

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME IV

Index of Statements by Country and Subject  
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament  
in 1982

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 18 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario ALESSI

(Italy)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI

Mr. MAACHI

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARSALES

Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR

Mr. R.W. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. J. GAUDREAU

Mr. E.B. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. El S.A.R. EL REEDY  
Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY  
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Miss L. GHAZERIAN

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGER  
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY  
Mr. G. SZENTESI

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN  
Mr. S. SARAN  
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA  
Mr. B. MAUNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. A. BAHRIN  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran:

Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK  
Mr. A. JALALI  
Mr. A. SABZALIAN

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. V.M. GAIJA  
Mr. V.A. EDVOKOUSHIN  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV  
Mr. B.T. SURIKOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. L. MIDDLETON  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT  
Mr. R.V. KYLES

United States of America: Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M. BUSBY  
Mr. J. MARTIN  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Mr. P.S. CORDEN

Venezuela: Mr. R.R. NAVARRO  
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Mr. M. RADOTIĆ

Zaire:

Ms ESAKA EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI



The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 164th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 5 of its agenda: "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so.

In this connection, document CD/260, entitled: "Progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the thirteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events" has been circulated to you today and is therefore available for consideration by the Committee. It is customary, in addition to the statements members may make on this report, to allow a certain amount of time for the questions which the members of the Committee may wish to address to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. I therefore intend to invite him later during this plenary meeting to reply to any questions you may have on the subject of this report.

We shall first of all proceed simply to a consideration of the report, which will later be put before the Committee for decision. In the meantime, the report will be reissued in order to correct certain errors. This applies in particular to paragraph 10, which should read as follows:

"10. In order to assist the Committee on Disarmament in reporting to the second special session on disarmament, the Group prepared the appended overview summary of its work up to March 1982".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary, Australia, Sri Lanka, the Soviet Union, India, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden and the United States of America.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Hungary, His Excellency Ambassador Komives.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): At the outset I would like to extend a hearty welcome to our new colleagues in the Committee, my good and old friend Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands. Offering them the co-operation of my delegation, I wish them every success in their responsible work in our Committee.

According to the programme of work for the first part of its session the Committee on Disarmament is to discuss this week the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The Hungarian delegation has for long been paying special attention to this subject both in plenary and informal meetings and in the Working Group entrusted with the task of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The steady devotion of my delegation is motivated, among other things, by the growing awareness among world public opinion that the ongoing scientific and technological revolution and the accelerating pace of progress in various fields of science harbour not only beneficial possibilities for solving the basic problems of mankind, but also— if misused— a grave danger of triggering a qualitatively new round in the arms race. A realization of this danger, and of the pressing need to avoid it, are clearly reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and in all the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on this subject.

The real danger of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction cannot be denied. The latest event substantiating such fears is the decision on the production and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons. Although a number of delegations claim that it is just another nuclear weapon, a great amount of scientifically supported evidence has been compiled in this Committee as well as in scientific, military and other publications. They all prove that while being an updated version of the nuclear weapon, it is also a new type of nuclear weapon, not only in technological terms but in its political and military implications as well. It is so especially because it increases the danger of an all-out nuclear war by introducing an "easy-to-use" nuclear weapon.

That is why the socialist delegations of this Committee proposed the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons, and submitted a draft convention for that purpose as early as 1979. They continue to be steady proponents of such efforts.

The question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was first taken up by the United Nations General Assembly in 1975, and has been discussed in this Committee since 1976 following the submission by the delegation of the USSR of a draft agreement on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and a working paper on the definition of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

In 1977 an expanded draft agreement (CCD/511/Rev.1) was submitted to this Committee and served as a basis for discussion on the broad issue of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. A proposal of a procedural nature was submitted in document CCD/564 concerning the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

The exchanges of views that took place in the CCD and later in the CD between 1976 and 1982 showed a difference of opinion concerning the effective ways of preventing the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction. My delegation continues to be convinced that a comprehensive

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

approach is the most effective way to reach our aim. This implies the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement banning in a general manner the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, accompanied by a list of specific types of weapons to be prohibited. Such an arrangement could provide for the conclusion of separate agreements on specific new types of weapons of mass destruction.

In its resolution 36/89 the General Assembly requests the Committee on Disarmament to "intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons."

Paragraph 3 of the same resolution calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, and other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new weapons of mass destruction, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Such declarations would be approved subsequently by a decision of the Security Council.

This resolution gives a possibility for the Committee to make efforts on two lines. Working paper CD/261 prepared by the Hungarian delegation — which has been circulated already by the secretariat — proposes concrete action on both lines. In submitting this working paper the Hungarian delegation starts from the conclusion that no delegation has contested in substance the real necessity of preventing the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction. The representative of the United Kingdom, for instance, stated in 1977: "I need hardly say that the British Government fully supports the aim of preventing the development of new weapons of mass destruction. Where there are differences between ourselves and others they are in the choice of means to achieve the desired end." (CCD/PV.757).

The working paper submitted by my delegation gives particular attention to the call by the General Assembly contained in paragraph 3 of resolution 36/89. Looking back as far as 1977 one may find clearly expressed positions of a similar nature. The delegation of the United Kingdom in 1977 stated the following: "... a more fruitful approach would be a firm condemnation by the world community of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, coupled with a request to this Conference to keep the matter under review. Such a condemnation and request to the CCD might usefully be embodied in a resolution at the next General Assembly."

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

That proposal was supported by a number of delegations, among them those of Italy, the United States and Sweden.

The delegation of Canada, commenting on the proposal of the United Kingdom, stated: "Until something more tangible comes into view on which we can focus in a practical way, we would support the common-sense approach suggested recently by the United Kingdom delegation, that we should seek 'a firm condemnation by the world community of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, coupled with a request to this Conference to keep the matter under review'. A United Nations resolution of that kind could go beyond the mere expression of a generalized condemnation of the unknown, and embody a firm undertaking by all participating States to be vigilant in and outside the CCD against the possible development of new weapons of mass destruction." (CCD/PV.760)

Analysing the statement referred to above in the context of the proposed call by the General Assembly to the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as to other militarily significant States, my delegation is of the view — as contemplated in the Hungarian working paper — that the Committee on Disarmament could take an active part in working out a draft text for such declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal by States to create new types of weapons of mass destruction, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the subject, with the idea that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council.

In this statement I would like to mention only a few preliminary ideas which could be taken up in the course of the proposed informal meetings:

A solemn reaffirmation of the undertaking to adhere to the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament;

The realization that the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction could lead to a qualitatively new round in the arms race, and should therefore be firmly condemned by the world community;

Possible obligations to be undertaken by those States which are expected to make such declarations, including the prevention of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction by all possible national means;

(Mr. Konives, Hungary)

A call to the Committee on Disarmament to intensify negotiations in order to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, including a statement of the determination of States to contribute to such negotiations in a constructive way.

Taking into account the converging positions on this question, my delegation thinks that it should not be too difficult for the Committee to find a common language for such declarations, even if only in a preliminary form, for transmission to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, and later to the Security Council, for further action.

The second part of the working paper suggests a concrete way in which the Committee could — in our view — keep the question under continuing review. The useful outcome of last year's informal meetings gives us an encouraging basis for proceeding further in the substantive examination of the issues involved, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts. In this respect, delegations and their experts could focus their attention on defining the tasks that an ad hoc group of experts could be entrusted with, and perhaps work out a possible mandate, acceptable to all, for such a group.

It would be a step forward to summarize the proceedings, findings and conclusions of the proposed informal meetings and submit them to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Concerning the timing of the informal meetings, my delegation believes that informal consultations on that subject could be held already this month or in April. The final dates for holding the informal meetings could be agreed upon in July, when the Committee prepares the programme of work for the second part of its 1982 session.

Before concluding my statement I would like to dwell shortly upon the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons. First I would like to express the satisfaction of my delegation that the Working Group charged with this task has been able to start its substantive work under the dynamic chairmanship of Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany. My delegation shares the expectations of many others that negotiations on a treaty banning radiological weapons will lead to substantive progress and that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to present a good record on this item to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The Hungarian delegation will do its best to this end.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, may I begin by offering you the congratulations of my delegation on your assuming the chairmanship of this Committee during the key, central month of our activity.

I take occasion also to express on behalf of the Australian delegation our appreciation of the dedicated, capable and friendly way in which the distinguished representative of Iran, Ambassador Mahallati, presided over the important opening stages of this session.

I am sufficiently new to this Committee clearly to recall the spirit of help and co-operation with which those around this table received me and others among us who were similarly new, when first we joined the Committee. In that same spirit I welcome our new colleagues Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.

I turn now to speak on two aspects of item 1 of the Committee's agenda.

The overview summary annexed to document CD/260 which is before us on the table begins with a sentence that is self-explanatory: "The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, so as to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, was established in 1976 by the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and has later been maintained by the Committee on Disarmament". Australia has from the very outset and even before it became a member of the Committee on Disarmament, played an active role in that Group. The Australian delegation regularly encourages the Group to continue its excellent and important work under the distinguished chairmanship of Dr. Ericsson. I need only refer to the most recent Australian statement on the matter, namely, that of 18 August 1981 when the progress report on the twelfth session was submitted to the Committee.

The progress report on the thirteenth session, covering work done in the first two weeks of March, is submitted to us today. It is a valuable report, valuable as much for what it does not say as for what it does say. It has not been possible to include in the report full details of all the important achievements of national investigations in recent years. It is hard for any group having a restricted mandate to look at all the implications of its work or to speculate into the future. Those are largely political tasks and therefore tasks for this Committee.

There have, in recent years, been some remarkable technological advances of direct application to the work of the seismic Group. The advances open up many new possibilities. In three areas alone the advances have changed our ideas of what is possible. The areas to which I refer are the digital recording of data from seismographs, improvements in computers and the development of communications satellites. Such are the advances that have been made that it is probably fair to say that they have rendered the 1976 mandate somewhat antique, even antediluvian in several respects. The mandate says, for example, that level 2 data (i.e. information which is substantially more detailed than the level 1 basic parameters of detected seismic signals and which are provided in response to requests for additional information) may be delayed for 4-6 weeks. It is now possible and, indeed, more convenient, for seismic stations to pass on at least some level 2 data with negligible delay. In the view of my delegation the Committee has an obligation to take full advantage of the startling information revolution that I describe: if seismic data can be transmitted for analysis in larger quantities, at faster speeds and with greater benefits then this will be of very considerable value in monitoring a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

I mentioned the national investigations carried out under the auspices of the Group. Some of the investigations, for example those considered by study group 4, deal with the format and procedures for exchanging level 2 data and illustrate the possibilities I have just mentioned. Australia and Japan have had responsibility for study group 3 which has looked into the possibility of exchanging seismic data using the World Meteorological Organization's global telecommunication system. I join Ambassador Okawa who on 16 March spoke of the results produced in the second experiment with this system: I share, in particular, his satisfaction that some 20 countries, including five socialist countries, took part. Finally, I draw the Committee's attention to a proposal, put forward by Australia and Japan for study group 3, and Sweden and the United States for study group 5, to develop the experiment with the global telecommunication system by exchanging seismic data through temporary data centres. The experiment would simulate many of the functions envisaged for an eventual full system and would have considerable practical benefit both for the Group and for the work of the Committee as a whole. Again it will be important to have good participation in this experiment which, I understand, may be able to take place as early as at the end of this year or the beginning of next year.

I have spoken in some detail about the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, a body which I described in my statement of 11 February as a model of patient industry. There is no doubt that the Group makes a very great contribution to our work. It is perhaps unnecessarily hampered by aspects of its mandate. I have already suggested that in part that mandate is out of date. In part, too, it is ambiguous: whereas ambiguity was an asset in 1976 when agreement on the mandate was reached it is now, in our view, a distinct liability. It seems to me that the time has come for us to begin remedying the situation.

One more substantive restraint on the mandate, should, however, remain. Change in the central political aspect of the mandate of the Group of Scientific Experts, as spelled out in document CCD/550, would change the Group's essential charter in the setting up of an international co-operative system. I refer to the important sentence in CCD/558 which reads, "The Group should not, however, assess the adequacy of such a system for verifying a comprehensive test ban".

Last week the distinguished representative of the United States of America proposed that a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament could usefully discuss and define issues relating to the verification of, and compliance with an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. The proposal fills in a missing dimension in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. The proposal also offers an opportunity to fill in the main gap left in the work of the trilateral CTB negotiators. We know from the report submitted to the Committee on the progress of the trilateral negotiations that the subject of verification and compliance is an important one and one on which substantial work is still to be done. Other documents, notably the Secretary-General's report on a comprehensive test ban, contained in document CD/36, place verification of a CTB as first among the "major unresolved issues". The statement by the Group of 21 embodied in document CD/181 similarly draws attention to the issue.

Australia is unequivocally committed to the early negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Our commitment also encompasses whatever might be done to make progress towards such a ban. That, quite simply, is why we supported the step-by-step approach put forward by Canada. It is because of our commitment that we fully support the United States proposal. The proposal enables our Committee to take up immediately and for the first time, in a serious and detailed way, issues even more central to a comprehensive test ban than those canvassed in the Canadian proposal.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

We agree with those who hope for a dynamic in the Committee's handling of this issue. We agree with those who want to ensure that the goal of a treaty on a comprehensive test ban is not lost sight of.

We accept, in similar fashion, the logic of the questions: verification of what? Compliance with what? But the answers to those questions have already been given. The answers are implicit in what I have already had to say about the main gap left by the work of the trilateral negotiators. The answers are even more evident in what many of those around this table have already had to say on the question of a comprehensive test ban. I take, for instance, two examples. The first is from the statement that the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan, made on 13 February in this Committee on the subject of a nuclear weapons test ban. In talking of the course of the trilateral negotiations he said:

"It can be affirmed that the greater part of the work of elaborating the treaty was done."

I turn to the second of the two examples which give us the answer to the questions of verify what? Comply with what? That is to be found in the statement of the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, who said:

"Of course it is self-evident that negotiations relating to verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban must be based on a prior understanding, if not agreement, on the scope of the treaty. It would appear from the report of the trilateral negotiations submitted to the Committee last year that at least as between the three negotiating Powers, an agreement or understanding was achieved on the scope of the test-ban treaty. This was, in fact, reflected in the language of paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session ...".

In short, there is a sufficient body of established doctrine in the international community, as shown by the remarks of our colleagues I have cited, to permit this Committee to be reasonably clear on what we are aiming to verify and what we want to ensure compliance with. Not all the doctrine is there. It could not possibly be there since much of it was established in the negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. All the doctrine on the scope and definition of the treaty cannot be there since that was a trilateral negotiation and what this Committee is about is a multilateral negotiation. But sufficient of the doctrine is there and, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, shown in our statements to be there, to allow anyone seriously concerned to bring about a CTB, to begin in this Committee, for the first time, serious work on that most central of matters. The history of efforts at disarmament has been too much the history of unseen or lost opportunities. I urge you all, distinguished colleagues, to see and to take with both hands the opportunity that now exists, lest it is no longer here tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Ambassador Jayakoddy.



Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, permit me to offer you the felicitations of my delegation on your assuming the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of March. The admirable way in which you have already conducted the work of this Committee during the last two weeks amply justifies the hopes and expectations that we held when you assumed the chairmanship. We are confident that in the remaining period of your stewardship as Chairman, the Committee will succeed even more in executing its onerous tasks. My delegation, needless to say, stands ready to assist you at all times.

I would also like to express our appreciation of the dedicated work of the previous Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador Mahallati of Iran in February, under whose guidance the Committee took off on a fruitful course of work. His constructive guidance proved most effective in helping us to resolve many issues. It is a great honour for the Committee to have in its midst the distinguished Ambassadors of the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia. They bring to the Committee a wealth of experience, skill and knowledge from which we shall all benefit. I welcome them on behalf of my delegation and wish them all success in their new duties.

I would like today to address the Committee on agenda item 1 -- the nuclear test ban. My delegation has always held the view that the manner in which the Committee handles this question and the issue of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament will demonstrate whether it is discharging its unique role and heavy responsibility in matters relating to nuclear disarmament. To the extent that the Committee remains ineffective on item 1, it fails short of the aims and expectations of the member States of the United Nations. To the extent that it confines itself to debate and dialogue alone on item 1, the Committee is not carrying out its role and responsibility as envisaged when it came into being.

The long period of stalemate over a CTBT could give rise to a feeling that some of those who carry the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament interpret this to mean that negotiations on nuclear disarmament is the exclusive responsibility of nuclear-weapon Powers alone. We must not allow this to happen. My delegation, like many other delegations in this Committee, has voiced appeals and requests for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a CTBT on many occasions. Up to 11 March, the response that we received from two of the nuclear-weapon Powers had been negative. We have kept voicing our views not merely for the sake of the record, but because we felt that it was necessary to repeat and restate our point of view so that some movement would take place. It now seems that our voices, individually and in groups, have had some hearing. It is a welcome development.

My delegation wishes to record its thanks to the representative of the United States, distinguished Ambassador Fields, for the statement he made on 11 March on nuclear issues, including a CTBT. This statement, in our view, reflects the desire of the United States to widen its co-operation in the Committee and is, of course, welcomed by us. At the same time, let me extend our appreciation to distinguished Ambassador Summerhayes, too, who conveyed the support of his delegation for the proposal contained in the United States delegation's statement.

Distinguished Ambassador Fields, in the penultimate paragraph of his statement of 11 March, demonstrating consummate negotiating skill, told us so much and yet so little. We were glad to hear that the United States was responding to our many appeals. But my delegation has been left with many doubts and questions relating to what is really intended. I shall therefore, raise a few questions through you, Mr. Chairman, in the hope that before long answers will be available.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

Firstly, the word "negotiations" does not appear in the crucial penultimate paragraph of the United States statement. It is significantly left out, because in the paragraphs that preceded it, negotiations have been ruled out. We are, therefore, offered a threshold of action, a procedure that is far below the level of negotiation. We are also told in the statement that the time is not propitious for negotiations. But what is left unsaid is what conditions could make the time propitious. On the one hand, for three years, when some of us in this Committee kept pointing out that the trilateral negotiations were stalled, and no bilateral negotiations were in progress, we were told that the time was not propitious for CTBT negotiations. We all welcome the ongoing bilateral negotiations, but once again we are told that the time is not propitious for CTBT negotiations. This creates a serious concern in our mind. When will we be told that the propitious time has dawned and, from whom will we hear it? Further, what will influence the identification of a propitious time? All aspects of this question seem to be out of the hands of the Committee. No amount of shared concern and shared interest seem to assist in bringing closer mutual agreement on a propitious time for negotiations on a CTBT. On the other hand, the General Assembly and millions around the world feel that the propitious time had arrived many years ago and that this session of the Committee is also a propitious time for negotiations to commence.

Secondly, in the United States statement it is proposed that a subsidiary body be set up on agenda item 1. Are the words "subsidiary body" code words for an ad hoc working group, or is there any other intention? It would be helpful if this could be clarified.

Thirdly, the United States proposal suggests that the subsidiary body discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance. It is evident at once that the ambit of work suggested is a limited one -- only to discuss and define but not to negotiate. Discussion and definition are essential requirements but like painting the sky they can be endless and seamless, and where one will get to is totally uncertain. It can become an extremely interesting, academic exercise, shedding a lot of light on the twin problems of verification and compliance. But to what will the exercise be anchored and to what will it be directed?

Verification and compliance are complex, essential, vital elements of any future CTBT. They can be most effectively discussed and examined, not in a vacuum but in relation to a proposed treaty, agreement or other such instrument. A technical examination of verification and compliance alone cannot produce a political document. Any CTBT has to be a political document if it is to gain the favour and win the approval of member States. But in the United States proposal we can find no provision that will assist in giving the proposed discussions the dimension and quality needed to formulate a political document.

Fourthly, what future perspective does the United States proposal offer on negotiating a CTBT? The United States proposal suggests a starting point for discussions. But it is silent on how things could or should evolve. We agree that work on negotiating a CTBT cannot have a pre-planned chart or pocket guide that will set out each future step. But the least that we need is to have some idea of a process which will be followed and which would lead to future stages of negotiation on a CTBT.

The United States proposal is silent on this aspect. Further, it has no comment to offer on how discussion on verification and compliance elements can be linked to other elements of a CTBT, in the future. My delegation would like to see even faint outlines of the future process that can be expected. If we start on a process that offers no perspective, there is a danger of getting stranded at the starting point itself, or getting lost through numerous deviations.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

Fifthly, what is the response of this Committee to nearly 30 years of ardent, universal clamour for a CTBT? On the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we should be trying to formulate an adequate and meaningful response. On the other hand, if we adopt the United States proposal made on 11 March in the way it was spelt out, we would be falling far below the expectations of millions. In effect, we will be announcing that this Committee, in the last weeks of this session, was able to achieve this very limited step alone on a CTBT. The Committee's task, in the view of my delegation, is much wider and deeper than that. We need to search harder for a more comprehensive, more acceptable solution.

My delegation holds the view that every constructive initiative must be met by a constructive response. I have therefore tried to respond constructively by asking for greater elaboration and clarification through you, Mr. Chairman, from the United States delegation. I am confident this will be given to us before long, either in plenary or elsewhere. If the United States proposal is to be considered with all the attention it deserves, it is necessary for it to be spelt out more elaborately. My delegation would like to know in specific terms what is envisaged.

We have before this Committee several initiatives on agenda item 1. The Group of 21 proposals are contained in document CD/181. These offer a comprehensive basis for writing an effective mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1 of our agenda. There are other proposals; from the socialist countries and from the Canadian delegation. Our failure up to now to reach consensus stems from our inability to work out co-operative approaches which are essential if we are to succeed. Mr. Chairman, you are holding consultations in earnest to help the Committee arrive at a consensus. My delegation's hope is that through these consultations a way out can be developed. We wish you success in your efforts.

A new opportunity has offered itself to this Committee and it should not be beyond us to work out an acceptable solution, a solution that caters to the deeply held wishes of all delegations. The United States delegation and the United Kingdom delegation have a special role to play here. We feel that they have made the first cracks in the freeze that existed for so long in this Committee. It is very much in their hands now to widen the cracks and help trigger a lasting spring-thaw on item 1 of our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Allow me first of all to welcome the new representatives in the Committee on Disarmament: our friend, Ambassador Milos Vajvoda of Czechoslovakia, who is well known to all of us for his great competence in matters of disarmament. I believe that his participation in the work of the Committee will be useful to us all. I should also like to welcome the new representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Dongen.

I should like today to make some comments on a number of items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. I shall begin with item 7 of the agenda.

This year mankind will observe the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the conquest of space, which is one of the greatest achievements of science and technology in our century. The progress in this area achieved today cannot be

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

separated from general progress on our planet. The use of outer space in connection with communications, meteorology, navigation, the study of the earth's natural resources and for other purposes is of the greatest value to mankind.

Unfortunately it has to be admitted that outer space is becoming not merely an area for the peaceful efforts of different countries through its exploration and use, but also the arena of an ever-growing military confrontation.

Reflecting the concern of the world community in connection with the danger which the militarization of outer space represents for the whole of mankind, the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session adopted a resolution calling for the conclusion of an appropriate international treaty to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space and requesting the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations with a view to agreement on the text of such treaty.

The outer space problem occupies a special place in the spectrum of disarmament issues. What is most important here is the prevention of a new and even more dangerous spiralling of the arms race in another sphere of vital interest to the whole of mankind. In this connection the implementation of the numerous projects which have appeared in recent years for the creation of a whole series of space weapons designed to carry out strikes on targets in outer space, in the atmosphere and on the surface of the earth would be especially dangerous. Among them the most threatening are the projects the implementation of which might upset the strategic balance that exists in the world and thus increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Foremost of these are the plans for the deployment in outer space of anti-missile systems, based, in particular, on the use of the latest scientific and technical advances in the field of laser and accelerating technology. In the opinion of an authoritative committee of the American Senate, the deployment of laser and so-called "particle-beam" weapons in outer space will provide "the unique potential for changing the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union".

No less dangerous are the plans for the creation of multiple-use manned spacecraft, capable also of carrying out purely military tasks such as the placing in orbit of reconnaissance, communication, navigation and other satellites for military purposes, and also the testing of new types of outer space weapons and the inspection and destruction of satellites.

It would be a dangerous error, distinguished colleagues, to suppose that if weapons make their appearance in outer space, then the latter will be the sole firing ground and "battlefield", in the spirit of science fiction.

The essentially "earth" character of the outer space armaments under development is evident. This would still further increase the danger of a nuclear conflict, with all its frightful consequences for the whole of mankind, particularly as military space programmes are accompanied by the promulgation of doctrines and concepts proclaiming the admissibility and acceptability of nuclear war, the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

There is another aspect to this matter. It is difficult to imagine how much it would cost to create even a small potential for the conduct of military operations in the area of space close to the earth. According to the estimates of experts, the cost of launching a weapons system into orbit is several times greater than the cost of deploying it on the earth's surface. And all this is taking place when, over a considerable part of our planet, people lack the barest essentials for a normal existence.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Then, why do some circles need a new spiral of the arms race in outer space?

The American magazine Business Week gives the following answer to this question: "Whoever manages to seize control of outer space -- the main arena for future wars -- will be able decisively to change the balance of power and this will mean the establishment of world supremacy".

The Soviet Union has constantly opposed the conversion of outer space into an arena for the arms race, and it continues to do so. On 18 April 1981, President Leonid Brezhnev stated: "Let the boundless ocean of space be unsullied and free from weapons of any kind. We wish by joint efforts to achieve a great and humane goal --- the prevention of the militarization of outer space".

At the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union made a proposal aimed at preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space and the conversion of outer space into a source of aggravation of the relations between States. To that end it urged the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. We propose that States undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, not to install such weapons on the celestial bodies and not to deploy them in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which may be developed in the future.

The draft treaty also deals with the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, the solution of which is urged by a number of States. Article 3 of the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union contains an undertaking not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning of or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States parties to the treaty, if these objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with the provisions of the treaty.

We propose the initiation of negotiations on this matter in the Committee without delay and the establishment of an ad hoc working group to this end. We would not object if the mandate of the working group were to include also the recommendations in resolution 56/97 C of the General Assembly with respect to negotiations on the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. At the same time we believe that the Committee's main aim should be to solve the problem of the elimination of the arms race in outer space as a whole, and therefore the question of anti-satellite systems should, of course, be discussed in the context of other measures aimed at achieving this goal.

As the Committee on Disarmament is this week considering the item on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well as radiological weapons, we would also like to touch briefly upon this question.

With respect to radiological weapons, we would like first of all to recall that the basic elements of a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons have been under discussion in the Committee for about three years already, which were preceded by two years of bilateral negotiations. Is that not, gentlemen, too much time to have spent on the elaboration of a document on the prohibition of a non-existent type of weapon? Of course, we do not insist that the draft should be ready by the beginning of the second special session on disarmament at any price, so to speak. But it seems to us that the positions of the participants in the negotiations have so crystallized that the time has come to find solutions.

We understand very well the interest shown by a number of delegations in the problem of the prevention of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities and we are not against the elaboration of appropriate international measures. If we can reach an understanding that such elaboration will be conducted outside the framework of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

negotiations on radiological weapons, then we are prepared to seek appropriate forms of arrangement to assure the interested States that their proposals will be the subject of serious negotiations. At the same time we would like to declare again that this problem has nothing to do with radiological weapons. It is an independent problem and a very complicated one, including numerous technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects. The proposal for the elaboration of provisions envisaging a commitment not to attack civilian nuclear facilities is regarded seriously by our delegation and that is why we believe that it merits serious discussion.

As regards the problem of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction as a whole, the basic approach of the Soviet Union to this matter is well known, and we would not wish to repeat it. This problem has been on the agenda of various international bodies for a number of years now, and the General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions on it. It seems that nobody denies the real danger of the possibility that the latest achievements of science could be used for the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction if this is not prevented in time. Unfortunately the main thing -- the readiness of a number of the leading military States to solve this problem -- is lacking. As a result, the years go by without any real progress being made. We therefore consider it a timely and positive development that at its last session the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (36/89) calling upon the States permanent members of the Security Council and also other militarily significant States to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject. As is clear from the resolution, such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council.

Such an approach, in our view, would permit the placing of a first obstacle, of both moral and political value, in the way of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction. At the same time it does not envisage the immediate conclusion of a formal comprehensive agreement, the advisability of which is questioned by some States. These States, incidentally, have in the past submitted proposals whereby the solution of this problem would be sought in the first instance through the strong condemnation by the world community of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction. We have in mind in particular the United Kingdom proposal of 20 July 1977, to which Ambassador Komives has already referred in detail today. Taking this into account, it would be useful if the Committee on Disarmament, in which all the militarily significant Powers are represented, could discuss possible ways of implementing the appeal of the General Assembly to which I referred. For our part we are ready at any time to enter into contact on this question with all delegations concerned.

We listened with great interest to the comments of Ambassador Komives at today's meeting and we consider that they are in complete accord with the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and with other decisions of the General Assembly. We support his proposals for certain organizational measures, in particular his suggestion for the holding of informal consultations in the very near future.

By way of conclusion to my statement and an appeal to the Committee to take concrete and positive actions towards the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, I should like to resort to plagiarism and end with the words of the Ambassador of Austria, applying them, of course, to the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction: "The history of efforts at disarmament has been too much the history of unseen or lost opportunities. I urge you all, distinguished colleagues, to see and to take with both hands the opportunity that now exists, lest it is no longer here tomorrow."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of India, His Excellency Ambassador Venkateswaran.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, the art of modern diplomacy owes a great deal to its Italian origins. The tradition of statecraft and diplomacy that you represent has already become manifest in the short period that you have been with us. May I, on behalf of the Indian delegation, offer you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this Committee for the month of March, and pledge to you the full support and co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your duties.

At the same time I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues in the Committee from the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia whose contribution to our work my delegation looks forward to with pleasant anticipation.

I would also like to extend to Ambassador Mahallati of Iran the sincere appreciation of my delegation for the competent and considerate manner in which he guided the Committee's work during the opening month of February.

In accordance with rule 30 of our rules of procedure, I would like to devote my statement today to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, relating respectively to a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

For the past two decades and more, the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons has been accorded the highest priority by the international community. In 1978, the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament reaffirmed once again the highest priority and utmost urgency attached to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. For the same reason, the very first item on the Committee's agenda is entitled "Nuclear test ban".

However, in the past two and a half years, this Committee has had to witness the incredible situation of multilateral negotiations on this item of the highest priority being prevented on one pretext or another. At first we were told that multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament concerning a nuclear test ban might have an adverse impact on the trilateral negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR which had been in progress since 1977. No attempt was made to explain to us as to how and why the mere fact of this Committee undertaking negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty would, in fact, have a negative impact on these restricted negotiations. Now, of course, even this argument cannot be used since, as all are aware, the trilateral negotiations have been suspended over the past year and a half. And there are no signs that they will be resumed in the foreseeable future, even though one of the three parties has repeatedly declared that it is willing to do so.

In any event, no one in this Committee has argued that negotiations on nuclear issues should not be held among nuclear-weapon States. There is nothing to prevent such negotiations from taking place. In fact, our concern precisely is that such negotiations are no longer taking place, except on a very limited range of issues, involving intermediate nuclear forces in Europe.

In his statement of 9 February 1982, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Eugene Rostov, challenged the very concept of a nuclear test ban as an item of the highest priority. He put forward an entirely new and alarming argument against the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. He argued that "in the many discussions of this problem here, the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, but unanimity has been lacking on

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

questions of approach and timing". We are not aware of any differences of opinion concerning the approach to and timing of a test ban treaty. The universally acknowledged objective of such a treaty would be the general and complete cessation of the testing of all nuclear weapons by all States for all time to come. It has also been universally accepted that such a test-ban treaty should be concluded as early as possible.

Mr. Rostow went on to link the question of a test ban to the so-called "ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces" and stated that "limitation on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues". What Mr. Rostow has done at one stroke is to negate the highest priority that the international community, including the United States, has consistently accorded to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty since the early 1950s. At a subsequent informal meeting of this Committee, the United States delegation even went so far as to suggest that a nuclear test ban could only be considered after substantial reductions in existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons had been achieved.

For nearly a quarter of a century, some nuclear-weapon States including the United States and the United Kingdom have repeatedly denied that they lack political will to agree upon the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. Technical problems relating to verification have been put forward as the sole obstacle to progress in negotiations, not lack of political will, nor the failure to recognize the highest priority attached to this item by the entire international community. And yet one nuclear-weapon State sees no inconsistency or, indeed, incongruity in announcing to this Committee that it no longer believes that under present circumstances a comprehensive test ban could be accorded pre-eminent priority and that in its view, it should be dealt with as a long-term objective and as part of a whole range of nuclear issues. What in fact is being implied is that a complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons would only be possible when the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

We do not question the right of any State to review its position on any of the items of the disarmament agenda. However, let it also be clearly understood that such arbitrary overturning of established priorities does little to enhance the credibility of the commitments made by the States concerned, to achieving nuclear disarmament or in fact any other disarmament objective. How can we any longer have confidence now that the nuclear-weapon States concerned are in fact committed to achieving nuclear disarmament? How can we be certain that a few years from now we shall not hear the argument that nuclear disarmament is no longer a priority item and that some entirely new weapon system hitherto unheard of should be dismantled on a still higher priority basis? How can we be sure that in the very near future, one of the States possessing chemical weapons will not turn around and announce to the Committee that a ban on chemical weapons cannot be pursued as it might affect the stability of the military balance or that the development of chemical weapons is essential to it for the maintenance of so-called "deterrence"?

This is not a question only of political credibility, but a question that has very grave implications for the security of States and for the cause of disarmament itself. Negotiations on disarmament can only be undertaken on the basis of a mutual adherence by all States to certain agreed fundamental principles, objectives and priorities in the field of disarmament. Once this basis is eroded, no State could be expected to accept partial measures of disarmament or the so-called step-by-step approach, because there would then be no confidence that the commitment to the



(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

priority objectives would continue to remain valid. Many States, including India, agreed to sign the partial test-ban treaty, despite its limited relevance, precisely because it was envisaged as the first step towards the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The stand now taken by the United States has belied that expectation and erodes credibility even in regard to the measures already concluded.

A comprehensive test ban treaty has been identified year after year, by consensus, as the first and most urgent step towards the halting of the nuclear arms race, particularly in its qualitative aspect. The first step cannot be confused with some other long-term objectives in the distant future. No, the nuclear test ban is for here and now. It is not a wall to be built brick by brick over a long period of time. We just cannot afford to wait any longer to achieve this objective.

At our plenary meeting held on 11 March, we heard statements made by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, as well as the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, concerning the nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament. On that occasion, while giving our delegation's preliminary reaction to the statements, I stated that there had been a positive change in the attitudes of the United States and of the United Kingdom towards the way in which the Committee on Disarmament should discharge its responsibilities with respect to items 1 and 2 of its agenda. While the Ambassador of the United States restated the new policy of his Government concerning the nuclear test ban as had been referred to by Mr. Rostow, he, nevertheless, expressed the readiness of his delegation to join a consensus in the Committee to establish a subsidiary body with respect to item 1 of the agenda. In doing so he recognized that the Committee on Disarmament "has a legitimate interest in all disarmament issues and an obligation to make a substantial contribution to the disarmament process in all its aspects". Therefore, despite the fact that we did not agree with the United States delegation concerning the priority to be attached to the nuclear test ban and the role that such a ban could play in the halting of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons, we felt it would be to the Committee's advantage to explore any possibilities which could lead us towards actual negotiations on the text of a treaty. It is our hope that the consultations currently being carried out by the Chairman of the Committee on the formulation of an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1 will bear fruit at a very early date. Such a working group would naturally also consider questions relating to verification and compliance which appear to be of such vital concern to the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom.

While attempts are being made to consign item 1 of our agenda to the never-never land of the long long term, we are seriously concerned that the competence of this Committee to undertake negotiations on item 2 of our agenda, namely, nuclear disarmament, also continues to be questioned. In his statement of 11 March, the distinguished Ambassador of the United States argued that his delegation "continues to believe that establishing a subsidiary body to negotiate on nuclear disarmament would not be a productive step at this time, especially in view of the fact that such negotiations have begun among certain of the nuclear-weapon States". Here again is an argument which is made without any explanation. We would like to ask the distinguished

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Ambassador of the United States as to why the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this Committee should be precluded merely because such negotiations have begun among certain of the nuclear-weapon States? Why should restricted negotiations among some or all of the nuclear-weapon States and multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament be mutually exclusive? Could he explain to us what he fears might be the negative consequences of undertaking multilateral negotiations in this Committee on restricted negotiations among certain of the nuclear-weapon States on the vital question of nuclear disarmament? My delegation would also look forward to the responses of the United States delegation to the very relevant questions posed by the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Jayakoddy, this morning. Perhaps if he could take us into his confidence and tell us what his apprehensions are in this respect, we may be in a position to allay them.

It has been stated by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, both at formal and at informal meetings of the Committee, that nuclear issues should initially and primarily be dealt with among the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Ambassador Fields, in his statement of 11 March, while recognizing the legitimate role of the Committee, recalled numerous occasions on which the nuclear-weapon States have been reminded that they have the primary responsibility for undertaking such negotiations. As I have stated before, we are not asking the nuclear-weapon States to desist from holding negotiations on nuclear issues amongst themselves. In fact we would positively encourage such negotiations. What we have repeatedly asked the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, without getting an adequate and satisfactory answer, is a very simple question: in which forum would the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States be addressed, if not in this multilateral body? The Final Document acknowledges that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences which would affect nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Recently, the head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency also himself admitted before us that in the present-day context, "the dynamics of war permit no sanctuaries". It has been acknowledged in the Final Document that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, especially on items affecting their security. Nuclear weapons pose a grave danger to the survival of mankind, and the vital security interests of all States are directly and fundamentally jeopardized by the very existence of nuclear weapons. Where are these security interests to be considered? Or do the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom deny that the vital security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States are equally involved in matters relating to nuclear weapons and doctrines concerning their use?

If it is argued that issues concerning nuclear weapons are to be dealt with mainly by the nuclear-weapon States, what is the role of the Committee on Disarmament in respect of these issues? Is it the position of the United States and the United Kingdom that as far as issues relating to nuclear weapons are concerned, the Committee on Disarmament should not function as a negotiating body? If all that we are permitted to do is to hold informal meetings on such questions, would this not mean in effect an effort to reduce this body to a mere debating forum with respect to items of the highest priority on its agenda?

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Let me clarify our delegation's position in this regard. We are not against holding informal meetings for the exchange of views concerning item 2 of our agenda. In fact, we welcomed as a positive step the informal meetings that were held on items 1 and 2 of our agenda during this Committee's session last year. Those discussions were extremely useful. However, such discussions must lead to something. In our view, they must lead to negotiations on actual texts of treaties. This is the business of the Committee on Disarmament as we understand it. The Committee has before it concrete proposals for dealing with item 2 of its agenda. These can be found in document CD/180 submitted by the Group of 21 and document CD/193 submitted by a group of socialist countries. Instead of refusing to entertain the idea of setting up a subsidiary body under item 2 of the Committee's agenda, perhaps the United States and the United Kingdom could look at the substance of these proposals, and participate in consultations concerning the formulation of an appropriate mandate for a subsidiary body as they are doing already in the case of item 1.

Mr. Rostow, in his statement before this Committee on 9 February, pledged to work constructively with the Committee in removing the burden of nuclear weapons from world politics. Several delegations enquired of the United States delegation as to what ideas it had to offer in giving concrete shape to this pledge. I am sure that Ambassador Fields will concede that a mere willingness to participate in informal meetings of this Committee on item 2 of the agenda falls far short of giving concrete shape to Mr. Rostow's pledge.

Before concluding, I would like to draw the attention of the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States in the Committee to resolution 36/81 B of the United Nations General Assembly entitled, "Prevention of nuclear war", which was adopted by consensus. We appeal to them in this context to bring to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament concrete proposals concerning a subject that has a bearing on the very survival of mankind. Over the past several years, the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially the non-aligned countries, have made constructive proposals in this regard. One such proposal, embodied in General Assembly resolution 36/92 I, is for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While two nuclear-weapon States have explicitly supported this proposal, others still continue to oppose it. We believe, therefore, that we are entitled to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to come forward immediately with their own concrete proposals on this issue, bearing in mind that this question relates not merely to the security of a handful of States, but to the survival of mankind as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): In my statement today I would like to address myself to the item on our agenda concerning new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well as to the subject of nuclear neutron weapons and certain aspects of the CTB in the light of our ongoing exchange of views on this subject.

But before elaborating on these questions, allow me, Mr. Chairman, to touch upon the recent proposals made by the head of State of the USSR, Leonid I. Brezhnev, with regard to the limitation of nuclear arms. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the latest decision of the Soviet Union to introduce, unilaterally, a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR, as well as its readiness to reduce a certain number of those weapons on its own initiative.

We also support the Soviet proposals for the resumption without delay of the SALT negotiations and for the two sides to undertake a commitment not to open a new channel for the arms build-up and not to deploy sea- and ground-based long-range cruise missiles. These far-reaching initiatives of the USSR are a gesture of goodwill. They are a further proof of the constructive approach of the Soviet Union to disarmament negotiations, in particular to the negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. It is our hope that the other side will seriously examine these initiatives and will react positively. A positive reaction would, there is no doubt about it, also have a positive impact on the international atmosphere and on the work of our Committee in discharging its responsibilities.

Since 1976, when the Soviet proposal on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction was discussed here broadly for the first time, my delegation has strongly supported the early elaboration and conclusion of an appropriate comprehensive agreement.

We have been convinced and still believe that such a step would effectively help to curb the qualitative arms race which today very seriously threatens negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. An agreement on this subject could contribute to the reversal of the process we are observing now, that is, that disarmament negotiations are far outpaced by the rapid military use of the latest achievements of science and technology.

During recent years my delegation has extensively and repeatedly explained its approach to this question. In my statement of 9 July 1981 I elaborated, inter alia, on the urgent necessity of the above-mentioned agreement as well as on its scope of prohibition and the verification of compliance with it. Today I am not going to repeat our arguments.

Let me rather try to explain our approach to the practical solution of the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Taking into account proposals submitted by a number of other countries we are ready to proceed in accordance with a step-by-step approach. Only recently this was once again outlined by us in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Such steps could be the following:

(a) Declarations by the permanent members of the Security Council as well as other militarily significant States concerning the refusal to create new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction;

(b) The conclusion of a comprehensive or "umbrella" agreement which could be supplemented by a list of single types and systems of prohibited new weapons of mass destruction;

(c) The conclusion of single agreements on the prohibition of specific new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, if this is deemed necessary.

This very flexible approach was actually approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 36/89. Now it is up to our Committee to proceed to business-like negotiations.

In the past, informal meetings with experts have played a useful role in throwing light on some of the questions involved. This should systematically lead us to more structured forms of our work. Therefore, my delegation favours the establishment of an ad hoc group of experts. Such a group could consider possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction and elaborate a general definition of such weapons to be included in an international instrument. Having this in mind, my delegation fully supports the proposals contained in the working paper which was tabled today by the Hungarian delegation.

The advantage of the proposed procedure is obvious: whereas the Committee on Disarmament could concentrate on its main tasks -- items 1 and 2 -- an adequate approach to item 5 would be assured and the ground for negotiations on an appropriate international agreement could quickly be prepared.

The development and production of nuclear neutron weapons by the United States is proof of the topicality of efforts to stop the qualitative arms race. There is no doubt that the neutron weapon is a specific new type of nuclear weapon. If it is not prohibited now, its manufacture and deployment will entail dangerous consequences for the international situation and for disarmament negotiations.

In emphasizing this, my delegation takes into consideration the following aspects:

Firstly, the production and development of nuclear neutron weapons will inevitably lead to an escalation of the nuclear arms race. There should be no illusions: the nuclear neutron weapon represents the first type of a whole new generation of nuclear weapons, sometimes called "specialized nuclear weapons" or "nuclear weapons designed for special purposes". Besides the nuclear neutron weapon or "enhanced radiation weapon" there are nuclear weapons under development in which such characteristics as blast and electromagnetic effects are to be enhanced, whereas other effects, such as nuclear radiation, are to be reduced. All these weapons are thought to provide appropriate possibilities for their user to predetermine the damage inflicted on the enemy.

Thus, being the first type of a new generation of nuclear weapons -- the "H-bomb of the battlefield" -- the nuclear neutron weapon would only be the "summit of the iceberg". Its introduction into military arsenals could be used by the military and industrial complex as an argument for the subsequent deployment of other types of "specialized nuclear weapons" also.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Secondly, nuclear neutron weapons are planned to be stationed especially in Europe, a region of direct concern to my country. According to press reports on NATO plans, the introduction of nuclear neutron weapons should follow the deployment of such medium-range nuclear weapons as the Pershing 2 and land-based cruise missiles. It is intended that the territory of our western neighbour should become an area for the possible stationing of nuclear neutron weapons, thus enhancing the very high density of nuclear weapons already existing there.

Whereas the ultimate responsibility for creating the nuclear neutron weapon lies with the nuclear weapon State concerned, i.e. the United States, it should not be overlooked that the States on whose territories these weapons are to be stationed also bear a special responsibility. As was emphasized by the delegations of Hungary and the German Democratic Republic in working paper CD/256, "it is up to the national authorities of non-nuclear-weapon States to take a sovereign decision on whether to accept nuclear weapons on their territories or not".

Thirdly, by lowering the nuclear threshold, nuclear neutron weapons are conceived to make a nuclear war feasible. They are part and parcel of American and NATO concepts of the waging of a limited nuclear war, e.g. in Europe. Thereby military planners praise such alleged "advantages" of nuclear neutron weapons as the following:

Their possible use very near to the front line, thus lowering the risk of damage for the troops of the country using those weapons;

Minor destruction at the battlefield, thus improving the possibilities for conventional forces to exploit the "advantage" of a tactical nuclear strike;

Better possibilities for putting nuclear weapons into action in an area where the density of population is very high etc.

**Actually, all these military considerations can be reduced to one aim: to wipe out the distinctions between nuclear and conventional weapons, thus making the unthinkable -- a nuclear war -- a conceivable instrument of military strategy and tactics, especially in the "European theatre".** But the question may arise: who gives those military planners full assurance that the use of nuclear neutron weapons will not lead to an all-out nuclear war? Not to mention the fact that for Europeans nuclear war is too dangerous a thing to be left to foreign decisions.

And by the way, the above-mentioned problems connected with nuclear neutron weapons are not limited only to Europe. Who will exclude the possibility that those military considerations may make nuclear neutron weapons very attractive to such régimes as those of South Africa and Israel? It stands to reason that this is a weapon par excellence for a would-be aggressor since its use would enable him to annihilate human beings and to take over intact material capabilities such as towns, factories and the like, after a relatively short time.

Guided by the above-mentioned dangerous implications of the development and production of nuclear neutron weapons, the German Democratic Republic, at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, sponsored resolution 36/92 K requesting the Committee on Disarmament to **start without delay** negotiations with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. It was very encouraging for us that this concern in New York and here in the Committee on Disarmament was and is being shared by many delegations.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Some delegations stressed in their statements that they regard the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons as an important and urgent task. On the other hand, they consider that this question should not be singled out from the over-all context of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. But bearing in mind the above-mentioned special features of the nuclear neutron weapon such an approach seems to be not convincing.

As far as the implementation of item 2 of our agenda is concerned, we deem it necessary to start with negotiations on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of nuclear weapons. Why could an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons not be a first step in this direction? Such an approach would provide appropriate conditions for the next stages of nuclear disarmament: the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction of stockpiles.

It has become obvious that actually the same nuclear-weapon countries which refused to accept the proposals to set up an ad hoc working group on item 2 also oppose negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons. Therefore my delegation asks you, Mr. Chairman, to include in your consultations on the proposals to create the appropriate organizational framework for such negotiations the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

My delegation believes that ad hoc working groups or other subsidiary bodies could be the appropriate instrument to start negotiations on item 2 as well as on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons. We have great doubts whether informal meetings will be the right means to bring us closer to a solution of these important questions.

Furthermore, we cannot share the view that the Committee on Disarmament is only a "forum for dealing with the interest in nuclear disarmament". At least, paragraph 50 of the Final Document as well as item 2 of our agenda are proof of the widespread interest in nuclear disarmament. The Committee should live up to its responsibilities. It should play a more active and effective role in nuclear disarmament.

As long ago as in 1979 the group of socialist countries expressed in document C/4 its conviction that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and that such negotiations should not be to the detriment of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on various aspects of the limitation of nuclear armaments, including strategic armaments.

It is also due to the absence of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests that the nuclear arms race is proceeding at an unprecedented pace, which has led to such developments as the nuclear neutron weapon. This process cannot be stopped either by a general discussion on CTB matters or by an abstract debate on verification of compliance with a CTBT. What is needed are true negotiations aimed at a quick elaboration and adoption of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In my statement of 25 February I analysed some ideas concerning our further dealing with item 1 put forward by delegations of the Western group. In that statement I expressed my delegation's grave doubts about ideas whose implementation would mean nothing other than "movement for the sake of movement", but no real CTB negotiations.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Recent developments in this Committee have reinforced our doubts. As in the past, we favour the establishment of an ad hoc working group to negotiate on a CTBT. It should be not merely a subsidiary organ for deliberations but a real negotiating body which should deal with all the issues connected with a CTBT. While we recognize the importance of verification, we believe that this question cannot be singled out and also that it cannot be considered in the abstract. In so believing, we are proceeding from the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament which in paragraph 31 clearly says that the "form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement". This means that, before considering aspects of verification we should be aware of what we are going to prohibit. Proceeding from this assumption, my delegation shares the considerations and doubts expressed by the distinguished representatives of Brazil, Cuba and Pakistan on 16 March 1982 and today, who stressed the link between the substance of a CTBT, i.e. the scope of prohibition, and verification measures.

As long as a CTB is regarded by some nuclear-weapon countries only as a "long-term objective", there is the real danger that a singled-out verification debate could only serve to camouflage the lack of political will to achieve and implement a CTB.

This, by the way, is by no means a new discovery made by my delegation. The history of disarmament negotiations since the Second World War provides sufficient proof that unjustified verification demands have very often been used for the purpose of blocking progress in the negotiations concerned. We have sometimes seen attempts to convert negotiations on disarmament into negotiations or discussions on verification.

Before concluding, allow me, Mr. Chairman, to touch upon the statement made by the United Kingdom delegation on 11 March. We were told that, on the one hand, the trilateral negotiations were useful in clarifying many issues of a CTBT. On the other hand, the view was expressed that "for the present, no further progress can be expected in the trilateral talks". Since this problem is closely connected with our work in the Committee on Disarmament concerning item 1, my delegation is very interested in hearing the reasons for this assumption. In the same way we would like to know why the United States delegation, while proposing a discussion on CTB verification considers that negotiation on an agreement on item 1 "may not be propitious at the time".

On 16 March my delegation tabled in working paper CD/259, a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1. The purpose of the proposed mandate is twofold: (a) to have real negotiations; and (b) to have negotiations on all aspects of a CTBT.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Lidgard.



Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Swedish delegation I wish to introduce document CD/260 containing a progress report from the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I want to draw your attention to the fact that the progress report this time contains an overview summary of the achievements to date of the Ad Hoc Group. The purpose of that summary is to be of assistance to the Committee on Disarmament in its reporting to the second special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament.

The overview summary contains several paragraphs describing the envisaged co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events, essentially by exchanging data from a world-wide network of seismological stations by means of the global telecommunications system belonging to the World Meteorological Organization and analysing them in international data centres, so as to assist States in their national evaluation of seismic events under a complete test ban. Details about the envisaged measures are to be found in documents CCD/558 and CD/43.

The summary report also deals with the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group to develop the scientific and technical aspects of the proposed system by the inclusion of the latest scientific and technological developments relevant to the matter. Several countries have made significant contributions through extensive national investigations. Concerning the matter of international data centres, these investigations resulted in increased understanding of their operation. The world-wide exchange of data has been tested in co-operation with WMO, involving active participation by altogether 20 countries. The test was led by Mr. MacGregor of Australia and Mr. Ichikawa of Japan, to whom my delegation has a special reason to express its thanks, as it was the Swedish delegation that originally proposed the data exchange system, as long ago as in 1965.

The recent efforts of the Group to modernize the proposed system are not yet concluded, as indicated in the last paragraph of the summary report. The group has therefore proposed that it should hold another session, this coming summer, namely, from 9 to 20 August.

Mr. Chairman, I propose formally that the Committee on Disarmament takes note of the progress report contained in document CD/260.

I further want to state that the Ad Hoc Group would be much helped in its endeavours to reach consensus on a proposal for a modernized data exchange system if its present mandate, of 7 August 1979, were amended correspondingly or if an improved understanding of the present mandate could be reached.

Finally, I want to say that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. Ulf Eriasson of Sweden, is prepared to explain the report to us in more detail, as has been our custom in the past.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I understood that we were to hear from Dr. Ericsson first, and would prefer to make my remarks at the conclusion of his presentation.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): In that case, I should like to ask Dr. Ericsson if he would like to make a statement or to reply to any questions members of the Committee may have on the subject of the report.

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): Thank you Sir. Ladies and gentlemen, document CD/260 is a progress report in the customary fashion, to the Committee on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. This time, the meeting was attended by scientists from 27 co-operating States, five of them not members of the Committee, and we also again enjoyed the co-operation of a representative from the World Meteorological Organization. In paragraph 10 of the progress report, it is stated that the report has an appendix which is an overview summary of its work up to March 1982. That appendix is intended to assist the Committee on Disarmament in its reporting to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament. If you turn your attention to the first page of the annex to document CD/260, you will find a number of paragraphs which outline the history and the structure of the data exchange which has been proposed and, I think, widely accepted, to assist States in their national endeavours to monitor a complete nuclear test ban.

The data exchange proposed consists of a global system with three main elements: first, a network of more than 50 existing or planned seismological stations, including equipment and up-graded procedures for the extraction of data; secondly, an international exchange of data from those stations, over the global telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization, and thirdly, a processing of the data at special international data centres for the use of participant States. I may say that the clearly understood purpose here is that these international data centres would only prepare the data for national assessments as to the nature of the observed events.

The Group has made several observations about this proposed system. One which I think is very important is the desirability of increasing the number of observatories in the southern hemisphere and also generally providing such observatories with modern equipment for what is called digital recording. The data to be extracted from the earth and transmitted in the fashion indicated to participating States would be on two levels of detail. Level 1 would be basic parameters, that is, brief descriptions of the observations. The second level would be rather detailed descriptions of what has been recorded, in fact, whole records. In the system originally proposed, and I think widely accepted, the global exchange would be of level 1 data, of the brief description of events. And for this purpose WMO has very kindly given its preliminary acceptance of such a scheme. It is also foreseen that the system envisaged would exchange complete records, on request. The proposed international data centres would have the purpose of providing States with easily accessible data on seismic events for the national assessment of those events by the participating States. The international data centres would not themselves assess the nature of the events. They would, however, be expected to provide quite a lot of details of the mathematical treatment of the data, so as to make them easily understandable to the human mind.

(Mr. Ericsson, Chairman of the  
Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

What I have described now is essentially the content of the consensus reports CCD/558 and CD/43 which were submitted a few years ago. Since then, the Group has devoted itself essentially to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of this proposed global system. This has been done by means of national investigations, a few of them of considerable volume and impact on the matter. Among them, a variety of scientific methods for the analysis of the data have been studied and developed. The conditions for reliable data exchange through the WMO system have been studied in two global experiments, the last one last year engaging not less than 20 participating States. As a result of that experiment, these conditions are still under study and certainly need additional investigation. The details of how to operate data centres have been developed by vast and, I think, very efficient efforts by participating States. In summary, the impact of the now very fast development of computer and telecommunication technology has made itself felt, strongly suggesting that the efficiency of the global exchange system as envisaged in the reports which I mentioned could, in principle, be greatly increased by the adoption of these new methods and technical possibilities. The extent of consensus in the Group about these new developments has, however, not yet been established and therefore, suggestions from the Group as to how the original proposal about the global system for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events might be improved in the light of recent scientific and technological progress would have to wait for some further efforts by the Ad Hoc Group. I might add that I would be very glad to answer questions on this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I now give the floor, if he so wishes, to the representative of the United States, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I have listened with great interest to the report of Dr. Ericsson on the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. My delegation agrees that the Committee should take note of this report. My delegation also agrees that the "Overview summary" of this report, contained in its annex, should be used in reporting on the work of our Committee to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament. My delegation does, however, have some concerns about the report, and I would like to make a few comments and direct a question to Dr. Ericsson.

First, the United States experts who participated in the thirteenth session of the Group have reported to me that they have not discerned any notable degree of disarmament among those experts who participated in the meetings with regard to matters of a purely scientific nature. I think that this is an important point for us to recognize. On the one hand it is encouraging, but at the same time it gives rise to questions as to why the report is so brief.

I am also encouraged regarding the recent second global experiment carried out by participants in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. In this experiment the conditions for the reliable exchange of seismic data, using the global telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization, were studied. Twenty States, with broad geographical distribution, participated in this experiment. My delegation looks forward to the continuation of such investigations, and in fact has made a proposal to this effect in the Group of Scientific Experts in co-operation with Australia, Japan and Sweden.

A number of participating States in the Group of Scientific Experts, including my own, have brought before the Group information and technology which represent significant advances beyond those available for the earlier work and reports of

(Mr. Fields, United States)

this Group. In this regard I wonder if I might address a question to Dr. Ericsson. Having reviewed the progress report which we have before us, I have been somewhat at a loss to find reflected in it adequate indication that the Group received and discussed new information, except for brief citations such as that in paragraph 10 of the "Overview summary". Yet my delegation knows this information was presented and discussed in detail. Perhaps Dr. Ericsson would be good enough to elaborate a little on why this aspect of the Committee's work is not more fully reflected in the report.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. I still have on my list of speakers the representatives of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. It would perhaps be preferable to give them the floor before asking Dr. Ericsson to reply, so that he can take into account all the questions put to him by delegations.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): In view of the hour I will be very brief. I wanted to express the appreciation of my delegation for Dr. Ericsson's presence here today and for the important role he has played in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I think all delegations are very much in his debt. We have read the overview summary with interest: my delegation naturally needs some time to assess fully, with the help of appropriate advice at home, the progress that the Group has made, and I am not in a position to make more than preliminary comments today. It does seem, however, that even if there were some differences of interpretation over the purpose of the experiment and the way in which it was carried out, in recent months, the experimental exchange of data was in many ways successful and provides further useful experience on which we can build. Such experiments of course place very heavy demands on all our resources and on the individual scientific experts who take part in the countries involved. I am sure that all delegations here agree that it is important to do everything possible to enable all those countries that have taken part to derive the maximum benefit at the most economic cost in running these experiments. If it appears that the present mandate of the Group is too restrictive, and is hindering the achievement of the goals which have been set, then my delegation would certainly be prepared to consider an expansion or modification of the present mandate.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation has also listened with great interest to Dr. Ericsson's oral report on the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and is grateful to him. It has also carefully studied the Group's own progress report. My delegation is pleased to take note of the progress report. However, while it contains valuable material for consideration by the Committee, I must share the regrets of some other delegations that the Group has not been in a position to adopt a more comprehensive report on the basis of the draft before it, and that the wealth of new advanced information presented and examined in the Group's proceedings is not fully reflected in the progress report. It is today generally acknowledged that new and in part revolutionary technical developments may offer further possibilities for the Group's work, and my delegation is therefore somewhat at a loss to understand why the information concerning it should be cut out. We also regret that the discussion about the broader mandate of the Group has so far remained inconclusive.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

On a different subject, Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me -- I noted a reference by one delegation to certain arms policies proposals put forward some days ago by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, Mr. Brezhnev. In order to give delegations a more comprehensive view of the significance of these proposals, I have taken the liberty of making available to delegations in an informal manner the text of a brief statement reflecting my Government's positions on these proposals.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. May I ask Dr. Ericsson if he wishes to reply to the questions put to him by some members of the Committee?

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): The scientists, on the basis of national investigations, presented a number of new results, taking into account recent developments in science as I indicated earlier, brought about largely by themselves; also taking into account developments in communication technology, which is made available nowadays at an ever-increasing speed. There was no disagreement about the so-called scientific content of these presentations. It has, however, been difficult, and in fact so far not possible, to reach a consensus about how these new developments, and the new possibilities which obviously are a consequence of those developments, should be brought into relation to the material which we have in the reports CCD/558 and CD/43. We have not yet found language describing the relationship between these two materials in a way which is agreeable or acceptable to everyone in the Group. It is, as indicated by several distinguished delegates here, very much a matter of the interpretation of the mandate of the Group. Some feel that the mandate restricts the Group to consider modern developments and amendments, improvements -- to something which is essentially within the framework of the original proposal. Others interpret the same mandate as giving considerable lee-way in introducing also proposals for fundamental changes in the system. So, it is very much a matter of interpretation of the mandate and therefore, I think, to a large extent, a matter outside the competence of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. In order to describe this in somewhat more realistic terms -- less general terms -- I indicated to you a while ago that there would be a planned exchange of level 2 data, meaning whole seismological records from the designated seismological stations taking part in the data exchange. This can now be done very quickly and effectively by using modern communication technology and, once the investments are made, the cost of communication is very low. That would ease the effort needed also to put the complete records into the compilations at the international data centre, thus improving the power of analysis there, to my understanding, very considerably. The reports in document CCD/558 and CD/43 clearly said that the calculations in that data centre should be concerned only with the level 1 data, and that the level 2 data -- the whole record -- should merely be transported through the data centres to the interested parties. This is the technical description of what has been debated in great detail by the scientists and, as I said, it is very much a matter of how the present mandate is read and understood and therefore, it is to my understanding very much a matter outside the range of competence of the Group of Scientific Experts to decide how to go forward from this point.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Dr. Ericsson for his statement. Before giving the floor to the representatives who have asked for it, those of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, I should like to remind members of the Committee that they will, as I said at the beginning of the meeting, have an

(The Chairman)

opportunity to continue this discussion at one of our future meetings, at which we shall also take whatever decisions are necessary with respect to the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I think it would be helpful, in the light of what we have heard today from the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, to recall the terms of reference of the mandate under which the Group is operating, and under which my delegation had anticipated a rather fuller report than the progress report with which the Group has provided us today. This mandate specifies that the work of the Group should include "further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system" envisaged for use in international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. In the view of my delegation, this instruction clearly provides guidance to the Group to avail itself of the latest developments in the fields of seismology, data processing and communications, in order that the international exchange of seismic data might be as efficient and as productive as possible. If this is in question, then this Committee should discuss the matter. The objections of some delegations to the use of the available technology have the effect of imposing artificial filters on the exchange of data, and clearly hamper the work of the Group. My delegation is deeply concerned about this. I hope that it will be possible for the Group of Scientific Experts, in their efforts between now and their next meeting envisioned for this summer, to work closely together on the basis of bringing into their third report to this Committee a full treatment of these developments. A number of States which have been participating in the work of the Group have invested a considerable amount of time and of money with a view to making this system the best available. The United States has supported these efforts, and, as I have stated before this Committee in my address on 25 February, will continue to do so, so long as these efforts are useful. It is our firm view that they are and should continue to be so.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should also like to express the gratitude of the Soviet delegation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Mr. Ericsson, for the useful work which has been done. We have no objection to taking note of the report but would like to make an observation about the organization of the work of the Committee, in particular as regards the discussion of this report. The question, as is clear from the statements of a number of delegations, is one of considerable importance to them and, obviously, to others. For some reason we began discussing this report at 10 minutes to one, and as a result the discussion has been rather hasty and unsatisfactory. I would earnestly request that for the future, provision should be made in the Committee's plan of work for the discussion of the report so that, like some of my neighbours, we can have behind us our experts who can give us information on certain questions which have now arisen in their absence, a situation which is in my view not only inefficient but also even not entirely ethical. It is obvious, therefore, that in the future we must arrange for the discussion of the report on this subject to be held on a specified date and not in this hurried, truncated way, and more particularly not in an emotional fashion, but seriously, and with the participation of experts. We shall clearly have to revert to this subject. I have heard certain reservations and comments being made, but frankly I did not altogether understand for whom they were intended.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union. I have taken good note of his statement and I repeat that the Committee can at its next plenary meeting, if it so wishes, consider and discuss the report further. If there are no other comments in this connection, I should like — and I am trying to interpret the feelings of the Committee — to thank Dr. Ericsson very warmly for his participation in this meeting and for the effective, competent and balanced way in which he has been carrying out his delicate task as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

The secretariat has circulated among you today, at my request, an informal document containing a time-table for the meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies next week. As usual, this is purely indicative, and can be amended later, if necessary, in accordance with the requirements of our work. I should like to give the Committee some explanations about certain items in the time-table. A short informal meeting could be held on Tuesday, after our plenary meeting, to enable Ambassador Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, to make a statement with respect to documentation and other matters in suspense on which the Committee will later have to take a decision.

It is suggested that on Friday afternoon, 26 March, we hold an informal meeting on the question of methods for the consideration of the composition of the Committee, which would be followed by a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, as requested by the Chairman of that Group. As you may recall, I had suggested that the first informal meeting on item 7 of the agenda, entitled, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", should be held on 26 March, but since that date will be devoted to the problem of the composition of the Committee, I suggest the date 30 March for the first informal meeting on item 7, leaving the date of the second informal meeting on that subject to be announced later.

I am glad to be able to inform the Committee that — although up to now we have tried to avoid having simultaneous meetings on our time-table — in view of the increased pressure of our work, the secretariat has been able to arrange for the Committee to have at its disposal, as from next week, if the need arises, a further conference room with full interpretation service.

If there are no objections, I shall consider that the Committee agrees to this time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I should like to inform the Committee that I have had informal consultations on the subject of a drafting group to formulate the mandate of a possible subsidiary body on item 1 of our agenda. As a result of my consultation I have come to the conclusion that there is agreement on the establishment of a drafting group consisting of Brazil, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, Nigeria, the United States of America and Yugoslavia. As is the custom of the Committee, the meetings of the drafting group will be open to other members of the Committee.

(The Chairman)

The drafting group will hold its first meeting, under my chairmanship, tomorrow, Friday, 19 March, at 11 a.m. in the conference room on the sixth floor.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has asked me to announce that the contact group on measures will meet this afternoon at 3.30 in conference room No. I, and that the meeting of the Working Group will begin at 5 o'clock this afternoon, here in the Council Chamber.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 23 March, at 10 a.m. because we already have a long list of speakers. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.



FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH PLEBARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 23 March 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario Alessi

(Italy)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI  
Mr. MAACHI  
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mrs. S. FREEMAN

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE  
Miss de CLERQ

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. GRINBERG  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV  
Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER  
Mr. E.B. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG  
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA  
Mr. J.L. GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Egypt:

Mr. El-S.A.R. EL REEDY  
Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY  
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE  
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGER

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN  
Mr. S. SARAN  
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. B. MAUNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. A. BAHRIN  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI  
Mr. R. di CARLO

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. van DONGEN  
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS  
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AKRAM  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. ZAWALONKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN  
Mr. S. KONIK  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. V.A. EDVOKOUSHIN  
Mr. M.M. IPFOLITOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO  
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV  
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. D. GILMOOR  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M. BUSBY  
Ms S.F. BURK  
Ms K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Mr. C. BAY

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. V. VOJVODIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVE

Switzerland:

Mr. PICTET

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 165th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee today begins consideration of item 4 of its agenda, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, the United Kingdom, Poland, Nigeria, Romania, Kenya and Switzerland.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Today this Committee takes up item 4 of its agenda -- the prohibition of chemical weapons. There is no need to elaborate on the necessity and importance of a ban on chemical weapons. This was done time and again here in Geneva during the 1960s and 1970s. There is at least one historical analogy: as at the beginning of the 1970s, we seem to be again at a crossroads. Owing to the attitude of some Western powers, the only result 20 years ago was the Biological Weapons Convention, while no comprehensive ban on biological and chemical weapons was achieved. Today, having to choose between the binary route and the chemical disarmament route, one important Western power has embarked upon the first one. It is planned to spend billions of dollars on starting the production of a new generation of chemical weapons. After years of hope, we seem to be now on the brink of a new arms race which will seriously affect disarmament negotiations. Now, it is only too obvious that the aim of a slanderous campaign on the alleged use of chemical weapons carried out during recent years was to prepare the climate for a new turn in the arms spiral.

The production of a new generation of chemical weapons is part and parcel of the so-called rearmament process initiated some years ago by the United States. Actually, after medium-range missiles such as the Pershing 2 and land-based cruise missiles, and nuclear neutron weapons, binary weapons are the third step in this programme. These up to now three components of the rearmament programme of NATO seem to have at least one thing in common: whereas these weapons are to be produced beyond the Atlantic Ocean, it is planned to deploy them in western Europe. Not to mention that the implementation of ideas to equip long-range cruise missiles with binary munitions would add a new dimension to chemical warfare.

Already today, military planners leave no doubt that the storing of binary weapons on the territory of its producer country would be of little utility. There are plans to deploy these dangerous weapons as near as possible to the future "theatre of chemical warfare", i.e. central Europe. Projects for the stationing of these weapons in the western neighbourhood of the German Democratic Republic are of immediate concern to my country.

It is not difficult to foresee the devastating results the use of these chemical weapons would have in densely populated central Europe. Therefore it is only too understandable that not only the broad masses of the people but also some Western Governments reject United States plans to deploy new chemical weapons on their territories.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Let nobody be deceived by arguments alleging that binary weapons are "normal" chemical weapons to be treated on a "business as usual" way. The opposite is true. The production and deployment of binary weapons is fraught with negative implications for disarmament negotiations.

In working paper CD/253, the delegations of seven socialist countries, among them that of the German Democratic Republic, substantiated the assessment that binary weapons will create a new situation with regard to our work. Especially two aspects of binary weapons seem to be relevant in this regard:

Firstly, some special properties appear to make binary weapons very attractive to military planners and to enhance the general interest in chemical weapons, which facts tend to fuel the arms build-up. And nobody really knows what is still in "Pandora's box".

As far as the "advantages" of binaries are concerned which make them so attractive to the military and industrial complex in some countries, we see the easier handling of these weapons, the increasing number of poisons which can potentially be used for chemical warfare, the lower costs of producing, storing and transporting binary weapons, and others.

Secondly, the production of binary weapons is likely to undermine the search for a chemical weapons agreement since it complicates or even foils the elaboration of adequate verification techniques. Thus, with regard to verification, a completely new situation has emerged with the development and production of binary chemical weapons. Already some years ago, responsible scientists had emphasized this aspect. In 1975 the SIPRI publication Chemical disarmament - new weapons for old stated that "binary weapons are, in effect, miniaturized nerve-gas production plants. The problems which they represent for verification are therefore analogous to those of moth-balled nerve-gas factories, with the important exception that their locations are unlikely to be detectable by any form of extra-territorial surveillance. Most of the verification procedures which have so far been proposed will thus have great difficulty in establishing whether binaries do or do not exist within a particular country. The appearance of binaries has therefore had the consequence of removing much of the value from existing verification studies; it has necessitated an expansion of these studies into areas that have not been extensively explored". Unfortunately, at the time when binary weapons were still in the developmental stage, the chance for precluding their full-scale production was missed because of only too well-known reasons. Today, as in other cases, too, we have to note that the military use of the latest achievements of science and technology has outpaced our negotiations in which we are trying to find solutions for ageing weapons. These solutions are likely to be rendered meaningless by the production and deployment of binary weapons.

This process must be stopped. While continuing our negotiations on a multilateral chemical weapons convention as a matter of high priority, we should explore other possibilities as well which could contribute to an early halt to the chemical arms race.

Of special importance in this regard is the appeal contained in resolution 36/96 B of the United Nations General Assembly. This resolution called upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the



(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

prohibition of chemical weapons. States should specifically refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where such weapons do not exist at present.

The implementation of this appeal would, without doubt, promote our efforts here in the Committee on Disarmament to deal with all aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

During recent years, considerable progress has been achieved in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. As a result of the able guidance of this group by its previous chairmen, Ambassador Sujka of Poland is now in a position to build upon the "Elements" elaborated in the past. We welcome and support his efforts to achieve a new quality in the work of the Group. We believe it is time to proceed, in accordance with the mandate, to actual drafting. The above-mentioned Elements as well as proposals concerning the scope of prohibition tabled in recent weeks by different delegations provide a sound basis for this. This endeavour should not be hampered by differences of opinion with regard to some questions. Moreover, all efforts should be made to arrive at reasonable compromise formulas.

This applies to verification provisions as well. Sometimes we hear arguments that the socialist countries are not interested in real verification measures and are only prepared to accept measures of "self-control". To the contrary, as regards verification of compliance with a future chemical weapons convention, we contemplate a variety of different methods and procedures, the core of which consists of the following three main elements:

Firstly, a national verification system. It is our belief that it is in the first instance up to the States parties themselves to enforce the obligations undertaken internationally on their own national territories and also to give some assurance to other parties that these obligations are being complied with. No international organization can relieve a State party of this obligation. In the German Democratic Republic, the chemical industry is centrally planned and managed. This provides excellent conditions for our Government to ensure compliance with a chemical weapons convention by all chemical enterprises.

The establishment of a national control system is, of course, the prerogative of the countries concerned. But this should not prevent us from introducing some recommendations about such a system in a chemical weapons convention. It was satisfactory to my delegation that our ideas in this connection found their reflection in the Elements drafted under the guidance of Ambassador Lidgard last year. At the same time, we cannot but deplore the fact that in working paper CD/244 tabled by the United Kingdom delegation, virtually no role has been envisaged for a national verification system.

Secondly, national technical means of verification could play a useful role in monitoring compliance with a chemical weapons ban. These means should be used in accordance with the generally recognized principles of international law.

A great body of interesting data and assessments has been assembled in many working papers tabled over the years in this Committee and its predecessors. These papers show the great verification potential inherent in national technical means. Here I would only like to draw your attention to working papers CCD/371 and CCD/502 tabled by the United Kingdom, CCD/533 by the Netherlands, CCD/538 and CCD/539 by the USSR and CCD/344 and CCD/577 by Finland. So, in United Kingdom document CCD/502 it

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

was stated that once a reliable indication of an infringement of a convention had been obtained by national technical means, then a case for on-site inspection would be greatly strengthened.

Thirdly, we envisage an international complaints procedure involving a consultative committee, certain international procedures of consultation and co-operation within the United Nations, and the Security Council. To establish the actual state of affairs in case of suspicion concerning compliance with the convention, relevant information might be requested and some form of verification by challenge could be used. In general, parties could exchange different kinds of data necessary for assessing compliance with the convention by other parties.

In view of the character of the modern chemical industry, regular and permanent international on-site inspections can only very marginally add to the effectiveness of a verification system. But they would be connected with serious political, economic, technical and financial problems which would more than outweigh their limited value. This concern was very eloquently stated in the Committee on Disarmament three years ago by the former Australian representative, Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll, whom I would like to quote:

"Problems of verification arise in acute forms because so much of chemical capacity and of chemicals themselves can be used for different purposes. There are going to be limitations on the value of inspection. To inspect all chemical productive capacity would involve a whole army of people -- an enormous number of people. The problems of preserving industrial secrets, commercial secrets as well as security secrets, are very considerable. One has to ask oneself how detailed an inspection is going to be justifiable either in results or in cost, because it is not just production that will have to be looked at, it is also the ultimate use. Chemicals can be stored perhaps for years and then be available for use in chemical weapons." (CD/PV.44, p. 20)

On the other hand, it is difficult to agree with the conclusion of Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll that it would take years to work out all these things. This approach as well as the approach that the verification means should determine the scope of prohibition would endlessly postpone the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

In the same way we have to recognize the problems stressed in 1978 by the former representative of Japan, Ambassador Ogiso, who stated that "since the threshold to be applied to chemical agents to be banned and verification procedures for dual-purpose agents involve technical, specialized and complicated problems, each country is concerned over the strong possibility that such verification procedures may obtrude upon its chemical industries for peaceful uses, and therefore needs to conduct detailed examinations in relation to national laws and regulations". (CCD/PV.801, pp. 25-26)

Having these problems in mind, one may ask if the private corporations of some States asking for intrusive international inspection are ready to accept these controls. The Canadian document CD/167 provides a useful analysis of the pros and cons of several verification methods. This document, in our judgement, very much shows the advantages of a verification system based on a combination of the three main elements listed above.

I think the whole complex of verification methods available and possible, ranging from national control to some international verification by challenge,

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

provides a high degree of assurance that a violation of a chemical weapons convention could be detected. It is highly doubtful that a militarily important violation could be concealed. So, we should be very reasonable and not lose ourselves in a labyrinth of technical details, forgetting about our ultimate aim in this regard -- a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons containing adequate procedures for verification of compliance with it.

Before concluding my statement allow me, Mr. Chairman, some general remarks concerning verification. Certain representatives, particularly from Western countries, this year again have come out with ideas to put more emphasis on consideration of the so-called verification question. In this connection we have again witnessed in this hall attempts to misinterpret the stand of socialist countries towards verification of compliance with agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. It has been alleged that socialist countries underrated verification, and were even not ready to join far-reaching verification measures. As a matter of fact, we are no less than other countries interested in verification. The basic principles of our approach to these questions were clearly outlined here on 31 March 1981 by the representative of the USSR, Ambassador V. Issraelyan. This approach is fully based on the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which in paragraph 31 and other parts contains clear provisions on verification. We also agree with the view of the Indian delegation reflected in working paper CD/209 "that it would be wrong to make a fetish of verification. It would be equally wrong to devise or establish a machinery of controls in the absence of genuine measures of arms limitation or disarmament. To do that would be like putting the cart before the horse. There can be no merit, either, in sterile and abstract discussions of the complexities of verification issues, kinds of verification régimes, or in stressing the need for some kind of an international verification organization, without reference to any concrete measure of real disarmament or serious arms limitation".

Yet it is just this clear relationship between disarmament and verification measures which was neglected in recent statements about "far-reaching verification measures". Actually we were told a lot about "balanced agreements", "transparency" and confidence-building measures, but virtually nothing was said about real disarmament measures. We subscribe to the view stated in the above-mentioned Indian working paper that "it is universally recognized that strong political will is a prerequisite to reaching agreement on any significant or meaningful measure in the field of disarmament. Once such political will has been built up, it will not be difficult, and certainly not beyond human ingenuity, to devise controls appropriate to any requirement in the field of disarmament, no matter how complex it may be".

Let me briefly raise two further political questions closely connected with verification.

Firstly, we proceed from the conviction that it should be the objective of verification measures to provide assurance that the corresponding agreement is observed by all parties, thus enhancing confidence in the agreement and attracting other States to adhere to it.

On the other hand, a certain minimum of confidence is necessary as a basis for devising an effective verification system. Thus, it was not by chance that in the 1970s when détente prevailed, satisfactory solutions to some verification problems were found. Then all parties agreed that these procedures worked well.

In recent years we have heard accusations concerning the compliance of socialist States with certain agreements on arms limitation. It is difficult

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

to see how the picture should have changed in some years' time. Moreover, one may ask if these accusations just conceal the intention to call into doubt the usefulness of curbing the arms race by mutual agreement.

In general we proceed from the conviction that normal relations between States based on détente and recognition of mutual interest are very conducive to the elaboration of reliable verification procedures, whereas a policy aggravating international tension and enhancing suspicion is not likely to promote the agreement on far-reaching verification measures. Can verification under these circumstances really be a substitute for trust? Furthermore, in discussing verification questions, should we not also take into account the international law of treaties? Why should a given country enter into a disarmament agreement if it intends to violate it? Why should a party violate a certain agreement, thus risking its international credibility, if it could easily withdraw from it, using the relevant treaty provisions?

Secondly, it is obvious that verification capabilities are in a continuous race with changing military technology which by such features as miniaturization, mobility, deployment methods and so on undercut the possibilities for making special disarmament measures verifiable. One may cite such examples as land- and sea-based cruise missiles, certain plans for MX deployment, binary weapons and other systems. For example, land-based cruise missiles resist verification as the launchers are small and mobile. In this regard one may agree with John Newhouse, a former Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who wrote that "there is no need for such weapons. They may very well give the arms competition another dimension. Once deployed, there will be no reliable way for the other side to count them. The Administration says it will deploy several hundred cruise missiles. If the Soviets said the same thing, one would assume eventual deployment of thousands". It should be quite clear that such weapon developments as cruise missiles threaten to undermine the very basis for disarmament talks -- a fact which was so eloquently described here by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, some weeks ago. The example of the cruise missiles shows that the protagonists of the qualitative arms race and of "far-reaching" verification measures are identical. It is difficult to understand how one can, on the one hand, reduce international confidence by creating new and unverifiable weapon systems and, on the other hand, demand "effective" verification measures rendered impossible by the foregoing. Furthermore, here again there is an attempt as usual to apply a double standard in verification questions: whereas socialist countries could not be trusted, the insinuation is that one's own trustworthiness is always out of the question.

Let me summarize our views on verification: the German Democratic Republic, like other socialist countries, stands for strict verification of compliance with concrete measures in the disarmament field. Verification measures should enhance confidence in those agreements, thereby promoting the disarmament process. In this sense my delegation is ready to play an active and constructive part in the elaboration of verification measures connected with concrete steps of arms limitation and disarmament. But the Committee on Disarmament should not be involved in an abstract verification discussion diverting its attention from substantive disarmament problems.

Mr. SUITTERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, my remarks this morning will be chiefly directed to item 4 of our agenda, namely, Chemical weapons. But I wish, however, first to refer briefly to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, that is, a Nuclear test ban and the Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

When I spoke in the Committee on 11 March, I welcomed the announcement by the United States delegation that it would be prepared to join in a consensus to set up a subsidiary body to study issues connected with a nuclear test ban. Since that time a number of delegations have sought clarification on a number of aspects of my own delegation's position. The questions which have been put to us merit a considered response, and I hope that the delegations concerned will understand when I say that I do not feel that it would be appropriate to attempt to answer them in detail today while the mandate for the subsidiary body is still under negotiation. As I said on 11 March, my delegation hopes that we can proceed rapidly to reach agreement on a mandate for a working group -- or whatever other form of subsidiary body may be acceptable to the Committee -- in order that it can begin functioning without delay. Having entrusted you, Mr. Chairman, and a number of our colleagues with the formulation of a mandate, I also believe that it would be inappropriate for me today to make a detailed statement concerning the position of my delegation on these matters.

However, these considerations need not prevent me from responding to the distinguished representative of India by saying that we do indeed recognize that the vital security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States are affected by matters relating to nuclear weapons and that we do indeed sympathize with and even share many of these concerns. The Committee on Disarmament provides an important forum in which the views of the non-nuclear-weapon States can be made known. But as CD/180, the document prepared by the Group of 21 to which the distinguished representative of India referred, itself acknowledges, "the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility". It is for that reason that I said in my statement of 11 February that my Government attaches the highest importance to progress in negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on limiting intermediate nuclear forces and that we also looked forward to the opening of the strategic arms reduction talks. We hope that progress in these talks will lead to progress in other areas of arms control endeavour in which the work of this Committee should figure substantially.

Turning now to the subject of chemical weapons, upon which the Committee has just concluded a week of intensive consultations, I intend to look at some issues which have come up during the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group, and in the meetings of chemical weapons experts. This pragmatic approach seems to be the appropriate one at the stage when we have started work on the elaboration of a convention.

I should like first to look at the work under way in the Ad Hoc Working Group under Ambassador Sujka's chairmanship and to consider how we envisage the work of the Group developing in the next few weeks before our spring session comes to a close. My delegation accepts and indeed welcomes the working method which has been adopted in the Group by Ambassador Sujka, namely, that delegations should attempt to put their views on particular points into concrete terms in the shape of draft elements. I believe that this is a good method for the stage which we have now reached, since we have had ample opportunity in the last two years of the Working Group's life to hear the argumentation behind each delegation's point

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

of view; the next step is quite clearly to see how particular points might appear in a convention. I would note, however, that this work method led to some extent take delegations by surprise. I believe this was to be expected, since it is one thing to make a general statement, and another to turn it into precise treaty-type language. I do not, therefore, think that we should be discouraged by the relatively slow start of the work in the Group, and I believe that its last few meetings have begun to pick up speed as delegations have had more time to prepare the concrete contributions requested by the Chairman. This is a good sign, and my delegation looks forward to seeing further proposals for draft elements before the end of the spring session. If we can achieve this much, we shall have reason to be pleased with our work and we shall then be in a position, when the summer session begins, to analyse the various drafts put forward in order to identify the common ground which exists between them, and where further substantive discussion will be required before agreement can be reached.

In this connection I do not believe it would help the pace of the Group's work if it were to attempt to produce a substantive report before the end of April. Instead, we would support a brief report by the Chairman on the lines of that given by Ambassador Lidgard at the same point in the Committee's session last year. There will, of course, need to be a passage on chemical weapons in the Committee's special report to the United Nations General Assembly's special session on disarmament. The report of the Committee to the special session will in any case need to look back over the last four years. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, I think delegations will agree that there is cause for a positive assessment of the pace of work in those last four years, particularly since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group in 1980.

I should now like to turn briefly to the United Kingdom working paper on verification aspects of a chemical weapons treaty, circulated as CD/244 and as Working Paper 26 of the Working Group. I am very grateful to delegations for the many comments which they have made on this working paper, both in the Working Group and privately. I look forward to its further discussion in the remaining sessions of the Working Group devoted to verification. One point has emerged from the discussion of the United Kingdom paper which I think it might be helpful to respond to here. Many delegations clearly feel that the fact that a particular proposal or particular course of action has not been included in the draft elements contained in CD/244 means that my Government opposes that particular course of action or proposal. This is not the case. The purpose of CD/244 was to change somewhat the emphasis contained in the draft elements attached to last year's report of the Working Group, because my delegation does not believe that those elements give sufficient emphasis to international means of verification. My delegation is not opposed to the inclusion of additional language in the elements, for example, on national means of verification or on the collection and exchange of data and information under the convention, subject, of course, to the language being satisfactory. We would in fact welcome concrete proposals from other delegations to deal with these points. But we attach great importance to the balance between national and international measures of verification which we have described in CD/244.

I should also this morning like to make a few comments on the meetings of chemical weapons experts which were held last week. As always, the presence of technical expertise proved stimulating within the delegations, and helped us to focus

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

on the areas where further work is required before we can achieve a ban on chemical weapons. But I want to record a view which is perhaps shared by other delegations, that, at least initially, the meetings of the experts appeared to have lost some of the impetus with which they began their work last year. This was perhaps because the Working Group did not tell the experts clearly enough what was wanted from them. However, towards the end of the week the meetings picked up momentum again, and the Chairman's report which has just emerged shows a satisfying degree of progress towards finding solutions to some of the technical problems associated with toxicity determinations. In order to ensure that the meetings of experts continue to maintain this momentum, my delegation believes that the Working Group should consider very carefully the list of suggestions put forward last week for further work on the technical aspects of a chemical weapons convention and recorded in the Chairman's report. We believe that we have now reached the stage where it would be useful to widen the scope of the experts' meetings in order to examine issues other than those related to toxicity criteria. For example, it would be useful to have a discussion of the technical aspects of the most basic provision of a convention, namely, the destruction of stockpiles, and the verification of their destruction. As far as toxicity criteria are concerned, my delegation feels that the Ad Hoc Working Group will need to consider more carefully the specific purposes for which such criteria will be used in a chemical weapons convention before requesting the experts to look again at this question. I should like to record here my delegation's gratitude to Professor Rump of the Polish delegation for his endeavours as Chairman of the meetings of experts.

Finally, my delegation would like to comment on the concern expressed recently by a number of delegations that because toxic chemicals can be produced by the binary process, a new dimension has been added to our discussions. I think we should give this matter careful consideration before reaching any conclusion of this sort. It is clear that binary weapons will need to be dealt with in a chemical weapons convention because, in common with all other types of chemical weapons, their production and stockpiling will be prohibited. But we question whether by their nature binary weapons make problems of verification more difficult. The components of binary weapons must be chemically very highly reactive for them to be suitable for use in such weapons systems. If the materials to be used are chemically highly reactive, then storage problems for at least one of the precursors will be just as serious as for other chemical warfare agents, and such precursors will not be stored in large amounts for civilian use. A system of verification which included on-site inspections of a random sample of major chemical installations, such as the United Kingdom has proposed in CD/244, would thus be adequate to verify the non-production of binary weapons as well as of other types of chemical weapons. Thus the problems of verification of essential binary precursors will be similar to those of the verification of other lethal agents, and in fact less difficult than the problems of dual-purpose chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide. We must not allow imaginary problems associated with binary agents to cause an unnecessary diversion in our work on a chemical weapons convention.

We shall hope to contribute further thinking on this particularly important issue during the meetings of the Working Group.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, may I begin by offering you, on behalf of the delegation of Poland, our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March. Together with my congratulations and best wishes, I pledge to you, Mr. Chairman, the full co-operation and support of my delegation in the discharge of your duties.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express to Ambassador Mahallati of Iran the high appreciation of my delegation for the dedicated and competent way in which he chaired this Committee in February.

In a spirit of friendship and co-operation I welcome in this room our new colleagues, Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.

The Committee on Disarmament is considering during this week's plenary meetings item 4 of its agenda, that is, Chemical weapons. I would like to devote my intervention today mainly to this subject. But I also intend to touch upon item 1 of the agenda, in the light of the recent exchange of views on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament.

Resolutions 36/96 A and 36/96 B adopted during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations have been rightly interpreted in this Committee by many speakers as a growing demand on the part of the whole international community, conscious of the dangerous consequences of a new stage in the development of chemical weapons, to advance effectively the pace of negotiations on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

This Committee considered it wise and possible to commence the elaboration of a future convention this year. This task has been entrusted to the Ad Hoc Working Group re-established at the beginning of this session with a revised mandate, authorizing the Group "... to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives".

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has at its disposal the results of years-long bilateral and multilateral negotiations and discussions, countless working papers and draft provisions, elaborated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and now by the Committee itself. They have been brought to this negotiating table and they reflect the differing positions of the participating States. These include, inter alia, the results of the work on defining issues and structuring the basis for a future convention undertaken by the Working Group in 1980 under the effective leadership of Ambassador Okawa which are, in fact, formulated in document CD/220, that is, in the report of the Working Group on its work in 1981 under the skilled leadership of Ambassador Lidgard.

Document CD/220 contains the basic elements for a future convention, together with comments reflecting the differing views of individual delegations or groups of delegations on the shape and substance of the said elements. What is important is the fact that the specific dimensions of both the convergences and divergences of views on the form and contents of the chemical weapons convention's future provisions have thus been clearly outlined.



(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Starting its work this year under its new mandate, the Working Group has decided to continue and develop further the results achieved so far. The Group is aiming this year at translating the positions expressed in the comments contained in document CD/220 into the language of alternative elements or various versions of elements. The divergences expressed in such a way should lead to a narrowing of the gap in the positions of particular delegations or groups of delegations. I am of the opinion that the Working Group has not yet arrived at such a stage of negotiations, but I note with satisfaction that, so far, it has been actively engaged in a discussion of the organization of its work as well as in the detailed consideration of the scope of a future convention and the elaboration of alternative versions of the elements. Last week, considerable assistance to the Group was provided by consultations with experts in toxicology who managed to agree on their recommendations on standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations and for acute inhalation toxicity determinations.

My delegation wishes to express its conviction that the present organizational framework, as succinctly described above, meets the requirements of the present stage of negotiations in the Working Group under its new mandate. Furthermore, the progress and results of our activities in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons may depend on how soon and to what degree particular delegations will be able to clear up their positions, in particular, in questions where there are significant divergences.

It is the considered view of my delegation that the results of the work on a convention have significantly decreased in the absence of the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations. This comes to mind not only because of the importance of the last report from these negotiations published in document CD/112, but also, and perhaps particularly, because of the role these negotiations could play at present in finding possible solutions to very many controversial problems the Working Group has to deal with.

Of decisive importance for the future convention, and particularly for the acceleration of work on its elaboration, is a clear-cut line between what is only desirable and what is possible, real and necessary in this treaty. What we need is not the will of a perfectionist but a persevering effort towards the cessation, as soon as possible, of the dangerous chemical armaments race which, if not stopped, may lead to a further postponement, for many years, of any possibility of reaching a universally acceptable agreement. This view of my delegation makes me think of the following analogy: as the production and equipment of armed forces with neutron weapons mean a new dangerous spiral in the nuclear arms race, so the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons in the same way will inevitably lead to a new spiral in the chemical arms race. Let us be frank: here we speak about new generations of weapons of mass destruction, which increase

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

the danger of the outbreak of a war with the use of different types of weapons of mass destruction. To make it absolutely clear, I am of the opinion that we would be considerably closer to concluding the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons if no binary weapons existed. It seems to me that if this is the case we should conduct the negotiations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons more energetically, while it is not too late.

The questions which arise in this context and which should be given a clear and honest answer are, among others, these: what new problems and what kind of new problems do binary weapons create for our negotiations? Which elements of the future convention will be mostly affected by their emergence? These questions are justified particularly in the light of United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/96 B which in its paragraph 5, inter alia, "... calls upon all States to refrain from ... production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present". Moreover, and unfortunately, these questions are justified in the light of the decision on the production of binary weapons already taken by the United States Government. The emergence of these weapons in arsenals of other countries, after the aforementioned decision, may be only a question of time. This is why no effort should be spared by this Committee in negotiating, without any unnecessary delay, a convention which would ban, inter alia, the proliferation of binary weapons.

In our considered view, the emergence of binary systems will affect many crucial elements of the future convention, namely: its scope, prohibition of transfer, declarations of stocks, destruction and, above all, prohibition of their production and stockpiling.

It is important to point out that the deployment of binary weapons will complicate the already complicated and controversial problems of the verification of compliance with the provisions of the future convention. In fact, one cannot apply to binary weapons such verification methods as are based upon the extreme toxicity of the chemical agents used in traditional types of chemical weapons. All this, in a new way, raises the question of the verification of stocks and their destruction, and the question of control over the non-production of chemicals for chemical weapons.

Coming up to the question of their proliferation, we have no doubt that the production of binary weapons by one country makes possible their deployment on the territory of another country, precisely because of a considerable easiness in their transport, stockpiling and retaining. Secondly, in the case of binary weapons, there exist comparatively easy ways of transforming industrial production capabilities from peaceful purposes to warlike ones. These questions are discussed in document CD/258 of which Poland is co-author, and furthermore, in the questionnaire presented by the delegation of Bulgaria in document CD/CW/WP.29. My

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

delegation is of the opinion that replies to the questions touched upon in the said documents would facilitate bridging the gap which, in negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, has been created by the emergence of the binary systems. In fact, it is inconceivable to elaborate a convention which would not take into account all the consequences brought by binary weapons.

In the Working Group, we have examined in depth the questions concerning the scope of prohibition, aiming at further narrowing the differences. The Group, I have to stress, unfortunately has not managed to determine clearly the scope of prohibition. But I would like to come now to the question of verification. From the first round of discussions it can be said that a more reasonable approach seems to be emerging during this session. However, in our view, further discussion should concentrate more on the aspect of the adequacy of the verification system in relation to the sphere of prohibition. I think that there exists a somewhat artificial problem or certain misunderstanding in the discussions on verification. It is pointless to discuss whether national means of verification are better or more efficient than international mechanisms, and which ones are to be applied, because in fact both are needed. And the negotiations should go in both directions. Moreover, the negotiations should concentrate on methods and means of verification so that they can be adjusted to the contents and form of the prohibition. In other words, with three categories of chemical agents as spelled out in document CD/220, adequate forms of verification through national and international means should be applied to each of them in a differentiated but internally balanced and mutually interrelated system. This could be taken into account in our further discussions on verification.

As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, I would like now to touch upon another question which has been quite intensively discussed at the recent meetings of the Committee. I mean the declaration made by the United States delegation at the meeting of 11 March with respect to the establishment of "a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement".

As you know, somewhat earlier, to be precise on 9 February of this year, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow, stated the United States position on the question of a nuclear weapons tests prohibition. He stated: "... we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance". This statement shows that the United States refuses to study the question of the tests prohibition as an independent item, but rather links it with the "wide range of nuclear problems". At the same time, the United States flatly refuses to take any step towards multilateral negotiations on

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

the limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. In particular, the United States impedes the establishment of a working group on this question which the non-aligned and socialist States insist upon. The United States delegation in its statement of 11 March reaffirmed its negative position both in respect of a nuclear weapons test ban and with respect to the nuclear disarmament problem as a whole.

Thus, on the one hand, the United States expresses its readiness to discuss the matters of verification connected with a nuclear weapons test ban, and on the other, it excludes the possibility of concluding an agreement on this subject in the near future. In this connection, delegations have a number of questions. Our delegation would also like to ask some questions. The main question is: is there any reason to discuss matters of control if the possibility of concluding an agreement is being denied? If the United States delegation proposed starting the elaboration of an agreement on a nuclear test ban with questions of control, then maybe one could understand it (although not necessarily agree).

There is another question: matters of control of a nuclear test ban have been discussed for a quarter of a century in various bodies and in different forms; in what manner should the discussion of control questions differ from previous discussions of previous questions? Is it a fact that previously the discussions of control questions were carried out in connection with the need to conclude an appropriate agreement, and now the American side proposes to indulge in pure abstraction?

Finally, we would like to ask the United States delegation the following questions. Does it envisage discussing only the problems of control over a nuclear weapons test ban or also problems concerning peaceful nuclear explosions? What does it envisage doing with the question of the scope of prohibition? Is the American delegation going to initiate the discussion of this later? Or does it not see any necessity in it at all, since it denies the possibility of the conclusion of an agreement on this matter? Thus, we return to the point we started from: why discuss questions of control if there is no prospect of concluding an agreement?

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, His Excellency Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWIRE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, firstly, let me seize this opportunity to welcome our new Czechoslovak colleague, Ambassador Vejvoda, to this Committee. My delegation looks forward to working closely with him.

My intervention today will deal with some items on the Committee's annual agenda.

Item 3 of the Committee's agenda relates to "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and my delegation is particularly pleased to see my friend and neighbour, Ambassador Mansu Ahmad of Pakistan, as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject. His diplomatic skills will, we are confident, be an invaluable asset to the Working Group.

The numerous interventions made on item 3 have clearly demonstrated the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group needs to make more progress. My delegation shares this view. We believe that a situation in which the nuclear-weapon States continue to show reluctance either to undertake nuclear disarmament or even to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, as a first step towards halting the arms race, clearly makes the means of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear-weapon States of immediate concern. It is therefore a matter of serious concern for my delegation that for three years the negotiations in this Committee on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States have continued to reveal that the "specific difficulties relate to differing perceptions", and I would stress the security perceptions of some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Coupled with the problem of differing security perceptions, the negotiations had also to take account of the "complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a common formula acceptable to all, and which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". The present situation is surely not satisfactory, and the ball is squarely in the court of the nuclear-weapon States to enable the Ad Hoc Working Group to make the necessary progress.

What needs to be stressed to the nuclear-weapon States is that the strained international climate exacerbates the nuclear arms race, increasing the number of nuclear weapons in the territory of the nuclear-weapon States as well as on the territories of their respective allies, which in turn can only increase the fear entertained by non-nuclear-weapon States for their security. The non-nuclear-weapon States are all too well aware that a nuclear war will affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike in a catastrophic manner that defies imagination.

It is in this context that those States which have committed themselves to renouncing their sovereign right to the development, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons should be given binding and credible assurances by the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the victims of a nuclear attack or blackmail.

The problem of nuclear blackmail is real. The solemn declaration of African States of their intention to free their continent from nuclear weapons has been grossly undermined by the racist and terrorist régime in South Africa -- a country that has refused to append its signature to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

and has persistently threatened the security of African States and indeed that of the entire world. As my delegation has stated before, we would want to be assured that the far-reaching desire of African States to maintain their continent a nuclear-free area will be respected by all.

The nuclear-weapon States must go beyond mere declarations that adequate consideration needs to be given to the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. They must give credible and effective assurances of a legally binding nature. It is a fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States have made a sacrifice in the interest of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in order to ensure world peace and security. Their fundamental premise has been that a world free of nuclear weapons will be a more secure and stable world for all. But as long as this promise continues to be refuted by the nuclear-weapon States, then what my delegation stated on 5 March 1981 holds true, namely, that

"Security for all countries will either have to be sought in ways other than the possession of nuclear weapons, or all countries should be accorded the right to determine the means, including the possession of nuclear weapons, for protecting their security".

In order for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances to make substantial progress, the nuclear-weapon States must look beyond their narrow security interests. The present situation is unacceptable. General Assembly resolution 36/95, in its paragraph 3, appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. It is the hope of my delegation that the nuclear-weapon States will demonstrate this political will, bearing in mind that the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade has given a clear time-frame whereby the General Assembly should be given agreed texts at its second special session devoted to disarmament. My delegation believes that the problems inherent in a common approach can be overcome if there is "goodwill" among the nuclear-weapon States.

To our mind, the points which need to be clearly spelt out in the search for a common approach are:

1. Which non-nuclear-weapon States should be eligible for assurances from the nuclear-weapon States; and,
2. Under what circumstances nuclear-weapon States will withdraw their assurances.

As a country whose commitment to the non-proliferation régime has continued to be firm, and as an early signatory of the non-proliferation Treaty, we believe that in order for a non-nuclear-weapon State to qualify for assurances, there must be a legal commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. We are living in times of strained international relations and grave tension. A country like Nigeria, located in a region where the development of nuclear weapon capability

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

is being clandestinely, persistently and actively encouraged by South Africa and its allies against the security interests of the countries of that continent, cannot just presume that "a country is a non-nuclear-weapon State just because it says so". With regard to the conditions under which the assurances should be withdrawn, my delegation believes that they should never be withdrawn, since we are against the use of nuclear weapons. However, realism should prevail and we must take into account the fact that non-nuclear-weapon States that have nuclear weapons on their territories are targets for nuclear attacks, since such attacks could be undertaken from their territories. However, they could be given some type of security guarantees with conditions whereby they would be obliged to undertake certain obligations. We hope that delegations will reflect on these remarks, and given the correct attitudes, particularly on the part of those States that should give guarantees, the Ad Hoc Working Group should be able to make progress and report in concrete terms to the General Assembly at its second special session.

Allow me now briefly to comment on the new developments on the issue of a nuclear test ban, a development which my delegation is pleased to note is taking place during your tenure of office.

In my statement on 25 February 1982, I concluded by saying that we sincerely hope that "the rigid positions which the nuclear-weapon States have tenaciously clung to for well over 25 years will bend". It is in this perspective that my delegation sees the statements of Ambassador Fields of the United States of America and Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom on 11 March 1982. A quick look at the new positions seems to indicate a positive step forward, and a recognition of the need for the active participation of this forum in drawing up a nuclear test-ban treaty, but a more serious look at the proposals and the further clarifications that we have heard so far in this Committee do not justify the orchestrated optimism that heralded those proposals. The U-turn, which many delegations like mine have persistently called for, in the approach of these countries to the subject of a nuclear test-ban treaty, has continued to elude us in this Committee. We believe that the time is more than "propitious" for negotiations on this top priority item on the Committee's agenda. While recognizing the importance of verification and compliance (as the case may be) in all disarmament negotiations, my delegation believes that the exercise we are about to embark on following the United States and British proposals should not exclude other elements like the scope of the treaty and its final clauses. After all, the final goal is a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests.

My delegation welcomes the initiative of establishing an open-ended drafting group, under your able guidance, Mr. Chairman, to draft a mandate for the proposed subsidiary body. My delegation, as a member of that group, pledges its full co-operation. A fruitful outcome of the work of the group will, of course, depend on the collective will of all the parties. Although we believe that the position of the Group of 21 contained in working paper CD/181 and United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/84, among other texts, provide an adequate basis for

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty mandate, my delegation is prepared to be flexible in adopting this "brick by brick" approach, but we assume that the solid and impervious brick should ultimately lead to the completion of a formidable edifice that would prohibit all nuclear weapons testings for all time.

A great statesman once stated that the non-nuclear-weapon States "can only groan like the chorus of elders in a Greek tragedy". It is my belief that our "groans" are at last being heard. Confidence among States is an important ingredient for a less armed world, and perhaps we ought to seize the opportunity of every small "brick" in this Committee in the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. It is in this light that my delegation fervently hopes for a speedy conclusion of an effective and meaningful radiological weapons convention. The early establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group, and the dynamic and intellectual approach of Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany are all laudable contributions towards finding lasting solutions to the outstanding problems relating to the scope and definition, the peaceful use clauses, and verification, to mention but a few. However, while the informal consultations undertaken by the Chairman served the desired purpose of identifying areas of convergence amongst delegations, as well as pinpointing outstanding obstacles to the conclusion of a treaty, my delegation still believes that this intellectual realism should not close the door to the further exploitation of political solutions to the complex problems. It is obvious from the present state of negotiations in the Working Group that, given the will to negotiate and to narrow down differences, considerable progress will be made in the formulation of texts.

For my delegation, the fact that the rate of scientific and technological achievements heightens the arms race and far outpaces progress in disarmament negotiations, makes the early conclusion of a radiological weapons convention desirable. The Swedish proposal on the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities gives substance to the subject-matter of banning non-existent weapons. Nuclear installations for peaceful purposes should not be targets for attacks. A recurrence of incidents such as that seen last year in the Israeli air attacks on the Tammuz (Iraq) civilian installations should be prevented by the inclusion of a provision covering that subject in a future radiological weapons convention.

We also attach great importance to the peaceful uses clause in a future radiological weapons convention. Efforts to prohibit the possible emergence and the use of radiological weapons should not affect the inalienable rights of all States to develop and implement their programmes of research, and the use of radioactive materials for peaceful purposes. My delegation believes that the treaty should contain positive formulations recognizing these third-generation rights, and the promotion of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries.

As we approach the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the problems to be solved remain complex and monumental. It is only through genuine efforts to close ranks, and also through the collective will of all delegations that it will be possible to make the desired progress in this non-priority but relevant disarmament measure.



The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement. Before giving the floor to the representative of Romania, His Excellency Ambassador Halitza, I should like to inform the Committee that our distinguished colleague and friend will unfortunately soon have to leave us for a new post. I am sure that we shall very much miss the courtesy and diplomatic talents of Ambassador Halitza which we have all come to appreciate and which have been so useful to the Committee in its work. In giving him the floor, and I hope that it will not be for the last time, may I wish him every success in his new post. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. HALITZA (Romania) (translated from French): My purpose in taking the floor today is to introduce working paper CD/252 as a contribution to our discussion on the subject of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Scientists in my country, like all those who follow our work, consider that the Geneva Committee on Disarmament has an eminent responsibility to negotiate and achieve agreements capable of making an effective contribution to the halting of the arms race and the initiation of a genuine process of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

The achievement of an agreement on the limitation and reduction of military research would constitute, from this point of view, a reasonable first step towards broader agreements aimed at the "gradual stifling" of the technological race through the negotiation of measures for the reduction of allocations for military research and development purposes.

The Romanian Committee "Scientists and Peace" feels that towards this end consideration might be given to the establishment, under the Committee on Disarmament, of an ad hoc body of scientists for the purpose of examining, at the Committee's request, the scientific and technical aspects of questions under negotiation and formulating concrete suggestions and proposals in respect of them. This body, which would be representative in character, could be established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the basis of a decision of the General Assembly. The fact that other proposals which have been made pursue the same goal of associating science with disarmament is a positive element which we support.

There is no area of human activity that exercises a greater influence on contemporary society than that of military research and development, and it does so in two ways: on the one hand, by imposing its own rhythm on the arms race and contributing towards its acceleration and, on the other hand, by subverting the values and falsifying the true ends of science. As never before, modern science is invading the universe of man. The fact that military research and development today occupy a dominant position -- absorbing some 50 per cent of all funds allocated to research -- is a problem that concerns us all to the highest degree. This situation is having a dramatic effect on the arms race as well as on society at large. It is enough to have had some experience of the work of various

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

United Nations bodies to know how many problems still await a solution, how many remedies need to be found and gaps filled, always with the hope that science and technology will offer their assistance. But they keep their doors closed, defended as they are by the great wall of the military. Military research and development are connected with the malfunctioning of society as much as with the idea of peace and war. Their impact is at the same time social, political and cultural. We seem to have reached a new crossroads.

When we talk about putting a stop to the arms race we should be thinking of that moment of cessation that will result from all the measures aimed at halting, freezing, immobilizing, paralyzing or suspending military competition.

We believe that the demilitarization of science must be an integral part of this package of measures because military research and development are the real mainspring of the arms race, which is essentially qualitative and almost exclusively technological.

The specialists are well aware that no innovation in the sphere of new weaponry can any longer affect the existing balance in a decisive manner, and the average citizen likewise regards the feverish efforts to achieve new refinements of ever more destructive weapons as completely irrelevant because in any case he can only die once.

It is therefore urgently necessary to make immediate efforts to introduce a limitation and a control of military research and development. In the Declaration on its first special session devoted to disarmament the United Nations General Assembly called for "negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes".

Even a cursory analysis shows that, paradoxically, the demilitarization of science and technology is hardly more complicated than the demilitarization of national economies, and that, moreover, certain circumstances appear to act in its favour. This is due particularly to certain characteristics which are today perfectly clear. First, there is the fact that military research and development at the national level are strongly concentrated under governmental control and are publicly financed in all countries without exception. Secondly, there is the great polarization of military research and development at the international level. Six countries with the largest military expenditures are responsible for about 85 per cent of the world's research and development efforts for military purposes. This represents ten times the entire scientific and technological capacity of the developing countries. Lastly, military research and development today are more and more oriented towards certain fundamental scientific problems that are the focus of attention in mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology -- problems the solutions to which can contribute either towards the well-being of our species or towards its destruction by still more refined means.

It is for these reasons that we believe that the halting of the process of the militarization of science and technology is not only pressing and urgent but also possible.

(Mr. Ialitzu, Romania)

I should like to stress that the association of scientists, in an appropriate manner, with our work would facilitate negotiations. They could make available to us eloquent scientific data concerning the immense destructive power of the stocks of weapons that exist, and especially nuclear weapons, and the increasing fragility of modern systems for preventing the outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Furthermore, they could be particularly useful in the work of elaborating acceptable solutions and of devising methods and techniques for the verification of future agreements.

The adoption of a decision to convene informal meetings of the Committee on this subject, as proposed by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Imre Komives of Hungary, constitutes a positive development which compels us to make the effort to consider how to initiate and organize this course of action. In our delegation's view, the following elements, among others, could be taken into consideration in determining the objectives of such informal meetings:

- (1) The advantages of negotiating a global prohibition of all military research aimed at the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.
- (2) The elaboration of a system for the periodic examination of developments in scientific research which could be used to produce new weapons and new systems of weapons.
- (3) The consideration of certain specific areas in which the adoption of measures aimed at the prohibition of technological escalation might contribute towards the halting of the arms race or preventing its spread to new spheres, at present unknown.
- (4) The possibility of the adoption, by the countries which play the leading part in military research and development, of measures at the national level with a view to freezing military research and development activities until the conclusion of a global agreement on that subject.
- (5) The establishment, as proposed in working paper CD/262 which I have just introduced, of an ad hoc body of scientists which would have as its main function the examination, at the request of the Committee, of the scientific and technical aspects of questions on which we are conducting negotiations. In that connection, I should like to stress that we ought at once to make greater and more frequent use of existing instruments such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) which has made great strides and can supply us with the scientific elements necessary to our discussions.

Before concluding, I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind and friendly words in connection with my departure from this Committee. Allow me to say to you and to all my colleagues that although the time I have spent here has been rather short, its intellectual intensity and the valuable experience of negotiation that I have derived from it will make it unforgettable for me.

I shall always be proud of having served on the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body, among colleagues and friends of such distinction and eminence.

I can assure you that the memory of this experience will not fade as time passes but will rather become a steady point of reference.

Mr. DON HANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, when I addressed this Committee on 25 February last, I focused my remarks on those organizational and substantive aspects of the Committee's work which my delegation believed the Committee should concentrate its energies on during its current session. We still believe that this session of the Committee on Disarmament has an important role to play, inter alia, in the preparation of an analytical and constructive report for the use of the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, and in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament for consideration and ultimate adoption by the General Assembly at that session.

Today, I shall limit my intervention to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, namely,

- (a) Nuclear test ban; and
- (b) Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Before I do so, however, permit me, Mr. Chairman, to extend to you, and through you to the other members of your delegation and Bureau, as well as to the interpreters and every other member of the Disarmament Secretariat involved in one way or another in the provision of assistance to us, the appreciation of the Kenya delegation for your excellent services. I wish also to congratulate you on your assumption of the Committee's chairmanship for the month of March. As you know, Sir, excellent bilateral relations exist between our respective countries, and we note with great satisfaction the positive policy which your Government has adopted toward the developing countries like my own, Kenya, especially in the fields of science and technology and renewable energy sources for the socio-economic development of these countries. Also, Mr. Chairman, the seat of your Government is the seat of the Papacy -- that traditional symbol of world peace and mutual understanding, as well as trust and goodwill. At this session of the Committee, you need, Sir, the co-operation and support of all delegations, and I assure you of my delegation's support and co-operation.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation also joins the other delegations which have already expressed gratitude and appreciation to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran, for the impartial manner in which he guided the Committee during the month of February. We also welcome the Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands who took up their respective seats in the Committee for the first time last Tuesday, 16 March. No doubt, their vast experience in disarmament matters will reinforce the already active and constructive contributions of their respective delegations to the work of the Committee.

This is a critical month in the work of the Committee on Disarmament's current session, and we look to you, Mr. Chairman, for guidance so that we can reach agreement particularly on how to treat the questions of items 1 and 2 of our agenda. One hopes that, as a diplomat of international distinction, you will continue to exert every effort to bridge the gap that exists on these items between the vox negationis and the vox populi, which is, as they say, the vox Dei. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, all that we need from the former vox is the political will and firm commitment which, I must hastily add, are the sine qua non conditions not only for reaching agreement as to how to deal procedurally within the Committee

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

on Disarmament with the questions of a nuclear test ban and the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, but also for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the world Organization." Do those have any meaning? Can the recommendations, decisions and resolutions of the international community -- the General Assembly, for instance, and the Security Council -- as well as the numerous recommendations contained in commissioned studies, special and other reports and agreements, arrangements, treaties, etc. etc.--can they have any meaning, when there is lack of political will on the part of some countries to implement them? Why, then, adopt them, in the first place, if they are not to be carried out promptly and effectively by every State which participates in their adoption? By signing the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (better known as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty) on 5 August 1963, and depositing their instruments of ratification on 10 October of the same year when the Treaty came into force, the original Parties to that Treaty agreed to undertake a firm political commitment to pursue a comprehensive test ban, when they inscribed the following provisions in the Treaty:

"The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ... seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances, have agreed as follows: ... Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control ... [and] ... to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion ... anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described ... in paragraph 1 of this Article..."

It is most regrettable that, although initially believed to be an occurrence of historic significance, the emergence of that Partial Test-Ban Treaty did not, and has not up to now, slowed down the nuclear arms race among the major nuclear-weapon powers. On the contrary, and ironically, that Treaty seems to have served as an excellent licence for accelerated nuclear testing, and this despite the existence of more than 25 General Assembly resolutions banning such testing in all environments! Furthermore, the existing competent studies on this question clearly indicate that the original Parties to the Treaty alone account for more than 90 per cent of all nuclear explosions conducted between 5 August 1963 and 31 December 1979. Moreover, the firm commitment of the Parties "to pursue a comprehensive test ban" was shelved for more than 10 long years!

As we also all know, the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been the topic of annual deliberation and action in decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly for the last quarter of a century. These resolutions have, inter alia, expressed the conviction that, whatever the differences on the issue of verification -- and judging from the statements made during this session of the Committee on Disarmament, both formally and informally, this is one of the

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

greatest concerns of some delegations -- there is no serious reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. This sentiment found a special place in, among others, General Assembly resolutions 2934 C (XXVII) and 3078 A (XXVIII), adopted respectively at the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth sessions of the General Assembly. I cannot help but reiterate that sentiment and conviction today. Other resolutions of the General Assembly have stressed the "highest priority" treatment which must be accorded to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. General Assembly resolutions 33/60 of 14 December 1978 (paragraph 2), 34/73 of 11 December 1979 (paragraph 2), 36/84 of 9 December 1981 (paragraph 2) and 36/92 E of 9 December 1981 (paragraph 1) are among the good examples of the action of the international community in this regard.

Thus, despite the General Assembly's earnest and repeated appeals, a look back on the implementation of the aforementioned resolutions, as well as of other General Assembly resolutions and studies on the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly adopted at its tenth special session -- for example, those contained in resolutions 34/83 and 36/92 M and in documents A/34/752 and A/36/752, reveals that very little indeed has been done toward their implementation. Resolution 34/83 J on "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" states in its paragraph 2:

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations, as a matter of high priority, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session".

General Assembly resolution 36/92 E states in its paragraph 3:

"Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to continue consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate".

I find no fun in quoting these resolutions of the General Assembly. They are meaningless unless they are implemented in good faith, and promptly. And this prompts me to turn to the recent pronouncements of those members of the Committee on Disarmament who have hitherto expressed serious doubts not only with regard to the competence of the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate legally binding international instruments on items 1 and 2 of our agenda, but also as to the need to create ad hoc working groups to commence negotiations on these highest priority items. My delegation has noted the positive sentiments already expressed by some delegations on the said pronouncements. I wish I could share these sentiments; I wish I knew that the pronouncements were representative of the flexibility and political and firm commitment so essential in our negotiations. My delegation has consequently scrutinized the statements of the said delegations, and the more we have read them, the more we have been convinced that the authors of those policy statements owe the Committee a clarification. We need to be more educated -- if only just in order to better understand the positions of those delegations.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

In the circumstance, I pose the following questions to those delegations who still disagree with the vox populi call for the creation of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2:

In their opinion, then,

Is the time ripe for negotiation on problems of the nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament? If not, then when and under what conditions will it be opportune for us to negotiate these highest priority items?

Is the Committee on Disarmament an appropriate, or the appropriate forum for negotiations on items 1 and 2? In other words, has the Committee on Disarmament the right and corresponding duty to negotiate these items, or would the delegations favour smaller forums, preferably of a bilateral, trilateral or even quadrilateral nature?

Is the preference of some nuclear-weapon States to allow the Committee on Disarmament merely to generally debate, perhaps only informally, and display interest in problems of nuclear weapons but to leave serious negotiations only to "those who matter because of their nuclear status", or would they condition the commencement of serious negotiations on items 1 and 2 within the Committee on Disarmament upon the conclusion first of a treaty on these items outside of the Committee on Disarmament?

How on earth can the theories and policies of nuclear balance and nuclear deterrence be reconciled with the ultimate goal of the disarmament process, namely, the achievement of absolute, comprehensive and complete disarmament under effective international control, as unanimously agreed by all Members of the world community in the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly on 30 June 1978?

If a subsidiary organ or subsidiary organs were to be created within the Committee on Disarmament to deal with items 1 and 2 of its agenda, what terms of reference would such subsidiary bodies have? Would they be limited or comprehensive in scope?

Genuine responses to the above questions would assist my delegation, at least, to understand better the thinking of the said delegations on items 1 and 2 of our agenda. For my delegation, this is our thinking:

(1) The Committee on Disarmament has the right and corresponding duty to negotiate on items 1 and 2. The Committee is the right, and most appropriate, and single organ for the conduct of multilateral negotiations for the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament because:

- (a) The consensus Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament says so, e.g., in its paragraph 120, and others. Similarly, other competent documents say so, e.g. A/36/592.
- (b) The only nuclear-weapon States on earth, i.e., the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France and China, are members of the Committee on Disarmament. They decided

(Mr. Don Hanjira, Kenya)

to join the Committee on Disarmament willingly and unconditionally. They also happen to be the permanent members of the Security Council, upon whom and upon which the world community has entrusted, under its Charter, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. And there is no question that these very permanent members of the Security Council and sole possessors of nuclear weapons have, under the provisions of Chapters V, VI and VII of the United Nations Charter, the additional and heaviest duty of being the de facto keepers of international peace and security. These very States, especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals have, under paragraphs 48 and 50 of the Final Document, also been given special responsibility for the attainment of nuclear disarmament.

In the circumstances, I must therefore hastily stress that the days are gone, and gone for ever, when some members of the international community, whether because of their military might or their vast wealth, used to get away unchallenged with the manipulation of international situations and the monopoly in "closed circles" of vital and critical international issues. The evolution of international relations has brought about a revolution in the systems and behaviour of States among themselves, and this fact has found expression, inter alia, in paragraphs 14, 18, 19, 20, 28, 36, 42 and 47 of the Final Document. Therefore, "primary responsibility" cannot and does not mean "exclusive or monopolistic responsibility", of the nuclear-weapon States vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(2) Time is indeed overdue for the creation of two subsidiary bodies to deal with the primary items on our agenda, i.e., items 1 and 2. Such bodies, once established within the Committee on Disarmament, should be given separate comprehensive terms of reference to encompass all the issues of the nuclear test ban on the one hand, and of the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the other. I note with satisfaction at this juncture and support, in principle, the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic contained in document CD/259 for the creation of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2.

(3) Items, once inscribed in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, deserve and must be given a thorough treatment. This particularly applies to the afore-mentioned items of the highest priority on our agenda.

(4) Once ad hoc working groups have been established within the Committee on Disarmament, we should move fast to clear the organizational aspects of their work and then concentrate our energies on the substantive aspects -- such as problems of mandates, scope and measures to be evolved. I believe it is high time that formal as well as informal meetings were scheduled weekly and as appropriate in order to receive and discuss proposals and counter-proposals on the establishment of, and negotiation within, working groups and their contact groups and working parties if necessary, on items 1 and 2 and the various issues under them, including the question of verification.

(5) Bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral and any other "lateralist" negotiations can take place outside the Committee on Disarmament, provided they are complementary to those carried out within the Committee on Disarmament. The former should not contradict the letter and spirit of the Final Document as indicated in paragraphs 51 and 121 of the said Document, and in General Assembly resolution 34/83 B of 11 December 1979 (paragraph 2). In this context, one would urge an early resumption and conclusion of the tripartite negotiations which should result in the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban in a treaty of a permanent character.



(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

(6) The main reason why many delegations reject the theory of deterrence is because it promotes the arms race between the Super-Powers through improvements in the quality and quantity of arms, in technological development of nuclear-weapon systems, and the like.

In short, ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of our agenda should be established immediately; no time should be wasted on procedural matters; the Committee on Disarmament should formally take up this matter and the newly created working group or groups would immediately begin tackling, inter alia, the following fundamental issues of substance:

I. Problems of the scope of a CTB

- (i) Sources of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes only;
- (ii) Kinds of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes only;
- (iii) Problems of research and technological development in the field of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes only;
- (iv) Problems of the protection of non-nuclear-weapon States and regions;
- (v) Etc.

II. Problems of verification of a CTE

- (i) Kinds and levels of verification;
- (ii) Forms and procedures of verification;
- (iii) Verification measures;
- (iv) Institutional arrangements for verification;
- (v) Problems of on-site inspection and its modalities;
- (vi) Problems of strict adherence to agreements;
- (vii) Problems of participation in the process of verification;
- (viii) Etc.

III. Problems of the duration of a CTB

Examination of the proposals for:

- (i) Unlimited duration-- i.e., permanent and indefinite, or "for all eternity"; and
- (ii) Limited duration for agreed short or long fixed periods of time.

(Mr. Don Manjira, Kenya)

The concept of limited duration would not be acceptable to my delegation because to accept it would be, inter alia, to risk the security of both the non-nuclear-weapon States like my own, Kenya, and of all the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

IV. Problems of the final clauses of a CTB

and

V. Problems of the review and appraisal of the implementation of a CTB

These are also significant, and should be seriously discussed and negotiated.

In conclusion, I must stress that the idea of the maintenance of international peace and security through deterrence is a paradox. It is a very bad paradox, for it would indeed be tragic for the nuclear-weapon powers, especially those with the largest arsenals, to use their vast economic resources and technological skills to terrorize and intimidate the basic human instinct for survival, which is the common heritage of humankind. Secondly, paragraphs 6, 15 and 99 et seq. of the Final Document stress the importance of public opinion which should be systematically mobilized for the purposes of disarmament. My delegation attaches great importance to this matter because we believe that the mobilization of public opinion can be an effective instrument especially in situations where an impasse reigns. The Committee on Disarmament must therefore give due consideration and emphasis to this issue in the near future. Thirdly, we have entered a stage where the patience of the Committee might be at stake, and the temperature of our deliberations might start to be irregular and fluctuate. I do not know whether you are aware of this but the traditional way of treating a patient with high fever (temperature), in some of the hot parts of Africa, say the Kalahari Desert, is to cover him/her with as many clothes and blankets as possible, because the higher the temperature, the colder the patient becomes. In the United States, most doctors advise patients, especially babies with very high temperature, to undress to the bone and lie in very cold water. Well, the two methods of treating high fevers may be extreme, but for the purposes of items 1 and 2 of our agenda and the proposed creation of ad hoc working groups of the Committee on Disarmament, I would hesitate to accept working groups with half-mandates because, as it was once said and written, if the water is lukewarm, spit it out, for it will not quench your thirst.

Lastly, we should be careful lest our patience should run out. If such a situation were to occur especially with regard to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, then not even Rudyard Kipling's advice in his "If" would be of any assistance to us. For, who would keep his or her head, when all around him or her in this Committee were losing theirs over items 1 and 2? Only Cicero, that mighty Roman ancestor and greatest orator of all time, would best advise us in his "Quo usque tandem abutere, Catina, patientia nostra ...?" He would say: "How long, oh Catalina, how long will you try our patience ...?" The patience of the Senate of Rome had run out. I would hate to be the Catalina of the Committee on Disarmament, but who would like to be the Catalina or Catalinae, of the Committee on Disarmament? This is the question that is before us at this moment in time of our deliberations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and I am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed both to the Chair and to my country.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 159th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of our host country, Switzerland, His Excellency Ambassador Pictet.

Mr PICTET (Switzerland) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor. I should like to assure you that it is a great pleasure for me to take the floor in the Committee on Disarmament while it is meeting under your chairmanship.

In the year that has elapsed since it was first authorized to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Switzerland has noted with a great deal of interest and attention the modest but nevertheless genuine progress made in the consideration of this difficult question. The issues involved are beginning to emerge more clearly and their formulation, in the form of elements, by the prior Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard, has greatly helped to clarify ideas. My Government therefore welcomes the re-establishment of the Working Group and more particularly the fact that it has been given a new mandate allowing it to proceed now, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, to the actual elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Switzerland will continue to be represented at the meetings of the Working Group, and my Government sincerely hopes that it will prove possible during the current session, in spite of its brevity, to achieve further positive results.

I wish first of all to recall that, as I stated in your Committee on 14 July 1981, the Swiss private chemical industry, which is, as you know, highly developed, does not and will not under any circumstances manufacture chemical weapons. The Confederation, for its part, produces no chemical weapons for military purposes in its own establishments. Furthermore, Switzerland has not acquired chemical weapons from other countries; it has no stock of chemical weapons and no such weapons are stored on its territory. The equipment possessed by the army is designed solely to protect combatants against the effects of toxic chemicals, should these be used in a conflict.

In making this statement, which is also a commitment as regards the future, Switzerland is demonstrating that, with respect to the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, it has no military chemical capacity whatever to defend. My Government nevertheless attaches very great importance to a convention in this sphere because of the inhuman character of chemical weapons and of the serious threat which they represent also for civilian populations. My country's interest in the conclusion of such a convention is twofold: on the one hand, from the standpoint of its security, which implies in particular that the convention should include adequate verification procedures, a sine qua non condition for the renunciation of costly national measures of protection and defence; and on the other, from the standpoint of the development of its chemical industry for peaceful purposes, which ought not to be hampered.

I should like today to make some observations concerning certain of the elements submitted to the Working Group by its Chairman last year, since they are still serving as a basis for the Committee's discussions.

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

The question whether it would be appropriate to repeat in the convention the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons which appears in the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) has been the subject of a great many comments relating to Element I ("General provision"). On the one hand, it can be argued that such a prohibition would have the advantage of being more comprehensive than that contained in the Protocol, since the latter does not cover all chemical weapons and prohibits only their first use. Furthermore, it would be a means of making up for the absence in the Protocol of any control machinery, a highly regrettable shortcoming when allegations are made concerning the use of chemical weapons, as has been the case on several occasions recently. On the other hand, the fear has been expressed that to reaffirm the prohibition of use in the convention would in the final analysis lead to a weakening of the Protocol, which must, of course, be avoided. Upon reflection, we believe that this is to a great extent a false problem. In fact the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol will, we believe, together form a set of complementary obligations, such that it seems extremely unlikely that a State would become a party to the convention without being bound by the Protocol. If that view is accepted, the convention should not only not "be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from ... the Protocol" (according to the wording proposed in Element VII entitled "Relationship with other treaties") but should rather express the idea of an organic link between the two instruments. That the parties to the convention should also be parties to the Protocol is important from three points of view: first, during the transitional period, which will be especially critical, in the course of which States will proceed to the dismantling of their stocks of chemical weapons, secondly, with regard to the amounts of super-toxic chemicals the possession of which would be authorized for non-hostile military purposes (as provided in Element VI); and, lastly, in the event of withdrawal from the convention. With these considerations in mind, my delegation wishes urgently to reiterate the hope that all States will forthwith become parties to the Geneva Protocol. Universal adherence to the Protocol, combined with the making of unilateral declarations of the non-possession of chemical weapons and the intention never to possess any, like the declaration which Switzerland has made on two occasions, would constitute confidence-building measures that could not but help to create a climate favourable to the negotiation of the convention.

With regard to the general definition of chemical weapons, which is the subject of Element II, my authorities are of the opinion that it would be preferable if the convention covered only chemical weapons in the strict and classical sense of the term, i.e. super-toxic and toxic substances which are produced expressly for military purposes and have lethal effects on man or cause lasting physiological harm. We are aware that such a definition has the effect of leaving outside the scope of the convention dual-purpose chemicals and substances intended for civilian use even if they can be employed for hostile purposes, such as certain herbicides and insecticides. True, chemicals in this category constitute a definite danger from the military standpoint, but it is a danger that is incomparably less serious than that represented by chemical weapons proper.

Furthermore, various difficulties, such as the need to use huge quantities when they are employed for military purposes make their utilization in hostilities unlikely. However, the main reason why Switzerland advocates the exclusion of these substances from the scope of the convention is that verification measures in respect of them would pose immense problems. In fact, an effective control would all for the placing under surveillance of virtually all civilian chemical manufacturing concerns because it would be possible, in certain conditions, for a very wide range of chemical products to be used for military purposes. Even though certain verification techniques used in the matter of non-proliferation could be applied, it would hardly be possible to place a country's entire chemical industry under control, in the way the non-proliferation Treaty has placed all nuclear installations under control.

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

Moreover, as regards the use of herbicides and insecticides for hostile purposes, we may recall articles 54 and 55 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and article 13 of the second Protocol, relating to the protection of property essential to the survival of the civilian population and the protection of the natural environment.

Other terms used in Element II ought also, we think, to be clarified. For example, the meaning of "other lethal, and other harmful chemicals" would be clearer if the text read "other lethal chemicals or chemicals causing lasting physiological harm to man which are capable of being used for military purposes". With regard to precursors, we believe that this term should be used only to designate the component elements of so-called binary weapons and not the chemical substances used as starting materials or intermediate products, with no distinction being made between the civilian and military sectors. Lastly, the "means of production of chemical weapons", the prohibition of which is envisaged in Elements I, IV and V, can, we believe, only refer to the facilities that carry out the operations which render capable of military use chemical substances to which the convention would be applicable (loading or filling facilities).

Element VI, to which I referred earlier, provides that each party to the convention should undertake not to possess super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes in an aggregate quantity which exceeds 1,000 kilogrammes. We have serious reservations about this provision. It amounts in effect to perpetuating, and in fact legalizing, through the very convention that is designed to banish chemical weapons from the arsenals of States, the de facto inequality at present existing between the States which possess such weapons and those which do not. A State which possesses no chemical weapons at the time of its adherence to the convention will in fact be unable to acquire any quantity whatever of super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes without violating the undertaking under Element I "never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile [or] retain ... chemical weapons".

Consequently, stocks intended for "non-hostile military" purposes would be held only by the powers, happily few in number, which now possess, or will possess, at the time of their adherence to the convention, chemical weapons in the form of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Thus the impression of equality created by the fact that, under Element VI, each State party would be able to possess the same quantities of these chemicals for such purposes is, we believe, a false one, concealing what is in reality the discriminatory nature of this provision.

In any event, the quantity permitted appears to my delegation to be altogether excessive since these are substances intended for purposes of research in the matter of defence and protection. Consequently, the possession of such quantities of these chemicals by certain Governments would continue, in spite of control measures intended to ensure that the authorized ceiling is not exceeded to constitute a threat to the security of other States.

Allow me, before concluding, to say a few words about the measures for verification of compliance with the convention. Switzerland continues to be firmly of the view that in order to provide adequate guarantees of security, the verification system will have to be based on a combination of national and international measures and to include the possibility of on-site inspections. We have read with great interest the working paper presented on 18 February by the United Kingdom delegation (document CD/244), which seems to us to be one of the most detailed texts presented on this subject. With regard to on-site inspections, it is essential that an explanation should be given for any refusal to authorize such an inspection, and that provision should be made for a complaints or

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

recourse procedure in such a case. In this connection Switzerland, faithful to the general principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, is of the view that every party should have the right, in the event of disagreement regarding the interpretation of a provision of the convention, to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice, the recognition of whose competence should be compulsory. However, it seems to us somewhat premature to consider in detail at this stage the methods for verification of compliance with the convention. The modalities of control will in fact depend in part on the scope of the convention and, in particular on the definition of chemical weapons given in it. As I indicated earlier, Switzerland would see many advantages in confining the convention to a limited range of chemicals, produced specifically for military purposes. The broader the scope of the convention, the more extensive the verification measures will have to be and, consequently, the more complex and difficult to apply.

Unlike other measures of disarmament or arms control, a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons would at present concern only a small number of States, those possessing such weapons. These States therefore bear a special responsibility similar to that of the nuclear-weapon States. It is as necessary to try to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons as it is to prevent that of nuclear weapons. But chemical weapons, which are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce, are within the reach of a very large number of States, if they wish to possess them. Hence the very real threat which such weapons represent. In these circumstances, therefore, it is perfectly understandable that many States should wish to be associated with the negotiation of a convention on this subject. They are all entitled to stress their legitimate security interests as well as the interests of their civilian chemical industry and their technology, which should be protected. It is, in any event, these considerations which led the Swiss Government to seek permission to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to this very important item on its agenda, and in particular to present to you again today its views on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no further speakers on my list. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor?

If not, I should like to recall that, as we decided last week, we shall, immediately after this plenary meeting, hold a short informal meeting so that Ambassador Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, can make a statement on the subject of documentation and other questions in suspense.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 25 March, at 10 a.m., as indicated on our time-table for this week.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 25 March 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario Alessi

(Italy)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI  
Mr. MAACHI  
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mrs. S. FREEMAN  
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE  
Miss DE CLERQ

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. GRINBERG  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV  
Mr. N. MIHAILOV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER  
Mr. E.B. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. LIN CHENG  
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO  
Mr. LI WEIMIN



Cuba:

Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA  
Mr. J.L. GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. El-S.A.R. EL REEDY  
Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY  
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. GESBERT  
Miss L. GHAZERIAN  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. H. KAULFUSS  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. F. RUTH  
Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. HOLLAI  
Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESHARAN  
Mr. S. SARAN  
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. B. MAUNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. A. BAHRIN  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. M. MAHALLATI  
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS  
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. U.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. H. AKRAM  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. ZAWALONKA  
Mr. S. KONIK  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJMAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. H.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. V.A. EDVOKOUSHIN  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO  
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV  
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M. BUSBY  
Ms. S.F. BURK  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO  
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. V. VOJVODIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA  
Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA  
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 166th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda: "Chemical weapons". However, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

I should like to welcome today to the meeting of the Committee two distinguished visitors, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the representative of Hungary.

His Excellency Ambassador Ruth has already made statements before our Committee several times in the past. As you know, he is the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. He has been very active in matters of disarmament, not only in this Committee but also in New York, where he has attended the regular sessions of the General Assembly.

His Excellency Mr. Imre Hollai, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, is also an experienced diplomat who has already twice served in his present post. From 1974 to 1980 he was the permanent representative of his country to the United Nations in New York. As a specialist in multilateral diplomacy, he has participated in a number of international conferences, some of them on disarmament.

I know that members of the Committee will listen with great interest to the statements our two visitors are going to make to us and that their presence here is greatly appreciated.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, the United States, Mongolia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Kenya, Argentina and China. A further member of the Committee has expressed a wish to speak today and I hope that I shall be able to give him the floor. However, since we already have nine speakers on the list for this morning, he has kindly agreed to speak only if we have sufficient time when the above list of speakers is exhausted.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, His Excellency Ambassador Ruth.

Mr. RUTH (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, it is a very great honour for me to address the Committee on Disarmament again. The last time I had this privilege was on 6 August 1981. On that occasion I explained my Government's position on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (CD/205) jointly submitted by Australia, Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time I was able to obtain a personal impression of the great sense of responsibility, the dedication to serious negotiation and the expertise which characterize the Committee's work. In my address I warned against either euphoria or resignation and stated that I was particularly encouraged by the negotiations within the working groups for chemical and radiological weapons. I note with satisfaction that the work on a convention banning chemical and radiological weapons has been intensified.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

The work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament has entered a decisive phase. We shall continue to participate constructively in the work of the Committee aimed at presenting a product to the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly that is capable of gaining the support of all sides.

As we all know, the prospects for tangible success of the Committee's efforts depend to a large extent on whether there is an improvement in the international climate, especially between East and West. Unfortunately there has been a deplorable reverse trend: since 13 December 1981 a dark shadow has been lying over the relations between East and West as the consequence of an event that runs counter to the objectives and results of the CSCE process in Europe. Several delegations, including my own, have stressed this in the general debate at the beginning of this session.

Realistic and concrete arms control continues to be an urgent task of international security policy. It is therefore gratifying that the Committee has been able to agree on an effective programme of work, that a new extended mandate has been formulated for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and that progress has been made towards the establishment of a new working group on the subject of nuclear testing with a focus on problems of verification of the observance of a comprehensive test ban.

My Government, which has attached great importance to the Committee's work in the field of a chemical weapons ban from the very outset, is ready to make its contribution so that success can be achieved. With this in mind my delegation is submitting a new working paper on the question of verifying compliance with a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and stipulating the destruction of existing stocks and production plants. We do so knowing that a large measure of agreement has already been achieved on the convention's scope and on definitions. Unfortunately this positive development has until now not been accompanied by corresponding progress in resolving the crucial issue of verification.

The position of my Government is clear:

The Federal Republic of Germany is a contracting party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which it adheres without reservations. Furthermore, in 1954 it became the only country until now to commit itself -- vis-à-vis its allies -- not to produce nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. When signing the Bacteriological Weapons Convention in 1972 my Government declared that "in the sphere of chemical weapons, it will neither develop nor acquire nor stockpile under its own control any of the warfare agents which it has already undertaken not to manufacture". My country also agreed, in connection with its commitment, to international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The experience gained from this practical verification was presented at an international workshop held in March 1979 and was then recorded in document CD/37.

In view of these circumstances my country felt justified to make energetic efforts to promote the conclusion of a comprehensive and -- at the same time -- verifiable chemical weapons convention. Our parliament, the German Bundestag, unanimously supports these efforts. In a decision unanimously adopted on 3 December 1981 it called upon the Committee on Disarmament to make even greater efforts than hitherto for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, which it deems indispensable and of which effective international verification must be an integral part.

(Dr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

I know that we are all agreed on the following points:

Chemical weapons are regarded by the international public as being especially obnoxious and are a particularly great threat to the civilian population.

The danger that these weapons might be employed in a military confrontation despite the Geneva Protocol banning their use cannot be precluded as long as they exist.

This danger must be averted, and indeed it can be averted. This requires an agreement which stipulates the destruction of all existing chemical weapons subject to adequate verification and ensures that no State may in future develop, produce or stockpile chemical weapons.

The observance of such an agreement must be reliably safeguarded. This is the only way of ensuring that the horrors of chemical warfare are completely banned and forever from the world.

Our experience with regard to the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons reinforces our conviction that, although these problems are even more multifaceted and complex than those connected with other arms control agreements, practicable solutions that are universally acceptable can none the less be found. Let me outline some of the elements of a necessary verification arrangement.

(a) A chemical weapons convention cannot be monitored by national technical means alone. By looking at a chemical factory from the outside one cannot see what is going on inside.

(b) On-site inspections by teams of international experts must therefore be a firm component of a verification régime.

(c) A reliable verification régime has two main functions: it must enable situations requiring clarification to be examined impartially, and it must ensure the observance and implementation of the convention by means of regular and non-discriminatory international measures according to a fixed procedure.

(d) The legitimate interest in keeping chemical production and research methods secret must be fully protected.

There are, in my view, favourable prospects for progress towards a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Only recently the President of the United States stated unequivocally that his country regards the conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention as a high priority of its arms control policy and that it would welcome such an achievement by 1984 since it would then no longer need to resume the production of chemical weapons discontinued by the United States in 1969 and introduce modernized chemical weapons. The Committee's working group on chemical weapons has for the first time been given a comprehensive mandate for the drafting of a convention. The discussions in this group have been speeded up and intensified. The future work of the Committee can build on the substantive progress already achieved. International opinion has been made sensitive to the subject of chemical weapons not least by reports that such weapons may have been used in crisis areas in South Asia. Thus the conditions exist for a successful outcome which would free mankind from a nightmare.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

The working paper submitted today by my delegation is intended to be a constructive contribution offering practicable solutions to the one problem still causing the greatest difficulty: that of adequate verification.

The authors of the paper have been guided by the following objectives: we propose a verification régime which, in our view, is both effective and acceptable. It recognizes that expenditure and the manpower requirements must be kept within reasonable limits.

The paper envisages regular checks for monitoring both the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and the undertaking not to manufacture chemical weapons. In addition, the paper calls for inspection on challenge, that is the possibility of special checks in the event of founded suspicions. Neither of these two procedures is sufficient on its own; a dependable verification régime must include both of them.

The paper does not overlook the fact that a verification régime could be more elaborate. We do not exclude the possibility of defining additional confidence-building measures in the field of chemical weapons, which could have a particular psychological and political impact. The paper does not contain any specific suggestions in this field as it is designed to outline the elements of a verification régime that we consider indispensable for any ban on chemical weapons.

Let me add a few words on the regular checks described in the paper. We feel that we have not proposed any unreasonable measures. To verify that the commitment not to manufacture chemical weapons is being honoured, we consider it sufficient to ensure random on-site inspections of chemical plants producing organo-phosphorous substances. The paper recommends that lots be cast to select the plants for inspection. In our view, the very possibility of the lot falling upon a potential violator serves to ensure a large measure of confidence that the convention is being complied with.

Specific rules are suggested for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. They provide for obligatory inspections before and after the period during which destruction is to be effected; during the period itself jointly agreed forms of monitoring with technical aids, such as flowmeters, and random on-site inspections are to be carried out.

As you will notice, we do not suggest the inclusion of regular checks to monitor the production of dual-purpose agents. In this respect the scope of the convention goes beyond that of this proposed verification régime. This seems to us to be a justified limitation. In our view, comprehensive verification would be very difficult to carry out from a technical point of view in this particular field. Furthermore and above all, the agents concerned are of less military importance. The regular checks suggested by the paper therefore concentrate on supertoxic agents. In this context the actual design of a production facility will give an indication of whether the convention is being violated.



(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

In this connection the paper also suggests a method for verifying the non-production of binary weapons. This involves the taking of samples, which are analysed at the inspection site itself. The analysis involves a summary procedure which proves the non-production of the key precursors of binary weapons but does not disclose the complete actual composition of the sample. When I speak of binaries I mean a composition containing a key precursor as one of the two or more components. Only this key precursor is a phosphorus-organic compound which is essential for a binary weapon. It is this key precursor which must be subject to verification. It is thus not true that binary production techniques cannot be subjected to reasonable and effective verification. In this context I should like to add that the term "binary", as used in the paper, includes weapons made up of two or more active substances..

Let me stress that the proposed procedure is intended to rule out the possibility of any abuse. My country's chemical industry, which faces lively competition on both national and international markets, strongly supports the proposals made here and is willing to share the experience it has gained with any interested party.

I invite all delegations to the Committee to take a close look at our paper and to incorporate it in their own considerations. In the interest of increased international co-operation and trust, long-standing reservations should now be re-considered. Clearly defined on-site inspections should be recognized as a suitable means of verification in the field of chemical weapons. This would also create favourable conditions for other disarmament and arms control efforts. Reliable verification is not to the advantage or disadvantage of any individual party: rather, it serves the interests of everyone concerned and enhances world-wide confidence in arms control agreements and the realistic expectation of achieving co-operative measures designed to ensure compliance with negotiated results.

Ever since the Geneva Protocol was drawn up in 1925, this city has been the scene of many successful international endeavours for disarmament and arms control. At present it hosts not only the Committee on Disarmament but also another negotiating forum of crucial importance for security and stability in Europe and worldwide. I refer, of course, to the American-Soviet negotiations on the reduction and limitation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which, after the agreed two-month recess, will be resumed on 20 May with a new round. My Government is naturally following these talks with the greatest interest and is participating actively in the consultations of the North Atlantic Alliance on this subject. In our view, the bilateral American-Soviet INF negotiations and the Committee's multilateral efforts to achieve a comprehensive chemical weapons convention have something in common: they both aim at a zero-level outcome, in other words, the INF negotiations at the elimination of all land-based long-range nuclear missiles, and the efforts of this Committee at the elimination of all chemical weapons, thus making a contribution to achieve outcomes at the lowest possible level. My country hopes that such substantive results will be achieved in both cases. We will support every effort to move towards constructive and concrete results to facilitate the negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Hungary His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Imre Hollai.

Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): Allow me first of all to thank you for the very kind words of welcome you have extended to me, Mr. Chairman, and also to associate myself with the sincere congratulations that the head of the Hungarian delegation has already expressed on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March. It is a privilege for me to address the Committee on Disarmament today and to present the views of my Government on some of the very important issues presently occupying the attention of the peoples and their representatives. It is also a source of great personal pleasure to see so many familiar faces around this table. I am happy to have had the opportunity to work with many of you in previous years, and look forward to co-operating with all of you on forthcoming occasions.

There is not a single person in Hungary who would disagree with the resolution of the Twelfth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party which states that "In our epoch it is decisive for mankind to maintain peace and to prevent the outbreak of a new world war". That national unity is the most solid basis of my Government's foreign policy, the priority objective of which it is to contribute to the strengthening of peace and international security, the easing of tension and the elimination of the danger of war.

With a view to achieving that priority objective the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has always done and continues to do its best to promote every effort aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, reducing arms and armed forces, and arriving at genuine and effective measures of disarmament. As a proof of our profound commitment to arms limitation and disarmament, I may mention that Hungary is a party to all international agreements in force in those fields, and actively contributed to the elaboration of many of them. The representatives of my country spare no efforts to be engaged actively and constructively at all fora where such issues are deliberated or negotiated.

The Hungarian People's Republic has always devoted particular attention to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. We are convinced that today when the international situation is marked by the aggravation of the confrontation between the forces of war and peace, when militaristic circles attempt to disrupt the existing parity of forces and openly strive for military superiority, today the responsibility of this Committee -- the single international forum to negotiate global issues of arms limitation and disarmament -- is greater than ever before. Consequently, the responsibility of the States members of this body has similarly increased. Now that all nuclear weapon States and most of the militarily significant countries are represented here in a well-balanced negotiating body, the Committee has no one else to blame for its shortcomings but itself or some of its members.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

In the process of preparations for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the States members of the Committee on Disarmament must face the frustrating problem: should each of them share equally the blame for not having utilized fully the last three years? In an alarmed world where public opinion will judge the Committee by the extent to which it has succeeded in halting the arms race and achieving substantial cuts in the enormous burden of the armaments programmes, the answer is clear. Clear as the balance sheet of the majority of the member States which have from year to year come forward with concrete proposals, draft treaties, working papers on substance, as well as real measures of arms limitation taken unilaterally in order to set an example and pave the way to equitable agreements.

In a world where the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, poses a permanent threat to the very survival of mankind and civilization, when all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament, the duty of States to negotiate in good faith is a primary obligation. It is an obligation that has been unanimously undertaken in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Therefore, any State unwilling to fulfil its obligation takes upon itself a heavy responsibility.

The Hungarian People's Republic, like other socialist States, is pursuing a consistent foreign policy aimed at arms limitation and disarmament. Together with the other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, Hungary has repeatedly reaffirmed its readiness to negotiate and conclude agreements on the limitation, reduction or prohibition of weapons of any kind on a just and reciprocal basis. As stated recently in the Communiqué issued after the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty States towards the end of last year, that readiness "applies not only to nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction but also to conventional armaments. It also applies to the numerical reduction of the armed forces of States."

Representatives of my Government have stated on numerous occasions that for the Hungarian People's Republic the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the elimination of the threat of a thermo-nuclear catastrophe and nuclear disarmament are questions of the highest priority. We continue to maintain that within the complex of nuclear disarmament measures the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests must be treated with the greatest urgency. In this context, my Government has welcomed the constructive step taken by the Soviet Union when it expressed its readiness to accept for a definite, initial period such a prohibition on a trilateral basis. We are deeply convinced that a comprehensive test ban would have unprecedented catalytic effects upon the whole range of nuclear disarmament problems.

For the socialist countries, co-sponsors of the comprehensive proposal in document CD/4, the most attractive and most expedient solution is to prepare and start negotiations on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons, and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until the

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

complete elimination of such weapons. There are several measures, however, which might be conducive to a comprehensive approach. The first one would be the further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, and in the same scope, the adoption of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

The adoption of such an agreement, we are firmly convinced, would be an important measure in itself, and in addition it could serve as a precursor to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The socialist States have for long been advocating that idea, and my country supported every effort aimed at creating such zones in various parts of Europe, like the North of the continent, the Balkans, as well as the central part of the European continent in which we are particularly interested. We are also in favour of creating a zone of peace and co-operation in the Mediterranean region. The Hungarian Government is of the view that such zones would be instrumental in lessening tension and strengthening confidence even beyond their geographical boundaries.

The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament clearly recognized the special responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon powers in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union has always lived up to that responsibility. Even after the United States had unilaterally broken off bilateral negotiations, the Soviet side continued to manifest a constructive attitude, and on numerous occasions called for the speedy resumption of their talks, in particular those on strategic arms limitation. The Hungarian Government is strongly urging the prompt renewal of those negotiations with a view to achieving a significant limitation and reduction of strategic arms. We are convinced that such a turn of events would have a beneficial influence on the international atmosphere as a whole, and would promote arms limitation and disarmament negotiations also in other frameworks.

There is a close relationship between the global aspects of the SALT process and the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Hungarian Government welcomed the opening of negotiations on this complex subject between the Soviet Union and the United States, and expressed its full support for the lofty objective and constructive proposal of the Soviet party. We are in favour of a solution which would provide for the total elimination of all medium-range nuclear weapons targeted on our continent, ultimately making Europe totally free of all nuclear weapons. Last week the Soviet Union has again demonstrated its consequent and resolute stand in this respect when it decided to introduce a unilateral moratorium and offered a reduction of a certain number of medium-range missiles later this year. The international community of States would have expected similar goodwill and reciprocal readiness at the negotiating table from the other party. However, the hasty refusal by official circles in the United States only revealed an alarming lack of readiness to give thorough consideration to the important proposals aimed at solving one of the most difficult problems of our days.

The Hungarian People's Republic, just like any of the non-nuclear-weapon States, has a legitimate concern for its security, as well as for the security of all the peoples of the world. We are convinced that the best solution to

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

remove the threat of a nuclear war would be the earliest possible elimination of all nuclear weapons, or at least to outlaw the first use of such weapons as the gravest crime against humanity. Partial measures, however, could also contribute to the strengthening of the security of States.

In this context, I wish to emphasize that my Government attaches great importance to strengthening the guarantees of security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Our point of departure is that States -- like my own country -- which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons under a valid international legal instrument, and whose territories are free of nuclear weapons of other States, have an inherent right to unconditional guarantees that they will never, under any circumstances, be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We continue to be advocates of a solution within the framework of an international convention. However, we support the proposal to have, as a first step, declarations by the nuclear-weapon powers to that effect, identical in substance and confirmed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Hungarian people was deeply shocked and alarmed when in August last year the United States Government announced the commencement of the large-scale production of neutron warheads. Even the thought of a possible use of that weapon is profoundly deplorable, and generates a strong feeling of indignation all over the world, but particularly in Europe where it is intended to be deployed. My Government is resolutely urging the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations without delay on a convention to prohibit in a comprehensive manner that abominable weapon.

The amount of time I have devoted to questions concerning the complex of nuclear disarmament, just like the great emphasis that the Hungarian delegation has always laid on all such issues, is clearly indicative of the urgency and priority which the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic attaches to those problems. This fact, however, does not detract from our will and readiness to pursue meaningful negotiations on all the other items on the Committee's agenda.

The Hungarian delegation has, indeed for a long time, been one of the proponents of urgent measures, the conclusion of international agreements aimed at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of such weapons; the prohibition of radiological weapons; and the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The people of my country, like peoples in the whole of Europe, are deeply worried by recent measures taken in the United States on the production and deployment of binary weapons. All States, in particular the European States, should raise and firmly reject the sinister plans aimed at flooding this continent with new waves of nuclear, neutron and chemical weapons. This Committee should accelerate its efforts aimed at preventing a new and very

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

dangerous spiral of the chemical arms race. Urgent steps should be taken to prevent the production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons, as well as the deployment of chemical weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present.

The Hungarian delegation has been deeply involved in efforts to elaborate a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, and it will continue to be engaged in further negotiations to that end.

Only a week ago our delegation submitted a proposal in this Committee concerning various steps aimed at preventing a qualitatively new round of the technological arms race, and to achieve a comprehensive prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. We suggested also to give serious consideration to appropriate formulations, by which all States, especially the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States would make solemn declarations, identical in substance, condemning any further efforts to develop, manufacture and deploy new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. My Government is hopeful that our initiative is carefully considered and will be given positive response.

Before concluding this review of my Government's position on some of the major problems of arms limitation and disarmament, I wish to mention that we fully support the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly for the earliest possible conclusion of an international treaty aimed at preventing outer space from becoming a new arena of the arms race. We hope that all the members of the Committee realize the great danger that would face mankind if another sphere of vital interest to all States got involved in the arms race.

In conclusion I wish to reaffirm the great importance which the Hungarian People's Republic attaches to the success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With that in mind, our delegations here in the Committee and its subsidiary bodies, and in the Preparatory Committee in New York, are co-operating in the preparations in order to ensure the realization of all the sound anticipations. We expect the special session to become a forum of action-oriented decisions. We shall do everything to help preserve and further develop the results achieved at the first special session. We want to contribute to the maintenance of the principles embodied in the Final Document, and to be instrumental in the preparation and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation has been actively engaged, and continues to do so, in the drafting of that programme. Our position of principle is well known to everyone, and our constructive proposals are well received and appreciated. Therefore, I can limit myself now to stating only a few basic considerations of my Government.

In the introductory part of this statement I have made it clear that the Hungarian People's Republic is ready and willing to negotiate and conclude agreements on the limitation, reduction or prohibition of weapons of any kind on a just and reciprocal basis. This commitment has been declared on various occasions, most recently in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, held in Warsaw in May 1980. That document was signed by the highest political personalities of the member States, and discussed and ratified by the relevant political and legislative organs. I should like to mention that the Declaration contains a detailed description of the commitment, which -- as a matter of fact -- was reaffirmed and further developed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty countries at their last meeting held at Bucharest in December 1981.

The Hungarian People's Republic is determined to continue negotiations in full harmony with the principles and priorities adopted by consensus at the first special session, and embodied in the Final Document. We are further determined to negotiate on all measures in a comprehensive manner, on a rational sequence of interrelated actions to be taken over established periods of time. We support the inclusion in the comprehensive programme of disarmament of appropriate provisions on the holding of periodic reviews in order to ascertain the realization of commitments and the achievement of the projected measures. Such reviews should give further impetus to the continuation of the disarmament process, and should lead in due time to the convening of the first world disarmament conference. In our opinion, such world conferences could mark the fulfilment of the objectives of each major phase of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which -- we sincerely hope -- will lead in the not too distant future to general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): We are indeed privileged today to have two distinguished guests participating in our plenary session. Their presence confirms the importance which their respective Governments attach to our Committee. My delegation takes great pleasure in joining you, Mr. Chairman, in extending to their Excellencies Ambassador Friedrich Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Imre Hollai of Hungary to our meeting, and in expressing to them our appreciation for their presence in the Committee. I also wish to note with some regret the departure of our distinguished colleague and friend, His Excellency Ambassador Mircea Malitza, the able representative of Romania to this body. My feelings, I must confess, are mixed because, while I shall, as indeed shall we all, miss his congenial and skilful work in our Committee, I must say that our sense of loss here in Geneva is a selfish one because he takes up his post in Washington, and there he will become the diplomatic representative of Romania to the United States. I wish him well in his new responsibility and know that he will make a significant contribution to Romanian/United States relations.

The achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a goal which ranks near the top of the Committee's agenda. It is a goal to which my Government attaches great importance.

In his statement to the Committee on 9 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow, outlined the position of the United States with respect to a chemical weapons prohibition. Today, during one of the two plenary sessions devoted specifically to the subject of chemical weapons, I would like to set forth the United States approach in greater detail.

The United States views the effective prohibition of chemical weapons as a means for increasing our own security and the security of our friends and allies, as well as the security of neutral/non-aligned States. We are seeking to eliminate a real threat by removing real weapons from existing arsenals of potential adversaries. The United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect. They are particularly effective against military forces and civilians in small countries who do not have the means to protect themselves. We are convinced that even as we sit in this room these weapons are being used in current conflicts in remote areas of the world -- in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. We must stop the use of chemical weapons and achieve the goal we seek -- a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons for all time.

Ensuring that a chemical weapons ban increases security and that, so far as is possible, it does not harm legitimate chemical activities is a heavy responsibility. It is a highly complex and difficult task to strike the proper balance. Toxic chemicals are ubiquitous in modern societies. Today all societies depend heavily on toxic chemicals used as drugs, pesticides and chemical intermediates, to name but a few examples. It is my Government's view that the simple approach used in the past for biological weapons and environmental warfare cannot serve as a model for dealing with the much more complex problems surrounding a ban on chemical weapons.

The Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors have already been working on a chemical weapons ban for over a decade. In view of the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, it should not be surprising that reaching agreement has proved difficult. Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that considerable useful work has been accomplished.



(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

Unfortunately, progress has been very uneven. Far greater progress has been made in defining the scope of a prohibition than in working out arrangements to ensure universal confidence that all parties are complying with their obligations. It is clear that lack of agreement on issues in the area of verification and compliance constitutes the key obstacle to successful completion of the Committee's work.

In this context, I would like to discuss briefly certain events outside the Committee which form an important part of the background for the Committee's discussions of a chemical weapons ban, and which have a great influence on the attitude of my Government. A proper understanding of these events is essential if members are to understand the United States position on this subject.

First, as is well known, the United States has concluded that it cannot any longer postpone steps to modernize its deterrent chemical weapons stockpile. More than a decade ago we shut down all of our chemical weapons production facilities. We have not produced any chemical weapons since that time and have in fact destroyed large quantities of such weapons. We had hoped for reciprocal behaviour on the part of the Soviet Union, and believed that progress toward a chemical weapons ban would obviate the need for future production by eliminating the threat our chemical warfare capabilities were designed to meet. Unfortunately, however, the threat not only remains, but is greater than ever. We must take prompt steps to deal with it -- to do otherwise would be irresponsible. We would greatly prefer an adequately verifiable treaty, we will continue to work actively for it, but until such an agreement is achieved, it is clear from Soviet actions that we must maintain military capabilities in the chemical weapons field. This approach is consistent with that taken by my Government in other areas where negotiations are under way. Sadly, my Government has concluded that no other approach is likely to produce positive results. I shall not belabour this point. For the information of other distinguished delegates, my delegation is submitting today a working paper entitled, The United States programme to deter chemical warfare, which explains in greater detail the several steps we are taking and the reasons behind them. The objective of the United States chemical programme as has been clearly stated, is to maintain the safest, smallest level of chemical munitions which will provide an effective deterrent to a chemical attack by an aggressor. It is not, as some would have you believe, to gain a superiority in these weapons, or even to match the sizeable Soviet capability. I would note in particular that over 70 per cent of our planned expenditures are related to protection against chemical attack.

Allegations have been made in this Committee that the United States is not negotiating in good faith, and that we are deliberately creating obstacles to an agreement by modernizing our chemical warfare capabilities. That is sheer nonsense. United States commitment to the goal of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the highest authority of our Government. I would also like to make clear that if we are successful in achieving such a ban, we would be willing, indeed eager, to terminate our binary weapons programme promptly.

In addition, some delegations would have others believe that production of binary chemical weapons will make adequate verification of a chemical weapons ban considerably more difficult or perhaps even impossible. This, too, is nonsense. The fact is that all manufacturing processes for chemical warfare agents, whether for conventional, binary, or other multi-component weapons, present the same basic verification problems. Our planned binary systems will produce standard nerve agents which have been discussed extensively in this Committee. They will use the

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

same key precursors used to produce nerve agents by conventional methods. A binary production facility will still contain special devices for handling toxic chemicals. These will not be as extensive as in a conventional nerve agent plant, but this difference will have no real impact on verification. National technical means are not adequate even for dealing with conventional chemical warfare agent plants. As with facilities which produce conventional chemical weapons, an on-site visit to the production facility itself could determine without great difficulty what was being produced and for what purpose. Also, as with conventional chemical weapons, there are precursors involved which are "single-purpose"; that is, they have no commercial application. Such key precursors will have to be dealt with in a future convention, regardless of the type of chemical warfare agent production process in which they may be used.

There is a second series of events which has much more serious implications for the work of the Committee -- events which have created grave concerns that existing arms control constraints on chemical and biological weapons are being violated.

The United States now has good reason to question soviet compliance with the biological and toxin weapons Convention -- an arms control treaty negotiated in this Committee's predecessor body. We have compelling evidence of a highly unusual outbreak of anthrax, linked to a heavily-secured military installation, in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979. We have repeatedly, on a bilateral basis, asked the Soviet Union to provide information which would allay our concerns. The response of the Soviet Government -- that this outbreak was due to natural causes -- is frankly not consistent with the information available to us.

In addition to the Sverdlovsk outbreak, the United States and other countries have evidence of the use of chemical weapons by Soviet and Soviet-assisted forces in contravention of international law. Lethal toxins, whose possession for hostile purposes is prohibited by the biological and toxin weapons Convention, have been found in samples from areas of reported chemical weapons attacks in Laos and Kampuchea.

My Government has just completed an exhaustive review of all the information currently available on the reports that chemical weapons are being used in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. We have concluded that lethal and other chemical weapons are being used in all three countries and that a member of this Committee, the Soviet Union, is directly involved. We will make available to all delegations a copy of the document which outlines our conclusions and the information on which they are based.

This accumulation of evidence, from many different sources, raises a number of serious issues regarding existing and future arms control agreements, particularly in the area of chemical weapons. The need for improved international verification procedures and mechanisms for dealing with compliance issues has been clearly demonstrated. The repeated refusal of the Soviet Union to co-operate

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

in resolving these outstanding issues, which are of great concern to the United States and others, casts a pall over our collective efforts to attain a chemical weapons ban.

These developments have reinforced my Government's determination to ensure that the verification and compliance arrangements of a future chemical weapons convention are truly effective.

The importance which my Government attaches to verification is well known. This is not an abstract negotiating position. It is a fundamental security consideration. We believe that a capability to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack is essential for the purpose of helping to deter such an attack. If we are to accept an obligation under a convention to relinquish such a capability, the provisions of the convention must provide an adequate level of confidence that potential adversaries are also relinquishing their chemical weapons capabilities. Let me be frank. We will not accept a convention that cannot be adequately verified and thus cannot be relied upon to eliminate the threat which chemical weapons pose to the security of the United States and others. I cannot conceive that my Government would enter into a convention if serious doubts on this remained.

There is general agreement that a verification system for a chemical weapons convention should be based on a combination of national and international means which would complement and supplement each other. However, fundamental differences exist. Some delegations want to rely almost totally on national technical means and national measures of implementation. Many others, including my own, believe that only international measures, including systematic international on-site verification, can provide the basis for adequate verification. We are convinced that for the foreseeable future, national technical means will be inadequate. Furthermore, national implementation arrangements will not help assure others that national Governments are in compliance. There can be no substitute for co-operative international verification measures, including appropriate provisions for systematic on-site monitoring, agreed in advance in the convention.

Discussions of general approaches to verification have amply demonstrated that these fundamental differences exist in the Committee. One would think that in such a situation, an intensive effort would be made to isolate, and focus on, the problem areas. That is the approach favoured by my delegation and many others. But a number of delegations apparently want to avoid tackling these difficult questions. We do not see how such an approach can lead anywhere. Ignoring problems will not make them less real or less important and certainly does not facilitate their resolution. Meaningful progress toward a chemical weapons convention will depend upon progress in resolving basic verification issues. In my delegation's view, it is not productive to try to draft the text of provisions in other areas when there is not even the basis for a common approach on the verification provisions.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

The time has come to move beyond a general discussion of broad approaches to verification. The Committee should now focus on specific verification tasks, one by one, and devote as much time as may be necessary to achieving agreement. The list of tasks outlined in the Canadian working paper, document CD/167, would provide a good starting point for drawing up a list of issues to be addressed. There clearly will not be any simple formula which can be applied in all cases. Because of the variety of verification tasks, a chemical weapons verification system will need to include a variety of measures tailored to suit particular situations.

Finding solutions to the many remaining problems will require active co-operation among all members of the Committee, applying their collective imagination and expertise. It is in this spirit that my delegation has sponsored two briefings on the concept of remote continual verification. In the near future we will submit a concrete proposal to the Committee for a detailed evaluation of this technique as a possible component of a chemical weapons verification system.

The active involvement of technical experts will be needed for understanding both the technical dimensions of the tasks and the technical possibilities for accomplishing them. In this regard, my delegation believes that the principal work of experts in the area of toxicity determination has been completed. The most important need now is for expert advice in the area of verification. We would agree that as a first step, experts be asked to outline this summer possible procedures for monitoring destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and to address several other specific verification-related topics contained in the draft report of the consultations held on 15-19 March.

There is one final point that I want to ensure that everyone understands. My delegation pledges its full co-operation in the Committee's efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban. We are ready and willing to sit down with others to try to find specific solutions to the many specific problems which have to be resolved if a chemical weapons convention is to be achieved. In this regard, some have suggested that one of the most effective ways to achieve rapid progress would be for the United States to resume bilateral negotiations with the USSR. Let me clearly state the United States position on this matter. The possibility of resuming bilateral negotiations remains open, pending a demonstration by the Soviet Union of genuine readiness to negotiate effective verification and compliance arrangements, and to comply with their obligations under existing agreements. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. The ball is squarely in the Soviet court.

We have been seeking an effective ban on chemical weapons for many years. We have no illusions that solutions will be found quickly. But the longer we wait to grapple with the real problems in the area of verification and compliance, the longer it will take. We should not lose any more time.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Allow me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation to extend to you our sincere greetings on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee and our wishes for the successful completion of your responsible task.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our delegation's thanks to Ambassador Mahallati of Iran for his efforts as the Chairman for the month of February in organizing the present session of the Committee.

I take particular pleasure in welcoming the new representative of Czechoslovakia, my good friend and colleague Ambassador Milos Vejvoda, and assuring him of my continuing close and business-like co-operation.

Before embarking on a more detailed statement of the Mongolian delegation's position on item 4 of the agenda, I should like to make a few more brief remarks on the highest-priority issue of nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation, like many others, was and is in favour of an early start being made on genuine negotiations in this Committee on items 1 and 2 of its agenda, and the immediate establishment of ad hoc working groups with appropriate mandates. It is perfectly natural that the main theme in the statements of many delegations in this forum should be a just demand for the starting of negotiations on the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Almost all are in favour of such negotiations being no longer postponed.

At earlier plenary meetings we listened with great attention to the statements made by a number of delegations from the Group of 21, including the delegations of India, Sri Lanka and Brazil, and also to the statements of Ambassador Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, and Ambassador Sujka, the distinguished representative of Poland, all of which statements touched upon a number of important aspects of a question relating to item 1 of the agenda — more precisely, that of the setting up of an ad hoc working group.

We believe that the mandates for the ad hoc working groups adopted by the Committee on Disarmament should be such as to permit the conduct of negotiations on the substance of the issues concerned, that is, the elaboration of the relevant multilateral treaties and agreements.

In this connection we fully endorse the suggestions made by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic in document CD/259. We consider that precisely such an approach would serve as a basis for further concrete actions to be undertaken by members of the Committee. It is important that those actions should lead to results.

In the present difficult international situation questions of the elaboration and adoption of effective measures in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament are becoming most urgent and acute. The attainment of positive solutions to these highest-priority problems is the goal of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in their constructive efforts and

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

initiatives aimed at the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. In this context I should like to stress the importance of the new Soviet proposal concerning a key issue in the matter of the prevention of the growing threat of a nuclear missile war.

The Soviet Union's new peaceful initiatives, put forward a few days ago by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, at the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, have been received with full support in the Mongolian People's Republic. The Soviet Union's decision unilaterally to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR, the quantitative and qualitative freezing of such weapons already deployed there and the halting of the replacement of old missiles by newer ones, as well as a number of other concrete proposals advanced by the Soviet Union, are permeated with a sincere concern to avert the threat of war and a desire to reduce the level of military confrontation and to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in the Soviet-United States negotiations on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union has thereby demonstrated once again its goodwill and its readiness to strive for the positive solution of vitally important problems in the interests of strengthening peace and stability, not only in Europe but in the world as a whole.

Allow me now to make some observations on behalf of the Mongolian delegation with respect to item 4 of the agenda, which the Committee has begun considering this week.

The many years' efforts of the Committee on Disarmament aimed at the elaboration and approval of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction are meeting with serious new difficulties. We are convinced that the prohibition of chemical weapons is today one of the most urgent tasks, brooking no further delay, in the sphere of real disarmament. The majority of the world's States are of the same view, namely, that mankind must be spared the horrors of chemical warfare and saved from that most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction.

However, a diametrically opposite position has been taken on this important issue by the Washington Administration, which has adopted a multi-billion-dollar programme for the "chemical rearmament of the United States", the essence of which consists, basically, in commissioning a new generation of chemical weapons and ultimately stationing them on the territories of other States. The decision of the United States to step up the production of charges containing a new and even more lethal nerve-gas mixture, the so-called binary charges, is creating a situation fraught with the most dangerous consequences.

The addition of binary weapons to the military arsenal of the United States of America and its NATO allies represents first and foremost a threat of the use of this most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction in densely-populated parts of Europe. Thus attempts are being made not only to transform Europe into an arena for some kind of "limited nuclear war" but also to regard that continent as the most suitable theatre for a future war with the use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

At the same time, the authors of that very programme of "chemical rearmament of the United States of America" are continuing in every way possible to inspire reports of "instances of the use of Soviet chemical and toxin weapons" and to involve the United Nations in a so-called "investigation of the matter". In the statement just made here in the Committee by the representative of the United States there was again an attempt to make allegations not in accordance with the facts. Members of the Committee on Disarmament are well aware that such ploys have failed to produce any result whatsoever.

It is not surprising that such slanders and distortions of the facts are being resorted to by those who for many decades ignored the 1925 Geneva Protocol and, in the early 1970s, made use of chemical weapons, or rather waged real chemical warfare against the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea. Such inventions are resorted to by those who are waging an undeclared war against Afghanistan. They gladly supply chemical weapons to terrorist bands sent into the country from abroad, who then use them against the peaceful Afghan population.

All these actions are being undertaken by certain circles to justify their practical steps towards the implementation of the plan for "chemical rearmament" and, in particular, the large-scale production of a new generation of chemical weapons — binary weapons.

These actions are being undertaken also in order to justify the Reagan administration's plans, which were confirmed by the United States Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger in his interview on "The Voice of America", to consider reviewing international treaties and agreements prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The modernization and the unprecedented increase in the production of war gases is inevitably leading to a new and dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race and is creating a situation in which everything positive that has been achieved towards the reaching of agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons and further efforts in that direction could be reduced to naught. In other words, the whole matter of the emergence of binary weapons will severely complicate the negotiations on the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

At the last plenary meeting, Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, very rightly said that the emergence of the problem of binary weapons inevitably creates certain difficulties in solving a wide range of questions relating to the future convention — questions relating, in particular, to the scope of the prohibition, transfer, the declaration of stocks and their destruction, and issues directly connected with the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, the delegations of the socialist countries, including Mongolia, have submitted working paper CD/258 drawing attention to certain important aspects most directly related to the negotiations at present taking place in the Committee. I do not wish to dwell in detail on that document, as its contents are already known to all members of the Committee, and it should form the subject of careful consideration.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We are convinced that a review of the decision, i.e. the renunciation of the wide-scale production and deployment of a new generation of chemical weapons, would contribute towards the early achievement of generally acceptable agreements in the important disarmament sphere of the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

The Mongolian People's Republic, together with other peace-loving States, is resolutely opposed to the production and deployment of binary weapons.

In that connection I wish to point out once more that at the last session of the General Assembly Mongolia was a joint sponsor of resolution 36/96 B, which was supported by the votes of 157 delegations, only the United States delegation voting against. Proceeding from its consistent policy aimed at preventing war and strengthening universal peace and security, the Mongolian People's Republic considers it urgently necessary to intensify multilateral efforts to curb the chemical arms race even further and to undertake practical steps towards the attainment of agreement in that area of genuine disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament can do a great deal in that respect, first and foremost by successfully completing the elaboration of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Mongolian delegation notes with satisfaction the active continuation of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the capable and enterprising chairmanship of Ambassador B. Sujka of Poland. We hope that on the basis of the broader mandate adopted at this session of the Committee, the Working Group will achieve even more substantial progress towards the earliest possible elaboration of an appropriate international instrument.

While it has the floor, the Mongolian delegation would like to deal in detail with one of the issues relating to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As members of the Committee know, the agreed position of the group of socialist countries set forth in document CD/245 has evoked considerable interest on the part of a number of delegations, and especially among the representatives of the Group of 21. The sponsors of that document have been requested to provide additional explanations on some of the points contained in it, and a number of questions were raised in that connection.

The Czechoslovak delegation has made several statements here on behalf of the group of socialist countries, giving a detailed explanation and exposition of our agreed position. The Mongolian delegation will not, therefore, repeat what has already been said, but would like to answer some questions asked by the distinguished representative of India at an earlier plenary meeting of the Committee.

Those questions relate to the initiative of the Mongolian People's Republic concerning the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. That proposal was formulated in document A/36/27 (p. 100) and also in document CD/245 (p. 8).



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

To the question: "How would such a convention be different from the responsibilities already undertaken by States of all regions under the United Nations Charter?", I should like to give the following answer.

The principle of non-use of force is, of course, proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations as one of the fundamental principles governing international relations. Article 2 (4) of the Charter provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Here, the principle in question is given as a ruler of conduct for States and for the Organization itself in its activities.

I do not think anyone will dispute the already existing practice of giving more precise form to the rules and principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations in special documents, both declaratory and contractual in nature. That is the natural process of their deeper elaboration and confirmation, taking into account new realities and objective requirements in international relations. In that connection, mention may be made of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and, last not least, to the 1972 declaration on the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

I wish to stress that the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference represented a major contribution towards the development and strengthening of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. Mention should also be made of the Bandung Declaration, known to us all.

Furthermore, in implementation and development of important provisions of the United Nations Charter, a whole system of international treaties and agreements has already been worked out and concluded with respect to the halting of the arms race and disarmament.

It seems obvious that the future convention will not be a simple repetition of what is already set forth in the Charter of the United Nations but will contain specific practical measures for the development and implementation of the Charter provision concerning the prohibition of the use of force under the conditions of a specific region, where the need for the conclusion of such an agreement is vital and perhaps more urgent than in any other region of the world.

Here I should like to draw your attention to a passage in the message addressed by our President, Yu. Tsedenbal, to the Heads of State and Government of the countries of Asia and the Pacific in connection with the convention we are

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

proposing: "The proposed convention would also, naturally, develop and strengthen the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and a number of United Nations resolutions on questions relating to the renunciation of the use of force, with respect to the specific situation in the region."

And there is one other important consideration to which I should like to draw the attention of Committee members. The proposed convention should contain provisions identifying ways of implementing the principle the observance of which it seeks to achieve. For example, another passage in the above-mentioned message from our President reads: "An important place should be occupied by provisions providing for active steps by States parties on such cardinal issues for the strengthening of peace and security as measures relating to the reduction of military confrontation, the curbing of the arms race and disarmament."

Thus the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in relations between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean will represent a significant contribution towards the implementation of a most important provision of the Charter of the United Nations, which, unfortunately, is often violated, especially on the Asian continent.

Article 52 of the Charter envisages the possibility of the conclusion of regional arrangements on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. The conclusion of the proposed convention could become a concrete step towards the implementation of that important provision of the Charter.

To the question: "Is the convention being proposed a multilateral convention limited to the States of the region of Asia and the Pacific or is a series of bilateral treaties envisaged?", I wish to reply as follows:

The Mongolian People's Republic is proposing the conclusion of a multilateral convention covering the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, we consider it desirable that all the States that are permanent members of the Security Council, which bear a special responsibility as regards the maintenance of international peace and security, should participate in the elaboration and signing of such a convention. At the same time, we in no way belittle the value of bilateral agreements on the non-use of force between countries of the region. Such agreements would obviously help to create the conditions for the implementation of measures on a multilateral basis.

We see bilateral treaties and agreements on peaceful mutual relations and co-operation between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean as important components in the elaboration and adoption of a multilateral instrument of a regional nature. Incidentally, it would be appropriate in this context to recall recent reports concerning the initiation of negotiations between India and Pakistan on the question of the conclusion between them of a non-aggression treaty or peace treaty — what matters here is not the name of the document but its purpose and contents. If a treaty is concluded which really meets the genuine interests of

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

the peace and tranquility of the peoples of both countries and of the southern Asian sub-continent as a whole, then, in my view, the idea of collective security is beginning to gain ground in that most important part of the Asian continent and there are prospects of a further deepening of that process in future. And that is very important.

Lastly, in reply to the question: "How would breaches of the convention be dealt with and what would be the relationship of such a security system to the collective security framework already provided for under the United Nations Charter?", I would make the following points:

As we understand it, in the event of a breach of the convention's provisions, the parties to it could, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, employ such means as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means of their own choice.

No provision of the proposed convention should affect the rights and obligations of States under the United Nations Charter, including the provisions relating to collective security measures.

Questions relating to the implementation of the convention's provisions could be examined at periodic conferences for the review of the operation of the convention or through the creation of some form of machinery which might be provided for in the convention. Examples in that respect may be found in the activities of certain organizations set up on a regional basis.

It goes without saying that, in the event of the occurrence of a situation representing a threat to international peace and security, emergency measures could undoubtedly be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that the very essence of the Mongolian proposal consists in the search for a path that could lead towards meeting the long-term interests of States in that largest and most populous of the world's continents. Such a search calls for a great deal of time and for persistent concerted efforts by countries and peoples.

The important thing, in our view, is the need for a political dialogue to strengthen confidence and a broad mutual understanding. As we have already said, the Head of our State, Yu. Tsedenbal, last year addressed a message on this subject to the Heads of State and Government of almost all the States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Most of the States in that region received the Mongolian proposal with great attention and expressed their support. Due attention and importance are being given to this matter at various conferences of international organizations and other bodies.

Thus, I believe a good start has been made towards achieving a constructive dialogue. It is important that this process should be strengthened further so that a sound basis may be laid for further successful progress in the common cause.

The Mongolian People's Republic is fully resolved to continue making efforts, together with other States, towards the attainment of the noble common goal.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, His Excellency Ambassador Grinberg.

Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria): My delegation has already had an opportunity to extend its congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee, as well as to welcome the new representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands in this Committee. Let me now express our satisfaction in connection with today's participation in our deliberations of two distinguished guests, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, Mr. Imre Hollai as well as Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Ruth, the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lastly, I would like to state how much we regret that the head of the Romanian delegation, and our very good friend, Ambassador Mircea Malitza, is leaving this Committee in order to take up another important post. We have always appreciated his important contribution to our work and enjoyed his close co-operation and his contribution to the development of our common endeavours in this Committee.

Today I would like to present certain considerations of the Bulgarian delegation on item 4 of our agenda, "Chemical weapons". Instead of describing the importance of our negotiations in this field, let me give a brief quotation from a manual on chemical weapons: "After only a brief exposure to nerve gas, victims bleed profusely from the nose and mouth, go into severe convulsions and die within minutes or after days of agony." To this the manual adds that the lethal doses are measured in milligrams. While discussing this issue, therefore, we should not forget that the military arsenals of today may contain several hundred thousand tons of chemical warfare agents.

I think we need such a reminder in order to grasp the true dimensions of our task.

Paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly's first special session on disarmament proclaimed that "The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament", and that the conclusion of a convention to this end "is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations". Very soon this Committee will have to report on the results of its efforts to halt and reverse the arms race in this important area.

Looking back over the years of deliberations, we would like to underline first of all the fundamental role that was played by the bilateral USSR-United States talks in the period 1976-1980. It is to be regretted that these talks have been unilaterally discontinued, because they could still have served a very useful purpose.

Turning now to the multilateral negotiations, I would like to note with satisfaction that during the sessions of the Committee in 1980 and 1981 very useful work on the elaboration of the elements of a future convention was done under the leadership of Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard. This year's session has been marked by the resumption of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an extended mandate, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland. Our delegation welcomes the business-like atmosphere that prevails in the Working Group. A number of statements and documents presented by different delegations will no doubt contribute to the formulation of the elements of the future convention. Finally, let me also mention that for the last three years we have been assisted in our work by technical experts from more than 20 countries, including Bulgaria, and I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express to them our acknowledgement.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

We are all aware that in spite of the progress achieved so far, a lot of problems still remain to be resolved, including those of definitions, the scope of the prohibition, declarations concerning and the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons, verification of the implementation of the convention etc. It is essential, at this stage, that all delegations take a balanced approach towards the whole complex of questions, without artificially upgrading some at the expense of other, equally important questions.

It is heartening to note that there is an increasing awareness of the necessity of such an approach. Even in the statements made on the complex and delicate subjects of control and verification, it has often been possible to discern signs of a growing realization that the "concept of distrust" would lead us nowhere. For our part, we fully share the position of the Soviet delegation, as presented by Ambassador Issraelyan in his important statement of 31 March 1981: "No matter how much we expand and complicate the verification system, no matter how comprehensive we strive to render it, we shall never reach the point at which we can be sure that no uncertainties have been left concerning some important aspect or other of the activities of States, related to the observance of all the provisions of a convention banning chemical weapons."

Having said this, however, I would like to stress most emphatically that our position regarding the possibility of devising an effective system of verification over the implementation of the future convention is a positive and optimistic one. In this respect my delegation has been encouraged by the initial exchange of views in the Working Group, which revealed that even though some important questions have yet to be resolved, there are a considerable number of converging points on questions of both principle and detail.

We could hardly make an attempt at assessing the present state of the negotiations on banning chemical weapons without taking into account the recent decision of the United States Administration to proceed to the production and deployment of what are known as binary and multi-component chemical weapons.

To condition the American people to accept these unpopular measures and in order to justify themselves before world public opinion, in the course of the last several years, the United States has been waging an unprecedented, large-scale defamation campaign against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, affirming the alleged use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and south-east Asia. Today the United States representative, Ambassador Fields, thought fit to repeat these slanderous accusations in his statement. We can only regret that those who are responsible for this campaign have not yet abandoned their tactics which can only result in poisoning the atmosphere and making our work even more difficult than it actually is.

The fact is sufficiently worrisome in itself, that at a time of greatly increased tensions and an escalating arms race in many fields, a new, particularly deadly weapon is being added to the long list of horrible means of mass destruction, threatening the survival of mankind. But on top of this, as has been rightly pointed out by many delegations, we have to bear in mind that should these new weapons, based on the latest technological achievements and on qualitatively new principles, actually be produced and deployed, the current negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would be greatly complicated. This is the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the international community as reflected in General Assembly resolution 36/96 B, which in its operative paragraph 5 "Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons". It is indeed regrettable that the United States cast the only negative vote on this important resolution.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

We cannot fail to voice our anxiety and to deplore the fact that the new multi-billion-dollar programme for the production of binary weapons will open up a new channel in the arms race. But as Europeans we have additional reasons for concern because hardly anyone could doubt that these weapons are to be deployed in densely populated areas of the world, and above all in Europe. That is why my delegation strongly supports the idea of the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territory of countries where such weapons are not stationed at present. We have also proposed that each State party to the convention should recall to its national territory, not later than six months after its adherence, all chemical weapons stationed under its jurisdiction on the territory of other States.

Following an objective preliminary analysis of the implications resulting from the emergence of binary weapons, the delegations of a group of socialist countries presented to the Committee document CD/258, in which they have put forward their views on a number of issues related to those weapons. Apart from this, the Bulgarian delegation submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group a questionnaire on the same subject. At this point I would like to refer in general terms to two major problems that the emergence of binary chemical weapons poses for all of us. The first one relates to the scope of the prohibition in the future convention, the second to its control and verification provisions.

1. In the considered opinion of our experts, binary weapons will further complicate the already difficult distinction between commercial chemicals and those which can be used for chemical weapons. This applies especially to organo-phosphorus compounds in the production of pesticides.

2. In the area of control and verification, binary weapons will multiply the difficulties in the evaluation of the declared stocks of chemical weapons, the control over non-production of chemical weapons, the non-possession of chemical weapons, etc.

In stating the above we are fully aware that these views are not shared by some delegations. Only two days ago the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, questioned whether by their nature alone binary weapons made problems of verification more difficult. Today we heard similar views from the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields. To prove his point Ambassador Summerhayes maintained that the components of binary weapons were chemically highly reactive and, because of storage problems, essential binary precursors would not be stored in large amounts for civilian use. Hence, the problem of verification of such precursors would be similar to, if not less difficult than those of the verification of other lethal agents.

The arguments adduced by the United Kingdom delegation failed to remove our concern regarding the negative implications of binary weapons for our efforts.

As is well known, the civilian chemical industry uses for permitted purposes many substances which are highly reactive. Their storing in large amounts does cause some technical difficulties but these problems are not insurmountable. Thus, on the one hand, it would not be impossible to store highly reactive substances as precursors of binary weapons, and, on the other, the presence of such substances in a given country could not in itself constitute a basis for suspicions of non-compliance unless they are known to be components of binary weapons.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

But, could there be a guarantee that the States parties to the future convention will be fully informed of developments in the field of the production of binary or multi-component chemical weapons? How are they going to overcome the dangers resulting from a possible lack of knowledge or from an overdose of suspicion? These are real and not imaginary problems.

I hope the question I have raised will not be interpreted as an expression of pessimism. Our purpose is only to contribute to the better understanding of the problems posed by the introduction of the new generation of chemical weapons and, through this, to their solution. We sincerely believe that, should there be a political will, this Committee will be in a position to accomplish successfully its difficult tasks.

I would like to turn now briefly to item 1 of our agenda. We have already addressed the nuclear test-ban issue on previous occasions and our position is clear. We are in favour of setting up an ad hoc working group to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. With this in view we gave our full support to the proposal for a mandate for such a working group made by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic (document CD/259).

As is known, there were some new developments in this area recently. A statement was made by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, to the effect that the United States would be in a position to join a consensus to establish "a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement".

In view of some previous statements which made clear that the United States no longer considered the negotiation of a CTBT an immediate task to be accorded the highest priority, many delegations met Ambassador Fields' announcement with mixed feelings and many questions. These reservations were fully justified because a discussion of an issue of such complexity as verification in a vacuum, and without any reference to a clearly defined objective, could hardly serve any useful purpose.

Now, as is known, in spite of these legitimate doubts, a drafting group was set up under your chairmanship to try to formulate a mandate for a working group which would make it possible for this Committee to start a process of genuine multilateral efforts which should culminate in the conclusion of a CTBT. My delegation is participating in the drafting group, proceeding from the belief that should there be goodwill on all sides its task would be successfully accomplished. In our view to achieve this the mandate of the future working group should be based on the following premises: (1) it should allow for a consideration of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests in all its aspects, and (2) the aim of this discussion should be the subsequent early conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):  
Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation has asked for the floor today in order, in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, to state our position on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, before I pass on to this subject, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union on the key problems of the prevention of the ever-increasing danger of a world nuclear-missile war which were put forward by President L. Brezhnev on 16 March of this year.

Especially significant are those proposals which are designed to facilitate the achievement of an agreement on a large-scale reduction of the nuclear weapons of the two sides in Europe, based upon the principle of equality and equal security. The decision of the Soviet leadership unilaterally to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe serves these goals. Moreover, the Soviet Union intends already this year, if there is no new aggravation of the international situation, to reduce, on its own initiative, a certain proportion of its medium-range missiles.

In response to the request made to us by a number of representatives in the Committee, the Soviet delegation is distributing a part of the statement of L. Brezhnev at the **seventeenth** congress of trade unions of the USSR as a document of the Committee on Disarmament.

For a number of reasons we attach particular importance to our statement today. It concerns the prohibition of chemical weapons i.e. the problem of one of the most dangerous and barbarous types of weapons of mass destruction, the solution of which is awaited impatiently by all mankind and which is rightly listed among the priority issues confronting our Committee.

The position of the Soviet Union with respect to chemical weapons is clear and unequivocal: the Soviet Union was one of the initiators of the proposal for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and it has done and is continuing to do everything in its power in any forum and within any organizational framework where such efforts are made, for the speediest possible elimination of this type of weapon from the arsenals of States.

At the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and subsequently, the Soviet Union drew the attention of the world community to the fact that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons were inadmissibly slow. That was not a mere statement of fact but rather an expression of concern for the speeding up of the negotiations. The effective conduct of negotiations and their successful conclusion are needed particularly now in the light of recent events, when an entirely new situation is emerging or has already emerged in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. If no decisive steps are taken today to eliminate chemical weapons, tomorrow it may be too late.

In this connection the most serious factor, leading directly towards a dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race and thus undermining the very basis of the negotiations on the prohibition of this type of weapon, is the United States decision regarding the further expansion and the modernization of its chemical arsenal. The five-year programme amounting to \$10 billion includes the mass production of binary chemical munitions and the development of new methods for the use of chemical weapons. In spite of the fact that present United States stocks of chemical weapons



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

include about three million shells, tens of thousands of aircraft bombs, hundreds of thousands of mines and high explosive bombs, it is planned to increase the quantity of **chemical** charges up to five million units and to replace the types growing obsolete by new ones, and mainly by binary munitions.

The United States decision on chemical rearmament is part of an over-all scheme which includes the initiation of the production of neutron weapons, the plans for the stationing of new American nuclear missiles in western Europe and the general NATO decisions on the expansion of military preparations. According to the latest United States military doctrines, the European region is the most probable arena for the use of chemical weapons. The United States deputy Under-Secretary of Defense, speaking in Congress, stated that it was necessary to equip the United States armed forces with the newest types of chemical weapons in order "to have the possibility of conducting large-scale chemical warfare in Europe against the Warsaw Treaty countries".

We sometimes hear it said, including today in the Committee on Disarmament, that the production and deployment by the United States of new varieties of chemical weapons, and especially binary weapons, are essential in order to guarantee the security of the United States and also its allies, and because the United States is "lagging behind" the USSR in the sphere of chemical weapons, because of the "Soviet threat", and so on. Gentlemen, how often can the same pretexts be used, particularly when they have over and over again been flatly refuted, even by some leading American figures?

The world has already witnessed American discomfiture over the alleged United States lag in the sphere of nuclear weapons and bomber aircraft in the 1950s and over the "United States missile lag" in the early 1960s. Later it turned out for example that the Soviet "missile threat" had been overestimated by some 15-20 times, but by then the United States had already embarked on the mass production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus laying the foundation for a renewal of the arms race. The United States is now trying to convince us of its "backwardness" in the sphere of chemical weapons. The United States is obviously using these fables to try to persuade American taxpayers to finance its gigantic military programmes.

It is claimed that what is involved is a normal modernization of chemical weapons. In reality, the development of the production of binary weapons introduces a new generation of chemicals into the range of warfare agents.

The other side of the coin consists in the fact that the production of binary chemical weapons will considerably complicate the search for mutually acceptable solutions at the current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The work of the Committee at the present session has already confirmed this. Many delegations, both in the Ad Hoc Working Group and at plenary meetings, have pointed out the additional difficulties arising in connection with the emergence of binary weapons.

In this connection we would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to working paper CD/258, "Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons", submitted by a group of socialist countries. The sponsors of the paper, without claiming to give an exhaustive analysis of the negative consequences of embarking on the production of binary chemical weapons, mention a number of important points of direct relevance to the negotiations in progress in the Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation of Bulgaria put forward a number of specific questions which have arisen in connection with the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

decision on the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. It seems to us that the answers to these questions are of interest to all members of the Committee. The Yugoslav delegation submitted an interesting document on binary weapons in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We agree with the statement of the United Kingdom Ambassador that it is necessary to give careful consideration to the matter of binary chemical weapons before reaching any conclusion. One can also agree with his words that "binary weapons will need to be dealt with in a chemical weapons convention because, in common with all other types of chemical weapons, their production and stockpiling will be prohibited".

At the same time we can in no way share his opinion that the problems of control as regards binary weapons and as regards chemical weapons with ordinary unitary munitions differ very little from each other, since allegedly the components of binary weapons, designed by their nature to be highly reactive, are related to toxic chemicals also by their aggressiveness with respect to the material of the munition's case. There is no need to be an expert in order to understand that there is a serious inaccuracy here. From unclassified literature it may be learned that there is no correlation between a chemical's toxicity and its activity with respect to the material of the casing. Thus the high reactive capability of these chemicals is of no assistance in the matter of control.

As regards the additional difficulties which arise in connection with the emergence of binary chemical weapons, they include, for example, the ensuring of compliance by States parties with the commitment not to transfer chemical weapons, since the separation of chemicals for commercial purposes from chemicals for weapons purposes will become an almost insoluble problem. Difficulties will arise also in connection with the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production of such weapons, because it will be necessary to specify the **chemicals** for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons.

To illustrate this problem let us take the following example. As components for the synthesis of warfare agents in the binary charges being elaborated and developed in the United States, isopropanol and polysulfide are being used, i.e. common chemical products. Consequently, in order to produce binary munitions the Pentagon has no special need to establish new branches of industry. The other components of the binary synthesis -- the chemicals "DF" and "QL" -- are somewhat more complicated in their composition, but they, too, without any particular difficulty can be absorbed into the technological processes for the production of organophosphorus pesticides production. In addition, the cases of binary munitions are virtually the same in structure and shape as those of other special munitions (smoke, signal, propaganda, etc.) and they could be produced by factories producing ordinary munitions.

It is quite probable that even at factories producing the separate components of binary systems as well as cases for binary munitions, it will be impossible to determine the real purpose of the products. Thus even if the representatives of an international verification body are admitted to such a plant, they are unlikely to be able to detect anything relating to binary weapons. The conditions will therefore exist for the secret stockpiling and storage of chemicals for purposes of binary weapons -- for the production of chemical weapons within the framework of commercial production. We shall, of course, study document CD/265, introduced today by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, but all that we have said shows that there is no justification for the conclusion contained in the statement of Ambassador Ruth that "it is not true that binary production techniques cannot be subjected to reasonable and effective verification".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The idea of binary weapons allows the possibility of selecting the pairs of components among a wide range of chemicals, which would lead to the emergence of ever new varieties and modifications of chemical agents with the most diversified spectrum of effects. This fact means that the establishment of a list of potential chemical agents to be prohibited would become meaningless. How, then, is it possible to dismiss as "nonsense", as the representative of the United States did today, the concern of a large number of States, including a number of Western countries, at the appearance of binary weapons?

We are saying all this now, not in order to give a political assessment of the actions connected with the production of binary weapons. That has already been done, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in resolution 36/96 B, which contains an appeal to States to refrain from the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. As you know, of the 157 States Members of the United Nations, only one voted against this resolution — the United States of America. Here in the Committee on Disarmament we are concerned, first and foremost, about the fate of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and about the **effectiveness** of **any agreements** that might be reached at those negotiations.

The same resolution contains an appeal to States to refrain from stationing chemical weapons in those countries where there are no such weapons at present. This appeal, which in particular was also adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union, is designed to increase the effectiveness of a future agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is important, in our view, that while efforts are being directed towards the elaboration of a convention and also during the first years of its implementation, when stocks of chemical weapons are to be destroyed, no actions should be allowed which could lead to a proliferation of chemical weapons on the globe, and in particular to their stationing on the territories of other States. In the Ad Hoc Working Group, the Soviet delegation has already submitted a draft for a provision of the convention on the non-stationing of chemical weapons, either directly or indirectly, on the territories of other States during the period of implementation of the commitment on their destruction or conversion to non-hostile purposes. It would be a good idea also if we were to consider together how to solve the question of the non-stationing of chemical weapons also during the period before the convention enters into force.

I should like now to touch upon questions of verification. We have repeatedly stated, and we reaffirm it again, that we, no less than others, are concerned that the commitments under the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be strictly observed. We do not therefore altogether understand the United States representative's excessive emphasis of the importance of verification questions. Whom was he actually trying to convince? — himself?

The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity to express in the Committee on Disarmament the substance of our views regarding the verification of compliance with a prohibition on chemical weapons. In order not to repeat myself I will refer to our statement of 31 March 1981. Briefly, our view is that control should be based on national methods of verification, supplemented by international procedures; it should not be accompanied by "total verifications", which are tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of States and are detrimental to peaceful industry. Control should in all respects and at all times be commensurate with the real requirements of the convention and ensure the fulfilment of each of the undertakings provided for in it.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The representative of the United States attempted in his statement to present the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in a distorted light. He asserted that they rule out international forms of verification. This, like many other things in the statement of the United States delegation, is not in accordance with the facts. I repeat: we are in favour of a combination of different types of control measures. At the same time it is clear from the statement of the representative of the United States that the latter recognizes nothing other than systematic intrusive international verification. That, to be precise, is the true situation.

How then can we solve this difficult problem, taking into account all these requirements, which are undoubtedly fair in themselves, and on a basis acceptable to all States parties to the future convention? Past experience suggests that the time has come to change somewhat the methods used for the examination and elaboration of provisions on verification.

It seems to us that we could stop discussing in general terms whether preference should be given to national or to international means of verification, whether international on-site inspection should be carried out on a voluntary basis or not, whether such verification should be conducted when necessary, upon demand, by request, according to lots, on a systematic, regular, periodical basis, etc., etc., and pass on to a consideration of verification problems in a more specific way.

We have in mind the following. Clearly under the convention, the States parties will assume a very specific range of obligations. To a large extent these have already been defined. Thus, there is the possibility of considering concretely, for each of these obligations, what forms and types of control would be necessary and to what degree.

For example, States will be obliged to destroy within established periods of time their stocks of chemical weapons. There could be endless discussions, with no common view emerging, as to whether, in connection with this obligation, there should or should not be international inspections at the site of the destruction, whether samples should be taken at the same time, and if so of what kind, how often and by whom, etc. In order to start making some headway, we could proceed differently. We could think carefully about the series of measures necessary in order reliably and effectively to guarantee the destruction of stocks, beginning with those that are the most natural and easy for States to carry out, and passing on if necessary to the more complicated and difficult ones. In other words, whenever a common opinion emerges to the effect that national verification measures may be insufficient, appropriate international procedures could be discussed according to the same principle -- that is, proceeding from the relatively simpler to the more complicated measures.

In proposing that we should proceed in this way we are taking into account the extreme difficulty of devising a verification system which, while ensuring the requisite control over compliance with the convention, at the same time meets the need to respect the legitimate security interests of the States parties.

All more complicated and difficult verification measures should be used only in cases where the control measure more acceptable to the State cannot give the desired result i.e. provide the assurance that the convention is being implemented.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This approach takes into account also the important fact that the control measures will be supplemented by various kinds of declarations, the exchange of information and other measures giving States the assurance of compliance with the convention.

Allow me to refer to the words of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, concerning questions of control in connection with a nuclear weapons test ban. In particular he said: "The quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all." Ambassador Okawa further said that the adequacy of any verification system is probably in the last resort a question of political assessment.

Distinguished delegates, we must endeavour to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem. It is completely out of place to put forward preliminary conditions, as was done today, in an almost threatening manner, like an ultimatum: either the Committee accepts unconditionally the principles of verification for a convention prohibiting chemical weapons that please the United States, or that country will not become a party to the future convention. That is not the language of negotiation. It will lead nowhere. It merely compromises those who resort to it.

I should like to make one general observation. With every new development in the consideration of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Working Group shows a quite natural and lawful tendency to go deeper into the technical points and details. This reflects the progress in its work. At the same time, we would like to warn against too great a passion for discussing various, sometimes strictly scientific and even abstract problems which will merely deflect us from the immediate and priority task of the earliest possible elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons.

The Soviet delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the way in which the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been organized and is proceeding this year. Precisely in accordance with the new mandate, intensive work is being done on individual provisions of the future convention, and comments and working papers are being put forward which contain at times some interesting approaches. We are especially pleased to note all this since the Chairman of the Group is our friend Ambassador B. Sujka.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties mentioned in our statement today, we are optimistic as regards the possibility of achieving progress in the field of chemical disarmament. At the same time we naturally understand that a great deal of work still remains to be done in order to make this progress real. We call upon other delegations to co-operate constructively in this important matter.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In recent years the United States and some of its allies have often tried to envenom the political atmosphere in many international bodies, including the Committee on Disarmament, with baseless slander directed at socialist States. One of the favourite forms of this slander has been references to some kind of involvement of the Soviet Union in alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

We have repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union has nowhere and never violated any international agreements including those in the fields of arms limitation and disarmament. Nevertheless the slander continues, as was shown by the statement of the United States delegation at today's meeting. This is done in order to justify before public opinion, including that of their own country, the new spirals in the chemical arms race. The false and fabricated character of this statement is shown among other things by the fact that the initiators of the slander, while shedding crocodile tears over alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol slyly, and of course intentionally, pass over in silence the terrible consequences of their own actions in south-east Asia. The representative of the United States did not say that the crimes of the American soldiery in this region of the world are still having their effects even today. It is true that the United States representative recognized that "the United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect", but he did not dare to admit that the United States itself has made extensive use of chemical weapons, that no State in the world in the whole history of mankind has used chemical weapons on such a scale as the United States. And again, he did not say that the consequences of the crimes of American militarists in south-east Asia are continuing today.

Recently a delegation of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR visited Viet Nam, where it examined the conclusions of the studies of the consequences of chemical warfare in that country. Here are some of them. The mass utilization by the United States armed forces of chemical weapons against Viet Nam during the period 1961-1971 caused profound changes in the ecology of the country, greatly undermined the economy and inflicted irreparable damage on the health of the population of Viet Nam. More than 100,000 tons of various chemical agents were used against the people of Viet Nam, including 96,000 tons of phytotoxins and more than 7,000 tons of war gases. Toxic chemical agents were spread over 44 per cent of the tropical forests and jungles and 40 per cent of the cultivated areas of South Viet Nam. In their attacks on large tracts of forests and cultivated lands, the United States armed forces used chemical agents in huge quantities -- from 10 to 100 kg per hectare. In recent times, to the many thousands of victims of chemical weapons during the period of the war there have been added the victims of those weapons' so-called long-term consequences. These are people suffering from nervous disorders, skin diseases and more serious illness such as, for example, cancer of the liver. The women of Viet Nam give birth to deformed babies; they are subject to abnormal pregnancies and miscarriages.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Most anomalies observed now in Viet Nam, especially during child-birth, are the result of disorders of the genetic structures caused by dioxine. It should be noted that the nature of the changes in the genetic structures observed in Viet Nam in those of the population who suffered the effects of the "orange mixture" are similar to the changes in the chromosome structures observed in the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who suffered the horror of atomic bombing. Thus at the present time it can be affirmed that as a result of the use by the United States of various types of weapons of mass destruction, there are on our planet two sets of people with disorders of the genetic structures: they are among the inhabitants of Japan and Viet Nam.

It is becoming more and more clear that Americans themselves are among the victims of the chemical warfare carried out by the United States in Viet Nam. The ecological delayed-action bomb which they laid in Viet Nam has transformed itself into a boomerang destroying the very Americans who participated in the war in Viet Nam. Those who carried out chemical attacks are now suffering in the same way as their former adversaries and victims. Thousands of veterans victims of chemical weapons are registered now in the United States.

Those who are now doing their utmost to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have allegedly used chemical weapons wish to pass over the above-mentioned crimes in silence.

The representatives of the Soviet Union, including those at the highest level, in different international bodies have resolutely repudiated this lie. We would like to point out that many eminent scientists and experts, including some in the United States, have found a complete incompatibility of the above-mentioned fabrications with the scientific, medical and technical data. Substantially the same conclusion was reached also by the group of experts who, as is clear both from the document they submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly and from press reports, were unable during their official visit to Asia to find any evidence of the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons. Even the most zealous instigators of the anti-Soviet campaign are compelled to recognize the absence of any facts on this score.

Allow me, for example, to quote the note verbale of 14 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General: "American experts have studied and evaluated the symptoms described in these reports in order to determine what poisonous substance or substances could have had such effects. They came to the conclusion that none of the known classical chemical warfare agents, either alone or in combination with other substances, could have caused the symptoms that were described or have led, as was reported, to such rapid death." The matter could have been closed there. The soap-bubble burst, but the State Department decided to continue the campaign it had begun.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Nothing is changed and nothing can be changed in this regard by a new opus of the State Department. It is high time for the United States to stop inventing fables about Soviet-made chemical weapons. The insinuations of the Western press and officials about a "Soviet chemical threat" will not become true by being repeated many times. Neither the Western press, nor those who give it biased disinformation have or can have any objective data about the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons because no such facts exist in nature.

Two words about the Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union's position regarding the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States has been repeatedly stated by President Brezhnev. We are prepared to resume the talks that have been broken off, but we are not begging for them. We can make headway either with or without negotiations with the United States. But we cannot permit a distortion of the facts.

Typical of such distortion in the statement of the United States representative was the attempt to create the impression that some kind of deadlock had occurred in the Soviet-American negotiations over the question of control. There was no such deadlock in those talks, as is evident in particular from the Soviet-American report to the Committee on Disarmament of 7 July 1980. That report (CD/112) states in particular: "The United States and the Soviet Union wish to inform the member States of the Committee on Disarmament of their earnest intention to continue their persistent efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to the extremely complex unresolved issues relating to a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to completing successfully the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations and presenting a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest possible time."

How is it possible to talk about a deadlock when in fact the date was given for the next round of talks-- January 1981. The United States unilaterally broke off those negotiations in the same way as it broke off many other negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms limitation questions. They decided to do this, not because of any difficulties which had arisen on one question or another in the course of the negotiations, but in accordance with the general anti-Soviet policy adopted in the matter of armaments by the Government of the United States. That is true on this matter also.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as is shown among other things by their actions in the Committee, are actively participating in the efforts aimed at the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons, and they believe that this type of weapon of mass destruction should once and for all be eliminated from military arsenals.



The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. The last three speakers on the list of speakers for today, namely, the representatives of Kenya, Argentina and China, have very kindly, in view of the lateness of the hour, agreed to defer their statements to the next plenary meeting of the Committee, on Tuesday, 30 March. I should like to thank them on behalf of the Committee for the understanding they have shown and to assure them that their names will appear at the head of the list of speakers for the meeting on 30 March. Are there any other comments? Ambassador Herder has asked for the floor.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic highly appreciates your efforts to promote an early agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1 of our agenda.

In recent days, my delegation, the delegation of the People's Republic of Poland as well as other delegations addressed pertinent questions to the United States delegation in order to clarify some problems connected with the United States proposal on this subject made on 11 March. We are very much interested in having clear answers to all those questions because this would provide my Government with the necessary information to determine our further approach to the elaboration of the above-mentioned draft mandate.

After having had a look at the list of today's speakers and having noticed that the United States representative was on the list, I had expected, frankly speaking, an answer from him to the many questions which were addressed to his delegation in connection with our efforts to agree on a mandate for a CTBT working group. I hoped that after several attempts made by my delegation and other delegations to get some explanations from the United States delegation, that delegation would at least respect the wishes expressed by members of the Committee and show a constructive approach to the items inscribed in our agenda. What happened was just the opposite.

It was with deep regret that my delegation today listened to a fairly undisguised statement on the necessity of a new spiral in the chemical arms race. Obviously, the country concerned needs not only nuclear-weapon tests for a "credible deterrence" but also a "chemical weapons deterrence". Thus, we may ask ourselves if the Committee on Disarmament, shortly before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, should be transformed into a Committee for advertising and justifying different kinds of doctrines on deterrence and on the need to develop and deploy corresponding sophisticated weapons. As far as binary weapons, verification of compliance with a chemical weapons convention, and the "alleged use of chemical weapons" are concerned, my delegation explained its position on 23 March. There is no need to repeat our arguments.

Through you, Mr. Chairman, we repeat our request to the above-mentioned delegation to respond to our questions, since a failure to do so could complicate, even delay an understanding on a draft mandate for a CTB working group.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I did not wish to raise a point of order out of respect for Ambassador Herder whose rank is higher than mine, but since three distinguished representatives, those of Kenya, Argentina and China, have withdrawn their names from the list of speakers, I think we ought to abide by your decision and close the meeting now.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belgium. I understood that the statement made by the representative of the German Democratic Republic was in exercise of his right of reply, and it was for that reason that I gave him the floor.

I should like now briefly to mention another subject. I should like to remind members of the Committee that, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations applying to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Friday, 9 April and Monday, 12 April, will be official holidays. The Committee will not, therefore, be able to hold any meetings on those two days. The Chairman is well aware that we shall certainly have a great deal of work to do during the last two weeks of the first part of our session, and I shall therefore consult the chairmen of the working groups to find out their needs as regards additional meetings, particularly during the month of April. As I said at our plenary meeting last Thursday, we shall perhaps in the future be obliged to hold simultaneous meetings. In drawing up the timetable for the coming weeks, the Chairman will endeavour to reduce the number of such meetings to the minimum necessary to enable the Committee to complete its tasks.

The secretariat has distributed to you today, at my request, an informal document containing a timetable for the meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, it is purely indicative and can be modified later, if necessary, according to the requirements of our work.

If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Committee agrees to this timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): May I remind you that the Committee is to hold an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m. to consider methods for the review of its composition. At the same time I should like to put before the Committee the question of deciding on the date of closure of our session, with a view to our having, if possible, an exchange of views on this subject and reaching an agreement. Immediately afterwards, there will be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 30 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 30 March 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario ALESSI

(Italy)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY  
Mr. M. MATI  
Mr. MAACHI  
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE  
Mr. V. ESPECHE GIL

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE  
Miss DE CLERQ  
Miss G. VAN DEN BERGH

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. GRINBERG  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO  
Mr. LI WEIMIN

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK  
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY  
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Miss L. GHAZERIAN  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKS  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. B. MAUNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. R. Di CARLO

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN  
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AKRAM  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. G. ANDERSSON

Mr. S. ERICSON

Mrs. G. JONÅNG

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

Mr. H.E. SWIFT

United States of America:

Mr. B. BUSBY

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament  
and Personal Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 167th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee begins today its consideration of item 6 of its agenda, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so.

In this connection, members of the Committee will recall that at the 164th plenary meeting the Committee began examining document CD/260 entitled, "Progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the thirteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events", and that at our informal meeting on Friday last I informed them that I would invite the Committee to adopt the recommendations contained in that document at the end of our plenary meeting today.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Kenya, Argentina, China, Venezuela, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Sweden, Morocco and Belgium.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Kenya, Mr. Don Nanjira.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor.

If I had made my current intervention as originally planned on 25 March, I would have limited my remarks to the important question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Since, however, I am taking the floor at a very critical stage in the work of the Committee's current session, with only two to three weeks still left at its disposal before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, I should first like to take the liberty of making a few observations on the state of the current negotiations -- I use the term "negotiations" for lack of a more appropriate expression to describe what has been happening since the Committee convened here on 2 February last, for indeed there has been less negotiation than I would have liked to see on the substantive issues before the Committee and on the international agenda for disarmament which we unanimously adopted last month for substantive examination by the Committee at this spring session. Looking back on the deliberations of the Committee in the past eight weeks, I conclude that there are two broad chapters in the Committee's activities which not only deserve our full recognition and reaffirmation but also require priority treatment at this point in time of the Committee's work. These points pertain to the common features and fundamental characteristics of the mandate of the Committee on Disarmament and of each of its subsidiary bodies and the problem areas requiring the Committee's closest attention at this juncture of our deliberations and indeed on this eve of the second special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament. The negotiating mandate of the Committee on Disarmament on all disarmament issues seems to be highly questionable indeed amongst some States represented herein; but there is no question that the said mandate must be strictly observed by all of us, if the Committee is not to be rendered impotent in the execution of its responsibilities. The same applies to all the subsidiary organs of the Committee on Disarmament. To refuse, therefore, to recognize the duty and right of the Committee to negotiate multilaterally on every question and on all issues of disarmament would be to incapacitate the Committee and deny it its rightful responsibility of dealing with and finding lasting solutions to disarmament questions through mutually acceptable formulations and language.



(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

There is no way we ourselves and the 40 States we represent which, although admittedly not sovereignly equal are none the less and unquestionably equally sovereign, can deserve the high honour and carry out with complete dignity the heavy responsibility bestowed upon us by the world community -- namely, to undertake to continue substantive negotiations, I repeat, substantive negotiations, on the priority questions of disarmament on the Committee's agenda, as agreed both in the Final Document and in the General Assembly's relevant decisions and resolutions, some of which I had occasion to cite in my observation of last week -- unless we recognize the over-all negotiating capacity of the Committee in the field of disarmament, and facilitate the Committee's exercise of authority in this regard.

The expression "negotiate" is the key; it is the operative, the fundamental characteristic in the terms of reference of the Committee on Disarmament. I am aware, Mr. Chairman, as you yourself are, and as are many of the other distinguished delegations seated around this table, of the unacceptable quality and unpalatable nature which have been attributed to the concept of "negotiation" in more recent months by some delegations. But as far as I am concerned, negotiation for the purposes of the Committee on Disarmament means discussion of substantive issues of disarmament on which the various delegations hold divergent views and positions but make every effort, bona fide, to find just and fair resolutions to their differences through the employment of a mutually acceptable language. The absence, then, of any of these five elements in the negotiating process can only result in empty rhetoric, politicking and even mere intellectual exchanges which, no matter how gratifying they may be, should have no place in this Committee because they would be invaders and strangers in the midst of the Committee's terms of reference.

The next common or fundamental feature of the Committee on Disarmament is that its negotiating character, which emanates from paragraph 120 of the Final Document and resolution 36/92 F of the General Assembly, among other sources of the Committee's negotiating nature, extends to every subsidiary organ which may be created within the Committee to help the latter expedite its work. Therefore, every subsidiary body established within the Committee must be entrusted with a mandate to negotiate each and every aspect of disarmament which falls directly within the sphere of competence of the subsidiary body, as agreed in the Final Document and in all the other relevant documents, resolutions and decisions of the United Nations General Assembly.

In this respect, the mandate of each of the ad hoc working groups on security assurances, chemical weapons and radiological weapons includes provisions for the elaboration of a multilateral convention or conventions in their respective fields of disarmament. Thus, on security assurances, for instance, there are provisions to that effect not only in the Final Document (for example its paragraph 59) but also in such General Assembly resolutions as 36/94 and 36/95. On chemical weapons paragraph 75 of the Final Document together with General Assembly resolutions 36/96 A and B are particularly relevant. On radiological weapons we have, for example, paragraph 76 of the Final Document and General Assembly resolution 36/97 B.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

In the area of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, paragraph 77 of the Final Document and General Assembly resolution 36/89 clearly and earnestly call for the prevention and prohibition through multilateral treaties of any emergence and/or development and manufacture of new generation weapons of mass destruction. The stipulations regarding the nuclear test ban have clearly been inscribed in General Assembly resolutions 36/84 and 36/85 and the only reason, Mr. Chairman, why I am referring to these resolutions and paragraphs is because they all point to the fundamental negotiating nature of the Committee on Disarmament which, needless to say and as I have indicated above, does not seem to be totally acceptable in some quarters of the Committee.

We also need, at this juncture of our work, to pay close attention to the fact that the Committee is obligated at this session to make specific recommendations to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the work of the Committee since the first special session. General Assembly resolutions 36/81 A, 36/84, 36/85, 36/92 F, 36/96 A and 36/97 B, which I have already referred to above, do, in some of their operative paragraphs, expressis verbis request the Committee to make a positive contribution to the preparatory process for the second special session. It is also noteworthy that General Assembly resolutions 36/96 A and B on chemical weapons and 36/97 B on radiological weapons, like the Final Document itself, call for an elaboration of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons and on their destruction.

In the light of the foregoing observations, and bearing in mind both the very short period of time still left at our disposal before the conclusion of this session of the Committee, and the duty and necessity for it to present the results of its current work to the Preparatory Committee for the second special session, which, as we all know, will convene its last session in New York almost immediately following the closure of our current session, I firmly believe that the time has indeed arrived for us to begin examining the items on our agenda primarily in the context of the second special session. We should now look more closely at those problem areas which, in our opinion, require the Committee's closest attention before the said special session, as well as our formulation of concrete and specific recommendations for the consideration of and ultimate adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Obviously, the field of priority issues of disarmament is as broad and complex as disarmament itself, but in my judgement the following should be among the primary questions which, on the eve of the special session, deserve and ought to receive our highest attention at this point in time of the Committee's work:-

- (1) The Committee's special report to the General Assembly at its second special session as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 36/92 F

On this we should receive as soon as possible the skeleton of the special report in the light of the views exchanged herein and the guidelines given herefrom to the Secretary of the Committee, and as agreed. Once the draft is received, we should hold informal meetings on it without any delay, in the normal manner.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

(2) Creation of an ad hoc working group on a CTB

This is another extremely significant item. Sir,--we are aware of your efforts to create such a body, and my delegation, like the majority of delegations assembled here, would not welcome the creation of such a body with half a mandate. Agreement must therefore be reached quickly on a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament which shall undertake substantive consideration of a nuclear test ban. Once we agree, in principle, that the terms of reference of such a body will not be limited to the discussion and negotiation of some items, but that it will, rather, consider and reach agreement on all fundamental issues of the CTB, then the newly created working group could start negotiations on any of the fundamental issues of CTB -- verification and compliance, for instance.

At this session also, a specific recommendation should be made with regard to the establishment of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament -- which is item 2 of our agenda. The Committee could formally create such a body at its 1982 summer session. And sufficient documentation exists for the creation of such working groups, including document CD/181 and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

(3) Elaboration of a CPD

While not pretending that a clean text of a comprehensive programme of disarmament can be agreed upon at the current session of the Committee, I would none the less call for more flexibility in the positions of some delegations and groups of delegations, in the negotiations currently being carried out under the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, to whom I would once more like to extend the gratitude of the Kenyan delegation for the tireless efforts he has been exerting over the months in the negotiations conducted within the CPD Working Group. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to request the Ambassador of Mexico, H.E. Alfonso García Robles, to reveal to me the secret of manufacturing new and renewable sources of energy which give him all the stamina and discipline and tenacity and toughness par excellence which he possesses, and yet enable him at the same time to remain so agreeable, likeable and most respectable. Such a revelation would no doubt be a confidence-building measure to newcomers to the Disarmament Committee like myself.

The search for mutual understanding, flexibility and co-operation on CPD negotiations must be continued. We must continue to look for a common language and a meeting of minds on the main basis of the three documents submitted by the various groups of delegations on a CPD, that is, CD/223, CD/205 and CD/245. We should now attempt to minimize the brackets in a consolidated text and thereby facilitate the work of the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

(4) Elaboration of draft provisions for a multilateral convention on chemical weapons

Here too, my delegation is appreciative of the efforts and patience of the distinguished Ambassador Sujka of Poland, who is currently the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. This is a very complex area of the Committee's activity, but we must continue to look for compromise and accommodation on the main basis of document CD/220, but of course full justice should and will be given to the numerous other papers presented to the Group for negotiation.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

The same applies to

(5) Elaboration of draft provisions for a multilateral convention on radiological weapons

The Working Group on this subject is currently chaired by the distinguished Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, to whom also I am grateful for the manner in which he has been guiding the deliberations of the Group. A consensus seems to be emerging in that Group on some of the various formulations that are being derived from the numerous papers before the Committee. This is an encouraging trend, the ultimate fruition of which we shall impatiently await.

(6) Elaboration of drafting provisions for a multilateral convention on security assurances

Here, too, there are some encouraging signs, thanks to the efforts of the distinguished Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan. Obviously, many difficulties remain to be overcome in all the aforementioned working groups, and questions have repeatedly been asked as to how to proceed henceforth with the work in the Groups, now that the second special session is just around the corner. Well, it seems to me that care must be taken not to let the proliferation of proposals and counterproposals overwhelm us or subdue and overtake the capacity of the Committee to examine and manage them. These papers should be thoroughly examined, consolidated and negotiated against the background of the existing basic documents. Common elements in the various texts should be identified and restructured in logical sequences. We should avoid proliferating brackets and duplicating formulations. One way of minimizing brackets is to maintain them only around formulations where fundamental differences still exist. Similarly, it would not be advisable to reproduce all the past and present views and comments expressed by delegations on all the items, and a unanimous decision could and should be taken to that effect before the closure of the Committee's current session. The consolidated texts could be used as bases for further future negotiations and the secretariat could prepare them appropriately as draft reports which could, for instance, be divided into three broad categories or sections. In category A, for instance, would be placed all the provisions or elements on which a meeting of minds has been achieved. In category B would be placed provisions or elements on which there is still no complete consensus but where the differences are not all that deep or fundamental. And category C would comprise provisions or elements on which fundamental differences still exist, and this section of the report would be allotted the highest concentration of negotiation in the future. Each of the three sections could then be concluded by the substantive reactions and comments of the various delegations, but again only those comments whose elimination could not be agreed upon. Attempts to remove the differences and brackets would be continued through the remaining preparatory process for and during the General Assembly special session itself in New York.

In this endeavour, my delegation stands ready and indeed eager to participate as effectively and constructively as possible, despite our very limited human resources, and finally, but not least among the highest priority issues for the second special session is the question of strengthening the negotiating capacity of the Committee on Disarmament and the problem of a review of the Committee's membership. I realize that you yourself, Mr. Chairman, have started conducting informal consultations on this issue, and my delegation reiterates its full support

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

for that approach. We hope that the Committee can reach agreement soon on how to treat this matter. Our main wish is that the Committee should retain its fundamental characteristic as the single multilateral negotiating body on all matters of disarmament. Its other fundamental characteristics of efficiency, effectiveness and speed, must also be promoted and safeguarded. These must be stressed both now and at the special session of the General Assembly.

Distinguished delegates, permit me now to turn to the second part of my address today, the subject of which is item 3 of our agenda, namely Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The existing literature on disarmament stresses the fact that nuclear weapons constitute the greatest and gravest threat to humanity. In the context of my current intervention, paragraphs 11, 18, 32, 33 and 56 through 65 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are particularly relevant. A good number of resolutions have also been adopted by the General Assembly on the question of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States like my own, Kenya. Many delegations have also articulated their positions many times throughout the existence of this Committee, and in my statement of 23 February, I expressed the serious concern of my delegation, and we are not alone in this respect, at the lack of progress in the deliberations on the Committee's highest priority items, i.e., items 1 and 2 of our agenda. During that address, I emphasized a few points to which my delegation attaches great importance -- for instance, that the maintenance and strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States would depend to a very large extent upon the behaviour of nuclear-weapon States, and that the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence was unacceptable to many delegations because it is a very bad and dangerous paradox. I cannot help but reiterate our earnest call to the nuclear-weapon Powers to re-examine their declared policies and positions relating to arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is as closely connected with the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban as is the NPT with the CTBT, which the world community has been seeking for a good number of years already. Obviously, patience is a great virtue, but it has its own limits, and as for the non-nuclear-weapon States, they have exercised and will no doubt continue to exercise their legitimate right to demand that the nuclear-weapon States provide immediately concrete and legally binding undertakings regarding a substantial and accelerated progress toward nuclear disarmament and the ultimate conclusion of a legally binding convention on general and complete disarmament under strict, adequate and effective international control.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

As indicated in paragraph 32 of the Final Document, the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States as presented in 1980 are unacceptable to the Group of 21 and to many other delegations because not only do the said declarations lack the firm commitment of their authors necessary to implement the legitimate demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States, but worse still, and ironically, the declarations seek to protect the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves against non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation fully subscribes to and reiterates the position of the Group of 21 which states that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States must be universal and unconditional. I note, therefore, with appreciation the repeatedly and unilaterally declared assurance first made in 1964 by the People's Republic of China that "at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons". We note also with interest the proposals of China on the question of security assurances contained in document CD/207 of 6 August 1981. That document deserves close examination, and we hope that the other nuclear-weapon Powers can come up with revised positions which could also be subjected to scrutiny by the Committee on Disarmament. Such a move would indeed be in line with paragraph 59 of the Final Document, which in essence necessitates the making of urgent efforts by the nuclear-weapon Powers to conclude effective and unconditional arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, my delegation reiterates the need fully and strictly to observe the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was signed on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. This Treaty serves the security interests of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear alike. Pending, therefore, the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of an international convention on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, it is evident that action must be taken by the international community along the following lines, inter alia:

1. There is an imperative need to accelerate, within the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, the process of elaborating a convention valid for all time on the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;
2. Nuclear Powers should urgently extend effective and adequate arrangements to all non-nuclear-weapon States without any limitations or conditions;
3. The testing of nuclear weapons should be halted at once;
4. A complete and prompt prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be effected.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

5. Effective and adequate international arrangements should be established against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones;

6. An urgent adoption of an international treaty to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be effected; and

7. It is essential urgently and fully to implement the decisions and recommendations of the international community adopted at the global or regional levels in the field of disarmament, for example, resolutions Nos. 28/72-P and 29/12-P, respectively on Strengthening the Security of Non-nuclear States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and the Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, which were adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Baghdad, Iraq, from 1 to 6 June 1981.

Security assurances must thus be extended not only to non-nuclear-weapon States, but also to nuclear-weapon-free zones, and here also, the behaviour of nuclear-weapon States will be a significant determining factor, especially at this point in time when we are experiencing the most sophisticated and rapid technological advances. Similarly, non-nuclear-weapon States must be protected both from attacks and threats of attack with nuclear weapons in all environments, including outer space.

In conclusion, then, I must say that the ball is in the court of the nuclear-weapon Powers, but the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances should now build up on the areas of convergence and concentrate their efforts on those specific issues and problems encountered in the various proposals, where major disagreements still exist between the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. In short, then, the search for a "common approach" acceptable to all delegations should be intensified, and the mandate of the said Ad Hoc Working Group should be renewed promptly at the beginning of each year of the Committee's work, in order to enable the Working Group to continue negotiating, with a view to reaching agreement, as recommended by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I wish to state that the Kenya delegation is indeed satisfied with the manner in which informal contacts and consultations are being held, particularly on items 1 and 2 of our agenda, under your able and competent chairmanship. The consultations are proving to be very useful, and I hope that the momentum and willingness to discuss candidly the differences among the various delegations and groups of delegations will be maintained and intensified in order to reach an early agreement on both the procedural and the substantive problems before us for resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I have already had an opportunity to express the satisfaction of my delegation, Mr. Chairman, at seeing you presiding over the work of this Committee, as also of expressing our appreciation of the very efficient work done by your predecessor as Chairman of the Committee, the Ambassador of Iran. Allow me, then, on this occasion, Sir, simply to express my delegation's pleasure upon the arrival in this Committee of two new representatives, the Ambassadors of the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, and also my personal regret at the departure of Ambassador Malitza of Romania my friendship with whom dates back 20 years and with whom it was a pleasure to work in this Committee. I should like to ask the Romanian delegation kindly to convey to Ambassador Malitza the best wishes of my delegation and of myself personally for his success in the new duties with which his Government has entrusted him.

Today I should like to speak about the agenda item that was the subject of our discussion last week, when I was originally to have spoken, namely, item 4 of the Committee's agenda, on "Chemical weapons".

First of all, I would like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the agreement which allowed the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group to be broadened -- a change long sought and which we are well aware was not an easy one. It is to be hoped that the new mandate will give a fresh impetus to the efforts that were so ably guided in previous years by Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard, and that are now being conducted with the same enthusiasm by Ambassador Sujka.

It is unnecessary to stress the importance of a convention on chemical weapons in the general context of disarmament. Agreement on such a convention in the near future would meet the deep desire of the international community which has so far remained unfulfilled, despite the bilateral negotiations which took place between the United States of America and the Soviet Union and the many years of multilateral discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee.

It is true that, owing to the very nature of chemical substances, their prohibition gives rise to a number of technical problems. There is little divergency with regard to super-toxic lethal chemicals since their high level of toxicity means that they cannot be used in peaceful activities or for research purposes, except in minute quantities.

The picture is not so clear, however, with regard to the lethal and harmful chemical substances which, because of their dual nature, the constant development of the chemicals industry and ceaseless research, are indispensable in medicine, agriculture and other peaceful fields.

Precursors and the appearance of "binary weapons" have added new and difficult problems to the formulation of a precise and correct definition of the chemical weapons which are to be prohibited by the convention.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In this connection my delegation, as it declared earlier, in its statement of 21 July 1981, considers that the definition of "chemical weapons" should include an express reference to "binary weapons".

The "general purpose" criterion will permit a broad distinction to be made between prohibited and permitted chemical substances, but it must be complemented by other criteria such as those of "toxicity", "chemical structure" and "quantity".

The complementarity of different criteria is particularly important in the matter of verification of compliance with the convention. The subjective nature of the so-called "general purpose" criterion and the difficulty of applying it, whether actively or passively, makes it necessary to have recourse to other means of establishing whether or not the production, stockpiling or transfer of a given substance in a given quantity constitutes a violation of the convention.

We believe that international records of the production, consumption, import and export of specific chemicals could be extremely useful in this connection.

The Argentine delegation, together with other delegations, has constantly advocated a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, the scope of which should include their "use".

Arguments have been put forward against this proposal which, with all due respect for the positions of the delegations concerned, my delegation has found very unconvincing.

It has been argued that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 comprehensively prohibits the use of chemical substances in warfare, that to restate this prohibition would raise doubts as to the recognized value of the Protocol and that the inclusion of verification machinery would give rise to ambiguities.

We do not believe this to be so, for the following reasons:

In the first place, the proponents of the express prohibition of the "use" of chemical weapons have in no way sought to discredit the 1925 Protocol. On the contrary, its validity could be clearly reaffirmed in the text of the convention, both in the preamble and in its operative part.

The existence of international treaties which mutually reaffirm and complement each other is a normal occurrence in the constant evolution of international instruments. Examples of this are the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 concerning the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, which were adopted in 1977. These Protocols first, in their preambles, reaffirm the validity of the Conventions of 1949 and then set forth a series of provisions complementing and developing those of the Conventions.

Secondly, the Protocol of 1925 was drafted at a certain stage in the history of international law, which has since undergone changes and progress. In the past, "war", the only term used in the Protocol, was clearly distinguished from other types of "armed conflict". The specific character of its conditions and protagonists gave rise to legal consequences which did not apply to other types of conflict.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

War was prohibited, first of all partially under the 1919 League of Nations Covenant and then wholly under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, but other armed conflicts whose characteristics did not qualify them to be described as casus belli, remained outside that prohibition. The Charter of the United Nations did away with that distinction, ruling out any resort to force.

From then on, the traditional term "war" was replaced by other expressions such as "armed conflict" or "hostilities", which broadened the concept as regards both the situations covered and the protagonists involved.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are a good example of the foregoing. Article 2 (1), common to the four Conventions, refers to "international armed conflicts", which includes both war and other armed conflicts between States, whatever their intensity. The Additional Protocols of 1977 continue that development by adding new elements to the concept.

The evolution of concepts can also be seen in the convention on chemical weapons we are discussing.

Element II of the draft contained in the report of the Working Group submitted in 1981 speaks of "hostile purposes", while element III refers to the prohibition of the transfer of chemical weapons to "anyone", a broad term which covers not only States but also any organization, group or person.

The limited nature of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is thus obvious, and the inclusion of the word "use" among the prohibitions of the new convention is therefore, in our view, essential.

Thirdly, the definition of the substances and devices prohibited under the Geneva Protocol is vague and gives rise to serious doubts as to whether it covers all the chemical weapons which the development of the chemical industry has made possible, including binary weapons.

And fourthly, in the course of the last 50 years many allegations have been made of the use of chemical weapons and we may assume from our experience of international realities that the same will happen in the future.

This situation of uncertainty, in which charges are made but there is no way of either establishing their truth or disproving them, is the result of the fact that the 1925 Protocol prohibited the "use" of chemical weapons but did not establish a procedure for the verification of compliance with that prohibition, and it can only be corrected if "use" is included within the general framework of the prohibition of a genuinely comprehensive convention embodying a satisfactory system of verification.

It is precisely to that other important aspect of the convention, verification, that I would like to refer now.

The problem of verification involves not only technical questions but also political decisions.

Argentina favours a flexible system of verification combining national and international mechanisms.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

We believe that international verification, including on-site inspections carried out on a non-discriminatory basis, is the only effective system for developing countries which do not have access to sophisticated technologies enabling them to ensure that other States parties are complying with the convention.

Some States are opposed to international verification, invoking arguments of sovereignty and claiming that it would constitute interference in their countries' industrial activities.

However, if international verification is carried out through a body representative of the States parties to the convention, established on the basis of a fair geographical distribution, which uses universally accepted methods and verifies compliance with the convention by all States parties equally, the interests of each country would be duly safeguarded.

In this sphere, discrimination is the element which affects the rights of States. And discrimination should not exist in a convention drafted within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, the first truly multilateral negotiating body; if the Committee's rule of consensus is applied to the conclusion of an agreement, that should guarantee its universal acceptance.

As it has already stated on previous occasions, my delegation considers it essential that a consultative committee made up of not too large a number of States parties and having at its disposal a group of experts appointed by those States, should be recognized as the body responsible for the control and verification of compliance with and implementation of the convention on chemical weapons.

This consultative committee should receive allegations of possible violations and be responsible for confirming or disproving them.

On the other hand, we are not in favour of including the United Nations Security Council in any stage of the procedure.

The present voting system in that body makes it unsuitable for playing a positive and impartial role in the sphere of verification.

In addition to considerations of a political nature, as I said earlier, there are the technical issues. Many documents have been submitted to the Working Group and to this Committee, describing possible methods of verification for each of the elements of the convention.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

I shall not go into the details of these suggestions but shall confine myself to pointing out that however much technological and scientific progress allows us to approach the ideal of complete and exhaustive verification, there will always be a margin for doubt, and the possibility of deception or concealment.

Will it ever be possible to be sure that a State has really destroyed all its stocks of chemical weapons? Or that it has not omitted to mention, in its declaration, certain of its storage places? What kind of verification could be established to prevent scientists and engineers from divulging key information that would allow others to manufacture chemical weapons?

Ambassador Okawa, speaking at the plenary meeting on 23 February last with reference to item 1 of our agenda, said the following:

"The effective functioning of a reliable verification system is of fundamental importance to any disarmament or arms control measure. However, the quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all. A reasonable balance has to be struck between the value of having a positive if not complete disarmament agreement, on the one hand, and the risk that certain violations may be theoretically possible in spite of the verification mechanism that has been agreed upon, on the other. Perhaps the adequacy of any verification system is ultimately a matter of political judgement and mutual trust."

We believe that the words of the Ambassador of Japan are just as pertinent in connection with the convention on chemical weapons.

Every treaty must be based on a certain amount of trust between the parties.

If a choice is to be made between having a convention with an adequate -- and I stress the word "adequate" -- system of national and international verification, even though this system may not be perfect for each and every one of its provisions, and having no convention at all, we prefer the former.

My delegation will continue to contribute to the search for a system acceptable to all, so that it may be possible with the goodwill and co-operation of all the members of the Committee, to draft a convention on chemical weapons, the adoption of which is becoming increasingly necessary and urgent.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, since the establishment of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons by the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, under the energetic guidance of Ambassador Okawa of Japan and Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, detailed and in-depth discussions have been held in the Group on questions relating to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Through the discussions on "the elements of a chemical weapons convention" in particular, many substantive issues have been clarified. We are pleased to see that this year the Committee has made a correct decision to enlarge the mandate of the Working Group, so that its work has proceeded to the important stage of elaborating the convention. It is our hope that under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland and with the efforts of all the delegations, the Working Group will fulfil the important task entrusted to it by the Committee.

Notwithstanding the fact that certain progress has been made in our work, the road leading to an agreement is not smooth and there is no ground for optimism about its prospects. Some events which have occurred over the past couple of years in particular have caused our deep concern. I am referring first of all to the charges about the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. An increasing number of reports and evidence have already aroused the close attention of world public opinion. It is only natural that people should demand that fair investigations be carried out to bring the truth to light. The United Nations has adopted resolutions to this effect and established investigation groups. However, the States concerned, while flatly denying their use of chemical weapons, have obstructed the investigation work. Under these circumstances, one may ask: how can the "confidence" they glibly talk about be established? If the existing international treaties cannot be proved to have been complied with, how can the effectiveness of the future convention be guaranteed? Such a state of affairs will inevitably cast a shadow over the ongoing negotiations. In addition, one Superpower has asserted that in order to offset the superiority of the other Superpower in chemical weapons, it has decided to produce binary chemical weapons. This decision is bound in its turn to lead to a further expansion of the chemical weapons arsenal of the other Superpower. We all know that to both Superpowers the technology of producing binary chemical weapons is nothing secret, and they both have the capability to produce such weapons in large quantities. The adoption of such technology would turn the production of chemical warfare agents into that of ordinary chemicals. As a result, the preparations for chemical warfare will become more covert and easier. This will further increase the danger of chemical warfare. The people of all countries are faced with the situation in which the arms race between the two States with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals has entered a new field and their development and use of chemical weapons is reaching a new stage. If this Working Group fails to make rapid progress in its negotiations and fails to conclude at an early date a convention on a general prohibition and the total destruction of chemical weapons, then the arms race between the Superpowers in the field of chemical weapons will further escalate and chemical weapons will probably be used more frequently and on a larger scale in wars and armed conflicts. This is something the people of the world are resolutely opposed to. The Committee on Disarmament has the responsibility to prevent the emergence of such a situation and to reach an agreement on the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons as soon as possible.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons is in the process of formulating the specific provisions of the future convention. We have consistently maintained that the scope of prohibition of the future convention should cover the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. The reason underlying this has been repeatedly explained by our delegation at plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and at meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. A provision on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons was proposed in document CD/CW/CRP.24 of 3 March 1982, co-sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, Pakistan and China. Here, I shall not repeat the reasons why the future convention will be complementary instead of contradictory to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, since they have been stated before. I simply want to confine myself to the following point, namely, that the Geneva Protocol lacks complaints procedures and verification clauses, which has resulted in failure to take the necessary actions to deal with and prevent acts of violation in the ensuing years. If the scope of prohibition of the future convention does not cover a prohibition of use, the measures of verification, no matter how detailed they may be, cannot apply to the use of chemical weapons, thus leaving a serious loophole. We hope that delegations present here, aware of the urgent need to prevent the use of chemical weapons, will take this proposal into serious consideration.

The Working Group has concretely discussed the question of verification. It is the consistent view of the Chinese delegation that a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons must provide for strict and effective international control and measures of verification. Without these, there can be no really meaningful disarmament agreement. The Chinese delegation has made it clear in its working paper CD/102, submitted in 1980, that there should be stringent and effective measures for international control and supervision to ensure the strict implementation of the provisions of the convention. An appropriate organ of international control should be set up for this purpose, charged with the responsibility of verifying the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons and the dismantling of facilities for their production. Such an organ should also be empowered to initiate prompt and necessary investigations in the event of a complaint concerning the use of chemical weapons or other violations, and to take appropriate measures to deal with such a violation when the complaint has been verified. In this regard, document CD/244 submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom recently offers a comparatively comprehensive proposal in the form of provisions for the future convention. We appreciate this contribution on the part of the United Kingdom delegation.

With regard to the composition, task and working procedures of the international verification mechanism, there are some concrete proposals and suggestions in working paper CD/220. What I would like to point out is that in respect of the verification task of the future international monitoring and control mechanism, the said paper and other working papers do not have a clear provision for effective on-site inspection of the use of chemical weapons. We deem such on-site verification not only necessary but also more pressing than ever before in view of the international incidents which have taken place in recent years. As a matter of fact, there has been an almost continuous flow of complaints about the use of chemical weapons ever since signature of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. For this reason, we are of the opinion that not only should the scope of prohibition in the future convention cover the use of chemical weapons, but the verification measures should also apply to the use of such weapons. In this way, the Geneva Protocol would be strengthened and the future convention would become more comprehensive and effective.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

The consultations of experts held not long ago adopted standardized methods for determining lethal toxicity through subcutaneous injection and inhalation, and suggested that an inventory be drawn up listing the key precursors of chemical warfare agents and other harmful chemicals, whose toxicity criteria are difficult to formulate. These concrete results of a technical nature can undoubtedly be helpful to the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. We welcome these positive results. The Chinese expert has also presented a working paper, contained in document CD/CN/CTC/3. It is our hope that the Committee will conduct more consultations on the technical problems during future sessions, taking advantage of the presence in Geneva of experts from various countries, in order to promote the progress of our negotiations. Of course we are fully aware that the negotiation on the prohibition of chemical weapons is mainly a political matter rather than a technical issue. In this respect, the two Superpowers which possess chemical weapons should undoubtedly have major responsibilities. If they could halt their chemical weapons arms race and demonstrate the sincerity that is required, the process of negotiations for the conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons would be greatly accelerated.

Mr. NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, before I begin to explain Venezuela's position with regard to the different items on our agenda, I would like to congratulate you upon your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. Our country enjoys particularly good relations with the country you represent.

I should also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to the Ambassador of Iran for the very efficient way in which he presided over the meetings of this Committee during the month of February.

Last year, I was warmly welcomed on my arrival here to represent my country in this the only multilateral negotiating forum, and it is now my pleasure to welcome in turn the representatives of the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, whose contributions will undoubtedly be of great benefit to the Committee in its work.

I also wish to bid farewell to my good friend Ambassador Halitza of Romania and to express my delegation's appreciation and very best wishes for his outstanding success in the new and important functions he has been called upon to discharge.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will take place very soon, and the most important document to be adopted at that session, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, while it may not now be in an embryonic state, is nevertheless still far from completion. Understandably, we are finding it very difficult to formulate the measures making up the programme.

The measures included in the programme should be very specific and subject to completion within a time-frame which, although flexible, ought not to be so flexible as to defeat its own purpose. We would stress that the comprehensive programme of disarmament ought to be adopted by consensus at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament since otherwise we shall lose sight of the primary objective of the programme, which is to unite the will of all the peoples of the world in a process directed towards general and complete disarmament.

This meeting of wills cannot be a mere compromise between ideas about disarmament. This is no longer possible. We do not all agree on how to bring about disarmament, but there will be no disarmament if we do not reach an agreement on how to achieve it. We

(Mr. Navarro, Venezuela)

need to "create disarmament". Ideas must combine to create a new substance composed of elements that should be inseparable, for otherwise a process which ought essentially to be universal will go on being distorted in order to satisfy the most egotistical interests.

The words of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Venezuela, Dr. José Alberto Zambrano Velasco, are more valid than ever, at this time of negotiation: "The moment of truth can be expressed in the following terms. It is the moment at which we clearly perceive that the new international order cannot be achieved by temporary adjustments, which would only prolong the current agony, but by a change in the fundamental conception of the world in which we are living."

The world is suffering more and more from a contagious disease which, as it spreads, is creating areas of tension and an unwarranted arms build-up that could well put an end to its very existence. The greatest danger to humanity is the one which is threatening its existence: atomic weapons.

The world could destroy itself many times over with the existing nuclear arsenal, but it seems that that is not enough; there are those who are not convinced that three tons of dynamite per person are enough to protect their security.

I could refer to studies like the one circulated in this Committee at the request of our delegation (document CD/233), which was prepared by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences at the request of Pope John Paul II in order to help persuade the leaders of the great powers of the world of the need for disarmament. I could also quote frightening paragraphs from the Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons and make your ears ring with the unbelievable figures of the money that is thus squandered, at the expense of the development of the peoples; but the great Powers' terror of insecurity makes them deaf to the most basic humanitarian demands of those who have nothing to do with but are rather the object of their policies of domination and expansionism, policies which, we repeat, are simply a reflection of their own insecurity, both internal and external.

We are pleased that negotiations are taking place in Geneva between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe, but we still ask that negotiations should be started on the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, as the Group of 21 requested in its documents CD/180 and CD/191 of 24 April 1981.

We have a new element to consider, in order to be able to begin negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The delegation of the United States of America has proposed the establishment of a subsidiary body to discuss and to define issues relating to verification and complaints to be dealt with in the comprehensive test-ban.

Our country is prepared, as it was last year, to seek means for negotiating a nuclear test ban. It was on the initiative, originally, of our delegation that informal meetings of the Committee were held at the last session on agenda items 1 and 2.

We would like once again to state that, after those consultations, in which we had exhausted all preliminary discussion on this subject our next step was nothing other than the negotiation of a nuclear test ban.



(Mr. Navarro, Venezuela)

Venezuela is prepared to consider the various alternatives for the mandate of the proposed working group only if it is understood that the work of that group will form part of the process of the negotiation of a nuclear test-ban treaty, meaning that there must be the intention to negotiate such a treaty, which is a matter of unquestionable priority and has been demanded countless times by the international community; otherwise, the Committee's time can be spent more usefully on something else. In short, if there is no intention of negotiating, there is no intention of coming to an agreement and so we know already what the results of such discussions will be.

The tasks of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons are of great interest to our country; there is a need for a convention which will complement and reinforce the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the purpose of eradicating those atrocious weapons - chemical weapons. We believe that policies of deterrence based on chemical weapons are incompatible with the objectives of such a convention. We hope that, through this convention, doubts with regard to the scope of application of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 may be resolved and that a procedure will be established for verifying charges of the use of chemical weapons as well as an adequate system for verification of compliance with the obligations flowing from the convention, whether these imply actions or refraining from actions. The importance of this convention as a true disarmament measure will reside precisely in the system of verification.

I shall resist the temptation to go into very detailed aspects of verification, but would like to stress the principle of verification since it is not only the details but the basic concept itself that is endangering the success of this future convention, as also, of course, that of the nuclear test-ban negotiations. In the first place, verification is in no way synonymous with confidence, nor can the one term be substituted for the other. Confidence is not achieved through verification and cannot be written into documents. It is a matter of the general attitude of one State towards another or towards the international community.

Whereas verification is a mechanical act, confidence is a human act. States must more actively endeavour to win the confidence of others, and a system of verification of a mixed character with the emphasis on openness towards the world forms part of this process of becoming worthy of confidence.

The so-called negative security assurances demanded by the non-nuclear-weapon States represent a just claim on the part of those countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and even more so of those which have renounced nuclear weapons through legally binding instruments. Venezuela, since it belongs to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, is covered by those assurances from all the nuclear-weapon powers, and we offer our solution and our experience to all those who, like ourselves, wish to ensure, through a legally binding instrument, that they will not be subjected to a nuclear attack. We do not share the views of those who do not possess nuclear weapons but would be prepared to use them. It is clear to us that the only real assurance is the non-existence of nuclear weapons; however, if what we are now talking about is provisional measures, then we are satisfied at having obtained them. I said that we offered our solution to others, but we are not imposing it and what is more we uphold as a profoundly legitimate claim not only that the non-nuclear-weapon States should be assured that these weapons will not be used against them but also that nuclear weapons should never under any circumstances be used. Until such time as all nuclear weapons have disappeared, we shall continue to try to ensure that these assurances are as universal as possible, for atomic weapons neither recognize frontiers nor read documents.

This Committee has the task of elaborating a convention on radiological weapons. These so-called radiological weapons do not even exist and seem, furthermore, to be indefinable. Our delegation maintains that when the treaty is drawn up, radiological

(Mr. Navarro, Venezuela)

weapons should be defined in a positive way and that something that is not a radiological weapon should not be so termed, even for the purposes of the treaty: I am referring to radioactive material. Radioactive material is not a weapon. In fact, radioactive material could be considered a weapon but only as an a posteriori conclusion, that is, once the intention so to use it has become manifest, which would mean establishing a subjective and discretionary criterion that might prejudice the development of the peaceful uses of radioactive material and of nuclear energy in general.

At the start of the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons we proposed that the focus of the treaty be changed to reflect what really represents a possible threat: the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes. Since that would cover any future radiological weapons, the problem of the definition of such weapons would have been solved, and the two objectives -- the prevention and the elimination of the threat -- would have been achieved. We have seen that it is not possible to achieve a consensus on this change of focus; we will not, therefore, insist on it, but we are still concerned about the central theme of our proposal. Accordingly, we are prepared to agree to a treaty which both prohibits the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes and prevents the appearance of radiological weapons. We are prepared to elaborate this proposal in order to dispel the doubts it engenders as regards nuclear weapons. But the success of such elaboration will depend on whether we manage to formulate the necessary positive definition of radiological weapons.

As regards the prohibition of attacks on nuclear plants and similar installations, no distinction should be made between civilian and military installations. The criterion which our delegation would propose in this connection is that the prohibition should refer to nuclear plants that are in operation.

Before emphasizing the importance which my Government attaches to the relationship between disarmament and development, I should like to take a few minutes to explain how we understand the work of this Committee with regard to the negotiation of treaties. In the first place, the title of a treaty is merely illustrative and without prejudice either to the contents of the treaty or to its actual final title. In the second place all proposals, whether applying to the complete text of a treaty, to individual articles or to certain aspects, are discussed on an equal footing and consequently no texts are to be regarded as endorsed or sanctified.

If you will allow me a comparison, the procedure in this Committee somewhat resembles the situation when a doctor puts his patient's case before a panel of physicians whom he considers to have greater authority on the subject, since otherwise he would have taken the decisions himself. Once the case has been referred, the doctor cannot assume that they will automatically endorse his diagnosis, but they may increase the patient's chances of survival.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to the approach which we consider essential for the achievement of disarmament.

It is our firm conviction that it is only through the full development of the peoples that we can achieve a stable and lasting peace, and that this development is both a factor in and a product of disarmament. To this end it is necessary not only to divert resources from armaments but to devote them to the development of all the needy peoples in the world. The words of Dr. Luis Herrera Campins, President of the Republic of Venezuela, were very eloquent on this subject, when he affirmed his belief in "... a more just and human international law, based on full and harmonious development -- a peace that is not merely an absence of wars, a justice impregnated with social solidarity between peoples of the earth and a full development that takes man as the centre and the goal of its concerns".

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, I cannot open my first statement in my capacity as the representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to this Committee without an expression of sincere thanks to you and to my distinguished colleagues for the warm welcome given to me upon my arrival. This welcome reminds me of a friendly and business-like atmosphere prevailing here some years ago when I had the honour to head the Czechoslovak delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. And I would like to assure you, distinguished delegates, that the Czechoslovak delegation will continue to do its utmost in order to maintain an atmosphere conducive towards overcoming difficulties and solving the complex problems of disarmament, so that our negotiations can bring about concrete and tangible results as early as possible.

Since the month of March is coming to an end and today we have our last plenary meeting under your guidance allow me to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on the successful fulfilment of your duties as the Chairman of the Committee.

If we are to assess the state of affairs in this important multilateral negotiating body with a sense of objectivity, we are forced to our great sorrow to admit that we can hardly achieve any spectacular breakthrough before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We regret this, since my country is among those which considered the occasion of the convening of the second special session devoted to disarmament an important impetus for an effort to present it with some concrete results. We still cherished some hopes in this respect when the Committee opened its deliberations early this year. However, it is rather difficult to maintain those expectations when the Committee is about to start formulating its report for the second special session. Nevertheless, all has not yet been lost.

The importance we attach to the forthcoming special session and to the urgent need to use it as a new impetus to disarmament negotiations was expressed by representatives of socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, on numerous occasions, most recently in the joint communiqué from the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty last December in Bucharest. The socialist countries always were and are advocating reasonable steps leading to disarmament without giving anybody advantages and without endangering the balance of powers. New proof to this approach was given by the USSR in the statement and proposals put forward by President L. Brezhnev on 16 March at the seventeenth congress of Soviet trade unions, which my country fully supports. It is an especially far-reaching unilateral initiative of the Soviet Union which should facilitate the reduction of nuclear weapons of the two sides in Europe, that simply cannot be underestimated whatever the hasty arguments raised by its opponents. It is most regrettable that no apparent progress has been achieved in the key sphere of nuclear disarmament, and that all those and other proposals put forward by the USSR were not met at least half way by other nuclear-weapon Powers. This was caused by the amazing approach of some nuclear-weapon States that obviously decided to "solve" the problem of nuclear disarmament by an enormous further build-up of their nuclear forces.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Our Committee still seems to be in a position to produce at least some results in its preparatory work for the second special session devoted to disarmament. The importance my delegation attaches to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and to its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly is well-known. We expressed our basic considerations in this respect in document CD/245 as well as in several statements made by our delegation on behalf of a group of socialist countries.

Recently we have been taking an active part in the work of contact groups drafting different chapters of the CPD. Let me avail myself of this opportunity to express the thanks of our delegation to the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Brazil and France who skilfully chaired their respective contact groups.

Our thanks naturally go in the first place to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, who also chaired the contact group on measures. We find the work of contact groups a useful form of negotiating a draft CPD. However, full success cannot be achieved where political will and a constructive approach are lacking. Thus, in the contact group on measures, we were amazed at the approach of some delegations to the basic aspects of nuclear disarmament. In this respect especially, the attitude of the United States delegation to the problem of a nuclear test-ban, which we consider a question of the highest priority, is rather discouraging.

The Czechoslovak delegation will continue to exert all efforts for the elaboration of a consolidated text of a draft CPD, albeit with some provisions still in brackets. It is also our understanding that the draft text of the programme remains open and should react flexibly to all new proposals and developments in the field of disarmament. In this context I would like to express the view of a group of socialist countries that the new proposals of the Soviet Union, to which I referred a while ago and which are now contained in document CD/268 submitted by the Soviet delegation, should also be appropriately reflected in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. A group of socialist countries intends to introduce relevant proposals in the respective Working Group.

It is not mere coincidence that the problem of a nuclear test-ban has been inscribed as the first item on our agenda. This undoubtedly reflects the highest priority which members of the Committee attach to this question. And justly so, since nuclear testing has been dealt with in the United Nations for more than 25 years and for almost the same period in various negotiating forums in Geneva. Moreover, from 1977 to 1980 tripartite negotiations on this matter were proceeding until they were, regrettably, unilaterally broken off by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom. Because of the highest priority which we attach to this question, my delegation was alarmed by the approach of the United States to the necessity of banning nuclear-weapon tests which was reflected in the statement of Mr. Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. If we are told that the achievement of the relevant agreement is not urgent and remains only an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives, then we fully understand and share the discontent which has been voiced about this statement by so many delegations.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Item 1 of our agenda has been widely discussed recently in connection with the proposal of the United States delegation, supported by the delegation of the United Kingdom, to establish a subsidiary body "to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement". As to our delegation, we have a definite idea of what this agreement should be about. Therefore the expression "any comprehensive test-ban agreement" seems, after years of negotiations on the subject matter, rather outdated. It is our understanding that this expression has been used intentionally and is precious to the United States delegation. Its use leads us to believe that its proponents are willing to discuss verification and compliance in total isolation from the concrete provisions of a future agreement.

Besides, my delegation has also serious doubts on the utility of creating one more body to deal solely with problems of verification and compliance. The right approach to this problem was chosen in 1976, when the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was created. The results achieved so far in this expert group, with the active participation of two experts from Czechoslovakia, create a solid basis for a reliable verification system, consisting of both national and international verification procedures.

Moreover, the proposal of the United States delegation is very unclear. It escapes our understanding why a delegation suggests that a subsidiary body be created to discuss the verification and compliance aspects of an agreement the conclusion of which in the near future is excluded by this very delegation. But there is no need for me to seek all necessary clarifications since the relevant questions were raised by the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and Poland in their statements of 18 and 23 March respectively. Regrettably, the United States delegation has so far not offered any answers.

A number of delegations around this table elaborated eloquently on the dangerous consequences of the further perfectioning of nuclear weapons, should their testing continue unabated. Neutron weapons, the prohibition of which my delegation fully supports, should be a sufficient warning in this regard. And my delegation considers, that a working group with the mandate suggested by the United States delegation could not cope effectively with the problem of a nuclear test-ban. We therefore associate ourselves with the view expressed by the distinguished representative of Nigeria in his statement of 23 March in which he said: "A more serious look at the proposals and the further clarifications that we have heard so far in this Committee do not justify the orchestrated optimism that heralded those proposals".

At the same time, we fully support the creation of an ad hoc working group on item 1 of our agenda which should negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. In this respect we fully support the proposal of the German Democratic Republic concerning the mandate of the relevant working group contained in document CD/259.

We were told by some delegations that the United States move concerning the creation of a working group on the verification of a nuclear test-ban was a step forward, however small a one. We still wonder whether a move which will not bring about anything concrete with respect to the desired treaty can be called a step forward.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

I am now going to refer to another issue of high priority, that of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

For the last three years this issue has been dealt with predominantly in the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group. The Czechoslovak delegation acknowledges with satisfaction that the Working Group has been re-established this year with a revised mandate enabling it to start elaborating the text of the convention.

Our delegation highly appreciates the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland as the Chairman of the Group, and fully supports his intention "to translate the positions expressed in comments contained in document CD/220 into the language of alternative elements or various versions of elements".

We all know that in spite of the many years' efforts in the Committee, there continue to be significant divergences of views on a number of aspects of the principal elements of the future convention. The task of the Group will, therefore, certainly not be easy. Still, our delegation is convinced that substantial progress can be achieved, provided that the problems are approached in a business-like manner, and with good political will to co-operate and to find concrete and realistic solutions.

This is fully true also with regard to the problem of verification.

Rather too often, clamorous demands have been made for an over-all intrusive verification, according to which verification should permanently, through on-site inspection, in fact cover an unlimited range of industrial, defence and other types of activity. It seems self-evident that such one-sided and exaggerated demands, often virtually in the form of an ultimatum, cannot serve as a basis for serious international negotiations.

We are glad to note that some of the proposals submitted in the last period of our work show a greater sense of reality. With perhaps a few exceptions, the idea of an interlinked system of national and international verification measures seems to be generally accepted. It is also becoming increasingly understood not only that an atmosphere of co-operation is a prerequisite for verification, but also that all procedures relating to consultation, co-operation, national and international verification and complaints compose an integrated system assuring compliance with the convention. While national control of implementation, exchange of information, consultations and co-operation would be the main permanent procedure, the intrusive methods of verification should be reserved for selected situations. A lack of information on a substantive activity covered by the convention or a contradictory information which could not be sufficiently explained might perhaps be one such reason for suggesting the use of an intrusive international verification procedure.

We fully support the view of delegations suggesting the elaboration of concrete specific verification procedures for each relevant provision of the treaty. Such an approach will make it possible to discuss things in concrete terms and to evaluate the necessity of specific information, material, laboratory evidence, etc., with regard to all provisions of the convention.

As far as the States parties to the convention are concerned, it seems evident that they should create a national verification system. We are aware of some opinions expressed in the Committee that a national verification system may be a rather ineffective self-control of the Government concerned.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Such an approach might indicate a certain lack of information or at least a serious underestimation of the complexity of the problem.

The chemical weapons convention will have important implications not only for military activities but also for industry and research. Under present practice, no governmental organ exists covering such a broad spectrum of diverse activities.

We are not going to suggest the establishment of any obligatory national institutions controlling the implementation of the convention. This is fully for each Government to decide.

In principle, however, in any country with a developed chemical industry and a significant research basis (irrespective of the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons), there should be an organ responsible to the Government (but independent of institutions fulfilling the duties imposed by the convention), which would survey the implementation of the treaty by all institutions under the State's jurisdiction. It should have permanent access to all data relevant to the convention, and should collect, check, assess and publish them in a proper way. It should also have permanent access to all relevant activities, including the possibility of laboratory testing, etc.

In our understanding, this should be an organ to assist, in the first place, its own Government, since it is certainly the Government which is responsible for the implementation of the treaty. One can, however, assume that for routine contacts with a corresponding international organ such as the proposed consultative committee, there would be a delegation of the Government's responsibility to such an organ.

Also, for any intrusive international verification, the information gained from such a national organ would probably be the most important point of departure for any verification procedure. A close co-operation with such a national organ would also be indispensable in cases where technical assistance was needed, etc.

I have explained our views on some functions of the national verification system in more detail mainly to demonstrate that in our understanding the principle of a balanced system of national and international verification measures has quite a concrete content which opens a way for the further elaboration of specific questions.

Giving our main emphasis to positive, constructive efforts in the Committee, we cannot avoid expressing our deep concern with regard to some serious events threatening to abolish the results of all efforts made so far towards elaborating the chemical weapons convention, or at least to make our work still more complicated and difficult.

I have in mind above all the decision of the United States Government to start production of a new generation of chemical weapons, namely, binary weapons. I am certainly not going to repeat the arguments indicating how much the proliferation of binary weapons would hinder the elaboration of a convention. Our view was fully expressed in document CD/259. Our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Fields of the United States, in his last statement rejected any idea about binary weapons creating obstacles for negotiations very categorically. We would, however, be much more satisfied if in addition to strong language some more concrete evidence supporting his view could be displayed.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In any case the American decision to start a new spiral in the arms race, with an aggressive military deterrence doctrine in the background, has a most negative implication for the international political atmosphere. Instead of concentrating all efforts on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the main attention of a great Power is focused on boosting its chemical armaments.

Trying to find arguments to justify its chemical weapons programme, the United States Government has also initiated and systematically elaborated an unprecedented propagandistic campaign of allegations, suggesting that the Soviet Union and its allies have been using chemical and even biological warfare agents in several areas of conflict.

In his last statement, the distinguished delegate of the United States once more repeated, for example, a three-years-old story concerning a so-called "highly unusual outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk". It is not a new issue; it was presented on many different occasions.

In the meantime, however, a very interesting piece of information was published in the American press: at the time of the "Sverdlovsk case", an American scientist on an official United States-Soviet exchange was working in Sverdlovsk and living with his family in the town. In his published statement he denied the American accusation fully.

Moreover, it can be documented without any difficulty that since the Second World War anthrax has been extensively studied for the purpose of biological warfare in only two large military research institutes: one of them happened to be Fort Detrick in the United States, the other one the Porton establishment in the United Kingdom.

In addition to this, it is equally easy to prove that all philosophy of modern biological warfare was born in the United States of America. As far as socialist countries are concerned, the biological weapons issue was always tackled exclusively from the point of view of defence and biological warfare was outlawed.

The American accusations are thus not only lacking in any substantive ground; they are also totally inconsistent with all historical facts regarding biological weapons.

The same kind of unbelievable inconsistency between confusing and contradictory evidence on the one side, and far-reaching political conclusions on the other side is also very typical for all stories we have so far heard with regard to the alleged use of toxins and (undefined) chemical weapons. It is not only our claim; statements about the unbelievable inconsistency between confusing and contradictory evidence were recently made in several articles in the American press.

The American propagandistic so-called "yellow rain" evidently has a lot of unique characteristics:

It was demonstratively coloured;

It was used in the form of a coarse-particle aerosol, which is the least effective form in which a biological agent can be applied;

People died after touching a sample contaminated with a toxin which can kill only if eaten in doses many times higher than those reportedly detected in the laboratory of Dr. Hirocha of the University of Minnesota;

Chemical weapons have allegedly been used in some regions since 1976: after six years of such chemical warfare, during which thousands of people were



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

reportedly killed by toxins, nobody, including the United Nations Commission of experts, was able to find one single case of typical intoxication.

And, what is equally striking, there is an absolute absence of medical findings of chemical exposure even among those claiming to have just suffered from "yellow rain" attacks in the areas along the Thai-Kampuchea border. It is not necessary to remind the Committee that the reports of chemical warfare in Kampuchea appear to emanate almost entirely from the Pol Pot military organization.

Compared with the terrible consequences of the first primitive use of chemical weapons in the period of the First World War, or with the lasting devastating effects on the ecology and the health of the population in Viet Nam, where chemical weapons were used by the United States army more than a decade ago, the yellow rain with its untracable effects really seems to be a most spectacular case in the history of chemical warfare.

In spite of these brainwashing attempts to make the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons as fuzzy as possible, we still sincerely believe that the great majority of delegations in this room are vitally interested in the total and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, and they will not diminish their efforts aimed at reaching that goal as soon as possible.

Finally, I would like to offer a few comments on the informal consultations on issues relating to toxicity determination held by the Chairman of the Working Group in the week from 15 to 19 March 1982. The fact that 52 experts from 25 countries participated in the consultations only indicates the importance delegations attach to the solution of technical problems relevant to the convention. We acknowledge with satisfaction that two standard protocols for estimating toxicity were elaborated, so that screening procedures needed for the practical application of the toxicity criteria for the purpose of the convention have become available.

At the same time, two important restrictions on the application of toxicity criteria were indicated by experts: the precursors of binary chemical weapons and incapacitating agents cannot be classified for the purpose of the convention according to their toxicity levels. Hence, in addition to the general purpose criterion, other approaches should be elaborated, and the elaboration of illustrative lists of precursors and of incapacitating agents was suggested as a task for the future consultations.

Our delegation wishes to express its support for this recommendation, since the solution of both the above-mentioned questions would be very important for the elaboration of several basic elements of the convention (such as definition, scope, verification, etc.).

It is hardly necessary to recall that Czechoslovakia has always been active in all relevant meetings with the participation of experts. We value very much the qualified opinion of our experts, and we have been using their assistance as frequently as possible. There is also no need to emphasize how many serious and complex technical problems underly the chemical weapons issue.

However, I would like to express our view that all crucial questions regarding a chemical weapons convention are basically of a political nature, and that political decisions of principle are the fundamental prerequisite for the success of the negotiations on a convention. Technical procedures and suggestions, important as they undoubtedly are, play basically an auxiliary role, and there certainly can be no reason for any delay in the work on the treaty because of technical questions.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I assure you that the Czechoslovak delegation stands ready to contribute as much as possible to the final efforts of the Committee to find ways to contribute to a successful outcome of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement. I am also grateful to him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Mr. Cabras.

Mr. CABRAS (Italy): Mr. Chairman, I would like, on behalf of the Italian delegation, to speak about item 7 of our agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Two resolutions dealing with arms control and disarmament in outer space were adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session; both requested the Committee on Disarmament to take action on that issue. Our Committee has accordingly agreed to include a new item in its annual agenda and has scheduled two informal meetings for a first airing of the subject. These are welcome developments which prompt my delegation to place on record some preliminary views on the subject.

We believe that the informal meetings and the more substantive discussion which we expect to take place during the second part of the session could serve three main purposes:

Firstly, to offer a general overview and an evaluation of what has been achieved so far in terms of stemming a military competition in outer space;

Secondly, to proceed to an assessment of the activities taking place in outer space and of scientific and technological developments liable to threaten the preservation of outer space as a peaceful environment;

Thirdly, to identify those "further measures" and "appropriate international negotiations" which, in the words of paragraph 80 of the Final Document, are to be undertaken in order to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Both resolution 36/97 C and resolution 36/99, adopted by a very large majority at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, refer the question of preventing an arms race in outer space to the Committee on Disarmament. It is -- in our view -- a recognition of the fact that this question cannot be treated in total isolation from the complex issues of security on Earth and the global process of disarmament. We have noted with satisfaction that delegations with a long-standing interest in the subject, like the delegation of Sweden, have indicated that the Committee on Disarmament has now the primary responsibility for efforts in this field.

It is all to the credit of the United Nations, and in particular of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the motive force in international co-operation, that progress in space sciences and technologies is being achieved in an orderly manner and benefiting mankind as a whole. These results are highly commendable, and the work of the Committee and other bodies such as the Outer Space Affairs Division remains essential. The international community has now appealed to the specific expertise and role of the Committee on Disarmament to complement that work from another angle, that of arms control and disarmament proper.

(Mr. Cobres, Italy)

My delegation understands the concern expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt at the plenary meeting of 16 February not to lose sight of the goal of preserving outer space for peaceful uses only, in the interests of all peoples of the world.

This should indeed remain our common goal, in keeping with the principles set forth in resolution 1962 (XVIII) unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at its eighteenth session. The Committee on Disarmament should make its contribution towards the achievement of this goal in the field which is proper to this negotiating forum, concentrating on the specific objective we have set for ourselves, that is, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

My delegation feels that the problems of outer space cannot be effectively solved through an all-embracing approach of the kind devised in 1961 for the Antarctic. The earliest of the post-World War II arms limitation agreements could hardly provide, in 1982, a suitable pattern for a comparable treatment of outer space.

We share the opinion, widely supported also in the scientific community, that such an approach would result merely in the delaying of urgently needed, more limited measures which are within the bounds of feasibility and can effectively curb the most immediately threatening developments. To tackle effectively the disarmament issues relating to outer space, we have to place them in a forward-looking perspective and identify priorities. These issues are not stationary: they evolve at the pace of technology which, in the case of outer space, is particularly rapid. Some of them cannot wait for over-all progress on all fronts. Without establishing an order of priorities we may just be creating a storehouse of highly volatile problems with potentially harmful consequences for the future of our endeavours.

The two States with major space-capabilities seem to have established an order of priorities for themselves when, between 1978 and 1979, they held three rounds of bilateral talks on the limitation of anti-satellite systems. The work in the First Committee last year showed that a growing number of countries appear to be aware that the testing and deployment of physical and technical means to destroy, damage or interfere with space objects constitutes the most immediately threatening development.

A survey of specialized literature indicates that this is also a largely shared opinion among experts and scientists.

Let us dwell for a moment on this aspect.

The existence of many public sources describing in detail the activities currently performed by satellites saves my delegation from having to refer to this aspect at length, at least at the present stage. One such source is the "Study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency", drawn up by a group of governmental experts and annexed to document A/AC.206/14 of 6 August 1981. It offers a very useful general survey.

(Mr. Cabras, Italy)

Even a cursory reading of this study suffices to give a good idea of the efficiency of satellites and of their extreme versatility. Their use extends to fields as diverse as meteorology, cartography, geodesy, communications, reconnaissance, navigation, early warning, etc. Reconnaissance satellites provide the most effective means of verifying compliance with certain disarmament agreements and play a stabilizing role in crisis-monitoring. The use of early warning satellites contributes to international security and confidence.

Many current and potential uses of satellites are of great importance for the economic and social development of all countries, particularly the developing countries.

The relevant technology is no longer the monopoly of two States; other nations possess a national capacity in this field, while a number of others participate in the implementation of space programmes through organs of international co-operation.

The importance of satellites and the dependence of States, of all States, on them are likely to increase: in many instances, satellites provide unique capabilities, capabilities that cannot readily be duplicated by ground-based systems; for certain other missions they are cost-effective or perform with higher efficiency.

These very characteristics, together with their vulnerability, make satellites, virtually all satellites, tempting targets. Outer space is at present a medium still mainly free from kill-mechanisms. Yet the deployment of anti-satellite systems marks the beginning of a trend that, unless checked, can introduce the arms race into this new dimension.

Without, for the time being, going into the complex details of the various anti-satellite systems, be they at the experimental stage or at the operational stage, it is sufficient to note that in this sector the ingredients for a military competition seem to be present: the importance of satellites as targets, the development of a panoply of physical and technical anti-satellite means which would give the holder a considerable advantage, the difficulties of protecting satellites by making them less vulnerable, etc. -- all these factors could set in motion the reactive cycle which characterizes an arms race.

It is easier to forecast an arms race in the anti-satellite system sector than to indicate its likely consequences. It seems clear, however, that it would be extremely costly, strategically "destabilizing", and disruptive for the orderly exploitation of outer space in the interest of all mankind. Resolution 36/97 C describes the negotiation of an agreement on the matter as "an important step" towards preventing an arms race in space and assigns priority to it. Its consideration would be an appropriate task for the Committee on Disarmament, as it would constitute a genuine disarmament measure, entailing a ban on systems which are in existence, which form part of military arsenals, which are deployed.

It would be premature to undertake even a preliminary analysis of the issues involved in the question of anti-satellite systems. It would, however, be useful to try to glimpse the complexity of some of these to demonstrate that a serious consideration of them would already constitute a formidable task in itself.

(Mr. Cabras, Italy)

Foremost among these issues is the definitional question of what constitutes an "anti-satellite system". The vulnerability of satellites to an array of weapons and techniques makes a solution particularly arduous. How broadly is the term "anti-satellite system" to be construed? Should it only encompass weapons specifically designed to damage or destroy a satellite and their components? Should it also comprise any weapon constructed and deployed for an ASAT role, or tested in an ASAT mode? Would it be possible or desirable to identify the various types of ASAT systems?

In addition, the even more difficult issue would arise of what constitutes an "anti-satellite activity". In fact, without necessarily damaging or destroying the satellite, it is possible to interfere with its functioning, for instance through electronic jamming or by blinding it with lasers or by moving it from its orbit, etc.

Adequate verification, which is an essential requirement of any arms control and disarmament agreement, would, in this case, be very difficult to achieve. Even a limited ASAT capability, acquired or retained in evasion of an ASAT ban, could be significant. For this very reason, a comprehensive consideration of the problem could not avoid the question of disarmament per se. Operational capabilities in this field are already a reality. The issue of dismantling procedures for existing ASAT systems and their components, and the related verification procedures, would be yet another very complex issue.

Any draft treaty or proposal purporting to deal with the problem of ASAT systems should be judged in the light of the whole range of issues involved in this highly sensitive area and on the basis of the answers it provides to them.

What, for instance, would be the value, in terms of arms control and disarmament, of an agreement that amounted to a "no-use" arrangement? If ASAT systems can be freely tested or deployed, would not each side anticipate that they might be used, and take appropriate measures? It can be argued that anything less than a prohibition of testing, deployment and use would be seriously flawed.

The opportunity before us is ripe, but perishable. As a result of the broad examination that we are going to commence on this item, we need to identify our real priorities, lest we disperse our energies. If we want to keep outer space free from any kind of weapons, should we not start with those weapons that already exist, that have been deployed?

We are aware that this would be only a step, a first step, in a process.

Consistent with its long-standing interest in the field, the Italian delegation stands ready to contribute further to the work of the Committee on item 7, but most of all it stands ready to listen, to learn and to give serious consideration to any suggestion or proposal which can serve to advance our common endeavour.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, like most previous speakers today, I am going to focus my intervention on issues under item 4 of our agenda, namely, concerning chemical weapons.

It should be obvious to all that a chemical weapons convention is now more urgently needed than ever. It is therefore a source of great satisfaction to my delegation, as well as to me personally, that the Committee on Disarmament has this year provided its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an improved mandate which enables it to embark upon genuine and serious negotiations in order to achieve agreement on such a convention. We are grateful to Ambassador Sujka for having taken upon himself the strenuous but also stimulating task of leading those negotiations this year. I am confident that with his serious resolve and diplomatic qualities the negotiations will take an important step towards the conclusion of a convention.

It has taken the Committee three years -- and I want to remind you that our predecessors dealt with this issue from 1963 -- to reach the stage where we now are in the negotiation process. In the first year we were told that the matter was not ripe for being dealt with in a Working Group. It was only the following year that a Working Group was established but regrettably only with a vague mandate. I think today nobody would contest the value of multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. The experience we have obtained in the Working Group proves the viability of the existing machinery for such negotiations. This bodes well for our hope that the future convention will gain universal acceptance. The example of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons should also be used to dissipate the remaining reluctance about multilateral negotiations on other disarmament matters.

As regards the developments in the Working Group during the present session, Sweden welcomes the increased participation by the major powers in the work. They have more clearly than previously stated their views and presented concrete proposals. This has certainly contributed to the solution of many of the still outstanding issues. This year, as last year, many other countries also have made very interesting and valuable contributions as regards both the scope and the verification of a chemical weapons convention.

It is obvious that important differences of opinion regarding the scope of a future convention still remain. Among them could be mentioned the questions whether a convention should include a prohibition of use and whether it should include prohibitions regarding animals and plants. Another question in which my delegation has taken a particular interest is the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the utilization of the toxic properties of chemicals as weapons in combat. My delegation has submitted a working paper to the Working Group on this last issue, document CD/CW/CAT.29 dated 15 March 1982. Responding to the request of the Chairman of the Working Group, we have suggested wordings to be added to the elements included in last year's report of the Working Group. We have also responded to various questions and comments with regard to our proposal.

While no delegation has questioned our statement that in order most effectively to eliminate a chemical warfare capability it is necessary also to prohibit organization, planning and training for the purpose of such warfare, some have asserted that it would

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

be difficult to verify such provisions. One could, however, recall that other prohibitions, too, have been suggested that may be very difficult to verify, e.g. the non-existence of stockpiles of chemical weapons. No one, of course, seriously questions this prohibition. The verification measures that the Swedish delegation has suggested to accompany its proposal would to a large extent be based on an exchange of information regarding different activities.

My delegation has also pointed out that, for practical reasons, the provisions on planning, organization and training would most probably take effect only after the complete destruction of all main stockpiles. We hope that other delegations will study our suggestion and make comments, so that an appropriate solution can be found.

The other week the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons held consultations with delegations assisted by their technical experts primarily on questions concerning toxicity determinations and on their standardization. The Swedish delegation would like to express satisfaction on the results obtained in those consultations. Thus, it was most valuable that the participants were able to recommend two protocols on standardized toxicity tests to the Working Group. We express our appreciation to the Polish expert, Professor Rump, for his highly qualified work, which made this result possible.

Another development during the consultations will no doubt prove important for our future negotiations, namely, the discussions of the application of the toxicity criterion and thereby also of toxicity tests in order to relate the so-called precursors of chemical weapons to the provisions of a chemical weapons convention. This is a complicated question, although far from unsolvable. My delegation has suggested a conceptual basis for the application of the toxicity criterion in this connection. A working paper on this question will be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in the near future. The discussion which took place on this issue during the consultations showed how difficult it is to have a purely technical discussion when political restrictions are imposed. My delegation considers, for example, that the question of the reliability of toxicity tests on chemical reaction mixtures, including those from binary weapons, is irrelevant.

It is not the toxicity of the reaction mixture as such that matters, but of the toxic chemical warfare agent formed, among other chemical reaction products.

By saying this my delegation does not want to give the impression that binary weapons do not pose a problem for our negotiations. It is, on the contrary, with great concern that my delegation learned of the preparations by the United States to start production of binary chemical weapons. This has sometimes been explained, inter alia, by the lack of willingness of the Soviet Union to provide information that would dissipate fears of an overwhelming strength as regards chemical weapons on its part. The United States decision to build up its chemical weapons arsenal is, however, more likely to lead to further escalation of the arms race than to the alleged purpose of promoting a chemical weapons convention.

This brings me to the question of verification. We have studied the working paper presented by the United Kingdom delegation on verification, document CD/244, with great interest. It is clear in its aim. We have also noted the explanation by Ambassador Summerhayes the other day that the suggestions in the working paper do not

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

imply that proposals which are not dealt with in it would not be acceptable to the United Kingdom. The Swedish delegation shares the view that the verification provisions of a chemical weapons convention should include on-site verification. We think, however, that a more balanced presentation of all the aspects relevant to an interrelated complaints and verification procedure would have been obtained if the problem had been approached within the framework of the existing elements in CD/220 rather than by presenting a new structure.

For the moment, I would only like to state that the Swedish delegation attaches great importance to an adequately functioning structure, which allows information-gathering, fact-finding and information-dissemination to serve the parties to the convention. It is our firm belief that a consultative committee -- which is necessary for many purposes -- cannot determine the respective security needs of the parties and what those needs may require as to clarifications from or on-site inspection on the territory of other parties. In this connection we note with interest the discussion on remote continual verification, the so-called RECOVER project, which highlights an interesting approach towards less intrusive verification measures. The Swedish delegation feels that this possibility should be further investigated.

My delegation noted with satisfaction the statement the other week by the Chairman of the Working Group in which he expressed confidence about the development of the negotiations on verification issues. Ambassador Herder on that same occasion gave a comprehensive and interesting review of the verification problems. A continuing constructive treatment of these questions would be most welcome, including an agreement on the necessity of adequate on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany also introduced in the form of working paper CD/265 dated 24 March 1982, a considered view, inter alia, on the verification of non-production of chemical warfare agents, which my delegation will study with great interest.

In this context I should like to state that I listened with great interest to what Ambassador Rodriguez Navarro said this morning about confidence-building measures. My delegation entirely shares his evaluation of the importance of such measures. We intend to submit in due course a working paper on the subject to the Committee.

The discussions about allegations of the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world very forcefully indicate the need to establish permanently available, flexible and objective complaints and verification mechanisms in arms limitation and disarmament agreements. They could, in the form of an international machinery, give the parties the possibility of having their cases investigated in an impartial manner. Such mechanisms would provide for investigations to be carried out without hindrance and for full access to sites and materials, which would shed light on the facts in each case. It is conceivable that the existence of such mechanisms would have been useful and of assistance to the countries involved in the present dispute.

Another lesson to be drawn from the current experience is that an effective control of disarmament agreements, including the one on chemical weapons, requires greater openness. To suggest relying on mutual trust is merely a pious hope when there is a grave dispute about compliance. When allegations of breaches of international agreements are made, co-operation between the parties will in most cases be difficult to obtain through bilateral contacts. This is but one of the factors which underline the necessity of multilateral negotiations and international solutions to problems which affect us all.



The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. I still have on my list of speakers for today's meeting two delegations, those of Morocco and Belgium. In view of the lateness of the hour I propose, if there are no objections, to suspend this meeting now and to resume it this afternoon at 3 o'clock. The delegations of Morocco and Belgium have been good enough to agree to take the floor on the resumption of our meeting this afternoon. So, if there are no objections, I shall now suspend the meeting and we shall meet again this afternoon at 3 o'clock.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare reopened the 167th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I give the floor to the representative of Morocco, His Excellency Ambassador Skalli.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to welcome Ambassador Vejvoda on the occasion of his appointment as the representative of Czechoslovakia to the Committee on Disarmament. It is gratifying to see again among us so eminent a diplomat, whom I had the pleasure of knowing and appreciating at the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament.

My delegation intends to deal today with the question of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

The Moroccan delegation has repeatedly expressed its views as to the importance of concluding a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests everywhere and by everyone. It has always stressed the responsibility of the three nuclear-weapon Powers which are the depositaries of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that connection, my delegation noted with satisfaction the statement by the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 13 February that the signing of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the other nuclear-weapon Powers was not essential for its entry into force.

In my intervention of 4 March, I referred to the deadlock in which the Committee has found itself since this subject was placed on its agenda as a priority item in 1979. I expressed the hope that this year that problem would be satisfactorily resolved. It seems that that hope, shared by all, is now perhaps on the way to becoming a reality.

For the present situation is indeed very different from the one that existed before the statements made by the distinguished representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 11 March 1982.

A first analysis of these two statements reveals the following facts:

First of all, unanimity thus exists today on the need to create, at this stage of our work, a subsidiary body on item 1 of our agenda. We may hope that this body would be an ad hoc working group, as the Group of 21 has always wished.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

There is also unanimity concerning the important question of the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament in the sphere of disarmament and especially that of nuclear disarmament. The statement of the distinguished representative of the United States is clear on this point. For Ambassador Fields declared: "The United States fully shares the view expressed by many delegations that the Committee on Disarmament must effectively discharge its responsibilities". He also said: "The Committee on Disarmament should address every issue which relates to the vital security interests of all States, including the control, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons", and that: "The Committee on Disarmament, the only disarmament body in which all five nuclear-weapon States participate, is an appropriate forum for dealing with the interest in nuclear disarmament — an interest deeply shared by all States".

The two delegations proposed that the subsidiary body should concentrate its efforts on the key issue of verification. The American delegation specified that this body would be responsible for examining and defining problems relating to verification. The comprehensive test-ban treaty should deal with these problems. As for the United Kingdom delegation, it expressed the hope that discussions in the subsidiary body would not only throw light on the nature of the problem of verification, but would indicate detailed ways in which it might be resolved.

We understand this to mean that the working group will be required to deal with a problem of a political nature and not with the technical aspects of verification, which are within the competence of the Group of Experts.

As we all know, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been studying these aspects for nearly six years and the Group, which is headed by the eminent Dr. Ericsson of Sweden, has accomplished a great deal in this area.

The three essential elements we have noted in the statements of the American and British delegations may be summarized as follows:

The establishment of a working group;

Reaffirmation of the responsibility of the Committee;

Initiation of a process of a political nature.

My delegation welcomes with satisfaction the proposals put forward by the American and British delegations. It believes that a new development has occurred in the Committee, which could lead to the beginning of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The Moroccan delegation, aware of the fact that the problem of verification of compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is an important element of such a treaty, believes that consideration of this problem could be a starting point for negotiations on this treaty.

Although the American and British delegations have given reason to hope that the Committee may succeed in emerging from the impasse of earlier years, they have also raised many questions, particularly as regards the mandate of the proposed working group. These questions are at present being discussed in the drafting group, which is presided over by yourself, Mr. Chairman, and open to all delegations. The Moroccan delegation will do its best to help clarify these points.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

We believe that with the goodwill of all, the Committee could reach a consensus fairly rapidly on the mandate of the working group. It would thus be taking a step closer to negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. You will remember that the Committee was in the same situation two years ago when the Working Group on Chemical Weapons was established. Although this Group has not yet achieved tangible results, it is nevertheless currently engaged in serious negotiations with a view to the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of these weapons.

In this connection I would like to express to you, Mr. Chairman, my very sincere thanks for your tireless efforts both during the informal consultations and in the drafting group on the mandate of the working group on item 1 of our agenda.

I would now like to deal with the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons. We wish to express our satisfaction at the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group on this question has been able to overcome the difficulties which arose last year concerning the way it should approach all the problems relating to the scope of the prohibition of such weapons. This result was made possible thanks to the flexibility and open-mindedness shown by the various delegations, determined as they were not to limit the sphere of prohibition to radiological weapons properly so-called but to include in it attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. I would like to stress the extremely positive role played by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group, especially in bringing about a reconciliation between opposing views. We would offer him here our sincere congratulations on the way in which he is guiding this work.

My delegation which, together with others, has agreed, as a possible procedure, to the separate examination of the two aspects of the convention on radiological weapons, wishes to reaffirm its position of principle that the Convention must contain provisions prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. The Israeli attack of June 1981 on the peaceful nuclear power station of Tammuz in Iraq provided ample justification for our views. As regards the definition of radiological weapons, positive formulations must be sought which define these weapons directly and precisely.

We continue to believe that the rapid conclusion of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons would constitute a valuable contribution to the efforts of the Committee under item 5 of our agenda.

Before concluding this statement I wish to say how much we regret the departure of our eminent colleague and friend, Ambassador Halitza of Romania.

Knowing his intellectual and human qualities we do not doubt that, as you so rightly said, Mr. Chairman, we shall very much miss them. We wish Ambassador Halitza every success in his new and important functions.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me in my capacity as Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, His Excellency Ambassador Onkelinx.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I think I am right in saying that this is the last formal meeting of the Committee that you will be presiding over. I should therefore like to thank you for the way you have guided our work during this important month for the Committee on Disarmament. We already had an opportunity, at the beginning of the month, to praise your talents, your intelligence and your experience, but I can truthfully say that you have not disappointed us. I know that in our conversations we sometimes wondered whether you inherited your diplomatic talent from Machiavelli, Cavour or the doges of Venice, but I do not think we have time to go into that question now and I should like simply to express our gratitude to you for the very imaginative and skilful way in which you have conducted our work.

Our work during this session has been characterized by the emphasis placed on the activities of the four working groups we set up, in which we hope significant progress will be made with a view to the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

I would like to refer today to two matters other than those for which working groups already exist -- two questions on which, for various reasons, positive developments have taken place in recent weeks.

The first concerns the prohibition of nuclear tests. For the first time, the Committee on Disarmament has been able to agree on a procedural formula, namely, the establishment of a working group which should enable it in due course to lay the foundation for the negotiation of such a prohibition. The consensus which is now emerging in the Committee on the establishment of such a working group is already one of the striking features of this session. That is why, Mr. Chairman, I wish to repeat the Belgian delegation's full support for the consultations you are holding on the formulation of this working group's mandate.

We do not think that the Committee's working groups are the appropriate place for academic exchanges. On the contrary, we think that they ought to be able to deal effectively with the matters before them. Such effectiveness is necessary to the success of a process which should lead to agreements to ban the weapons concerned.

With regard to the banning of nuclear tests, my delegation believes that we should concentrate on the issues which present the greatest difficulties. This means in fact the problem of verification, for this question was the stumbling-block in the negotiations on a total nuclear test ban which were carried on in the separate talks the latest assessment of which was communicated to the Committee on Disarmament in June 1980 (document CD/130).

The verification of compliance with agreements in the sphere of arms control and disarmament is not of equal importance in every case. It depends very much on the subject-matter of the prohibition. The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, for example, did not give rise to any particular verification problem. That is no doubt why it was possible to

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

conclude the Treaty without the inclusion of any provisions concerning its verification. This Treaty can easily be verified, principally by national technical means. However, the situation is quite different when the object of the prohibition is more ambitious, as in the case of a total nuclear test ban. Such a ban would properly constitute the field of application of the comprehensive treaty envisaged in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as my colleagues from Pakistan and Australia have already pointed out. The crux of the problem of a total nuclear test ban thus clearly resides in the question of verification.

The experience of the trilateral negotiations should constitute an important element in our work on this subject. It would also be useful if this work, which will by definition be of a political and legal nature, were to take due account of the accumulated experience of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-Operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. A revision of that Group's mandate might be a useful contribution to the work of the Committee's working group. It could, for example, consider the necessary methods of detection — especially seismic and atmospheric — for the verification of compliance with a total nuclear test ban. It could also determine the means required for the implementation of those methods: national means and international means. In that connection it could also consider the institutional machinery needed for a verification and complaints procedure.

Echoing the remarks made earlier in this connection by my colleagues from Australia and the USSR, I too would like to stress our very great concern that this opportunity of initiating a process which might lead to a nuclear test ban should not be wasted through an excessive concern for the wording of the mandate of the working group we are on the point of setting up.

The second question I wish to refer to today is that of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are pleased that the Committee on Disarmament has placed this item on its agenda and that it has agreed to hold informal meetings on the subject in the near future.

Having said this, we recognize that not all the items on the Committee's agenda offer the same possibilities for negotiations. This question is a new item, which the Committee is taking up for the first time, and it is important because of its implications for the security of our States. It is necessary, at this initial stage, for the Committee to explore the subject.

The obligation to take up this question arises from paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly. As early as 1979, Italy proposed that the matter be taken up when it submitted document CD/9. At the last session of the General Assembly two resolutions were adopted -- neither of them gave rise to any objection, and one of them, resolution 36/97 C, was co-sponsored by Belgium -- requesting the Committee on Disarmament to take up this matter for consideration.

Our objective ought therefore to be to try gradually to fill the gaps in the existing international legislation.

At present, such legislation rests principally on the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. It would also be useful to take into account the implications for outer space of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

We ought further to consider the possible connections between the prevention of the arms race in outer space and the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, which was the subject, in particular, of General Assembly resolution 34/83 E, co-sponsored by Belgium.

We believe that initially the main aim of the Committee's work should be the question of the negotiation of an effective and verifiable agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems. At the present stage, such systems constitute the greatest identifiable destabilizing threat.

In fact, anti-satellite weapons could seriously compromise the mechanisms designed to ensure respect for arms control and disarmament agreements.

Particular attention ought also to be given to methods of verifying such a prohibition, with reference again, to the subject of the prohibition. This would imply, among other things, a definition of the concept of arms in relation to outer space. My delegation hopes that at the informal meetings we are shortly to hold it will already be possible to clarify some of these questions.

It would also be useful, I think, if the Committee could consider, in the light of its priorities, the most appropriate procedural arrangements to enable us to begin substantive discussions in the most effective manner possible at our summer session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement. I should like to thank him also for the kind and far too flattering remarks he addressed to me; they were undoubtedly dictated by a spirit of friendship, for which I am particularly grateful to him.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor? The representative of the Soviet Union, His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan has asked for the floor. I give it to him.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have asked for the floor in order to make a slight factual correction. The Ambassador of Belgium, Mr. Onkelinx, has just said, if I correctly understood the Russian translation of his statement, that the prohibition of nuclear weapons depends on the solution of the problem of verification and compliance. I must say, as the representative of a State which participated for more than three years in the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests that took place between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, that that is not in accordance with the facts. I should like to refer to the authoritative opinion of the leader of the delegation of the United States of America at the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, Mr. Paul C. Warnke, who writes in today's issue of the International Herald Tribune: "The implementation of a freeze could logically begin with the prompt completion of the comprehensive test ban treaty that has been under negotiation with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom since mid-1977". And even more important is what he says next: "All that now stands in the way of an agreed-on total ban on nuclear explosions is the necessary political will." I think that Mr. Warnke is correct and Mr. Onkelinx is not correct.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I did not realize that after my statement I was going to be taken to task by my friend Ambassador Issraelyan! But it is with great pleasure that I answer him. What I could do would be to reread the relevant passage in my statement, a passage which was summed up in one sentence: it is that sentence that he has taken exception to; it was about the problem of verification. This question has been the stumbling-block in the negotiations on a complete prohibition of nuclear tests that took place through separate talks, an assessment of which was communicated to the Committee on Disarmament for the last time in June 1980. For my part I drew my information, not from a private author as Ambassador Issraelyan has just done, but from the report we received here on the trilateral negotiations, document CD/130. It was in that document that I discovered that the sphere of verification was apparently the one on which the parties to the trilateral negotiations had not succeeded in reaching agreement. And it was from that report that I drew the conclusions that I have just now presented to you.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Allow me again very briefly to quote from Mr. Warnke. He said: "All that now stands in the way of an agreed-on total ban on nuclear explosions is the necessary political will." I think Mr. Warnke is right.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union. If no other representatives wish to speak, I should like, as I announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, to put before the Committee for adoption the recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which has been circulated in document CD/260. In particular, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has proposed that its next session should be held from 9 to 20 August 1982 in Geneva.

If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Committee adopts these recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Distinguished colleagues, since this plenary meeting is the last one for the month of March, I should like to express to all of you my sincere gratitude for the spirit of co-operation you have shown, for the very effective support you have so kindly given to my chairmanship and also for the many expressions of friendship that have been addressed to myself. Thanks to the assistance and goodwill of all, it has been possible to hold very useful exchanges of views and negotiations on a considerable number of questions of substance. At the same time, the four ad hoc working groups under the able guidance of their respective chairmen, have been able to intensify their work and in some cases to make progress. But this month of March has undoubtedly been marked by the developments that have taken place in the consideration of the question which appears as item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". Since the Committee entrusted me with the task of conducting private consultations on this subject and since it asked me to preside over the drafting group which is at present engaged in formulating a draft mandate for a possible subsidiary body, all my efforts have been directed towards the goal of securing a positive advance in the handling of this priority issue which has for so many years been the focus of attention of the international community. I think

(The Chairman)

that the intensive negotiations which have been going on since have permitted some progress to be made in the reciprocal understanding of the various positions on this subject. I sincerely hope that the continuation of these negotiations may lead as soon as possible to a positive conclusion. To that end, I should like to appeal to all delegations to spare no effort to try to reach the conclusion we all desire in the interests of the activity of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to item 1 of its agenda.

Allow me to say that one of the privileges of the Chairman is to work in close contact with the secretariat. I have thus been able to appreciate to the full the great competence and the qualities of Ambassador Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee. I should like to express to him all my gratitude, a gratitude which reflects my most sincere feelings. The advice and assistance of Mr. Berasategui have also been extremely valuable to me during this month of my chairmanship; I should like to tell him how much I have appreciated his assistance during this period. My gratitude goes also to all the staff of the secretariat as well as to the interpreters and translators whose competence and dedication I have been better able to appreciate. Lastly, I should like to offer my successor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, my very warm good wishes for his success in the exercise of his mandate. I think it is a very happy coincidence for the Committee at such an important moment in its work that it will have as its Chairman so eminent and competent a colleague as Ambassador Okawa. I am sure that under his guidance the Committee will be able to conclude its work in the most efficient manner possible and that he will be able to submit a meaningful report to the United Nations General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament.

In accordance with our time-table for this week, the Committee will, immediately after this plenary meeting, hold an informal meeting on item 7 of its agenda, 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space', and we shall also be able, if we have the time, to take up again the question of the date of closure of this session as well as the problem of the composition of the Committee.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 1. April 1982, at 10 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.



FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 1 April 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio Okawa

(Japan)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J. CARASALES  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE  
Mr. V. ESPECHE GIL

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE

Belgium: Miss de CLERQ  
Miss G. VAN DEN BERGH

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. L. GOTZEV  
Mr. B. GRINBERG  
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. WANG ZHIYUN

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA  
Mr. J.L. GARCIA HERNANDEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE  
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE  
Miss L. GHAZERIAN  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN  
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. B. MAUNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. S.O. BOLD  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. U.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. G. ANDERSSON  
Mr. S. ERICSON  
Mrs. G. JONANG  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT  
Mr. H.E. SWIFT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Miss S.F. BURKE  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Miss M.E. HOINKES

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO  
Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 168th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Distinguished members of the Committee, before we start the programme of work for this plenary meeting, I would like to make a brief statement on the occasion of assuming the chairmanship of the Committee.

Today we enter the third and last month of the spring session of this Committee and, in the remaining few weeks at our disposal, in addition to our normal work as the disarmament negotiating body, we have to prepare our report to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the results of our negotiating efforts over the past three years.

It is hoped that the second special session will produce concrete results or at least provide new and badly needed impetus for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. In my own country, the expectations of our citizens are mounting daily and hardly a single day passes without the large daily newspapers carrying some article or editorial concerning the special session or disarmament in general; and I imagine this is also the case in many other countries. I could add that our activities in this Committee are also followed with considerable interest in Japan.

At such a moment, I feel particularly honoured to be given this opportunity of serving in the chair of this respected international forum. I assume this task with humility and a sense of great responsibility. I pledge to you all that I will do my best to fulfil my duty.

Fortunately, my two competent predecessors for this year, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran and Ambassador Alessi of Italy, have completed most of the ground work for this session and I am extremely grateful and indebted to them. I wish to pay them a tribute for the painstaking efforts and the most effective leadership they provided for us during the months of February and March. My task is therefore, with your guidance and co-operation, to try and wind up the work of our spring session in a reasonably presentable manner.

In this connection, I would like to express my respects to Ambassador Jainal and to Mr. Berasategui and to the other members of the Secretariat he so ably leads and say how much I shall be depending on them to support and assist me in my task.

Our main and immediate preoccupation is, of course, the completion of a meaningful and appropriate report for presentation to the second special session. At the same time, I trust my distinguished colleagues will agree with me when I say that we should not allow the second special session to make us lose sight of our long-range objectives and responsibilities as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Let us remember that, after the second special session, we must return to this room in the summer to resume our work and try to make real progress in substantive disarmament negotiations.

Before concluding these brief remarks, I may perhaps be permitted to mention a few practical considerations which I think will be relevant in view of the very limited time we have available to us this month. Firstly, I shall endeavour, to the extent possible, with your understanding and co-operation, to maintain punctuality in

(The Chairman)

the opening and closing of our meetings. Secondly, I shall seek your collaboration to keep interventions in the Committee and in informal meetings, as well as in informal consultations, as concise and to the point as possible. Thirdly, I wish to remind you of my suggestion last year that we could perhaps do with a little less formality in our proceedings, although I certainly do not wish to deprive my predecessor of the praise he so rightly deserves.

I count on your understanding, your co-operation and your support to enable me to steer our spring session to a successful conclusion.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 6 of its agenda, entitled "comprehensive programme of disarmament". In any case, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Argentina, Cuba, Australia, Morocco, China and Indonesia.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, after your thoughtful remarks, it is my pleasant duty as the first speaker to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this Committee for the month of April.

I do not think that I am going against your appeal for less formality because it is not formality when I express to you a few words concerning the sincere appreciation my delegation feels in seeing you in the chair for this difficult month of April, when we are supposed to conclude our work and make a meaningful summary of it in order to give the special session a good basis for its assessment of our achievements.

You, perhaps more than most of us here, are personally involved in and devoted to these matters. Not only that, you are also exceptionally experienced and skilled in leading international negotiations. It is therefore with great confidence that we look forward to your leadership during the month of April.

To your distinguished predecessor, I also would like to say a couple of words, namely, to express our appreciation of the way in which he led our work in the month of March. He did so with great calm, steadfastness and, of course, all the diplomatic skill that one can expect from an Italian diplomat and I think that it is with deep satisfaction that he can look back at his achievements of the past month.

I am going to speak today on item 7 of the agenda, the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The peaceful uses of outer space are now, 25 years after the start of the space age, manifold and bring great benefits in areas such as communications, navigation, meteorology and remote sensing of the earth. It is no doubt of great importance further to advance the peaceful uses of this environment. Simultaneously, however,

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

military applications are rapidly assuming increasing importance. In fact, the vast majority of satellites launched so far have had a military mission. It is thus estimated that about 75 per cent of all satellites orbited since the start of the space era in 1957 have been launched for military purposes. Although it is true that a considerable portion of military satellites have a rather limited lifetime, they nevertheless illustrate the fact that outer space is being heavily militarized. Other factors of a qualitative nature give added reason for concern that outer space may become a future battlefield if nothing is done to prevent such a development.

We live in times of rapid progress in science and technology. What is science fiction today may well become reality tomorrow. This is true not least in the field of military technology and perhaps particularly so as far as the exploitation of outer space is concerned. Only a couple of decades ago, the military exploitation of outer space appeared as a fantasy to most people. Outer space has now become the main arena for the technological arms race. It is of capital importance to prevent this new domain from continuing to invite further costly investments in terms of human talent and material resources in a futile race for superiority and bargaining chips. The recent discussions regarding anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and ballistic missile defence (BMD) provide examples of conceivable developments which would presumably be enormously costly and also destabilizing.

Awareness of the threatening evolution as far as outer space is concerned is certainly not new. Several attempts have been made to bring this matter to the attention of this Committee. I have in mind particularly the thoughtful contributions made by Italy and the Netherlands and, of course, the two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly last autumn, where the Soviet Union, as well as the western countries I just mentioned, played an important role in promoting multilateral negotiations on this issue.

It is a fact, well-known to all of us here, that disarmament negotiations are often outstripped by the pace of developments in military technology, which make warfare possible in environments which have so far been spared from militarization. This is a matter of great concern to my Government and no doubt to many other Governments represented in this Committee.

Efforts have already been made in this respect. One example is the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and reserves the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. Its provisions are, however, not sufficient to prevent a general arms race in outer space. Further efforts must be made in this regard.

This matter is now before the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation welcomes the fact that these important and, in some respects, urgent questions will be dealt with in the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. We consider that, after the initial exploratory talks taking place during the first part of this year's session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee should be established with an appropriate mandate in the summer of 1982.

The two Superpowers play a predominant role in the military and civilian exploitation of outer space. It is therefore a welcome development that they have already held bilateral talks on the problem of avoiding an arms race in this environment. It is regrettable that these talks have been suspended. In the view of my delegation, it is highly desirable that they should be resumed as soon as possible.



(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

However, outer space is a common province of mankind and its use or abuse is therefore a matter that concerns all countries. Even if the Superpowers have a clear technological lead, an increasing number of other countries will gradually be in a position to make use of outer space. It is also for this reason natural that the prohibition of an arms race in this domain should become the subject of multilateral negotiations.

It should be noted in this connection that satellites can make a very useful contribution in the disarmament field by providing the means for non-intrusive verification and surveillance. It is a well-known fact that surveillance by satellites has been tacitly accepted as a means of verification in the SALT context. Similar ideas are the basis for the timely and valuable French initiative on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency. This initiative is all the more valuable and forward-looking in that it envisages a multilateral body which would play a crucial role in international verification, since it is unlikely that the verification techniques which are available to a small fraction of the countries of the world would achieve universal acceptance.

Our immediate concern, however, is, in accordance with the wording of item 7 of our agenda, how an arms race in outer space should be prevented. For a number of reasons, it is extremely difficult to define at the outset in exact terms the scope of limitations and prohibitions one should aim at in order to achieve an effective prohibition that would prevent undesirable developments without hampering legitimate activities in outer space. One problem is that some space systems have both military and civilian applications. Another is that some military systems may primarily have stabilizing effects and others may have destabilizing effects.

A fundamental question will be to consider whether efforts should concentrate on banning or limiting various weapons systems in space or on banning or restricting certain activities or actions which would constitute interference with or an attack against space objects. Perhaps a combination of both approaches is called for.

It seems appropriate initially to determine the extent to which existing provisions in treaties such as the 1968 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty and its subsequent Protocol need to be completed in order to cover existing and expected developments in outer space warfare.

As a matter of principle, it must be agreed at an early stage whether a prohibition should cover all military satellites or concentrate on those space systems which are primarily and increasingly integral parts of terrestrial warfare systems.

Another matter of principal importance is the extent to which it would be possible and desirable to limit research on and the development, testing and production of military space systems.

A third issue which must be dealt with initially is whether one should aim at a comprehensive convention or apply a step-by-step approach. If the latter alternative is chosen, it would seem appropriate to establish a list of priorities according to which the most threatening developments would be subject to negotiations first. It is, for example, quite conceivable that the problem of anti-satellite warfare should be addressed at a very early stage. This question also comprises complicated problems of definition, as so pertinently illustrated by the distinguished representative of Italy last Tuesday.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

It would seem to my delegation that, primarily, all devices that have the purpose of hampering the stabilizing uses of outer space should be prohibited. Verification through technical means must not be interfered with. At the same time one must also be aware of the problem of asymmetry which may arise in military conflicts between space Powers and other countries as far as space communications for military purposes are concerned. A considerable number of existing satellites are designed to give early warning of attacks. If they were to be eliminated, the adversary might well react in an unpredictable way. Such destabilizing undertakings should, in the view of my delegation, be prohibited.

It is Sweden's view that outer space itself, as is already the case for the moon and other celestial bodies, should be reserved for exclusively peaceful purposes. However, it is a well-known fact that military uses of outer space are frequent and far-reaching. It therefore becomes a matter of paramount importance to prevent such activities from having a hampering effect on existing and future civilian and peaceful uses of outer space.

It is obvious that the monitoring of military activities in outer space and the verification of compliance with future limitations and prohibitions will entail a number of difficult political and technical problems. My delegation attaches great importance to this matter and wishes to stress the need to strive for multilateral solutions to these problems.

General knowledge of what is going on in terms of current and potential military developments is particularly limited as far as outer space is concerned. Here, as in other areas of the global arms race, excessive secrecy is one of the main driving forces behind the race. If the leading space Powers are really interested in reaching agreements with prospects of universal adherence, they should be forthcoming in providing information and answering the questions which will no doubt be put to them in this Committee. My delegation therefore urges them not only to resume their bilateral talks on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but also to give a comprehensive report to the Committee on the issues and problems of substance they are faced with in these talks. This will enable the Committee on Disarmament to address the issues and to make progress in parallel with the bilateral efforts by the leading military Powers.

There can be no doubt that the space Powers and, especially, the leading among them bear special responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space. Developments in the field of space technology are such as to widen the gap between the leading powers and most members of the world community. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the present oligopoly will last forever. The sooner this is realized and accepted, the better the prospects for progress in the forthcoming negotiations, for the benefit of us all.

It is not too late to avoid a fruitless arms race in outer space, which would waste enormous resources and make our planet still more insecure. But time is a crucial factor in disarmament negotiations. The longer we wait, the more difficult it will be to tackle the many complex problems we shall face.

**The CHAIRMAN:** I thank Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out in your opening remarks, last year, during the Committee's informal consideration of ways of improving its functioning, you and I were among those most strongly in favour of doing away with what had become a ceremony of congratulations extended to the new Chairman by all members of the Committee and of having that pleasant task performed by one representative only. However, as you have said, the fact is that it is very difficult to give up a practice which indeed simply reflects the truth. It is for that reason that I take great pleasure in expressing satisfaction at having you preside over our deliberations during the current month of April and in wishing you every success, which will also represent a success for all of us, since the last month of a session usually involves a great deal of work and the need for exceptional efforts to bring our three months of work to a satisfactory conclusion. For this, you can count on the Argentine delegation's firm and steadfast support.

At the same time, I wish to extend to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Alessi of Italy, my delegation's sincere congratulations on the very efficient manner in which he guided the Committee's deliberations during the past month; the quality of his leadership was reflected not only in our formal and informal meetings, but also in all the work done outside this room; we have not all had an opportunity to know and, in particular, to realize how many consultations he had to engage in while presiding over the work of the Drafting Group, whose task was and is of particular importance. He did all this very well, with the distinction that is customary for Italian diplomats. It is therefore with genuine pleasure that I extend to him my delegation's warmest congratulations.

Today I shall refer to agenda item 3: "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this question for more than three years, in pursuance of the provision of paragraph 59 of the Final Document, which I shall not read out since it is so well-known. I wish to point out, however, that the appeal made in this paragraph by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is a transitional measure, pending the achievement of the fundamental objective contained in paragraph 56, which states that "The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons".

The Argentine Republic has expressed the view -- which it continues to hold -- that the "most effective guarantee" -- to use the words of the Final Document -- and perhaps the only guarantee of survival, in the true sense of the term "guarantee", that a State can have is the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

There is no need to repeat that this basic objective is now farther beyond our reach than ever.

The Committee on Disarmament has nevertheless set up an Ad Hoc Working Group on this issue for three consecutive years and has done so once again in 1982. The Group has done valuable work in identifying problems, clarifying positions, suggesting common formulas and seeking procedures that might serve as a substitute for a binding international convention, an instrument which, as everyone agrees, is as desirable as a goal as it is impossible to achieve, at least at the present time.

(Mr. Garasales, Argentina)

At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 36/95, reaffirmed the urgent need to reach agreement on this matter and appealed "to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character."

The meetings held by the Ad Hoc Working Group in 1982 show that the positions of the States which should provide the guarantees — the nuclear-weapon States — have not undergone any change. For some time now, they have had what might be called crystallized by them approaches based on their strategic perceptions and on their respective unilateral declarations, which are all different and all contain conditions, requirements and escape clauses that so reduce their value as to make them meaningless as guarantees on which non-nuclear-weapon States can rely for their security.

In view of the rigidity of these positions and the comprehensive exploratory work done by the Working Group, it seems evident, in my delegation's opinion, that the next steps should be taken in the area of the political will of the nuclear States and that there is no longer any point in continuing sine die with theoretical debates confined almost entirely to the repetition of viewpoints that have already been expressed and discussed. There are also other items on our agenda that have not yet been discussed in depth and that perhaps offer better prospects of success.

It therefore seems logical to ask whether the time has not come to discontinue, for the time being, and I stress the words "for the time being", the efforts which the Committee has been making with regard to so-called "negative guarantees" and to say so frankly to the second special session of the General Assembly, as suggested in the statement made on 16 March 1982 by the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan. Perhaps the General Assembly can give fresh impetus to these discussions and the nuclear-weapon States can take advantage of this opportunity to announce new policies that are more in line with the desires of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which will be the beneficiaries of such guarantees and must regard them as satisfactory in order for this exercise to have some meaning.

The Argentine Republic continues to believe that the only measure which will justify this effort is a legally binding international instrument, without any conditions or limitations as to scope, which will protect all non-nuclear-weapon States and include an undertaking to work effectively for nuclear disarmament that will lead to the genuine and real guarantee, namely, the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

The experience of the Ad Hoc Working Group shows that this objective is still far beyond our reach, and all the alternatives proposed or mentioned (resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, identical unilateral declarations, etc.) do nothing more than restrict the importance of or nullify something that is in itself of no great value.

So long as nuclear weapons remain available for use, a convention on so-called "guarantees" will be nothing more than a palliative that will leave a great many questions unanswered. Can a declaration of intent really be verified? Can one be sure

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

that a nuclear State which considers its national security to be seriously threatened will not use every means at its disposal to defend itself? Will not the effects of a nuclear war also be felt in the territory of a State which is supposedly protected by a "guarantee", even though the State under attack is a different country which is not protected by the guarantee, but with which it shares a common border?

These and other questions which many of us are asking ourselves should not, however, hamper the search for means of enhancing — even if only to a small extent — the security of States which form part of a world in which a nuclear disaster seems increasingly possible.

It is to be hoped that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the body through which the international community will express and put forward its views on this matter, which is, to an ever-increasing and more intensive degree, uppermost in the minds of peoples, will succeed in bringing about a resumption of the negotiations on item 3 of our agenda. This is yet another challenge the nuclear Powers face and, on this issue, as well as on others, a great deal depends on how much imagination and flexibility they show in trying to respond to the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In fact, all issues which involve nuclear weapons are interconnected, and it can be said that the security of all States, or at least that of the non-nuclear-weapon States, will be enhanced if measures are taken to prevent a nuclear war.

It is perhaps not irrelevant to point out in this connection that resolution 36/81 B, adopted by consensus at the recent session of the General Assembly, urges, in its paragraph 1, "all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General ... (for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament) their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war".

To the best of my delegation's knowledge, no nuclear-weapon Power has responded to this appeal by the General Assembly, although the time-limit set in resolution 36/81 B, 30 April 1982, is very close.

The process is, however, already under way. On the basis of the provision of operative paragraph 2 of the same resolution, the Government of India submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on 8 February 1982, its comments and proposals with regard to the prevention of nuclear war and I am sure that those proposals will receive careful consideration at the next Assembly.

My delegation considers, as it has already stated on other occasions, that the prevention of nuclear war continues to be a question of the highest priority and that, if the Final Document expressed that view four years ago, this urgency is, if possible, even greater today because the time that has passed since then has made the threat even more immediate.

It is therefore logical and inevitable that the second special session of the General Assembly should give careful attention to this issue and that, in order for this examination to lead to results which are concrete and feasible as well as positive, it will be essential and indispensable for proposals and practical suggestions to be made by all States concerned and, primarily, by the Powers which possess the means of unleashing a nuclear war.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

It is therefore to be hoped that the objective which prompted the adoption of resolution 36/81 B will actually be achieved. If it is, an important contribution will have been made to the work of an international meeting which is now the focus of our attention, namely, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Carasales for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, His Excellency Ambassador Solá Vila.

Mr. SOLÁ VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First, Ambassador Okawa, I would like to express my delegation's most sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April; we are certain that, under your able guidance, demonstrated yet again when you were the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, this negotiating body will conclude its spring session for the year successfully. Allow me also to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Alessi, for the efficient way in which he conducted our work during the month of March.

The Ad Hoc Working Group established by this Committee to negotiate a convention banning chemical weapons is one of those that has, in our opinion, accomplished worthwhile work. Efforts to that end have been encouraged by the international community for many years and this negotiating body, in particular, has devoted a considerable proportion of its time to the subject.

Although, at the beginning of the Committee's work, the Working Group had a limited mandate which did not satisfy all delegations, this year at last its mandate has been broadened and the Group is, technically at least, fully in a position to complete its work successfully within a short time.

However, the hopes which many delegations placed in the work of this Group seem to be evaporating in the face of what is undoubtedly the beginning of a new escalation of the arms race: the decision to start manufacturing binary chemical weapons.

In his statement to the tenth World Trade Union Congress held recently in Havana, Fidel Castro, the President of the Councils of State and Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, said: "In present conditions, the improvement of any kind of weapon sets off a chain reaction that necessarily leads to the further development of weapons systems and makes the previous means of warfare obsolete, so that they are swiftly abandoned. Every day the cost of such systems rises and every day the period during which they will be effective is reduced. This is the absurd and irrational logic of the spiralling arms race".

The manufacture of this new generation of chemical weapons adds a further link to the disastrous chain which started with the decision to postpone ratification of the SALT II Agreement and continued with the decision to deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and, more recently, the decision to start manufacturing nuclear neutron weapons.

It has been rightly said that the production of binary weapons makes the negotiations to ban chemical weapons far more complex, since it has a negative effect both on the determination of toxicity and on aspects relating to verification.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

In referring to the complexity of this latter question, document CD/167, submitted by the Canadian delegation just over one year ago on 26 March 1981, points out that the situation could become even more tense if the United States decided to renew its binary weapon capacity; unfortunately, that prophecy has been fulfilled.

The arguments used to justify production of this new generation of chemical weapons are based on the theory of deterrence and are therefore unacceptable to my delegation.

Speaking in this Committee on 25 March last, the representative of the United States said that an effective ban on chemical weapons was a way of increasing its own security, as well as that of its allies and the non-aligned and neutral countries. As the representative of a non-aligned country, I have to state in this respect that such an objective cannot be achieved by accelerating the chemical weapons race. Far from protecting the security of States, binary chemical weapons merely increase the dangers involved by placing substances that have traditionally been used for peaceful purposes in the category of chemical warfare agents.

Similarly and as a result of the foregoing, document CD/264 contains various arguments which do not bear close scrutiny.

These arguments, which are also based on the policy of deterrence and dramatize an imagined danger which does not in fact exist, are intended to give the impression that the objective sought is the strengthening of defence, when in fact it is to force negotiation from positions of strength.

It is now easier to understand the reason behind the false and tendentious allegations made about the use of chemical weapons in various regions. It is now more obvious that the idea was to condition public opinion in order to eliminate as far as possible any opposition to this new escalation of the chemical arms race.

The production of this new generation of chemical weapons is a serious obstacle to the work of this Committee and, in particular, to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the scope of the ban, toxicity criteria, transfers, declarations of stockpiles and production facilities and verification measures.

In order to give an idea of the foregoing, suffice it to say that the number of neuro-toxic substances which may be used as components of binary mixtures will not only tend to increase, but it will also be impossible to discount the development of substances with other toxic effects.

With regard to toxicity criteria, the Committee has already been informed of the existence of opposing criteria. It has been stated, rightly in our view, that the toxicity of binary substances cannot be determined either by their precursors or by the final products.

In the first case, binary substances would be classified in a lower category; in the second, the role of the by-products of the final reaction might well be unknown.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

With regard to transfers, it should be noted that the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons is growing: the purpose of certain transactions will be very difficult to determine since it is practically impossible to draw a distinction between chemical substances for commercial use and those for use as weapons.

Consequently, it will also be extremely difficult to demonstrate that violations have occurred.

It is worth noting that the declaration of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities will become more difficult because chemical substances produced for commercial purposes may also be used to manufacture binary weapons. It should also be pointed out that this affects the developing countries which do not have chemical weapons and which will have to provide data on their economies that may deliberately be used to hinder their development.

Lastly, I would like to make some brief comments on verification measures. The development of binary chemical weapons has undoubtedly created a new situation and the methods of control which we have discussed for so many years do not appear to be able to guarantee with any certainty that a particular country has or does not have binary weapons.

The existence of chemical substances which can serve a dual purpose and be used both in civilian and in military industry detracts from the effectiveness of the so-called in situ inspections supported so strongly by some delegations. It can also be said that this situation lends itself to concealment of the funds which States allocate to chemical weapons and thus also affects the declarations we referred to earlier.

In view of the foregoing, it is essential to recognize the importance of a national system of verification and control under which States would, because their prestige was at stake, take all the necessary steps to guarantee strict compliance with an international agreement on the subject.

A national system of verification as a basis for the control of any agreement assumes considerable significance in terms of international verification measures, since the direct participation of States in the control of agreements to which they are parties would prevent doubts and suspicions concerning the implementation of such agreements and guarantee that the collection of the data needed for effective control would not be hampered.

In conclusion, we must recognize once again the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which were in progress on this subject outside the Committee, but which have now been unilaterally and unjustifiably interrupted. The resumption of those negotiations would undoubtedly help to solve many of the problems that arise in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, with the work which this Committee is called upon to do in that field.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, His Excellency Ambassador Skalli.



Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, you will understand that I feel bound to say how pleased we in the Moroccan delegation are to see you presiding over our work for the month of April.

Your devotion to the cause of disarmament and your humanity are only part of the explanation for the conscientiousness and enthusiasm you display in bringing to the work of our Committee the invaluable contribution of your country, a great friend of my own.

These qualities, together with your great courtesy and perceptiveness, which are a reflection of the great civilization to which you belong, have made of you a man whose views and opinions are received here with respect and keen appreciation.

We are convinced that, under your chairmanship, the momentum created by your predecessor, the very distinguished representative of Italy, Mr. Alessi, will be sustained and continued.

I should like to devote my statement today to a problem to which my country attaches the utmost importance, namely, that of the security guarantees to be granted to non-nuclear-weapon States.

As you are aware, this is a problem that has been of concern to all non-nuclear-weapon States for nearly two decades. Serious efforts have been made in a number of international forums, such as the 1968 Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States, and during the elaboration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The purpose of those efforts, it should be noted, was and still is to free the non-nuclear-weapon States from the fear of the use or threat of use against them of nuclear weapons. These countries want to obtain from the nuclear-weapon States a binding legal commitment that they will never use and never threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State that undertakes not to acquire such weapons.

These efforts have led to the results of which we are all aware: Security Council resolution 255 (1968), General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) and the five unilateral declarations made by the five nuclear Powers.

Morocco, which, jointly with other non-nuclear-weapon States, has undertaken by virtue of its accession to the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons in any way whatever, endeavoured at the Conference at which that Treaty was reviewed to obtain guarantees of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Thus, at the first Review Conference held in 1975, the Moroccan delegation called for the adoption by the Conference of an international instrument relating to security guarantees that would form an integral part of the NPT.

We do not intend to dwell on the results to which those endeavours gave rise. They are well-known to all of us.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

At the special session in 1978 which it devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly gave fresh impetus to the efforts made in that area. For instance, in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of that session, the General Assembly, having taken note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, urged them to pursue efforts to conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My country, which considers that the results achieved, including the unilateral declarations, are inadequate, welcomed the adoption of paragraph 59 with satisfaction. It likewise welcomes the manner in which the Committee of Disarmament is dealing with the problem. It is worth recalling that, as far back as 1979, the Committee appointed, for this purpose, an Ad Hoc Working Group, which, until this session, had the benefit of the competence of the distinguished representatives of Egypt and Italy, who presided over it, as it now has the benefit of the experience and skill of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan.

Although we cannot underestimate the obstacles that stand in the way of a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character, we must pursue our efforts to achieve that goal.

The Committee's discussions have made it possible:

- (1) To identify some elements of the commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States; and
- (2) To carry out a detailed and comparative analysis of the possible alternatives to a common approach or formula.

The discussions during the four sessions of the Group have provided a detailed view of the propositions before us. We are now faced with two approaches: on the one hand, an approach that provides for assurances to be granted without any condition, qualification or limitation and, on the other, an approach which requires certain criteria to be met in order to determine which non-nuclear-weapon States would be covered by the guarantees.

My delegation, which represents a country that has entered into a binding commitment, is unable to accept some of the conditions proposed by some nuclear Powers. In particular, it is unable to agree that non-nuclear-weapon States, such as Morocco, should be required to enter into additional commitments.

We cannot agree that States such as Morocco, which are Parties to the NPT, must wait for a nuclear-weapon free zone to be created in their region before claiming the benefit of security guarantees. My country is sparing no effort to establish nuclear-free zones in Africa and the Middle East. However, the efforts that have been made in the past two decades with a view to denuclearising the African continent have, unfortunately, been unsuccessful because of South Africa's totally negative attitude. The efforts to denuclearise the Middle East are also being deliberately obstructed by Israel. If these facts are borne in mind, one cannot but understand our attitude towards such a proposition.

Morocco can also not agree that the granting of assurances to a State Party to the NPT should depend on its accession to an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

As to the form of the international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Moroccan delegation has already stated on several occasions that it is in favour of concluding an international convention on the matter.

We are also pleased to note that, in principle, there is no opposition to such an approach.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Skalli for his statement and for his very kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure that, on behalf of my delegation, I congratulate you, the representative of a State with which Australia not only has strong regional ties, but a special treaty relationship, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee.

May I also express my appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Italy, Mr. Alessi, on the efficient and sensitive manner in which he presided over us. That the Committee has been able, in difficult international times, to make recognizable progress on several important fronts is in no small way due to his personal efforts.

I turn now to two items on our agenda, namely, the issues of chemical weapons and of radiological weapons.

We, as the Committee on Disarmament, can take some satisfaction from the sense of priorities and timing that led us to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons; a Working Group which has, moreover, the mandate of elaborating an agreement to prohibit such weapons.

In one context or another, the attention of the international public is being drawn, increasingly, to these peculiarly sinister and grotesque tools of war. International concern at their very existence grows steadily. The topic is an emotional one, as it has been ever since the first horrific use of chemical weapons almost 70 years ago. Emotion is not a good basis for reasoned debate or substantive negotiation, but it lends impetus and urgency to the search for a convention designed to eliminate these weapons.

There are already important areas of consensus on the means of achieving and shaping such a convention. There is consensus, for example, on the need for such a convention. There is consensus on the aptness of this Committee as a body in which to negotiate a convention banning chemical weapons. There is consensus on the fact that chemical weapons are of considerable military value. That point is nowhere disputed in the publicity currently being given to these weapons. Indeed, it is partly their very efficiency, notably against civilians and the inadequately protected, which makes resort to them tempting and the need for a ban on them urgent.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

If chemicals of one sort or another are being used in the conflicts now taking place in too many parts of this earth, then there can be no doubt that those chemicals are taking a very severe toll. If, already, there is deployment on a large scale on one or both sides of the European military theatre, then that is because the use of chemical weapons in certain military contingencies offers a decisive advantage, even when those who constitute the target have some protection. If there is to be an increase in CW capabilities, for example through the development of binary weapons, this is because that increase in capabilities may serve to deter. I do not intend, here, to give an assessment of the various public reports that have appeared on these matters. But I will come back to them in describing the task before the Committee.

Two major issues remain to be resolved in our efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Those are the issues of scope and verification. The issue of scope, including the important question whether or not there should be a ban on use, is a contentious one. Once again there is, however, consensus on some fundamental points. One of these is the sanctity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, even though it does not do so in a comprehensive way. The Protocol is far from perfect, for it suffers from ambiguity, as well as a lack of comprehensiveness. Nevertheless, the Protocol of 1925 does have great merit: it is already in place, it is already part of the machinery of constraint and a great many States are parties to it. The Protocol will need to be referred to in the new convention towards which we are working, since whatever the scope of the new instrument, it will build on the achievement of 1925. What our convention should do is link itself, perhaps in its preamble, to the Protocol. In doing so, it should reinforce the Protocol. This reinforcement would then be mutual. The determination of the international community to make chemical weapons impossible would be unequivocal.

Some delegations have in the past expressed concern that a new convention could have the effect of weakening the 1925 Protocol. I do not think they need worry. When a treaty builds on an earlier one, the legal force of that earlier treaty cannot be weakened. Nor is there ambiguity of commitment. A party to one, but not to the other remains bound by the commitment it has made. If bound to both, the commitment is equally clear. In practice, it seems highly probable that all States parties to the 1925 Protocol will also move to adhere to the new convention.

Another fundamental point under the heading of scope on which there is consensus concerns the definition of the criterion of purpose. There is general agreement that some highly toxic chemicals will be permitted for production, stockpiling, retention, transfer and so on. Such chemicals will, for example, include pharmaceuticals. The essential criterion distinguishing permissible chemicals from those to be prohibited is the ends to which these chemicals are to be put. The definition of the general-purpose criterion is, and must be, the corner-stone of the treaty at which we aim: all other definitions refer back to it. In the definition of categories -- supertoxic lethal chemicals, lethal chemicals and other harmful chemicals -- the criterion of purpose will determine what is and what is not to be banned.

The criterion of purpose as applied to chemical warfare agents refers to the purpose for which they are made. They are produced for use in armed conflict in order to confer military advantage. Thus, the criterion of purpose refers, in fact,

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

to the specific activity of gaining a military advantage, namely, the use of chemicals in war. In other words, the general-purpose criterion already refers to the use of chemicals in armed conflicts. It seems logical therefore to ban the use, as well as the production, stockpiling and so on, of toxic chemicals.

A ban on use is also logical from another point of view. The clauses of a CV convention aimed at determining whether or not the convention is being honoured are likely to be applied only when there are reports, suggestions or news that chemical weapons are being used. You may think that a pessimistic statement, what in the jargon of our times might be termed a "worst-case scenario", but it is for all that a realistic statement. Consequently, it seems to my delegation logical that provision must be made in a convention for a ban on use to be investigated and verified on its own merits. We should not make the problems of verification more difficult by introducing artificial constraints that permit verification only of less central and more oblique violations, such as unlawful production or stockpiling.

Even in the best case, use is pertinent: if our efforts are successful, that will be evident only by the fact that chemical weapons are not used. Whether or not there is unlawful production, stockpiling or transfer, there will be little real concern among States or on the part of world public opinion so long as there are no suggestions of use.

Recent reports of use in various conflicts bear directly on our task, both with regard to the scope of a future convention and with regard to its verification provisions. The United Nations is looking into these reports, but under considerable handicaps, not the least of them being the absence of agreed mechanisms. This is, in part, why the United Nations investigation has been extremely slow. The procedures for collecting and assessing material relevant to the United Nations team's enquiry are undetermined. The lesson to be drawn is that the convention we seek must provide for eventualities of this sort: it must ban use and it must establish machinery for complaints and for verification. Many sound ideas have been advanced on these aspects. Those ideas include proposals to link the new convention to existing instruments. In the Ad Hoc Working Group, detailed proposals have been put forward for establishing a consultative committee. One suggestion, which has not been made in this Committee before, but should not be ignored altogether, is for agreed, designated neutral States to make available a small corps which would specialize in verification techniques and could quickly investigate cases referred to it by the consultative committee. I mention these ideas to show not only that our work is urgent but that we should not have closed minds on the range of options open to us in tackling it.

Since the Committee on Disarmament first began work on this agenda item, it has benefited from the help of experts. Delegations have been able to draw on technical advice and feed it into the Working Group. This has helped in regular sessions of the Working Group and in separate exercises structured around specific problems such as

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

the determination of toxicity. It is time, in the view of the Australian delegation, to develop this important aspect of our work. It is time that technical advice should be available when a political need for it has been determined. Conversely, technical advice can help to shape that political need and, indeed, ensure that the need is a real one or well-based or intelligently framed. My delegation considers that on aspects such as verification, it would greatly assist the Working Group to know what technologies are available and how they might be applied to our task. We have consistently supported, for example, the work done in this area by Finland and believe that this work will prove valuable. It is for this reason that we consider that the technology described as remote continual verification -- or Recover -- should be further examined. It is why we believe that the CW specialists should be convened here again in August to explore technical aspects of a future convention, as recommended in Working Paper No. 30.

We have heard a great deal about binary weapons at this session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation regrets any new development of chemical weapons, for whatever reason. We would be happy to see the shelving of any new development, including that of binary weapons. But some fundamental points need to be faced squarely. First, binary weapons are no more or no less than the sum of their parts: the known sum of known parts. For the purposes of our convention, as has been urgently argued by Yugoslavia in document CD/266, the parts can be called precursors, or more precisely "key precursors" and subjected to the same procedures as the chemicals which go to make up a chemical weapon of a non-binary type. The binary process -- involving chemical reaction during use -- would therefore be treated under the convention in the same way as the process of producing chemical weapons by a chemical reaction at a chemical plant. Secondly, are the most vocal opponents of this development in favour of a ban on binaries? If so what arrangements do they have in mind in practical terms for verifying such a ban? In my delegation's view, verifying a ban on binaries is no different from verifying a ban on other chemical weapons and it should, of course, involve on-site inspection. Finally, the clock cannot be stopped, let alone turned back. Assuming there was a ban on binaries, and an effective, verifiable one at that, we would still have to cope with the potential for binaries. We would still, in attempting to draw up a chemical weapons convention, have to acknowledge the possibility that a weapon could be constructed by mixing two chemical agents in flight. In other words, the issue of binaries is with us come what may: the problem is a technical one and it should have nothing to do with politics.

My last remarks on this item relate to the activity of the Working Group, under its dedicated Chairman, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. My delegation was pleased to see the mandate of the Working Group expanded. We were pleased that its new terms of reference permit specific wording to be tabled in the form of alternative elements of a draft CW convention. It is pleased too at the response of delegations to this development. It considers that a positive report on its

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

current work can be made by the Working Group, through the device of an agreed Chairman's statement, to the second special session on disarmament. It considers that, at the resumed summer session, the Working Group will be able to go a stage further and seek to rationalize the various new alternative elements. Together with the elements and comments that constituted last year's report of the Working Group, under the distinguished chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. Such rationalization should mean that, by the end of the year, much of the work of elaborating a convention on chemical weapons will have been done. Many technical details will remain to be worked out. It may be that the questions of scope and of linkage with other instruments will not have been fully resolved by then. Nonetheless, we shall have taken a decisive step forward, a step which does much to meet earnest international hopes for real progress towards proscribing chemical weapons.

I now turn to the subject of radiological weapons, on which the Australian delegation has not spoken substantively in plenary for some time. That is because, in our view, more was to be gained by concentrating our efforts in the Working Group on resolving outstanding questions. For two reasons, we judge that the time has now come to speak out on some aspects of the Working Group's tasks. We note first that, building on the strong foundations laid last year by the distinguished Ambassador of Hungary, Mr. Komives, and under the driving leadership of this year's Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wegener, there is a real chance of progress in the work on what is defined as the traditional subject-matter of negotiations on radiological weapons. Secondly, the Working Group has begun serious study of how to ban attacks on civilian nuclear installations.

On the text covering the traditional material, Australia last year sought to help define what constitutes a radiological weapon. This year, we have put forward in the Working Group four different definitions. In so doing, we hoped not so much to conceive a definition that would meet the stringent technical requirements that are needed, but to prompt creative thinking on the problem. In that respect, we believe we have succeeded. We earnestly hope that, once a technically sound definition has been achieved, political objections yet unvoiced will not impede its ultimate inclusion in a treaty. Many grey cells and much sweat have gone into the effort to devise a definition that can in no way be interpreted as legalizing the use of nuclear weapons. Discouragement and much disappointment would undoubtedly follow if doubts yet unexpressed on this way of proceeding were to negate it.

As to the other articles of the projected RM convention, we have been greatly encouraged by the workmanlike attitude of those taking part in the Working Group and firmly endorse the Chairman's view that we should try, before the second special session, to come as close as possible to an agreed treaty.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Frankly, my delegation has always seen a convention on radiological weapons as a marginal disarmament measure. Nonetheless, we have also regarded it as worth persisting in as a further step on the path to disarmament. Agreement, even near agreement, on the draft of a convention is, moreover, something which can only encourage us in our work and help ensure a successful special session. We need, in any event, quickly to despatch this particular monster so that we can attack with greater confidence the larger monsters that crowd our agenda.

As to the projected ban on attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, Australia still has under review how this might best be achieved. One thing, however, is clear: there is little to be gained from linking it in such a way to negotiations on the traditional material that neither is advanced. The banning of attacks on civilian nuclear installations will be, as even the first of our meetings has shown, a task of great complexity. It requires and deserves the full attention of a Working Group free from other preoccupations. It has, for example, been argued that so fierce are the consequences of the hostile dispersal of radioactive material from nuclear facilities that attacks on the whole range of installations involved in any way with such material should be prohibited. While this may sound like a good idea, it raises immense problems not only of verification, identification and marking of the facilities to be protected, but also of adequately delimiting perimeters and sanctuaries. Many countries are, moreover, so peppered with facilities which use or handle radioactive material for a wide variety of purposes, that an effort to ban attacks on all of them immediately runs up against insurmountable practical problems.

Thus, the Committee will need to look carefully at the problem of definition, especially at the lower, less dangerous, end of the spectrum, which includes such installations as spent fuel storage facilities, nuclear research establishments, factories working with irradiated material and radioactive material being transported between facilities. Australia, as a country with facilities at this lower end of the spectrum, is concerned to see a full exchange of views on all the options open to the Working Group in developing a definition of the kinds of facilities and installations to be protected by the projected ban. Accordingly, we would welcome any technical information and expertise that delegations can bring to the discussions. I do not want to finish this statement without stressing that my delegation brings an open mind to the matters encompassed by a ban on attacks against civilian nuclear installations and looks forward both to learning from and to co-operating with all delegations on this journey into relatively uncharted waters.



The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, first of all, please allow me warmly to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. We believe that, with your diplomatic skill and rich experience, you will be able to guide our Committee to the completion of its arduous task in the last month of the spring session. I would also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador M. Alessi of Italy, who so excellently accomplished extensive work during the last month.

I would now like to express our views on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is a task entrusted to the Committee by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This is a reflection of the urgent desire of the people of the world that such a programme should help halt the arms race and promote disarmament. Since the Working Group on a CPD resumed its work last January under the skilled and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles, many meetings have been held and a great deal of work has been done. During this period of time, representatives of member States have held serious and intensive discussions and frequent consultations on the elements of the programme. As a result, they have further clarified their respective positions and views and gradually arrived at various degrees of convergence on some of the issues and achieved some progress. In this connection, I wish to express our appreciation of the active role played by the Group of 21. However, we cannot fail to note that, on the conceptual issues relating to the stages, nature and time-frame of the programme, the measures to be included in the programme and the procedures for the review of the implementation of the programme, differences still exist among various sides and agreement still eludes us. Greater efforts therefore still have to be made in this regard.

In our view, if a comprehensive programme of disarmament is really to accelerate the process of disarmament, we should, as stated by representatives of some States, make a step forward from the Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The programme should encompass specific measures to be implemented by stages rather than merely listing various measures. For the promotion of the disarmament process, the measures of the initial stage are the most crucial. Measures for this stage should be as specific as possible. Their formulation should proceed in the light of the escalation of the arms race and the growing danger of war and it should reflect the principle that the States with the largest arsenals should be the first to reduce armaments so that the implementation of those measures may curb the arms race and reduce the danger of war. With regard to the question of how many stages should be included in the programme, various sides generally think that there should be at least three stages: the first, intermediate and final stages, with the intermediate stage being sub-divided into two or three stages if necessary. We view this approach as feasible.

With regard to the question of time-frames, views remain widely divergent. We are of the opinion that there should be an indicative time-frame for each stage. This would give us a sense of urgency in the implementation of the measures. If there is no time-frame at all or if States do not undertake to implement relevant measures within a time-frame, then the programme will lose much of its practical significance.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

Apart from an indicative time-frame, it is also necessary to define an appropriate review mechanism and procedures. Periodic reviews will not only promote the implementation of the programme, but also facilitate the adjustment of measures for the next stages. Therefore, reviews may generally be carried out at the end of each stage without excluding the possibility of also conducting mid-stage ones, should the necessity for them arise. We subscribe to the view that the United Nations should play the central role in reviewing the implementation of the programme. We believe that, if the negotiating parties genuinely wish to promote disarmament by elaborating the Programme, then once it has been worked out after serious negotiations, they should naturally undertake the obligation and responsibility of implementing it conscientiously.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is drawing closer with each passing day, yet the text of the various elements of the programme, especially the most substantive part on "measures", still contains many brackets. This situation cannot but arouse general concern. As some representatives have pointed out, the achievement of results in negotiations depends on the will to negotiate. We would like to emphasize that the fulfilment of the task of elaborating the programme depends mainly on whether or not the Superpowers that possess the largest arsenals have the will to cease their arms race and to carry out disarmament. Though they cannot overtly oppose the provision of principle that they have special responsibility for disarmament, the Superpowers, in discussions and negotiations on specific disarmament measures, have frequently placed in brackets the reasonable proposals of the non-aligned and neutral States that they take concrete disarmament actions. This constitutes the main obstacle to substantive progress in negotiations.

In the course of the meetings, we have deeply felt the effects of the general international situation on the disarmament negotiations. The intensified Superpower rivalry in various parts of the world, their accelerated arms race and the continued aggression and occupation of sovereign States by hegemonists have jeopardized confidence and understanding among States and have seriously affected the atmosphere of the disarmament negotiations. This has naturally added to the difficulties involved in the elaboration of the programme. Therefore, in order successfully to elaborate and, subsequently, implement the programme, it is of key importance that the Superpowers should change their positions and honour their professed desire for disarmament with concrete actions.

Finally, I wish to state that the Chinese delegation will continue to exchange views with other delegations and work together with them for the completion of the elaboration of the programme.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutresna.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, permit me, at the outset, to express on behalf of my delegation our sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. Your accession to the chair during the last month of the Committee's first session of 1982 augurs well for the completion of the Committee's work, in view of what the Committee is expected to contribute to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I say this because we are all aware that you have long been deeply involved in this multilateral disarmament negotiating body. This factor, against the background of the past, yet unique experience of the country which you so ably represent, has given

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

my delegation added confidence that you will be able to guide our work to a successful conclusion. My delegation pledges its support and co-operation to you in the accomplishment of your task.

I shall be remiss if I do not also say, on this occasion, how much my delegation appreciates the contribution made by your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Mario Alessi, during his term of office as Chairman of the Committee for the month of March. The skill, tactfulness and firmness he displayed in presiding over our work during that period enabled the Committee to reach the stage at which it finds itself today.

My brief intervention this morning will be devoted to item 6 of the agenda namely, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and, in particular, the question of the nature of the CPD.

My delegation attaches considerable importance to the nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In my delegation's view, it will determine and reflect the degree of our commitment to the implementation of the CPD in future. The embodiment of the CPD in a legally binding instrument would constitute the greatest assurance of its credibility and worthiness and crown the long, hard and laborious work that has gone into its elaboration.

My delegation realizes that some delegations in the Committee have raised objection to this idea. They have argued, for example, that the success of any negotiations would depend on various factors and that, in pursuing disarmament efforts States cannot be legally bound. While it is true that we cannot treat disarmament negotiations in isolation, it is equally true that relations among States at any given moment are the result of the behaviour of the States concerned and, as such, lie within the domain of their respective responsibility. Linkage theory can, and must, work both ways. Thus, external factors may influence the disarmament negotiations, but especially if progress is achieved, the disarmament negotiations can also help to shape relations among States.

My delegation also suspects that there is some apprehension that, once the CPD is embodied in a legally binding instrument, it will eventually serve as another platform for blaming one State or group of States in the case of failure to arrive at successful results. If this failure occurs, the blame will be on all of us without exception. Needless to say, the Final Document constitutes a vivid reminder to all of us that we have to proceed to disarmament or face annihilation. It is therefore difficult to understand that this noble aim of disarmament should be put aside simply because of the perceptions and security interests of a few States.

The distortion of the noble aim of disarmament has, to some extent, also been caused by those who expressed doubts about the assumption on which the state of affairs referred to in paragraph 11 of the Final Document was based; and who went even further, saying that paragraph 11 was an exaggeration. My delegation is aware that some military strategists have advocated the view that a nuclear war could be winnable. Another suggestion based on this false premise was that, as they are already used to the existing situation, they argued that there is no point in changing it and that there is no other way than to accept it as a reality. The only remark that my delegation can offer, at least for the purpose of this brief intervention, is: are we going to continue to live under constant fear as a result of the so-called balance of terror or deterrence policy? My delegation submits that to live without fear is one of the fundamental rights of mankind.

In conclusion, the experience I believe we all gained from the first special session devoted to disarmament is that political commitment alone is not enough to ensure the implementation of the Final Document

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

I am not at all suggesting that the embodiment of the CPD in a legally binding instrument will automatically ensure its strict and faithful implementation. However, my delegation believes that we will at least have the assurance that the obligations contained therein will be carried out in good faith.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a CPD, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, requested us, during the last meeting of the Contact Group, to find an acceptable solution to the two different approaches to the nature of the CPD and to choose between a legally binding instrument and a simple recommendation of the General Assembly.

I am not claiming that, by this brief intervention, my delegation has adequately responded to such a request. I must admit, however, that my delegation continues to hold the view that the CPD should be legally binding. As to its appropriate form as a legal instrument, my delegation has an open mind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sturesna for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing the timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As announced by my predecessor, there will be no activities in the United Nations Office at Geneva on Friday, 9 April. Therefore, in order to maintain the frequency of weekly meetings, we have had to provide for simultaneous meetings. Of course, this is not a new development, since we have already been holding simultaneous meetings for some weeks. The only difference is that we can now count on full conference services for the meetings shown in the informal paper. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and we can adjust it as we proceed. It seems to me, however, that the arrangements contained in the informal paper are the minimum required to allow the Committee to discharge the tasks facing it before the end of the first part of the present session.

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been asked by Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to transmit to you the following message:

"The Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons invites delegations to open-ended informal consultations on the format of the report, on Monday, 5 April 1982, at 10.30 a.m. in Room I."

I will now adjourn the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 6 April at 10 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 6 April 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio Okawa

(Japan)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. ILTI  
Mr. M. BELKERID  
Mr. A. TAFAR

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES  
Miss H. NASCIMBENE  
Mr. V. ESPECHE GIL

Australia: Mr. D.H. SADLEIR

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELIUK  
Mr. J.H. NOIRFALISSE  
Miss DE CLERQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. B. GRINBERG

Burma: U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. H.N. FAHIY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. de BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES  
Mr. M. VILLETTE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK  
Mr. A. BAHRIN

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDENBILIG  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. S.H. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRALBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. von DONGEN  
Mr. H. WAGENIAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. H.H.G.S. PALIYAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT



United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J. HISKEL  
Miss M.E. HOINKES  
Mr. J. MARTIN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. HAVARRO  
Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRITUNEC  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I declare open the 169th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee continues today its consideration of item 6 on its Agenda, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". As usual, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so, in conformity with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mongolia, the United States of America, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, Romania and Brazil. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Mongolia, His Excellency Ambassador Erdembileg.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in its statement today the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic would like to express some views on item 5 of the Committee's agenda, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

But before doing so, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, sincerely to congratulate you in connection with your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April.

My delegation places great hopes in the successful outcome of the Committee's deliberations under your wise guidance in this important and responsible period covering the completion of the work of the first part of the Committee's 1982 session and the submission of the special report to the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Permit me to take this opportunity to express once again my delegation's gratitude to the representative of Italy for the work done by him in discharging the functions of Chairman for the month of March.

Today, the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with its programme of work, is completing consideration of agenda item 6. The Mongolian delegation has briefly expressed its views on this item in its previous statements.

As is known, General Assembly resolution 36/92 F requested the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit it in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

In this connection, I should like to point out that, notwithstanding the considerable efforts made by the Committee in the contact groups and in the course of consultations between interested delegations and apart from certain results, there still remain unresolved problems and a number of difficulties in the way of agreement on the text of the programme.

However, we have not yet lost hope that the Committee will prove able to make the most efficient use of the time remaining and move ahead with the execution of the task before it.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Mongolia's position on the question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction has been stated in this Committee on several occasions. We, like many others, continue to hold the view that the simplest and most reliable means of resolving this problem is the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement that would erect a firm barrier to the emergence of any new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. At the same time, meeting the position of the western partners in the negotiations in the Committee half way, we do not preclude the possibility of concluding agreements on individual types of such weapons.

In this context, radiological weapons could already have been declared illegal. When the joint Soviet-United States proposal on the prohibition of radiological weapons was introduced in the Committee, many delegations expected, with fully justified hope, that, on the basis of this proposal, agreement would be reached in the Committee on Disarmament on this type of weapon of mass destruction in the near future.

But facts remain facts and it can only be regretted that the negotiations have moved in the direction of the complication of the problem. We consider the first requirement to be to reach agreement on the question of prohibiting radiological weapons themselves without linking it to other, unrelated questions.

With regard to the problem of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, I should like to refer to General Assembly resolution 36/89, which "calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons", that "would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council".

In this connection, the Mongolian delegation supports the proposal of the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic for the holding, during the second part of the 1982 session, of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of governmental experts to consider the question of the aforementioned declarations and other issues, relating to the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

In our opinion, such an approach would enable the Committee to make progress in this matter.

I should like to say a few words about the question of the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon.

The concern felt by world public opinion about the threat of this most inhuman and barbaric type of weapon was fully reflected for the first time in resolution 36/92 K, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

In this resolution, it is stressed that the introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in the military arsenals of States escalates the nuclear arms race and significantly lowers the threshold to nuclear war, thereby increasing the danger of such a war.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Further on in the resolution the General Assembly recognizes the inhumane effects of this weapon and requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

Thus, the General Assembly has clearly and unambiguously defined its attitude to neutron weapons.

However, it is to be regretted that, because of the obstructionist attitude of some delegations, there has been no decision by consensus within the Committee on Disarmament concerning this recommendation from the United Nations General Assembly.

Nevertheless, the Mongolian delegation, together with other socialist countries, continues to believe it essential that, in accordance with the above-mentioned recommendation of the General Assembly, the Committee should start concrete negotiations on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon and set up an ad hoc working group for this purpose. In this connection, I should like to point out once again that as long ago as March 1978 the group of socialist countries submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

We consider that, in order to prevent a new neutron spiral in the arms race and a further increase in the danger of war, the Committee on Disarmament must heed the call of world public opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Although you have asked that the customary tribute paid to incoming Chairmen should be dispensed with, in your case I must demur, for I would be remiss if I did not express the pleasure and satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you, my dear friend and colleague, in this Chair. We have important work before us this month and we are confident that your experience, skill and dedication, so ably demonstrated during your tenure as the representative from Japan to this Committee, will lead us to a successful conclusion during this critical period in our 1982 session. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's admiration and appreciation to our Chairman for the month of March, my good friend the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi, who has given unsparingly of his time and considerable talents to the work of our Committee during his chairmanship.

Today I would like to speak on agenda item 6, dealing with a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

For the past three sessions, the Committee has pursued efforts to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control through a Working Group dedicated to the development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This work has been carried out under the able and dedicated leadership

(Mr. Fields, United States)

of Ambassador Adeniji, the representative of Nigeria, in 1980 and our distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, in 1981 and 1982. This task -- inspired by the desires of all people to live in a world of genuine and lasting peace -- has not always been easy, due to the fundamental nature and complexity of the issues involved. We have, despite these difficulties, accomplished important and useful work. However, our task is still far from complete, and significant work remains to be done, both here in the Committee and at the second special session of the General Assembly, where the results of our work will be submitted to the scrutiny of an anxious world community. Although my delegation will undoubtedly have more to say about the programme when we refer to the procedure for forwarding the results of the Working Group's efforts to the second special session, I would like briefly to outline its views on certain aspects of the work done to date.

In saying that difficult questions remain, I do not want my colleagues to think that I am a prophet of doom. The resolution of the remaining problems is not beyond our reach. It is, however, important that we understand fully not only what the issues and the problems are, but the underlying rationale for the positions of various concerned delegations.

The United States approaches the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament within the framework of its over-all national security policy -- a policy based on enduring principles aimed both at achieving and at maintaining peace. An essential element of our policy, as reiterated by Secretary Haig on 14 July 1981, is the search for sound arms control agreements.

My Government is committed to this search and this commitment was reaffirmed by President Reagan in his press conference on 31 March, in which he said:

"I have and I will continue to seek realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments and enhances global security. We can accept no less".

In calling upon the Soviet Union to join us in pursuing the goal of peace, President Reagan said:

"I invite the Soviet Union to join with us now, to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth".

The importance which our President attaches to arms control issues was highlighted yesterday by his decision to address the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In this connection, he expressed both the hope that President Brezhnev would also attend and his desire that the two should meet at that time to discuss issues related to disarmament, so important to all of us. In his announcement, he said:

"The whole idea ... of arms reduction, arms control, is one of the most important things that is facing us, and I hope that we'll (Presidents Reagan and Brezhnev) be able to address the conference".

(Mr. Fields, United States)

These statements by President Reagan make it clear that there can be no question about my country's commitment to the search for an enduring peace and its strong desire to begin the process of reducing nuclear weapons as a major contribution towards this goal.

I would like to point out that President Reagan spoke of "realistic arms control agreements". It is with this sense of realism and commitment to the arms control process that my delegation has approached our negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I cannot over-emphasize the attachment of my delegation to a workable and realistic programme. Regrettably, past attempts by serious and dedicated men and women to create and maintain peace have not always been marked by great success. The fundamental causes of war and international tension have not been eradicated despite our best efforts. For us to achieve success, our endeavours must take full account of the interaction between the causes of tension and the accretion of armaments. Agreements to limit and reduce arms must be carefully negotiated to protect and enhance the security of all the parties involved and to ensure that such agreements do not create instabilities which increase the risk of the very conflicts they are designed to lessen. The obligations they create must be precise and compliance with them must be verifiable. The process of negotiation is necessarily a consensual one. The technical and political complexity of these issues, the fundamental nature of the interests involved and the impossibility of foreseeing with precision relevant future developments make it unrealistic to predict a rigid sequence or arbitrary time-tables for the conclusion of particular agreements. Distrust and suspicion are obstacles to disarmament; thus, collateral measures to promote openness, or "transparency", and enhance the building of confidence are vital to the process. Moreover, progress in disarmament must go hand in hand with the strengthening of international procedures and institutions for peace-keeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes. For these reasons, we believe that, to be successful, progress must be made by discrete steps and through specific agreements.

While experience and practice have shown that success in disarmament can only be achieved through a realistic step-by-step approach, we have none the less supported, and continue to support, the broad approach to disarmament adopted by this Committee in the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation has participated actively in this work, in the belief that such a programme can provide both a broad guide to action towards disarmament and a means of measuring progress. It is our belief -- one shared by many in this Committee -- that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should provide the necessary framework for action towards disarmament. It should not dictate specific actions to States, but should, rather, serve as a guide or plan for use by States in the development of the specific actions to be undertaken by them. It should identify measures that require negotiation and the principles to guide those negotiations and suggest priorities to be observed. It should

(Mr. Fields, United States)

also indicate procedures for ensuring adequate and effective verification and compliance with the measures to be negotiated by States, as well as the appropriate mechanisms for review and appraisal.

The content of the comprehensive programme of disarmament must reflect realistic, as well as effective, balanced, verifiable and appropriately interrelated approaches which take fully into account the existing security needs of all States, the international atmosphere and political realities. The concept of the integration of measures and the negotiations on them is extremely important. Negotiations can be pursued on different measures at the same time and several measures may be discussed in one set of negotiations. This concept reflects my Government's policy towards arms control and disarmament negotiations.

The United States is at present engaged in a variety of arms control and disarmament negotiations. In Vienna, we are involved in negotiating the reduction of arms and armed forces in Europe. Here in Geneva, we are negotiating bilaterally with the USSR on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We have discussed the expansion of confidence-building measures in Europe in the context of the Madrid Review Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe. In this Committee, we have been pursuing negotiations on a radiological weapons convention and the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. On all of these issues, our desire is to achieve agreements as soon as possible. However, these efforts, and others to be commenced, involve complex and difficult issues, on which it is not possible to reach agreement overnight. My delegation therefore believes, as do others, that it is unrealistic to include deadlines or even indicative time-frames for the initiation or conclusion of specific negotiations on measures contained within the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The establishment of such time-frames without regard to unpredictable future international developments is illogical. The concept of urgency can be more realistically reflected by agreeing on the need to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control in as short a time as possible and by setting in motion a process of periodic reviews to give impetus to the implementation of the programme. Such a dynamic process would take the best advantage of progress reached in negotiations on the measures outlined, the state of negotiations in progress and the international atmosphere and political realities.

As to the nature of the programme, my delegation does not view the comprehensive programme as a substitute for the negotiation of specific agreements which will move the world towards general and complete disarmament. The binding legal commitments which will further this process can only be entered into as a result of successful negotiations on effective, balanced and verifiable agreements. We earnestly seek the conclusion of such agreements. What is required now is the political will not only to subscribe to, but also to undertake to implement the programme. This is best done not in words, but in deeds -- and, specifically, through the activities of States to create the kind of trust which enables true progress towards disarmament.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

I would like to turn now to the question of measures for inclusion in the programme. My delegation has always held the view that, if the programme is to serve effectively as a road map to disarmament, the measures included in it should indicate the subjects upon which negotiations should take place, as well as the general issues to be discussed in these negotiations. The measures should thus not be too specific and should not be phrased in such a way as to prejudice the outcome of such negotiations. It is, after all, the primary responsibility of the States undertaking such negotiations to determine the specific contents of the negotiations, as well as the manner in which specific measures will be discussed.

My Government also has had some difficulty with the placement of specific measures in a series of stages or phases within which the negotiation of measures are to be implemented. The negotiating process is a continuing one which does not lend itself to the conclusion of a particular package of measures at any specific time. We do agree that measures to be negotiated can be identified in a logical sequence and we have worked in the Working Group on this basis. It also seems logical to us that measures can be grouped according to the steps that are initially required by the present situation, intermediate steps and steps to bring about general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Through this approach, some progress has been made in the Working Group's Contact Group on measures. Some headway has also been made in an informal contact group which is hard at work in attempting to reconcile the different texts submitted concerning specific measures.

We have made progress in our negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament both in the Working Group proper and in our informal contact groups. Under the respective chairmanships of the Ambassadors of France, Brazil and the German Democratic Republic, we have developed negotiating texts, albeit in some cases highly bracketed ones, on objectives, priorities and principles of a CPD. We have also, as I have already noted, made some progress on the identification and elaboration of measures for inclusion in the programme. Furthermore, I think we all agree on the need for a periodic review of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and my delegation does not foresee great difficulty in working out the specifics for such a review. We believe that at the end of this session we will have a negotiating document, however bracketed, however informal, that delegations can refer to their Governments for intense review before we turn again to the task of the final shaping of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we must strive to negotiate a comprehensive programme which will command the necessary consensus. We must avoid inequitable or unbalanced formulae which, in their impact, are destabilizing and would jeopardize peace. Our programme must responsibly take account of the longing of the peoples of the world for the establishment of a framework for disarmament which will lead to lasting peace. It is a noble effort, and I pledge the co-operation of my delegation in that effort.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Fields for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Sutresna.



Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): I take the floor this morning for the purpose of introducing the joint technical report contained in document CD/270 and submitted by Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning the destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at a site near Bandung, the capital city of the Province of West Java, Indonesia.

It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation that, at this juncture in the Committee's work, the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands are in a position to submit this report to the Committee with a view to sharing with all other member States the experience of co-operation gained by our two countries in a field related to a subject — that of chemical weapons — which is under consideration by the Committee. We sincerely hope that the report will contribute, in one way or another, to the progress of the work being done by the Committee in this respect.

As you may have noticed from the document, the destruction of this dangerous agent took place three years ago in my country. The report is being submitted at a time when the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the able chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, is elaborating provisions of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons relating, in particular, to their destruction and verification. The crux of this prohibition, in the view of my delegation, is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents.

I believe it appropriate to stress that the existence of this mustard agent in Indonesia was an inheritance from the then Government of the Netherlands East Indies, under whose authority this chemical weapon was intended for use in retaliation in the event that chemical weapons were used by the enemy during the Second World War, which was extending to the region. As it turned out, chemical weapons were not used there during that war.

As you are aware, Indonesia underwent physical struggle prior to the proclamation of its independence in 1945 and in the years thereafter. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that the Indonesian authorities should have been completely unaware of the presence of the mustard agent in the country. This also seems to have been the case in the Netherlands.

It was fortunate for the two countries that, in 1975, a Dutch national who had been involved in the dismantling of the plant around 1949 was conscientious enough to bring the matter to the attention of the Netherlands Government, which in turn informed the Government of Indonesia.

The two main considerations that motivated the decision of the Indonesian Government to dispose of this dangerous agent as soon as possible were:

1. The realization of the serious consequences its prolonged existence might have for the population living in the vicinity and for the environment, especially after the subsequent discovery of a corroded tank;

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

2. Strict adherence to the 1925 Geneva Protocol by Indonesia, a party which did not make any reservations. Indonesia therefore considered that the countries party to this Protocol are obliged to destroy on their own initiative dangerous chemical agents existing in their respective countries or in the territories under their jurisdiction.

For this destruction, the Indonesian Government requested the Netherlands Government, the authority responsible for the existence of this agent in Indonesia, to provide technical assistance; for its part, Indonesia provided logistics and security for the whole operation.

The ensuing co-operation between the Governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia in the destruction of this dangerous agent was indeed exemplary and reflected the prevailing excellent and amicable relations between the two countries.

When the Indonesian-Netherlands joint operation came to an end, it turned out that there were still about 2,000 litres of mustard agent at the site. Indonesia took upon itself to destroy them by the hydrolysis method.

It is not my intention to dwell on the technical aspects of this operation, which was called "Obong". However, some of its highlights of a non-technical character are perhaps worth mentioning.

Indonesia, a country which does not possess or manufacture chemical weapons, gained invaluable experience from the destruction operation.

Despite 40 years of storage in the underground shelter, the agent was still potent mustard. This may serve as a reminder that, even after being stored for such a long period of time, the agent still possesses its full destructive capacity. Such agents are at present probably still in the possession of a number of countries.

In a future convention, the need for on-site inspection during destruction is essential to ensure that the destruction of the agent is really carried out in terms of its declared type, quantity and location, thus eliminating possible doubts about the sincerity of the parties concerned.

The destruction of such a quantity of mustard agent using relatively simple equipment in a relatively short period of time might become an element for determining the time-limit for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons of the same category, having due regard for local conditions.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

For a developing country like Indonesia, such destruction requires technical assistance and expertise from developed countries; this might also be considered as an element of the future convention.

Lastly I wish to submit that the case of Indonesia might also be applicable to other countries which have similar historical backgrounds. In this connection, may I avail myself of this opportunity to express once again the appreciation and gratitude of the Government of Indonesia to the Netherlands Government for the assistance and co-operation extended during the operation.

While I have the floor, may I be permitted to touch briefly on two aspects of the item on chemical weapons to which my delegation attaches great importance.

Many members of the Committee have voiced concern about recent developments with regard to the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, namely, binary weapons, which they consider might impede the Committee's work on the banning of chemical weapons.

The emergence of these new weapons will undoubtedly add a new dimension to the chemical arms race.

My delegation does not at all question the right of any State to develop and adopt a policy which it conceives would best serve its defence or security interests. But if States have committed themselves to achieving a particular goal in a negotiating forum, it is only logical to expect from them that they will not take action or develop policies which, by their very nature, contravene that same goal, lest the credibility of their pronouncements be diminished, if not undermined. Apparently, what appears to be logic for countries like Indonesia does not appear to be so for others. But, my delegation submits, two wrongs do not make a right.

My delegation has taken note of the statement by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, on 25 March 1981, in which he gave an assurance that "the United States commitment to the goal of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the highest authority of our Government". Ambassador Fields further stated that "if we are successful in achieving such ban, we would be willing indeed to terminate our binary programme promptly".

My delegation interprets this assurance as having a dual message. On the one hand, it asks the Committee to work speedily on the prohibition of chemical weapons and, on the other, the United States will strive for the achievement of the goal of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

It is the sincere hope of my delegation that this pledge will become a reality in the not too distant future.

There have been some objections, raised in this Committee, to the need to include a ban on use in the future convention since the topic was already covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Logically speaking, as the use of chemical weapons has already been prohibited in the Geneva 1925 Protocol, existing stocks should have been destroyed and there should be no point in developing new types of such weapons. The contrary has, regrettably, proven to be true.

This situation, as my delegation sees it, has been mainly due to the following:

Firstly, the reservations made by a number of countries, including the most powerful ones, to the 1925 Protocol on the eventuality of non-compliance with its provisions by an enemy State, have brought about a situation under which chemical weapons continue to be of potential use;

Secondly, the limitative scope of use in the Geneva Protocol, which does not cover other forms of armed hostilities short of war; and

Thirdly, the absence of compliance machinery in the 1925 Protocol has rendered more probable the potential, or even actual, use of chemical weapons.

The continued existence of chemical weapons in the arsenal of States and the reported intention of manufacturing a new type of such weapons only reinforce my delegation's conviction that the ban on the use of chemical weapons in the form which **appears** in the 1925 Protocol should be strengthened; hence the need to reaffirm the prohibition of the use of such weapons in the comprehensive chemical weapons convention that we are **now elaborating**.

The importance of the need to include the element of use in the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has been further underlined in the Canadian paper contained in document CD/167, in the light of new developments regarding the problems of dual-purpose agents and binary compounds.

Furthermore, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador David Sadleir, spoke very eloquently and in a comprehensive manner on the question of use in the statement he made on 1 April 1982. I have nothing to add to that statement. It suffices for me to recall that Indonesia, together with Australia, Argentina, China and Pakistan, has submitted a proposal for alternative wording for the scope of prohibition of the future chemical weapons convention.

Mr. van DONGEN (Netherlands): This is the first time that I take the floor to make a formal statement in plenary session of the Committee on Disarmament and it gives me great satisfaction to be able to do so under your chairmanship. In the short time that has elapsed since my arrival at Geneva, I have already learnt the value of your knowledge and your judgement, and when I therefore congratulate you on taking the Chair of our Committee, enlightened self-interest makes me congratulate myself as well that my first formal steps in the field of disarmament can be made under your guidance. Belated thanks are due to your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran and Ambassador Alessi of Italy, and to the several colleagues who both formally and informally welcomed me to this body. Before going into the substance of my statement, I particularly wish to put on record, my respect for the work done here by my valued friend and predecessor, Ambassador Richard Fein. It is both a privilege and a challenge to follow in his footsteps in the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, invoking rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, I wish, like the distinguished representative of Indonesia before me, to introduce the joint working paper CD/270. After the intervention of my distinguished colleague, its subject-matter needs little introduction.

The Netherlands delegation has two good reasons for welcoming the opportunity to speak today, the first being the fact that, jointly with Indonesia, we can report on something that was actually done and not merely talked about in the disarmament sphere, the second that we can report on a joint effort made by the two countries concerned in an atmosphere of harmony and mutual trust.

Operation "Obong" can be regarded as an implementation "avant la lettre" of a possible chemical weapons treaty. Such a treaty remains of immediate priority for our two delegations and I am happy to note that one may conclude from the active negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons that this appears to be the case for all delegations and that keen interest has been displayed by a number of observers.

An essential element of any CW treaty is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents under adequate international verification.

To generate maximum confidence in a CW treaty, countries should declare all their stocks and if possible start destroying them before the treaty enters into force. This, of course, you realize, would be the optimal scenario. In reality, it is probably too much to expect that all countries will declare their operational stocks before the treaty enters into force, while destruction of operational stocks is likely to start only after the treaty has come into force.

At the same time, there are no reasons why obsolete stocks should not be declared and destroyed as of now. We know that several countries are in the process of destroying old stockpiles of chemical weapons or have already done so, recognizing the importance of removing extremely toxic materials from the environment. Publicizing such activities may help to build confidence and help other countries in the search for suitable methods of destroying their stocks.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

The destruction of chemical weapons and agents is often far from simple. Their extreme toxicity and, thus, the risks involved for the persons working at the destruction site require high safety standards. Transportation of old stockpiles can be dangerous and therefore undesirable. The possibility of adverse environmental effects must also be taken into account. As a result, the entire destruction operation is likely to be costly and time-consuming.

Between the two World Wars, a number of countries produced or possessed mustard agents. After the Second World War, several of them decided to destroy their old mustard stocks. Different destruction methods were designed. These were either highly complex --- in part because of the requirement for large quantities of water and/or decontaminants --- or entailed the risk of an unacceptable environmental impact.

Examples of the former are the hydrolysis method and the method used by the United States Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS); open-pit burning and ocean dumping are examples of the latter. All methods have their advantages and their disadvantages.

Today, the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands present to you a report on their joint operation to destroy a considerable amount of mustard agents. This technical report is contained in document CD/2/0. The operation described was, of course, adapted to the prevailing specific conditions, but, we are confident, that it also demonstrates that the destruction of mustard agents is a viable fairly simple and cost effective operation that can be carried out without endangering public health or the environment.

My distinguished colleague from Indonesia has already given you the sum of the historical background and I shall try to keep this part of my intervention as brief as possible. The stockpile at the site on the island of Java originally was intended as a deterrent against possible chemical warfare in the region. But as it turned out, chemical weapons were not used in the war that broke out. After the war, the plant that had been in operation to produce this stockpile was dismantled. But the mustard agent itself, stored in sealed tanks in underground shelters, was not destroyed. And only a few people were in possession of all the facts; in particular, neither the Indonesian nor the Netherlands authorities were aware of the existence of a stock of mustard agent. And only in the second half of the seventies was attention drawn to the matter by one of the persons who had been involved in dismantling the plant.

The Indonesian and Netherlands Governments then decided to eliminate the dangerous substance and they agreed that the Netherlands Government would provide technical assistance, including technical experts, and the Indonesian Government would be charged with providing logistics and guaranteeing security during the operation. The Prins Maurits Laboratory TNO in the Netherlands was charged with the provision of the technical assistance.

A fact-finding mission in April 1973 revealed the presence, on a site adjacent to an artillery range and in close proximity to an inhabited area, of five steel tanks of 10 cubic metres each in as many underground stone shelters half-filled with water. One of the tanks had corroded to such an extent that the contents had apparently leaked out. Yet no mustard agent could be detected in relation to that tank although decomposition products were present. The other four tanks were found to contain mustard agent, to an estimated total of 55,000 litres.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

The presence of such a large amount of mustard agent in close proximity to populated areas and the possibility that the tanks could leak were, of course, of great concern to the Indonesian Government. Consequently, it was decided that the agent should be disposed of as quickly as possible.

Several methods of destruction were considered; taking into account that on-site destruction was necessary since transport of the agent over large distances was evidently too risky. This latter factor limited the available options, in view of restrictions on energy, on water and on material supplies. The methods I mentioned earlier ... hydrolysis, the CAIDS and TAIDS methods, open-pit burning or ocean dumping ... were therefore rejected. Other methods were also rejected, mainly because they presented disposal problems.

In the end, the decision was made to use a method of controlled incineration. A specially-designed incinerator was built in the Netherlands and shipped to Indonesia. After the Indonesian ABC Defence Corps had made the necessary preparations on the site, the construction and the testing phase started. This phase lasted for about a month. The actual incineration of the mustard agent took place in June 1979. A total quantity of 32,000 litres of mustard agent was destroyed. You will find in the working document a detailed description of the incineration method, as well as of the difficulties encountered in the destruction of part of the stock.

What lessons can be drawn from this operation and the history behind it? The first is that the destruction of considerable quantities of mustard agent under the conditions described can be safely carried out in a reasonably short period of time and with relatively simple equipment.

The second, no less important, is the demonstration of the value of co-operation. We have here a tangible example of a joint, practical effort to help build the basis for a treaty banning chemical weapons altogether.

The third lesson concerns verification. During the destruction operation, due attention was given to a possible verification mechanism. Supposing for a moment that the Obong operation had taken place under a chemical weapons convention, the question of a required type of verification would then, of course, have arisen. And our reply would have been that, with the technology now available, only on-site inspection on a regular basis would have provided adequate proof that the chemical warfare agent had indeed been effectively and totally destroyed. Theoretically, possibilities of remote observation and control exist, but they are still a long way from becoming operational. Much research and development will be required before the feasibility of such a system can be established. For the foreseeable future, only on-site inspection during the destruction will provide adequate verification for the destruction of stockpiles, as in Operation Obong.

These are some preliminary observations as an introduction to document CD/2/0 jointly circulated by the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands. Our two delegations intend to arrange for a presentation of a more technical nature in this Committee later in the year.

It goes without saying, and in this I am sure that I can speak for my Indonesian colleague, that both our delegations are prepared to answer any question that may arise concerning this operation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Ambassador Jayakoddy.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, T.S. Eliot, perhaps with poetic licence, described April as the "cruellest month". Let me hasten to say that my delegation does not think that the month of April needs to be the cruellest month either for you or for the other distinguished representatives in this Committee. It can become a hard and punishing month in which the Committee endeavours to complete its work, hopefully with a measure of success.

Your long and distinguished record of work in this Committee and the intense commitment to disarmament of your country, its Government and its people are greatly appreciated by distinguished representatives here. It is therefore an honour and privilege for my delegation to welcome you as Chairman, wish you success and, at the same time, pledge to you our fullest co-operation and assistance. We are confident that you will, with your infinite patience, great competence and unfailing courtesy, help to bring the Committee to a successful conclusion of its current session.

We were privileged to have the distinguished Ambassador of Italy to guide us through the Ides of March. The last month was a difficult one for all of us. It called for quiet diplomacy, tenacity and skilled persuasiveness to steer the Committee towards important decision-making. Ambassador Alessi demonstrated all these qualities in ample measure, thus helping the Committee to make several strides towards accomplishing the tasks before it. My delegation would like to express its sincere thanks to Ambassador Alessi for his invaluable contribution during the month of March.

I wish to make a few observations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which is on our agenda for today. We have all accepted that a comprehensive programme of disarmament could become the centre-piece of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I do not wish to anticipate what kind of centre-piece it will be, but my delegation hopes that it will not be a disappointment to those who hope for something significant and substantial. The Committee owes a very large debt of gratitude to distinguished Ambassador García Robles for his indefatigable chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. He has, with great pains, unswerving determination and single-minded commitment, tried to move the negotiations forward. What has been achieved up to now in the Ad Hoc Working Group is modest, but there is still time and an even greater desire for more accomplishment. We hope that, by the end of this session, we shall have something worthwhile to place before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation has no illusions about what the eventual adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament could mean. We do not think that the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament by the Committee and its adoption by the special session will trigger an avalanche of instant disarmament that will make us turn our military weapons into ploughshares. Nor will it, by itself, end the nuclear arms race or reliance on deterrence and counter-force strategies to ensure national security. Our expectations are more limited. A comprehensive programme of disarmament will, in our view, be a starting point that reflects a common will and



(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

commitment to initiate a balanced, comprehensive and realistic process that encompasses genuine and effective measures of disarmament being negotiated and implemented. It will, in our view, signify that we accept a framework of positive, affirmative action towards general and complete disarmament, taking into account the various interrelationships between security, military preparedness and the desire to create an international order in which war is not used any longer as an extension of politics and diplomacy. It is in this light and based on such a hope that my delegation views the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and its eventual adoption and implementation.

I would like to touch on two matters that will be referred to in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The first refers to the establishment of zones of peace. I have in mind here, specifically, the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. As the distinguished representatives on this Committee well know, my country has, since 1972, been active in promoting the concept of the Indian Ocean being declared a zone of peace. Sri Lanka's unwavering commitment to this proposal and our uninterrupted pursuit of this goal are based on the deep conviction that its realization can eliminate a serious threat to the peace and security of the entire Indian Ocean region. The militarization of the ocean that has been under way over the last decade has resulted in an escalation of tension and has given rise to great concern that the Indian Ocean could become a nuclear battle ground. This is an eventuality that we wish to avoid by taking all effective measures before it is too late.

Keeping this in view, my delegation has, in the course of negotiations on the CPD, emphasized the importance of formulating the measure dealing with the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace with accuracy and clarity and of attaching the necessary high priority to it in the process of implementation. We feel that failure to recognize the full significance of this measure, or a postponement of its implementation to a far-distant date, will contribute to a further aggravation of tension and the widening of nuclear conflict areas in the world. We therefore hope that the measure and timing of its implementation will be reflected appropriately in the CPD by consensus and without reservations.

My delegation attaches particular importance to the machinery and procedure envisaged in the CPD to promote the disarmament process, to review continuously the progress of implementation and to hold special review sessions. These are vital functions to assist and ensure that the CPD is being implemented and to identify problems or set-backs that may be experienced. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that progress in implementation will be influenced by a wide variety of factors and interrelationships in different degrees. Adjustment, readjustment and the need for changes of pace, taking account of developments, particularly in the fields of science and technology, will have to be considered on a systematic basis if realism is to prevail.

These requirements help to underline the need for a more comprehensive review of institutional arrangements relating to disarmament within the United Nations system. This question has already been recognized and we have the report of a Group of Experts

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. The report will come before the second special session. It is necessary to refer in this connection to the proposals made at the first special session regarding institutional arrangements relating to the disarmament process and the role of the United Nations in this field. Paragraph 125 of the Final Document has listed all of them. They include the proposal for a world disarmament authority made by the President of Sri Lanka, His Excellency J.R. Jayewardene. Subsequently other proposals were made in the General Assembly.

All these proposals, in our view, merit serious consideration by this Committee, as well as action by the second special session and future sessions of the General Assembly. It is our view that the process of refining and revitalizing the United Nations disarmament machinery has not ended. We feel that the proposals that have been made contain very useful elements which can be refined and elaborated further before being given an institutional character. They could then enhance considerably the central role of the United Nations in promoting disarmament and stimulating more accelerated negotiations.

Even a cursory study of the activities of member States in the United Nations General Assembly in recent years on disarmament issues clearly illustrates the quantum leap that has taken place in their interest in disarmament. Equally significant is the fact that the issues have increased not only in number, but also in complexity and pervasiveness. The adoption of a CPD will make its own impact on existing disarmament machinery and institutional arrangements. If we are fortunate enough to witness the adoption and implementation of a CPD, we can surely hope to see at least a marginal increase in the further commitment of States to the acceleration of disarmament and a bigger increase in the determination of people all over the world to pursue the goal of disarmament.

In the light of these conditions, it is the view of my Government that it is neither premature nor utopian seriously to consider the need to bring existing disarmament machinery and institutions fully into line with the current needs of disarmament and, to some extent, even to foreshadow future developments.

My delegation considers, therefore, that any reference in the CPD to the question of machinery and procedure should serve a wider purpose, namely, to contribute to the examination of all existing institutional machinery within the United Nations system related to disarmament with a view to fashioning the most effective arrangements which will fully respond to current conditions and needs and effectively serve the new needs that hopefully will emerge in this second Disarmament Decade. My delegation hopes that this will become the shared interest of all delegations in this Committee and at the second special session.

Finally, my delegation welcomes the statement that was made this morning by the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Fields, to the effect that the distinguished President of his country, Mr. Reagan, will address the second special session. We hope other distinguished leaders, too, will participate in this session to make it the success it deserves to be.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Jayakoddy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Mr. Noleşcanu.

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all associate my delegation with the congratulations and the warm welcome extended to you on the occasion of your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April.

Your qualities as a diplomat, negotiator and colleague are well known to the Committee and stand as evidence that our work during this difficult month will take place in the best possible conditions for the positive conclusion we all desire. I should like to assure you that you will have my delegation's full support in the discharge of your important responsibilities.

I should like to take this opportunity of warmly extending to Ambassador Mario Alessi of Italy my delegation's most sincere thanks for the efficiency, courtesy and friendship which characterized his chairmanship.

In its statement today, the Romanian delegation would like to refer to the agenda item relating to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Since the initiation of negotiations on this subject within the Committee, the Romanian delegation has had several opportunities to express its views on the importance of the elaboration of such a document in the context of the second special session devoted to disarmament, as well as its standpoint with regard to the Programme's structure, content and general approach. We have supported the initiatives aimed at securing the achievement of that objective and, in particular, the proposals of the neutral and non-aligned countries of the Group of 21. At this stage in our work, I shall therefore confine myself to making a few observations.

An analysis of the stage reached in our negotiations on this subject does not give us cause for much optimism. Despite the intensification of efforts and the negotiations that have been going on under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, the Romanian delegation considers that we are still far from having a broadly acceptable draft document for submission to the special session. This leads us to believe that, in the days to come, we shall be forced to take a decision of principle concerning the way in which we should present to the special session the results of the efforts we have made in the Committee.

It must be acknowledged that the task of drawing up a comprehensive programme of disarmament is certainly a complicated one. It involves nothing less than re-establishing general and complete disarmament as the foremost task of disarmament negotiations and, to that end, formulating a coherent set of measures that will lead to the achievement of that objective. This amounts to saying that the task has been to prepare, on the basis of the existing documents and, primarily, the Programme of Action of the first special session devoted to disarmament, a genuine disarmament strategy for the years to come.

Secondly, it must also be recognized that, since the beginning of our negotiations, there has been a difference of approach, and that, despite the negotiations, it has not vanished. On the contrary, we would rather be inclined to say that these differences of approach have been reflected throughout our discussions and have left their mark on

(Mr. Meleşcanu, Romania)

specific issues relating to the programme, especially the legal force, the phases of application and the terms for the implementation of the measures. It is quite obvious that, in these circumstances, it has been difficult to arrive at concrete, generally acceptable formulations for the substance of the draft programme.

The proposal by the Chairman of the Working Group to set up a drafting body to try to find possible ways of reaching an agreement represents, without any doubt, one of our last chances to equip ourselves to submit a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the special session. The Romanian delegation supports this initiative and, for its part, is ready to make a constructive contribution to these activities. At the same time, we should like to point out that this exercise should take place within the limits set by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and those deriving from the practical value which we should like to impart to the programme.

With regard to our mandate, the Final Document of the first special session states that the Committee on Disarmament should elaborate a "comprehensive programme of disarmament".

My delegation considers that the following consequences may be drawn from the contents of paragraph 109 of the Final Document:

We are supposed to elaborate a programme and, therefore, an instrument in which the time element must be present. Even if it is a question of indicative time-frames, as many delegations have emphasized, the time element is, in our opinion, an essential feature of the programme.

Secondly, we have been asked to elaborate a comprehensive programme. For us, this means that the document will contain a comprehensive set of measures designed to lead from the present situation to general and complete disarmament. We should like to stress that this concept implies at the same time the existence of several phases of implementation, for the process in question is a long-term one that cannot conceivably be completed all at once.

Thirdly, the special session instructed us to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I should like to stress the word "disarmament", as it is an important indication. What the General Assembly has in mind is the elaboration not merely of some arms control measures, but of a genuine programme of disarmament having as its objective the halting of the arms race and the initiation of a real process of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

In addition to these limits which stem from the mandate given to the Committee on Disarmament by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, there are also practical considerations which must be taken into account.

If the comprehensive programme of disarmament is to be of any practical use, it should not be a carbon copy either of the Programme of Action adopted by the first special session devoted to disarmament or of the Programme of the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade.

(Mr. Meleşcanu, Romania)

As my delegation has repeatedly emphasized, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be a genuine practical instrument for the mobilization of the political will of all States in favour of disarmament. Consequently, it is unimaginable that it should be given no more binding force than that of a mere resolution, even one adopted by consensus. My delegation supports any initiative designed to make the programme as binding as possible, in order to make it a real practical instrument for starting the disarmament process, beginning with nuclear disarmament.

We are convinced that the time has come for all delegations, including our own, to show goodwill and a spirit of compromise so that we may finalize the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. My statement today is intended to assure you of the Romanian delegation's desire to contribute to the achievement of solutions which are as widely acceptable as possible. Nevertheless, it should be stressed, as we have already done, that there are, stemming from our very terms of reference, as well as from the considerations of practical usefulness that we must bear in mind with regard to this important document, limits to every spirit of mutual understanding.

It is in this spirit that my delegation is prepared to co-operate, both now and in the future, in the elaboration of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, His Excellency Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, it is, for my delegation, a source of special satisfaction to see you in the Chair of our Committee, not only because of your personal qualities of diplomatic skill and statesmanship, but also because of the very close and co-operative ties that prevail in the relations between our countries. The same I could say of your distinguished predecessor, and of the relations between Italy and Brazil. To Ambassador Alessi I should like to pay a warm tribute for the highly praiseworthy manner with which he discharged his functions last month.

The first part of the 1962 session of the Committee on Disarmament started and is about to end under the shadow of heightened confrontation between the two major military alliances and particularly between the Superpowers. Both sides utilized this chamber, a negotiating forum, for rhetoric or propaganda, blaming each other for the armaments race and misconduct in international relations. Since their mutual relations are based on hostility and mistrust, the accumulation and improvement of weapons of mass destruction is seen as a viable answer to their security problems. They have also made it clear, by implication, that the individual security of nations outside their immediate system of alliances has but little impact on their over-all strategic policies. Accordingly, they do not seem to assign to multilateral fora anything more than a marginal role. This situation has, of course, a direct bearing on the ability of this Committee to fulfil its mandate.

In assessing the first half of the 1962 session, one striking feature immediately comes to the forefront: the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies to accept even an initial engagement, let alone a clear commitment, seriously to undertake multilateral negotiations on any measure of nuclear disarmament. This has been especially apparent during the protracted activities of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, but let us briefly examine the current status of the work on each of the items of our agenda.

(Mr. de Souza Silva, Brazil)

I will not make comments on item 1 (Nuclear test ban), on which procedural negotiations are being held. My delegation and several others have been actively participating in these negotiations on the formulation of a mandate and it is our hope that all delegations will show enough flexibility and spirit of understanding to allow those efforts to come to a successful end, so that the Committee may at long last deal with the substantive aspects of the question.

Of the remaining six substantive items, only one has been the subject of concrete multilateral efforts to elaborate a convention banning a certain category of weapons of mass destruction. The laborious process of providing the Working Group on Chemical Weapons with a negotiating mandate for the performance of such a task bespeaks the reluctance of some major Powers to enable the Committee to discharge its functions. Work on the "elaboration" of a chemical weapons convention has been plagued by dispute over accusations of the past and present use of such weapons. Moreover, one side openly embraces the debatable theory that, by increasing the sophistication of its chemical arsenals, it will provide an "incentive" for the other side to come to terms at the negotiating table. Its opponent refuses even to consider including the prohibition of the use of such weapons in the scope of the convention and does not seem prepared to ascribe a meaningful role to international means of verification in the mechanism aimed at ensuring compliance with its provisions. By the time the new generation of chemical weapons starts to be deployed, the other Superpower will probably claim that it, too, must procure the same kind of weapons with which to face the new threat coming from the potential adversary. In such a climate, prospects for the early conclusion of a convention seem very slim.

In the field of radiological weapons, a different situation reflects the same realities. Here, the two Superpowers, having agreed in happier times on a draft treaty to ban a kind of weapon the precise definition of which they themselves seem at pains to supply, have asked the Committee to sanction their agreement as fast as possible, so that this body can at least present the United Nations with one specific text. Some delegations, however, not convinced either of the timeliness or the usefulness of the initiative, sought to inject some substance in that draft. Their substantive proposals, which dealt mainly with the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, with the link between radiological non-armament and nuclear disarmament and with the effective promotion of the peaceful uses of radioactive material, all met with fierce objection from the proponents of the original draft treaty. A meaningful instrument on radiological weapons will remain a distant possibility as long as the Superpowers insist on dealing with this question according only to their own strategic perceptions.

But it is in the chapter on negative security assurances that the confrontation between the Superpowers and, for that matter, among all nuclear-weapon Powers, has had a definite paralysing effect on the procedures of this Committee. Their declarations on security are solely aimed at each other, while the right to security of the rest of the world has been utterly disregarded.

The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, also subject to the same distortions, has continued to elude this Committee. In the painstaking process of putting together the various chapters of the draft programme, the nuclear-weapon Powers have clearly avoided undertaking any definite commitment to nuclear disarmament. The vagueness of their own proposals and their inability to accept even the slightest

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

indication of the timing for the implementation of the various phases of the programme cast serious doubts on the possibility that the second special session will adopt any effective such document by consensus. In the absence of a negotiated compromise, the last resort might only be to utilize the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly for the adoption of the programme.

The consideration of the new item introduced this year in the agenda of the Committee, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, again reflects the confrontational aspect of the relationship between the two Superpowers, already evident in the formulation of the two resolutions adopted by the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly on the matter. Each resolution seeks to prohibit the development of specific space activities in which each side perceives the other as holding a technological edge. Brazil cautioned the First Committee last year about the possibility that the introduction in our agenda of an item on outer space might prove detrimental to the pursuit of efforts towards a structured treatment of item 2 (Nuclear disarmament) in the Committee. It seems now clear that our fears were not ill-founded. Last year, this Committee held an interesting, albeit inconclusive and oddly secretive, debate on item 2 of its agenda. During this first half of the 1982 session, however, the treatment of this priority item has gone no further than its mention in statements in plenary. My delegation, for one, views this development with the utmost concern, since the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have been assigned the highest priority by the United Nations. We would again urge the Committee to devote adequate time to item 2 of its agenda at the forthcoming second part of the 1982 session.

In a word, the ability of the international community to negotiate effectively in the field of disarmament has so far been the most conspicuous casualty of the heightened climate of hostility and confrontation between the Superpowers.

This rather grim assessment of the results of the first part of our 1982 session points to the urgent need to take serious stock of the current situation in the field of disarmament. This Committee was created, four years ago, upon the trust of the community of nations that the fundamental tenets of the Final Document would be observed in good faith in the pursuit of a common goal. These fundamental tenets stand clearly above the natural fluctuations of the changing relationships among nations and should not be questioned at the whim of such changes. Yet, in this short span, some members have openly questioned their validity and refuse, by word and deed, to live by the commitments they solemnly undertook in May 1978. Arguments to the effect that the realities of the world situation now justify a different attitude are misleading inasmuch as reality is also a consequence of the very actions and perceptions of nations, particularly the most heavily armed. The assessment of reality, moreover, should not be restricted to the state of the relationship of the Superpowers and their allies; it encompasses the aspirations and the security needs of the vast majority of nations as well. It is thus for all nations together, particularly those that bear the greatest responsibility for disarmament, to reinforce the commitments formally undertaken, rather than detracting from them by narrowly seeking individual security at the expense of the security of others. The special responsibility for disarmament does not mean exclusive responsibility for negotiations; it makes the nuclear-weapon Powers accountable before mankind and does not confer upon them any special privilege.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

The second special session devoted to disarmament offers a chance for such serious stock-taking and for a political understanding of great significance for the future of mankind, an understanding that would have its conceptual basis in the Final Document and would find its operative expression in a meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament. The most powerful States on earth, however, now seem to have second thoughts about the conceptual basis provided for in the Final Document, which ought to be incorporated in the comprehensive programme. Until they realize that there is no alternative to disarmament, mankind should not be condemned to watch helplessly as the threat of nuclear war looms larger ahead. The special session offers a framework for achieving political definitions and finding pathways for action on the most pressing issue of the prevention of nuclear war.

Nuclear war cannot be prevented by heightened confrontation or simply by increasing the odds of destruction against a potential adversary. There must be instead a strong political commitment to act now, through appropriately binding agreements, to ensure that nuclear war no longer remains a contingency in the strategic planning of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Such a bold step forward would be even more effective in a disarmament perspective and must thus be predicated upon a genuine will actively to seek nuclear disarmament. Will, in political matters, derives from the conviction of one's legitimate interest and perceived needs. It seems, however, hardly possible to assert that there is any legitimate interest or need to pursue the course of nuclear armament when such a course is seen as a threat by the very populations whose security it was originally designed to protect.

The Superpowers have in the past concluded partial agreements between themselves with a view to preventing the possibility of a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, such as the establishment of hot lines, limited exchanges of information and the like. While those agreements are certainly useful, they lack the disarmament perspective which is demanded by the community of nations. Such agreements were designed to minimize or offset the involuntary use of nuclear force, which is voluntarily kept in a constant state of preparedness for a strike. They seek to bolster reliance on and acceptability of nuclear force and not gradually to phase out existing nuclear arsenals. Prevention of nuclear war in an operative sense should aim at a much more ambitious goal. It must look beyond the narrow perspective of parochial security interests towards genuine security for all nations.

All nations of the world, including the peoples of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies, wherever they can be freely heard, demand explicit reassurances that will allay the growing fear of extinction. Resolution 36/01 B, adopted by consensus at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, can supply the basis for the achievement of such a political commitment, which is of profound significance for the community of nations as a whole. Let the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament be remembered as the historic occasion when the nuclear-weapon Powers finally decided to use their might for the benefit of mankind and not for its annihilation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de Souza e Silva for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?



Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Today, document CD/271, entitled "Technical Evaluation of 'Recover' Techniques for CW Verification" and sponsored by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia, was circulated in this conference room. In this official document, reference is made to a demonstration system which has been deployed since 1930 in certain countries, inter alia in Germany. Since there is no Germany, neither in the United Nations, nor in the Committee on Disarmament, nor elsewhere, I wonder which country is meant. To my knowledge, the German Democratic Republic has not joined this system. Perhaps the authors had in mind the Federal Republic of Germany? I would therefore like to ask the authors of this document, through you, Mr. Chairman, to correct this part of the document and to use the names of countries in accordance with generally-recognized international practice. This is not only a matter of mutual respect, but also necessary to avoid any misunderstanding and possible misinterpretation. I am particularly grateful in this connection to the Russian translators, who, obviously on their own initiative, have made the necessary correction in the Russian version of this document.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Herder for his statement. Before I give the floor to the next speaker who has asked for it, may I ask the authors of this document if they would like to say anything?

Mrs. HOINKES (United States of America). On behalf of the United States and, I am sure, the co-sponsors as well, may I express our apologies for this oversight. I am sure that it will be remedied, with due haste.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): I have a small announcement. In June 1980, the Canadian delegation tabled in the Committee on Disarmament a compendium, a rather large document, dealing with arms control verification proposals. This document surveyed a number of proposals -- I think well over several hundred -- which had been put to the Committee and its predecessor bodies and which emanated from some very ambitious and energetic people in Ottawa. They have now updated that original compendium and it is my honour to submit it to you, with the request that it be circulated to members of the Committee for their interest, enjoyment and amusement.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Skinner. Are there any other delegations which would like to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

Distinguished delegates, the Secretariat has circulated today at my request Working Paper No. 59, dated 2 April, as well as a communication received from the Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations Office at Geneva. Copies of that communication were also placed in the delegations' boxes last Friday. The last decision follows the pattern of previous decisions adopted by the Committee in connection with requests from non-members of the Committee wishing to participate in its work. Before we adjourn this plenary meeting, I suggest that we suspend it briefly to consider Working Paper No. 59. We could then resume the plenary meeting and take the relevant decision if consensus exists? I see no objection to this suggestion. The plenary meeting is therefore suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.25 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The one hundred and sixty-ninth plenary meeting is resumed. I invite the Committee to take a decision on Working Paper No. 59. 1/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

Before adjourning this plenary meeting, may I remind members that the Committee will hold this afternoon at 3 p.m. an informal meeting to consider the following questions: (a) the draft report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; (b) the closing date for the first part of the Committee's 1982 session; and (c) modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of India, Mr. Saran.

Mr. SARAN (India): In the programme of work that you had circulated, there appears to be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons also scheduled at 3 p.m. I had indicated in the Working Group the problems that could arise, particularly for small delegations like my own, from the holding of concurrent meetings, both of which will be considering very important questions. To my mind, it would be advisable for the Ad Hoc Group on Radiological Weapons to convene after the informal meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Saran; I was just about to address that question. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has asked for the floor to make an announcement.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Indeed the distinguished Indian colleague's concerns can be met easily because the Working Group, at its last formal session, did take a decision to make contact with the Secretariat to arrange for a meeting this afternoon subsequent to, rather than concurrent with, the informal meeting of the Committee and I expect that the Radiological Weapons Working Group will resume its work immediately upon conclusion of your informal meeting. In this context, I am happy to note that arrangements have been made with the interpreters to stay after 6 o'clock. However, the meeting time will be so limited as not to endanger the success of certain social functions that are likely to take place later in the day.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): As we have half an hour at our disposal, I would suggest that, to save time, we open the informal meeting to start consideration of this afternoon's programme now.

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1/ In response to the request of Tunisia [CD/252 and CD/276] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Tunisia to participate during 1982 in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. SARAN (India): My thanks are due to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. May I request similar consideration from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, who I see has also scheduled a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group simultaneously with the informal meeting tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Saran. Perhaps we should give Ambassador Sujka time to consider that request.

Meanwhile, I would like to seek your comments or reactions to the practical suggestion that emanates from Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. The proposal is that, since we have roughly another 30 minutes, the Committee might reconvene in an informal meeting and start the discussion that was supposed to take place from 3 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. AKINSANYA (Nigeria): My delegation would not have any problem with the proposal of Ambassador Lidgard, but I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that it looks forward to hearing about progress made in your ongoing consultations on item 1.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Akinsanya; I will bear that point in mind. Does silence mean that the Committee is in favour of Ambassador Lidgard's proposal?

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Of course, silence could mean agreement or disagreement, depending on how you look at it. However, I think most delegations were prepared to tackle this question this afternoon, and, usually, when a meeting ends earlier, there is the hope that we are going to leave earlier, to prepare for the next meeting. However, if the Committee decides to take up this matter now, it would mean that we would continue with it this afternoon. If the decision is to start the informal meeting now perhaps we could start with sub-item (b).

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Nanjira for his very useful suggestion. I would propose then, if there is no objection, that after we conclude the formal meeting of the Committee in a few minutes' time, we convene an informal meeting to discuss sub-item (b), which is the closing date of the first half of the 1982 session. Will that be agreeable to the Committee? Thank you very much, we will act accordingly.

Now I would like to invite Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to respond to the question put to him by Mr. Saran of India.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): I would like to respond in a most positive way to this requirement but I am afraid that it will be impossible. If the Chairman of the Working Groups are asked to present the reports of the subsidiary bodies to be included in the report of the Committee, to the plenary meeting on Thursday, 8 April, my Group would need prolonged discussion on the second reading of the draft which was prepared yesterday. It was discussed for the first time yesterday and it is scheduled to discuss it tomorrow afternoon, together with two other also rather complicated

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

issues, deriving from the programme of work of the Working Group for the spring session. This is why we have even discussed the possibility, or rather the necessity, of having a night session of the Working Group tomorrow. If the plenary meeting of the Committee does not consider the reports of subsidiary bodies on this critical 8 April, we can certainly agree with the suggestion to convene the meeting of the Working Group after the informal meeting of the Committee tomorrow at 3 o'clock. But it depends on the programme of the meetings and the issues to be discussed during the plenary meetings of the Committee. It is totally in your hands Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: The statement from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group on Chemical Weapons was, I admit, more or less along the lines that I anticipated. I will recall that, when we adopted the timetable for this week, I referred to the need for simultaneous meetings in some cases, in view of the shortness of the time available to us before the end of the session. So I feel that we should try, after all, to hold simultaneous meetings, although it may cause some inconvenience to certain delegations. I do not think we have any alternative, but I would be willing to listen to the views of others. My inclination would be to have the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Chemical Weapons tomorrow afternoon while the informal meeting is in session.

Mr. SARIN (India): I realize that we have a rather full agenda in front of us, and that, in certain cases, it might be necessary to have simultaneous meetings, but so far we have avoided holding concurrently important meetings, such as the informal meeting to consider extremely crucial issues, and meetings of negotiating bodies. Of course, if it is the decision of the Committee to hold a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group simultaneously with the informal meeting of the Committee, I would not object, but I would only like to make it clear that my delegation might find it necessary, when the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons comes before the plenary, to suggest rather drastic amendments if they do not correspond to our positions. My delegation would certainly not like to face the plenary of the meeting with such a situation, but we have certain important interests in the negotiations which are taking place in the Ad Hoc Working Group and we would certainly like to see a reflection of our views in the report. Informal consultations have been held along with other meetings which we have not been able to attend. Decisions which are taken in these informal consultations are not binding on our delegation, so I would like to make it clear that, while we have no objection to such simultaneous meetings being held, I would like to reserve the position of my delegation concerning any report which may be submitted to the plenary.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for his understanding and the point that he has just made will certainly be borne in mind by the Chairman in the scheduling of future meetings. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 8 April, at 10 a.m. I would wish to remind the members of the Committee that the time for the opening of the Committee on Thursday is 10 a.m. and not 10.30 a.m. Immediately after adjourning this meeting I will convene an informal meeting of the Committee to discuss the closing date. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

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