, Ambassador Mario Alessi, deserves our gratitude for the effective manner in which he steered the work of the Committee through the busy month of March. For one thing, my delegation will always remember the important developments that took place in the Committee under his chairmanship and the tireless efforts he made to start us on the way to meaningful discussions of the vital subject of a CTBT. Events may yet prove that, during his chairmanship, some important steps were taken in this regard.

My statement today will in the first instance be devoted to item 6 of the Committee's agenda, a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This agenda item no doubt deserves frank and honest assessment by all members of this Committee in view of the wide recognition of its significance as the "centrepiece" of the second special session. The fact that, at its current session, the Committee on Disarmament must complete the elaboration of the programme for adoption by the second special session reinforces the concern of my delegation about the present state of negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group and its modest achievement.

The considerable interest that my delegation has shown over the years in the comprehensive programme of disarmament is as old as the subject itself. Our position on the elements of the comprehensive programme was clearly stated in document CCD/555 of 24 February 1978, which was presented to the CCD and subsequently reviewed in statements and working papers that were later submitted to this Committee. My delegation has consistently been of the view that a comprehensive programme of disarmament is of foremost and urgent importance in the efforts towards general and complete disarmament. Basically, we believe in a global and all-embracing approach to bring about real disarmament and lasting peace and international security.

The Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament held in 1978 adopted by consensus the Programme of Action in the Final Document, which contains several important elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Paragraph 109 of that consensus document requests this Committee to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament:

"encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

The declaration of the Second Disarmament Decade, which took the novel form of a strategy for disarmament in the 1980s and paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 36/92 F further justify and validate the significance and urgency attached to the completion of the programme at the current session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Since 1982 is the year of the first major event of the Second Disarmament Decade and the year when the second special session is expected to complete the blueprint -- a comprehensive programme of disarmament -- for global disarmament negotiations, our modest achievements and indeed the bitter fact that a completely bracket-free comprehensive programme still remains elusive as we approach this big event are a matter of regret to my delegation. In fact, the present position does not truly reflect how the forefathers conceived of the programme. The words of Alva Myrdal of Sweden, one of the early protagonists of the programme, are relevant here; she stated that:

"The history of disarmament should have been a series of positive, purposeful, effective steps towards the goal which is acclaimed by everybody. We are still waiting for a first decisive, or even a serious, step to be taken".

If the second special session is unable to agree on a consensus comprehensive programme of disarmament that combines specific measures into an integrated whole, the chances of mankind's survival until the year 2000 look uncertain.

Despite the considerable work done in the Ad Hoc Working Group since January 1982 under the skillful and able guidance of the disarmament stalwart, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico, basic issues such as principles, objectives, stages of implementation and time-frames remain unresolved. This is also true for the measures, the nature of the programme, machinery, and procedures for implementation. The reason is not difficult to understand. The varying conceptual approaches and reticence on the part of some delegations to negotiate and give the necessary priority to specific measures to halt and reverse the arms race have been a major stumbling block. For those delegations, the well-thought-out package of co-ordinated measures, sequentially structured into four stages in document CD/223 submitted by the Group of 21, appear like a fairy tale in the world of an "unpredictable millinnum" in disarmament negotiations. Rather optimistically, such delegations opted for the so-called "Italian exercise", which sought to compile all measures and mechanically structure them into three "baskets" or phases of implementation without any clear-cut criteria. As was to be expected, the exercise has not provided the magic for success either, but, in spite of this frustrating situation, the interest of the Group of 21 in this important subject remains unshaken. The historical fact that the only clear chapter on "priorities" emerged under the able guidance of Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil is proof of this continued interest.

A pertinent question at this juncture is: what is the fate of this document of hope for the overwhelming majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament?

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

The increasing arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons, poses serious threats to the survival of mankind and my delegation continues to believe that disarmament negotiations could, in themselves, change the present situation through the reduction of mistrust and suspicion implicit in dialogue and negotiations. As a framework for sustained international action in the field of disarmament, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should contain "specific" measures that need be implemented within the shortest time possible to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament does not remain ever illusory in a world infested with striking advances in weapons technology. We also firmly believe that measures for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be strengthened to take account of the realities of the present world situation. For instance, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa needs to be updated to reflect South Africa's nuclear capability and the increasingly intense collaboration between some Western Powers and the racist régime in South Africa in the development of its nuclear science and technology. My delegation sees any act of restraint in nuclear collaboration with apartheid South Africa as a significant contribution to the work of this Committee in the field of general and complete disarmament.

The close link between disarmament and development has also been consistently stressed by my delegation. It should by now be clear to us all that rising global expenditures on armaments have not only aggravated the problems of the developing countries in achieving an adequate level of economic and social development, but have also affected the current structural and economic crises facing some industrialized countries. It is obvious to my delegation that drastic reductions in these unproductive expenditures would provide enormous resources for the well-being of mankind.

Let me briefly comment on the questions of time-frames and the nature of the programme. The exchanges of views we have had so far in the Working Group and Contact Groups should by now dispel any doubts about the non-rigidity of time-frames. We are convinced that it is necessary, for the conduct of negotiations, to provide for a time limit by which negotiations on specific items are expected to be concluded. Such an indication would also be a sign of the commitment of States to the achievement of substantive progress in the field of disarmament. This is also true of the nature of the programme. My delegation sees the comprehensive programme as a once and for all agenda for negotiations leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. The programme should constitute an agreed framework for negotiations in the field of disarmament and elicit, from the outset, adequate political commitments by all States to the implementation of the programme. What therefore appears feasible and realistic for my delegation, in terms of binding obligations, is a solemn declaration by each country, at the highest political level, to ensure the adoption of the programme. This offers a possible alternative to the apparent lack of consensus in having a legally binding programme, which member States may sign and ratify at will, depending on the existing legislative processes in their different political systems.

At this stage of our work and given the time constraints, I believe that some reflection or soul-searching would now be appropriate to ascertain whether all

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

possibilities for compromise with a view to a clean programme have been explored in this Committee. Far from it. The will to negotiate is not forthcoming, if not totally non-existent, on the part of certain delegations. To those delegations, the many imponderables that affect disarmament negotiations, namely, the complexity of some measures for negotiation, verification and compliance and the international situation, especially the political relationship between the Superpowers, are necessary conditions for progress. Perhaps such an assessment offers a lop-sided justification for maintaining the status quo, but, for my delegation, a self-contained document like the comprehensive programme of disarmament, if implemented within the possible twenty-year time-frame originally proposed by my delegation, would considerably change the present trend of the arms race. Such an eventuality would also lend credibility to the determination of the Member States of the United Nations to live by the obligations they assume in declaring decades for the achievement of disarmament.

Time is short, but a genuine change of heart is still possible and my delegation will continue to offer its modest contribution.

Permit me now to comment briefly on item 4 of the Committee's annual agenda: Chemical Weapons.

My delegation would like to join other delegations which have expressed their pleasure at seeing Ambassador Sujka of Poland chairing the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We are sure that, under his able chairmanship, the Group will make the necessary progress, as it did under the energetic chairmanships of Ambassadors Okawa of Japan and Lidgard of Sweden.

Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction and their terrible impact is next only to that of nuclear weapons. My delegation would therefore like to see this system of weapons banned for all time. Negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons have been going on far too long and my country, a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention, finds the present lack of progress on a CW convention unacceptable, since the close link between a BW convention and CW convention has been clearly spelt out in article 9 of the BW Convention. Those States which assumed obligations and were trusting enough to sign the BW Convention are still anxiously awaiting the military significant States to negotiate in good faith and to proceed to negotiations on the text of a CW convention.

After three years of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, the perennial question of verification has yet again been brought up to explain why progress should necessarily be slow in negotiating a CW convention. As far back as May 1978, Adrian Fisher, the United States representative to the CCD, stated that:

"The issues involved in complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons are extremely complex. The political and technical issues involved are directly linked and thus must be dealt with at the same time. The development of an adequately verifiable disarmament measure which is designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

States and which also affects one of the major industries in many countries is a task which requires great care".

At this session, Ambassador Fields of the United States has again stressed the importance of verification and has even expressed a lack of confidence in the Soviet Union. My delegation stresses the importance of effective verification measures in any disarmament negotiations. However, we would merely like to state here that "100 per cent verification" is impossible and hence there must be an element of confidence among States. Consequently, a combination of international and national means of verification would be the most ideal for a CW convention. We note with regret that some western and socialist States continue to disagree on the proportions in which such means should be mixed. However, the working papers presented at this session and the Canadian paper contained in document CD/167 continue to form a good basis for negotiations.

My delegation would like to stress that we do not favour the conversion of chemical weapon facilities for "peaceful purposes", even if economically profitable, for this would only increase verification problems. My delegation does place importance on the destruction of chemical weapons and their means of production and we are therefore willing to study measures whereby means of production can be converted for destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We believe that 10 years is a suitable time-frame for the destruction of CW agents and weapons systems after the treaty enters into force.

My delegation cannot support the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances and we are therefore disturbed to hear allegations of use in this Committee. Needless to say, the racist régime in South Africa has used chemical weapons. My delegation agrees with the view expressed by Ambassador Lidgard at our plenary meeting on 30 March 1982, namely, that the United States decision to build up its chemical weapons arsenal is more likely to lead to further escalation of the chemical weapons arms race than to the alleged purpose of promoting a chemical weapons convention.

The already irrational race in the nuclear field should have demonstrated to both parties that there can be no winners in a CW race. Confidence-building measures are urgently required and my delegation urges both parties to adopt such measures, since they can lead to the reduction of suspicions and thereby facilitate the conclusion of a CW convention.

It has been stated that disarmament is seldom fashionable. This is true. But certainly my delegation and the non-governmental organizations currently meeting in Geneva believe that it is a worthwhile cause. As we approach Easter, I merely wish to associate myself with the following view expressed by the British Council of Churches in 1972:

"We believe it our duty to pursue disarmament not just as a means to enhance security, or to effect economies, but as a clear Christian obligation, by which we mean that to use the human and material resources of God's creation to prepare for destruction is contrary to God's will for the human family".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Mihajlovic.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, let me at the outset congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship for this month and assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation. I am sure that with your skill and patience you will succeed in carrying out your difficult task. I would also like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Alessi, for the efficient job he did as our Chairman for last month. My delegation was particularly pleased to co-operate with him as the representative of a neighbourly and friendly country.

In the very brief period before the beginning of the second special session devoted to disarmament and the even briefer one left until the adjournment of the first part of the Committee's current session, the question arises as to what record the Committee on Disarmament will take with it to the second special session.

The Committee should answer this question in its special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/92 F, which has requested it to do so. However, since it is very difficult to conclude from the draft report before the Committee what the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration is, it will be up to each delegation to draw its own conclusions.

The Committee has probably never before been involved to such an extent in a series of formal and even more informal meetings and contact groups as it has been since the beginning of this year. All this activity is, as has been emphasized many a time, the result of the importance of the second special session.

The particular contribution to the second special session that the General Assembly has requested of the Committee is the comprehensive programme of disarmament, on whose elaboration the Ad Hoc Working Group has been working for two years already. We can freely say that the results achieved by the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would not have been possible without the outstanding involvement and high dedication to the cause of disarmament of its Chairman, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

The Ad Hoc Working Group has, unfortunately, not been able to reach agreement on some important parts of the comprehensive programme, particularly on its most important part, disarmament measures, which has mostly been kept between parentheses. The negotiators' differences of opinion with regard to the implementation of the programme according to stages and within established time-frames still exist. Agreement has also not been reached on the nature of the programme, which remains to be settled at the second special session. It is therefore necessary to decide on the basis for seeking solutions at the second special session.

It seems to us that the solutions should be sought bearing in mind the following elements. The comprehensive programme of disarmament must be conceived in such a manner that the taking of agreed measures would be conducive to the final objective:

(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

general and complete disarmament under strict international control. It must be that which lies at the very core of its name: a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In order to be able to be this, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should provide for appropriate stages and appropriate time-frames for implementation, which should be broadly conceived and indicative in nature. Finally, it should be both a plan for the conduct of negotiations and a plan for the implementation of agreed measures, for it is obvious that an agreement on particular measures can be reached only through a process of multilateral negotiations.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament would not be needed if its role were merely to identify and make a list of measures, without at the same time prescribing definite dynamic action to carry them out according to established procedure and priorities. There are plenty of United Nations resolutions to this effect. We consider that the measures included in the programme should be specific enough not to leave any doubt that the countries which are invited to negotiate on them in due course should also be responsible for their implementation.

We cannot accept the notion that it is unrealistic to include even indicative time-frames for the initiation or conclusion of specific negotiations on measures because of unpredictable future international developments. Instead of adopting such a pessimistic and negative approach, it would be much better to make conscientious and determined disarmament efforts, which would surely help to make future international trends more predictable.

We agree that periodic reviews are very important in order to give impetus to the implementation of the programme and to make all the necessary adjustments in respect of stages and time-frames. These should be carried out on the basis of the then existing international atmosphere rather than on the basis of international developments predicted far in advance. This is, in our opinion, a more realistic approach.

By its character and content, the comprehensive programme of disarmament must necessarily differ to a considerable extent from existing documents, such as the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament or the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. This is the only way the second special session can create a basis for genuine progress in the field of disarmament.

The Committee will, unfortunately, not come before the second special session with any other result. Nevertheless, this time we shall not speak about the work of the other Working Groups which will continue after the second special session. It is perhaps possible that some of them may achieve greater success before the end of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament than has been the case so far.

We would also like to mention that the Committee has not yet succeeded in establishing a subsidiary body on the nuclear test ban. The drafting group of eight member countries appointed by the Committee to formulate its mandate has so far been negotiating without success. The reason for this is, in our opinion, that some countries still maintain a very restrictive position with regard to the recognized priority of the nuclear test ban and to the multilateral negotiating character of the Committee on Disarmament. We hope, however, that these efforts will soon be crowned with success so that the Committee may at long last begin its consideration of this priority agenda item.

(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

In this connection, it should be recalled that some new and earlier expressed doctrines and theories have been heard during the first part of the Committee's work this year. The most recent phase of the accelerated nuclear arms race and the opening of a new one in relation to the production of new chemical weapons are being justified by the need to achieve a military balance that has been disturbed. However, the establishment of this balance is always sought at an increasingly higher level or is being disturbed at such a level. Theory and practice, which aim to present the development of new weapons and the arms race as a nucle as an imperative of national defence interests and a way of seeking military balance, in reality represent an attempt to justify the arms race. Lasting and stable peace and international security can be achieved only through the halting of the arms race and the lowering of the level of armament by way of disarmament. In this process, the aim is to achieve undiminished security for all States at the lowest possible level of armament and military forces. Theory and practice, which presuppose an arithmetical balance of all types of weapons, instead of a general and approximate parity of force, which should be the basis for practical disarmament measures, are nothing more than a way of further intensifying the arms race.

The new theory, which has come as a complete surprise since it concerns a priority issue in the Committee's work that all of its members have adopted by consensus, refers to the statement that the nuclear test ban has become a long-term objective and that it will be possible and acceptable only after a significant reduction in nuclear armaments has been achieved.

What is particularly disturbing in this connection is that a long-standing recognized priority on the list of measures geared towards disarmament, for which solemn pledges were made within the framework of the partial test-ban Treaty and the NPT, now finds itself at the bottom of the list. This measure ought to have, among other things, contributed to the halting of the nuclear arms race, the strengthening of the régime of nuclear non-proliferation and the universality of the NPT.

The second special session devoted to disarmament will also consider, within the framework of the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted at the first special session, the machinery for disarmament negotiations. We would, at this time, like to make a few preliminary observations on the possible improvement of the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

We consider, first of all, that negotiating within working groups has proven to be the most appropriate method of multilateral negotiation and that it should be maintained and perfected. To that end, if there are real prospects that an intensification of negotiations will lead to specific results, the Committee's working groups should not adjourn their work during the regular sessions of the General Assembly. This means that the Committee should be accorded more time to conduct negotiations. On the one hand, this requires delegations to organize themselves in such a way as to allow negotiations to be conducted simultaneously in several working groups. On the other hand, the Committee should be more rational in establishing its agenda. The Committee should create working groups for negotiation on all the priority disarmament issues and should, respectively, negotiate only those issues which concern either arms

(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

limitations or disarmament. All other broader disarmament questions, such as confidence-building measures, the elaboration of different programmes of disarmament and so on, should, in our view, be relegated to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the working groups it would establish for that purpose.

We also think that there is room for the further democratization of the Committee's work; this would create even more favourable conditions for active participation by non-member States in the work of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

Greater involvement by the Committee in negotiations would make it necessary to alter existing practice, which has it that the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission cannot meet concurrently.

In our opinion, the number of plenary meetings of the Committee should be kept to a reasonable minimum so that all the remaining time can be used for negotiations within working groups.

With a view to ensuring the greatest possible efficiency and saving time during consideration of organizational and procedural matters, the Committee should, instead of half-year and one-year programmes of work, have longer programmes of, let us say, two years, accompanied, of course, by all the necessary flexibility, should a different need arise.

As the single multilateral negotiating body, the Committee would take on even greater importance if the separate negotiations of particular members of the Committee on certain disarmament issues were transferred to it and conducted within a special sub-group that would be set up by the Committee's working group dealing with such issues.

Last but not least, we think that consideration should be given to the most effective way of preventing the Committee's work from being blocked on procedural or organizational matters. In our opinion, it might be necessary to consider the possibility of amending the existing Rules of Procedure for that purpose.

The Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body which includes the 35 non-nuclear-weapon States and the five nuclear-weapon States, is the best forum for the conduct of disarmament negotiations. Let us hope that the Committee will not again fail this year to respond to the overwhelming desire of the Member States of the United Nations for the achievement of some results.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Mihajlovic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, His Excellency Ambassador El Reedy.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, at the outset allow me to express our pleasure at seeing you preside over the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament during this decisive and crucial month in its work. The sun of the renaissance in Asia rose in your country, which, throughout its modern history, has passed through both glorious and severe experiences. From all this emerged the modern Japanese personality, which plays a vital role in the international community's search for peace and fulfilment. In following your activities in this Committee, we have become convinced that, thanks to your diplomatic ability, professional talent and extreme modesty, no one can represent the Japanese personality better than you.

I would also like to express our deep appreciation to Ambassador Alessi of Italy, who guided the work of our Committee last month with wisdom and the greatest skill.

May we extend a warm welcome to Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, who with their past experience will undoubtedly enrich our work. We join previous speakers in expressing to our friend and colleague, Ambassador Malitza of Romania, our best wishes for full success in his new and important assignment.

In the past few days in our Committee, as we have been preparing our report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is only rational that we should have focused our attention on the results of our work. This report is of particular significance in the light of the growing threats to peace and security in various regions of the world. Furthermore, world public opinion has become increasingly aware of the dangerous situation inherent in the continued stockpiling of arms of mass destruction and the elaboration of new programmes for the further accumulation of such arms. As a result, people have become more and more aware and fearful of the consequences. All this takes place at a time when it is becoming increasingly difficult for the third world countries to sustain respectable living standards, one of the basic reasons for this being the arms race and lack of progress in the field of disarmament and arms limitations.

It is only normal that, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly should undertake to assess everything that has been accomplished in the field of disarmament since the first special session and the adoption of the Final Document.

We consider that we have to play an important role in assisting the General Assembly in carrying out this evaluation. We realize that the members of our Committee may hold different views on the matter, but such divergences should not prevent us from performing this task. It could even be useful and healthy for the special report we shall submit to reflect the dialogue in which different views were expressed on the assessment of our Committee's work and the reasons which have so far impeded any achievement.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

For our part, we consider that the responsibility for failure to achieve any real progress in the field of disarmament during this period and the years preceding it falls entirely upon the shoulders of the nuclear States. The countries of the third world have spared no efforts and still strive to promote disarmament, but they remain unable to bring about any change in the political will and action of the major Powers. They continue to be the victims of the continued arms race and of the prevailing policies and doctrines which entail the possible use of arms of mass destruction as a viable option.

In the course of more than three years, the Committee on Disarmament has remained unable to carry out any negotiations on the most serious matter entrusted to it, namely, nuclear disarmament issues. All this, despite the pressing reality and increasing pressure by the world community and the dozens of resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in this respect.

Because we feared that our Committee would start and end its spring session without any tangible results, we suggested at the beginning of this session that it should use the time available to it to make some modest achievements which we could report to the General Assembly.

Now we have reached the final days in the work of our Committee without having done so. Nevertheless, we still believe that it behoves us to use the remaining few days in an attempt to make some progress even if it should be continued in New York prior to the second special session.

In this connection, I would like to emphasize the following points.

Our success in elaborating a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament is of special and additional importance since it will provide world public opinion with proof that there is a serious commitment to work, on the basis of a unified approach, for the creation of a world free from the permanent threat of a war in which arms of mass destruction could be used and in which we could achieve general and complete disarmament.

We therefore take note with appreciation of the efforts made by the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles to arrive at a draft text. We pay a tribute to this Group for the success achieved in agreeing on a unified text of the chapter on priorities. We note with satisfaction its attempts to reconcile views and positions on the chapters dealing with objectives and principles. In this regard, a special word of tribute is also conveyed to Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil, Ambassador de La Gorce of France and Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic.

We express the hope that, through further constructive dialogue, the efforts of the Group concerning the crux of the programme -- namely the chapter on measures -- will be crowned with success.

It remains for us to invite delegations to show the same flexibility as the Group of 21 with regard to the nature of the programme and the time-frames for its implementation. We should all agree that the real value of this programme lies in the commitment to implement it within reasonable and flexible time-frames.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

We believe that we are entitled to feel cautiously optimistic about the limited success achieved in the Committee's consideration of the topic of a nuclear test ban, for, at present, serious negotiations are being held to define the mandate of a working group to deal with this item. We are indeed grateful to Mr. Alessi, the outgoing Chairman, for his initiative in starting these negotiations.

We share the opinion that the question of verification of compliance is crucial to the conclusion of a convention on a comprehensive and final nuclear test ban. We nevertheless hold the view that, even if this aspect enjoys a degree of priority in our negotiations, it is not an end in itself, but, rather, an integral part of other elements aimed at reaching the ultimate goal, the conclusion of a convention on a comprehensive test ban. Consequently, the definition of the mandate of the working group must be in keeping with the general objective contained in the Final Document of the first special session and in conformity with the numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the matter. This is an objective on which the hopes of world public opinion are pinned. Agreeing on it would be an achievement by our Committee and will testify to the seriousness of our endeavours, so that we can, at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament through the working group on whose mandate we hope to agree during this part of our session, pursue our efforts towards this goal.

We also believe that the question of effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is one of the urgent topics in respect of which a number of steps should be taken at the forthcoming special session. If it is not feasible here to achieve progress on this issue, it might be possible to pave the way for the second special session to formulate a categorical guarantee by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We can think of more than one formula to confer a binding character on such commitments and to widen their scope and increase their effectiveness in order to give a stronger sense of security to the non-nuclear-weapon States, the majority of which are non-aligned or neutral States that have officially renounced the nuclear weapon option and submitted their nuclear facilities to international safeguards.

I also believe that it is still possible to agree on the principle of setting up an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space so that the working group can begin its activities during the next part of our session.

These are some of the matters we deemed it useful to raise in a last attempt at achieving some progress in our work here.

However, the essential truth remains that, as far as the continuation of the arms race and the failure to curb it and to achieve disarmament are concerned, the present situation is one which the world can no longer tolerate. The nuclear Powers and particularly the two Superpowers are the ones basically responsible for this. During the next special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly should examine the serious consequences of the continuation of such a situation.

We can see that all the peoples of the world, whether in the North or in the South, in the East or in the West, are determined to refuse to live under the spectre of nuclear war. They are resolved to control the arms race and reverse its course. The second special session is duty bound to deal with this fact.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador El Reedy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, His Excellency Ambassador Summerhayes.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the Chair this month and to express my delegation's thanks to Mr. Mario Alessi, your predecessor during the month of March. My intervention this morning will be brief. It is on a matter which is a cause of grave concern not only to my country, but to the international community as a whole, and which has a direct bearing on the climate in which we conduct our work.

I wish to draw attention to the serious situation which has arisen as a result of the invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. This flagrant and illegal use of force and the failure of Argentina to withdraw in defiance of a mandatory Security Council resolution runs counter to all the principles which guide our work in this Committee and constitutes a grave setback to the cause of arms control and disarmament. We call on the Argentine Government to withdraw its forces immediately in accordance with the mandatory resolution of the Security Council, resolution 502.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Summerhayes for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Minister Tian Jin of China.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words on the content of the special report. The Chinese delegation is grateful to the Secretariat for the efforts it has made to draft the outline of a special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The international community is concerned with the work of the Committee on Disarmament, which functions as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. The special report of the Committee on Disarmament will become one of the major documents of the second special session, as well as one of the important reference documents for the preparation of other documents at the second special session. We therefore believe that the special report should reflect not only the situation at the current session and the activities carried out by the Committee on Disarmament since its establishment, but also concisely describe where progress has and has not been made and why, so as to acquaint all Member States of the United Nations with the work done by the Committee on Disarmament.

Proceeding from these considerations, we think that the report should mainly reflect in a brief way the views and differing opinions of the various sides on major items, as well as on the situation of disarmament. Organizational and other routine matters should be described as briefly as possible and lists of documents might be annexed to the report, thus making it clear-cut, short and convenient for all Member States of the United Nations to read and study.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium): Mr. Chairman, I will, with your permission, leave it to Ambassador Onkelinx to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee and to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Alessi.

As the representative of the country currently holding the presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, I would like to inform the Committee on Disarmament of the position adopted on 2 April 1982 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Ten with regard to the Falkland Islands case, to which the Ambassador of the United Kingdom has just referred.

The text of the statement by the Ten reads as follows:

"The Foreign Ministers of the Ten condemn the armed intervention in the Falkland Islands by the Government of Argentina, in defiance of the statement issued on 4 April by the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, which remains seized of the question.

They urgently appeal to the Government of Argentina to withdraw its forces immediately and to adhere to the appeal of the United Nations Security Council to refrain from the use of force and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Noirfalisse for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

At the opening of this meeting, I read out the names of those speakers who had put their names on the list for today. Since then, a number of other delegations have approached the Secretariat, or the Chair, to have their names included. For today, I have taken these names down. I feel, however, that it might be appropriate in the future that delegations which wish to speak, in addition to those whose names the Chair has announced at the outset, should perhaps raise their hands when I enquire if there are any other speakers. I think that has mainly been the practice of this Committee in the past and feel that this might help to prevent possible confusion and misunderstanding. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency Ambassador van Dongen.

Mr. van DONGEN (Netherlands): With your permission Mr. Chairman, I should like to refer to the issue raised by my distinguished colleague from the United Kingdom. The Netherlands position on this issue is clear and unambiguous. The Netherlands Foreign Minister was one of the signatories of the joint declaration just read out by the distinguished representative of Belgium, the country holding the presidency of the European Communities. That declaration leaves no room for doubt about our full agreement with Security Council resolution 502. There has undoubtedly been a breach of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter, which we are committed to live by. The Netherlands has consistently and invariably held that the use of force in international relations, wherever and whenever it may occur, must be condemned. It will therefore come as no surprise that, as the representative of the country that has the honour to have been chosen as the seat of the International Court of Justice, I can but repeat what we very deeply believe in, namely, that the rule of law must be upheld. We therefore have no hesitation in supporting the position formulated in Ambassador Summerhayes' statement.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador van Dongen for his statement. The representative of Argentina has asked for the floor to speak in exercise of his right of reply. In the meanwhile, I have received applications for the floor. I have received requests for inclusion in the list of speakers from the delegations of France, Italy, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil and the United States of America. So I respectfully wish to ask Ambassador Carasales when he would like to take the floor in exercise of his right of reply? I give the floor to Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the conduct of the Argentine delegation over the years since this Committee's establishment shows that it has never brought up matters that are not within the Committee's specific jurisdiction and, on this occasion, it was certainly not the Argentine delegation which provoked this debate. As on other occasions, other delegations have considered it appropriate to refer in this Committee to matters which are foreign to it. Although the Argentine delegation finds this regrettable, it is certainly not about to shrink from consideration of this subject if members wish to discuss it in this forum.

How history changes! The representative of a country which imposed itself by force on four continents, subjugating peoples and territories to satisfy its insatiable appetite for new colonies, is now complaining today because a country which was unjustifiably attacked five times in its history by that great Power has dared to recover one of those colonies and restore it to the territorial heritage to which it belongs and from which it was seized by force in 1833.

The situation in the South Atlantic was not provoked by the Argentine Republic. Civilians who were working peacefully in South Georgia, with valid documentation and with the knowledge of the United Kingdom, and carrying out a commercial operation planned more than one year ago were given an ultimatum to withdraw immediately. A warship was sent to the area with Royal Marines on board to expel them by force; nuclear submarines were dispatched to the area; in the British Parliament, the Government stated that no means, no means, would be spared to ensure that its position prevailed. Should Argentina submit meekly to this new show of force? That policy of force has been a constant tradition with regard to my country.

We were attacked in 1806, 1807, 1833, 1840 and 1848. The Malvinas were occupied by force and the Argentine administration and population were expelled in 1833; an act of aggression was committed in 1833 and has continued ever since, day in, day out, because the occupation of a foreign territory by force is an act of aggression, because that territory is Argentine territory and has always been Argentine territory and no country can invade its own territory. The recovery operation which took place in the Malvinas was one of a very special nature. No act of force is carried out without bloodshed -- the shedding of foreign blood, I should say. Not one drop of British blood was spilt, although there were Argentine dead and wounded, but the fact that no British blood was spilt was not a coincidence, the result of circumstances or because they were British, they were invulnerable. It was because there was a special order that every effort should be made not to harm anyone at all, even the occupying armed forces. You can imagine how much self-restraint the Argentine soldiers had to show when they saw their comrades fall and yet they still endeavoured successfully, not to spill a single drop of British blood in the recovery of our territory. The people of the Argentine Republic have nothing against the Government and the people of Britain. On the contrary, they would like to have the best relations with them, but this will never be possible while any part of Argentine territory is occupied by people who took it from us by force. I repeat once again that it is Argentine territory, and it is not only the Argentine Republic which says that it is.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The non-aligned movement, which has been in the forefront of all decolonization efforts, has also considered this question. I could recall many of the movement's declarations, but it is enough to quote only two or three. The Declaration of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries in Lima stated that the non-aligned countries, "without prejudice to ratifying the validity of the principle of self-determination as a general principle for other territories, strongly support in the special and particular case of the Malvinas Islands, the just claim of the Argentine Republic and urge the United Kingdom actively to continue the negotiations recommended by the United Nations in order to restore the said territory to Argentine sovereignty and thus put an end to that illegal situation"; I repeat "to that illegal situation, which still persists in the southern part of the American continent". The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Sri Lanka in 1976, expressly stated that: "In the special and particular case of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), the Conference firmly supported the just claim of the Argentine Republic and urged the United Kingdom actively to pursue the negotiations recommended by the United Nations for the purpose of restoring that territory to Argentine sovereignty, thus ending that illegal situation that still prevails in the extreme southern part of the American continent" and the movement's resolutions continue in the same vein, the most recent being the one adopted when the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries attended the latest General Assembly of the United Nations and it was stated that the meeting firmly reiterated its support for the right of the Argentine Republic to obtain the restoration of the Falkland Islands and exercise its territorial sovereignty over them.

The Argentine Republic has negotiated the problem unsuccessfully for over 15 years and it has spent more than 130 years trying in vain to settle the dispute, with no reply from the United Kingdom. The Argentine Republic is still ready to negotiate, however, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic recently stated: "The Argentine Republic is not threatening anyone, the Argentine Republic is not engaged in hostilities against anyone, we are not interested in an armed confrontation with anyone and we are ready to negotiate diplomatically all the problems we have with the United Kingdom, except sovereignty, because that is not negotiable".

That is and continues to be my country's position and, in this context, we see the threat of very serious conflicts. Today Her Majesty's fleet is sailing south, as it did 150 years ago, ready once again to attack the Argentine Republic 10,000 kilometres from its bases, in yet another attempt to impose the colonial yoke on a part of Argentine territory, to seek to retain by force one of the last remnants of its Empire, and this is not the first time it has tried to do so in recent decades. In short, it is going to try to repeat its "exploit" of 1833. I can assure you that, this time, it is not going to find it so easy.

Mr. de BEAUSSE (France) (translated from French): Mr. de La Gorce will undoubtedly want to congratulate you himself on your assumption of the chairmanship and to thank the distinguished representative of Italy for the way in which he performed the duties of Chairman during the month of March.

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

France condemned Argentina's military aggression against the Falkland Islands archipelago from the outset. It did so in the Security Council and when it participated in the drafting of the statement which the distinguished representative of Belgium has just read out to the Committee. France considers that this armed attack constitutes a clear violation of the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, which forbids the threat or use of force in international relations. Such a violation cannot but undermine the climate of confidence between States which must be maintained if the work of our Committee is to run smoothly. That is why my delegation endorses the appeal made by the United Kingdom delegation to the Argentine Government requesting it fully to implement the resolution adopted on this matter by the Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. de Beausse for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I give the floor to Ambassador Alessi of Italy.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): I would first like to repeat my delegation's congratulations and sincerest wishes, which I had the pleasure of extending to you when I handed the chairmanship over to you. Having listened to the statements made by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom and subsequent speakers, I would like to recall that my Government, which deplored the intervention by Argentina's armed forces in the Falkland Islands and renewed the appeal to negotiate made by the Security Council of the United Nations, fully shares the position of the ten member countries of the European Economic Community just stated by the distinguished representative of Belgium. My Government's attitude reflects an assessment of the situation which, while taking into account the traditional ties of friendship that link the Italian and Argentine peoples, cannot ignore the principles of international legality or concerns about the consequences which a serious deterioration in relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina might have for peace and stability in the world and, therefore, for the cause of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the head of my delegation will shortly inform you of the satisfaction which its members feel at seeing you in charge of the work of our Committee.

Permit me now to make a short statement concerning a matter that was brought up unexpectedly and at the last minute in this meeting.

My delegation has always maintained, as a matter of principle, that our Committee should in no case be used to raise matters of particular political interest that have nothing to do with its functions, but, rather, tend to reduce its effectiveness as the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Benavides de la Sotta, Peru)

It is also on principle that my delegation has opposed attempts artificially to involve the Committee in matters which are extraneous to its purpose and which, while they may be legitimate in other precincts, can, in this Committee, only provoke -- as we have just seen -- unnecessary polemics that cannot but cause consternation among delegations which, like my own, maintain normal and friendly relations with the parties directly concerned in the affair in question, an affair whose prompt solution, by peaceful means, is deserving of the most intensive and disinterested efforts of the entire international community. We are opposed to the settlement of international disputes through the use or the threat of force.

My Government issued an official statement on this matter a few days ago, but we do not believe that it is either necessary or fitting to repeat it in the Committee. For that reason, we regret that other delegations should have considered it appropriate to take such action with regard to their own statements.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank Mr. Benavides for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. AGUILAR PARDO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Firstly, Sir, permit me to congratulate you on behalf of our delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament.

Our delegation has always been opposed to the discussion in this or any other forum of matters that are not within its competence. However, the statements made in this forum compel our delegation to read out the text of the statement issued by the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 2 April of this year, and I quote:

"The Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs is following with the greatest interest the development of the situation in the Malvinas and is in permanent contact with the Venezuelan diplomatic missions which are able to provide the most accurate information.

The Venezuelan position as regards the attainment of peace and the struggle against the vestiges of colonialism is known to all. It is to be noted that serious efforts must be made to ensure the peaceful resolution of situations of historical injustice inherited from previous generations, since intransigence or indifference may lead to a dangerous exacerbation of feelings and situations that no one wants.

It is not appropriate at this time to adopt definite positions or to pronounce value judgments until more extensive and precise information on all the circumstances is available. In keeping with its tradition, Venezuela naturally regrets any occurrence that may lead to bloodshed and hopes that the problem will ultimately be peacefully and fairly solved. At the same time, it earnestly hopes that calm and a spirit of understanding will prevail so that there will be no aggravation of the situation".

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. de SCUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, some of the statements we have heard this morning prompt my delegation to make the following statement:

The historical background of the Brazilian position with regard to the question of the Malvinas Islands dates back to 1833, when the Government of Brazil gave an affirmative answer to the appeal made by the Argentine Government about British action in the archipelago. In his reply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that it would give instructions to the Brazilian representative in London to render assistance to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina in his representations to the British Government and to exert his good offices to the extent possible.

Last Tuesday, 6 April, in Brasilia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil summoned the Ambassadors of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom and handed each of them an identical diplomatic note, in which Brazil, inspired by the steadfast friendship that unites it to both nations, formulates a forceful appeal to both Governments to make every effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute and expresses the confidence of the Brazilian Government that the two countries will find a solution to the question dividing them, in accordance with the best interests of their peoples and of peace.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, having listened to the statements of other speakers on this particular subject, I would like to make a brief statement. The United States Government is firmly on record as deploring the use of force to resolve international disputes. That is a firm and continuing view held by my Government and it is certainly applicable in this situation. The United States voted for and strongly supports the Security Council resolution which was adopted last Saturday and demands an immediate cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and calls upon the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to resolve their differences through the achievement of a diplomatic solution. As is well known, the United States has offered its good offices to both parties in an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute. As some delegations may be aware, Secretary of State Haig, at the invitation of both Governments, is visiting London and Buenos Aires. The United States has stated in various bodies, including this Committee, its firm view that progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations cannot be made in an atmosphere of international tension. We have also stated on repeated occasions our view that Article 24 of the United Nations Charter requires all States to build the international confidence necessary for achievement of the goals we all seek. The unfortunate situation which exists today regarding the Falkland Islands underscores this fact. We are hopeful that a peaceful solution will be found and I can pledge the full support of my Government to that end.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will reserve my comments on your assumption of the Chairmanship for another occasion.

The views expressed by the delegation of Argentina make it doubly important for my delegation to speak in support of the statement made earlier by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. As one of the co-authors, my country also fully

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

identifies with the declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the ten countries of the European Community, as just read out by the distinguished representative of Belgium. In the decision it took on 7 April, the Cabinet of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, presided over by Chancellor Schmidt, again condemned the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and has characterized it as a flagrant violation of Argentina's obligation under international law to settle international disputes peacefully and to renounce the use of force in relations between States. The Cabinet confirmed the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany, jointly with its European partners, will continue to give strong support to the United Kingdom, a friend and ally, in its endeavours to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In addition, the Cabinet decided to suspend all arms deliveries to a country which continues to commit an act of aggression and a violation of international law and refuses to align itself with the mandatory resolution of the United Nations Security Council. My delegation fervently hopes that efforts at negotiations will lead to a peaceful settlement and will undo the attack and abuse of international law, which we deplore.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would first of all like to welcome you to the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of April. I also extend our appreciation and gratitude to Ambassador Alessi of Italy for the excellent leadership and guidance he gave the Committee last month.

The discussion we are having on the question of the Falkland Islands is an unforeseen development and I have no instructions on it at this time. But as the representative of a country whose President is the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, I wish to restate the well-known and consistent policy of my Government and, indeed, of all the countries of Africa, on the question of international peace and security and the settlement of international disputes, namely, that the use of force should be avoided in the settlement of disputes among all States. In this regard, we would strongly urge the two parties to this dispute to resolve their differences by peaceful means. We hope that peaceful means will be resorted to and that a mutually acceptable settlement will soon be reached by the two Governments.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Don Nanjira for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

Mr. SCLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, you explained that, following the closure of the list of speakers, a number of delegations put down their names to speak, but that was a natural consequence of the fact that a matter was raised in our Committee which does not fall within its mandate and which surprised many of the delegations here.

Our delegation has always spoken out against the idea that the Committee should devote itself to questions outside its terms of reference since that is a way of diverting attention from our work and of attempting to link a supposed international situation with disarmament efforts.

With regard to the situation in the Malvinas, the movement of non-aligned countries has consistently supported Argentina's right to exercise sovereignty over that part of its territory. We are struck by the fact that this question has been raised at a time when it is not just in the Southern Atlantic, as a result of action by Argentina or by the United Kingdom, that the international situation is tense, but that no account has been taken -- and we could bring this point up ourselves at the next session -- of the South African régime's continuing acts of aggression against the population of Angola, the situation created by Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights, the situation in which the Palestinians now find themselves in Gaza and the West Bank, the situation in

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

the Caribbean, concerning which the veto was recently used in the Security Council to block a call for peace and negotiations-- and yet matters are raised that are alien to our Committee. Our delegation is opposed to these positions and we reserve the right, should such situations continue, to bring before the Committee matters which are foreign to our Committee and also represent threats to international peace and security.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, permit me to reserve the expression of our satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair for when we deal with one of the items on the Committee's agenda.

My delegation's position concerning the Committee's functions is well-known. We stated it in 1980 and in 1981 and it is not to deal now with a situation that we deeply regret and that is, in geographical terms, taking place in the western hemisphere that we are going to change it.

For those who may be interested, the position of the Government of Mexico concerning the question of the Malvinas was stated in considerable detail by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs the day before yesterday in a Press release; it is thus public and well-known. Permit me to say only that, in keeping with our position of principle, emphasis was placed in that statement on the Mexican Government's belief that all States must make every possible effort to settle their disputes by the peaceful means made available to them by the Charter of the United Nations and that they must do so with the aim of reaching a solution within a reasonable period of time.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I intervene in view of the present discussion concerning the Falkland Islands and, in particular, in the light of the statement made by the distinguished representative of Argentina. I have listened to and considered most carefully what the distinguished representative had to say and feel that I should make some comment on that although I do not intend to say much, as very little needs to be said. There is nothing in that statement that justifies, or could possibly justify, the act of naked and unprovoked aggression in which the State which he represents has for some days now been engaged. To the extent that there was an attempt at justification, it seemed to be that we should all be acting not on the principles of the 1980s-- the principles on which we base our work in this Committee-- but on those of an earlier and darker age, namely, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Australia condemns in the strongest possible terms the invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands. It is an act which cares nothing for the principle of self-determination and the wishes of a small and isolated population without the means to defend itself. It is an act of contempt for Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the United Nations Charter, which condemn coercion and the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. It is an act that defies the basis of mandatory resolutions of the Security Council. It is an act that consigns to cynicism the principles, indeed the very reason of being, of this Committee.

There has been, from several speakers, the argument that matters extraneous to the work of this Committee and to its mandate should not be raised. How should we define matters which are directly related to the work of the Committee? Last year, mention was made in this Committee-- and most of us strongly condemned the attack-- of the nuclear facilities of one State by another. Neither State was a member of the Committee. The situation now before us-- as on that occasion-- threatens not only international peace and stability, but the climate in which we are to negotiate arms control and disarmament. Since the parties to the dispute over the Falkland Islands are both members of the Committee on Disarmament, the relevance, I should have thought,

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

was painfully obvious. The situation which one State has created by its own single-handed efforts is a most dangerous one. In that light, I call upon the Argentine Government to reflect most carefully on the consequences of its actions and, while there is still time, to withdraw at once its armed forces from the territory that it so wantonly occupied.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): I would like to reaffirm the support of India for the consistent position of the non-aligned movement that the Malvinas, otherwise known as the Falkland Islands, should be restored to Argentine sovereignty. My delegation expresses the sincere hope that, even at this stage, further conflict and clash of arms can be avoided. We trust that better counsel will prevail and that a peaceful diplomatic solution can be found for this issue.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief because it is not my wish to prolong discussions extraneous to this Committee. I should simply like to say two things: on the one hand, there have been repeated invocations of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations-- which my delegation values and esteems-- but I cannot fail to point out that it is strange that those principles should be invoked to prolong indefinitely a colonial situation that has been an affront to the deepest feelings of the Argentine people for more than 150 years. And this will be the consequence of the invocation of such principles, an invocation whose only purpose is to safeguard or defend the United Kingdom in its present situation in one of its last colonial redoubts. The argument of self-determination has also been invoked. I have already read out what the movement of non-aligned countries, which is unquestionably the most ardent defender of this principle in the international community, thinks of the invocation of this principle. To give this right to colonists who were brought in by the occupying Power and who replaced the original population is a solution that would have extraordinary repercussions in the present circumstances.

As I recalled a moment ago, the Argentine Republic has, through the person of its Foreign Minister, manifested its complete willingness to negotiate and it is, and always has been, the objective of my country to find for this question a peaceful solution having as its only consequence the restitution of my country's sovereignty over this part of its territory. And that is what my country has been doing for 150 years. We cannot be accused of having lacked patience. The countries of the NATO alliance that now advocate the course of negotiation are the ones which, when, in 1965, the United Nations adopted its first resolution urging the parties to negotiate their dispute, put up the most stubborn opposition to the conduct of any form of negotiation. Perhaps if they had at that time subscribed to the desire of the great majority of the Members of the United Nations and urged the parties to negotiate this dispute, taking into account the interests and not the wishes of the Islands' inhabitants, the United Kingdom would have displayed a different attitude during the negotiations that we have been conducting for the past 15 years without making the slightest progress on the substantive issue. That is all, Sir.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I regret taking the floor at this late hour, but I feel obliged to add the name of Canada to those countries which have condemned, in the strongest possible terms, this unconscionable act of aggression by Argentina in the southern Atlantic. We are unaware of any resolution by the non-aligned movement in any part of the world which has ever supported this kind of act of aggression. That being said, we regard this act as a violation of the United Nations Charter, as well as in defiance of the appropriate Security Council resolution. We have, in company with a number of other countries, withdrawn our Ambassador. I would also like to say that we are still hopeful that there is a possibility for a peaceful settlement to this-- and the word that I have written down here is "dispute" -- but it should probably be a different word.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, I, too, apologize for taking the floor at this late hour, but I think that it is my duty to convey my delegation's feeling of regret at the turn of events in the Committee this morning. Frankly, my delegation has been taken by surprise by the matter which is under discussion and is now developing in the Committee. Indonesia's position on decolonization is well-known and I do not think it is appropriate to repeat and to restate it here in this forum. However, permit me to convey the appeal of Indonesia to both parties to the dispute, with which Indonesia has enjoyed, and continues to enjoy, excellent relations, that those parties to the dispute, should do their best to refrain from any action which might further deteriorate relations between them. It is with this appeal that we, the Indonesian delegation here, wish to express the hope that those countries will do their best to achieve a peaceful solution to the problem.

Mr. MAHALLATI (Iran): I would like to apologize to the Committee for taking its time at this late hour and to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your assumption of the chairmanship. You have already shown your competence and ability in presiding over us in this forum. I would also like to express my congratulations and gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Alessi, for his fruitful chairmanship during the month of March.

If this Committee is a proper forum to discuss the question of one country's use of force against another, then, I believe the matter of the brutal invasion of my country by the Iraqi régime which has resulted in the occupation of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has caused tremendous economic and human loss on both sides, has priority for consideration in this Committee. Regarding the question of the Falkland Islands, I would like to state that my delegation has always condemned any act of colonization.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Mahallati for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Are there any other delegations who would wish to take the floor at this stage? Since that does not seem to be the case, I thank you for your contributions. I have counted 29 speakers this morning and that is quite a record number of speakers for this Committee.

I wish to recall, for the benefit of those representatives who were not here at the beginning of this meeting, that I stated there would be no plenary meeting on Tuesday, 13 April. There will instead be an informal meeting of the Committee at 10 a.m. to consider item 7 of the agenda and Working Paper No. 62 on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. That meeting will be followed by a meeting of a drafting group—an open-ended drafting group that will consider the draft of the special report to the second special session.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 15 April at 10 a.m. I have one announcement to make, at the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances. The Working Group on Negative Security Assurances will hold an informal meeting at 3 p.m. this afternoon in Conference Room V.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I merely wish to state that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group will be a formal meeting, not an informal one.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to correct myself: the meeting to be held at 3 p.m. in Conference Room V this afternoon will be a formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances which will have interpretation and full services.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST PLEINARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 April 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio OKAWA

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. H. MATI
Mr. H. BELKAD
Mr. A. TARTAR

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CAMASALES
Miss H. MASCHIBENE

Australia: Mr. D.H. SADLER
Mr. R. STEBLE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. B. GRINBERG
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRANOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG CYI
U THIAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIH
Mr. YU MEIGJIA
Mr. YAN MING LIANG
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ ROSQUERA
Mr. J. LUIS GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAIMY
Misc W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. P. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Mr. H. VILLETTE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN
Mr. V. RÖHR
Mr. E. BAIR
Mr. P. MÄNNING
Mr. A. MERTES
Mr. H. SCHÄFER
Mr. W. WEISKIRCH
Mr. R.D. von SCHUBERT

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. H. SUTRESMA
Mr. B. MAURA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK
Mr. A. BAHRIH

Iran:

Mr. H.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. J. ZAHEDIA

Italy:

Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAMA
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANIKI
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON HENJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYHERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILIG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. van DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. H. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAH

Peru:

Mr. J. BEHAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOPIEV
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.H. SUMNERHAYES
Mr. L. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. H.D. BUSBY
Ms. K. CRITTEMBERGER
Mrs. M.E. HOINKES
Miss S. BURK
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. O. ACUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA

Ms. E. EKANCA KABEYA

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 171st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the Sub-Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Sub-Committee is chaired by former Federal Minister Egon Bahr and is composed of members of all parliamentary groups. They have come to follow the work of the Committee, particularly in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I thank them for their interest in our activities and I wish them a successful visit to Geneva.

The Committee should consider today the reports of subsidiary bodies and its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. However, the reports of subsidiary bodies are not yet available for consideration by the plenary of the Committee and members may therefore wish to make use of rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure by which members wishing to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so at any time.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan, Poland and Ethiopia. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, you have had the courtesy to welcome the important parliamentary delegation which is here today from my country and I should like, on their behalf, to thank you most cordially for the warm welcome you have extended to them.

During your chairmanship this month, I have had occasion to make a number of interventions and at that time I reserve my comments on your assumption of the chairmanship. Now that I am making a declaration of substance, I should like to express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you in the Chair. For me, a junior member of this Committee, it is a particular matter of gratification to see you here. I admire the artfulness, the subtlety and the vast amount of experience with which you preside over our deliberations. It is experience from which we can only learn.

I would have liked also to say a word to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alessi, but I know that he is absent for a very sad personal reason.

Now that the spring session of our Committee draws to a close, I should like to follow the example of other delegations and offer a brief assessment of some of the major aspects of our work.

Obviously, my approach will be a selective one.

When this Committee convened in early February, two and one-half months ago, many delegations realized that the political environment in which our negotiations would have to be pursued was not propitious. At that time, my delegation joined others in expressing grave concern about the international

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security situation and the continued violation of the United Nations Charter in many parts of the world. I also voiced concern about the deteriorating balance of forces in Europe. Like others, my delegation pointed out that the chances for substantial progress towards arms control and disarmament were impaired by such developments and called upon those causing these grave disturbances to return to a policy of restraint and moderation in the pursuit of external interests.

We all know that it is difficult for disarmament to flourish in such a political environment. And yet, this unsatisfactory situation makes it even more imperative that we explore every chance, every niche of potential progress. It is a matter of limited gratification to my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament has had a relatively good season even under these disconcerting circumstances.

In fact, we must note that negotiations in several fields have progressed markedly in these last few weeks. In several areas, stagnation has been overcome. Our consideration of the chemical weapons issue has reached the stage of a full-fledged negotiation and the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee on vital issues allowing progress towards a comprehensive test ban, a cherished objective of many delegations in this room, is imminent. In large measure, this progress is due to the determination and sense of realism of one major delegation and I for one would like to pay a tribute to it. You will forgive me if I also list the field of radiological weapons as one where some progress has been possible.

Finally, the Committee has, for the first time in many years, undertaken to deal in earnest with the problems of a possible arms race in space and some new important vistas have opened up in this field.

All these steps have taken place in a sober, constructive atmosphere which has led us, finally, to approach some of the real problems involved in the issues at hand. While verification can never be a substitute for disarmament, just as little as confidence-building measures alone can play this role, my delegation continues to believe that verification and compliance are the centre-pieces on which the ultimate success of disarmament negotiations depend. We therefore consider it logical and indeed a token of the progress achieved that on many subjects simultaneously, we have now come to look into verification problems in concrete terms and that this session of the Committee, like few others before, has been marked by a wealth of new working papers on this important and complex subject.

After these more general remarks, let me turn to some of our concrete problem areas. I intend to touch, in that order, upon chemical weapons, problems of outer space, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and radiological weapons.

Let me first turn to the problem of chemical weapons. My delegation has attempted to provide a specific input relating to the technical aspects of verification procedures and supplementing the detailed efforts undertaken in the same direction by other delegations, particularly the delegation of the United Kingdom. We are gratified by the interest which the Working Paper

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contained in document CD/265 has aroused among all regional groups. The method of casting lots as a means of random selection of chemical installations for regular on-site inspections has met with particular interest and has been recognized by many delegations as a possible way of providing a comprehensive verification régime and still maintaining a low personnel input and cost effectiveness. The mere prospect that any chemical installation, even one inspected only a short while ago, could be designated by lot for inspection would act as a powerful disincentive to any breach of the future convention.

Many delegations have asked how the system of casting lots would work in practice and I am pleased to use this intervention to reply to a certain number of these questions, thereby clarifying our approach. While our long-standing experience with the inspection system of the Western European Union has prompted us to make our general experience available to others, the system of random selection by casting lots has not been part of this particular verification régime. It has rather been developed independently with the assistance of computer-based studies.

The subjects of the regular random-selection inspections would be all the stocks and production units declared as such by States parties. Declarations would cover existing stocks and production facilities of supertoxic chemical weapon agents, the general industrial production of phosphor-organic compounds, as well as the limited quantities of supertoxic warfare agents permitted by the future convention. All declared substances and facilities would, without exception, be subject to the lot-casting procedure.

The number of lots to be drawn would depend on the general percentage to be set in advance by the consultative Committee of Experts. This percentage could vary from year to year, for instance because of a sudden increase in the total number of objects to be inspected resulting from an increase in the number of States Parties.

While all States would, from a legal point of view, be radically equal before the lot-casting authority, there might be variations in fact. States Parties which have no industrial production of phosphor-organic compounds and may therefore not have any object to declare would of course be exempted from inspections. A country which chose to conceal stocks or production facilities would, for the moment, be exempted from on-site inspection. However, if doubts arose as to the existence of such undeclared stocks or units, the on-challenge procedure would apply.

It has been asked how several related production units in one country should be treated, for instance if they were spread over a distance, but were nevertheless administratively connected. Here we would recommend a criterion of local propinquity. All production units situated within a certain local perimeter, sufficiently clustered to permit one single inspection, would be counted as one unit, while production units dispersed over several localities would have to be counted separately, even if they were administered by the same managerial authority. It is, however, obvious that the duration and intensity of the inspection and the number of inspectors needed would depend on the dimensions and sophistication of the plant.

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In the questions put to us, preoccupation with the safeguarding of industrial secrets and property rights has played a substantial role. I would therefore like to emphasize that, whenever samples were to be drawn, they would, according to our conception, be taken by employees of the production units inspected. All chemical analyses would be conducted on the spot, a procedure made possible by the limited range of chemical substances indicative of compliance with or breach of the convention. No samples would be taken out of the country. The precise composition of the substances examined could therefore not be detected by the inspectors.

In reply to some other questions put to my delegation, I should like to stress that our procedure would not envisage national quotas for the total number of inspections to take place in each country. Identical treatment of all is guaranteed by the objectivity of criteria and the unpredictability of the lot-casting method.

My delegation has followed the debate on problems of outer space with great interest. In our view, the Committee has made a good beginning in approaching this topic in response to the relevant resolutions adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, one of which was co-sponsored by my delegation. The debate has quite clearly shown that there is a considerable difference of views concerning the method to be used in future work. Many delegations have subscribed to a pragmatic, gradual approach by which concrete negotiating steps would, in a first phase, be taken to deal effectively with the most threatening and destabilizing weapons systems, i.e. anti-satellite weapons, especially since such systems have already been tested and made operational by at least one country; anti-satellite technology is available and deployment may already have taken place. There is another approach which aims at a purportedly broader, non-specific ban on all arms in outer space, but places very little emphasis on real effectiveness. It is also difficult to see in what order of priority the various complex issues involved would be treated under this approach. While my delegation is in favour of every possible step designed to exclude non-peaceful uses of outer space, it would appear logical and appropriate to us to adopt a step-by-step approach and to build upon the existing body of international regulations in this field. The establishment of a working group to take this work in hand in the coming summer session of the Committee would be welcomed by my delegation, if the mandate reflects this approach. I would like to remind the Committee in this respect that General Assembly resolution 36/97 C specifically requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems. The mandate of a future working group would have to reflect this and, in our view, the Committee, acting accordingly, will have to avoid clogging the agenda of a working group with broad and hazy projects which would not allow the Committee to deal with concrete problems in a limited time and not aim at a really effective peaceful space régime.

My delegation has already given its view on outer space problems in a more comprehensive manner during one of the informal meetings devoted to the subject; the text of our statement has been made available to delegations in an informal manner. Now that I have the opportunity to speak on the subject in a formal meeting, allow me to reaffirm one clarification. The draft treaty of 10 August 1981 contained in document A/36/192 and referred to in General Assembly resolution 36/99 does not appear to my delegation to be a suitable basis for

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negotiation in this Committee. We have already pointed out the many contradictions and inconsistencies which this draft treaty displays. In this connection, my delegation has asked a certain number of questions which so far have found no reply. We, like the Italian and the Dutch delegations, still wait for the necessary elucidation from the authors of that draft. In addition to the lacunae and ambiguities of the draft to which we have already drawn attention let me briefly mention two others. Article III of the draft makes it legitimate to intercept space objects if these are not operated for peaceful purposes. However, the determination and decision whether interception should take place lies with the interceptor alone, who would thus take on the role of a self-appointed space police. In the absence of firm criteria and of any objective determination of prerequisites for such a police role, this draft provision would seem to pave the way for misuse and serve, rather, as an incentive for the development and testing of additional anti-satellite systems. Secondly, the rules on verification contained in article IV appear to be insufficient even in the light of other existing multilateral disarmament agreements and certainly in relation to the purposes of the draft treaty. In the view of my delegation it would be indispensable to have a substantially more detailed verification régime, with at least an independent investigating authority, such as a Consultative Committee, lest the desired prescription remain totally ineffective in terms of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the light of all these arguments and in conjunction with those already advanced, my delegation must confirm its view that the draft treaty in question is seriously flawed and particularly unsuitable as a basis for negotiations in this Committee.

I will resist the temptation to speak on the comprehensive programme of disarmament at great length. Despite the enormous efforts and time that have gone into the negotiations since January last, my delegation is still at a loss to assess present accomplishments. Is it that the representatives in the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament have become increasingly knowledgeable about an extremely complex topic and have succumbed to the danger of losing sight of the final objective? In any event, the non-initiated, trying to digest the stacks of paper that we see before us as the ultimate product of the Group for the season, fail to see how this instrument, even after additional negotiations, could provide the momentum for the international disarmament process which we all expect and the impact on public opinion which it would need. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that all the overriding issues of the comprehensive programme of disarmament remain unresolved. The mere juxtaposition of delegations' views is not a negotiation. Laudable efforts have been made, especially in the last few days, to streamline the various papers and make them more palatable to the reader. That is perhaps all that can be accomplished at this time and certainly the impossible cannot be attempted in the few remaining days of our session. To my delegation, it would therefore seem more useful to give some thought to how negotiating structures for the forthcoming process of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament in New York can be optimized.

It would certainly be inappropriate for us to effect a simple change of venue and continue where we have left off in Geneva. What is now needed is for delegations to address the overriding issues of the comprehensive programme of disarmament -- time-frames, periodicity of review, legal nature -- at an appropriately high level of abstraction and of rank of participants and to arrive

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at a generally shared perception of how these major issues should be resolved. Needless to say, there must be some give and take, building on the incipient compromises which we have seen in Geneva. A package deal should, if possible, be achieved. Once the finality of the comprehensive programme of disarmament has become clearer, the work accomplished in Geneva will then take on new and important meaning and many of the papers elaborated here may fit more easily into the agreed structure. It might also be a useful idea to allow delegations a short period of reflexion after the intensive negotiations which we have held and which may have led some, as the saying goes, to lose sight of the forest and see only trees.

In conclusion, I should like to touch upon the question of radiological weapons. I should make it quite clear that my comments are offered from the viewpoint of my delegation and that I am not necessarily speaking as the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons. That Group has worked intensively and has shown undisputed progress, especially in the earlier parts of this session. Stagnation and disenchantment with the subject were overcome and a procedural compromise made it possible for the Working Group to postpone the consideration of certain complex problems of legal form in order to achieve progress on substance. The convenient device of a temporary parallel negotiation on the two main items under consideration -- the so-called "traditional" radiological weapons question and the question of a possible ban on attacks on nuclear facilities -- has led to a series of fruitful and dense meetings. In the "traditional" radiological weapons field, the number of controversial issues has been substantially reduced and compromise formulations have had increasing appeal for delegations. Negotiations went on in a spirit of mutual understanding where all proposals were given careful and bona fide consideration by delegations. It is therefore simply not true, as one delegation recently proclaimed in plenary, that certain suggestions put forward by the Group of 21 have met with "fierce opposition" from the original proponents of a radiological weapons treaty. Rather, there appears to have been general willingness to accommodate the three notions so important for the Group of 21 -- a commitment to promote the peaceful uses of radioactive materials; a restatement of commitments in the general sphere of nuclear disarmament; and the inclusion of a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities -- in a manner which preserves the essential impetus of these notions. However, despite the seriousness of the work and the deadline set by the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly and General Assembly resolution 36/97 B, success has eluded us. In the final stages of the Working Group's activities, the spectre of stagnation again appeared and delegations seemed increasingly unwilling to move from established positions towards the necessary compromise. This is a grave disappointment and, more, a matter of considerable concern. It may very well raise the question of what negotiation in this Committee is all about. At some point -- after years of discussion and consideration -- the moment must come when all delegations appear ready to depart from initial positions and instructions and to align themselves on the median line of general compromise. It would be the view of my delegation that this time has come, at least for the question of "traditional" radiological weapons. One cannot interminably negotiate on a disarmament proposal of such limited dimensions. Yet, in the last few days, we have seen a certain number of

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inflated demands by some delegations which do not seem to take the possibilities of compromise into account. It is regrettable, if not ironic, that these are often the same delegations that so readily castigate certain other delegations in this room for the lack of "political will". If the Committee on Disarmament appears -- in this field as in so many others -- nearly empty-handed before the special session, these delegations would do well to do a little soul-searching of their own.

At least when the Working Group reconvenes later this summer, it would appear essential for some of the basic issues in the radiological weapons field to be decided on quickly. I see no reason why a suitable compromise solution to the question of linkage between the traditional radiological weapons question and the issue of a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities should not be found in the near future. A model which readily comes to mind would be a radiological weapons convention of general scope, as suggested by the original proponents, and an additional facultative protocol governing the ban on certain relevant nuclear facilities. Both instruments would be intrinsically linked and would come up for signature at the same time. However, there would be an option for States signatories to subscribe to the main convention in a first phase, while leaving accession to the facultative additional protocol open, at least during a period of reflection.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia, His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe, who will speak in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to see you in the Chair during the crucial month of April, when the Committee on Disarmament is not only winding up its work for the first part of the 1982 session, but also reviewing the work of the past four years in view of the forthcoming second session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is therefore fitting that a man of your calibre and experience should preside over this important phase of our work.

My appreciation also goes to Minister Alessi of Italy for his diligent and wise leadership of the Committee during the month of March.

I would also like to associate my delegation with the appreciation and thanks you expressed in welcoming the parliamentary delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany.

The purpose of my statement today is to introduce document CD/280, which contains the following points and represents the common denominator of the positions of the members of the Group of 21 on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

"1. The Group of 21 believes that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon States should refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear weapon States. The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Group of 21, therefore, welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc Working Group to reach agreement on 'effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'.

2. Most regrettably, three years of negotiations in the ad hoc Working Group have produced only marginal progress. This is due principally to the inflexible positions taken by some nuclear weapon States.

3. The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in the unilateral declarations of some nuclear weapon States reflect their subjective approach and that these declarations are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Taken together, these conditions, limitations and exceptions have the effect of severely restricting such positive features as may be contained in these unilateral declarations and they are, therefore, unacceptable to members of the Group of 21. The declarations do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

4. The Group of 21 notes that in accordance with paragraph 62 of the Final Document, the nuclear weapon States have given undertakings to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which are members of the existing nuclear weapon free zone. Besides these States, other neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances are committed not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. There is therefore every reason for these States being covered by the same legally binding assurances, especially if one takes into account that the nuclear weapon States were urged in paragraph 59 to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. The Group of 21 emphasizes that an agreement on the question of 'effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' should be based on the following principles:

- (i) The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (ii) Non-nuclear weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (iii) Such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21

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notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention;

- (iv) A common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21 stated above;
- (v) The agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. The Group of 21 considers that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States. Such an undertaking would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also contribute towards progress in achieving an international agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka, who will address the Committee in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, permit me first of all, as this is my first official statement this month, to begin by offering you my most sincere and heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. I am deeply convinced that, under your able and experienced leadership, this Committee will fully and perfectly discharge its reporting tasks in preparing the special report to the second special session devoted to disarmament.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and in full consultation with the Group, I wish to present to the Committee on

(Mr. Sulka, Poland)

Disarmament my oral report concerning consultations held during the first part of the 1982 session and to inform the Committee of the adoption of the special report of the Group to the Committee prepared in view of the special session devoted to disarmament.

At its 6th meeting, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons took note of the Chairman's report on issues relating to toxicity determinations and contained in document CD/CW/WP.30 and Corr.1. The Chairman was asked to inform the Committee on Disarmament of the results of these consultations and especially of the recommendations for standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous and inhalation toxicity criteria contained in the report and to ask the Committee to take note of the report, as well as of the recommended procedures annexed thereto.

On the basis of this report, the Group agreed that its Chairman should hold consultations with delegations on technical questions in the week of 2 to 6 August of this year, unless the Committee decides otherwise at the beginning of the second half of its 1982 session. The Working Group agreed to suggest to the Committee on Disarmament that it devote the week following the technical consultations to the consideration of the item "chemical weapons" in its plenary meetings. In order to allow for adequate preparations, the Working Group's Chairman should continue his consultations on the technical questions to be discussed during the consultations envisaged for the week from 2 to 6 August 1982.

Taking into account the report contained in document CD/CW/WP.30, the information obtained from delegations and the outcome of his informal contacts with delegations on this subject, the Chairman will announce, at the very beginning of the second half of the 1982 session, which technical questions he recommends for these consultations.

I take pleasure in informing you that last night, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons adopted the text of the special report to the Committee on Disarmament it has prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament. This report is now being processed by the Secretariat and should be available in all languages in time for the Committee's next regular meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have taken note of his request and, at the same time, I wish to congratulate him on the successful conclusion of the activities of his Working Group, which adopted its report yesterday afternoon.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmed.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, It seems to my delegation entirely appropriate that a distinguished representative of Japan should preside over this Committee as it prepares its contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. There is hardly a parallel to Japan's deep-rooted and sincere devotion to the cause of disarmament. Your diplomatic acumen and acknowledged ability will ensure that the Committee on Disarmament makes an optimum contribution to the success of the special session.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Ambassador Alessi of Italy for his patient and dedicated efforts as our Chairman during the preceding month.

The spring session of the Committee on Disarmament has been unique in many respects. While the political climate for disarmament has remained as adverse as at our two previous sessions, there has been, I believe, a genuine endeavour on the part of delegations to register some progress to show to the second special session. It is unfortunate that the sense of urgency which has infused many of our negotiations this spring was not evoked earlier. This may have resulted in the conclusion of at least some substantive agreements in time for the second special session. As matters stand, a judgement on the Committee's performance since 1979 must be harsh. Clearly, the Committee has not lived up to its potential and possibilities. Our failure reflects, basically, the absence of political will on the part of the major military Powers and their alliances to commit themselves unconditionally to the process of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. By and large, this Committee has been treated by these States as merely another forum where their narrowly conceived positions can be extolled. The heated exchanges which we have heard at this session demonstrate that, despite the consensus adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament, there seems to be an almost complete absence of agreed premises between the West and the East on ways and means of promoting a concerted process of disarmament. Were it not for the persistent endeavours of the non-aligned and neutral States, work in this body would not reflect even that minimum momentum which we shall no doubt seek to highlight in our special report to the General Assembly.

The failure of the Committee on Disarmament to agree on a mandate for an ad hoc working group on the item which has the highest priority on our agenda, a nuclear test ban, cannot be counted as a collective failure. What was and is required is greater flexibility on the part of those delegations which have sought to erode the urgency and to limit the scope of this Committee's responsibilities on this item. The Committee's failure even to open negotiations on a nuclear test ban will, it seems, figure at the special session as a symbol of the stalemate in multilateral disarmament negotiations and the impotence of this body when confronted with the arbitrary imposition of the rule of consensus. Yet, the real implications of further delay in concluding a nuclear test-ban treaty will be far-reaching for the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States and for future negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation also considers that a greater demonstration of political will on the part of the major nuclear Powers might have made it possible to achieve some progress in the negotiations concerning security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, most of the nuclear-weapon States have remained entirely inflexible about contemplating the changes in their unilateral declarations which are clearly necessary to promote an agreement on the question. The position of my delegation has been stated on previous occasions and I will not repeat it. I would like, however, to underline the significance of the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Ethiopia on behalf of the Group of 21 this morning on the subject. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States will heed the call to review their basic positions at the second special session. The demand by the neutral, non-aligned and other developing countries outside the two major military alliances that they be given legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should not be ignored. We look forward to a genuine response at the special session from the nuclear-weapon States concerned.

We admire the courageous efforts made by the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, to evolve the text of a treaty on this subject. It has been clear from the outset, however, that an agreement on this issue must respond to the basic questions raised, in particular, by the non-aligned and neutral countries regarding, inter alia, the definition of radiological weapons and the commitment of the nuclear Powers to pursue nuclear disarmament and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Above all, agreement on an RW convention should be accompanied by an agreement regarding the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities -- which is, in our view, the only feasible way in which radiation can be used, at present, for hostile purposes. The Pakistan delegation remains open about the precise manner in which this issue should be resolved, i.e. whether under the RW convention itself, in an attached protocol or through an entirely separate international instrument.

Very briefly, in response to the remarks made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject, I would submit with great respect that soul-searching is required first and foremost by those delegations which take the view that the Committee should adopt a virtually meaningless convention on radiological weapons, but seek to open the option to attack nuclear facilities causing mass destruction that would be no different from the effect of the use of nuclear weapons. It is the view of my delegation and of several other members of the Group of 21 that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be as comprehensive as possible. Since the basic objective is to prevent mass destruction, there can be no justification for differentiating between civilian and military facilities. Mass destruction would result from attacks on either kind of facility. However, mass destruction is not the only criterion relevant to this issue. My delegation sees an important objective of the proposed instrument as being to restore confidence

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

among the developing countries regarding their nascent nuclear programmes. This confidence has been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities last June. Therefore, the scope of the prohibition should include not only larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities, but also smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries.

Pakistan has submitted a concrete proposal regarding the scope of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities on the basis of the criteria and considerations I have mentioned. We hope that the important political issues involved in this matter will be discussed in the near future.

The negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons currently being pursued under the sagacious guidance of Ambassador Sujka of Poland have assumed greater urgency in view of recent developments. Repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world have not been conclusively disproven. The acrimony surrounding the issue, however, attests to the overriding need to affirm in the CW convention that the use of chemical weapons is totally prohibited and to provide for adequate and credible means by which such allegations can be objectively investigated in the future. My delegation has made no technical determination as to whether the development of binary chemical weapons will further complicate the negotiation of a CW convention, particularly its verification procedures. Nevertheless, the current escalation of the arms race in chemical weapons, the implied reliance on these weapons in the "balance of terror" and persistent reports about the use of chemical weapons are ominous portents, especially if one bears in mind that the capability to produce these weapons of mass destruction is, unlike nuclear weapons, not limited to a handful of States. These disturbing dimensions of the problem must be addressed squarely at the forthcoming special session and in our subsequent negotiations.

As was to be expected, the most intensive work has been done at this session on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Despite the political and conceptual difficulties encountered, considerable progress has been made in this task under the experienced and dedicated leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. Unfortunately, significant portions of the text remain in square brackets. My delegation believes that further progress in negotiating the comprehensive programme of disarmament depends on appropriate political decisions being taken especially by the major Powers. Before resuming work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is essential to reach some understanding on the fundamental conceptual issues involved. There seems to be de facto agreement that the programme should be elaborated in three stages. This agreement seems logical and natural and it should be formalized. Some members continue to entertain reservations about the concept of "time-frames" for the implementation of the programme and its stages. It is possible to link the notion of indicative time-frames with the procedure for the review of the implementation of the programme. The Group of 21 has made specific proposals in this regard. My delegation is flexible on the kind of linkage that may eventually be established. But the review mechanism in itself cannot serve as a substitute for a political indication that certain disarmament negotiations would be undertaken in good faith by the States concerned within a certain period of time. My delegation continues to regard the end of the century as a symbolically attractive and politically feasible target date for the completion of the comprehensive programme.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The value of the comprehensive programme will depend to a large degree on the nature of the commitment of States to implement its provisions. In a sense, this commitment will be represented by the extent to which States agree to include specific disarmament measures in the programme. Another indication of commitment would be the acceptance of time-frames for the implementation of the measures included in the programme. Most importantly, the nature of the commitment to the programme will depend on the manner and form in which it is adopted. The consistent position of my delegation has been that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be a legally binding instrument. Some delegations are, however, not in a position to accept this concept of the comprehensive programme. It is our understanding, nevertheless, that there is an implicit understanding that the comprehensive programme should be more than another recommendatory document. In order to promote a compromise, perhaps the following procedure for the adoption of the comprehensive programme could be considered. First, the programme could be adopted by the General Assembly in a solemn declaration in which States would commit themselves to implement its provisions. After adoption, the declaration and the comprehensive programme could be transmitted by the General Assembly to the Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations for their signature. These signed documents could thereafter be deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General. Finally, the declaration and the comprehensive programme, together with the signatures of a required minimum number of States, could be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, which could note them in a resolution adopted under the provisions of the Charter that are designed to create obligations for States. We hope this approach will be accorded further consideration at the second special session.

In conclusion, the Pakistan delegation would like to express the hope that the second special session will be viewed by States and, especially, by the major Powers not only as a political challenge, but also as a historic opportunity. The anticipated participation by several States at the highest level engenders a corresponding expectation about their contribution to the cause of disarmament and peace. We hope that the major Powers will be able to defuse current fears about the danger of a nuclear conflict and that they will demonstrate in a specific and tangible way their commitment to the noble goals which they espoused in 1978 and to which they profess continued adherence. Equally, we hope that a sincere effort will be deployed by all concerned to resolve those outstanding disputes and conflict which are the main cause of the present climate of international tension and insecurity.

Pakistan, for its part, will continue to make a constructive and positive contribution to the success of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, although I have, on two occasions during informal meetings, expressed my delegation's sincere satisfaction at seeing you preside over our work this month -- one of the most important in our 1982 session -- this is the first time I have had an opportunity to do so in a plenary meeting and I would therefore like to repeat **those** words so that they appear in the record of today's meeting.

When I asked for the floor, in other words, when I sent a message through one of the members of my delegation to the Chair indicating that I would like to speak, the distinguished representative of Pakistan had not yet spoken. Much of what he said makes it unnecessary for me to repeat the points I wished to make in my statement and I shall therefore be very brief.

The reason I asked for the floor was to make a few comments on the statement by Ambassador Wegener, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, concerning the work of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I thought that my brief comments should appear in the same record as the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany because, otherwise, readers of the record would, in my view, be left with an unfair impression of the industriousness of the members of the Working Group and the results of their efforts.

When I come to speak as Chairman of the Working Group, I shall have an opportunity to describe in greater detail the results as I see them. For the time being, I would like to refer to three points only. The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany told us that he was afraid -- and I am going to read **his statement in English, since the text is in English -- that the members** of the Working Group had and I quote: "succumbed to the danger of losing sight of the final objective." I can assure you that that was not the case and that all the participants in the Group -- including, in fact, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany himself, and I am referring to Mr. Röhr, who played a very active and effective role -- all of them, I repeat, constantly bore in mind the final objective. Then, and this is my second point, Ambassador Wegener told us that he felt unable to digest "the stacks of paper", in his own words, "the stacks of paper that we see before us as the ultimate product of the Group for the session". I think it is somewhat exaggerated to speak of stacks of paper. Stacks of paper have resulted from two years' work, during which, on the one hand, delegations made very useful contributions and, on the other, the Secretariat prepared long and painstakingly detailed working papers. If this is what Ambassador Wegener is referring to, there have been stacks of paper; but if, as he said, he is referring to the "ultimate product" of that work, it **represents** only 60 or 70 double-spaced pages. Furthermore, if, as we all hope, we manage, in New York, to eliminate many of the alternatives that appear in brackets, the documentation will be only some 40 or 45 pages long -- far shorter than the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly.

Lastly, I would like to refer to another point and, in this connection, state that I fully share the view expressed by Ambassador Wegener when he drew attention to the need, and again I quote his words, to "arrive at a generally shared perception of how these major issues should be resolved". The "major issues" to which he referred were carefully considered on several occasions. At least half a dozen

(Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico))

meetings of the Working Group were devoted exclusively to them, but, precisely because they are difficult, their solution has until now eluded us, as the saying goes in English. I hope -- and, here again, I share the Ambassador's wish -- that the situation will be different in New York. But, as he said, to that end, we shall have to be very much aware of the fact that "there must be some give and take"; there will have to be equal political will on the part of all those who have participated in the discussions to date and no one should claim that the comprehensive programme of disarmament is not a step forward compared to the Final Document or that, as has unfortunately been said, the comprehensive programme is, in some respects, a step backwards compared to the Final Document.

Therefore, to conclude on an optimistic note, let us hope that Ambassador Wegener's wish, which, I repeat, I share, will find fulfilment in New York and that all the parties will have this spirit of "give and take".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador García Robles for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Would any other delegation like to take the floor?

That does not seem to be the case.

Members will recall that, at our informal meeting on Tuesday, the Committee considered a draft decision submitted by the delegation of Hungary. As a result of an exchange of views on that draft decision, it was decided that the plenary of the Committee would take up this matter today. The Secretariat has circulated Working Paper No. 62/Rev.1 1/ containing a draft decision under item 5 of the agenda of the Committee. I suggest that we now proceed to consider and adopt this draft decision.

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

1/ "The Committee decides to hold informal meetings during the second part of its 1982 session under item 5 of its agenda, 'New types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and new Systems of such Weapons', with a view to examine proposals and suggestions pertaining to this issue. Participation of experts will be welcome in these proceedings.

The informal meetings will be open to States non-members of the Committee and to their respective experts.

The number and dates of these informal meetings will be decided upon as appropriate when the programme of work for the second part of the Committee's 1982 session will be under consideration".

The CHAIRMAN: I have received a letter from His Excellency Ambassador Nettel, the representative of Austria, stating that Austria would like to be considered as a candidate for membership of the Committee on Disarmament. This is by way of advance information; the letter will be circulated to all members of the Committee.

I now give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament): I wish to inform the members that we in the Secretariat have received several communications addressed to the Committee on Disarmament by non-governmental organizations and private groups and persons on topics relating to disarmament. For example, 286 persons belonging to the Christian Community of Albertville in France have written to express support for this Committee's disarmament efforts. The 75 members of the Women for Peace organizations in Bern and Basel have declared their opposition to nuclear war. Similar communications -- about 20 -- declaring that "the Earth should be for Life" have come from Denmark, Italy, Nigeria, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. These communications are available in my office for inspection by interested members.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank Ambassador Jaipal for that information.

As members know, we usually circulate at the plenary meetings on Thursdays an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings of the Committee to be held during the following week. However, we have set as a target date for the completion of our work next Tuesday, 20 April, when we should adopt the special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Under the circumstances, I would like to urge the working groups to conclude their work not later than tomorrow, Friday, and I suggest that we should hold an informal meeting of the Committee on Monday at 3.30 p.m. in order to consider those sections of the draft report adopted by the drafting group.

I suggest that, in principle, we should schedule the plenary meeting for Tuesday, 20 April, at 3 p.m., on the understanding that it might be advanced or postponed by notification made by the Secretariat to the members of the Committee. I do not think that, at this stage, we can foresee how our work will proceed from now until next Tuesday.

If there is no objection, we will adopt this procedure.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting, I wish to announce that, as foreseen in the timetable, the open-ended working group to consider the draft report to the special session will begin in Room I in five minutes' time and at that meeting we will start with the consideration of Working Paper No. 61/Rev.1.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 April 1982, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio OKAWA

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Miss N. NASCIMENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TALLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
Mr. J. LUIS GARCIA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK
Mr. A. BAHRI

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. J. ZAHINIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Mr. A. MEERBURG

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. M. AKRAM

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. G.V. BERDEMIKOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. L. MIDDLETON

Mr. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mrs. M.E. HOINKES

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. M. MIHALJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA

Ms. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I declare open the one hundred and seventy-second plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee starts today its consideration of reports of subsidiary bodies, as well as of its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As usual, in conformity with rule 30 of our rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so at any time.

Before we start with our business for today, I would like to inform the Committee that I have received a communication from the Permanent Representative of Turkey, dated 16 April 1982, in which the Permanent Representative of Turkey reiterates the keen interest of his Government in becoming a full member of this Committee and states that "Turkey should be considered as a candidate when a review of the membership of the Committee takes place at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". I believe copies of this communication have already been circulated to members of this Committee. I would also like to inform members how I envisage proceeding from now on. It is now clear that our target date of 20 April, which happens to be today, for the conclusion of the first part of our 1982 session, cannot be met. We should, then, continue at least until tomorrow, provided that we can work speedily today as well as tomorrow, and I emphasize that proviso. The secretariat is making every effort to circulate this afternoon, at 4.30 p.m., Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2, which will contain the text of the report as agreed upon by the drafting group entrusted with that task, and since we concluded our work in the drafting group at 1 o'clock, or rather, after 1 o'clock this afternoon, the draft report you will be receiving at 4.30 will be circulated only in English.

I intend, therefore, to proceed as follows: firstly, this afternoon the plenary meeting will be mainly devoted to the introduction of reports of working groups for consideration by the Committee. Secondly, after this meeting of the plenary, an informal meeting will be convened to consider Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2 which I have just referred to and which will be available in English. I would appeal to all members to agree to the use of the text in English during the discussions in the informal meeting. In the meantime, the versions of Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2 in the other languages will be processed and will be made available in the delegations' boxes at 11 a.m. tomorrow morning for your consideration. For that purpose, and as well as to give some time for the secretariat to prepare the last papers, we will not meet tomorrow morning. It is clear, however, that if we wish to adjourn the first part of the session tomorrow, we will need to conclude our consideration of Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2 today and consequently, I have planned for an extended informal meeting this afternoon. I envisage the last plenary meeting of this part of our session to be held tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

Any changes suggested in connection with the translations of the draft report in the other languages should be given directly to the secretariat, since I do not think we need to deal with them at our meetings.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan and France.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, taking into consideration the exchange of views during the informal meeting yesterday afternoon, the group of socialist countries wants to stress again that it does not want to stand in the way of the establishment of a working group on item 1 of our agenda, namely, on a nuclear test ban. In order to express our willingness to agree to immediate action and an immediate solution of the problem, the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wish to present the working paper in document CD/287, which bears the title "Proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group under item 1 of the agenda entitled, 'Nuclear test ban'". Allow me to read the full text of our proposal:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the SSOD I, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'Nuclear test ban'.

"The elaboration of the mandate of the working group will be completed at the very beginning of the summer session of the Committee, taking into account the results of the SSOD II."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda for his statement. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is contained in document CD/283.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament): I have the honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which I have had the privilege of presiding over during the Committee's 1981 session and the present part of its 1982 session, together with a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which is annexed to the report.

Since the content of the report is what is customarily termed self-explanatory, I shall confine myself to making a few comments on it. First, I should like to say that this has been one of the most industrious working groups of what the United Nations General Assembly has described as the "single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament", for as you know, it began its work this year by holding daily meetings during the last three weeks of January before the Committee met, and, after the resumption of the Committee's work on 2 February, it held an average of three meetings a week, without counting the very frequent meetings of its subsidiary bodies. As a result, the Group has been able to complete the task which was entrusted to it, albeit with the inevitable limitations imposed by circumstances which are familiar to you all.

In the report to which I am referring, there already appear the names of those who merit special mention for the valuable contribution which they made to the Group's work: Ambassador Olu Adeniji of Nigeria, who presided over the first 10 of the 59 meetings held, Ambassador François de la Gorce of France, Ambassador Gerhard Herder of the Democratic Republic of Germany and Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva of Brazil, who co-ordinated the work of

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group
on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament)

their respective contact groups, and Mr. Tariq Altaf of Pakistan, who acted as co-ordinator of an informal drafting group. I should simply like, therefore, to record my especial gratitude to someone who, as a result of having undertaken to draft the report in consultation with the Chairman, was obviously unable to make an appropriate reference in the report to her participation in the Group as its Secretary. In the light of the experience which has enabled me to observe her at work at very close quarters and to rely on her untiring co-operation for approximately a year and a half, I consider it only just to take this opportunity of placing on record my view that Miss Aida Levin can serve as a model for the discharge of any office such as that which she has held in this Group, by virtue of her absolute objectivity, her knowledge of disarmament matters, her outstanding drafting abilities and her lively intelligence, which has so frequently produced formulas that have gained general acceptance.

With regard to the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which the Working Group transmits to the Committee as an annex to its report and which, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 35/92 F adopted by the Assembly on 9 December 1981, has to be submitted "in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament", I do feel that it is my duty on this occasion to make a few comments on the basis of my lengthy and intimate connection with the efforts made to prepare the programme.

I shall begin by emphasizing that the structure of the document which the Group is submitting to the Committee corresponds to that which has been approved since 1980 and which, as indicated in paragraph 68 (7) of the Committee's report to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, should comprise --- in addition to an introduction or preamble which would be prepared last of all --- six chapters dealing with objectives, principles, priorities, measures, stages of implementation, and machinery and procedures, respectively. The only change that has been made in this structure is that, for reasons which would appear obvious, two of these headings have been merged to serve as a title for the fifth chapter, which deals with both "measures and stages of implementation".

As for the contents of the programme, the Working Group has endeavoured to keep as faithfully as possible to the mandate clearly defined in paragraph 109 of the Final Document, in which it was stipulated that the programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated", reiterated word for word in paragraph 7 (b) of the "elements" approved, also by consensus, by the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 34/83 H of 11 December of the same year, and confirmed by the Committee on Disarmament when it adopted the report which the Working Group submitted to it in 1980, in paragraph 10 of which it was expressly agreed that "the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained".

The fact that a considerable number of the provisions of the programme are still between square brackets should not be a reason for discouragement but, on the contrary, should serve as a spur for efforts to find texts capable of gaining general approval. To this end, it should not be forgotten that the draft Final

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Document which the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament transmitted to the Assembly as a result of five meetings -- three of which were held in 1977 and the last two in the first half of 1978 -- had also been riddled with square brackets but that that did not prevent the Assembly from finally approving by consensus a document which was completely free of those symbols of differences of opinion.

However difficult the efforts required to achieve this purpose may be, this will probably not be one of the most difficult tasks that has ever been brought to fruition, especially if no delegation tries to renege on the commitments undertaken in the Final Document in 1978. It would also seem that it will be by no means impossible to reach an agreement on the number of stages that the programme should comprise, in the light of the flexibility that has been evidenced by many of the delegations that have formulated the main working papers submitted to the Group, since, with general acceptance, the Group has been able to channel its deliberations, as it were in the nature of "working hypotheses", firstly on the basis of four stages and subsequently on the basis of three. A similar comment might be made concerning the revision machinery or procedure, in respect of which too there already appears to be a more or less general acceptance of a five-yearly régime and of the fact that such revision or examination should be undertaken through specific special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If the foregoing is taken into account, there would appear to be some justification for concluding that the two most difficult problems still outstanding are that of determining whether or not the programme should have a timetable for its implementation and that of determining the extent to which the programme should be of a binding nature. If it is agreed, as we think it reasonable to do, that all the States participating in the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament may be expected to give evidence of goodwill and good faith in the formal and informal negotiations taking place at that session, there will be a solid basis for expecting that a satisfactory solution to these problems will be found.

With regard to the question of dates to be included in a possible timetable, it should first of all be pointed out that, for the moment, no one is thinking of rigid time-limits like those which appeared in the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962 by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. In this connection, it is also encouraging to note that reference was made in the deliberations on this subject -- and it is the more encouraging in that the reference was made by the representative of one of the most important members of the group known as the group of western European and other countries -- as an example of terminology that might be followed -- to that used in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, in which the time factor undoubtedly occupies a prominent place.

With regard to the nature of the programme, although, on the one hand, it would seem that there is now no longer hope of winning a consensus in favour of giving the programme the legal status of a multilateral treaty, it is clearly apparent on the other hand, from the comments made at the various meetings which the Group devoted to consideration of this subject, that there is a general trend towards finding formulas which will enable the programme to be placed at a level far above that of the resolutions annually adopted by the General Assembly. This will undoubtedly require the inclusion in the programme of provisions similar to those contained in paragraph 126 of the Final Document, in which the States that participated in the first special session "solemnly" reaffirmed, inter alia,

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"their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war;" and "implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race". This will certainly require also that the Programme make an express provision along the lines of the statement in paragraph 17 of the Final Document emphasizing the pressing need to "translate into practical terms" the provisions adopted and to "proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament". Furthermore, in view of the fact that, unfortunately, the Final Document has been to a considerable extent treated by the nuclear Powers as a dead letter, consideration must be given to the possibility of including in the introduction and final paragraphs alike of the Comprehensive Programme, provisions which both politically and morally impart the greatest possible, though freely accepted, binding character to the text, a binding character which, it is to be hoped, will be greater than that achieved in 1978.

In this connection, it is also worth remembering that, at the Group's meetings, representatives submitted a number of valuable suggestions aimed at highlighting, through symbolic acts, both the importance of the programme and, more particularly, the political commitment of Governments to execute its provisions. Among these suggestions, pride of place -- in view of its originality and potential effectiveness -- should perhaps go to the suggestion that the programme should be signed by the Heads of State or Government of all the States Members of the United Nations. In my opinion, the fact that most if not all of them will almost certainly not be in New York at the closure of the Assembly's session should not be an obstacle to an acceptance of this suggestion; quite the contrary, in fact. A special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations might very well be given the responsibility of taking the original text of the programme to all the capitals of those States for the purpose of collecting the signatures of their respective Heads of State or Government. This could, at the same time, help to ensure that public opinion in each of those countries has a true awareness of the significance of the programme.

Recently, particularly during the last year or so, there has been throughout the world an increasing number of acts of all kinds which reveal the concern that the nuclear arms race and the emergence of doctrines such as the credible possibility of a limited nuclear war or the illusory hypothesis of a nuclear victory, have aroused throughout mankind. If, as the Assembly stated in 1978, all peoples have a vital interest in the success of the negotiations on disarmament, it may be asserted without any exaggeration that the thousands of millions of human beings who make up these peoples will follow very closely the work of the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament which is to be held at United Nations Headquarters from 7 June to 9 July 1982. This may very well be the decisive element in making the representatives of those peoples deliberating in New York realize the need to approve by consensus a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which, starting from the text which the Ad Hoc Working Group is today submitting to the Committee, may give new life to the pressing objectives which, for four years, have been set out in paragraph 109 of the Assembly's Final Document. It must never be forgotten that, as stated in the Final Document itself, the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a nuclear war, since this threat has confronted mankind with a choice between proceeding to disarmament or facing annihilation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador García Robles, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, for his statement and for introducing his report. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the representative of Poland, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group contained in document CD/281.

Mr. SUJKA (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons): Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I have the honour to introduce a special report of this Group to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The text of the report is contained in document CD/281 which, I hope, is available to all the distinguished representatives in this Committee.

I would like to be as brief as possible, as I have always been during our meetings. First of all, I wish to state that in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of United Nations General Assembly resolution number 36/92 F, this Committee has been requested to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament "a special report on the state of negotiations on various questions under consideration by the Committee". In a similar way, a specific requirement by the General Assembly has been stated in paragraph 4 of United Nations General Assembly resolution number 36/96 A, as far as chemical weapons are concerned. I hope that the report, as contained in document CD/281, does reflect the present state of negotiations in the Committee's Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The report itself being self-explanatory, I would like to share briefly with the Committee some important points of the discussion in the Working Group which led to the elaboration and adoption of this report. Thus, in its introductory part, the Group wished to refer directly to paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament which, let me recall, stresses the importance and urgency of negotiations on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. On the other hand, the Group wished to refer, rather generally, to all other proposals and documents on the prohibition of chemical weapons which in the past had been presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee itself, assuming that merely listing them all would be a space-taking and not very productive task, especially in view of the second second special session.

The same approach has been displayed by the Group in elaborating the other parts of the report. Without going into details of its discussions in 1980 and in 1981, under its previous mandate, the Group emphasized the most significant points discussed in those two years as they, indeed, mark very important stages of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As far as the present state of the work is concerned, the Group has underlined the importance of a new mandate which allows the elaboration of a convention and succinctly described the topics of discussions for the first half of its 1982 session and the main differences of views and problems which emerged in the discussion in the past two months or so.

There is one thing I would like to make as clear as possible: the Group wished to avoid repeating in this report, all over again, all the various views of particular delegations or groups of delegations on countless smaller and/or bigger problems that emerged during the more than three-year-long discussions. These are sufficiently reflected in the Working Group's report of 1980 contained in document CD/131/Rev.1, and its report of 1981 in document CD/220. Both those reports are specifically mentioned in the present report of the Group.

In my concluding statement to the Group, I described in considerable detail a possible course of action for the Group during the second half of the 1982 session. In this connection, I appealed to the members of the Group asking them to do

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specific preparatory work for the summer session if we are to approach as closely as possible to the stage of drafting the provisions of the convention. I do not want to repeat myself because that statement, in view of the interest shown by members of the Group, has been circulated by the secretariat as a working paper of the Group on Chemical Weapons. But with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal again for a display of serious efforts by all delegations during the summer session so that we can translate as many dissenting views as possible into the alternative elements and then elaborate compromise elements. A compilation of draft elements and proposed new texts has also been made available to all delegations to facilitate the kind of exercise I am appealing for.

I would like to apologize to my predecessors, Ambassador Okawa and Ambassador Lidgard, for not mentioning their names as chairmen of the Group in 1980 and in 1981 respectively, in the introductory part of the report. I personally was of the opinion that that kind of introduction should not contain all the details I have noticed in the reports of other working groups. But certainly I am for the uniformity of the reports of all the working groups in this respect, and I hope that the Committee will agree to cover these problems in paragraphs 61 and 62 of its own report. The same procedure could also be applied as to the participation of non-member States in the work of the Working Group.

Finally, let me refer to some recent discussions in the Committee's drafting group. My reply is brief: the Working Group, indeed, has not been directly reflecting in its activities the Committee's plenary discussions. It has conducted its work on the basis of a new, I repeat, new mandate which was adopted with the consent of all delegations. On the basis of that mandate and the programme of work, also adopted by consensus, the group has acted and its activities have been reflected in this report. Let me also say that, exactly, this the the principal aim of the Committee's report -- to reflect the course and trends of discussions that have been taking place in plenaries. The Group's report, in my view, had to be limited to the discussions in the Working Group itself. References to the discussions in plenary have, of course, been reflected in the Group's work, when such discussions contained specific proposals relevant to the subjects of negotiations in the Group.

As the distinguished members of the Committee are well aware, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has entered, with a new mandate, another, sensitive phase of its work. We have held another series of thorough examinations of difficult and complex problems. I wish to emphasize, as Chairman of this Group, that despite the great sensitivity and complexity of our negotiations, the work has been conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding, respect and co-operation. For this understanding, mutual respect and co-operation I should like at this moment once more cordially to thank all the members of the Group.

I would like to ask you Mr. Chairman, that this statement be distributed as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament in the same way as document CD/286, which contains the statement of the distinguished Chairman of the CPD Working Group, Ambassador García Robles.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for his statement and for introducing his report. I am sure the request for his statement to be circulated as an official document will be duly taken care of. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, His excellency Ambassador Wegener, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group contained in document CD/284.

Mr. WEGENER (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons):
Mr. Chairman, indeed I have the honour to introduce the Report which you just mentioned.

The Working Group had chosen to make use of its time for substantive negotiations as late into last week as possible. As a consequence, only one meeting was available for discussion and adoption of the report. This has placed a considerable burden upon the members of the secretariat, who had to put in extra hours to reproduce the report from a somewhat heterogeneous collection of oral and handwritten amendments designed to supplement the original draft. They have done an excellent job under these difficult circumstances, and I should like to thank them on behalf of the Working Group.

However, it was unavoidable in this situation that a small number of errors or ambiguities have crept into the printed text. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should therefore like to read out this limited number of amendments which have become necessary, none of which changes the general thrust and structure of the report, but which will help to clarify it. None of the amendments adds to the text a sentence or thought that was not already part of the Working Group's decision to adopt the report. I refer, then, to document CD/284, and in the English version, to document CD/284*. I quote from the English text, on page 2, in the penultimate line of paragraph 6 we should strike out the words at the end of the line, "radiation from the decay of". On page 3, in paragraph 16, in the seventh line, after the sentence ending with the words "from attack", kindly insert the following additional sentence: "Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter". On page 5, in the last sentence of paragraph 27, there is a mere printing error: please replace the words "points of view" by "differences". And on the last page it has become necessary to clarify that some of the sentences written here are quotations from what delegations said. In paragraph 32, therefore, in the second sentence, the words "in their view" should be inserted. The sentence then read: "Since the basic objective was in their view, to prevent..." The following sentence should be prefaced with the words "they also believed that", so that the sentence then reads: "They also believed that mass destruction would result from attacks...", etc. In paragraph 34, in the second sentence, the words "in their view" should be inserted, so that the sentence then reads: "A partial ban could, in their view, legitimize...", etc. In paragraph 33, in the fourth line, the term "thermal effect" should, for reasons of mere technical correctness, be replaced by "thermal power".

As delegations will recognize, while taking note of the contents of the report, the record of the Working Group is far from brilliant. While a promising start was made in early March with a practicable procedural decision that did much to unblock a deadlock situation, the sense of urgency which General Assembly resolution 36/97 B had initially instilled into the Group and which raised hope that convincing progress could be made at least on the "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter, rapidly vanished, and the Working Group is now still faced with some of the same problems that made its work difficult in the preceding year. The willingness of delegations to consider

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compromise formulation and to join in a common effort to reach consensus results faded away, at least when the time came to draft this report. Instead of proudly going on record with the measure of progress achieved, delegations preferred to restate their earlier positions, in a clear attempt to keep their stance intact for the next round of negotiations. Some delegations even used the opportunity to phrase their demands with new vigour, although it must have been abundantly clear to them that their proposals harboured no promise of adoption by the Working Group. The Chairman, in various instances, attempted to put forward texts which in his view took a maximum number of positions into account, but he generally remained unsuccessful. When, in the closing stages of the session he offered to submit an integral draft text of a future radiological weapons treaty, covering the "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter, a draft which, in his perception, could have served as a suitable basis for a compromise on which all delegations could eventually agree, he was given to understand that such an initiative was unwelcome; he thus abstained from circulating the text.

The several parallel meetings on questions relating to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities provided an opportunity for discussion in depth of some highly relevant issues. A number of delegations contributed to an elucidation of the technical problems involved, and it is fair to say that the Working Group as a whole gained considerable insights into the problems at hand. However, major divergencies as to the scope of possible prohibition appeared at an early point, and proved to be so considerable as to impede further progress even on the level of initial discussion.

While the Working Group's session has certainly contributed to providing a clearer perspective to all delegations on the issues and on certain options for solution, the field is still wide open. Once again, the Working Group, dealing with a subject matter of only limited significance for the global disarmament process, has been unable to live up fully to its responsibilities. That constitutes a serious challenge for the forthcoming summer session. It will still be my privilege to preside over the work at **that** time. When work is resumed, I will urge all delegations to renew their efforts to come to grips with the still unresolved problems, and I would already ask them now to clear their minds and to use the intermediate period for reflection about how some of the outstanding problems of principle can be tackled without undue loss of time.

While then, the spring session was disappointing in its results, I yet have to acknowledge that many delegations, and many colleagues personally, offered the Chairman an exceptionally fine co-operation and bore with him in the search for results and compromise. I should like to express my gratitude to them, just as I thank the secretariat and the interpreters for their fine work.

Should a mode be adopted according to which all the introductory statements by Working Groups' Chairmen were to be circulated, I would not want to be excluded. However, I would think that in my special case a rendering in the verbatim record would be sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Wegener, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, for his statement and for introducing his report. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmad, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group contained in document CD/285.

Mr. AHMAD (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances): Mr. Chairman, it is my honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the special report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons contained in document CD/205.

In accordance with the Committee's decision, the special report contains a reference to the origin of negotiations on this item and covers the work done during the previous three sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, besides describing the present state of negotiations on the subject and outlining certain conclusions and recommendations.

The subject of "negative security assurances" has a fairly long history which includes the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States in 1978 and the consensus reached at the first special session to conclude effective arrangements on this question. At its first session, in 1979, the Working Group agreed that negotiations on the subject would need to cover both the form and the substance of the arrangements. At its sessions in 1980 and 1981, the Working Group concentrated mainly on an examination of the substance of the subject, on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on the form. During the final stages of its work, last year, the Working Group concentrated its efforts on evolving a "common formula" for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations and agreed upon by all concerned, or a "common formula" which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States.

At the beginning of its work during the present session, the Working Group decided to continue these efforts, taking into account, inter alia, previous recommendations as well as resolutions 36/94 and 36/95 of the General Assembly. The general positions of delegations remained unchanged, although some new ideas and suggestions were advanced. Apart from hearing the reiterations of such general positions, the Working Group further considered proposals submitted to it for a possible "common formula" or "common approach" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. As in the past, there was once again no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Subsequently, the Working Group considered proposals for interim measures, particularly a possible resolution of the Security Council on the subject. Furthermore, other courses of action which could be taken in the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were also examined. Some nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed that their declarations were credible and responsive to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States, while some other delegations suggested that these should be appropriately reviewed and revised at the forthcoming special session.

The conclusions of the Working Group speak for themselves. There is consensus that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that agreement on this item should be reached urgently. However, the evident divergence in the perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States continue to persist. And although many of the issues involved have been clarified, the Working Group has been unable to fulfil its mandate. The Working Group was able to recommend, in the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations on this item.

On a personal note, I am constrained to express my disappointment and concern at the failure of the Committee on Disarmament to make any substantive progress towards evolving an agreement on this question which is satisfactory to all concerned and

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on Security Assurances)

particularly to the non-nuclear-weapon States. May I take this occasion to appeal to all States, and in particular to the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach an agreement on this question. I hope that this political will shall be evident at the forthcoming second special session.

In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Working Group for their co-operation which was indispensable for the work of the Group. I would also like on behalf of the Ad Hoc Working Group, to express our deep appreciation for the very able assistance provided to the Working Group by Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung, the Secretary of the Working Group, as well as the entire secretariat staff, throughout the session and particularly in preparing this special report.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Ahmad, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, for his statement and for introducing his report. Distinguished delegates, I think that it might be useful if we request the secretariat to reproduce the oral statements of both the Chairman of the Radiological Weapons Working Group and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances as we did in the case of the other two working groups. I give the floor to Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Since the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the distinguished Ambassador of Poland, Ambassador Sujka suggested that the names of the previous Chairmen of that Group be included in the report, I would also like to suggest that, as far as the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is concerned, the name of the distinguished delegate of Hungary, Ambassador Komives, who headed the Group before Ambassador Wegener, should likewise be included in the report.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda. The last speaker on my list for today is the representative of France, and I give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, we are going to close the first part of our annual session tomorrow. On this occasion, the French delegation would like to draw a few conclusions from our work.

As was the case last year, this work has been conducted in politically unfavourable conditions. We know that negotiations on disarmament cannot progress independently of the international situation. Furthermore, the basic differences which we know exist on the conditions of and approach to disarmament have inevitably affected the progress of the discussions. Thus, despite the imminence of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a fact which ought to have stimulated our efforts, the results we have to show are extremely modest. We note, however, certain positive decisions aimed at extending the sphere of our work.

With regard to item 1 of our agenda, on a "Nuclear test ban", the French delegation would like to recall its position in view of the initiative for the setting up of a working group on matters of verification and compliance with a prohibition agreement. It will not object to a consensus on this proposal, subject to the terms of the mandate. But it would like to recall that in the words of the Final Document, the cessation of testing should take place "within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process". It ought not therefore, to be a preliminary measure, independent of this process. I would also like to recall the reservation made by the representative of France at the first special session of the General Assembly with respect to article 50 of the Final Document.

(dir. de la Gorce, France)

Item 2 of our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", has not been thoroughly examined during the first part of our session, for lack of time. My delegation participated actively in the discussions held last year at informal meetings. It attaches great value to such discussions on these basic aspects of disarmament. It is prepared to continue its contribution to seeking and defining conditions which may lead to progress.

For the first time since our first annual session, the Committee has added a new item of substance to its agenda: "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". This item has already formed the subject of a number of substantial statements and I should like to make a few remarks on it at this point. We attach the greatest importance to the destabilizing effects which attacks against satellites would have. This is why we feel that examination of this question should be undertaken without delay. During our debates, the merits and also the inadequacies of the 1967 Treaty on **outer** space were clearly brought out. The resulting situation inspired the proposals which have been submitted to us.

One of them, that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, does not appear to us to offer a satisfactory solution. In effect it amounts, paradoxically, to making each space power its own judge in matters of outer space. How are articles 1 and 3 of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union to be interpreted except as giving every State freedom to destroy a space object which it decides of its own accord, without consultation or reference to any pre-established criterion, is carrying weapons? Furthermore, the draft treaty makes provision only for national technical means of verification of compliance with its provisions. Moreover, we do not believe that there is any justification for bringing specifically into the discussion the question of reusable space vehicles -- the question of space shuttles. Is it the intention thus to extend the field of application of the treaty to objects whose trajectory is not exclusively orbital? On the other hand, there is no provision, it seems, for resolving the problems which may arise from the dual use -- for both civilian and military purposes -- of orbital platforms. Furthermore, nothing is said of the part that would be played in this approach by satellites which, as France and other countries have proposed, could be used on behalf of the international community for purposes of verification of disarmament agreements and crisis control.

In fact, our initial discussions on this subject in the Committee have amply demonstrated that outer space activities are so complex and so rapidly evolving that what we must do first is, on the one hand, to define more precisely, in relation to outer space, terms which are often used ambiguously, such as the word "weapon", and, on the other hand, to determine the priorities in examining this problem. In view of the large volume of the resources at present being invested in outer space activities for both civilian and military purposes, amounting in all to several billion dollars in orbit daily, and of the stabilizing part played by satellites, as has been expressly recognized in several international documents stipulating non-interference when the satellites are used for purposes of verification, it is essential for the international community to reach an agreement to prevent the occurrence of a situation where anti-satellite weapons or techniques would become a new factor of instability. In fact, in spite of the protections and reinforcements that might be possible, at great cost and with a reduction of the payload, the intrinsic vulnerability of satellites gives the attacker an advantage.

We therefore feel that the Committee should proceed to a more general examination of the problem in terms of the stability of strategic systems and security. What we need to do is to determine, among the existing or conceivable systems, which would represent potential factors of destabilization with a view to prohibiting them as a matter of priority. For example, the development of anti-ballistic missiles based on space stations would, we believe, be extremely destabilizing. The conclusion of this examination would also bring out the fact that it would probably not be in the

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interests even of the great Powers, especially in view of the cost-effectiveness ratio, to keep all the options open. For all these reasons, we consider it very important for the Committee to examine the problem of anti-satellite techniques thoroughly when it resumes its work. We would have no objection to the establishment, for this purpose, of a working group which could have the help of experts.

The other items on our agenda have been discussed in working groups, as they were last year.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has finally been given a mandate appropriate to its task. We are pleased at this and we appreciated the attitude of the United States delegation in this connection. However, the work conducted very competently by Ambassador Sujka has not shown any very appreciable progress. In truth, there was insufficient time. The problem of verification was once more at the centre of the discussions. This is a fundamental problem the solution of which will largely determine whether or not it will be possible to take decisions on the prohibitions in question. For after all, what would be the point of instituting prohibitions if compliance with them could not effectively be verified? Some delegations put the accent on internal verification through purely national bodies. Others, ourselves included, stress the primary importance of an international system of verification. We do not deny that national authorities should be responsible for supervising the implementation of the convention on their territory, in order, in particular to prevent the chemical industry of their own country from engaging in prohibited activities clandestinely. But such control is far from meeting the requirements of an international convention. It does not constitute genuine verification. If a Government decided, in defiance of its commitments, to keep or to build up stocks of chemical weapons, a national control body could hardly prevent it from doing so, and much less would it denounce it. It is, however, essential that each State party should have the assurance that the convention is being fully applied by all, an assurance that can be given only by an international verification mechanism empowered to conduct on-the-spot investigations.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, directed with authority and competence by Ambassador Wegener, was not able to achieve the progress for which we had been hoping. The French delegation is unfortunately obliged to note that the warnings it voiced were well-founded. The difficulties which have hampered the negotiations in certain respects are the result of the attempts, of which we are all aware, to include in them matters unrelated to their immediate object. As I said at the outset of our session in my delegation's preliminary statement, these involve either prejudging the solution of other problems, such as the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, or the solution of problems which fall within another field of international law, such as the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear installations. The French delegation does not deny the importance of these matters, but it believes it to be essential that the working groups should keep within the exact terms of their mandates. As a demonstration of goodwill, we did not oppose a consensus on the solution offered by the Chairman of the Working Group, which consisted in devoting a few meetings of this Group to a preliminary examination of the problems presented by the Swedish proposal on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear installations. But considering that this problem did not fall within the competence of the Committee, and does not, under the terms of its mandate, fall within the competence of the Working Group, the French delegation refrained from participating

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

in those meetings. It regrets the fact that it proved impossible, in the circumstances, to resolve the outstanding difficulties as regards the terms of the convention itself, and that we were unable to reach a conclusion under this item on a matter which unquestionably falls within the competence of the Committee on Disarmament.

We certainly attach importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, presided over with much distinction by Ambassador Ahmad. We are aware of the difficulties of the problem and we shall not dwell upon those relating to the search for a common formula. We have seen the proposals submitted by Pakistan and the Netherlands and we are certainly anxious that progress should be made in this matter, but it is difficult for us to say more on it at this stage. We shall obviously maintain our interest in this question and we are prepared to continue our participation in exploring paths which might lead to a common approach or to any formula capable of satisfying the international community as a whole.

Lastly, I should like to devote my concluding remarks to the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This Group had the extremely heavy responsibility of completing a document in itself extraordinarily ambitious, and we came up against difficulties which in fact we knew beforehand we should encounter. I would like to pay a tribute here to the patience of Ambassador García Robles, who directed the very numerous meetings with great competence. We must take note of the result, namely, a document which is no doubt far from reflecting the unanimous agreement we were hoping for, but which represents an acceptable basis for the continuation of the consultations, and we hope that it will be possible in New York to reach an agreement. This is very important for our Committee, since this document is the principal contribution we were required to make to the work of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In this very complex matter, where there are very divergent approaches regarding absolutely fundamental problems, such as the legal nature of the programme, the formulation of time-frames for the implementation of the measures and the different stages, and the link between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, it is obvious that it will be very difficult for us to reach common formulas if we persist in trying systematically to reach what is called a compromise, which would mean in fact that all sides would be required to make concessions on conditions they consider essential. We therefore consider that what we ought rather to do is to try to adopt formulas that are sufficiently flexible to take into account not only the views of opposing sides but also the progress made in the matter of disarmament. The latter depends on the state of international relations, the maintenance of the security of States during the disarmament process -- which is crucial -- and the actual conditions of this security: a balance where it is necessary for security, international verification, consideration of regional factors, etc. It is only by seeking formulas which meet the needs -- the requirements -- of all sides that we shall be able to reach a solution. This is not an exercise in which we should try to win a victory over partners whose own needs in the matter of security deserve to be respected. The way to find a solution is to seek to overcome the difficulties through formulas which will satisfy everyone without requiring them to make sacrifices as regards their security and the conditions they can accept in that respect. We earnestly hope that a solution can be found, for it will undoubtedly be an extremely important element in the success of the second special session and an equally important element for the authority, the credit and the credibility of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence and that of all my colleagues if I venture to ask for the floor a second time this afternoon. The few words I have to say now I will say in my capacity as the representative of Mexico and not as the Chairman of any subsidiary body of the Committee. Their purpose is to explain the submission, which will have been noted by all distinguished representatives this afternoon, the submission, I repeat, of document CD/282 entitled "Working paper containing the text of the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the prevention of nuclear war, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the invitation extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981".

As we all know, on 9 December last, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/81 B entitled "Prevention of nuclear war". The preambular paragraphs of this resolution recall and reproduce nearly word for word some of the concepts embodied in the 1978 Final Document, such as alarm at "the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race"; the need to bear in mind the fact -- and again I quote -- that "removal of the threat of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day"; a reiteration of the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in disarmament; and a reminder of the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States.

On the basis of facts such as these, the General Assembly included in the operative part of its resolution an exhortation and an invitation. The exhortation is addressed to all nuclear-weapon States, which are urged to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982 their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war so that these views, proposals and practical suggestions may be considered -- the resolution says -- at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The invitation is extended to all other States Members of the United Nations, if they so desire, to do likewise. I believe that the difference in the verbs used reflects a recognition of the fact that the degree of responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers in this matter is infinitely greater -- and this is why they have been "urged", while other States have been "invited". The Government of Mexico, which has always been very serious in contributing to the utmost of its ability to the achievement of disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, recently sent the Secretary-General of the United Nations its views and practical suggestions on this matter, and the full text of those views is reproduced in document CD/282.

I do not wish to go into great detail -- the text is self-explanatory. I merely wish to note that, as the document states, the Government of Mexico considers that, for the purpose in question, namely, the prevention of nuclear war, measures like those that are the only ones the nuclear-weapon Powers have so far managed to agree on, for example, the establishment of direct communication lines between the Heads of State of the nuclear super-Powers, however laudable they may be, may in the context of the terrifying situation confronting the world, be regarded as merely cosmetic. The Government of Mexico also states that it is convinced that the recipe for the permanent removal of the threat of a nuclear war is very simple: it would be sufficient to take seriously the provisions which were adopted by consensus in 1978 and set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. And if it were necessary to single out any of these measures, the choice would unhesitatingly go to those contained in paragraphs 47 and 50 of the Final Document, which I shall not quote here because they are so well-known. As the

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

communication I have been referring to states, it has not been the lack of clearly defined methods and procedures which has so far obstructed the adoption of effective measures for the prevention of a nuclear war. There has simply been a complete lack of political will on the part of the States which bear the greatest share of responsibility for remedying the alarming situation confronting the world. The communication ends with these words, with which I shall also conclude my statement: "It is to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the two nuclear super-Powers can reach the same conclusion and bring their international conduct into line with it. We believe this will not be difficult for them if they consider that it is absurd to try to achieve national security by increasing universal insecurity, that the nuclear arsenals accumulated are more than sufficient to produce, not once but many times, total death on the planet -- whether it be instant death or death through slow and agonizing disintegration, and that, as is stated in one of the conclusions of the Secretary-General's last report on nuclear weapons, it is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization should be used by some States to promote their security, which means that the future of mankind is then made hostage to a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably the two super-Powers".

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, in accordance with paragraph 30 of our rules of procedure, I should like to make the following statement.

For three years now, the Group of 21 has consistently tried to achieve the establishment of a working group on item 1 of our agenda. The group of socialist countries supported these efforts. Yet, our proposals have been blocked by two nuclear-weapon powers of the West, and during that period the efforts of the Group of 21 have been to no avail. During this session of the Committee, laborious negotiations on the text of a mandate for a working group on item 1 were initiated. Yesterday, the Group of 21 declared its readiness to support a text which gave only minimum satisfaction to its stated position, in the hope that a consensus could be achieved. But since these efforts originated in an initiative from the opposing side it was the socialist group that blocked its approval. Today, document CD/287 has just been tabled by a group of socialist countries. It contains a proposal that was originally made in the drafting group for the elaboration of a mandate for a working group on item 1 of our agenda. Most certainly, it will not obtain consensus in the Committee because it originates from one super-Power, and will be vetoed by the other. The main reason for that is the prevailing state of confrontation between the super-Powers. They seem determined to ensure that any initiative originating in the opposite camp ends in failure. This seems a very effective way to block any multilateral action on a nuclear test ban, an objective that both have agreed to be of the highest priority and urgency and which they have committed themselves to pursue by virtue of binding international instruments. For this reason, my delegation does not see any point in participating at this late stage of our work in the power-game of the most heavily armed nations in the world. We will not join in this new display of a spirit of confrontation which totally disregards the interests and concerns of the greater part of mankind. After the results of the second special session are known and after the entire international community has had a chance to debate the real reasons for the failure of this Committee to discharge its functions, then we believe that the Committee on Disarmament may again look into the question of establishing a working group on item 1 of its agenda.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, having been a member of the drafting group which, under your enlightened and active chairmanship, endeavoured to draft a mandate for a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament on item 1 of the agenda, and having myself had the honour of guiding the group's work when I served as Chairman of the Committee during the month of March, I would like at this juncture to express my delegation's deep regret at our failure so far to achieve any results on this item, in spite of all the efforts we have made.

I cannot say that the document which has just been submitted to us by the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia and bears the symbol CD/287 in itself offers any possibility of results. The drafting group started from the premise that a working group could have been set up. The real problem was not the establishment of a subsidiary body but the formulation of its mandate. Furthermore, only yesterday we had another discussion in an informal meeting in the course of which, among the other arguments put forward, I heard — I think it was Ambassador Herder say that there was no point in our rushing to establish a working group on the eve of the closure of this session, and that we might just as well take the matter up again at the special session of the General Assembly or when we resume our work. That is an argument which could, I believe, be applied even more to the establishment of a working group without a mandate and which would not, therefore, be able to begin its work immediately upon the resumption of the Committee's session but would have to wait until the Committee itself conferred upon it a mandate agreed on by consensus.

I must say that during the work of the drafting group I was aware of the efforts being made by all members of the group, as well as by the other members of the Committee who came to take part in its work, to try to reach a consensus on this question, and I often had the impression that we were very close to a positive result, which is what I believe all delegations very much want. My own delegation has, I must say, for years, been hoping that the Committee on Disarmament or the negotiating bodies that preceded it would be able to come to grips with this problem, which is an essential issue and one of the highest priority. That is why I wanted to express my deep disappointment. During the last few days, we have seen Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, trying to co-ordinate the efforts that were being made in the drafting group and draft a text which would strike a political balance between the various positions — a text which would involve sacrifices on all sides but would not be weighted in one direction or in another. With your permission, I would like to read out this text to the Committee; I shall read it in English, the language in which it was drafted. The text includes in its first paragraph an amendment that was formulated by the delegation of Mexico. It reads as follows:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'Nuclear test ban'.

Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

When I saw this text and realized that it had the support of a large number of delegations (and in particular of the Group of 21, subject to its forming the basis of a consensus), I earnestly hoped that this session could end with a result which, given the difficulty of setting up a working group on this topic with a suitable mandate, would in itself represent an important victory for the Committee on Disarmament. The amendments to this text proposed by the group of socialist countries naturally reflect that group's position, but, in my view, they add nothing to the substance of the text itself. I would really like to know whether the text I have just read out places such an important limitation on the work of the subsidiary body we want to establish that it justifies -- to state explicitly what I consider to be already implicit in the text -- jeopardizing the efforts at compromise made by all delegations, including those of the socialist countries, in order to reach agreement. I believe that the text that I read out could give the Committee a chance to undertake useful work, without confining itself strictly to certain aspects of the negotiation of a nuclear test ban -- for the entire effort of compromise was directed precisely at rendering implicit in the text what could not, for political and negotiating reasons, be stated more explicitly. However, I repeat, the amendments proposed by the socialist countries can in no way broaden the working group's possibilities as regards the task it is to undertake. Thus, all that these amendments do at the present stage is to make agreement impossible, while not, in my view, advancing the interests of the Committee, most of whose members are only too anxious to seize the opportunity offered them to embark on genuine substantive work on a matter which is of great concern to us, which is important and which has for years and years been a priority and a source of difficulties and polemics.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, it is clear that what we have in document CD/267 is a last-minute manoeuvre which merely distracts the Committee's attention from the outcome of the long and serious negotiations which have been going on since February and about which all delegations are well informed. In yesterday's discussion, here in this room, it clearly emerged that a majority of delegations were prepared to join in a consensus to accept the draft known as "J-1". Only the socialist group declined to agree to this, for what appeared to most of us insubstantial reasons. The procedure now suggested, in CD/287, that we set up a working group without first agreeing on its mandate, seems to my delegation to be unacceptable both in principle and in fact. Indeed, this idea has already been projected in the course of the negotiations in the drafting group. We are very sorry that the situation has turned out in this way after all the effort that has been made to try to achieve agreement. We hope it is still not too late to adopt "J-1" as the distinguished representative of Italy has just suggested.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): With reference to what I said a short while ago about France's position as regards the discussion of agenda item 1 in a working group, I should like to make it clear that the proposal contained in document CD/287 is unacceptable to my delegation. My delegation would be unable

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

in any case to join in a consensus on such a basis since, if it agreed to the establishment of a working group on item 1, that would be subject to the group's mandate. In other words, we could only agree to the principle of the setting up of a working group in the light of its mandate. Since this proposal does not contain any mandate and defers the elaboration of the mandate to the opening of the summer session, it is obvious that the French delegation cannot agree to it.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further statements, I wish to thank delegations for their contributions this afternoon. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting of the Committee, in about 10 minutes' time, to consider the draft special report to the special session of the General Assembly. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, Wednesday, 21 April, at 3.30 p.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 21 April 1982, at 6.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio OKAWA

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. A. TAPPAR

Argentina: Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Mr. A.V. GONZALEZ
Mr. J. LUIS GARCIA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK
Mr. A. BHRIN

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCININE
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mrs. M.E. HOINKES
Mr. J. MISKEL

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. E. EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 175th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of reports of subsidiary bodies as well as of its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As usual, in conformity with rule 30 of our rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so at any time.

Before we consider our business for today, I wish to put before the Committee for adoption the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 67, dated 21 April 1982. This is on the establishment of an ad hoc working group under item 1 of the Committee's agenda. In that connection, I wish to make the following statement.

Distinguished delegates, you will recall that the small group that was established to draft a mandate for a CTB working group began its work on 19 March, under the chairmanship of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alessi. Since then, in fact for the past five weeks, continued efforts have been made by members of this Committee to draft a mandate that would be acceptable to all. Our work has been long and arduous. This morning our efforts were crowned with success when we learnt that all delegates and all groups were able to accept the text that I now have the honour of placing before you. In submitting this text, as contained in Working Paper No. 67, I have to mention the name of our distinguished Secretary, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, who came to our help when many of us, including your Chairman, were beginning to give up hope. It was Ambassador Jaipal who saved the day for us, with the texts which came to be known, affectionately if I may say so, as J-1 and J-2. I wish to thank him for the great service he has rendered to us all. The language of this text, while perhaps not giving complete satisfaction to any of the delegations around this table, does allow for a degree of flexibility in its interpretation. The actual work programme of the working group will certainly be the subject of detailed discussion in the working group itself when it convenes at the beginning of the second half of our 1982 session. And once the substantive discussions start and delegations begin -- I quote from the proposed mandate -- "to discuss and define through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban", they will, in my view, find that there are a great many issues which relate to verification and compliance. Delegations will inevitably find themselves discussing or at least trying to discuss such a broad range of subjects that the future Chairman of this working group will indeed have a hard time. But that is for our summer session. Today, I wish to express my deep respect to all the delegations around this table for the great efforts they have made and for the spirit of constructive compromise that everyone has shown. Each and every delegation has had problems, difficult problems, not only of language, but also as regards substance, or even principle, and I am sure that they have experienced agonizing moments, especially in the course of their discussions, or arguments, rather, with their capitals. They have prevailed upon their Governments, and have enabled us in the Committee to reach a compromise which I consider to be both reasonable and honourable. I once again pay my tribute to all delegations, and particularly to Ambassador Alessi and Ambassador Jaipal for their efforts, and submit to the Committee the draft mandate

(The Chairman)

contained in Working Paper No. 67. 1/ May I take it that this draft mandate is approved by the Committee?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka, for a statement concerning the report of his Working Group.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Through you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to inform the Committee on Disarmament that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons had a further meeting last night to discuss some changes in its report. The Working Group then adopted its report subject to the incorporation of the following amendments:

On page 1, paragraph 1, line 12, after the word "weapons" insert the following in brackets: "(CD/48, CD/112)".

At the end of paragraph 1, add the following sentence:

"A list of all the documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted under the agenda item entitled 'Chemical Weapons', as well as of the documents of the Working Group which included working papers and conference room papers, is contained in the annex to this report."

On page 3, in paragraph 3, at the end of line 9, add the following, "and provisions on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States".

In paragraph 3, line 11, between the words "national" and "means", add the word "technical".

At the end of the document CD/281, add an annex listing Committee on Disarmament plenary documents on chemical weapons as well as the documents of the Working Group.

1/ "In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear test ban'.

Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The list of documents has been circulated in photocopied form. Should delegations wish to add to it, I suggest that they inform the secretariat accordingly. Amended in this way, it is my understanding that the report of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons can now be included in the special report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for his statement.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, His Excellency Ambassador Wegener, for a statement concerning the report of his Working Group.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Following the precedent of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, at the request of some delegations, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons also held a short, additional meeting today to reconsider some parts of the report and a certain number of technical errors were corrected and some amendments introduced. With your permission I would like to read out the changes to be made to the printed document we have before us, CD/284, in the English version -- the one with an asterisk.

Yesterday, on introducing the report, I read out a certain number of amendments, but I think it would be clearer to delegates if I were now to read out all the amendments together so that delegates can introduce them into their documents and check on the earlier changes. The title should be amended to read, "Special report to the Committee on Disarmament ...", etc. In paragraph 4, second line, after "Working Group", please insert the words "under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Imre Komives (Hungary)", and then the text continues as before. On page 2, in the penultimate line of paragraph 6, the words "radiation from the decay of" should be deleted. On page 3, in paragraph 16, in the eighth line, after the words "from attack", a new sentence is to be inserted, reading: "Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter." In the footnote on the same page, after the fifth word, the words "for the purposes of this report" should be inserted. There are no changes on page 4. On page 5, the word at the end of the first line of paragraph 26 should be in the plural, and read "provisions".

Paragraph 28 has been substantially amended, and the text now reads: "The view was widely held that the treaty should enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a lower number than the 25 hitherto discussed, and the number of 15 was advanced in this context, while some delegations reaffirmed their position that the treaty should enter into force upon its ratification by 25 Governments, including the nuclear-weapon States."

In paragraph 27, still on page 5, the last three words of the penultimate line, "points of view", should be replaced by "differences". In paragraph 30, in the second line, before the last word, "centered", the word "and" should be inserted, and in paragraph 31, five lines from the bottom, after "It was pointed out that", the words "attacks on such facilities could" should be inserted.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

In paragraph 52, a number of small inserts was agreed upon to make the language clearer, and I think it would be wise for me, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to read the entire paragraph: "Some delegations proposed that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be as comprehensive as possible. Since the basic objective was, in their view, to prevent mass destruction, there could be no justification to differentiate between civilian and military facilities. They also believed that mass destruction would result from attacks on either kind of facilities. However, in their view mass destruction was not the only criterion relevant to this issue. They argued that an important objective of the proposed instrument was to restore confidence among the countries regarding their peaceful nuclear programmes. This confidence had, in their opinion, been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities of a developing country. Therefore, they argued that the scope of the prohibition should include not only the larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities but also the smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter, in their view, would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries." The last sentence of the paragraph stays as printed.

In paragraph 53, in the fourth line, the word "effect" is to be replaced by "power". Three lines further on, in the sentence beginning, "In this regard, it was particularly emphasized", the words "by these delegations" should be inserted. Equally, in paragraph 54, the second sentence has some new language: after "A partial ban could", the words "in their view" should be inserted.

In paragraph 55 the following sentence was added at the end of the present text: "The delegation whose working paper had been quoted in the preceding paragraph drew attention to the fact that the paper in this context also contains the following statement: 'The political difficulties of protecting military facilities in an international instrument are obvious, and such facilities therefore seem to have to be excluded from a convention'." Whereupon, paragraph 56 also had to be amended, and it now reads: "It was, however, stated by some delegations that such political difficulties as may be involved were not sufficient reason for a partial prohibition. In their view such an approach would leave open the possibility of legitimizing mass destruction in the conduct of warfare".

Finally, the Working Group decided that the example of the other working groups should be followed and that a list of all documents relating to the work of the Working Group should be added. This list is at present being established by the secretariat on the basis of the available documents.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to draw your attention to a certain overlap that could result from the addition to paragraph 4 and paragraphs 11 and 12 with the new paragraph to be included in the Committee's main report, printed in Working Paper No. 53/Rev.2/Corr.2, but I think it is a matter for the secretariat to prevent possible overlaps, as the Group has expressed its understanding that overlaps of this kind should, if possible, be avoided.

So far I have spoken as the Chairman of the Working Group. I would like for a brief moment to take up a matter related to my function as a Chairman, and this is a brief statement of which I have informed you in advance, Mr. Chairman.

Last night, at the informal meeting that was held under your chairmanship, Mr. Chairman, the delegate of the Soviet Union made the following statement, and I quote excerpts from the English translation:

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

"... There were cases when, in spite of the insistent request addressed to the Chairman of one of the groups not to distort situations in the Group, such a distortion did occur ..." and further on, I quote:

"... if, in the report, there is an incorrect presentation of the situation in the Working Group, and nevertheless, that situation was adopted by methods which were somewhat less than democratic ...".

These are serious accusations. The Chairman of one of the working groups is accused before the members of the Committee of deliberate distortion of his Working Group's report, and of undemocratic behaviour in the exercise of his functions. To my knowledge, personal accusations of this gravity have so far never been levelled against any other delegate in this Committee. Should they now become part of our working modes, I would foresee very unfortunate consequences. I do not think, therefore, that the Soviet delegate's utterances should stand uncorrected.

Many delegations have informed me that in their understanding the accusations were clearly directed towards me. This needs clarification. I should like, therefore, to request, through you, Mr. Chairman, an adequate clarification from the Soviet delegate. Should it turn out that I was in fact the Working Group Chairman referred to, I would expect his apology on the record of this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons for his statement. I would say that I, as Chairman of this Committee, have been accused of being too authoritarian; I have also been accused of being too democratic. I think that the very job of a chairman involves those risks. It is the lot of a chairman to be accused of all sorts of things. I would hope that this matter would not be pursued to undue length.

The revised reports of the working groups on chemical and radiological weapons will be issued later by the secretariat. In the meantime, I would consider that the Committee is prepared to adopt the reports of the four working groups of the Committee as contained in documents CD/281, as amended, for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, CD/283 for the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, CD/284 as amended for the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, and CD/285 for the Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the reports of these four working groups.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now turn to Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2 and Working Papers No. 58/Rev.2/Corr. 1 and 2, containing the draft special report of the Committee to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. May I take it that this Committee is prepared to adopt the draft special report? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I have on my list of speakers so far for today the following 17 delegations: Canada, Belgium, the United States of America, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic, Japan, Nigeria, India, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Kenya, China and Mexico. I give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the representative of Canada, His Excellency Ambassador McPhail.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, let me first say to you how much my delegation has admired your presiding over our Committee in these difficult final days of this first half of the session. I want to assess, in general terms, the work of the Committee on Disarmament in the light of the forthcoming second special session, and to make comments on a few specific topics.

The Committee is about to adjourn, and when it resumes its 1982 session the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be over. It is not difficult to tell what then our concerns will be. These same concerns will be addressed by the second special session. The Committee, however, is charged with a unique responsibility -- to negotiate. Regular sessions of the General Assembly do not -- and cannot -- negotiate. Nor is the special session a forum for negotiation. Against this background, let us examine this Committee's performance as measured against its responsibilities.

We would no doubt all agree that the record, since 1978, when the Committee on Disarmament was established following the first special session, is mixed. The expansion of the work of the Committee, and the rapid proliferation of meetings (so ably recorded for us by the secretariat) do not seem proportionate to the results. Procedural matters consume great amounts of time and it is questionable whether, in some instances, the fundamental purpose of working groups -- to negotiate -- is in danger of occupying second place as the tendency grows to read prepared statements in these groups.

But is not the greatest difficulty the Committee on Disarmament faces the frequent lack of a real negotiating dynamic? This dynamic is present only if a willingness exists among negotiating partners to make concessions in the interest of reaching a mutually-agreed goal.

Demands and exhortations are frequently put to this Committee, but are they related to any larger bargain? Do they contribute to progress through negotiation? For example, are all those who have sought to contain the nuclear "at risk" area and to guarantee protection to nuclear facilities -- objectives commonly shared -- willing to undertake concrete commitments to the future control of nuclear weapons potential?

Furthermore, broad declarations of a willingness to negotiate have not always been followed up with real contributions to the negotiating process. The debate that has been held, for example, on toxicity determinants of precursors to binary chemical weapons is of unproven value in terms of the purposes of the proposed treaty. Equally, the inability of the Seismic Experts Working Group to reach agreement on an extended progress report is a cause for concern. Thus, there are gaps between declared willingness and actual performance.

Yet, the Committee on Disarmament can move no further and no faster than the international situation permits. If progress on major issues has been slow, it is largely because the international atmosphere has not allowed it to be otherwise.

I began with some of the negative elements in the Committee's work. Taken together, they add up to one unavoidable conclusion: since the Committee was established, it has been unable to produce any single agreement on any subject related to arms control and disarmament matters. But is this the sole basis upon which we

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

should make our judgements? I think not, for the Committee remains, despite its shortcomings, the only multilateral negotiating forum on arms control and disarmament matters. If it did not exist, it would surely be created; if it were disbanded, it would surely be replaced. Accordingly, we should assess the Committee on Disarmament's value, not so much in terms of what it has accomplished, but more in terms of what it may accomplish, once conditions are right: now, measured in this way, already we have some signs of promise.

The first is the establishment of the Committee's working groups. These continue to hold potential as operative forums for business-like negotiations on arms control measures, provided that the subject-matter and the timing are right. A case in point is the Chemical Weapons Working Group which, with its expanded mandate, continues to make real progress towards the eventual conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty.

The second sign is the creation of what is known as "subsidiary bodies", as well as other forms of collective endeavour. I noted that the Seismic Experts Working Group has had difficulties, but it has also had successes; and it is obviously upon the latter that we should build. Similarly, the practical work registered during "concentrated sessions" on chemical weapons has allowed the Committee to focus on technical matters of importance to the eventual conclusion of a treaty. These sessions have been invaluable, not least because points of principle advocated by various delegations often took second place to the range of practical questions which necessarily must be addressed before the actual implementation of a treaty: here, then, debate was replaced by discussion.

The third sign is the demonstrated ability of the Committee on Disarmament to move in worthwhile directions. A working group dealing with certain aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is now close to realization. Already the informal discussions on the working group's mandate have in themselves brought to the Committee a more focused approach to this critical problem. In the near future, other working groups will probably be established also, each dealing with specific aspects of issues of concern to the Committee.

These are the considerations in our minds when reflecting upon how the Committee on Disarmament should relate to the second special session. Some argue that the Committee's special report should review past activities, and account for performance and assign praise and blame accordingly. But we do not agree. Consensus on precisely what are the Committee's shortcomings is unlikely. Nor do we think it advisable to dwell on the past; we prefer instead to move forward on the basis of what has been accomplished -- which indeed should figure in the special report.

I spoke of signs of promise, and of some negative aspects of the Committee's work, both in the context of the second special session, which for many has been the central focus of the Committee's activities for some time. Great effort and indeed ingenuity have been expended in drawing up a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is now evident that on a number of fundamental points, no agreement has been possible; and so the work on the programme must be carried on by the General Assembly itself, at its special session. The question of time-frames remains the single, most intractable issue; and it is an open question whether it can really be resolved. In the final analysis, is not in fact the issue something of an artificial one? Surely nations will conduct negotiations on the matters listed in the draft CPD only when and if their assessment of their own national security interests allows them to do so. A comprehensive programme which fails to take this into account is unlikely to achieve consensus, either in the Committee on Disarmament or at the second special session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

I think this is a time for frankness. How much effect will the comprehensive programme have on the work of the Committee? The comprehensive programme remains essentially an agenda, no matter how described, of negotiations on arms control and disarmament. But the Committee has its own agenda, which will still guide our work when the second special session is over, and for this reason, it is all the more important to concentrate on the practical and realizable when the Committee resumes. Statements of broad vision do have their place, and indeed it is a common hope that the second special session will provide the world community with that vision; but the Committee must rightly deal with the mundane, the practical, the negotiable. Negotiation is never easy, and requires both attention to detail and compromise -- not really the stuff special sessions are made of.

In short, we cannot look to the special session to solve problems this Committee deals with because it will not; and the practical issues the Committee confronts will still be present after the second special session is history.

One of these major practical problems is verification. It has been a theme, if not the major theme, of this session. In aspects of the Committee's work where hope is highest, for example with respect to chemical weapons, the emphasis on verification is greatest. The accomplishments of the Committee on Disarmament through the activities of the Seismic Experts Working Group are essentially in the area of verification. The CTB Working Group will address the subject of verification. On the other hand, one of the built-in problems in achieving a mutually satisfactory and universal negative security assurance is that, by its very nature, such an assurance is unverifiable: it deals, not with arms, but with intentions. Perhaps the lesson of verification has only recently been learned. Many have asserted that verification adds to confidence, and does not detract from it. Treaties have been concluded in the past without adequate verification provisions, and the consequences have underlined their resulting weakness. Inherently unverifiable treaties have been concluded, such as the Briand Kellog Pact, which outlawed war. It is this historical experience which troubles many in discussing proposals that cannot be verified. In their view, and indeed in ours, the law is only the law if it is agreed -- and enforced, in the case of international agreement on arms control and disarmament, through verification.

Earlier I noted three positive signs in the Committee's work. There is a fourth. The Committee has moved beyond discussing verification as an abstract principle, and is now considering the means of verification. Views differ, perhaps not as much as before, and solutions are in sight, if not yet within grasp.

The resolution of verification problems is rarely a glamorous business. But it is always essential. The second special session, obviously, cannot do this work. We can and should.

There are some who, while agreeing in principle to verification, are concerned that insistence on absolute verification, or something close to it, is a means to avoid progress on other substantive arms control and disarmament matters. It is easy to sympathize with this concern. That is why we believe our aim should be to seek adequate and mutually-acceptable verification measures. We are confident that with patience and perseverance, this can be done -- even in such technically demanding fields as chemical weapons verification. In the meantime, no agreement of consequence is likely to be achieved without suitable verification provisions. Let us therefore proceed accordingly. We, for our part, in due course, will be putting forward further suggestions on verification, particularly in the area of chemical weapons.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

We have worked hard to produce the final agreement on the contents of the special report to the second special session of the General Assembly.

During the course of our work we have heard the views of some who seek to assign responsibility for arms control measures exclusively to the "militarily significant" powers, or to the nuclear-weapon States, by implication perhaps leaving themselves blameless and without responsibility. But is this really the case? Surely, as the United Nations Secretary-General said in Geneva 10 days ago, our responsibilities in those respects are collective.

The international community, at the second special session on disarmament, will, we expect, and rightly so, we believe, reaffirm the validity of and the necessity for this Committee -- not because of its accomplishments but because there is no other choice. The ultimate test of this Committee's credibility is its ability to make progress on significant arms control measures. Whatever the outcome of the second special session, the Committee has yet to meet this test. Let us be guided accordingly in our resumed session next July.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as we are coming to the end of the Committee's spring session, I wish first of all to address myself to you, but I do not know whether it would be better to congratulate you on the way in which you have presided over our work during your period of chairmanship, or instead to express our sympathy with you for having been obliged to act as Chairman in such difficult conditions -- during a period when the organization of the Committee's work was particularly arduous, despite the great efforts of Ambassador Jaipal and the secretariat -- a period of procedural discussions and complications of which the Committee ought certainly not to be proud, and which we should think about as regards the future and our future sessions. In spite of all the difficulties, however, you have given proof of the great qualities we have seen in you ever since we have had the pleasure of working with you, namely, skill, tact, the patience that was certainly needed this time, and your diplomatic finesse, and I think that the Committee will always owe you a debt of gratitude for your display of these great talents which were, alas, very often, and at times harshly, put to the test.

As this spring session of the Committee on Disarmament draws to a close, we have just adopted our report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. It is the prospect of this important event that has dominated all our work since the beginning of this year.

In this connection, the agreement reached in the Committee today on the establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban is a particularly welcome development. Indeed, we are gratified by the success achieved as a result of the difficult negotiations on the mandate of this working group. We are also particularly grateful to the delegations most directly involved in these negotiations for the spirit of compromise they have shown. We now hope that the working group will be speedily set up when the Committee resumes its activities after the special session.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In preparing for the second special session, it was quite normal that the Committee should spend most of its time on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as it was requested to do by the General Assembly.

It is not my intention to draw any conclusions about the results submitted to us by the Working Group.

These results are, of course, very embryonic and, in view of the many texts on which agreement has not been reached, they may seem somewhat disappointing.

The report of the Committee on Disarmament is, however, only one stage in the negotiating process that will be pursued in New York. We sincerely hope that the combined efforts of delegations will enable this process to be completed at the forthcoming special session.

We should therefore make the best possible use of the few positive elements we now have in our favour.

The first is the negotiating climate. What happened in the informal group led by the delegation of Pakistan showed that progress was possible. There is now a noticeable improvement in the chapter relating to measures. It would be regrettable if these results, however fragmentary they may be, were jeopardized.

The structure of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is also clearer now. The measures have been divided into three stages and, within each one, sets of measures have been more coherently defined, primarily in the fields of nuclear and conventional disarmament.

In addition, there seems to be greater understanding of the need to allow the parties to the negotiation of disarmament agreements some degree of flexibility. Such negotiations ought not to be hampered by arbitrary schedules. The various disarmament measures could very well, if necessary, be incorporated into the programme in accordance with the possibilities for negotiation.

It should not be too difficult to reach agreement on the texts that have been prepared on the chapters relating to the objectives and the principles of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Efforts to this end might be based on those made with regard to the chapter on priorities, the only one that has been fully agreed on by our delegations.

There is also broad agreement on the chapter relating to machinery. There, too, it should be possible to reconcile the texts submitted by different groups of delegations.

The negotiations to be held in New York should focus primarily on the broad conceptual issues that have not yet been resolved.

The main problem is that of the time-frame for the programme. My delegation does not see this problem as insoluble. Precedents exist, particularly in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. Furthermore, although it seems to us impracticable to lay down, even tentatively, a set date for the completion of each stage, we nevertheless believe that the conferences for the review of the implementation of the programme, and hence of the measures in each stage, could be convened at regular intervals. This periodicity would in itself be an important feature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, as compared with the documents previously adopted by the General Assembly. For the fact of States agreeing beforehand that their policies in the matter of disarmament should be subject to review would be a particularly significant innovation.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Another important problem that has not yet been fully discussed is the nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation is happy to note that the various positions that have been expressed in this connection have shown a definite flexibility and open-mindedness. To what extent the obligation assumed by States as regards the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be legally binding is undoubtedly a matter for negotiation. There again, however, it seems to me that a solution acceptable to all parties could be found.

Clearly, what will require the greatest expenditure of time on the part of our delegations in New York is the negotiation of the various measures. Efforts to arrive at compromise texts are essential in more than one respect. In fact, on many subjects on which differing views are still being expressed, such compromise texts already exist. We ought not, therefore, to rule out the possibility of using them again in the comprehensive programme. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament defined by the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Declaration concerning the Second Disarmament Decade should continue to be useful sources of inspiration for our future negotiations.

Lastly, it will in due course be necessary to review the organization of the presentation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament in order to avoid, so far as possible, repetitions like those that "clutter" the Final Document. In addition, the question of verification has not yet really been given a proper place in the proposed structure of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We ought not to hesitate to give this important issue full treatment and to devote a chapter to the subject of verification.

It has not been possible to give the other activities which the Committee on Disarmament has carried out in working groups the same priority as the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Considerable efforts have nevertheless been devoted to them.

Progress has undeniably been achieved on what we now call "traditional" radiological weapons questions. The draft treaty in this connection submitted by the Chairman of the Working Group represents, in our view, a compromise that should offer a broadly acceptable basis for the completion of the negotiations on this subject.

The question of the prohibition of deliberate attacks on nuclear installations gave rise to some particularly interesting exchanges of views. However they showed how complex the subject is. They also revealed the existence of a number of widely varying negotiating options. It is thus clear that these exchanges formed part of an as yet very preliminary stage of the negotiating process.

In view of these facts, my delegation has some doubts about the advisability of a symmetrical approach to these two issues. We ought perhaps, therefore, to consider the possibility of bringing the negotiations on the first of these issues to a rapid conclusion and agreeing to continue negotiations on the second, which is not strictly a matter of prohibiting a weapon but rather a question of the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. If necessary, we might envisage the conclusion of a protocol to be annexed to the so-called "traditional" treaty, as my colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany has suggested.

With regard to chemical weapons, I should like to mention in particular the positive development represented by the Committee's conferral on the Working Group of a mandate which permits it to negotiate a convention. The work it has done at this

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

spring session has certainly enabled the Group to consolidate the results it achieved last year. We ought to try, during the summer session to negotiate all the questions involved more thoroughly and more intensively. My delegation would wish, in particular, to develop its contribution on the definition of chemical weapons so as to take into account as many as possible of the views expressed so far.

We should also like to give more careful consideration to the needs as regards verification of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. In this connection, Belgium wishes to stress the great importance it attaches to the proposal submitted by Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the study of verification possibilities of the "recovert" type. This question formed the subject of document CD/271 which was recently put before the Committee.

Belgium also hopes that after the discussions that have been held on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it will be possible, at the second part of the Committee's 1982 session, to adopt procedural decisions that will permit this important question to be dealt with more systematically.

The results of more than three years of work by the Committee on Disarmament are extremely limited. True, in recent months we have made some progress in so far as our work has focused more on the topics under negotiation and has been less hampered by theoretical or procedural discussions.

Nevertheless, the spirit of negotiation seems to have been lacking. In too many areas, delegations have done no more than restate their positions, without making any effort to seek compromises. All too often, also, interim solutions have been rejected on the grounds that they would merely make it impossible to seek proper solutions.

Such attitudes, which have been evident in particular, for example, in the matters of security assurances and radiological weapons, seem to me hardly compatible with the requirements of the disarmament process, where what is needed essentially is a patient search for small areas of progress which will gradually make it possible to achieve more and more ambitious goals.

I should like now to make a comment of a general nature: my delegation has noted that, throughout its discussions, the Committee on Disarmament has attached overwhelming importance to nuclear disarmament. I understand why the international community regards this as a matter of priority, but I venture to submit for your consideration and reflection that it is wars waged with conventional weapons that are still daily causing victims and that have decimated entire populations in recent decades. It seems to me that the Committee pays too little attention to conventional disarmament, and that it ought to correct this imbalance, while keeping things in proper perspective.

The limited results achieved by the Committee on Disarmament are also and perhaps especially a reflection of the situations of tension in the world to which reference has been made at the beginning and at the end of the current session. Belgium hopes that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will offer States an opportunity to gain greater awareness of the impact their conduct can have in the sphere of disarmament negotiations. It hopes that the special session will succeed in giving fresh impetus to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, so that the Committee can more effectively carry out the important task entrusted to it.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, it is with great pleasure, frankly more than I had anticipated yesterday, that I take the floor in the closing moments of our meeting. Under your chairmanship, we have clearly made considerable progress. We owe you a debt of great gratitude, for your even but firm hand, and your wise, kind counsel. It is in no small measure due to your able guidance in April that we can now look forward to the prospect of moving ahead on important issues when we return this summer. I would also like to take this occasion to pay tribute to the distinguished service rendered by the chairmen of the working groups, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico and Ambassador Sujka of Poland. Each of these capable and distinguished gentlemen has guided his Group with wisdom, intelligence and energy.

On one particularly important issue, an issue on which many delegations and more particularly you yourself, Mr. Chairman, your predecessor, Ambassador Alessi and Ambassador Jaipal have expended great and skilful efforts, it appeared until just hours ago that progress would not prove possible. Being one who never gives up, I have been carrying two sets of closing remarks around in my pocket. My hopes, indeed my cherished hopes have been realized and I am delighted to be delivering today the happier version, indeed the one which I had fervently hoped I would be making to this final plenary meeting of our spring session.

In previous years the United States has been unwilling to agree to the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive test ban. We have openly and candidly expressed our position. Again this year, at the outset of this meeting, we frankly stated our most serious reservations. But we fully understood the importance which most other delegations attached to the CTB issue. We listened to appeals that we should not stand in the way of the Committee's proceeding to deal with its agenda item 1, and we ultimately refined our position in a manner which would enable us to join a consensus. On 11 March we indicated our willingness to agree to the establishment of a working group which would address the fundamentally important areas of verification and compliance. Consensus on that basis has now been achieved.

I do not think it necessary to elaborate upon my personal pleasure, which I am sure is obvious. I would, however, like to pledge my Government's commitment to steady progress in the newly-established working group on a CTB. Having come so far toward establishing a working group on a CTB, missing the opportunity would have been particularly unfortunate. But we have chosen the course of accommodation and co-operation rather than confrontation. This outcome is particularly fortunate, for the blocking of a consensus on the CTB issue and the open threat of an overheated atmosphere at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at this especially critical juncture for the Committee, could only have had most serious adverse effects upon our ability to come to grips with the important questions which will confront us in New York.

However, I do not want to leave the impression that the last-minute success on the nuclear test-ban agenda item is the only matter on which there has been important progress at this session. We have moved forward on other issues. Our progress has been dependent upon a willingness, displayed by all, to compromise. It is that spirit which we hope will prevail at the second special session, and thereafter upon our return to Geneva to continue the important work of our 1982 session.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

Our agenda over the coming months is a full one and it deserves our very best efforts. Our work in this Committee cannot be dealt with in the abstract, but has to be considered in the context of the existing international political situation. But at the same time we believe that the possibility of positive developments on the international scene as a result of progress in our Committee's work cannot be overlooked. To this end we remain optimistic.

Mr. Chairman, it is with considerable joy that I can now discard the other version of my speech.

Again, Sir, my deepest thanks to you.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament was marked by a complicated international situation, which was the result of increased efforts on the part of the opponents of peace, détente and disarmament to engage the world in a qualitatively new round of the arms race, especially in the field of nuclear armaments. Long-term plans for the modernization of strategic nuclear forces declared by the United States administration and new aggressive military doctrines advanced by it represent a direct threat to international peace and security and seriously undermine the possibilities for the achievement of real progress in the field of disarmament negotiations.

The socialist countries continued to advance new proposals aimed at the reactivation of disarmament negotiations. They reaffirmed their readiness to negotiate on any question on the basis of equality and equal security. They went even further and came out with important unilateral initiatives. Among these, the initiative of the USSR advanced by President L. Brezhnev on 16 March of this year, instituting a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR, met with keen interest and appreciation among all peace-loving forces.

The socialist countries attached particular importance to the 1982 spring session of the Committee in view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The delegations of the socialist countries did their utmost to enable the Committee to negotiate concrete results which could be presented to the second special session.

Regrettably, given the approach of some western delegations to basic problems of nuclear disarmament and other important items of its agenda, the Committee was not in a position to achieve concrete results.

It is by no means incidental that the vitally important question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament was regarded as of the highest priority by most delegations. The continuing arms race undoubtedly represents the main threat to international peace and security. The socialist countries represented in the Committee have always supported the creation of an appropriate working group to conduct negotiations on this question. In addition to the documents submitted to this effect by the socialist countries in previous years, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic submitted, during the first part of the 1982 session, document CD/259 reflecting the views of the socialist countries concerning the draft mandate for an ad hoc working group on this question, which was welcomed by many members of the Group of 21. However, the United States and United Kingdom delegations continued to block consensus on the setting up of such a working group.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In connection with the problem of nuclear disarmament, the socialist countries stressed the necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and drew the attention of delegations to the relevant declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. The positive effects which would be brought about by an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons were also underlined.

Together with many other States, the socialist countries vigorously condemned the full-scale production of neutron weapons carried out by the United States. The delegations of the socialist countries reminded the members of the Committee that already in 1973 the draft of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons was put before the Committee by the socialist countries in document CCD/559. Neither this initiative nor the proposal of the socialist countries for the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group for the preparation of such a convention, put forward in 1981 in document CD/219, met with a consensus owing to the negative attitude of the western Powers. The socialist countries regret this development since the production of neutron weapons substantially lowers the threshold of nuclear war and represents an important step towards putting into practice the doctrine of a "limited nuclear war", while the eventual deployment of such weapons in Europe would create a highly dangerous situation on this continent.

The group of socialist countries attaches special importance to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They have always considered that the Committee on Disarmament, with all nuclear-weapon States represented in it, should live up to its responsibilities as the single multilateral negotiating forum and start negotiations on this question. Together with the Group of 21, the group of socialist countries therefore proposed the creation of an ad hoc working group to this effect. Regrettably, a lot of valuable time, which could be dedicated to business -- like negotiations in the working group, has been lost due to the opposition of two nuclear-weapon States to the creation of such a working group. The socialist countries have also expressed their views concerning its possible terms of reference in document CD/259 mentioned above.

The socialist countries also studied carefully all other proposals concerning the mandate of such a working group. They also took an active part in the deliberations on a possible compromise formulation in this regard. Their aim was to achieve an agreement on such a mandate which would allow the future working group to address all basic aspects of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to negotiate a treaty on this problem. Since it appeared that, for the time being, consensus could not be reached on such a "comprehensive" mandate, the socialist countries, considering the achievement of the nuclear-test ban a question of highest priority, agreed to the establishment of the working group with a compromise formulation of its mandate. They proceed from the understanding that any delegation may raise in the working group any questions related to the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the discussion of verification questions should not stand in the way of the elaboration of the agreement in all its aspects. The socialist countries also believe that progress achieved in the working group will also be duly reflected in the future through adequate adjustment of its mandate.

The delegations of the socialist countries also hope that the working group on the nuclear-test ban will not wind up in abstract discussions on the question of verification and compliance without any connection to the nuclear-weapon test-ban itself. In this regard they expressed their concern over the over-all shift in the

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position of the United States towards the problem of a nuclear-weapon test-ban expressed in the statement by Mr. Rostow to the Committee on 9 February when he informed the Committee that, in the view of the United States delegation, negotiation on a nuclear test ban "may not be propitious at the time". The socialist countries also consider inconsistent the United States approach to a nuclear test ban whereby it links progress on this subject to reductions in nuclear armaments while opposing the commencement of negotiations in this respect.

The delegations of socialist countries continue to believe that the resumption and successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations would be of special significance and would create the possibility for a future nuclear test ban to enter into force provisionally before the two remaining nuclear-weapon Powers joined it.

The delegations of socialist countries continued to work actively in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. They welcomed the initiation of a new phase in its deliberations marked by the adoption of a new mandate allowing it to work on the text of the future convention, which they favoured already during the earlier stages of negotiations on this question. During the first part of the Committee's 1982 session, a very useful exchange of views was carried out which clearly showed the areas of mutual understanding on a number of substantive aspects of the future convention.

The group of socialist countries continues to maintain that the future convention will be effective only if it takes into account all recent developments in the field of chemical weapons. In this respect they fully shared the view expressed by the overwhelming majority of delegations to the effect that the future convention should also exclude any possibility of the production of binary weapons. The delegations of the socialist countries expressed their views on this question in document CD/258, in which they drew the attention of delegations to United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/96 B which calls upon all States "to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present".

The socialist countries draw the attention of delegations to the draft of a provision for the chemical weapons convention proposed by the Soviet delegation on the non-stationing directly or indirectly of chemical weapons on the territories of other States during the period of implementation of commitments on their destruction or transfer for non-hostile purposes.

The question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction remains a problem of primary importance and should, in the view of the socialist countries, be given due attention in the work of the Committee. They consider that the time is ripe to set up an ad hoc working group of experts, which could seriously address this matter. The group of socialist countries also considers that the Committee could be helpful in giving consideration to appropriate formulations by which all States, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States, would make solemn declarations, identical in substance, condemning any future efforts to develop, manufacture and deploy new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/89.

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The group of socialist countries appeals to all members of the Committee which are in a position to do so to send their experts to the informal meetings which were proposed by the Hungarian delegation in document CD/261 for the second part of the 1982 session.

The necessity of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has now become a question of high urgency. The socialist countries express satisfaction at the fact that the consideration of this problem has been inscribed on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. They maintain that, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/99 the Committee should start negotiations on a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The most effective approach to the fulfilment of this task would be the creation, at the second part of the 1982 session, of an appropriate ad hoc working group. The views of the socialist countries concerning the terms of reference of such a group were reflected in document CD/272 submitted by the delegation of Mongolia.

The socialist countries attached due importance to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They took an active part in an effort to evolve mutually acceptable formulations, which would nevertheless make it possible to stress the necessity to start early negotiations on all urgent problems of disarmament, in the first place in the field of nuclear disarmament, and on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war. With this objective in mind the socialist countries submitted a comprehensive working paper on the CPD in document CD/245.

Regrettably, during the deliberations in the Working Group on vital questions, no common formulation could be agreed upon. The fact that even the inclusion of the achievement of a nuclear-test ban in the first stage of the programme is questioned is a source of serious concern. However, the socialist countries will continue to exert all efforts so that the General Assembly can adopt a programme which will give a new impetus to disarmament negotiations and assist towards the commencement, in the shortest possible time, of negotiations on all priority questions of disarmament.

With respect to the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons, the socialist countries note with regret that further progress has not been achieved in this matter.

While recognizing the importance of the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, the socialist countries are of the opinion that the deliberations on this subject which have taken place up to now and the complexity of the issues involved demonstrate that this question cannot be solved within the framework of a radiological weapons treaty.

A complicated situation has developed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the strengthening of the security guarantees of the non-nuclear weapon States. The socialist countries continue to maintain that the most effective way of meeting the legitimate security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in this respect would be the preparation and conclusion of an international convention on this subject. The initiation of concrete negotiations in this regard would, in the present circumstances, represent a positive step forward.

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Document CD/256, submitted by the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, reflects the basic view of the socialist countries that the elaboration of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would, inter alia, assist the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. For this reason the creation of an ad hoc working group on this subject has been proposed.

The group of socialist countries continued to pay due attention to the question of the organization of the work of the Committee.

It put forward its specific views and proposals to this effect, mainly concerning the process of the setting up of and activities of subsidiary bodies, contained in document CD/241. The socialist countries also consider that the effectiveness of the Committee's performances should be increased and while advancing their proposals in this respect they took note of all the relevant suggestions by other States. They expressed the view that the present composition of the Committee meets the requirements for a limited multilateral negotiating body. Hence, it would be highly premature to proceed to further alterations in its present membership.

In spite of many difficulties and the slow progress of the negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament, the socialist countries declare their readiness to contribute actively to its further work so that the Committee may eventually achieve concrete and tangible results. In this connection they favour the resumption of the second part of the 1982 session as early as possible after the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Since I have the floor, let me add something which usually takes place at the very end of meetings. I presume that we shall be very tired and any prolongation of our deliberations then will be unwelcome. What I am going to say, I certainly do not want to be unwelcomed by the Committee and that is, that I want, on behalf of the socialist group, to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, for the manner in which you performed your duties as Chairman for the closing month of our spring session. I should definitely add that I could say much more, but allow me to express briefly our admiration and thanks. We also owe our thanks to the chairmen of the working groups, Ambassadors Sujka, García Robles, Wegener and Ahmad. I also want, on behalf of our group, to express thanks to the secretariat of our Committee, in the first place, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and then, to all those who helped us in our deliberations, starting with the members of the secretariat, administrators, interpreters, translators and all the United Nations professionals either from New York or from Geneva, who performed such valuable services for our Committee.

Mr. ISSRAELYANI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Taking the floor at a formal meeting for the first time in the month of April, the Soviet delegation would like first of all to welcome you as this month's Chairman of the Committee, to express our satisfaction with and appreciation of your guidance of the Committee's work, and also to wish you success in performing the duties of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the next few months. We are aware that you are faced with the responsible task of presenting the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I should like, Mr. Chairman, to express particular satisfaction at the fact that it is under your chairmanship that the Committee has

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succeeded in adopting a decision on the establishment of a working group on the question of a nuclear test ban. The Soviet delegation considers this a token of our sympathy and respect for the Japanese people who were the first victims of the use of atomic weapons in 1945. It is to be hoped that the negotiations in the Committee begun under the chairmanship of the representative of Japan will result in the early conclusion of an agreement on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapon tests by all States and in all environments.

The Soviet delegation has taken the floor in order to give its appraisal of the results of the first part of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. We do not propose to dwell on separate items of the agenda, since this has just been done with great mastery on behalf of the Soviet delegation, among others, by Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.

Throughout the session, statements by the delegations of most, if not all, of the States represented on the Committee expressed serious concern at the growing threat of nuclear war, the absence of progress in disarmament negotiations and the dangerous development of the international situation as a whole. We share that concern, which reflects the profound alarm of the whole international community at the growing danger of war involving the use of nuclear weapons and the new spiral in the arms race. To say that the present international situation is complex and critical is perhaps not enough. In fact it is one which inspires the profoundest anxiety as to the fate of the world and of mankind as a whole. As was recently observed in a magazine article, the difference between past wars and the threatened global thermonuclear war is that past wars have marked the end of historical eras but a future war will mark the end of the entire human era.

To us the recognition of such a danger is not a cause for dismay and pessimism but a powerful stimulus towards fresh efforts and decisions for the prevention of nuclear war and the curbing of the arms race. In that connection, we should like to emphasize once more the importance of the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe adopted by the United Nations as a major landmark on the path towards the elimination of threat of nuclear conflict.

We are often told that we have an ideology of our own.

Yes, we do have an ideology, and we believe in our ideals.

The cornerstone of our ideology and our policy are peace, disarmament and co-operation between peoples. In embarking upon the construction of a new society, the Soviet Union has always proceeded from the belief that, as V.I. Lenin, the founder of our State, said, peace will "advance matters an infinite number of times better than war". Sixty years ago the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference spoke of its intention to "propose a general reduction of armaments and to support all proposals designed to lighten the burden of militarism". Exactly 50 years ago, for the first time in the history of mankind, the Soviet Union put forward a concrete programme of general and complete disarmament. That is a matter of history. This year, too, the Soviet State's political will for peace and disarmament has repeatedly found expression, inter alia, at the session of this

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Committee. In his statement on 16 March of this year, L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, again confirmed proposals for a two-thirds reduction of medium-range and tactical nuclear arsenals stationed in Europe and intended for Europe. The Soviet leadership unilaterally decided to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union. A number of other proposals were also advanced.

On the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have repeatedly reaffirmed their determination to contribute towards the success of the preparation and holding of the session. And those are not mere words. There is not one specific disarmament issue either here, on our Committee's agenda, or in the whole spectrum of problems relating to the limitation of the arms race, for the solution of which the USSR and its allies could not come forward with a constructive programme.

Delegations in the Committee are familiar with the Soviet foreign policy initiatives expounded in documents of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in a number of subsequent documents of the Soviet State.

During the period between the two special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament, our country has resolutely and repeatedly expressed itself in favour of the intensification of the work of all international forums in which negotiations on arms limitation matters are being or should be conducted, and, in particular, that of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. We have reaffirmed our interest in the resumption of all those negotiations which were recently suspended and our readiness to contribute to their successful conclusion. This fully applies to negotiations on a complete and general nuclear test ban, on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, on the limitation of sales and deliveries of conventional weapons, on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean and on a number of other issues. We are in favour of an early start to negotiations on such issues as the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons, the prohibition of neutron weapons and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are none at present.

Here, in the Committee, the delegations of the socialist countries have made efforts to achieve progress in reaching practical agreements on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and the strengthening of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that extensive and useful work has been done in the Committee on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The document which has been prepared still contains a number of provisions on which agreement has yet to be reached. As a whole, however, it can serve as a solid basis for further work on this item during the second special session of the General Assembly.

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The USSR fully shares the prevailing concern over the growth of military expenditures at the expense of the economic and cultural development of all mankind. We are willing to come to an agreement on a reduction of the military budgets of, in the first instance, States with a major military potential -- either on a percentage basis or in absolute terms. A first step in this direction could be the freezing of the military expenditures of States. The socialist States' specific proposals on all aspects of this major problem are known and they remain in force.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that our proposals, together with the proposals of other States, concerning the need for the adoption of effective measures to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space have aroused interest in the Committee and have formed the subject of constructive discussion. We intend to continue pressing for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this topic.

The socialist States attach great importance to the prohibition forever of the use of nuclear weapons and the renunciation by all States of the use of force in their mutual relations, and also to the abolition of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of armed forces from the territories of other States.

That, if I may put it this way, is the quintessence of our position on arms limitation questions. It is based on a steadfast political will for peace and real disarmament. And we are glad to note that efforts in that direction come to fruition from time to time.

A year ago a proposal was made from the rostrum of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for a summit meeting of the leaders of a number of States to study the possibilities of improving the international situation and preventing war. That idea won the sympathy of millions of people in many different countries. During these spring days, world public opinion notes with deep satisfaction that the question of giving effect to the Soviet foreign-political initiative concerning relations between the USSR and the United States of America is now being discussed at a practical level. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, has reaffirmed Soviet readiness to hold a Soviet-United States summit meeting. Such a meeting must, naturally, be well prepared and conducted in a serious manner, not casually.

There is another matter of substance that should be mentioned in connection with the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. We are witnessing the development of a powerful anti-war, anti-missile, anti-nuclear public movement throughout the world. This movement, as one delegation rightly pointed out at the beginning of the session, is a distinctive "sign of the times"; it reflects the deep concern of the whole world community over the growth of the military threat. Not only we in this Committee but also the representatives of more than 200 non-governmental organizations meeting at a conference in connection with the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly have spoken in this building about the need to put an end to the insane arms race. A vivid manifestation of the will of peoples for peace in these April days have been the numerous peace marches whose routes have traversed the roads of many European States, and of other States also. Their participants were protesting against the absurdity of "overkill" -- the senseless accumulation of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

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under the pretext of strengthening security. The Committee is called upon in its work to provide a response to that concern and alarm on the part of world public opinion.

In that connection I should like to stress that the point at issue is not just the ending of a period between two special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament. Nothing is more dangerous to the cause of peace and international security than to suppose that the present stage of disarmament negotiations in no way differs from the many periods that preceded it. The refining of weapons is a process which accelerates exponentially. It took 40,000 years for primitive early means of warfare -- stone axes, spears, the bow and arrow -- to be replaced by metal side-arms; it took another 10,000 years for firearms to take the place of sabres and swords. As little as 500 years later (in the course of the First World War), chemical weapons were used. The atom bomb was exploded in 1945, the hydrogen bomb in 1952. The threat of the nuclear self-destruction of civilization is a reality of our century.

In recognizing this, we are not giving way to despair, nor are we seeking to intimidate anyone. On the contrary, we are convinced that the world community will find within itself the strength to put an end to the insane arms race. It is the task of the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations with a limited membership, to be an effective instrument for practical disarmament. The accomplishment of that task is well within its powers, provided the right lessons are drawn from past negotiating experience and provided all delegations are imbued with the conviction that there is no reasonable alternative to disarmament and peaceful co-operation between peoples.

We have already expressed our great satisfaction at the Committee's adoption of a decision to establish a working group for the purpose of conducting negotiations on item 1 of its agenda. In connection with the adoption of that decision, the Soviet delegation would like to state the following.

The Soviet Union, like most other members of the Committee on Disarmament, attaches exceptionally great importance to the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement on a complete and general nuclear test ban. That being so, we have done everything within our power for the successful progress of the negotiations on this issue with the United States of America and the United Kingdom. We continue to consider it essential that these negotiations, which were broken off by the Western participants in them at the concluding stage, should be resumed without delay.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has invariably advocated and still advocates that full use should be made of the possibilities of the Committee on Disarmament for the successful holding of multilateral negotiations aimed at the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments and by all those who conduct such tests. Mindful of this position of principle, the Soviet Union has repeatedly supported proposals for the establishment within the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group on this issue and it joined in the consensus on the setting up of

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such a group. The Soviet delegation's agreement to the compromise formula for the mandate of the group was based on the understanding that in the course of the group's work any delegation may raise any aspect of the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It is our view that the consideration of issues relating to verification should not be used to delay the elaboration of the agreement as a whole, as, regrettably, has been the case more than once in the past, and that such consideration can be useful only if verification is not artificially divorced from the specific content of the arms limitation measure being elaborated but is examined in organic connection with it.

As members of the Committee know, agreement on the group's mandate was preceded by lengthy and difficult consultations. In the course of those consultations the parties naturally put forward various proposals. The socialist countries, too, played an active part in the consultations. I should like to take the opportunity to thank all members of the drafting group, and particularly the representatives of the group of socialist countries in that group, Ambassador G. Herder and Ambassador B. Grinberg. In proposing their formulations for the group's mandate, they were guided by the desire to improve it to the greatest extent possible, so that it might truly contribute to effective negotiations towards the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement on a complete and general nuclear-weapon test ban.

It is a cause for regret that some representatives at the plenary meeting on 20 April did not understand or did not wish to understand that it was this same objective that inspired our proposal in document CD/287.

In particular, it is a complete distortion of our position to assert that the Soviet Union's actions in connection with achieving agreement on the mandate proceeded from the "state of confrontation between the super-Powers". We do not propose to engage in polemics with the delegations in question. We believe that the successful outcome of the consultations on the group's mandate is the best answer to their over-hasty polemical sallies.

In conclusion, I should like to say that the Soviet Union, together with its allies and friends, will continue to walk shoulder to shoulder with those who are in favour of genuine and effective measures for the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament.

In accordance with the tradition, I too should like to express our thanks to all the chairmen of the working groups: Ambassador B. Sujka (Poland), Ambassador A. García Robles (Mexico), Ambassador H. Ahmad (Pakistan) and Ambassador H. Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany). All of them have done a great deal of useful work. As for the remarks addressed to me by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, I bow to your appeal, Mr. Chairman, and do not propose to develop this theme, considering the incident closed. I should also like to thank Ambassador R. Jaipal, whose contribution to the drafting of the mandate you have already rightly noted, the Deputy Secretary of our Committee, Mr. V. Berasategui, all the secretaries of the working groups, the technical staff and the interpreters, who have had a particularly hard time during the last few days. I wish all my colleagues a successful conclusion to this session of the Committee and a successful preparation for the second special session of the General Assembly, where we shall all undoubtedly meet again.

Mr. SUMNERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I shall refrain from giving you a catalogue of my country's views. But a few impressions of the session do seem to be justified.

My delegation, like others, came here in January with the expectation of making real progress on several items of our agenda, believing that we ought to have and would have some solid achievements to report to the special session. Thanks to the consensus just reached today for the setting up of a nuclear test-ban working group based on Ambassador Jaipal's "J-1" draft mandate, we now have at least one important forward step to report to the General Assembly. We are glad that the group of socialist countries finally decided to join the consensus and that the working group will be able to meet from the beginning of our summer session. On some other agenda items, however, progress has been much less than it should have been.

In particular, the work on radiological weapons has been disappointing to my delegation. We had real hopes that substantial progress would be made towards the drafting of a treaty banning radiological weapons under Ambassador Wegener's able and energetic chairmanship. In the discussion of draft articles for the treaty, my delegation was ready to compromise on many key points. We considered that the draft text prepared by the Chairman, while not acceptable in its entirety, represented a real advance on earlier texts and formed a suitable basis for further work. We were sorry, therefore, that it did not receive more general endorsement.

My delegation has previously expressed doubts whether the prevention of attacks on civil nuclear facilities could be contained within the text of a radiological weapons treaty. The discussions on this topic indeed demonstrated the complexity of the problem and thus tended to confirm us in our belief. We considered, frankly, that the suggestions put forward by some delegations were rather far removed from the basic purposes of the treaty. We can see no prospect of agreement being reached on this topic, in this or in any other form, unless there is a greater readiness to compromise in the future.

Before I comment briefly on our work on the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, I should like to note the real appreciation that my delegation feels is due to Ambassador García Robles, and to pay tribute to the devotion he has shown in his difficult task as Chairman of the Working Group.

In looking at the Working Group's report in document CD/203 and its annex, I must make the comment that we had hoped it would be possible to obtain here in Geneva at least outline agreement on fundamental aspects of a CPD. We had also hoped that it would be possible to forward to the special session a more concise text with fewer bracketed areas. We do nevertheless feel some encouragement at the results of our work, and particularly at the results of the consultations which took place in the last few weeks of the session on the measures section of the programme. In spite of our slow progress here, this recent work gives hope that the special session may eventually be able to adopt a CPD by consensus. But there is a great deal to be done before then. In this connection, my delegation supports the suggestions already made that any consultations on a CPD that may be held between now and the beginning of the special session should focus on the fundamental aspects of the programme, such as its nature and the question of time-frames. But we shall need a period to reflect on the results of our work here before discussions are resumed in New York.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

Turning briefly to the subject of chemical weapons, my delegation is encouraged with the progress which has been made in the Working Group under Ambassador Sujka this session and welcomes the business-like report it submitted to the Committee. Although the work of the Group has perhaps been less intensive than we would have hoped, given the importance of the item, we believe that the presentation of draft elements has clarified the positions of delegations and that we now have a sound basis for the continuation of our work in the summer. In July, we shall have the task of reconciling differences of opinion on particular aspects of a chemical weapons convention. My delegation believes that, for this, the advice of technical experts in the field of chemical weapons will be of great value, and we welcome the Committee's decision that the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons should hold further technical consultations early in August. We hope that the scope of these discussions will be widened so that experts can begin examining the technical aspects of the verification of a CW convention. That is the only possible basis for progress.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to offer you my most sincere thanks for the exceptional services you have rendered to the Committee this month. We are all greatly in your debt.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I shall address my brief statement today to one subject only. Certainly, I have felt tempted to try to present, like the previous speakers in their interesting statements, an overview of the Committee's accomplishments during this session in which I would, in particular, have expressed my delegation's sincere satisfaction at witnessing such a large amount of serious and constructive work in all the four working groups under the leadership of their energetic and skilled chairmen. I certainly would also have been remiss had I not associated my delegation with the expressions of great appreciation which have been addressed to you, Mr. Chairman, by the previous speakers. The naturally declining attention and increasing restlessness in the audience because of the late hour and the long list of speakers prompt me, however, to focus on the item which I hope will make this day well worth remembering -- because of the importance of the possibly even historic decision we have just taken to establish, at long last, an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban.

Representatives of my country have never hesitated to speak out strongly against the senseless arms race. Since Sweden became a member of the predecessor of the Committee on Disarmament 20 years ago, it has consistently and vigorously advocated a comprehensive nuclear test ban in order to stop the nuclear arms race. The nuclear powers frighten us with their persistent neglect of the risks to which they expose the whole of mankind through their continued accumulation of nuclear weapons.

In her statement on 16 February, the Under-Secretary of State, Mrs. Thorsson, expressed criticism particularly against one of the Superpowers because of its role in blocking the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its obligations under its mandate and agenda. When the representative of that Superpower a month later announced a certain change in its attitude, it gave me a welcome opportunity to express my delegation's satisfaction. It seemed to give reason for hope that at last the Committee could start the consideration of this subject in a working group, which is the most effective organ for the performance of the functions of this Committee. The ensuing negotiations on a mandate for such a working group turned

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out to be, as you yourself stated, Mr. Chairman, both long and arduous, despite the skilled leadership which you yourself exercised, as also your predecessor, Ambassador Alessi. The compromise formula which was worked out by Ambassador Jaipal and which is known as "J-1", certainly is far from what my own delegation and other delegations from the Group of 21 had proposed originally. My delegation has nevertheless agreed to this formula, because we see it as an opening, as an opportunity to start concrete work on the subject. "J-1" has deficiencies like those of the original mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Because of the experience of that Group, we see no reason why useful work cannot be carried out also on a nuclear test ban, even with a mandate that is so limited. We are convinced that the strength of our arguments will sooner or later lead to the conclusion of an agreement on a test ban. We are also convinced that this process can be shortened through the achievements of the forthcoming working group.

It was therefore with great surprise and deep disappointment that we saw the other Superpower and its allies reject this opportunity. Like the distinguished delegate of Brazil in his statement yesterday, my delegation could see such behaviour fitting into the power game which has become all too familiar in the history of multilateral disarmament negotiations. We were also prepared to react most strongly against such a misuse of the Committee on Disarmament.

However, let me now express again my delegation's satisfaction at seeing another change of attitudes, which has made it possible to come to this truly important decision of setting up an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. It will, of course, be possible to judge the real importance of this decision only when it becomes apparent to what degree the nuclear-weapon Powers are prepared to participate in its work with substantive contributions.

As I have **announced** already in one of our informal meetings, my delegation intends to submit again for the consideration of the Working Group, when it meets during our summer session, the draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban which it presented for the first time in 1977. We see nothing in the mandate which prevents a full consideration of that draft treaty.

In conclusion, I want to say that with today's decision the Committee on Disarmament can envisage the critical assessment of its work during the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly with a good deal more confidence than seemed possible only yesterday.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia has already very ably presented the views of my country on our assessment of the results of the spring session. Therefore I would like to confine myself to making only a few comments on the decision taken by the Committee on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban.

As in the past, my delegation during the first part of the Committee's session this year took an active part in the efforts to establish an ad hoc working group to negotiate a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It is in a spirit of compromise and co-operation that we today join the consensus on a mandate which was prepared by Ambassador Jaipal and amended by the Mexican delegation. It is the understanding of my delegation that this mandate and

(H. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

the working group to be set up will give fresh impetus to the initiation of real negotiations on a CTB, thus enabling the Committee on Disarmament to discharge its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as was stated expressis verbis in the mandate.

The endorsement of this mandate, of course, does not change the position of principle of my country concerning negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This position was explained many times in this Committee and reaffirmed in the statements my delegation made on 16 and 25 February this year.

With regard to a CTB as well as other problems of arms limitation and disarmament, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, now as before, proceeds from the principle that the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on and should be determined by the purposes, the scope and the nature of the agreement. This was clearly stated in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Having in mind these basic considerations, my delegation interprets the provisions of the mandate before us as allowing for the examination of all specific issues relating to a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and not only for the discussion of problems of verification and compliance. Furthermore, we believe the provision that "the ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives" provides for the consideration of all comprehensive proposals with regard to a nuclear test ban. In that connection we note the intention expressed by the Swedish delegation to put before the working group its draft treaty of 1977 (CCD/526 and Rev.1).

The delegations of Italy, Brazil, Nigeria, India and of other States as well as you yourself, Mr. Chairman, have given similar interpretations to that stated above. We note that nobody not even the United States delegation, has questioned these interpretations.

Lastly, we proceed from the assumption that the stipulation of the mandate concerning further progress towards negotiations on a nuclear test ban provides for the preparation of actual negotiations. A first step on this way could be this mandate which will cover the second part of our session this year. Next year, we could then move a step further in adopting a more comprehensive mandate. Documents CD/259 and CD/181, which reflect the respective positions of the group of socialist States and the Group of 21, could serve as appropriate guidelines for this new mandate.

Finally, I would like to express the hope that all delegations will contribute in a constructive manner to the work of the future CTB working group. Nobody would win, but lose, if this group was to be involved in an abstract debate on issues of verification and compliance. Such an approach, as we know from our long experience, could only lead to the blocking of any progress on the road to a CTB. It could be used by forces interested in creating new nuclear weapons to upgrade their "deterrent forces" for camouflaging their real position on a CTB. Being prepared to take an active part in the working group, my delegation will continue to strongly reject any attempts in this regard.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In conclusion, I would like to express my thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, and to all representatives, particularly those who have co-operated with me so closely in the drafting group, who by their activities and attitude made this result possible. I was particularly impressed by those many representatives, and I am grateful to them, who never, at any stage of our efforts, showed any signs of doubt about the objective fact that the socialist countries are honestly and consistently defending the cause of disarmament, that they have never, and do not, block progress to this end, but are trying to do their best in order to make headway towards real negotiations and definite agreements on effective disarmament measures.

Mr. TAKAHASHI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, at the close of the spring session of this Committee, on behalf of my delegation, I wish to speak briefly on the agenda item to which my delegation attaches the greatest importance, i.e. the nuclear test ban.

My delegation welcomes the establishment of the ad hoc working group under this agenda item with the mandate as adopted today. The achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has always been regarded by my Government as a measure of the highest priority in the field of arms control and disarmament.

While welcoming the trilateral negotiations on a CTB, we have consistently and continuously stressed the need for such a treaty to be achieved through truly multilateral negotiations in this Committee.

On 23 February of this year, the leader of my delegation reiterated our appeal for the commencement of multilateral negotiations in this Committee in order to achieve a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date. In this connection he expressed his continued hope that a consensus could be reached to set up a working group or other subsidiary body of the Committee to deal with this question in the most effective and concentrated manner.

In this context, we welcomed the initiative of the United States delegation as announced by Ambassador Fields on 11 March as a significant step forward.

Since then, my delegation has been actively engaged and involved in the drafting of a possible mandate for the proposed working group.

In the drafting exercise, we have recognized, in all fairness, a significant compromise gesture by all delegations concerned.

In particular, with the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament a few months ahead, my delegation shared the view of many other delegations that we should avail ourselves of every possibility for moving forward in the direction of a CTBT.

My delegation supported the draft mandate frequently referred to in this Committee as "J-1", which contained the most promising elements for a possible consensus, though not completely satisfactory to all.

In this connection, my delegation joins with many other delegations in expressing our gratitude for the painstaking efforts by the personal representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, in producing this draft text.

The mandate adopted today may not be as wide or as explicit as one would have hoped. As a matter of fact, it is different from any of the various draft texts my

(Mr. Takahashi, Japan)

delegation prepared for the consideration of the drafting group. It is a result of a compromise by all those concerned. But it does offer a very good starting point. It opens up possibilities for the future.

As a representative of one of the delegations which have been consistently calling for the achievement of a CTBT, as a step towards nuclear disarmament, I wish to express the determination of my delegation to participate actively in the work of the working group and to contribute to the progress of the work of this Committee at its forthcoming summer session.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, as we get ready to round off the first half of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament, I merely wish to associate myself with the warm felicitations already conveyed to you for the modest but significant achievements recorded under your able chairmanship.

As distinguished delegates here will recall, I opened my statement made in plenary on 8 April 1982 by saying that good things do happen to me in the month of April -- being the month in which I was born. The consensus that we have reached in this Committee today on the protracted issue of a nuclear test ban is a testimony to my belief, and my delegation would like to express its sincere gratitude to the group of socialist countries for their latest display of a spirit of compromise in accepting a consensus mandate for the ad hoc working group on item 1 of the Committee's agenda.

This decision is significant in many respects -- not only in the context of the long and hazardous journey towards the initiation of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban, but also because of the need for this Committee to change drastically its dwindling credibility as the sole multilateral organ on disarmament matters.

Obviously, this show of flexibility by the Superpowers is a step in the right direction, and my delegation hopes that the negotiations that this Committee will embark upon in the second half of the 1982 session will not exclude detailed consideration of existing proposals, new ideas and fresh initiatives that would make for progress towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The second special session, in the view of my delegation, should be a forum for the harmonization of the divergent positions and views of States, especially those of the nuclear-weapon States. We sincerely hope that the session will not turn into a forum for cold-war politics and confrontation, as this would certainly have an adverse effect on our deliberations during the summer session of our Committee.

Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues in the drafting group, other delegations, and the distinguished Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, who all contributed, in no small measure, to this significant achievement. No one group, in my opinion, has been able to achieve all that it set out to achieve. We in the Group of 21, expected the proposal christened "J-1" but which has now been given the symbol Working Paper No. 67 to be more precise and direct but we have had to agree to a considerable degree of dilution of our original objective. I expect also that both the western group and the socialist group, out of a spirit of "give and take", accepted Working Paper No. 67 by way of compromise. My delegation is pleased, if not flattered, to learn that our humble appeal and that of others have had some good effect.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction that it has finally been possible to obtain consensus on an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. We appreciate the untiring efforts made by you, Mr. Chairman, as well as by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alessi of Italy, in this regard, as well as the spirit of compromise and flexibility which has been displayed by all delegations, we believe, in the best traditions of this Committee. Needless to add, Mr. Chairman, the delegation of India fully shares the sentiments that you yourself expressed at the very key role which Ambassador Jaipal played in making this compromise possible. We are also particularly glad to know that the group of socialist delegations has, after careful reflection, agreed with our interpretation of the mandate that we have adopted. It has been our position from the outset, and we would like to underline this again, that the issues of verification and compliance relating to a nuclear test ban, as in fact, with regard to any measure in the field of disarmament, cannot be considered in isolation or separately from issues of scope, duration and entry into force of a proposed ban; otherwise, all that we would be engaged in would be an academic and sterile exercise. It is our understanding that the mandate as agreed upon takes fully account of the three essential elements that my delegation has emphasized right from the outset. These elements are, firstly, that any such mandate should recognize the role of the Committee as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, including with regard to a nuclear test ban. Secondly, the consideration of issues relating to verification and compliance must not exclude consideration of issues relating to other aspects of a nuclear test ban, and lastly, the mandate must lead towards the actual drafting of a treaty on this subject. It is on this understanding that we have accepted this mandate, even though our present situation remains as set out in document CD/181.

My delegation would also like to make a statement with respect to the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. It is the position of my delegation that the distinction drawn in this report between the so-called traditional and non-traditional subject-matter of negotiation in the Ad Hoc Working Group is an artificial one, and detracts from the very clear-cut and precise mandate of this Group. The subject-matter of our negotiations is nothing more and nothing less than a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

To conclude, I would like to express to you, Mr. Chairman, the warm congratulations of my delegation on the successful conclusion of the first half of the Committee's current session. It is a tribute to your wisdom and unfailing patience and courtesy that we have been able to chart our ship safely into harbour, albeit a day after our target.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, at the tail end of this protracted and difficult session of this Committee, may I be permitted to make a few observations regarding our work during the past three months. I would like to touch on two aspects of what we have tried to do at this session.

The first relates to the wide gap that exists between our achievements or lack of achievement in this Committee and the aspirations and hopes of hundreds of millions outside. As we all know, since this Committee came into being there has been, and quite justifiably, rising hope in the world that the Committee on Disarmament could

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

succeed even marginally in negotiating agreements on disarmament which would alleviate the concerns and anxieties that were expressed so lucidly in the Final Document of the first special session. There has been continuing and insistent pressure from Governments and people from all corners of the globe that the Committee on Disarmament get down to achieving something tangible on the path towards an end to the nuclear arms race, and help initiate the process of nuclear disarmament. In addition, there has been insistent demand that some degree of progress be achieved in negotiating other disarmament agreements.

However, when we look at the report that we have prepared for the second special session, it becomes evident to us, and it will be evident to those who will read it outside, that very little has been achieved. It becomes necessary, therefore, to reflect on why the level of achievement has been so little. To us in this Committee, it is clear that the lack of achievement has not been due to an inadequacy of effort or perseverance on the part of delegations. I think we have witnessed at this session, and in the previous sessions, a great deal of hard and committed work which has been directed towards achieving success. The main constraining factor has not been the procedures of the Committee or its membership or a lack of contributions from its members. The cause of the problem is elsewhere. Time and time again, we have heard that what is lacking is political will to negotiate on the part of member States, and as long as this political will is not forthcoming little will be achieved. The work of this Committee at this session has clearly demonstrated that this in fact is the case.

Political will can come only from the mind. It is, therefore, only in the minds of those who decide policies that the struggle for disarmament can be won. We, as representatives of Governments in this Committee, carry out our instructions which are based on the policies that our Governments have chosen to implement. It is, therefore, only natural that as long as there is continuing reliance on age-old theories of deterrence, parity and superiority to preserve security and safeguard peace, there is little chance for a change in the will to move towards disarmament. It has been clear all along that until this change in will, attitude and posture takes place, there is very little that can be achieved in this Committee, or elsewhere, in the field of disarmament negotiations. True enough, small, limited, tentative steps may be taken where arms control is concerned, but the more radical, decisive steps that need to be taken on the path towards genuine nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament will not be taken until a change of will and attitude has taken place. In this world of ours, tigers do not become vegetarians, but we do hope that by August this year some change for the better will have taken place in minds and wills so that real disarmament negotiations can take place in this Committee.

The second matter I wish to refer to is item 1 of our agenda. A major concern in this Committee over the last three and a quarter years has been nuclear disarmament. High priority was given to a nuclear test ban. After a long and protracted period of trying to agree on the setting up of a working group with an adequate mandate on this item, we now face the hopeful prospect of having such a working group with a mandate that has been adopted by consensus. Let me say, frankly, that the mandate that has been adopted for the ad hoc working group on a CTB is not exactly what my delegation had hoped for, or wanted. However, together with other member States in the Group of 21 we have always been ready to accept a mandate that meets our concerns and which could be

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

adopted by consensus in this Committee. My delegation would like to express its sincere thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to Ambassador Alessi, our Chairman for the month of March, and all the distinguished representatives in the Committee, as well as to Ambassador Jaipal, for the very hard and dedicated work that was put in towards arriving at a solution to this difficult problem. I would like also to express our sincere thanks to all the delegations which have shown the utmost flexibility and a great degree of reasonableness so that this Committee, before it closes this session, could adopt a decision on the setting up of a working group with an acceptable mandate. We feel that taking into account your statement of today, all the explanations, interpretations and definitions that have been given, there is a real possibility of commencing a course of work, on the basis of the mandate, which can eventually result in a CTBT.

In conclusion, may I say that we hoped for more tangible results at this session, but this was not realized. We hope that the second special session of the General Assembly will give a new impetus that can move the Committee towards a higher level of achievement at its summer session.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to associate myself with all the previous speakers who have expressed a deep debt of gratitude to you for the invaluable contribution you have made this year to expediting the work of the Committee and to achieving a measure of consensus in our work. Your patience and guidance have contributed immeasurably towards the little success that we have had in this Committee.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you on the way in which you have directed the work of this Committee during the month of April. We asked to be included in the list of speakers for today because of the very important decision which the Committee on Disarmament has just adopted. It has decided to set up a working group on the first item on our agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban", with a mandate acceptable to all members of this Committee. My Delegation wishes to express its great satisfaction that it has proved possible to take this decision, and to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador Alessi of Italy, for your conduct of the negotiations which led to this agreement. We should also like to offer our congratulations to the delegations that were most closely involved in the negotiating process, to the Committee on Disarmament itself and, of course, to Ambassador Jaipal, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.

Mr. TERREFFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my statement at this concluding stage of our spring session is to underline my delegation's position concerning certain points and also to explain the manner in which we assess the progress of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, whose special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament we have now adopted.

Since the first special session in May 1978, the Committee on Disarmament has been conducting its negotiations in a changing and sometimes disturbing environment. One can observe that 1979, the year immediately after the first special session, was perhaps the most productive in terms of cross-fertilization of ideas and healthy exchange of views on disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament. During this period, the Group of 21 in particular urged the major nuclear-weapon States to make more concrete

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

disarmament measures. In its working papers the Group insisted on the need to establish working groups on specific items of the agenda. The Group of 21 has also urged the parties to the tripartite negotiations on NTB to inform the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of their negotiations and to involve more directly and actively the Committee on Disarmament in these negotiations. It has also sought clarifications on outstanding issues. The Group of 21 has repeatedly requested the United States and the USSR to resume and complete their bilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Unfortunately, the responses to these requests have not always been satisfactory. The bilateral and tripartite negotiations are now suspended, thus preventing the Committee from focusing its attention on two most important items of its agenda. Moves have also been made to upset priorities set in the Final Document.

New types of weapons of mass destruction are being deployed and developed, including the neutron bomb and more sophisticated types of chemical weapons. The danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war has greatly escalated. In the face of all this, mass demonstrations have been held expressing opposition to the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and against the policy of preparing the stage for a possible nuclear war. People all over the world are calling for the cessation of the arms race, and for the total elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and for a freeze on nuclear weapon tests. Leading and knowledgeable personalities and organizations have challenged the doctrines of nuclear deterrence. It seems that such a spontaneous mass movement cannot go unheeded, particularly in view of the fact that mobilizing world public opinion in favour of disarmament is one of the objectives of the forthcoming second special session devoted to disarmament, whose agenda includes such items as disarmament education, training and public information activities. My delegation therefore expresses the hope that certain nuclear-weapon States may be persuaded to reject the theory of a so-called "limited nuclear war" since there will be no winner in such a war.

My delegation believes that the consideration and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is one of the most important tasks that the Committee on Disarmament is tackling. The report of the Ad Hoc Working Group included in the Committee's special report to the second special session is a noteworthy document and deserves thorough study. My delegation is fully behind the proposal that for such a programme to be realistic it has to include time-frames, and clearly defined objectives, principles and priorities to be negotiated. The world has anxiously waited for over two decades to see the beginning of a comprehensive programme such as the one we are trying to design. A time-frame not beyond the year 2000 is therefore reasonable. In the spirit of paragraph 50 of the Final Document, my delegation earnestly hopes that the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems will cease and that this will be followed by the cessation of the production of all such weapons and their delivery systems, leading finally to a comprehensive phased programme for the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles with a view to the ultimate and complete elimination of such weapons at the earliest possible time. The Committee on Disarmament was requested by the General Assembly in resolution 35/152 J and resolution 36/92 F to continue its negotiations on the elaboration of a CPD for submission to it at its second special session. The section on a CPD in the report we have just adopted, although not entirely free from square brackets, nevertheless represents over two years of hard work. The able leadership provided to the Ad Hoc Working Group by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico is highly appreciated by my delegation. My delegation expresses the hope that outstanding issues relating to measures, stages and the nature of the programme will be negotiated seriously in the future.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

Mr. Chairman, thanks to your relentless efforts, as well as those of Mr. Alessi, and the skills which you have applied, we have now reached a consensus and produced a mandate for an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test-ban treaty. This consensus, it seems to me, was possible not only due to the flexible position taken by the Group of 21, but also to the spirit of co-operation and compromise displayed by the group of socialist States, particularly at the consultation meeting held this morning under your Chairmanship. My Delegation congratulates all of those who contributed to this success. It is my delegation's understanding that this mandate will enable the ad hoc working group to negotiate, in the spirit of the Group of 21 document, CD/181, issues relating to the scope, verification of compliance, final clauses and other elements that would go into a draft treaty, and a treaty which would lead hopefully to general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. It is also understood by my delegation that the ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives in preparing the draft treaty. It is in this spirit, Mr. Chairman, that my delegation associates itself with your statement expressing appreciation to all those delegations that have shown a spirit of compromise and co-operation in our work.

Finally, my delegation is pleased to note the progress which has been made in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, chaired by Ambassador Sujka of Poland, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Wegener and the Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which has been chaired so ably by Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, this session of the Committee on Disarmament is about to adjourn, and I would like to take the liberty of expressing the genuine appreciation and satisfaction of my delegation at the impartial manner in which you, Mr. Chairman, have guided our deliberations during your chairmanship of the Committee. As you know, Sir, dramatic developments in our negotiations have taken place particularly during the last four days or so, and, fortunately, the ultimate result of your tireless efforts has not been too negative, especially if measured against the background of the discussions we have held since we convened here on 2 February last.

Let me also, Sir, express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassadors Alessi of Italy and Mahallati of Iran, as well as to the Ambassadors of Mexico, the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan and Poland who have impartially served as chairmen of the four working groups. I also wish to pay tribute to the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, and his entire staff, as well as the interpreters, for the excellent services they have rendered us in the past three months.

It is not the intention of the Kenya delegation to give a full evaluation of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I must, however, reiterate one of our central points of view, namely, that many loopholes still exist in the negotiating character of the Committee on Disarmament and that this Committee must fully address itself to this question. The forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will offer us a good opportunity for this purpose, and I hope that as we review and appraise the implementation of the recommendations of the first special session, we shall pay particular attention to and resolve to implement the vital requirement that

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

the Committee be the single multilateral negotiating forum, to carry out substantive negotiations, and not a mere community for debating disarmament issues. On a more positive note, I believe that the Committee has, at its current session, reached agreement on important areas of its work and these decisions should be borne in mind and built upon, not only during the second special session but also during the Committee's summer session of 1982 and beyond. One, is the agreement, perhaps the best achievement of the session, which we have reached on the special report of the Committee to the second special session of the General Assembly. It is, in my opinion, a balanced report, even though it lacks a recommendatory character which my delegation would have liked to see in such a report, which is customarily submitted only once in five years. Therefore, while conforming in structure and content to the special character which it was supposed to assume, on the basis of the guidelines given by the Committee at the beginning of this session, the special report should have offered some specific and practical recommendations for the consideration of the General Assembly at the second special session rather than limiting itself to the mere statement in summary form of "the state of disarmament negotiations since the first special session".

Another quite welcome agreement has just been reached on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban, on the basis of the proposal contained in working paper No. 67, dated 21 April 1982, prepared by Ambassador Jaipal, following his consultations with various delegations. We have particularly welcomed this positive development because it touches on an issue on which the Committee has spent a lot of time, both formally and informally, during its current session. My delegation has therefore decided not to stand in the way of the creation of a working group on the basis of Working Paper No. 67, not because the proposal per se offered the best mandate for the working group on a CTB, but basically because of four reasons. One, my delegation has come to the conclusion that the proposal in Working Paper No. 67 would offer the best chance so far for a consensus. Two, the mandate in that proposal is open; that is, it will enable the working group, once created, to discuss all issues relating to item 1 of the Committee's agenda. Three, the proposal does not in any way diminish the validity of the position of the Group of 21, of which my country is a member, contained in document CD/181, dated 24 April 1982. And finally, I strongly believe that as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, recognized by the international community and in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session, this Committee must not be prevented from exercising its legitimate right and corresponding duty to carry out multilateral negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. I believe that the block politics, tactics and military confrontation of the two military alliances and Superpowers should not at all be allowed to victimize the Committee on Disarmament. They should not at all obstruct the cause and universal character of disarmament, and the Committee on Disarmament itself should not be turned into a battleground for ideological and related purposes. As the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka told us yesterday, there is a saying in Sri Lanka to the effect that "when two elephants make love, it is the grass that suffers most". That is the saying in Sri Lanka, but there is also another saying in Swahili to the effect that "when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers most". What would happen if the elephants were to both fight and make love? In the context of the Committee, then, the grass would be the Committee itself, and the Group of 21. We shall therefore support every move calculated to enable the Committee to negotiate a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Don Hanjira, Kenya)

Other agreements reached during this session on other items have included, in particular, agreement on a consolidated text for the CPD, and all these agreements, as I have said before, are welcome to my delegation. Obviously, we would have liked to see greater progress on a CTB, but under the circumstances it has not been possible to achieve this. It is my hope that acceptance of the idea of stages for a CTB will lead to acceptance of the other concepts of a CTB, including, in particular, the critical questions of time-frames, review and appraisal, as well as the binding character, political will and firm commitment which the CPD must assume. Otherwise, this CPD will be a worthless document. My country stands ready to play its role in the cause of disarmament, and as a developing country, we shall continue to attach the greatest importance to the close relationship that exists between disarmament and development, and we shall call for the urgent allocation of the hundreds and thousands and billions of dollars -- the colossal amounts of money squandered annually on the arms race -- to social and economic development, in particular, of the developing countries, in the context of the New International Economic Order.

My delegation believes that it will be very worthwhile for our informal consultations to be resumed in New York right from the very beginning of the special session, and if possible, even during the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for that session. Finally, I wish to say that the Committee still owes the public at large a better way of informing the world community about the Committee's activities. Many things do happen within this Committee, some of them of a serious nature, but I must confess that the world at large knows very little about them and therefore I am really convinced that for the better cause of disarmament, it is essential that improved programmes of education of the masses and education of the policy-makers be initiated, and this in the not too distant future. Mr. Chairman, these are the few remarks that I wanted to make at this stage of our session, and I thank you very much for giving me the floor.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to point out that China's position on a nuclear test ban is well known. Now, the various sides have agreed to the setting up of a working group on a nuclear test ban in the Committee on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation would not stand in the way of reaching a consensus. However, it reserves the right to make further comments on this question.

Thanks to the efforts of various delegations, the current session of the Committee on Disarmament has yielded some results. The Chinese delegation appreciates very much the diplomatic competence and effective guidance demonstrated by you, Ambassador Okawa, in your work as the Chairman of the Committee for the month of April. However, we could not fail to note that the current grave international situation characterized by Superpower aggression, expansion and occupation and by the increasingly intensified arms race between the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals, has exerted an unfavourable effect on this Committee's work and rendered it impossible to make greater progress.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

The Chinese delegation greatly hopes that a comprehensive programme of disarmament will be approved during the coming special session on disarmament on the basis of the reasonable proposals put forward by the Group of 21. Similarly, we hope that the special session will see progress on the question of nuclear disarmament. On the question of security assurances provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States, it is our hope that the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals will change their attitude. We expect faster development in the elaboration of a chemical weapon convention during the summer session.

Finally, we hope that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is attracting world-wide attention, will make a major contribution to promoting the cause of disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, since I gave the Committee yesterday a description and brief analysis of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, although my delegation still thinks that it will be the central item on the agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, I think it is unnecessary for me to take the subject up again today. I have asked for the floor only in order to make a few comments on another subject, the one which rightly occupies first place on our agenda.

The position of the Mexican delegation on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests is well known. We have been stating that position for years, both in the First Committee of the General Assembly and in the negotiating bodies that preceded the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the Committee itself. The last time we presented our position at some length was at the opening meeting of the Committee's present session, held on 2 February 1982.

The verbatim record of that meeting can easily be consulted and there is therefore no need for me to repeat now what I said then. I will only say that our position has not changed and that it is on the basis of that position that the Mexican delegation will submit to the working group "proposals" and "initiatives" which, according to the last paragraph of the decision we have adopted today and which is incorporated in paragraph 38 of the Committee's report, should be "taken into account" by the group in discharging the task entrusted to it. And it will be the principles and purposes on which our well-known position is based that will guide our action when we reach the stage, referred to in the last part of the paragraph I mentioned, of adopting a decision on the course of action to be followed next year in this connection.

Until then, I should like to end this brief statement by offering our sincere congratulations and expressing our deep appreciation both to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Alessi, and also to Ambassador Jaipal who, as Secretary of the Committee, has given you both his constant co-operation. The efforts of the three of you have been rewarded today by the establishment of the working group to which I referred earlier and which, we earnestly hope, may be the first step towards the achievement in the near future of the goal that all the peoples of the world have been pursuing in vain for more than a quarter of a century, namely, the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests for all time and in all environments.

Mr. SUTRESIA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to make some remarks now that our Committee is about to finish its spring session. Looking back at what the Committee has tried to accomplish during these last three months, my delegation has reason to state that there are things which all of us, I believe, can be proud of and many others, regrettably, on which further perseverance, resoluteness and more laborious work will have to be put into before minimal progress can be achieved. It has been evident throughout our work during this session, as has been stated by many delegations, that the spirit of mutual accommodation, or the lack of it, continues to be the determining factor for the progress or failure of our endeavours in the Committee. This, I think, is normal in all negotiating forums, and particularly so in the case of our Committee as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament.

With regard to item 1 of our agenda my delegation, being one of those which have pressed for the early establishment of a subsidiary body to negotiate a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, wishes to join the previous speakers in expressing our satisfaction at seeing that it has finally proved possible to set up an ad hoc working group on the CTB under a mandate acceptable to all delegations. I wish to convey my sincere appreciation to all delegations for their commendable display of the spirit of compromise which has enabled the Committee to arrive at this situation. I believe this achievement constitutes a symbol that our Committee is responding in part positively to the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly, and however modest it may appear to be, it has shown that the Committee on Disarmament is able to maintain, if not enhance, its own credibility in view of the increasing importance attached to it by the international community. The fact that it is occurring during your tenure of office, Mr. Chairman, is also a source of gratification to my delegation, as your country and Indonesia continue to enjoy excellent relations. I should be remiss if I did not pay tribute also to the distinguished Secretary of our Committee, Ambassador Jainal. It is to a great extent due to his skillfulness that we have at long last reached the stage in which we find ourselves today. There is still a long way to go, but I submit that the Committee has made a good start.

On item 2 of our agenda, my delegation cannot but express its disappointment that, notwithstanding the fact that it also is regarded as an item of the highest priority by the Final Document, it again proved not to be possible during the spring session to reach a consensus. My delegation would not like to see this being regarded as a collective failure on the part of the Committee.

On the item concerning negative security assurances, very briefly, I wish to express the hope that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will give a new impetus that will enable our Committee in the summer session to make significant headway in the discharge of its task in this connection, although regrettably the obstacles appear at present to be insurmountable. But my delegation still entertains the hope that eventually the sense of objective realism will prevail.

With respect to chemical weapons, my delegation entertains the hope that it will be possible, at the summer session, for the Chairman to find a method of work that will enable the Ad Hoc Working Group to advance the process of elaborating the provisions of a convention at the earliest possible date. The importance of its early conclusion, I believe, is quite clear, particularly as we are racing against time in view of rapid technological innovations.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

On the item concerning radiological weapons, my delegation realizes that there are many unresolved problems in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group. However, my delegation shares the hope that the obstacles that have been identified during this spring session may eventually be overcome. It is our view that the Chairman's paper, together with the proposal that has or might eventually be submitted, could provide a starting point for our future work on this item.

On the CPD, it is true, as you may have noticed, Mr. Chairman, that a great part of the report contained in document CD/283 still reflects wide differences of view, some of which are of a fundamental nature. But my delegation is hopeful that during the second special session of the General Assembly, or even before, through informal contacts or consultations or otherwise, those differences may perhaps be resolved in a manner acceptable to all. I agree with some of the previous speakers, although they expressed themselves in a rather pessimistic tone, that each and all of us will have to display a sense of realism, or we shall not be able to overcome these obstacles. But I submit that in applying this sense of realism to our further efforts towards resolving those differences, we should not lose sight of the objectives we wish to achieve through the CPD. Ambassador García Robles, the able Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a CPD, in his statement introducing the report, touched upon the question of the nature of the CPD to which my delegation will briefly address itself. My delegation, for its part, will be prepared to go along with the consensus which might be evolved in New York to introduce an element of a binding character, because my delegation continues to believe that political commitment alone is not enough, as we have noticed from the experience gained from the Final Document. Ambassador García Robles alluded to several ways in which this could be done. In this context, I would venture to submit for consideration, that in the event of the adoption of the CPD by the General Assembly at its second special session, the programme could perhaps be signed by the heads of delegations, with the full powers of their respective Heads of Governments. This, in the view of my delegation, would be more practical, in view of the urgency that all member States attach to the CPD.

Much has already been said on the great importance attached to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. There seems to be practically nothing which my delegation could add to this. What my delegation wishes to say, however, is that a long period of four years has passed by since all the States members of the United Nations, by consensus, adopted the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, and there can therefore be no better opportunity than the second special session to translate into real deeds the political commitments we all made during the 1970 session. We members of the Committee on Disarmament would do well -- as I gather that many of us will be going to New York to attend the special session -- if we, collectively or individually, also manage to display a spirit of compromise and mutual accommodation there on this important occasion.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, through you, I wish to express on behalf of my delegation, our heartfelt thanks and appreciation to all members of the Secretariat, including those who have been working behind the scenes such as the interpreters and security officers for the commendable services rendered to the Committee during this session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sutresna for his statement. The Committee has heard the last speaker on the list of speakers. Would any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): I merely wish to correct part of my statement in which I think there was a lapsus linguae. It should have read "this Committee must not be prevented from exercising its legitimate right and corresponding duty to carry out multilateral negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests," and not States as I said.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Dr. Nanjira for his clarification.

Distinguished delegates, I think we have come to the conclusion of our final debate in the first half of our 1982 session, and I wish to thank you all for your contributions this evening. I would also like to thank you very sincerely for the most kind words that you have addressed to the Chair.

We have one more item of business to deal with, as you are well aware. We agreed in our informal meeting at the end of the afternoon that we would come back, in the plenary, to the question of the dates of the second part of our 1982 session. I regret to say that there is, at present, no consensus regarding the opening date of the summer session, in spite of the consultations that have been going on behind the scenes during this plenary meeting, and, in my view, no consensus is likely to be reached in the next few days. In the circumstances, I feel I have no option but to convene an informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament in New York, in June, during the second special session of the General Assembly. It may be possible, at that time, to reach consensus because several matters will be clearer than now. I hope you can agree to this procedure, which is permissible under rule 3 of our rules of procedure.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I understood you to say that this question to which we are now referring would be discussed after statements and the adjournment of the plenary meeting, at an informal meeting. I would therefore request that the formal meeting now be suspended and that an informal meeting be convened where your views can be stated fully. If you have put forward this proposal as a proposal by the Chair, I am rather fearful that it might precipitate a discussion at the formal meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. You have heard the proposal of Ambassador Erdembileg.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, in order not to prolong too much a discussion which has already gone on for too long, let us consider that there are four delegations interested in this matter -- your own, as the Chairman of the Committee until the month of July, and the delegations of Kenya, Mexico and Mongolia. I therefore suggest that we suspend the meeting and the four delegations, under your Chairmanship, consult among yourselves and the decision you come to, be reported to the Committee in the hope and trust that the Committee will endorse immediately the conclusion that you four may reach.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil. Would you agree to follow the suggestion of Ambassador Erdembileg and suspend this meeting of the Committee on Disarmament and meet again immediately in another informal meeting of the Committee? Is there a consensus on that procedure?

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for so kindly suggesting that I should be a member of this small group, but I assure you, Mr. Chairman, and the distinguished representative of Brazil, that the fact that Mexico is shortly to assume the Chairmanship of the Committee has absolutely no influence, as far as I am concerned, on the choice of a suitable date for the opening of our summer session. I believe, as I said this afternoon, and several distinguished representatives have also done so, that we have already spent too much time on this question. I fully agree with the procedural suggestion you have just made. I was also in agreement with the suggestion you made this afternoon when opening our meeting, and with the amendment to your suggestion put forward by Ambassador Issraelyan. I have nothing against our suspending this meeting and holding an informal meeting, subject to one condition, Mr. Chairman. I think that the informal meeting should last no longer than 15 minutes and that we should then take a decision in plenary meeting immediately afterwards. I would not agree to a suspension of more than 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Garcia Robles. The proposal to suspend the meeting and move into an informal meeting has been seconded by Ambassador Garcia Robles on the condition that it lasts not longer than 15 minutes. Are there no objections? We suspend the plenary and move immediately into an informal meeting.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 10 p.m. and resumed at 10.20 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: (Ambassador Okawa of Japan) The formal session of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that our Committee has been unable to reach a consensus on the date for the resumption of its work in the summer, we would propose that it should be decided that during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the Committee should hold a meeting in New York convened by its present Chairman, the Ambassador of Japan, to decide on the date for the resumption of its session in the summer.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Solá Vila for his proposal. Are there any objections to this proposal? There appears to be no objection, so I will take it that the Committee on Disarmament decides to take a decision to reconvene in an informal meeting in June in New York.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, before we adopt such a decision, I should like to propose that we make a last attempt to find a solution here and now in Geneva by means of brief consultations. I would therefore request that you suspend the meeting for another three or four minutes.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, we are not here to trifle: we have just had a suspension of 15 minutes, I am opposed to a further suspension.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I fully support the proposal put forward by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN: There does not seem to be any consensus, I am afraid, on the proposal just put forward by Mr. Nazarkin of the Soviet Union.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation finds it difficult to agree with the proposal put forward by the distinguished representative of Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN: Then the only other alternative is to adjourn the meeting without deciding anything. Or would you like to meet again tomorrow?

Mr. ERDENBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): If the Committee were to disperse without taking a decision concerning the opening date of the second part of our session, that would be a violation of our rules of procedure. So I would request you, Sir, and through you all the members of the Committee, to agree that we suspend this meeting for four or five minutes so that the group can consult among themselves and come forward with a decision, and then we can wind up the work of the first part of this session.

The CHAIRMAN: I suspend the meeting for five minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 10.25 p.m. and resumed at 10.35 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 173rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. I feel that there is no consensus on my proposal to convene an informal meeting of this Committee in June in New York. An alternative would be not to decide anything this evening, but to have a further meeting of this Committee at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow morning. Would there be a consensus on that?

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): I would like to ask that it be 10 o'clock as I have some other business later on.

The CHAIRMAN: I have just been informed that there would be no interpreters, so it would have to be in the afternoon.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I think that some of us here -- myself included -- have made our plans on the basis of the date that was fixed for the closing of this part of our session. I have engagements tomorrow that I cannot change, and in truth, Mr. Chairman, I do not see what can happen between today and 10.30 a.m. tomorrow that can change the situation. There are reasons for hoping that the situation might change between now and when you said, in New York, in June or at the beginning of July, or, if you like, during the early part of May when the Preparatory Committee will be meeting. But between now and tomorrow there will really be no change. Thus what is applicable at the present moment is rule 7 of the rules of procedure which states: "The Committee shall decide, as soon as practically possible, the opening date of the second part ...". For the moment it is not practically possible, and we ought therefore either to adopt the suggestion you made at the outset or to leave the matter open for you to decide when you deem it advisable to convene a meeting of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. It seems clear that there is no consensus on convening a further meeting of this Committee tomorrow. I have another alternative, and that is rule 7 of our rules of procedure which says: "The Committee shall decide, as soon as practically possible, the opening date of the second part and the closing dates of both parts of its annual session, taking into account the requirements of its work". The key words are "as soon as practically possible". We are not able to take any decision this evening, so we shall take a decision as soon as it is practically possible. That seems to be the only way out of the impasse in which we find ourselves.

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania): I am really sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I think you are obliged to announce the date of the next plenary meeting when you close this one and I think this would create a real problem. I am afraid we cannot under the circumstances use the provisions of rule 7 of the rules of procedure, I really do believe that you have to announce at the end of this meeting, whenever you close it, when the next plenary meeting of the CD will take place, be it a formal or an informal meeting. Otherwise, it means that the Committee is either in session -- continues to be in session -- or has ceased to exist. I am sorry, I do not mean to complicate things even more, but I do not see any other way out.

The CHAIRMAN: I would willingly announce the date of our next meeting if that were feasible. But since it is not feasible, under the circumstances, all I can say is that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be convened on a date to be announced.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Truly, this problem seems to be giving us more trouble than J-1 and J-2. We would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you put before the Committee the proposal that it should begin its work on 3 August and that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should start on 23 July. This would meet the demands of a number of members of the Group of 21 as well as of other countries, for we have not heard any objection to these specific dates. There is one thing that disturbs us about this matter: it is that if we do not take a decision we shall be unable, under the rules of procedure, to close this session, and if we cannot close the session this will create a very difficult situation for us because in that case we shall not be able to transmit the report we have approved. We would therefore suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you try to see if there is a consensus in favour of 3 August for the Committee on Disarmament and 23 July for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, together with the date indicated by the secretariat for the closure of the summer part of the Committee's session.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation does not object but supports the proposals put forward by the distinguished representative of Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN: A proposal has been made by Cuba to convene the Committee on Disarmament from 3 August and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons from 23 July. Is there a consensus on this proposal which has been recorded by Ambassador Erdembileg?

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I made a proposal at one of our informal meetings. Let me say that I entirely share the views of my distinguished colleague from Cuba that we would do ourselves a great disservice if we adjourned this meeting without coming to an agreement on the opening date of our summer session. When I made my proposal, I had the impression that it had broad support. The only objection to my proposal that I heard was that this would mean, to some extent, a suspension of one of our rules of procedure. Mr. Chairman, we are at present in a very difficult situation -- I would call it quite extraordinary. I cannot see that it serves us to any extent whatsoever to be restrained in this way by our rules of procedure. It has been said by a number of delegations that the rules of procedure should rather guide us in our work, not tie us unnecessarily. For that reason Mr. Chairman, I would again formally submit my proposal, namely, that we start the summer session on 27 July, with you yourself in the Chair for the rest of the month.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I would like to endorse the proposal of the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I, too, agree to that proposal, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKINSANYA (Nigeria): Just to say briefly, Mr. Chairman, that my delegation endorses that proposal.

The CHAIRMAN: Which proposal?

Mr. AKINSANYA (Nigeria): The Swedish proposal.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): I would like to support the proposal made by the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden.

Ms. EKANGA KABEYA (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, my delegation also supports the proposal of the representative of Sweden.

Mr. STEELE (Australia): My delegation also supports the Swedish proposal, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation can support the proposal of Sweden with the amendment that in July there will be the appropriate Chairman for that month and not the representative of a country whose period of chairmanship has expired. If I understood the representative of Sweden correctly, he said that in July you should continue serving as Chairman. We cannot agree with that proposal because it would be a violation of the rules of procedure.

Mr. de BEAUSSE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I was ready to give my full support to the Swedish proposal but if the distinguished representative of Mongolia insists on the application of the rules of procedure, which is in fact very praiseworthy, I think that we can respect the letter of the rules. We could decide to convene the Committee for its next session in the first days of August, and then we could decide that, in view of the amount of work we have to do, that we need to convene a special session. Since this special session would take place in the interval between two regular sessions, it would be held under the chairmanship of the current Chairman, namely yourself, Mr. Chairman, and this special session could be convened between 27 July and 1 August, or, if you like, between 23 July and 1 August. In this way, the letter of the rules of procedure would be strictly respected. We should in fact be applying rule 8, which authorizes the Chairman of the Committee to convene the Committee in special session without, moreover, including any stipulations as to the reasons for such special session.

The CHAIRMAN: (translated from French): You mean a special session of the Committee? Not an informal meeting?

Mr. de BEAUSSE (France) (translated from French): No, a special session, as specified in rule 8 of the rules of procedure.

The CHAIRMAN: You have heard the last proposal. Is there a consensus on that one? According to the proposal of France, the present Chairman would convene a special session of the Committee towards the end of July, and the second half of the 1982 session would begin on 5 August. Do I have your consensus on that?

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, if this proposal of France can achieve consensus, I would certainly not block consensus here. I only wish to add that I understood that there was also a proposal that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons should start on 20 July: it was not my intention in any way to change this proposal, on which there already previously seemed to be consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I do not think any delegation objected to that part of our proposal -- that the Chemical Weapons Working Group would meet on 20 July. I think we have reached an agreement.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, as regards the proposal that has just been made by the distinguished representative of France, the Mongolian delegation can be flexible. However, this would likewise be a violation of the rules of procedure. If the Committee were to decide to hold a special session, then I do not think that this could last only a few days. A special session, as its name implies, should be specially convened in order to discuss urgent, high-priority matters. That is how I understand a special session: it is not one that is simply the continuation of a normal session. From this point of view, I have an objection.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, as Ambassador Erdembileg has said there must be an important question that we must discuss at the special session, since the second special session on disarmament will have just ended, I would propose that our topic for discussion at the special session of the Committee on Disarmament should be a consideration of the decisions and recommendations taken at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, interpretation will stop very shortly. I intend to adjourn the meeting at 11 o'clock.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): I have kept silent, Sir, but since everybody is speaking, I thought I should ask a question. My question is: what is the specific reason why the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has to begin on 20 July? Why can it not be convened at the same time as the Committee on Disarmament? What is the specific urgency? That is my question.

Mr. UAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, if you are indeed going to close the meeting at 11 o'clock, I think we have no other choice than to convene another meeting tomorrow afternoon. I would propose that we hold another meeting of the Committee tomorrow afternoon, the 174th meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DON HANJIRA (Kenya): My delegation would find it difficult to accept that proposal. I think that would not be appropriate to my delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: I propose to adjourn the meeting at 11 p.m. The next meeting will be announced later.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): I want to make it very clear, Mr. Chairman, that I am not blocking consensus: I simply asked a question.

The CHAIRMAN: Maybe we shall have an answer tomorrow.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): If Mr. Mihajlovic was merely asking a question, then the only difficulty I see in the way of our adopting the solution proposed by the representative of France is the scruple of the distinguished representative of Mongolia about there not being a sufficiently important reason for holding a special session. However, I think that the reason given us by Mr. Saran, the distinguished representative of India, is sufficiently important to justify a special session. I have no objection, Mr. Chairman, to your announcing the next meeting later, but for the reasons I have already given I have to express my opposition to a meeting being held tomorrow. I am sorry, but that is how things are.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. The next meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be announced later. I will adjourn this meeting.

The meeting rose at 11 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 23 April 1982, at 11.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio Okawa

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. LIN CHENG

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES
Miss K. SINEGIORGIS

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A. VENKATESWARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. A. J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mexico: Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. H. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. DENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. PRJAKKIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. L. MIDDLETON

United States of America:

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. MISKEL

Venezuela:

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I declare open the 174th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. Members will recall that we held a plenary meeting on Wednesday evening during which a long exchange of views took place on the question of dates for the future work of this Committee. Several proposals were made by members and I am sure that the Committee will agree that we now need to take stock of the present situation and the alternatives open to us.

The recess we have had since Wednesday night has given us ample time to reflect on the discussions held on Wednesday and, consequently, I hope that we can now go back to this question and attempt to solve it quickly.

I have been holding consultations and as a result I have come to the conclusion that there is likely to be a consensus in this Committee on the opening of the second part of the 1982 session on 3 August, which is a Tuesday. May I take this to be acceptable?

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting we discussed the date for the formal resumption of the Committee's session in connection with the date on which the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will begin working again; on the understanding that that Group will start working on 20 July, your proposal is acceptable to the Soviet delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: I was intending to come back to that question after we had taken a decision on the opening date and I thank you for your concurrence.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): I would like to say, on behalf of my delegation, that Sweden will not stand in the way of a consensus on 3 August, although we do not find this date very suitable, as has been apparent from previous statements. I would also like to say that we would still propose that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons start earlier, as we had suggested.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the position of the Mongolian delegation on the question under discussion has been repeatedly stated and is well known to the members of the Committee. I reiterated our position even at the meeting that was held this morning in your office. My delegation will not oppose the opening of the summer part of our session on 3 August -- we shall not object to the Committee on Disarmament resuming its work for the second part of this session on that date, but I should like to endorse the remarks made a moment ago by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. The group of socialist countries has thus adopted a very flexible position and agreed to the reopening of our session on 3 August on the understanding that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will begin working on 20 July. If the members of the Committee have nothing against it, you could perhaps first take a decision concerning the resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on 20 July, and then, on the basis of consensus, adopt the proposal you put forward, namely, that 3 August should be agreed on as the date for the opening of the second part of the Committee's session.

The CHAIRMAN: We will come to the question of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons later.

Ms. CRITTENBERGER (United States of America): If you are going to address the subject of the chemical weapons Working Group later, I will defer my comments until then.

The CHAIRMAN: May I take it that 3 August is acceptable as the opening date of the second part of our 1982 session?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Now we may come to the question of the opening date for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. The date of 20 July has been proposed. On the understanding that this will not be considered as a precedent for ad hoc working groups to meet before the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament themselves are opened, I propose that we decide that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should begin its work on 20 July. Is this agreeable?

It was so decided.

Ms. CRITTENBERGER (United States of America): My delegation did not object to the chemical weapons Group starting earlier on 20 July, if that was what was going to achieve consensus on our opening date for the summer session. I would, however, state that with regard to your explanatory remarks we really do not see the need for the Group to begin early and would have preferred that it begin at the same time as the Committee itself.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): I in no way wanted to block a consensus in the Committee on the opening date of 3 August: we are happy to agree to that if it is the only solution, but I feel it necessary to say that, given the urgency of the matters before us, I and my Government regard it as unfortunate that we are delaying our resumption to that date. Likewise, as I said at an earlier meeting I find it rather extraordinary that we should begin one Working Group in advance of that date and not concentrate on the very necessary establishment of the working group on a nuclear test ban that we have agreed to set in train. I find it regrettable that that will be delayed.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): I wanted to join those who spoke before me and would like to put on record that the socialist group would have preferred 20 July as the beginning of the summer session but, after seeing the necessity of reaching a consensus, we agreed to 3 August.

Mr. AGUIYI-IRONSI (Nigeria): Very briefly, my delegation joined the consensus for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to start on 20 July but we do believe that the Working Group should have started when the Committee opens on 3 August and we note your statement that this is not setting a precedent. Since my delegation holds that item 1 is of the highest priority, we believe that this working group should, perhaps, have started first.

Mr. VAN DONGEN (Netherlands): Just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that we would have had a rather marked preference for starting our next summer session in July, primarily because starting only on 3 August will put us under a rather tight time-schedule for finishing the work of the session. Obviously, we did not want to stand in the way of a consensus, but I should like to repeat that this is of some concern to us, given the fact that we shall now have only six weeks available in which, hopefully, to complete the amount of work we would normally do in eight weeks, and we do not regard this as an ideal solution.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (translated from French): I am happy to note that flexibility has finally prevailed in our discussions. I also believe that we need not necessarily restrict ourselves to the date 10 September for the completion of our work. The Committee's report to the General Assembly is perhaps not a problem that we cannot overcome in a few weeks, and the period between 10 September and the beginning of the work of the First Committee should give us ample time to prepare this report -- or even a shorter period. In other words, if we find it necessary in due course to continue our work in certain spheres, we could perhaps consider going beyond the date 10 September which was adopted only as a target date for the conclusion of our work.

I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, while at the same time once more congratulating you on your patience and your gift as a negotiator that have made it possible to reach agreement on this minor question. I should like to recall that we are ending this part of our session with another, more important and more positive decision, as my country's Ambassador noted in the statement he made at our plenary meeting on Wednesday last.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Noirfalisse for his statement. If there are no further statements from the floor, I do not think that there is any further business we have to transact and it is time for the Chairman to make his concluding remarks. They will be brief.

We have had a difficult session, but we have managed to conclude our work and I wish to thank all delegations around this table for the tremendous spirit of compromise and co-operation they have demonstrated to the Chair. I wish to congratulate you all on this fact.

I would like to address a very special word of gratitude to the distinguished Secretary and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, for the excellent assistance and advice with which he has provided us during this session, and also to make a special mention of Mr. Berasategui who has shown a great deal of patience, especially in the work of the drafting group that was working on our special report to the General Assembly at its special session. I also wish to thank all members of the Secretariat who are sitting behind me, the Secretaries of the various working groups and their staff, our colleagues, the interpreters and technicians sitting behind the glass windows and the other teams, their colleagues, the translators, the conference room staff, the typists and all the other members of the Secretariat whose faces we have not often seen, but they certainly deserve our very sincere thanks.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 3 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 3 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. L. STAVINOMA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMLVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
Mr. T. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. A. BARRIN

Iran:

Mr. H.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAÏBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAUF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DITCOU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. M. BICHIR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALLIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. R.M. TIMMERBAYER
Mr. V.V. LOSHCININE
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRLACHIN
Mr. V.L. GALI

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Ms. E. EKANGA KIBEYA
Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 175th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates, let me first of all express my sincere gratitude to Ambassador Yoshio Okawa of Japan who, in accordance with rule 9 of this Committee's rules of procedure, has handed over to me the Chairmanship of the Committee. Ambassador Okawa has done an outstanding job since he assumed the Chairmanship of the Committee last April. The issues on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were still as complex and unresolved as they had been four or even more years earlier. But you did your best, Mr. Ambassador, and we owe you a debt of gratitude for the guidance and leadership you have provided to the Committee during this period.

I wish also to thank Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and his staff, for the valuable services they have provided to the Committee since we last met here three months ago.

Distinguished delegates, since this is the first meeting of the Committee on Disarmament since the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended, we cannot avoid looking back to it and drawing some conclusions. The session had two fundamental issues to deal with. It had to review the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament, and to consider, if possible, adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Most regrettably, neither of these issues was at all successfully resolved. The same can be said of three other main items on its agenda, which were: the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament.

Since the session was not able to complete its work on these issues, it decided to refer them back to this Committee and to the regular sessions of the General Assembly. This development imposes a heavy burden on the Committee during this short session and I believe for a few sessions to come.

My delegation was disappointed by the outcome of the twelfth special session as, I am sure, were many others, but we were encouraged by the determination of the session not to destroy the work done in disarmament so far. The act of referring back the unresolved issues to the Committee on Disarmament and to future sessions of the General Assembly, was a mark of faith and trust in this institution. It provides a challenge to this Committee, to you distinguished delegates and to the Governments which you represent. This is the way my delegation views the developments in the special session.

We recognized before the special session started that the circumstances in which it was held were inopportune. The political climate and the tensions in the world could only contribute negatively to the deliberations on issues of disarmament. Disarmament is not a science that can be developed in isolation from the issues

(The Chairman)

affecting nations from day to day. It is directly related to the perceptions of security of each State and the arrangements made to maintain international peace and security. If the arrangements made cannot be seen to provide security, if there is any doubt whether the machinery created to underpin security can work when the need arises, then negotiations in the field of disarmament must necessarily remain extremely difficult. This interrelationship between international peace and security and disarmament was recognized by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament and expressed in paragraph 13 of the Final Document, which reads as follows:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means".

My delegation hopes that these interrelationships will be borne in mind at all times and that serious work will be done to implement and strengthen the machinery provided in the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Uppermost in our thoughts as we start this summer session of the Committee are the ongoing conflicts in different parts of the world. While these do not fall directly in our field of work, nevertheless they do affect our deliberations and negotiations and therefore everything that can be done to bring them to an end should be done. The prevention of the frequent occurrence of local wars would go a long way to reducing tensions and thus contribute to improving the climate in which we negotiate in this Committee.

The recent outcome of the second special session devoted to disarmament necessitates a strong reaffirmation of the Final Document of the first special session and total commitment to it by all States. It also underscores the negotiating character of this Committee, which should be utilized fully by all its member States. Problems of scope and verification of compliance with agreements on disarmament issues are undoubtedly at the heart of the absence of political will.

Ways should be sought of enhancing the effectiveness of this Committee as a negotiating body on disarmament matters. Our agenda is full. There are the problems of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, among others, which the current session of the Committee has to tackle. We will need to work harder and faster.

Distinguished delegates, I have briefly outlined some of the fundamental problems which the General Assembly failed to resolve at its second special session

(The Chairman)

and which I believe the Committee should seriously negotiate during its current session. A draft programme of work for the plenary meetings of the Committee will be circulated to all delegations this afternoon. I hope that we can adopt it at the next meeting of the Committee, on 5 August, so that we can get started on our work without delay. This is going to be a relatively short session of the Committee on Disarmament and we should, therefore, take advantage of every hour available to us.

As for the establishment or re-establishment of ad hoc working groups and the organization of their work, I have initiated informal consultations and we shall discuss them this afternoon.

My delegation is entirely at your service and stands ready to help in every way possible to achieve progress in our work.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcou, who joins the Committee for the first time today as leader of his delegation. Ambassador Datcou is a very experienced diplomat who served recently as head of Delegation to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, before that, as Permanent Representative of his country in New York. He was previously Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva and also head of his country's delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I am sure that we can count on his vast experience in the complex tasks before the Committee. I would also like to welcome once again the presence among us of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, leader of the Swedish delegation, who will address the Committee today.

I would also like to recognize the presence among us today of the 1982 disarmament Fellows. I am informed that the Geneva part of the Fellowship Programme began on 12 July and will end on 30 August. The disarmament Fellows will be attending our plenary meetings during the course of their stay in Geneva. On behalf of the Committee, I extend a warm welcome to them and wish them all the best in their studies.

May I draw the attention of delegations to document CD/300 entitled "Letter dated 3 August 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament in connection with the concluding document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" which has been circulated today by the secretariat.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, Canada, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India, Sweden, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by expressing the sincere satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you presiding over the Committee on Disarmament during this first month of our 1982 summer session. All those who like myself have had the good fortune to see you working not only here in the Committee on Disarmament but also at the General Assembly in New York know that the guidance of the Committee's work is in very good hands. As regards myself personally, since, as we all know, it is the custom for the incoming Chairman to consult the outgoing Chairman before assuming his office, I believe that I could not have found a better predecessor to consult at the end of this month. I should also like to express -- or rather to repeat -- my congratulations to Ambassador Okawa, the distinguished representative of Japan. We all know how well he discharged his tasks here during the last month of the spring session. But those of us who were present at the recent special session of the General Assembly can also bear witness to the outstanding way in which he acted there as Chairman of the Committee. Lastly, I should like very sincerely to endorse your words of welcome here to Ambassador Datcou. He has only just joined us here but for a number of us, as you yourself said, he is an old friend from New York, where he was for a number of years his country's permanent representative. It is, of course, a great pleasure to me to see among us here once again my distinguished colleague and friend, Mrs. Thorsson, and I am glad to know, also, that the disarmament Fellows are with us again here this summer.

At the beginning of the first session of this "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", on Wednesday, 24 January 1979, I made the following statement concerning the Final Document which set down the results of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in the spring of 1978, and which, as you know established the Committee on Disarmament:

"Never before had the United Nations succeeded in adopting, and still less by consensus -- including France and China -- such a comprehensive document which emphatically proclaimed a series of conclusions or provisions -- whose accuracy or compulsory nature, depending on the case, it will in future be impossible to call in question -- such as those defined in the emphatic statements that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it; that the existing nuclear arsenals and the continuing arms race pose a threat to the very survival of mankind; that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development, and that any resources that may be released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used to bridge the economic gap between developed and developing countries; that in accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and that therefore Member States must keep the United Nations duly informed of all steps, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, taken outside its aegis."

The results of the second special session devoted to disarmament which has just been held at United Nations Headquarters were very different. The General Assembly, in fact, failed lamentably in what had, from the beginning, rightly been considered to be its fundamental purpose: approval of a comprehensive programme of disarmament which would faithfully reflect the requirements embodied in paragraph 109 of the Final Document.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

This failure was not, of course, due to any lack of organization, industry or determination. At its second meeting, held on 14 June, the Ad Hoc Committee of the twelfth special session established an open-ended working group responsible for the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The group -- Working Group I, which I had the honour of presiding over -- immediately set up four drafting groups, also open-ended, to try to reach agreement on the text of the various chapters of the programme, on the basis of the draft text, the fruit of two years' work, which had been transmitted to the General Assembly by the Committee on Disarmament.

It would be out of place here to give a detailed account of the uninterrupted efforts that were made for rather more than three weeks in the bodies I have mentioned and in various additional informal consultations in an attempt to achieve the objective sought. Suffice it to recall, briefly, that the chapters on "Objectives" and "Priorities" were almost completed, that very considerable progress was made with respect to the chapter concerning "Principles" and also, although to a lesser extent, on the chapter to be called "Machinery and procedures" and an additional chapter, containing material drawn from the preceding chapter in the Geneva draft, on the subject of "Verification".

In addition, at its fourth meeting, Working Group I had before it a draft "Introduction" which I had felt it appropriate to prepare, in my capacity as Chairman of the Group, and which -- although there was insufficient time for it to receive proper consideration -- did not give rise to any objection either.

On the other hand, the part of the programme concerned with "Disarmament measures", and more particularly the measures contained in the section entitled "Nuclear Weapons", proved to be an insurmountable barrier to the achievement of a consensus. I do not want in this respect either to go deeply into the various elements that came into play in producing the sorry outcome we are facing. I shall simply repeat what I said at the closing meeting of the special session of the General Assembly, on 10 July, when I expressed my firm conviction that the members of the group known as the "Group of 21" -- of which Mexico is a member and which, as you know, includes all the countries members of the Committee on Disarmament which are not attached to either of the two major military alliances -- could certainly have a quiet conscience, for, as I said at the time -- and I gave a number of concrete and irrefutable examples -- it is very unlikely that there was ever an occasion in the history of multilateral disarmament negotiations, when one of the parties made so many important concessions as were made by the Group of 21 during the short period of the negotiations that took place during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I cannot but mention also the surprise felt not only by myself but also by many other representatives of third world countries when the delegation of one Superpower, after declaring in the general debate that "we need deeds not words" and that "we should not confuse the signing of agreements with the solving of problems", because "agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept" shortly thereafter adopted an attitude in flagrant contradiction with those statements, which had been made on 17 June at the highest level. In fact, it was probably the question of the action to be taken with respect to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests which constituted the decisive element in the General Assembly's failure as regards the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The attitude that was adopted was, we believe, in clear contradiction with the obligation assumed in the partial test-ban treaty nearly 20 years ago, the preamble of which expresses a determination to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", an undertaking which was to be expressly reiterated five years later in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which is undoubtedly also reflected in article VI of that Treaty. Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that the same Superpower approved -- and not by participating in a consensus, which may sometimes mean mere passive acceptance, but by the positive and unequivocal act of a vote in favour -- the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of three separate resolutions in three successive years (resolutions 32/78 of 12 December 1977, 33/60 of 14 December 1978 and 34/73 of 11 December 1979) urging the three States which had been conducting negotiations -- that is, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union -- first, to "expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible" and secondly, to transmit the results immediately thereafter to the Committee on Disarmament, at the same time the General Assembly requested this Committee to initiate negotiations on the treaty in question "with the utmost urgency"; "as a matter of the highest priority" or "immediately" -- whichever expression you like to pick from the three resolutions in which they are severally used.

Naturally, it is the sovereign right of each State to decide on the principles of its foreign policy. However, it is also its inescapable duty towards the international community to let it know what to expect as regards the application of those principles. We were told during the debate at the recent special session of the General Assembly, in the words of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, that only tyrants' promises "are in deep contrast to their performances". If what that country wants is the limitless acceleration of the nuclear arms race, then it should say so frankly. The World Disarmament Campaign for which Mexico had the privilege of taking the initiative two years ago, and which the General Assembly solemnly launched at its opening meeting recently, has the specific purpose of providing reliable information to the peoples of the world -- those peoples both of Europe and the United States who have been demonstrating in their millions to express their desire for peace and disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament.

As the General Assembly so rightly stated at its special session of 1978, if nuclear weapons constitute a threat to the very survival of mankind, it is obvious that "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations". It is only natural, then, that those States which wish to be genuine spokesmen for their peoples should consider it not only an obvious right but also their imperative duty to analyse coldly and objectively the reasons why, after a quarter of a century of discussions in the United Nations and the various disarmament negotiating bodies, it has still not so far been possible to agree on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests once and for all. For the purposes of such an analysis, I believe that it would be very useful to consider certain recent opinions and facts of particular relevance, which I shall now mention.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In a book which appeared in the bookshops while the General Assembly was meeting recently, entitled "Nuclear Illusion and Reality", Lord Solly Zuckerman, undoubtedly one of the best authorities on the subject, wrote as follows:

"In July 1959 [a year that fell within the period of voluntary moratorium, 1958-1961], Harold Macmillan wrote that: 'The Americans ... seem now to be turning against a comprehensive agreement (to include underground tests). This, if true, is tragic.' Later he noted: 'The real reason is that the Atomic Commission and the Pentagon are very keen to go on indefinitely with experiments (large and small) so as to keep refining upon and perfecting the art of nuclear weapons.'"

Amplifying the above remarks by Macmillan which he quotes in his book, Lord Zuckerman adds some comments of his own, as follows:

"One reason why the Americans were so keen on continuing to test nuclear warheads was that by the time there was talk about test-bans, they had already embarked on a vigorous programme to develop ballistic missiles. The Russians, not surprisingly, responded by intensifying theirs. This added another dimension to the arms race, as did the dream of devising anti-ballistic missile systems.

"In 1964, a year after the Partial Test-Ban Treaty was signed, York and Wiesner, who were associated with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy at the centre of the debate, published the article to which I have already referred, and in which they stated that in assuring national security further tests of nuclear weapons were unnecessary."

I should like to repeat that last statement to make sure that members have heard it: York and Wiesner declared that no further tests of nuclear weapons were necessary to ensure national security. Lord Zuckerman goes on to say:

"As they saw it, the increase in military power which might follow from further testing and from the elaboration of more nuclear weapons was bound, in both the East and the West, to bring about a decrease in national security. In the considered professional judgment of these two men -- and they had all the facts at their disposal -- a continuation of the nuclear arms race provided no escape from this curious paradox."

That was the situation in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, and things do not seem to have changed much, as can be seen from an editorial that appeared in the New York Times a mere 10 days ago, on 23 July. For that article, which bears the vivid title, "Nuclear Sand in the Eye", contains the following statements, among others:

"The Administration has avoided test-ban negotiations for 18 months; it clearly has no interest in the total treaty. That is too bad for Soviet-American relations and for the cause of non-proliferation. Without great military risk to either power, a total ban would do much to help discourage other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff invariably insist that testing is essential for weapons development and for confidence in the reliability of old warheads. Their opposition is reinforced by America's weapons laboratories, which fear for the future of their work if denied the right to test. But there are good answers to these concerns that the Administration does not even bother to debate. It sides with the Chiefs and uses old scare stories about inadequate verification to confuse Congress and the public ..."

This article in the New York Times continues:

"So there would be no insuperable obstacle to monitoring compliance. The Soviet Union has gone further than ever before in agreeing to American-controlled monitoring boxes where Washington wants them and to the idea of on-site inspection on challenge...."

"A comprehensive ban would hamper improvements in warhead design, an American emphasis, and explosive power, a Soviet emphasis. It would also gradually erode confidence in the reliability of warheads on the shelf. But that is important only for a pre-emptive first-strike. American strategists who feel vulnerable to such a strike would actually gain security from a total ban."

That is the end of a quotation from an editorial which appeared in the New York Times 10 days ago, on 23 July.

At its second special session on disarmament the General Assembly, after expressing its regret that it had been unable to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament, said that it saw grounds for encouragement in the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, their solemn undertaking with respect to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in the matter of disarmament negotiations agreed upon in its programme of action. Shortly thereafter in those same conclusions, the General Assembly stated the following:

"Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. To this end, the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is hereby referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. The Committee on Disarmament is requested to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

We believe that the General Assembly was right not to contemplate any action by the Committee on Disarmament during the current year. For we are convinced that the fate of the comprehensive programme will depend primarily, not on the Committee, but on the "political will" of a few of its members and ultimately, it might perhaps even be said, on that of a single one of them which is very probably still not prepared to take the necessary decisions, if the Programme -- as many delegations, including our own, consider essential -- is not to imply any retreat, however small, with respect to the Final Document of 1978.

We hope that during the next six weeks, which will constitute the whole of what is called the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, it will be possible to establish exactly what the present situation is in this matter and how it may possibly develop in the near future. It should be borne in mind that the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", will be beginning its work for the first time. My delegation's position with regard to the question of "verification", which is given priority in that Group's mandate is well known. Basically it coincides with that expressed by none other than the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1972 when he declared to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement ..."

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification ... it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban ..."

"The potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests."

That is what the Secretary-General of the United Nations said here in 1972, and as we all know, he expressly repeated that statement in 1980 in his introduction to the report of the experts.

It is thus clear that acceptance of that mandate meant a tremendous concession on our part and we were only able to make that concession, as I said in my statement on 21 April last, at the 173rd meeting of the Committee, because, as is stated in its mandate, the working group "will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session," and also because, as is again stated in that mandate, "the Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

We hope that the Superpower whose future attitude on this question will, as I said earlier, in our view, be decisive for the fate of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, will be able in turn to show the necessary flexibility so that it can adopt a position on the substance of the matter that is consonant with the obligations assumed in the Treaties of 1963 and 1968 to which I have referred and the position endorsed with its affirmative vote in the three General Assembly resolutions which I have also expressly mentioned.

Only thus will the Committee be able -- and let us hope that this will come to pass -- to transmit to the General Assembly next year, at its thirty-eighth regular session, a revised draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which will justify the convening of a third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, His Excellency Ambassador McPhail.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I should like to welcome you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. It is good to see you in the Chair. Many delegations have worked with you in New York and here in Geneva on disarmament matters and I want to take the occasion also to thank Ambassador Okawa for his great efforts as Chairman in April when he attempted to prepare the Committee in order that it would maximize its contribution to the second special session. Much is expected of the Committee during this period. Much responsibility, therefore, lies with you. It is always a pleasure to see a fellow representative of the Commonwealth in the Chair. We aim to contribute to your success. At the same time, I should like to welcome Mr. Bensmail to the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament. He brings with him experience which will stand the Committee in good stead.

Just before it adjourned last spring, I referred in a plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament to its unique responsibility -- to negotiate. At its regular sessions the General Assembly does not negotiate, nor indeed was this the function of its second special session on disarmament.

Despite a number of shortcomings, the second special session has reaffirmed the critical role of the Committee on Disarmament in the multilateral process of negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. Indeed, the second special session reaffirmed, in a number of ways, the confidence of the international community in this Organization. Should we not therefore look quickly to the future? Should we not build especially upon areas where substantial progress has already been made?

In planning our work for this short summer session we need to husband our resources carefully. In our view, the Committee should focus its main attention on three substantive areas -- chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban and outer space.

Issues such as negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament should, in our view, be given less concentrated treatment. In the cases of negative security assurances and radiological weapons, discussions during our spring session suggest that while these matters need to be kept under review in the Committee, further consultations outside the Committee amongst individual delegations might yield the most profitable results.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

The General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament charged the Committee on Disarmament to proceed with further work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Experience at the second special session, and indeed that within the Committee last spring, suggest that there might be benefit now in a "cooling off" period. Instead of immediately resuming our efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory comprehensive programme of disarmament, the time may be ripe for reflection, for reformulation of national positions, so that we may, when the time is right, move ahead.

I should now like briefly to refer to problems related to our work on a chemical weapons convention, the comprehensive test ban Working Group, and the item on outer space.

With respect to chemical weapons, I should like to recall the words of my Prime Minister at the second special session: "Given the complexity and characteristics of many modern weapons systems, national technical means may not be adequate for verifying arms control and disarmament agreements. Consequently, the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s". Nowhere is this observation more apt than in our efforts to achieve a chemical weapons convention. Under previous Chairmen of the chemical weapons Working Group, Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard, much was accomplished: Ambassador Sujka has already added his particular contribution to this progress. We have now come to the point where it is clear that the success of our efforts will depend upon the degree to which there is agreement on adequate measures of verification. This, I repeat, is now the fundamental issue before the Committee.

We have noted with great interest the Soviet proposals concerning verification of a chemical weapons convention announced by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the General Assembly's second special session. We look forward to exploring these proposals in detail during this session of the Committee on Disarmament. We want particularly to explore those provisions relating to "on-site verification on an agreed basis". In line with our objectives in achieving further progress towards a chemical weapons convention, Canadian expertise will be provided for a period longer than in the past for technical discussions on verification matters.

We are pleased that the Working Group on a comprehensive test ban will commence work at this session. We believe it to be in the interest of this Committee as a whole that it should begin substantive consideration of the items under its mandate as soon as possible. We recognize, however, that given the shortness of this session, an in-depth examination of many of the issues may have to await our 1983 session. In the meantime, the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts will meet from 9 to 20 August; the creation of the comprehensive test ban Working Group

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

adds to the seismic experts Group a dimension of additional importance. I should like to recall that Canada has played an active role for the past six years in the development of international seismic data exchange, which has been the primary responsibility of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts. In the forthcoming months, Canada will be able to join those countries which have been exchanging data on a provisional basis. In this way we shall be one further participant in the definitive data exchange from the outset. We believe that such an exchange can -- and should -- be implemented in advance of the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The threat of an arms race in outer space has concerned the international community for some time. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly has acknowledged the Committee on Disarmament's responsibility to deal with this subject. As a beginning, we believe that the Committee should attempt to define the dimensions of this problem. To this end, it is our intention to participate actively in the consideration by the Committee at this summer session of the issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I have singled out the foregoing items as the important ones for treatment by the Committee in this short summer session. There are indeed other items on our agenda. Short though our time may be, we should take up one of the most significant of these remaining items, that relating to the organization and the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. The effective functioning of this body is at stake. We agree with those who have argued that a review of our work methods is necessary. We should seek to reach accord on the resolution of these matters, not only in the interests of the Committee on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body, but also in the interests of resolving the substantive tasks we have before us.

I think that in this Committee it is neither proper nor productive to dwell on the shortcomings of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I said at the outset today that we should be forward-looking. The best way this committee can reaffirm its commitment to the arms control and disarmament process, and to justify the trust the international community has placed in it is through the realization of concrete and practical steps. There indeed are opportunities before us. Let us seize them.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, the USSR delegation is glad to welcome you, the representative of Kenya, to the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. We would like to wish you all success. You can be sure that the Soviet delegation will support your efforts to promote the implementation by the Committee of the tasks it is charged with.

I should like, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to express our gratitude to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who so successfully carried out the tasks of Chairman of the Committee not only during the month of April but also subsequently, during the particularly responsible period of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We wish to welcome Comrade Datcu, the Ambassador of Romania, to the Committee and we look forward to a continuation of our traditional co-operation and friendship with the Romanian delegation.

The Committee on Disarmament resumes the work of its 1982 session at an important time. Last month the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament completed its work. During that session the will of the international community for peace, the determination of peoples to restrain the demon of war and to secure the realization of the life-long aspirations of mankind for a world without arms, for a world without wars, were expressed more clearly than ever before.

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in his message to the second special session noted that "if we are to single out what is the most important, the most urgent, what now worries people in all corners of the globe, what preoccupies the minds of statesmen and public figures in many countries of the world, it is the concern for halting the endless build-up of ever more destructive types of weapons, achieving a breakthrough towards the improvement of international relations and averting a nuclear disaster".

Does not the powerful movement for peace and disarmament which has lately attained such strength in all countries of the world bear witness to this? Owing to the vigorous actions of the peace-loving forces the second special session proved to be an important landmark in the efforts of peoples to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to curb the arms race.

The question of preventing nuclear war was the principal, the central issue at the session from the beginning to the end of the work of this representative international forum. In the document it adopted at the session the General Assembly, expressing its profound concern over the threat of nuclear war and stressing that the removal of that threat is "the most acute and urgent task of the present day", urged all States to consider as soon as possible "relevant proposals", designed to avoid nuclear war "thus ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered".

This means in the first instance the proposal that all nuclear-weapon States assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union has unilaterally assumed this obligation. If the other nuclear-weapon States follow our example, then the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war will actually be reduced to naught since this would be tantamount in practice to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether.

The head of the Soviet State in his message also expressed a positive attitude to the idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and eventually their complete elimination.

It is our opinion that the Committee on Disarmament should pay special attention to these urgent issues which are of deep concern to the international public.

At its second special session on disarmament the United Nations General Assembly in its decision unanimously reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of its first special session and the obligation of its member States to respect in negotiations on disarmament the priorities agreed on in the Programme of Action.

This, distinguished delegates, places before the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum responsible for working out concrete international agreements to restrain the arms race, tasks of vital importance. It can justifiably be said that the responsibility laid on our Committee by the international community through the United Nations General Assembly was never so great as it is today. We should convert into practical measures the impulse given by the General Assembly to the solution of concrete problems of arms limitation and disarmament. It is all the more imperative as the international public rightly expresses its serious concern over the fact that for more than five years now the Committee on Disarmament has made no progress and in fact has been merely marking time.

It is not our intention now to investigate the reasons for the lack of progress in the Committee's work. We have often spoken about this ourselves, and we have frequently heard many of the representatives sitting at this table also speak about the reasons for the stagnation in our work. This very morning the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico dwelt on them at some length. Progress in the Committee has been blocked for a long time now, and the main reason is that certain States still do not have the political will to undertake real measures of arms limitation and disarmament under effective international control.

This cannot go on for a long time. The Committee on Disarmament will fail in its duties as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and it will suffer the same grievous fate as befell other disarmament bodies which existed in the past if it does not achieve decisive progress in its work.

In accordance with the priorities specified by the General Assembly we should give our attention first and foremost to the problems of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It has long been a matter of urgency to set up an ad hoc working group on item 2 of the Committee's agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". At the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the Soviet Union in its memorandum, "To avert the growing nuclear threat and to curb the arms race" proposed the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. The major parameters of such a programme are set

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forth in the memorandum. Moreover, in compliance with the wishes expressed by many States we agreed that one of the first stages of the programme would be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials used for the production of various types of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to consider this problem in the whole context of the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is a very urgent problem. Before the recess the Committee set up an Ad Hoc Working Group on this item, and we hope that this Group will proceed without delay to work on the problem that was indicated in plain terms by practically all representatives when they agreed on the mandate for this Group -- the problem of drafting a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

In view of recent press reports concerning the adoption by the United States Administration of some new decision on the question of nuclear tests, it is important to us -- and obviously to all those present in this room -- that the United States delegation should clarify that country's intentions and indicate whether it is ready to draft such a treaty or not. Clearly, this will greatly influence the attitude of the States members of the Committee to the activities of the above-mentioned Working Group.

In accordance with our decision taken earlier, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work before the start of the plenary meetings of the Committee itself. This proves that the Committee is perfectly aware of the primary significance of the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, one of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of the speediest possible solution of this major problem. True to the humane purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Soviet Union has never used chemical weapons anywhere and has never transferred them to anyone. Motivated by the desire to achieve a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session a text entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction".

Our draft, which has been distributed as an official document of the Committee, contains quite a number of new elements, inter alia on the question of verification of compliance with future conventions, and we express our deep satisfaction at the fact that both at the second special session and during the work of our Working Group on Chemical Weapons many delegations gave a positive appraisal of the provisions of the Soviet draft. The representative of Canada has referred to our proposals at this morning's meeting.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that there now exist all the objective conditions necessary for a decisive advance towards the solution of the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. We therefore consider that the Committee should prepare by the end of its current session a composite draft text of a future convention containing both agreed provisions -- we hope there will be many of them -- and those on which we have not been able to reach agreement during this stage of our work on the draft of a convention.

The problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not less important, and it, too, has already been referred to today. Unfortunately events are developing in such a way that outer space is becoming more and more an arena for the arms race. It is for this reason that we ought without delay to start drafting

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an appropriate international treaty. The Soviet Union's concrete proposals on that question -- a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space -- has been submitted for consideration to the Committee on Disarmament. We consider that the Committee should set up an ad hoc working group to draft the treaty, as well as to consider other proposals directed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

Together with the delegations of other socialist countries the Soviet delegation has more than once put before the Committee concrete proposals for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Our proposals in this respect have concerned both the problem as a whole, and individual specific aspects of the possible production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

To dispute the urgency of this problem would be to show inexcusable negligence since we are witnessing the continuous creation of ever newer types of weapons of mass annihilation. Thus the cruel neutron weapon has become a reality. The same might happen also in the case of radiological weapons. We call on the delegations of all the countries represented in the Committee on Disarmament to show a realistic understanding of these problems and to intensify their efforts towards the drafting of appropriate international agreements on the prohibition of these types of weapons of mass destruction.

I should also like to recall that at the second special session on disarmament the Soviet Union spoke in favour of the renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes. This is a major and sweeping problem which it will of course not be easy to resolve. But it is a problem that exists and it is high time to start thinking jointly of ways to solve it.

I should like now to come to the question of the organization of the work of the Committee's summer session. First of all I will say that for reasons you all know, this session will probably be the shortest one for many years, a fact which in no way reflects on the responsibility and the importance of the tasks which are now before the Committee. It is precisely for this reason that we should organize the work of the session particularly efficiently, that is not wasting a day or even an hour on unnecessary procedural and organizational discussions.

The most important question for us to settle immediately is that of the resumption and effective organization of the work of the ad hoc working groups. In accordance with the priorities reaffirmed by the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the greatest attention should be given to the working groups on the prohibition of chemical weapons and nuclear weapon tests. We are in favour of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the skilful and experienced guidance of Ambassador Sujka, continuing its activities both in August and in September, and perhaps in the succeeding months of the present year. The Working Group on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should obviously begin its work next week. We hope that organizational questions not yet resolved will be settled through consultations in the next few days.

We would urge that consultations should be held under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee regarding the setting up at the summer session of a working group on item 2 of the agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We also feel that there is no justification for delaying the solution of the question of creating a working group on item 7 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". We believe that this working group should begin its work during the current session of the Committee. Here, too, we are ready for constructive consultations with delegations with a view to finding a mutually acceptable mandate and resolving other organizational problems.

As to the resumption of the activities of the other working groups -- those on the prohibition of radiological weapons, on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, in view of the limited time and the work done over a number of years, during which marked divergences at times appeared, we ought now to decide on the form and frequency of the negotiations in the framework of these working groups. We are prepared to show flexibility in this matter and to meet other delegations half-way. At the same time we shall oppose any unnecessary reiteration of positions well known to all since that would be a pure waste of the time of which we have so little.

There is one more question to which we ought all to give some thought. The General Assembly at its second special session resolutely reaffirmed the priorities established in the Final Document of the first special session. That was the consensus view of all the countries represented in this Committee. Those priority questions include such urgent matters as the drafting of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons and a number of other international agreements designed to curb the arms race and especially the nuclear arms race. In this connection, in our view, the need has arisen to establish time-limits for the conclusion of our work on those agreements. We attach great importance to this question and we express the hope that other delegations, too, influenced by the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, will regard this idea positively.

The Soviet delegation has come to the second part of the 1982 session determined to negotiate constructively on the whole spectrum of items on the agenda of the Committee and in conformity with the mandate received by the Committee from the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly. On all the items on the Committee's agenda, our delegation has concrete proposals to make, aimed at the speediest possible achievement of mutually acceptable agreements.

In conclusion, I would like to express confidence that all delegations represented in the Committee on Disarmament will make due efforts to fulfil to the utmost the instructions given to the Committee by the United Nations General Assembly -- by the whole international community -- and make a concrete, really tangible contribution to the solution of the problems of removing the threat of nuclear war and curbing the arms race.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, His Excellency Ambassador Venkateswaran.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Indian delegation, I would like to welcome you, the representative of friendly and non-aligned Kenya, as Chairman of the Committee for the month of August. We meet today for the first time since the conclusion of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. The total failure of that session to achieve any tangible result whatsoever adds a sense of urgency and importance to our work here as the only multilateral negotiating body. We hope, Mr. Chairman, that under your wise and experienced leadership we shall be able to dispel some of the gloom and pessimism that has descended over the international scene as a result of the failure of the second special session.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the sincere appreciation of our delegation to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who, as Chairman of this Committee since April, not only presided over the crucial phase of the preparation of our report to the General Assembly at its second special session, but also successfully steered us to a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. In addition, I have great pleasure in extending a warm welcome to Ambassador Datcu of Romania, a country with which India has cordial and fruitful relations. His experience and knowledge will be valuable to the Committee in its work.

The failure of the second special session last month to produce even the most modest results has been a great setback to the cause of disarmament. What is especially regrettable is the fact that the report of the session failed miserably to do justice to the depth of concern and anxiety which oppresses the people of the world at the growing danger of nuclear war. If one had to identify the single most important cause for the failure of the session to adopt even a single measure towards preventing the possible outbreak of a nuclear war, it is the patent fact that for the most powerful nations the illusion of political and military pre-eminence which is associated with the accumulation of armaments proved more important than the special responsibility they bear towards the international community to ensure world peace and security.

India, as you know, dissociated itself from the chapter on conclusions contained in the report of the session. We did so because we share the view expressed by a large number of non-governmental organizations and popular movements that survival is not a matter of consensus. At a time when popular disquiet and anxiety over the dangers of a catastrophic nuclear war have reached overwhelming proportions, the session could not offer even one modest measure to restore hope. The credibility of the multilateral process is now in danger of being entirely vitiated, unless we in the Committee on Disarmament can bring a new sense of purpose and urgency to our negotiating task, particularly on the priority items of our agenda. We may rightly be disappointed at the failure of the second special session but we should not allow that to discourage us in our efforts.

The summer session of the Committee this year will barely cover six to seven weeks. It is necessary, therefore, to be carefully selective in our approach and to focus attention on the most important priority areas. We are glad to note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which has been meeting since 20 July under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has at last come to grips with the crucial process of reconciling divergent positions through an exploration of various promising compromise options. This phase of the Group's work is perhaps the most crucial and at the same time the most difficult. It requires intensive

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work and imaginative diplomacy. It is, therefore, both appropriate and essential for delegations to give the Ad Hoc Working Group the maximum scope for advancing its work and bringing a chemical weapons convention closer to realization.

Needless to say, the newly created Ad Hoc Working Group on a nuclear test ban will also be a priority area of concern. It is nearly 20 years since the partial test-ban Treaty was concluded, with a commitment among the parties to negotiate a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons as early as possible. There is justifiable impatience in the international community over the continuing delay in concluding a treaty on a nuclear test ban. We cannot, therefore, afford to lose any time. We trust that within the time available to us this year, the Working Group will be able to complete its limited mandate and clearly identify the choices available to us with respect to the verification of a nuclear test ban. In this connection, the Committee on Disarmament can benefit from a detailed and negotiation-oriented report from the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts. On the basis of the conclusions reached as a result of our work this year, we should be able to get down to the real business of drafting the text of a treaty on a nuclear test-ban early next year.

A third area of major concern to all is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This subject is closely linked to the question of nuclear disarmament, including the prevention of nuclear war. A thorough consideration of this item is, therefore, essential, particularly in view of recent developments in space technology, many of which have far-reaching and significant military implications. Our delegation is prepared to be flexible as to the manner in which we deal with this problem. We could, for example, set up an ad hoc working group on outer space, which would in the first instance determine the scope of the problem and the precise area that negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament would cover. We could also explore the implications of several recent developments in space technology for the field of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament as well as for the prevention of nuclear war. The negotiation of an agreement to ban the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons would be a good starting point, in the view of my delegation, although it must be clearly understood that this again should be immediately followed by other far-reaching measures that would cover the development, testing and deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The Committee on Disarmament would be rendering a real service if it were to recommend to the General Assembly that pending the negotiation of concrete measures in this field it should adopt a resolution declaring outer space the common heritage of mankind to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

I commenced my statement by saying that the special session proved to be an unmitigated failure, especially because it was unable to produce even one modest measure for the prevention of nuclear war, the prospect of which hangs over our own as well as succeeding generations. What the special session failed to achieve

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the Committee on Disarmament must now try to redeem. There are, of course, differences amongst us over the concrete issues which should be the subject of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I believe, however, that we are all united in our common determination to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Several countries, including all the nuclear-weapon States, have now submitted their views on the question of the prevention of nuclear war to the United Nations Secretary-General in response to resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981 entitled, "Prevention of nuclear war". These replies contain some valuable ideas and suggestions on the question, which is universally recognized as of the highest importance. For example, the reply of the United States, contained in document No. A/S-12/11/Add.4 states that "there is no objective of greater importance than the prevention of nuclear war". The leaders of the Soviet Union have similarly repeatedly stressed the urgency of taking measures to avert a nuclear catastrophe. Other States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have all recognized the need to adopt concrete and effective measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war. It has also been recognized that both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States have a role to play in this regard. It is for this reason that in the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which was negotiated inconclusively at the second special session, the following measure under the section "Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons", figures without brackets:

"In this regard, the respective roles of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified".

The Committee on Disarmament has a clear responsibility to undertake urgent negotiations on measures for the prevention of nuclear war, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Since a nuclear war would affect both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the prevention of nuclear war is also quite clearly a multilateral concern of immediate relevance. I would, therefore, urge that under item 2 of our agenda, the Committee on Disarmament should immediately set up an ad hoc working group to negotiate, as a first step, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The working group could take as a basis for its work all the replies received by the Secretary-General in response to resolution 36/81 B, as well as the discussions on this subject at the second special session itself, where various initiatives and proposals were put forward by States in this regard. The working group could also identify the respective roles of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard, as indicated in the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. If by the end of the summer session the Committee on Disarmament is able to come up with just a few concrete and practical recommendations on this issue, which has generated such deep anxiety and profound concern amongst peoples all over the world, it would have amply justified its existence and restored its credibility with the international community.

I would accordingly request you, Mr. Chairman, to put this proposal for an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament before the Committee, so that an early decision may be taken and we could get down to work forthwith.

These, then, are the areas on which we ought to be focusing our attention during the limited time available to us during the rest of our 1982 session. What about other items on our agenda?

It is a matter of deep regret to us that despite the spirit of compromise and flexibility displayed by the non-aligned countries, a credible and meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament proved beyond our reach at the second special session. I do not wish to dwell here on the factors responsible for this failure,

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

of which you are all aware. It must be stated, however, that a comprehensive programme of disarmament without specific and concrete measures of disarmament, a clear-cut order of priorities, at least an indicative time-frame for its implementation and a credible commitment thereto on the part of States, would be meaningless. These minimum requirements of a credible comprehensive programme of disarmament are based in fact on the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, which was adopted by consensus. We cannot, therefore, agree to any retreat from that document. If there are those who wish to deviate from positions they themselves subscribed to only a few years ago, they must bear the full responsibility for their actions. In any event, it seems evident to us, in the light of our experience at the second special session, that no useful purpose would be served by another immediate round of negotiations designed to remove brackets from the text that has now come back to us from New York. We need to reflect over the approach we have so far adopted on this whole issue and perhaps be prepared to explore a new basis for reaching a consensus. Our own view is that instead of attempting to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament, whose nature and status is as of now ambiguous, we should instead return to the original aim of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In her message to the General Assembly at its second special session, the Prime Minister of India stated:

"Disarmament negotiations must once again revert to the task of achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament within an agreed time-frame, as was discussed between the United States and the USSR in the Agreed Principles and Draft Treaties of the early 1960s. Although the problems involved have become far more complex, the basic approach and the principles then formulated could still provide a basis for meaningful negotiations".

Only a treaty on general and complete disarmament would be able to resolve questions relating to the measures to be implemented, the nature of the obligations to be undertaken by States and the time-frame within which the goal of general and complete disarmament would have to be achieved. It would also resolve the problem of effective international verification and control to ensure compliance with the obligations assumed by States for achieving disarmament.

I would like to recall here that paragraph 38 of the Final Document explicitly calls for negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The paragraph states:

"Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

On the above basis, our concrete suggestion is that the Committee on Disarmament should start work on such a treaty and report the results achieved to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

During the spring session, it was obvious that the working groups on negative security guarantees and radiological weapons respectively had clearly reached an impasse in their negotiations. In the limited time available to us during this session, we would prefer that instead of convening regular meetings of those working groups, their respective Chairmen should conduct informal consultations, especially with the delegations most directly concerned, in order to explore options that may point the way to compromise solutions. It has been our experience that in a situation of deadlock, meetings of a group merely result in a restatement of positions and sometimes even a hardening of positions. It would be best to avoid such a development.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Before concluding my statement, I would like, with your permission, to introduce document No. CD/295, dated 23 July 1982, containing the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which was submitted by India at the second special session. The draft convention is an attempt to provide a concrete and practical basis for the long-standing proposal by non-aligned countries calling for a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament. I need not go into the rationale for the conclusion of such a convention, which will be self-evident. Both in Geneva and in New York, our delegation has made several interventions in justification of such a measure, and delegations present here are quite familiar with the arguments advanced in this regard. It had been our hope that in response to the widespread and rising wave of anxiety and concern over the growing danger of a possible nuclear holocaust, the General Assembly at its second special session would have agreed to an immediate prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, this did not prove to be possible. We trust that delegations represented in the Committee on Disarmament will now give serious consideration to the draft India has submitted and provide their reactions to its contents. Since it is put forward as a draft, we would, of course, be willing to consider any sensible amendments or modifications to it. Let me make it clear that our motivation in introducing this draft convention is to serve the cause of the prevention of nuclear war, the cause of human survival, and no other purpose. Those who disagree with our proposal should therefore at least be willing to engage in a meaningful debate on the issues involved and not attempt to reject it out of hand as some delegations sought to do at the second special session. We remain ready at all times to answer questions and to dispel any doubts that delegations may have on the text of the draft.

India has consistently tried to work actively and responsibly to further the cause of disarmament. It is not merely idealism that impels us to work for disarmament. In the age of nuclear weapons, disarmament has become, for India as a nation and for us all here as members of the world family, a practical matter for ensuring our survival. We all have our particular national interests to serve. But we should also be acutely conscious of the fact that in today's interdependent world, no nation can escape the common destiny imposed upon us by the very existence of nuclear weapons. As the Prime Minister of India asked in her message to the second special session: "In a war, the dominant thought is to win. Can we do less for peace?".

The delegation of India pledges to you, Mr. Chairman, that it will never be found wanting in the quest for peace and security through disarmament, a peace that is now more than ever before a categorical imperative in drawing the world back from the brink of nuclear disaster, before it is too late.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil, His Excellency Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is pleased to welcome you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament during the current month of August. You may count, Sir, on the full co-operation of the Brazilian delegation for the discharging of your responsibilities. I am confident that during your Chairmanship this Committee will achieve substantive progress in its endeavours.

Once again this single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament meets in Geneva to resume its work. This time, however, delegations are still pondering the dismal results of the second special session devoted to disarmament, which, as we are acutely aware, did not reach any agreement on the substantive questions placed before it. International public opinion watched the proceedings in New York with keen interest, and will certainly have derived the logical conclusions from the failure of the second special session to meet the expectations it had raised. No amount of pious expressions of regret will disguise the stark fact that the second special session did not accomplish its task because the commitments to the Final Document of 1978 and to the implementation of its Programme of Action have been systematically ignored in the policies of the nuclear-weapon Powers during the four years since the first special session and in the day-to-day proceedings of the second session itself.

During the preparatory stages of the special session, the delegation of Brazil repeatedly warned against the growing trend toward the dilution of the principles and priorities inscribed in the Final Document. Upon the adoption of the report of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, last October, I had occasion to express our misgivings over the opportuneness and the utility of holding a special session on disarmament if no adequate preparation were undertaken with regard to the substantive questions that should be addressed. I stated then that "some delegations raised difficulties as to the acceptance of language previously agreed upon by consensus", and that "such a disavowal of commitments accepted only four years ago is viewed by my delegation as a disturbing practice". I ended those remarks by saying that if substantive aspects were not seriously discussed in preparation for the second special session, its chances for success "will become so dim that it would be legitimate to ask ourselves whether it should take place at all".

The second special session did take place, however, and can claim as its only substantive achievement the adoption of a document that contains the "unanimous" and "categorical" reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session, as well as a renewed pledge by all Member States to respect the priorities agreed on therein.

Upon the adoption of the report of the second special session, my delegation stated its understanding that such a reaffirmation amounts to a renewed commitment for the immediate start of multilateral negotiations on such priority matters as the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing and measures of nuclear disarmament. The current session of the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate occasion to ascertain whether or not member States are prepared to live up to their renewed undertaking to honour their commitments. As I have just said, the failure of the second special session can be ascribed to the trend to backtracking from such commitments. The contradiction between the stated policies of some nuclear-weapon

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Powers and those commitments is even more disturbing. Nevertheless, such commitments were formally reaffirmed at the close of the special session. Accordingly, the credibility and usefulness of the multilateral machinery for disarmament, including this Committee, depend on the course of action that such Powers will choose to follow. Governments around the world, as well as international public opinion, will watch closely the attitudes and positions of those Powers during this summer session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Allow me now to turn to the immediate questions of organization that are before us, and which my delegation hopes can be quickly disposed of so that the Committee can dedicate the larger part of this short session to the substantive work assigned to it.

We ended our last session with four working groups, namely, those on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, radiological weapons, negative security assurances and chemical weapons. The latter has already resumed its work on 20 July, and should continue to the end of the Committee's 1982 session. As for the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the second special session decided that this Committee would continue its efforts to achieve a draft that could be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth regular session. After the experience of the detailed but inconclusive discussion on the comprehensive programme both in Geneva and in New York, and taking into account the forthcoming thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, my delegation believes that all of us could benefit from a period of reflection on the options open to us with regard to the programme. Accordingly, the Committee might decide that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should start its work some time next January, a few weeks ahead of the scheduled date for the Committee's 1983 session.

As regards the working groups on radiological weapons and on negative security assurances, the special report of the Committee adopted last April clearly showed that the difficulties that lie in the path of agreement are not likely to be resolved in the deliberations of this Committee for the time being. Progress on negative assurances depends ultimately on progress in the security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon Powers and on their understanding of the manner in which their present policies affect the vital security interests of non-nuclear-weapon nations. At the second special session the Governments of the USSR and France made important unilateral statements on matters that have a bearing on the question of negative security assurances. Both statements represent, in our view, an evolution with regard to their previous stand. The other nuclear-weapon Powers should examine thoroughly those two statements with a view to evolving their own positions on the matter, so as to provide adequate ground for multilateral progress.

As for radiological weapons, the low priority of the issue and the nature of the controversy over the scope of the proposed treaty would make it advisable for this Committee not to spend the scarce time available on the fruitless kind of exercise engaged in during the spring session.

At the same time, the Committee is now confronted with the need to speed up action on the top priority issue on its agenda, namely a nuclear test ban, on which

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

a working group was created at the close of the spring session. In order to discharge its responsibilities, the Committee should start by taking the remaining procedural steps so as to enable the Working Group to begin its substantive task without undue delay.

Proposals have also been made since the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly for the establishment of a working group on the demilitarization of outer space. At the last session of the Committee, my delegation expressed its doubts on the opportuneness of dealing with such question in the absence of agreement on the priority items of our agenda. The establishment of the Working Group on a comprehensive test ban and the renewal of the commitment to respect the priorities of the Final Document, however, seem to open up prospects for adequate multilateral treatment of the nuclear test ban as well as of questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. If such assumptions prove correct, my delegation would not object to the establishment of a working group on outer space, with an agreed negotiating mandate.

To sum up, my delegation proposes the suspension, for the time being, of the activities of the working groups on negative security assurances and on radiological weapons. The Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would resume its proceedings in early January next year. During the current session, the plenary of the Committee would, either formally, or informally, devote special attention to the discussion of item 2 of its agenda, with a view to achieving agreement on the modalities of its substantive treatment. The proposal by the Group of 21 for the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament is still on the table, as well as the suggestions advanced on the further development of the points contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. Together with the discussion of those issues by the Committee, there would be three working groups holding regular activities: the working groups on chemical weapons and on a nuclear test ban, both already established, and the new working group on outer space, whose mandate will have to be defined before it can actually start substantive work.

My delegation is convinced that a decision on those lines would ensure the best possible utilization of the short time available to us. We would hope that, in consultation with delegations, the Chair will be very soon in a position to make final proposals on the organization of our work for this second part of the 1982 session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, my delegation extends a warm welcome to you as the incoming Chairman. Your long, distinguished service both in East Africa and as your country's representative abroad have continuously strengthened your reputation as an immensely experienced and skilled international administrator and negotiator. You project the fine qualities of moderation, fairness and efficiency which your country Kenya has brought to the development of Africa in the international community at large and which, we are now assured, it will continue also to bring to bear in the future.

I would like to express gratitude to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Okawa, to whom we are very indebted indeed for his excellent guidance at a particularly difficult time. We gladly join in welcoming the distinguished new delegate of Romania, Ambassador Datcou.

The brevity of our summer session should cause us to curtail our general debate to a minimum. Accordingly, I will attempt to be very brief, and to dispense also with the more general political reflections which we have all found useful for setting the stage for our work on other occasions.

I would, however, devote a brief retrospective comment to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament which ended in New York on 11 July, and which thus immediately preceded our session. No doubt, the session has yielded unsatisfactory results in many areas, notwithstanding the hard work, heavy investment of time and collective goodwill that went into its preparation and marked its early stages. The outcome has been a disappointment for many, and the Federal Government is among those which share that regret, the more so since it deployed considerable effort to ensure a higher level of achievement at the conference. But my Government sees no reason to be discouraged by this development. It rather places the emphasis on the reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session, on the ensured continuity of the world-wide disarmament debate, and on the maintenance of the principle of consensus. In its view, the special session has thus confirmed the most important principles which will enable us to continue to give a positive response to the challenge of disarmament which faces the international community. All of us are aware of the complexity and multiplicity of the problems before us: perhaps, then, we should admit that, forgetful of that complexity, we assigned to the special session (with its relatively short opportunity for negotiation) too comprehensive a task -- that we set our sights too high.

But there are a good many useful and positive elements in the "Conclusions" of the second special session and we should also not forget that, parallel to the session, the two major Powers agreed to embark on a momentous disarmament negotiation in the strategic nuclear field and the fact that the first meeting of the START talks took place during the session itself provides encouragement and impetus for the future.

The Federal German Government is determined -- in the spirit of Chancellor Schmidt's speech of 14 June before the United Nations -- to continue to work vigorously for the objectives of disarmament and to make contributions that are as concrete as possible.

In this shortened session period, also, we are called upon to deal with concrete problems in the most rational and economic manner. Since all topics on our agenda are up for detailed discussion in plenary, I do not wish to give views now on them all. I would like to single out only those where my delegation sees particular potential for progress during this session, and where it places particular priorities.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The chemical weapons group has got off to an early and promising start. It will easily become the one work unit which will accumulate the maximum number of meetings by the end of our session. This is perfectly in keeping with my delegation's intentions. A comprehensive chemical weapons ban is highest on our priority list, and my delegation notes with encouragement the new vistas that have opened up for the Committee's work in this domain on the basis of declarations made during the second special session, mainly by the Soviet delegation. These vistas have to be explored with care, and have to be measured against the requirements which many countries have established in the course of previous sessions, specifically in the verification field. While my delegation generally welcomes the thrust of the new Soviet proposals, we feel that there may still be considerable deficiencies, mainly as regards the scope of regular obligatory on-site inspections, and there is a need also to incorporate in the future chemical weapons convention a full-fledged contractual obligation on the part of all States to submit to on-site inspections if a breach of the convention is alleged and a formal demand for such inspection is put forward. In order to obtain a clearer view of the meaning of the Soviet proposals, my delegation has submitted, in the form of a working paper, a number of detailed questions. We are looking forward to replies from the Soviet side, and express gratitude in advance. The chemical weapons Working Group has commenced its work with considerable momentum and speed, and this momentum should be maintained.

In the view of my delegation it is imperative that the Working Group on nuclear testing should get off to a rapid start under dynamic leadership, and that the potential of the mandate of the Group which the Committee agreed upon in late April be fully utilized with the aid of a well-structured work plan and a maximum of technical and political expertise. My delegation is particularly interested in seeing the work of this Group going ahead on the basis of realism, taking into account the preparedness and ability of all participating countries to move forward at this time. This would also imply that the Working Group does not disdain the principle of graduality and brings in its harvest, limited as it may appear to some, at a time when the fruits are ripe -- hoping for new seasons to yield additional and perhaps more delicious fruits.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is back on our list of agenda items. My delegation has attempted to make the fullest possible contribution to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, both prior to and during the special session. We are therefore particularly saddened that progress in New York was not more substantial. Yet the thorough discussion of all parts of the comprehensive programme during the special session brought intermediate results that should not be underestimated, and has certainly brought a better understanding of what the programme must and can achieve. There is perhaps little point in devoting a major part of this session to further formal negotiations on the comprehensive programme, but all delegations must now carefully analyse the results of the negotiations of June and July and, on that basis, perhaps in the framework of informal exchanges, give thought to how and when a new series of negotiations should be initiated, taking into account our 1983 deadline for that venture. During the final stages of the special session my delegation had occasion to suggest that we may also wish to rethink the methodology and structure of the comprehensive programme.

As the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons I am fully aware of the difficulties that lie in the way of a successful resumption and conclusion of negotiations in that Group. At this juncture, it appears important that all delegations should gain a very clear view of the options that offer themselves to negotiators. I have written to all heads of delegations in that sense, and would hope shortly to embark on some informal consultations on the basis of reactions to that letter, before new formal meetings of the Working Group, if any, are called.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Committee is to report to the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly on its membership structure, and must deal with a number of thoughtful recommendations as to the restructuring of its work. My delegation would wish to see informal plenary meetings commence at an early point to deal with these important subjects. A more rational working structure, instituting a better economy of its time, is urgent. My delegation is eager to concur with any useful suggestions that would be weighed in this context.

The recommendation made in the course of the second special session that the Committee should hold an extended uninterrupted annual session appeals to my delegation, and has obvious practical merit. However, the personal link between multilateral disarmament meetings in Geneva and New York must not be cut. In our view, the future work schedule of the Committee should be such that Geneva delegations could continue to make their full contribution to the proceedings of the General Assembly's First Committee, and also, if perhaps to a lesser extent, to the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

We are generally in favour of a limited enlargement of the Committee's membership with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee and we would urge that, quite independently of and before tossing around the names of certain candidates, the principle and percentage of such enlargement should be decided upon without delay on the basis of firm, objective criteria. Among these, the contribution individual countries can bring to our Committee on the basis of their prior earnest work is of particular significance.

My delegation is eager for the Committee to embark on its concrete work as early as possible, and promises you, Mr. Chairman, its full co-operation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

We have now exhausted the time available to use for this morning's meeting. If there is no objection, I would suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it this afternoon. We would then listen to the last speaker inscribed on my list, and immediately afterwards I would convene an informal meeting of the Committee to consider some organizational work. If there is no objection, we will proceed accordingly. Before I adjourn the meeting, I would like to announce, on behalf of Mr. Skinner of Canada who co-ordinates one of the contact groups of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that this contact group will meet this afternoon immediately after the plenary meeting of the Committee in conference Room I. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 175th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. As agreed this morning, the Committee will now listen to the remaining speaker inscribed for today's plenary meeting.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Inga Thorsson.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): First of all, it is my very great pleasure to congratulate you on advancing to the important office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of August. The Swedish delegation will, of course, give you its full support in the execution of your office which you will do with the skill and distinction that we have been accustomed to expect from you.

I would also like to thank you for your kind words of welcome to me this morning.

Warm thanks go also from my delegation to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, for the excellency with which he carried out his heavy duties as Chairman of the Committee, not only during the month of April, but also behind the stage of the second special session on disarmament. I want, furthermore, to welcome the new Romanian representative, Ambassador Datcu, my old friend of many years from the General Assembly's First Committee.

Likewise the Swedish delegation is very pleased to see this year's disarmament Fellows with us in this Chamber, and we want to welcome them here.

We have come together again -- we, the club of 40 nations -- committed, through the votes of our countries over the years in the United Nations General Assembly, to carry out successful multilateral disarmament negotiations. Have we come together more happy, more satisfied with the state of things than when we adjourned at the end of April?

Between that date and today lies the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Anyone pledged to the cause of disarmament would, I believe, be prepared to agree with my judgement, that we are not more happy than three months ago. The remaining impression today is that those Governments which are genuinely committed to disarmament, as the cause of this generation of mankind -- and the Swedish Government belongs to those -- will have, following the five weeks in New York, to redouble their efforts, with the aim of achieving a decisive breakthrough in the fairly immediate future in disarmament talks. Otherwise the end result will only be one. And let us admit that difficulties exist, obstacles exist, even adversaries of disarmament exist to make results infinitely hard to achieve. We experienced all of it during the five memorable weeks that we spent at the second special session in June and July. What should our judgement be on the events that have passed since the Committee adjourned in late April?

The weeks in New York were weeks of agony and anguish. And at the end, on Saturday, 10 July, we listened to an impressive list of speakers wishing to give their final views on why so much went wrong during these weeks.

There is indeed very much to be said in negative terms about the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. But I do feel it of importance to emphasize that most of what happened and what did not happen could have been foreseen in advance. Let us remember that the first special session, four years ago, needed six weeks of work, under severe strain and almost to the point of collapse, to achieve the ultimate

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

adoption of a Final Document that has, with full justification, been called of historic importance. This happened at a time when international relations, and relations between the two Superpowers in particular, were infinitely better than now. The second special session was faced with the task of managing, in a period of five weeks, to deal successfully with two main issues, of such magnitude and containing such controversial elements, debated and negotiated over for years, that an unbelievable amount of trust, confidence and goodwill would have been required to cope with it. We all know that under prevailing circumstances this was simply not so. The task before the second special session was comparable to a request by the United Nations that the two Superpowers should change their basic strategic concepts overnight.

Thus, the necessary prerequisites for reaching beyond the 1978 Final Document simply did not exist. But, in my judgement, four things were achieved at the second special session.

First, the session did adopt, by consensus, a concluding document, containing as its final part 10 paragraphs of political conclusions.

Secondly, it adopted guidelines for the World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched at the opening meeting of the session.

Thirdly, it acted as a catalyst for one of the most impressive manifestations of free popular movements ever witnessed, not only in New York but wherever opinion can be freely expressed.

Fourthly, it assured the continuous consideration of the items on its agenda by transmitting them to the forthcoming regular General Assembly session and, if necessary, to subsequent sessions. No proposals are finally killed.

Let me say a few more words on some of these achievements.

The concluding document is not a bad document. On the contrary it is, under the circumstances, a very good one. It states the history of the past four years in clear political terms. It contains, furthermore, a number of political statements adopted by consensus on issues which up to the very last moment were heavily contended by the major military Powers. What is even more important, considering indications that some of these Powers were wavering in their dedication to the 1978 Final Document, is the unequivocal and unanimous reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of this document, as well as their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations established in its Programme of Action.

Most unfortunately, I shall have to return, in very sad terms, to this particular point in a few minutes. This is due to something which became abundantly clear during the five weeks of the second special session but which indeed is not a new phenomenon. I shall dwell briefly on this matter as it is, beyond doubt, the main reason behind our failures so far in multilateral disarmament negotiations. As anyone could guess, what I am aiming at is the attitude of the Superpowers towards these negotiations, the Powers which have, through their policies of negligence and obstruction, blocked progress for years, the Powers which prefer secret bilateral talks behind closed doors, denying this multilateral body the right and the possibility to negotiate the highest priority items on its agenda, the Powers which disregard politically, although not legally, binding United Nations resolutions, on which they themselves have voted in favour, the Powers which through their behaviour display their arrogance towards the world around them.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

What has happened-- and not happened-- so far in the field of disarmament negotiations in the nuclear age is to me evidence of the lack of insight, and imagination, of these Powers. As a small piece of evidence, I shall quote one sentence from the letter which President Reagan sent to General Rowny, the Chairman of the United States delegation to the START talks which opened on 29 June here at Geneva:

"As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the USSR are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace."

I want to say in all sincerity that, judging those Powers by their performance so far, which is one of an accelerating nuclear arms race, the majority of the peoples of this earth entertain grave distrust in these self-appointed "trustees for humanity". We have the right to be equal partners, for two reasons:

1. The nuclear-weapon States have shown that they are unable to free themselves from a situation characterized by a morally and politically insoluble dilemma.
2. All States, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, militarily aligned, neutral or non-aligned, share the common fate of a possible nuclear holocaust.

Against the background of what we have witnessed over the years and, most recently, at the second special session, of obstructionist Superpower policies, I could not believe my ears when I heard the United States delegate on the last day of the session say:

"The United States is proud of its record in disarmament."

Nor could I but disagree with the USSR Ambassador to the United Nations when, on the same occasion, he spoke of the constructive approach of the delegations of the socialist countries and further stated that their positions accord with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the States and peoples of the world. It is, of course, deeds, and not words, that count when the performances of the Superpowers are assessed. And the deeds of the USSR speak against the words of the USSR at the United Nations.

One glaring example of the intransigence of the Superpowers, in this particular case especially of the United States, assisted by the United Kingdom, is of course the behaviour before, during and after the second special session, regarding the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, justly considered the key issue of nuclear disarmament and thus the highest priority item on our agenda. This key issue has, as we all know, a tragic history. So far, all efforts to get genuine negotiations started have been in vain. At the second special session also, the resistance continued, blocking attempts to have texts adopted which were watered down to a bare minimum. Disparaging remarks made on that occasion about the usefulness of a CTBT on the part of the resistant States might make us wonder about the seriousness of their recent agreement to initiate CTB discussions in a working group of this Committee.

It will, of course, again be recalled that, at the second special session, even these States joined the consensus decision to adopt the concluding document which, in its paragraph 62, states the following:

"The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action."

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

However, two weeks ago, 10 days after their support of this consensus document at the United Nations, the Reagan Administration decided, 19 years after the adoption of the partial test-ban Treaty, not to resume the trilateral CTB negotiations. This is grave news. Not that we particularly need the tripartite talks, which were, anyhow, only preparatory to multilateral negotiations in this body on our highest priority item. But the sense of the United States decision seems to be to postpone into the distant future any serious consideration of a CTBT.

Perhaps we should not be surprised, as we were given advance notice, for example in the memorable speech on 9 February by Dr. Eugene Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in this very chamber. He then stated that the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, and that "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives". But he went on to say something more stunning, and I quote him again:

"Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues."

How can the lumping together of the CTB and "the broad range of nuclear issues" be in conformity with the legally binding commitments of the United States to a CTBT, in the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, where parties pledged to seek the achievement of the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", a pledge which was confirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968?

There is nothing in these legally binding documents, that were signed and ratified by the United States, that links the CTBT to "the broad range of nuclear issues". On the contrary, a CTBT is explicitly said to be sought for on its own merits. The United States has not abrogated these preambular paragraphs. From its recent action, however, must we draw the conclusion that the United States does not want a CTBT, that through continuing nuclear testing it aims at continuing the murderous nuclear arms race? But is the United States now prepared to face a situation where it will be accused of violation of legally binding international commitments freely entered into? When these commitments were made in 1963, through the ratification of the partial test-ban Treaty by a Senate vote of 80 to 19, the late Senate Republican leader Everett M. Dirksen said:

"I should not like to have written on my tombstone: 'He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he did not take a first step.'"

The next step seems to be in the distant future. What will be written on the tombstones of those responsible for this deplorable fact?

Of course, there are also practical political considerations to be made by the United States, relating to its glaring refusal to accept full scope multilateral negotiations on a CTBT. This Superpower should be aware of the rapidly mounting, and fierce, opposition among non-nuclear-weapon States against the obstruction by the nuclear-weapon States of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. What will happen at the third NPT Review Conference in 1985, three years from now, if by that time we do not have a multilaterally negotiated CTBT? Will the United States take the risk of the collapse of the NPT, the only barrier, however deficient, that the international community possesses against horizontal nuclear-weapon proliferation?

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

No, we should not have been surprised at President Reagan's decision two weeks ago. We had been given early warnings. But we are deeply sorry and shocked that it was taken after the second special session, after the reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session. However, following this new act of disdainful disregard of consensus decisions at the United Nations, the United States is providing cheap ammunition to its main adversary. It does make action on the international stage unnecessarily easy for that Power.

Let me state emphatically, that, in accordance with Sweden's persistent policy, for us a CTBT retains its full importance both as a means to slow or stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a demonstration of the possible interest of the nuclear Powers to finally initiate an era of mutual nuclear restraint.

It also remains our view that the goal is, and must be, to achieve a complete test ban of unlimited duration. Although we support what must be called a moratorium in this context, i.e. a test ban of limited duration, we consider it only an instrument to promote the negotiation of a permanent CTBT under strict international verification. In this context, let me stress that Sweden does not believe in internationalizing a Threshold Test-Ban Treaty of the kind concluded in 1974 but not yet ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a Treaty could not restrain a feared horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms and is of little concern to developed nuclear Powers which could legitimize-- probably for a long time-- their intense continued development of nuclear weapons within the generous threshold allowed. It would amount to another smokescreen for unlimited testing. I say this with some emphasis as I understand the latest move of President Reagan to be to look for changes in that Treaty in order to further strengthen protection against violation of its limits. This would only serve the purpose of showing some zeal in the search for some measures of arms control while in reality there would be none.

The Working Group now established should be utilized to the full to investigate all relevant aspects of a CTBT. The Committee on Disarmament should bear in mind that the task of the seismic expert Group in important respects would assist and underpin the activities of the Working Group. In this context, let me also stress the desirability of allowing the expert Group to consider and report also on the most modern data acquisition and analysis methods available and of enlarging its possibilities for looking into further ways of verifying a test ban, such as through the detection and measurement of airborne radioactivity.

As the work of the CTBT Working Group unfolds, Sweden intends to reintroduce at an appropriate moment relevant parts of its 1977 draft CTB treaty text, together with new parts which take into account developments since then and the comments made in the Working Group, so as to again provide the Committee with a complete and contemporary draft CTBT text.

The brevity of this session of the Committee on Disarmament will probably only allow for limited progress on the other high priority item of chemical weapons, on which a lot of useful work has been performed during the last two years. In so far as there was a need for new political signals, we have noted with considerable interest the outline of a draft convention presented to the General Assembly at its second special session by the Soviet Union. As it seems to contain or reflect a number of features discussed by this Committee, it would be our hope that it represents a genuine will to negotiate difficult issues and is not intended merely to politically counter certain dispositions in the chemical weapons field by the other Superpower. We are looking forward to discussing these questions in greater detail in the chemical weapons Working Group.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The chemical weapons field appears to my delegation to be one area of negotiation where there is still hope for agreement, however complicated the substance. This opportunity must be used to the full by the Committee and its Working Group. Needless to say, it will take the active co-operation of the Superpowers not only in the Committee but also through a resumption of their bilateral negotiations. We for our part are prepared to make every effort to contribute to a solution of outstanding problems. We would not be opposed, inter alia, to continuing work beyond the scheduled working period of the Committee, if this appears desirable to achieve decisive progress.

This leads me on to a few words on the procedures and activities of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been reaffirmed as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Sweden does not believe that we should allow a discussion on this matter to develop into a great procedural debate, which would deprive the Committee of much of its precious negotiating time. On the other hand it would be futile to deny that certain improvements and changes could be brought about through informal consultations. At this point let me make the following brief comments.

We have some doubts about making this body a permanent around-the-year negotiating forum. Even the present work-load of the Committee strains the capacity of a developed and technically advanced country like my own. A further extension of working schedules and programmes would be likely to overextend smaller delegations and would only favour those large States or groups of States whose sincere disarmament interest there is sometimes reason to doubt.

But there is, as I said, room for improving the efficiency of our work. Thus, the use of plenary meetings for making repeated general statements could be questioned. Much stricter priorities should be set for the time allocated to working groups. Whereas it would seem highly advisable to provide additional meetings for the negotiations on chemical weapons and the CTBT and perhaps also for outer space, we should somewhat limit time allotted to some other working groups, not because the issues that they are dealing with are in themselves of secondary importance but because they are unlikely to yield results unless a change of wills and minds occurs. This could in due course be ascertained through informal consultations.

Let me also recall Sweden's firm view, which we share with many other members of the Group of 21, that the consensus rule of the Committee should not any longer be allowed to be misused in procedural matters, such as in blocking the setting up of working groups requested by a large majority of Committee members.

Much has been said and much will have to be said about the imperative need for a change of wills and minds, first and foremost in the leading military Powers. We have waited for that change a long time. Quite a number of us have recently gained new hope, not because of any signs of such a change, but because of the appearance of a new and, hopefully, significant political force, the sharply awakening public awareness of the tremendous risks that this and coming generations run, if we allow the leaders of the world to continue their present course. For a growing number of people, for a swiftly growing number of people, the issue has changed from being one of deterrence, of military balance, of inferiority or superiority, into being an issue of survival. It is a matter of rapidly increasing awareness of what a nuclear weapon actually is. For the first time since 1962, when Herman Kahn published his well-known book, people are thinking about the unthinkable. One of the reasons: they have suddenly understood that they will have to do so, because military and political leaders, by talking about "controlled nuclear counter-attacks", "protracted conflict periods", have made the

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

unthinkable thinkable, i.e. by the logic of nuclear doctrines, nuclear weapons are becoming usable. And people understand that this trend will have to be stopped for the sake of survival.

The forceful and broadly based popular peace movements in West Europe and North America are what George Kennan recently called the most striking phenomena of the early 1980s, having already had an influence of events. They were very much present during the second special session, and their activities during these weeks were more impressive than anyone could have expected. No one who participated, as I did, in the 12 June orderly, peaceful and gay mass demonstration of 800,000 people for disarmament and peace, will ever forget what role individual concerned citizens are able to play, and will continue to play in the struggle for fairness, decency and peaceful relations among nations. What has, by some, been called the dismal failure of the second special session must never be allowed to overshadow the compelling need for all people of good will to form an international disarmament constituency, to join forces for the achievement of a safe and peaceful world and the betterment of human conditions everywhere.

To relieve mankind of present dangers of extinction is the task of this generation of men and women. A few weeks ago I listened to a moving testimony to this compelling task by a well-known American Roman Catholic priest, the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh. He said:

"I experienced something almost like a religious conversion. For thirty years I have been deeply engaged in trying to create a better world, in the face of extreme poverty in Asia, Africa and Latin America, working to alleviate world hunger, to oppose the denial of human rights at home and abroad, working against tropical diseases afflicting hundreds of millions of humans, against illiteracy and for education -- and suddenly it dawned on me -- if we do not eliminate the nuclear threat, all of these other problems will be irrelevant, for there will be no more humans on earth to have problems."

When the same consciousness is awakened around the world, there will be no political leader, in any leading military Power, who can withstand it. Disarmament will be the idea whose time has come.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words that she has addressed to the Chair.

That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Committee, I would like to inform members that the secretariat has circulated today CD/INF.1/Rev.7 entitled "Basic information for delegations on conference arrangements and documentation". The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLER
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. L. STAVINOMA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. COUTHURE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran:

Italy: Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA

Romania: Mr. I. DATCOU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. M. BICHIR

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.F. PRLACHIN
Mr. V.L. GAI

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

United States of America: Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Mr. P. CORDEN
Mr. J. PUCKETT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 176th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Before we listen to the speakers who will address the Committee today, I would like the Committee to adopt its programme of work in Working Paper No. 68/Rev.1.

As a result of the exchange of views at the informal meeting, two days have been allocated to the comprehensive programme of disarmament. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts Working Paper No. 68/Rev.1.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We turn now to Working Paper No. 69, 1/ containing a draft decision on the request received from Greece to participate in the Committee's discussions. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now turn to Working Paper No. 70, 2/ dealing with the request received from Ireland to participate in the Committee's work. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I suggest that we take up now Working Paper No. 71, containing a draft decision to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I wish to state that it is the understanding of the Committee that there will be no formal meeting of this Working Group during this part of the session, but instead the Chairman will hold informal consultations or meetings of an exploratory character. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision on the basis of this understanding.

It was so decided.

1/ "In response to the request of Greece (CD/302) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1982 session."

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the second part of its session, the representative of Greece is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Greece."

2/ "In response to the request of Ireland (CD/303) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Ireland to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1982 session."

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the second part of its session, the representative of Ireland is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Ireland."

The CHAIRMAN: I also understand that there is agreement that the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, should be reappointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I extend to Ambassador García Robles on behalf of the Committee our congratulations and, at the same time, our thanks for having accepted once again this important and heavy burden.

We have now concluded with organizational questions.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Japan, Romania, China, France, Australia, Sri Lanka and the German Democratic Republic.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted, first of all, to welcome you to the post of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August and to wish you good luck in fulfilling your duties. Our delegation will be pleased to work under the chairmanship of the representative of a country which is a member of the group of non-aligned countries whose active role in disarmament negotiations Czechoslovakia values so much. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for his very useful and valuable work during the closing weeks of the spring session. It is also a great pleasure for me to welcome among us Ambassador Datcou, the representative of the brotherly Socialist Republic of Romania.

In view of the fact that our session started practically only a few days after the conclusion of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is quite natural that in most statements significant attention is paid to an assessment of that session. Today, after a certain, though relatively short time, we can evaluate everything positive that was achieved at that session and consider how our Committee can most effectively contribute to the implementation of its conclusions and recommendations, however meagre they were and unsatisfactory as regards the main questions on the agenda.

Our view as to why we did not achieve more positive and concrete results was unambiguously expressed in a joint declaration on the results of the second special session issued by the socialist countries at the conclusion of that session in New York. In reviewing the special session we proceed from the fact that even though no specific conclusions and recommendations were achieved, it was an important international event which clearly confirmed the interest of an overwhelming majority of States in putting an immediate end to the feverish arms race and in achieving real steps toward disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament. This is the most pressing task of today, a task which has to be accomplished in order to eliminate military and political confrontation and diminish the danger of war, in the interest of maintaining and strengthening the process of détente and developing international co-operation. We also believe that it was a highly positive feature of the special session that it raised a whole number of urgent, topical issues the immediate solution

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

of which is vital for mankind. Above all, this concerns such a grave problem as the prevention of nuclear war and the closely related question of the non-use of nuclear weapons which became the central items of the special session. Like most delegations, we also warmly welcomed the message of L.I. Brezhnev to the special session which contained a commitment on the part of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Not only do we see in this commitment a clear, concrete step aimed at resolving the most acute problem of the present time but also a highly positive contribution to the special session and, as we can say today, also its most significant result. Already in the course of the special session we emphasized that the adoption of a similar commitment also by other nuclear powers would reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war and would amount to a factual ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

Like the majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament and the world community, we too cannot accept the concept according to which the existence of powerful arsenals of nuclear weapons will help keeping the peace and maintain international stability in the world.

We welcomed also other concrete proposals of the Soviet Union submitted to the special session, especially the proposal for the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention, the proposals contained in the Soviet memorandum and those spelled out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. Gromyko, in his statement. Again we can only regret that a similar approach, that of submitting concrete proposals, was not assumed at the session also by the delegations of all other militarily advanced countries, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons.

While the special session had its important positive moments, as I stated before, its results in major areas were quite modest. Of course, we could hardly expect that any specific recommendations would be reached, for instance, in the field of nuclear disarmament, taking into consideration that even the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament and on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the Committee on Disarmament has been blocked for several years. It is also not very surprising that the General Assembly at its second special session failed to elaborate and adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament, because some western countries pay much greater attention to programmes of continued long-term arms build-up shaped in precise time-frames rather than to disarmament programmes. As for our delegation, we are ready to continue our active participation in the preparation of a draft comprehensive programme so that it can be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, next year. Nevertheless, we still believe that if such a programme is to play a positive role it must not evade the solution of basic priority questions, in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament. In the course of further negotiations on the CPD no delegation should forget that the second special session fully reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the first special session and stressed the obligation of States to respect in disarmament negotiations the priorities of its Programme of Action.

In our opinion the World Disarmament Campaign, the declaration of which we welcomed, should help in paying primary attention to crucial tasks in halting the arms race. For our part, we are ready to take an active part in ensuring the successful and effective course of the campaign.

With regard to the fact that at the special session attention was also paid to questions of the machinery for disarmament negotiations, I would like to underline that our delegation regards the existing negotiating forums and institutions as sufficient for present needs. At the same time, we share the view that there are possibilities for further rationalization aimed at greater efficiency of the existing

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

machinery, including the Committee on Disarmament. We regard several proposals tabled in this context as notable and we are ready to consider them constructively. However, the enhancement of the effectiveness of our work must be decisive.

These days the whole world public is once again recalling the tragedy of the moment when a lethal atomic mushroom spread over the heads of hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings for the first time in history. And it is most disturbing that today, when the arms stocks are overcharged with nuclear explosives, the ruling circles of a country whose leadership was already in the past not halted by its conscience from testing in practice the pernicious effects of atomic bombs, are now playing with new dangerous concepts and ideas. They admit the possibility of a first nuclear strike and plan the possibility of a so-called limited nuclear war, they have started the production of neutron weapons and seek further ways of attaining a higher degree of perfection of the wide range of other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Therefore, no other task is more urgent at present than that of building a firm barrier to the danger of war, of preventing the threat of nuclear disaster and of adopting effective measures aimed at the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

Since the problem of nuclear weapons emerged, the socialist countries have, in the various international forums, consistently been putting forward effective proposals for its solution. The proposal of the group of socialist countries of 1979 for achieving nuclear disarmament the implementation of which would not only bring the nuclear arms race to an end but would also ensure gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons until their complete elimination (CD/4), has lost nothing of its topicality; rather the contrary. We also consider highly constructive the proposal to elaborate, adopt and to implement stage-by-stage a programme of nuclear disarmament, contained in the Soviet memorandum "To avert the growing nuclear threat and to curb the arms race". It is a realistic proposal which takes into consideration also the views of other States e.g. on the question of the production of fissionable materials used for the production of various types of nuclear weapons. We believe that all aspects of nuclear disarmament could be effectively discussed within a working group dealing with item 2 of our agenda, the establishment of which we fully support. We also hold that the active participation of all the delegations represented in the Committee is a necessary prerequisite for the fruitful activity of such a working group.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests has been heading our agenda for quite some time. Our delegation considers this item a question of the highest priority and has always favoured its effective solution. We also maintained a constructive approach at the end of the spring session, when during the process of the creation of the relevant Working Group, efforts to restrict its mandate were displayed. Now, when the Working Group is about to start its deliberations, we also consider discouraging certain information to the effect that the United States administration has altered its approach to the achievement of a

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

nuclear-weapon test ban. We cannot but add our voice to that of the delegations of India, Mexico, Sweden, the Soviet Union and others, which have questioned the United States approach. We also believe that an explanation on the part of the United States delegation as to its approach to the Working Group on a CTB would be very useful.

Thanks to the constructive work of the group of experts in the field of seismology who, after seven years of complicated negotiations, have in fact resolved all the basic problems of the verification system for a future agreement, we can hope that this Working Group will be able this year to concentrate its efforts on the preparation of an agreement in all its aspects. Czechoslovakia is ready to offer the experience of its experts in seismology and intends to take an active part both in the meetings of experts as well as in the Working Group.

We welcome the increased activity of the Committee in dealing with the problem of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The relevant Working Group, headed by Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has since 20 July done a lot of useful work. We are convinced that given good political will there are sufficient opportunities for the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, including the establishment of an effective system of verification. The Soviet proposal concerning the basic provisions of a convention submitted to the second special session constitutes a new basis for undertaking decisive steps towards reaching the desired aim. We consider encouraging the fact that both during the second special session and in the Committee on Disarmament a number of delegations reacted positively to the proposal of the Soviet Union. We hope that a constructive approach will prevail also in the drafting process. In the present circumstances we consider it desirable that the Committee should undertake, preferably during this year's session, the elaboration of a composite draft text of a future convention. Although we shall probably not achieve generally acceptable texts on all the aspects during this summer session, it seems to us that a composite draft text could become a useful framework for an assessment of the progress achieved as well as serving as an instrument for further negotiations.

A positive course in the complicated negotiations would, in our view, undoubtedly be facilitated also by the implementation of the Soviet proposal not to deploy chemical weapons in territories where there are no such weapons at present. At the same time we cannot help wondering whether good political will in this regard exists on the part of all States members of the Committee. The United States attitude to the solution of problems of such weapons of mass destruction, its intention to start the production of binary weapons, the interruption of its bilateral negotiations with the USSR and the launching of noisy slanderous campaigns are a matter of serious concern.

(Dr. Vojvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The enormous progress achieved by the creative and technical genius of mankind provides already now real possibilities for finding solutions to such pressing and universal problems as the struggle against hunger, diseases, want and many others. However, all this requires that scientific and technological progress should begin to serve exclusively as an instrument of peaceful aspirations of mankind.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, along with other socialist countries, has for a long time been proclaiming the urgency of taking some precautions which would prevent the further misuse of the results of science and technology as well as the waste of human and material resources for the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. We are convinced that the drafting of the text of an appropriate international agreement and consideration of the possibilities of concluding separate specific agreements would be considerably facilitated by the setting up of an authoritative group of experts which would simultaneously observe and evaluate developments in this area.

The decision of the United States administration to build neutron weapons in numbers amounting to tens of thousands, in our view strongly adds to the urgency of considering seriously the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons submitted to the Committee in 1978 by the delegations of the socialist countries.

Nowadays we can also witness yet another tendency, inspired by the Western military-industrial complex, that of the penetration of weapons to areas which were not used earlier for military purposes. We condemn resolutely any steps aimed at spreading the arms race into outer space. Outer space should remain forever free of any weapons so that it cannot become a new sphere of the feverish arms race and a source of further deterioration in the relations among States. Therefore, we support the establishment of a working group which would deal in full responsibility with the problem of prohibiting all types of weapons in outer space. We believe that a generally acceptable mandate for this group could be agreed upon without unnecessary delay so that we can start business-like negotiations on a number of existing proposals already made at previous sessions and at this session.

In this complicated international situation we regard it as especially urgent to take a firm line of opposition to the policy of warmongering. It is encouraging that in spite of a complicated international atmosphere more and more efforts are taking place to halt the feverish arms race. It is promising that especially in recent years the number of initiative proposals from various countries designed to resolve the specific tasks of disarmament has sharply increased.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the Committee on Disarmament is ready to contribute in good faith to the constructive discussion of any proposal or a set of proposed measures on disarmament which would be based on the principle of equality and equal security.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan, His Excellency Ambassador Okawa.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome you back to this Committee, this time as our Chairman. Many of us here will recall the important role you played as Chairman of one of the Committees of the NPT Review Conference held in Geneva two years ago. My delegation is delighted to be able to work once again under your distinguished leadership.

I wish to thank you very sincerely for the most kind words you pronounced the day before yesterday in connection with my chairmanship in April.

May I take this opportunity to welcome amongst us Ambassador Datcou, the distinguished representative of Romania. I would also wish to say how sorry we are to learn that Ambassador Yu Peiven of China and Ambassador Valdivieso of Peru have left Geneva; while paying tribute to them for their work in the Committee on Disarmament, I wish them good health and happiness in the years ahead.

The second special session of the General Assembly is now behind us. The people of Japan and indeed the people of the entire world had hoped that that special session would prove to be a constructive forum to promote new international efforts for disarmament, and that it would be able to produce fruitful results through our common efforts.

We cannot therefore but express our regret at the fact that the General Assembly was unable at the second special session, to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament which was expected to be the principal outcome of the session. It was worthwhile that the validity of the Final Document adopted at the first special session was reaffirmed and that delegations expressed their determination to continue the disarmament process on the basis of that document. My delegation also attaches significance to the fact that many Heads of State and of Government and a great many other dignitaries were present at the special session and pledged to do their utmost for the promotion of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

In this connection my delegation, at the close of the second special session, expressed my Government's hope that it would provide a new and positive momentum to negotiations in the various forums, such as those between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms reduction and on intermediate range nuclear forces, as well as negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on such matters of the highest priority as a comprehensive nuclear test-ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons.

My delegation considers that the duties and responsibilities of this Committee as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum have been reaffirmed by the deliberations in New York, because it became clear to all that effective disarmament measures can be produced only through serious and painstaking negotiations.

If we are indeed to fulfil our role and respond to the expectations of the international community as represented at the second special session, I think we should seriously review our working methods with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee's work.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

In particular, this summer session will be of very limited duration -- 5 or 6 weeks at the most -- and we must endeavour to make the most of that short period. My delegation therefore endorses the idea that, during this summer session, we place emphasis on the truly priority items, i.e. item 1 (CTB) and item 4 (chemical weapons); we would like to see more time allocated to these items than to the other items both in the plenary sessions and in the working groups.

On the question of chemical weapons, the Working Group has been at work under the conscientious chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka since 20 July, prior to the opening of the summer session. My delegation hopes that, on the basis of the revised mandate achieved at our spring session, further substantial progress will be made toward the elaboration of the draft text of a convention by the end of this session.

In this connection a number of noteworthy proposals were tabled at the second special session by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Soviet Union and others. My delegation hopes these proposals will contribute to advancing our discussions in this Committee. We have duly noted that the concept of on-site inspections has in principle been accepted by the Soviet Union, in particular with respect to verification of the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks.

Japan has been consistently calling for the realization of nuclear disarmament as a matter of the utmost urgency. Japan has, in particular, urged the early conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, including underground testing, with a view to restraining the further sophistication of nuclear weapons as the first concrete step toward nuclear disarmament. It goes without saying that the elaboration of adequate and effective verification measures is indispensable for the realization of a comprehensive test ban. This is why Japan has been actively contributing over the years towards the establishment of a system of international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events.

In this connection, we wish to express our regret that the reopening of the trilateral CTB negotiations -- which Japan has been calling for -- seems to remain beyond our reach in the foreseeable future. Japan wishes to appeal once again for the early resumption of those trilateral negotiations, through joint efforts by the parties concerned to achieve a breakthrough in their quest for a solution to the problem of verification.

Under these circumstances, one can say that the role of this Committee on Disarmament in achieving a CTBT has become all the more important. In that context, the agreement at the end of our spring session to set up the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was most opportune. My Government places great hopes in the work to be undertaken by the Ad Hoc Working Group in the sense that it could open the way to truly multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban which Japan has been calling for for so many years.

I wish to urge that we initiate substantive deliberations in the new Working Group as soon as possible during this summer session, so that we may finally start making progress under the agenda item "Nuclear test ban".

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

We may recall that at the recent special session in New York a great many representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions came to add their voices to governmental delegates in calling for nuclear disarmament. My delegation, and I hope many other delegations, listened carefully to the fervent pleas of the Japanese NGO representatives who spoke from their personal experiences in the atomic bombings of 1945. I trust that their simple and stark messages were registered deeply in the minds of their audience.

Surely these appeals should be constantly borne in mind by us, as members of the Committee on Disarmament, when we pursue our duty of accomplishing or trying to accomplish effective disarmament measures -- notably nuclear disarmament measures -- and we must endeavour to achieve what progress we can during this short session in moving forward in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Romania, His Excellency Ambassador Datcou.

Mr. DATCOU (Romania) (translated from French): It is a particular pleasure for me, Mr. Chairman, to be taking the floor in this Committee for the first time under the chairmanship of yourself, the distinguished representative of Kenya, a friendly African country. Your wealth of diplomatic experience at multilateral gatherings and your qualities as a patient negotiator will be invaluable to us during this very important phase of the work of our Committee. In wishing you every success in the discharge of your tasks -- your responsibilities -- I should like to assure you of the full support of the Romanian delegation. Allow me also to take this opportunity to express to Ambassador Yoshio Okawa, the distinguished representative of Japan and our last Chairman, my delegation's admiration for the skilful way in which he presided over the activities of the Committee, for his assiduity and for the spirit of understanding he inspired. It is a genuine pleasure to see among the secretariat of the Committee colleagues who have left us in order at the same time to remain with us. I should like to offer my greetings to Ambassador Riki Jaipal, a former colleague and a long-standing friend whom I am very happy to see again. I should like, too, to express my sincere gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, and to all the representatives who have addressed such warm and friendly words of welcome to me, words of encouragement which I appreciate all the more in that I am returning -- not without a certain emotion -- to represent my country in this body after an absence of many years.

We are resuming the work of the Committee on Disarmament in circumstances of unprecedented gravity. International relations are marked by very serious tensions and the danger of the outbreak of new military conflicts, including a new world war, is constantly increasing. The policy of arming is intensifying beyond reason and the world is seeing the accumulation of a terrifying and irrational arsenal of nuclear weapons with a destructive potential which defies the imagination. At the same time, the balance of forces established following the Second World War, based on the existence of military blocs, is no longer relevant to current national, social, economic and political realities. We have in fact, now reached a period in which efforts are being made to establish a new world balance between the various States and groups of States, in which inter-State relations will be based on a greater diversity of centres of power and more importance will be attached to the interests and the role of small and medium-sized countries, of developing and non-aligned countries. Obviously we are still at a dangerous crossroads, where new conflicts and new states of tension may arise which, in the conditions of ever-growing

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

interdependence that is characteristic of the development of contemporary international life, may have unforeseeable consequences for the peace and security of all mankind.

During the period since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the arms situation has developed -- and this is profoundly disturbing -- in a direction completely contrary to that embodied in the conclusions, the decisions and the documents then adopted by consensus. The arms race has continued at an increasingly accelerated rate; the volume of military expenditures has grown constantly, breaking all records; efforts to develop and manufacture new types and systems of weapons with an unimaginable destructive capacity have intensified. The role and importance of the military-industrial complex in foreign policy have increased, which only serves to accentuate the trend towards the militarization of international life. And all this has taken place against the background of the absence of significant results in the sphere of disarmament and arms control.

The present situation in Europe is particularly serious, for Europe has become a gigantic nuclear arsenal where vast quantities of weapons have been amassed, far surpassing any rational defence needs, and where the two opposing military blocs are confronting each other. The deployment and development of new medium-range missiles on the European continent further increase the threat to peace and security for every country of our continent and for the world as a whole, endangering life itself on our planet.

I should like to add, too, that military expenditures cause great difficulties and anomalies in the economic and social development of all countries and particularly the developing countries, aggravating the world economic crisis and raising an important barrier to the achievement of world economic and political stability through efforts to eradicate under-development and establish a new international economic order.

At the second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, Romania submitted a series of concrete proposals aimed at halting the arms race and achieving disarmament. The suggestions of the Grand National Assembly and of Nicolae Ceaușescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, with respect to the problems that were discussed at the second special session, have been circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament, document CD/296.

The Romanian people are profoundly attached to the cause of disarmament, understanding and international co-operation. This is in part because, throughout its long history, it has frequently experienced the horrors and devastation of war. Millions of Romania's citizens signed the appeal of the Romanian people addressed to the United Nations General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, which has also been distributed as an official document of the Committee, CD/297.

It is the spirit of those two documents which guides the Romanian delegation's participation in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. Our mandate is clear: it is to spare no effort in working, together with other delegations, to ensure that everything is done to put a stop to the infernal cycle of military competition and to defend the fundamental right of men and nations to life, to peace, to a free and decent existence.

We share the view that, particularly after the second special session devoted to disarmament, our Committee should redouble its efforts to try to secure the adoption of certain concrete measures and as far as possible to avoid sterile polemics, which are a waste of the short time available to us. The important statements made at our first meeting and this morning, as well as the proposals put forward which we are studying carefully, seem to us to indicate that such an approach will prevail in the Committee.

(Mr. Datcou, Romania)

The huge demonstrations in favour of peace and disarmament which have taken place in many countries, including Romania, and have shown a strength and vigour never seen since the Second World War, prove clearly that world public opinion expects the negotiating bodies in this field, and in particular this Committee, to produce concrete results to save mankind from a nuclear disaster.

As many delegations have stressed, the second part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament is very short. Furthermore, it is taking place between the second special session and the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. In the view of the Romanian delegation, these circumstances require us to make an additional effort of will and organization so that the time allotted to us is used in the most effective way possible. It is on this subject that I would like to make certain preliminary remarks.

First, I would like to emphasize that, like other delegations, we consider that it is a matter of the utmost urgency and moreover necessary as a demonstration of the viability of this multilateral body that real negotiations on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should be initiated within the framework of this Committee. I would like to stress that in my delegation's view there can be no valid argument against the commencement of such negotiations. The complexity of measures connected with nuclear disarmament is simply one more reason for beginning the search for solutions as soon as possible, for there is no better way --- no other way, in fact --- of finding solutions than a patient and persistent search with a will to find solutions acceptable to all --- to large and small countries alike. This calls for the establishment of a more appropriate framework for the search for solutions than that of plenary meetings. That is why the Romanian delegation supports the creation of a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with the relevant rules of the rules of procedure for the effective discharge of the Committee's tasks in connection with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We believe that such a decision would make it possible to deal with all the specific proposals which have been submitted to the Committee concerning the halting of nuclear weapon production, the prohibition of the use of such weapons and other measures designed to reduce the risks of a nuclear war started either deliberately or by accident, error or miscalculation. Furthermore, it would provide an appropriate framework for the discussion of general questions arising from the adoption of specific measures in the nuclear field, and for keeping Member States of the Committee informed about the nuclear negotiations taking place in other forums.

As the Romanian delegation has frequently emphasized the establishment of subsidiary bodies is not an aim in itself for the Committee. But in view of the present state of nuclear arsenals and the conditions of grave tension affecting international relations, we believe that a decision to establish a subsidiary body on the subject of nuclear disarmament could have a considerable impact, by showing the political will of all of us to co-operate and to negotiate, lucidly and realistically, in a constructive spirit, and with respect for the interests of all countries.

It goes without saying that the launching of negotiations in the Working Group on a nuclear test ban, a vital element in the strategy for halting the improvement and development of nuclear weapons, will be an important test for the Committee on Disarmament. The appeal made this very morning by the distinguished representative of Japan made a very great impression on us. For the moment, I shall confine myself to stating once again my delegation's support for the urgent conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests.

The prohibition of chemical weapons --- weapons of mass destruction --- is undoubtedly a priority area this year. Without now going into the substance of the discussions on this matter, I should like to stress my delegation's support for intense and constructive activity in the Working Group which is presided over with such devotion and dynamism by our colleague, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland.

(Mr. Datcou, Romania)

The recent proposals made on the subject by the Soviet Union will, in our view, facilitate the negotiations in progress.

The Romanian delegation also feels that the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prohibition of the use of scientific and technological discoveries for military purposes are important and priority subjects for our Committee's work. We are convinced that the establishment of a working group on outer space and the organization of informal meetings, with the participation of experts, on new weapons of mass destruction will provide us with valuable opportunities to discuss these subjects. The Romanian delegation would also like to welcome the decision taken this morning to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the chairmanship of His Excellency Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico. The informal consultations which are to take place will, we are sure, enable the Committee to start its substantive work on this subject next year with better prospects.

These are, in our view, the priorities of the Committee on Disarmament during the second part of its 1982 session.

I would like to emphasize that, in my delegation's view, while concentrating its work on these subjects the Committee should continue to give its attention to such important questions as security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and radiological weapons. The programme of work we have adopted means simply that during this part of the session, which will necessarily be very short, we agree to the discussion of these subjects in informal consultations so as to ascertain how best to promote our negotiations on them next year.

We believe that certain specific tasks entrusted to the Committee by the General Assembly at its special session, such as those of increasing its effectiveness as the single multilateral negotiating forum and considering the question of an enlargement of its membership, should also find a place in our programme of work. I shall confine myself for the moment to restating my country's position of principle -- a position first stated here a very long time ago, practically at the start of the work of the multilateral disarmament bodies. We have in fact always considered it a matter of principle that disarmament questions are of concern to all States and that all, therefore, have the right to participate in the negotiations.

In contrast to the past, the trend which is now emerging in the Committee towards a more pragmatic approach, and negotiations on specific questions, seems to us to be among the good omens which give us cause for hope. For, there is still reason to hope, in spite of the lack of concrete results from the General Assembly's special session and perhaps even primarily because of that situation our negotiating forum can and should make progress in the solution of the specific problems on our agenda.

Romania considers that, today more than ever, the halting of the arms race, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and disarmament are the only alternative to the real risk of a devastating conflagration.

The most dramatic issue in the history of mankind -- "Peace or war" -- has never before been posed so starkly in the form of the equation, "Survival or extinction".

We are, of course, acting here in accordance with the mandate entrusted to us by our respective countries and governments, but as a multilateral negotiating forum we are all, I believe, the representatives of the hopes of the peoples, of humanity, of all those millions who are asking us to act before it is too late. Our responsibility is therefore greater than ever before in the long history of disarmament negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, first of all, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, I would like to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of August and to express the hope that under your eminent leadership our work during this summer session will proceed smoothly. The Chinese delegation will co-operate closely with you. Meanwhile, I wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for his contribution to our work, and warmly to welcome Ambassador Datcou of Romania to participation in our work in the Committee on Disarmament.

As this session of the Committee is being held subsequent to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is quite natural for us to review and reflect on our work. It is disappointing that, in spite of the enormous efforts made by many members of the Committee, and particularly by the non-aligned members, the second special session failed to live up to people's expectations that the session would promote disarmament. The work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, on which the Committee spent so much time and energy, ran into countless difficulties at the second special session and no agreement could be reached on it. Even the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session failed to achieve consensus. The course of the session clearly indicated that the superpowers with the largest arsenals lacked the will to carry out disarmament and used various methods and pretexts to shirk their special responsibility for disarmament. This is the basic reason for the failure of the session. The failure of the special session to produce substantive results also reflects the deterioration in the international situation. In recent years, the hegemonists have intensified their aggression and expansion and the superpowers have accelerated the arms race between them. The momentum of their expansion and military build-up has not decreased a bit, notwithstanding the holding of the special session. This inevitably jeopardizes normal international relations, thereby posing serious difficulties and obstacles for disarmament. From the second special session we can draw one conclusion, namely, that the international situation is closely linked with disarmament, and discussions of disarmament issues in isolation from the international situation would be what a Chinese proverb describes as "climbing a tree to catch fish". It follows that efforts should be made to overcome the obstructions and obstacles that aggravate the international situation, as this would be conducive to the achievement of real progress in the work of disarmament.

At the closing meeting of the second special session many countries, while expressing their disappointment, pointed out that the above-mentioned obstructions and obstacles should be eliminated and reaffirmed their determination to continue to make untiring efforts for the cause of disarmament. The Chinese delegation has the same feeling and determination with these countries.

I now wish to make some brief comments on the items under deliberation and negotiation at this summer session of the Committee on Disarmament.

I. The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are issues of common concern. With the intensification of the nuclear arms race and the increase in the danger of war, the voice of the people has been heard ever more strongly throughout the world in urging the maintenance of peace and the prevention of nuclear war. We fully understand and sympathize with the aspirations

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

for peace on the part of the broad masses. We believe that, with a view to safeguarding peace and preventing nuclear war, it is necessary to identify the source of the threat to international peace and the security of countries before effective measures can be instituted to check the arms race and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. At present, the two major nuclear powers are engaged in a fierce arms race to seek for nuclear superiority, and are intensifying their deployment and preparations for a nuclear war. Under such circumstances, the threat of nuclear war can be lessened only if these two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals cease forthwith their arms race and reduce substantially their nuclear weapons. Proceeding from this fundamental principle, the Chinese delegation put forward concrete proposals at the second special session, the main content of one of which is to call on the Soviet Union and the United States to cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacturing of any kind of nuclear weapons and reduce by 50 per cent all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Thereafter, all nuclear-weapon States should cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and reduce their respective nuclear arsenals according to agreed proportions and procedures.

Judging from the present state of nuclear armaments in the world, the key to disarmament today lies in the cessation of the testing, qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and their reduction by the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals, which measures we could call, for the sake of brevity, "three cessations and one reduction". Since they both possess the capacity for overkill, a mere cessation of the testing, qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons cannot bring about any reduction in the huge nuclear arsenals in their possession and, consequently, would be of no help in diminishing the threat of nuclear war. Only when the "three cessations" are carried out in conjunction with the "one reduction", will the nuclear threat be diminished.

As a nuclear-weapon State, China is also prepared to assume disarmament obligations. After the two superpowers have carried out the "three cessations and one reduction" and narrowed the gap between themselves and the other nuclear-weapon States, China will be ready to join all other nuclear-weapon States in assuming the obligation of the cessation of the testing, qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and to join in a reduction leading ultimately to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We are in favour of the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament as proposed by many countries in the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, we hope that the United States and the USSR will conduct their nuclear talks in a serious and responsible manner, so that their negotiations will result in agreements truly conducive to the curbing of the nuclear arms race and to the reduction of nuclear weapons.

II. The prohibition of chemical weapons has all along been a question of deep concern to the people of all countries. During the spring session, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons made some progress in its work. Its Chairman submitted document CD/CW/WP.33, which contains a summary of the deliberations of the group in recent years. This will facilitate further negotiations. Certain concrete technical results achieved by the expert group on toxicity determination will undoubtedly be of help also to the work of the Committee.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

Starting on 20 July, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has held in-depth discussions and earnest consultations on the existing divergences and on ways to resolve them. A number of delegations, including the Chinese delegation, have put forward specific proposals in a positive and constructive spirit.

China has consistently been opposed to the use of chemical weapons for massacring people. We are in favour of effective international investigation into reported cases of the use of chemical weapons. We advocate the speedy elaboration of a convention through negotiation, providing for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, so as to eliminate once and for all the threat they pose to mankind. The Chinese delegation will contribute its efforts to this task.

III. The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The threat to world peace and security posed by the development of weapons used in outer space is causing increasing concern among the world community. The two superpowers are sparing no expense in the development of military technology for use in outer space, and the arms race between them is steadily extending to outer space. As is known, at present only the two superpowers have the means to test, deploy and use weapons in outer space, and it stands to reason that they should undertake the responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. People should be vigilant against the practice in some quarters of paying lip service to "the peaceful use of outer space" while actually stepping up the development of various types of weapons used in outer space.

China firmly advocates that outer space be used for peaceful purposes and for the good of all mankind and strongly opposes the arms race in outer space, which endangers peace and security. Consequently, it stands for the prohibition of all outer space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons. We are in favour of the establishment of a working group on this subject. With regard to the mandate of this working group, it should, in our view, be the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of outer space weapons.

IV. The question of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. Faced with the increasing nuclear threat, the non-nuclear-weapon States at the second special session once again voiced their strong demand that nuclear-weapon States should immediately and unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, pending the realization of nuclear disarmament. This demand of theirs is fully justified. The Chinese delegation to the session reiterated that China unconditionally undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We hope that the major nuclear powers will no longer cling to their respective narrow self-interests so that conditions will be created to enable the Working Group to continue with its meaningful work.

V. The question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We appreciate the efforts by many non-aligned countries for the formulation of a CPD, which went on until the last moment of the second special session. We wish also to express our admiration for the talent and devotion of the Chairman of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the chairmen of the drafting groups at the special session. The Chinese delegation, having participated in the whole process of the negotiations on a comprehensive programme, fully understands the sentiments of disappointment and dissatisfaction felt by the non-aligned countries about the failure to reach agreement on a CPD at the second special session. We share the view expressed by some delegations that, if the countries with the greatest responsibilities for disarmament still lack the political will, it would be useless for the

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

Committee on Disarmament to continue with negotiations on the CPD in the same manner as before. We also agree to a period of reflection on the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme with a view to exploring new avenues. However, "cooling off" should not be used as a pretext for prolonged delay.

The Committee's current summer session is of limited duration. We hope that this session can resolve its organizational and procedural matters without wasting too much effort so that what little time there is at our disposal may be effectively used on substantive discussions and negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of France, His Excellency Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): The French delegation wishes first of all to offer you its congratulations and its very warm wishes for every success in your task. The African country you represent is making a particularly active and welcome contribution towards international co-operation. We have seen that ourselves here in the Committee on Disarmament.

We are therefore convinced that under your guidance our work will proceed in the best possible way.

I also wish to convey the French delegation's congratulations and thanks to Ambassador Okawa for the outstanding manner in which he accomplished an important and difficult task, that of guiding our work last April, more particularly as regards the preparation of the special report we submitted to the General Assembly at its special session.

That session has already formed the subject of certain comments in this Committee which the French delegation has heard with a great deal of interest. Needless to say, it shares the feelings of disappointment which have been expressed. It regrets, in particular, that the General Assembly was unable to conclude its work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the session's prime objective in the eyes of many of us and a subject to which our Committee had devoted much time and effort. Yet there are some useful lessons to be drawn from our painful experience in New York: disarmament is not an undertaking that can be conducted in isolation from political conditions, upon which its progress depends; and progress is possible only if the comprehensive and balanced approach enshrined in the Final Document of 1978 and based on the principle of undiminished security is respected.

Thus the relative failure of the second special session can lead us towards a more sober and realistic view of disarmament problems.

Lastly -- and, in our view, this is the most important thing -- the results achieved at the first session, which for a time we thought threatened, were in the end preserved: the Final Document of 1978 was solemnly reaffirmed, together with the institutional system it set up, the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament undertaking and the specific role of our Committee as a negotiating body.

The summer session will give us little time to show the greater effectiveness the General Assembly asks of us. But we must make the best possible use of the time available and, to that end, we must make certain choices. On this point the French delegation shares the views generally expressed thus far in our discussion.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

On item 1 of our agenda, the Committee took an important decision last spring by establishing a Working Group to examine issues relating to verification which would arise in connection with a nuclear test-ban treaty. The French delegation did not object to the consensus reached on that question. It fully recognizes the importance of defining an effective and non-discriminatory international verification system.

It would, however, like to remind the Committee of its position as stated repeatedly in the past. In the French Government's view, the cessation of tests must, as indeed is stated in paragraph 51 of the Final Document, take place within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process. My Government therefore feels that any commitments it might enter into in the matter of tests should be linked with those it would be prepared to undertake as regards the limitation of its own nuclear forces. Allow me to recall, however, that France will be able to embark on this process of reduction only when the two principal powers, for their part, have reduced their nuclear arsenals to such an extent as to narrow markedly the gap between those arsenals and the nuclear means in the possession of my country.

That being so, the French delegation will not be able to participate in work undertaken with a view to the elaboration of a treaty which the French Government could not sign because the conditions for an undertaking on its part have not been met.

With regard to item 2 of the agenda, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the French delegation considers that this topic should, as it did last year, form the subject of a substantive discussion at informal meetings.

In particular, it would be useful to examine the modalities which would enable the Committee to express its views on the bilateral negotiations in progress: the question of the prevention of nuclear war -- together with that of the prevention of war in general and the maintenance of security -- could also be discussed on the basis of replies received on this subject by the Secretary-General.

Item 3 of the agenda, negative security assurances, will probably give rise to only a limited number of meetings of the Working Group concerned. The French delegation nevertheless wishes to recall the new position adopted by its Government and stated before the General Assembly by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. As Mr. Claude Cheysson said in his statement, France "will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have them and that has pledged not to seek them, except if an act of aggression is carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State against France or against a State with which France has a security commitment. In thus moving closer to the kind of guarantee already made by others, France hopes to facilitate the drafting of a Security Council resolution on this issue".

By espousing this attitude the French Government hopes to promote the adoption of a common formula.

The French delegation, like many others, considers that chemical weapons constitute one of the priority items on our agenda and the item upon which our efforts should be concentrated in the coming weeks; in present circumstances, it is undoubtedly the field where concrete results are most urgently needed and where real progress is possible.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

But the urgency of the problem should not make us adopt an over-hasty solution -- on the contrary. It would serve no purpose to embark prematurely on the drafting of a text which on many points would be a mere juxtaposition of statements of different positions; these positions must first be given thorough examination and efforts must be made to see how far they may be compatible with one another.

Among recent proposals made on the subject of chemical weapons, my delegation noted with the utmost interest those put forward at the second special session on disarmament by Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and reproduced in a document submitted last month to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. A number of questions have been put to the Soviet delegation on the subject of that proposal and there will no doubt be others; the French delegation will undoubtedly wish to ask for clarifications on a number of points. Those questions and the Soviet Union's replies to them are of interest to the Committee as a whole, and the exchange will make a contribution of the highest importance to the consideration of the substantive problems that remain to be solved. Only when those substantive problems have been examined will it be possible to judge how far the drafting of a composite text would be useful to the progress of our work this year.

Among those problems, none is more essential than that of verification. In fact, only effective verification of each party's fulfilment of its undertakings can guarantee that the convention on chemical weapons will increase the security of all.

We consider that the system of verification to be established by the convention should be based essentially on international verification. We regard acceptance of such a system as the criterion of the political will to conclude the convention and to carry out its commitments in good faith.

With regard to the working groups on radiological weapons and on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it seems to us, as to other delegations, that they can be left in abeyance during the summer session. We should, however, be very happy if informal consultations conducted by their chairmen yielded some progress.

The last item on our agenda -- the new item, on the subject of outer space -- has already given rise to statements of substance. Many delegations, including our own, are in favour of the establishment of a working group. We are also in favour of the starting of consultations on the terms of the mandate of such a group. We should also like discussions on the substance of the question to continue so as to shed more light on the various aspects of this very complex issue.

Lastly, the Committee must, in accordance with the conclusions adopted at the second special session, report to the General Assembly at its next session on a possible enlargement of its membership. Consultations on this subject ought therefore to be initiated among us very soon. The French delegation will approach them with a very open mind; it takes a sympathetic view of the candidatures submitted by countries which have a sincere interest in disarmament negotiations and some of which have already made a substantial contribution to our work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Australian delegation may I congratulate you and welcome you as our Chairman. So many strands link my own country to yours. So many qualities have brought you to this key position. That can only benefit the Committee as it faces a short, sharp and intensive summer session. I also take the opportunity to thank Ambassador Okawa of Japan for his outstanding work in overcoming so many challenges to bring the Committee in such good shape to the second special session on disarmament. I wish, too, to welcome Ambassador Datcou of Romania who joins us at this session.

The General Assembly's second special session on disarmament interrupted the schedule of this Committee for 1982. The meagre outcome of the session remains fresh in our minds and will have its effects on our work in coming weeks. There is a range of interpretations on what went wrong at that special session, although there is unanimity that the session fell short of its aims. None the less, the aims continue to be worth striving for. I should like in my brief intervention today to set aside the interpretations, to acknowledge the consensus and, going on from there, to suggest a constructive approach to our work in the Committee.

It was not entirely surprising, Mr. Chairman, that the General Assembly in its five weeks session proved unable to negotiate agreed texts. One of the recommendations of the first special session was that the body entrusted with negotiating on disarmament should be of limited size. We did not really need a second lesson to show that a large forum, operating on formal rules with speakers given the floor in order, is an inefficient system for dialogue and for compromise. Sometimes it may be possible to achieve results by that method but in matters of international security it will always be difficult. The lessons I hope we can draw from the unproductive outcome of the second special session are, first, that the Committee on Disarmament itself probably offers the best prospects for international agreement on disarmament, secondly, that the Committee's membership and work methods should be finely tuned to that purpose and, thirdly, that our agenda should be so fashioned as to help us gain our objectives.

It is the view of my delegation, Mr. Chairman, that, more than ever, the Committee on Disarmament as an institution deserves the strongest support. It is here that compromises, if they are at all possible, should be attempted. It is here that formality should give way to consultation, and rhetoric to the search for middle positions. Perhaps we could achieve reforms along these lines by setting aside periods for debate with the aim of coming to decisions -- but we did try that in 1981 and 1982 and did not make significant progress. An alternative way has to some extent been pioneered in the chemical weapons Working Group, and here I pay tribute to the imaginative approach of Ambassador Sujka, its Chairman, whereby the participation of members is on an informal, loosely structured basis. So long as there is control and full accounting to the subsidiary bodies of the Committee or the plenary itself at appropriate stages, this approach could well

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increase our effectiveness. Creeping informality, if I might so describe the approach, could have other benefits in reducing those procedural difficulties which characterized the early years of this Committee's history, and served to delay its real work. It would, for example, Mr. Chairman, do us more good than harm if we distinguished ourselves less, if we referred to each other by name, allowed points to be taken more issue by issue than strictly by the order in which speakers speak, and, generally, took advantage of our unique round-table structure to foster negotiation.

It follows from what I have just said, Mr. Chairman, that my delegation favours some review of our work methods and a parallel review of our membership; we would not, however, favour any prolonged debate on either issue, nor do we seek much expansion, if any, in our numbers. We may not be at optimal size right now, although I suspect we are close to it. In any case it is, in my view, much more important that we develop our negotiating potential. This, as I have said, can best be done informally. If we move in this direction we will have learned from our experiences at the second special session.

I turn now, Mr. Chairman, to our agenda. Some things on it call for a greater effort than before, but others, I suggest, should not continue to absorb so much of our energies. In short, with the second special session behind us, it is timely for us to review our agenda.

Three items currently on the agenda have, in recent years, been exhaustively dealt with in working groups and have reached a point where we can rightly question the usefulness of proceeding as before. The first is the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Australia was naturally disappointed that agreement could not be reached on the programme at the second special session, particularly since our own delegation, along with many others, had put much effort into the matter. In many respects the CPD proved simply too large and complex an enterprise in view of the limited time available to the special session. However, everything is far from lost. On the contrary: we have gained for ourselves a period in which to reflect on the progress made so far and to ferret out new approaches to the comprehensive programme.

In this respect we welcome the decision just taken that, even though the CPD Working Group needs for procedural reasons to be re-established at this session, no meetings will be held until next year. The intervening period should certainly be put to good use, not only through informal contacts between delegations but also perhaps between delegations and the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador García Robles. A particular aspect on which a tentative start might be made is the introduction, or preamble, which, as Ambassador García Robles himself has mentioned, delegations did not have time to consider in detail at New York.

Secondly, we have said just about all that, for the time being, can be usefully said on the subject of negative security assurances. It is an important issue which my delegation values as, among other things, one possible pillar in the structure aimed at discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. But here, too, we should pause, perhaps until bilateral talks between the two major nuclear-weapon States show that the confidence necessary for new arrangements to be made is manifesting itself.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Thirdly, on radiological weapons we have reached a stalemate. My delegation considers that the so-called "traditional" track could still usefully be pursued to its conclusion, and that the other track should be developed as well, perhaps on law-of-war lines. We do not have particular ambitions or expectations in this area though we believe a convention or conventions on both aspects are achievable. We have tended to favour a radiological weapons convention more as useful practice for the Committee on Disarmament -- to demonstrate that it can produce something if it really tries.

Of the remaining agenda items, a ban on chemical weapons clearly is the best immediate hope for the Committee. If, in the foreseeable future, a convention could be elaborated here at Geneva this would practically in itself justify the existence of this Committee. It is not an impossible, merely a complex, task. We are already proceeding on sound lines, negotiating effectively, bringing in technical expertise as necessary and, above all, we are unanimous on the final goal. We should not fail to give the required time and resources to the task.

Our number one agenda item, a nuclear test ban, is entering a new phase. We should exercise some self-restraint on this issue. Having achieved the establishment of a Working Group we should not shoot for the moon. The mandate we have is restricted, but not unduly so. There is a very great deal that can be achieved within the prescription on which we have agreed. It would be to our credit if our first report to the General Assembly was along the lines that we had drawn on the existing work, done in many different forums, and set a sound basis for future work. If we were able to concentrate in these first stages on verification, we should be in all the better a position to argue for a broader mandate in coming sessions. I note in particular the related seismic work on verification done in the Group of Scientific Experts and urge all delegations to give this work particular support, preferably by active participation.

The other new item on our agenda, outer space, is similarly ready for serious consideration with fresh minds. Whether we should move straight into debate on the need for a working group is a moot point. My delegation would prefer that we first lay the basis for that step by identifying the potential areas for useful activity since we do not have a great body of existing work in this field to draw on. It is an important and a vast subject; it is a subject of considerable future potential for disarmament and it will need careful handling on our part.

I have not gone into all the possible questions that our agenda encompasses. I have avoided the issue of nuclear disarmament, partly because of a personal preference to leave something which has escaped all compromise in this forum to be given more of a chance in new bilateral forums. We could perhaps review the issues in more detail early in our 1983 session. Similarly I should like to see us begin looking at conventional disarmament some time, but since there are several priority tasks which command the attention of this brief session that topic, too, might be left to another year.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

I conclude by returning to the idea of a new approach in our work. We need, as we have been told many times in this Committee, the political will to reach agreement. Political will has the important component of decision at the highest level to modify national positions for the greater international good. It has no less importantly the component at the negotiating level of decision to forsake rhetoric, political point-scoring, propaganda and lack of substance in favour of aiming at the practical and the achievable. Should we be wise enough now to demonstrate this latter aspect of political will -- the costs, I should point out, are small and the rewards high -- then we shall have laid a basis for renewed mutual confidence. In a very real sense the large cause of disarmament depends on the more limited disarmament which is our opportunity and our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Ambassador Jayakoddy.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure for me, on behalf of the Sri Lankan delegation, to extend to you a very warm welcome as Chairman of this Committee for the month of August. You are the representative of a country with which Sri Lanka has very close and friendly ties, and Kenya and Sri Lanka together share membership in the Commonwealth and the non-aligned movement. You have already, Mr. Chairman, demonstrated great skill and distinction in conducting our meetings. My delegation has every confidence that your long experience in national and international affairs and your dedication to the cause of disarmament will contribute greatly towards making this session of the Committee a productive one.

May I also express the sincere appreciation of my delegation to distinguished Ambassador Okawa for his outstanding contribution to the work of this Committee in April and thereafter. All of us here owe a big debt of gratitude to him for the dedicated service he gave the Committee at times that were particularly difficult. And may I say a word of greeting to my neighbours, Mrs. Thorsson and distinguished Ambassador Datcou of Romania, who have already made valuable contributions to our work here.

At our spring session this year we were in agreement that the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament was to be an important event in the disarmament process. We agreed that our deliberations in spring should serve to enhance the significance and outcome of the second special session. Our expectations of the special session were varied, but none of us dared to feel that it would be as futile as it turned out to be.

The second special session was a welcome opportunity to take stock of the disarmament process since 1978. It was a timely forum in which not only could the increased intensity and magnitude of the threat of armaments be elaborated,

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

but it could also have served as the occasion to decide collectively on bold, decisive steps to make a new beginning. My delegation did not expect miracles or measures of instant disarmament, nuclear or conventional. Neither did we expect Member States to abandon abruptly positions that had been held stubbornly by them for over three decades. Our hopes were more modest to the extent that we felt there was an opportunity to make a start on moving away from baroque policies that have not increased security for the world but, on the contrary, have made us hostages of the destructive weapons that have proliferated.

But even this very modest measure of expectation was not realized. What we did realize in our view was a stupendous failure. No amount of public concern, of reasoned argument, of legitimate public protest that was supported and reinforced by rational and informed opinion were able to convince some powers that the time had arrived to break away from past patterns of thinking and reasoning that have finally brought us to the edge of disaster. We were compelled, therefore, to end the session with great seriousness masking our enormous failure with well-chosen words in concluding paragraphs that satisfied all of us in different degree.

My delegation sees no sense in trying to conduct an autopsy on the second special session here, or to apportion blame for what was not achieved or what took place. Far more important in our view is to dwell at least on one conclusion that my delegation draws from the session's failure. For my delegation the unwillingness of some Powers to prevent the session from turning into an exercise in futility, and their readiness to permit a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to end without a single tangible step being taken towards disarmament is a deliberate, serious blow struck at the multilateral disarmament process. It signifies a growing indifference to, and open disregard of, the entire multilateral disarmament process.

This attitude of some Powers, in our view, stems from their conviction that disarmament, particularly work on nuclear disarmament, is best restricted to bilateral or at most trilateral negotiations. It signifies their determination to treat States that are not militarily significant as of marginal value, at best, in disarmament negotiations. Their attitude stems from a mistaken notion that the wielding of nuclear weapons power gives them an exclusive right to determine how, when, where and to what extent disarmament will be negotiated. But this is a notion that was rejected many years ago by the vast majority of States. There is no State, no nation on this planet, that is ready to abdicate to other States, however big or powerful they may be, its right to be concerned and involved in the disarmament process. The multilateral process in disarmament was only grudgingly conceded but there can be no doubt about its continuing in the future.

For my delegation, bilateral and trilateral negotiations do have their place, and my Government has welcomed such negotiations as are now under way in this city. But the conduct of such negotiations, in our view, should not be used, either directly or indirectly, to minimize or constrict the role of this Committee or other multilateral forums that address the question of disarmament negotiations. In the light of this, we attach to this session of the Committee on Disarmament the utmost importance. Although it will be a short session, it should be the occasion for the Committee to reassert its role as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and it should do so by addressing itself fully and energetically to the items of highest priority viz. (i) a nuclear test ban and (ii) the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

At the special session it was abundantly clear that the major concern of mankind today is eliminating the threat of nuclear annihilation. If any single message came out loud and clear from that session it was the need to prevent nuclear war and to eliminate the means by which such a catastrophe could be brought about. The Committee on Disarmament in its summer session must therefore reflect this concern in its deliberations.

On the issue of nuclear disarmament the Committee has achieved nothing so far. We ended the spring meeting of this Committee far apart in our views on the creation of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament. My delegation hopes that this failure will not prevent us from returning vigorously to the issue at this session. To avoid it, by citing a variety of reasons as to why the time is not opportune amounts to a gross disregard of what the international community feels about continuing to live involuntarily within the embrace of nuclear arms. It is, in our view, an affront to the collective conscience of mankind.

Here I would like to mention that the distinguished Ambassador of India in his statement two days ago proposed the setting up of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. My delegation welcomes this initiative as it helps to draw this Committee's attention even further to the priorities that we must tackle. We hope this proposal will be given the consideration it merits in the course of our deliberations.

The Committee at this session should try to exploit to the utmost the marginally better position it enjoys with regard to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We agreed on setting up an Ad Hoc Working Group on this issue at our last session after protracted negotiations, in the hope that at long last we had found a starting point. The interpretations, explanations and definitions that have been since elaborated on the mandate signal that the path we must take will not be an easy or clear one. Further, a recent decision of one of the nuclear-weapon Powers casts doubts on the possibility of conducting serious negotiations that would lead to a CTBT. In agreeing on the setting up of a Working Group on a CTBT we opened up for this Committee a new opportunity that should be used fully for constructive work. My delegation hopes that when the Working Group commences its work it will explore all issues within its mandate in a constructive and comprehensive way. Achievement or lack of it in the Working Group in the coming weeks lies within our hands and our wills. We hope that the opportunity that was created so painfully for all of us will not be lost in this Committee by the actions of a few.

Having called for this session of the Committee to focus its attention on nuclear disarmament issues, may I say that my delegation would support proposals to hold in abeyance work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and on radiological weapons. These are items that were exhaustively examined in June and July and what we now need is a pause for longer and deeper reflection on how further work should proceed. We believe that they can be taken up usefully when the Committee resumes in the spring of 1985.

My delegation welcomes the resumption of work by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last month. We support the work that is under way on chemical weapons and hope that significant progress can be made in the Working Group during this session.

At our spring session this year, we examined the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Our exchanges were useful, though it was clear that two different approaches to the question were on the minds of distinguished representatives.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

But the objective was the same, viz., the need to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. If we do not try to prevent such an arms race now, it is estimated that within the next two decades, or even by the end of this decade, space weapons will end the balance of terror that has made nuclear war all but unthinkable for the last 36 years, but they will make possible a global conflict whose undamaged victor could dictate terms to a disarmed and helpless loser. This is a situation that all States would prefer to avoid.

My delegation, therefore, favours the setting up of a subsidiary body on the prevention of an arms race in outer space this year, which marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the launching of mankind's first space object -- the Soviet sputnik in October, 1957. But we hope that a consensus on the setting up of the subsidiary body and its mandate can be achieved without the time-consuming meandering process that we went through at the closing stages of the spring session. We hope that the setting up of the subsidiary body will signal the first tangible step in this Committee to prevent in outer space what mankind has not succeeded in doing up to now on earth.

We have at the second special session reaffirmed our commitment to the Final Document of 1978, and this in our view is a commitment to implement the Programme of Action in terms of the priorities set out therein. We believe that the reaffirmation was not confined to agreeing with the perceptions and concepts in the Final Document. Rather, it was an expression of willingness and readiness to participate constructively in realizing those conditions that alone can lay the basis for lasting international peace and security. We hope that this reaffirmation will be translated into positive action in this Committee at this and future sessions.

Although this is a forum for disarmament negotiations I feel it necessary to speak some words on the end-product of the use of armaments in gross violation of international law and total disregard of civilians who are trapped by naked aggression and illegal occupation. For the past eight weeks we have been witnesses of the bitter fruits of the barbaric implementation of a policy of exterminism directed against Lebanon and her people and the Palestinian people by the Israeli aggressors. In their premeditated attempt to exterminate a people, no screw is left unturned. And who are the biggest victims? -- civilians -- children, women, men -- who are exhorted to disappear from their homes if they wish to save their lives. Amongst the victims of the siege are thousands of my countrymen and women who had chosen to live and work there, particularly in Beirut. This state of affairs stems from the gross violation of international law and the relentless pursuit of policies of strength and deterrence. It is the harvest of devastation and death that grows out of the scourge of armaments when used to settle political issues. My delegation hopes that the events of the past eight weeks in Lebanon will help all of us to understand better the pressing and urgent need for disarmament, be it nuclear or conventional.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

We are now close to exhausting the time available to us for this morning, before suspending the meeting until this afternoon at 3 p.m. I give the floor to Ambassador Garcia Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for the congratulations you offered me at the beginning of this meeting upon my appointment to act once again as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which has been re-established by the Committee today. At the same time I should like, through you, to tell all the distinguished representatives of the states members of the Committee how much I appreciate the proof of their confidence in me that my appointment implies, particularly in view of the fact that I had the privilege of filling the same office both in 1981 and during the first part of this 1982 session. Lastly, I should like to stress that although my appointment is a signal honour for me, at the same time it entails a heavy responsibility which, as I said at the Committee's informal meeting at which this subject was discussed, I only felt able to accept -- for the reasons I gave in my statement of 5 August -- because it was clear that the Working Group would not embark on its tasks until next year.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I have a question to ask. I understood that you were about to close the meeting. Does that mean that Comrade Herder, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, has decided not to speak today? If not, then perhaps we could hear him. We have the time. He is the only speaker left on the list and there would not be much point in our meeting this afternoon just for that. But of course the Soviet delegation is ready to come at any time to hear a statement from the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting was not being adjourned; it was going to be suspended until 3 o'clock this afternoon. I had the opportunity to consult on the length of the statement of the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic; it appears to be quite lengthy and might therefore take quite some time, but if the Committee wishes to continue until approximately 1.20 p.m., I have no objections. However, I thought that the meeting should be suspended at this point and continued in the afternoon.

Perhaps we could hear some comments on whether to extend the meeting now or resume in the afternoon. Comments should not be long but I think we should consider the wishes of delegations.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that we might take twenty minutes to take that decision. As delegations have engagements at this time, we shall be pleased to return and hear the statement of the representative of the German Democratic Republic this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is no objection I suspend the meeting until this afternoon. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3.20 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 176th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. As agreed this morning, the Committee will now listen to the last speaker inscribed for today's plenary meeting.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, at the outset of my statement today I would like to join previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of August.

At the same time, I would like to pay particular tribute to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Okawa, the representative of Japan. It would not be an exaggeration to say that his remarkable diplomatic skill and his well-known tact considerably helped the Committee to solve a number of important issues, particularly in preparing for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation also welcomes Ambassador Datcu, the new representative of Romania, whose long experience in the disarmament field will certainly be of great value for the further work of the Committee on Disarmament.

At its 1982 summer session the Committee starts working at a time characterized by a dangerous deterioration of the international situation. Only four weeks have passed since the conclusion of the second special session. We are on the eve of the thirty-seventh anniversary of a crucial date in the history of the arms race: on 6 August 1945 the first atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima, killing tens of thousands of inhabitants of that city. All this reminds us of the high responsibility which the Committee on Disarmament is facing for the destiny of mankind by preventing a possible nuclear war.

Therefore I would like to concentrate on those questions which in our view should find full reflection in our programme of work and our activities during the forthcoming summer session. Certain conclusions from the second special session cannot simply be set aside, since they are closely connected with the discharge of our responsibilities.

In the course of the second special session, the overwhelming majority of States expressed their concern about the growing danger of a nuclear holocaust and advocated urgent measures for eliminating the threat of nuclear war and ending the arms race, especially in the nuclear field.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

On the eve of the second special session on disarmament and during the session the world-wide movement against the arms race assumed unprecedented dimensions. Numerous constructive proposals for the prevention of a nuclear war, for a freeze on nuclear arsenals and other disarmament measures were submitted to the special session by a number of States.

The socialist countries came to the special session well prepared with concrete proposals aimed at the implementation of the priority goals set by the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. We acted in the conviction that the session would offer a good opportunity for all States, regardless of their size, military potential or geographical location, to contribute actively to solving the most urgent problems of arms limitation and disarmament. Our entire approach to the tasks of the session was guided by this determination.

Together with other socialist countries, the German Democratic Republic reaffirmed its unchanged readiness to agree on the limitation, reduction or prohibition of all kinds of weapons on a just and reciprocal basis. In his message to the President of the second special session the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, reiterated that our country will always be an active and reliable partner in the struggle for lasting peace and disarmament and that it is imperative that measures aimed at ending the nuclear arms race be adopted and vigorous follow-through action ensured.

However, in view of the position of the United States of America and other NATO countries, the session was prevented from taking action on those proposals. Moreover, the session witnessed attempts by those States to call into doubt the priorities set for disarmament negotiations by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as to justify their superarmament policy and their doctrines of nuclear deterrence and nuclear first strike.

Owing to such an approach the session was unable to agree on a substantive document that would provide an answer to the challenges of our time and stimulate the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

Assessing the results of the second special session on disarmament, one comes inevitably to the conclusion that the session quite clearly reflected the two main tendencies by which the present international situation is characterized. Firstly, parallel to the second special session on disarmament again a NATO summit was held, this time in Bonn, capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. It endorsed new measures to implement NATO's long-term armament programme. Regardless of the opposition of the peoples and the reservations of some Governments in western Europe, the decision was upheld to deploy new United States medium-range nuclear missiles and cruise missiles in Europe beginning in 1983. Thus, a nuclear first-strike capacity directed against the Warsaw Treaty countries is to be established on the European continent.

Steps were agreed upon to extend NATO's sphere of activities. Just before the summit the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a new agreement on the additional deployment of six United States divisions in the Federal Republic in "times of crisis". Instead of responding favourably to the

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

proposal by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty not to extend military alliances and to start their dissolution, NATO admitted a new member. Recent decisions by the United States on an unprecedented military budget, on the establishment of a special military command for outer space and other measures are aimed at setting the course for the arms race over the next years or even decades.

At the same time, it was not without the consent of the same country that Israel launched the fifth Middle East war to eliminate the PLO and the Palestinian people and that the South African apartheid regime continued its aggression against Angola and Mozambique. In alliance and with the support of other States, Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations continues to be seriously violated.

Contrary to the principles of international law and the spirit of peaceful coexistence the United States has, in the interests of its military strategic aims, caused great damage to economic relations, which are of mutual benefit for peoples and States.

All these political, military and economic actions cannot but escalate international confrontation and reduce the international confidence needed for fruitful negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. Small wonder that the countries that pursue such a dangerous policy were eager at the second special session on disarmament to block any forward-looking decisions which could impede their attempts to achieve military superiority and accelerate their arms build-up. Such an attitude cannot be camouflaged by proposals on "drastic arms reductions", actually aimed at reductions only by the other side so as to upset the military balance. Nor can it be covered by proposals to discuss verification problems in an abstract way. The peoples of the world will not be misled by conciliatory speeches. They want to stave off the danger looming over all mankind.

On the other hand, the second special session on disarmament has shown the strong determination of the vast majority of countries as well as the world-wide peace movement to achieve urgent measures to remove the threat of nuclear war as well as to freeze **and** reduce nuclear arsenals and eventually eliminate them. The declaration of the USSR whereby it assumed a unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was, no doubt, the highlight of the second special session. It reflected the high sense of responsibility of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for ensuring lasting peace on earth and preventing nuclear catastrophe. This courageous step by the Soviet Union fully corresponds to the purely defensive nature of the strategic doctrine of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty which was re-emphasized in the Warsaw Declaration of 1980. That declaration stated that the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty had never sought and would never seek military superiority and that they took a consistent position in favour of ensuring a military balance at ever lower levels.

The proposals submitted by the socialist countries at the second special session on disarmament concern such priority issues as a nuclear disarmament programme, a comprehensive test ban, the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon and the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

Since all these questions are inscribed in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, all efforts should be undertaken to discharge our responsibility as the only multilateral body for the negotiation of disarmament draft agreements.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

This would not only lead to a significant reduction in the level of military confrontation we are facing today but also, in the long run, to the reduction and elimination of the most dangerous weapons threatening peace and the whole of mankind.

At the beginning of the second part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament it is up to member States here to draw the necessary practical conclusions from the second special session on disarmament. My delegation would like to emphasize two elements: firstly, the Final Document of the first special session remains fully valid. It provides a sound basis for negotiations on disarmament. Secondly, everything should be done to intensify all kinds of such negotiations at all levels, in all contexts. In this framework, multilateral negotiations do have their proper place. They should duly take into account the proposals advanced at the second special session on such priority tasks as

The prevention of nuclear war,

The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament,

A comprehensive test ban,

The prohibition of chemical weapons, and

The prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In this connection my delegation fully subscribes to what was said by the representative of India in his statement on 3 August. We fully support the proposal that the Committee on Disarmament should use all its possibilities to promote measures on the prevention of nuclear war. It should encourage all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives. A first step in this regard would be the commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use such weapons. The Committee should therefore appeal to those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet assumed such an obligation to take reciprocal steps. Such steps taken by all nuclear-weapon States would actually lead to an all out ban on the use of nuclear weapons. There are no arguments that could justify any reservation against such action.

The approach outlined above would build the confidence needed for successful negotiations on the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. It would also improve the situation with regard to an agreement on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Now as before the delegation of the German Democratic Republic favours the commencement of negotiations on item 2 of our agenda, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in the framework of an ad hoc working group. It was with this aim in mind that we proposed, in document CD/259, a mandate for such a group. Under this mandate the group should prepare, on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document, the stages of nuclear disarmament with the aim of preparing multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

and nuclear disarmament. All questions related to this subject have so far been discussed in the Committee on Disarmament in a rather loose way. They could be tabled and classified in an organized manner in such a working group. The group's activities should be aimed at preparing a programme of nuclear disarmament to be implemented in stages on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. All nuclear-weapon States should take part in the elaboration, adoption and implementation of such a programme.

The German Democratic Republic welcomes the proposal for such a programme contained in the memorandum presented by the USSR to the second special session on disarmament. The Soviet proposal fully takes account of the need for a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament. In this regard we also welcome the corresponding proposals by India and other countries.

In this context, my delegation draws attention to the unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR as well as to the proposal to agree already now that the strategic arms of the USSR and the United States be quantitatively frozen at the moment the strategic arms talks begin, and that their modernization be limited to the maximum extent possible. Practical results in these talks are more urgent than ever before.

In the over-all framework of nuclear disarmament my country attaches special importance to the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons. The production of this weapon is bound to lead to a further escalation of the nuclear arms race. Its planned deployment in western Europe, near the western border of my country and other parts of the world, as well as doctrines for a "limited" nuclear war connected with the deployment of this new weapon are likely to lower the nuclear threshold, thereby increasing the danger of nuclear war.

Guided by these considerations, the German Democratic Republic strongly advocated at the second special session the beginning of urgent negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, thereby contributing, as a matter of urgency and in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document, towards the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems. My country further proposed that the non-nuclear-weapon States declare that they will not permit the deployment of nuclear neutron weapons on their territories.

It is the hope of my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament, in establishing an appropriate working group, will create the necessary organizational framework for the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons. It would thus meet the world-wide concern expressed in General Assembly resolution 36/92 K, as well as by many non-governmental organizations.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is a long overdue question, as was emphasized only a few days ago also by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. There is no need to elaborate on its urgency in this forum. My delegation strongly objects to assertions that this issue could only be a long-term goal.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

To promote the start of actual negotiations in this Committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty my delegation submitted, during the spring session, a draft mandate for a working group on this topic. Unfortunately, owing to the attitude of some countries, it was not possible to agree on an all-embracing mandate directed at actual negotiations. In a spirit of compromise my delegation in April joined the consensus on a mandate which fell rather short of our expectations, and not only ours. In my statement of 21 April I already outlined my delegation's interpretation of this mandate. It is our hope that the new Ad Hoc Working Group, by examining all specific issues as well as relevant comprehensive proposals with regard to a nuclear test ban, will give fresh impetus to the initiation of real negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, thus enabling the Committee on Disarmament to discharge its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, as was stated in the mandate mentioned. My delegation intends, in the future course of this session, to put forward specific suggestions concerning the activities of the new Working Group on item 1 of our agenda.

The resumption and successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations which have been suspended would very much improve the conditions for the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty within our Committee. We therefore join all those delegations which called upon the United States and the United Kingdom to declare their readiness to take such a step. It is our hope that the negative reply given recently by the President of one major nuclear-weapon Power will not be that country's last word with regard to this issue.

At the beginning of this year's session a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was agreed upon. Some headway was made in our negotiations during the spring session.

At the second special session on disarmament, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, like many others, welcomed the proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention. This initiative takes into account the views of other countries, especially with regard to verification, and clearly shows the firm intention of the USSR to facilitate a breakthrough in the negotiations on the Prohibition of chemical weapons and to bring them to a successful conclusion. In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to the efforts undertaken in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, directed towards achieving tangible progress in elaborating a draft treaty. We express our hope that substantial results in the drafting of the elements of a convention will be reached in the foreseeable future.

The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention could be promoted by some urgent measures designed to bring about a cessation of the qualitative improvement of chemical weapons as well as their geographical spread. It was for that reason that the German Democratic Republic at the second special session on disarmament, proposed that States should refrain from any action which could impede the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In particular States were urged

To refrain from the production, stockpiling and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, and

Not to deploy chemical weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

My delegation looks forward to reactions to these proposals in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Those are the preliminary considerations of my delegation on the priority items of our agenda in the light of the deliberations at the second special session on disarmament. It is the intention of my delegation to comment on other items on the agenda in the course of the summer session. In concluding my remarks I would like to express the expectation of my delegation that this session will be marked by a spirit of co-operation and the common desire of all delegations to contribute to success in our disarmament negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I have requested the secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing the time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 9 to 13 August. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative, since we might have to allocate time for meetings of the nuclear test ban Working Group, once its Chairman has been appointed. We might also need to have informal meetings. Therefore the time-table may have to be adjusted as we proceed. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons requested a third meeting for next week. The Chairman informs me that the main topic of that meeting, to be held on Monday, 9 August, at 3 p.m., will be to take note of the Chairman's report on his consultations with delegations and experts during the present week. The meetings listed in the time-table will be held, as usual, in the Council Chamber.

As you know, as from Monday, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will start its summer session, scheduled to take place from 9 to 20 August. The first meeting of that Group will be held next Monday, 9 August, at 3 p.m. in Conference Room 5. Further meetings of the Group will be decided on by its members as their work proceeds.

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 August, at 10.30 a.m. On that occasion, the Committee will start its consideration of item 4 of its agenda, entitled "Chemical weapons".

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.

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