

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME III

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1982

GE.82-66734

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI (Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. V. BEAUGE
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T.C. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Miss R. de CLERCQ
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U NGWE WIN
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG
Mrs WANG ZHIYUN

Cuba: Mr. P. HÚÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. EL SAYED A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. de RELUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HEFDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. H.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. S. MOHAMMADI

Italy: Mr. M. LESSI
Mr. B. CABRIS
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. IRI

Kenya: Mr. C.G. MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NAJJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KOBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. J. BENAVIDES
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.B. BILTSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. H. BUSBY
Ms. S. BURKE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. GUNDERSEN
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. LEONARD

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. BILBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA
Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In the Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the one hundred and fifty-sixth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada, Egypt, Peru, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Let me, at the outset, welcome those new representatives who have joined the Committee and congratulate you, Sir, as you take the Chair in this opening month of our session. Not only do I want to pledge to you the traditional support of my delegation, but also to express the kind of sympathy that has to go with every Chairman who experiences the first month of the Committee's session. Having been through that myself, I know that the sympathy is needed and you have it.

Let me pay a tribute, as well, to your predecessor, who had to experience the final month of the Committee's session last year, as this too is the kind of onerous task that deserves not only commendation, but sympathy and he indeed has deserved and received all of that from us.

I want for just a moment to pay a tribute to our former Italian colleague. I do so, not least because within this room he displayed humanity, humour and friendship, and I can think of no international conference context, with the complexities with which we deal, in which those qualities are more important. I think he had them and displayed them, and I think we would do well to remember him and draw our inspiration in difficult moments from the example he set for us.

Today I wish to consider the activities of the Committee on Disarmament in the period leading up to the focus of our efforts in this first part of our work this year; the second special session on disarmament. I would accordingly like to present our estimation of where the Committee on Disarmament might best apply its efforts, given present circumstances both within this Committee — and outside it.

For a number of reasons 1982 is an extraordinary year. But in the twentieth century, each year seems extraordinary offering both opportunities and risks. This year, the time available to seize the opportunities open to us is especially short. Equally, the life of this body has been short — only four years, since it was established by the first special session and it may be too soon to make lasting judgements. Nevertheless, the second special session will, on behalf of the world community, assess the efficacy of this body and its ability to make progress on those critical issues entrusted to it. Our thoughts about the outcome of that assessment should surely be sober.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

International security and the Committee on Disarmament:

There is inevitably an international atmosphere within which we must conduct our business. Progress — or lack of it — by the Committee on Disarmament, equally inevitably, is a reflection of the world outside these chambers. No procedural manoeuvre, however timely, no drafting, however skillful, can erase the hard fact that the Committee on Disarmament can go no further than the realities of international life permit.

Present international conditions are an object lesson that international security and stability cannot be taken for granted. One focus of great international concern — Afghanistan — has now been joined by another — Poland. Many of us have drawn the same conclusions from both, however different local circumstances may seem. Surely it is incontestable that events in Poland eloquently — and tragically — underline the interdependence and interconnectedness of the world community. Surely events in that country, which some may claim are a purely internal affair, have had a profound and negative effect on immediate prospects for the construction of a new East/West atmosphere of confidence. Our deliberations — and our chances of making progress — are accordingly affected.

Prospects for stability and security in Europe, but in other areas of the world as well, have effects far beyond their region itself. Prime Minister Trudeau, like others, has recently pointed to the fact that economic problems and international disputes have increased in both number and complexity. Political and economic instability is painfully evident across the entire spectrum of international relations and, indeed, the problems of East/West and North/South relations, energy, nuclear proliferation, the environment, refugees and sporadic outbursts of violence and war all form a complex of cause and effect.

Yet despite the present international atmosphere, is it not in the mutual interest of all for every effort to be made, for every avenue to be explored, in pursuit of the goals the Committee on Disarmament has set itself. Expectations must necessarily be limited by the realities the international situation imposes upon us. We do not believe that ignoring these realities makes any easier the resolution of the problems they represent. Appeals to "political will" will not help. But let us get on with the job. We are for real negotiation, not confrontation.

How then to assess the prospect for success of this session of the Committee on Disarmament? Should we take encouragement from the results of the last General Assembly? Many resolutions were passed, but no resolution dealing with any substantive topic relevant to the concerns of this Committee was endorsed by the Assembly by consensus. This is not progress. Likewise the appearance of those resolutions whose purposes serve the interests of the sponsors more than those of the international community as a whole cannot be construed as progress. It is, in addition, a debatable blessing that other resolutions should have been passed by the Assembly looking for organizational solutions to substantive problems, thus turning such problems over to the Committee on Disarmament particularly at a time when this body already has a surfeit of work.

These are facts. It is only on the basis of a greater recognition of these facts and a willingness to deal with them that we will be able to contribute to the success we all hope for at the second special session on disarmament. Can we not build on that consensus reached in 1978 rather than destroy it by inadvertence — or by design? Should we not be governed by the considerations that lead to that consensus and strive to achieve the highest level of agreement on ways to move ahead?

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

Last spring, I noted that, in our opinion, it would be wise for the Committee to make an objective assessment of the direction in which we were moving and why precisely because we were leading towards the next special session devoted to disarmament. While it is true that the Committee on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body and therefore possesses unique authority, its authority, we repeat once more, ultimately depends upon the results it produces. This year we face a shortened session, yet this year, even more is expected of the Committee: and, let us face it, more hope is invested in it than in the past. These, then, are the international and internal atmospherics affecting the tasks with which the Committee is charged in the period up to the second special session. I now would like to turn briefly to these tasks:

Those who participated in the efforts of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons have reason to be satisfied. A number of the most complex areas in the elaboration of an eventual chemical weapons treaty were identified and set down. Complex problems remain, some substantive and some technical, particularly in the field of verifying the terms of an eventual treaty; and some, of course, of a more political nature.

It is a matter of great regret to us that the traditional resolution on chemical weapons jointly co-sponsored by Canada, Poland, the Byelorussian SSR and Japan was not adopted by consensus at the last General Assembly. The lack of consensus on this resolution could mean that the way is open for a prolonged debate on procedural matters, should some in this Committee so choose. Such a debate in our view would, we fear, sacrifice substance to form. We are confident, however, that such a debate can be avoided and indeed we hope and expect that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be adopted in this Committee by consensus.

Many expect that the comprehensive programme of disarmament will be a "centrepiece" of the second special session on disarmament. There are few areas where the consensus-building procedure of finding the lowest common denominator of agreement and raising it to the highest is more important than during our efforts to develop a comprehensive programme that can be accepted by all. This process will require patience and flexibility, for only through compromise is consensus possible. Great problems remain and consensus is by no means certain. We are encouraged however, that it does appear there is a gathering consensus on the holding of review conferences. This is only a beginning, but a good beginning.

We continue to believe that a treaty on radiological weapons has the advantage of closing off a weapons option and the prospects for its development. We do not exaggerate the importance of such a treaty, but we do think it would be a positive step. This said, if at all possible — and we think it is possible — the conclusion of the text of such a treaty by the time of the second special session would represent the first concrete evidence of the Committee on Disarmament's ability to produce an agreement. It is for this symbolic reason that we consider the conclusion of a text more important than it would otherwise be. There are still a number of proposals which could be incorporated into the text of a treaty on radiological weapons, particularly one put forward by Sweden on the safeguarding from attack of civilian nuclear facilities. It is surely not beyond the skill of this negotiating forum to find a technique for addressing seriously this question in parallel with the work already undertaken on the treaty.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

In our judgement, all aspects of the question of negative security assurances have now been explored, often in exhaustive detail. The time has therefore come to reach the highest common denominator of agreement on this matter. In the present circumstances, for reasons well known to this Committee, no "common formula" is likely to be agreed. We therefore support the proposal that, as an interim solution, means be explored for the Security Council to announce, in a suitably-worded resolution, the summation of each individual nuclear-weapon State's negative security assurances. Such a move by the Security Council would, we believe, be particularly appropriate during the second special session.

The debate on nuclear matters within the Committee — we cannot yet call it a negotiation — will resume. We were encouraged at the last session by some aspects of this debate: it contributed to greater understanding of the complex issues posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, a requisite, we believe, before we can talk meaningfully about nuclear disarmament. In respect of conventional weapons, we must understand why they exist before advocating disarmament which will meet specific conditions, as it must. We hope, however, that this debate will evolve into more of a dialogue engaging nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike for the practical and constructive ends, and not abstract ones, we all seek. In the meantime, we welcome a continuation of the process begun last year. Let us continue to give priority to the substantive over the procedural or abstract.

In that context, we continue to believe that it is productive for the Committee on Disarmament to give due weight to the question of setting up a working group on a CTB; but let us not give it undue weight. In the present context, this is essentially a procedural matter, although of great symbolic importance to many. Our substantive interest should be the eventual conclusion of a test ban treaty; it is not the setting up of a working group as such. We would be advised to focus our efforts on areas where progress is possible. I wish now to put forward some considerations on where we might best apply our endeavours.

The realization of a verifiable multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty, to end all nuclear testing in all environments for all time, continues to be a fundamental Canadian objective. It is one of the four interrelated nuclear arms control measures of the "strategy of suffocation" proposed by my Prime Minister at the first special session in 1978. The concept of the strategy was reaffirmed in the Canadian House of Commons last June.

The subject of a nuclear test ban has been part of the United Nations agenda since 1954. Since 1963, when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed, the negotiating body in Geneva has annually been requested by the United Nations General Assembly to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. The United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR conducted negotiations from July 1977 to November 1980, when they were recessed. The consensus necessary for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty as requested by the United Nations General Assembly, continues to elude us.

For the past two years or so, our principal concern has been that the Committee on Disarmament should assume some substantive role in the elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty — that this negotiating body do some useful and constructive work, at an early date, without prejudicing the accomplishments of the trilateral negotiations. Canada has called for the resumption of these trilateral negotiations. A year ago, in this Committee, Canada announced its "readiness to contribute to the definition of the Committee's substantive role". We have publicly

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

stated that we were in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate. Canada co-sponsored resolutions at the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a working group, although, as stated in our intervention on 16 July last year, "our objective is the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty and not the establishment of a working group per se; and our support for a working group rests on our belief that it could assist in this direction: that is to say, the working group should be viewed as a means to an end and not the end itself ... let us not permit debates on this issue to become bogged down in symbolism to the detriment of the actual matter at hand".

The question of setting up a working group on a comprehensive test ban is essentially a procedural matter, but we would support the establishment of a political experts group under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament to discuss matters which were not at issue in the trilateral negotiations from 1977 to 1980. They could include the financial, legal and administrative aspects of an international seismic data exchange as proposed in the Committee on Disarmament in April 1980 by Australia. The mandate for such a group would of course have to be agreed in consultation with the trilateral negotiating States.

Canada is not convinced that nuclear weapon testing must go on forever or at its current disturbing pace. Restrictions on the number and yield of tests should be possible, as well as on geographic locations of testing sites. To existing nuclear testing agreements could be added further agreements which would move towards the objective of an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty. There is a need to generate some movement in the negotiating process. There is a need to avoid the risks inherent in a continued freeze in the negotiating process on nuclear testing. A number of arms control treaties were realized as a result of the precedents created in working out the partial test-ban treaty of 1963. They include the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions of 1976. It has been argued by some that the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions would be undesirable and could be counterproductive. We do not agree. Fully implemented, these two Treaties, with international co-operation, could be utilized and built upon to move towards a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and on the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions would bring into force limitations on yield, albeit at a high level. It would also bring into force the exchange of technical data about testing programmes and the limiting of testing to specific designated sites, as provided for in the Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. It would also bring into force the provisions of the Protocol of the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions dealing with technical arrangements for monitoring and exchanging information.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

A very useful further step would be the resumption of the trilateral negotiations for the specific purpose of negotiating a second-stage agreement which would further restrict the numbers and yields of tests and the location of testing sites. Such an agreement could be for specific reductions or, even better, for sets of reductions over time.

With such a process in motion, it would seem possible to envisage a greater role for the Committee on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events by involving it in aspects of the exchange of information which would be occurring with the two Treaties earlier mentioned. At some stage in the not too distant future, the implementation of the international seismic data exchange (ISDE) would also appear to be useful.

The implementation of this international verification measure in connection with an interim agreement implies that such an agreement, once reached in trilateral negotiations, would, in certain respects at least, lead to the Committee on Disarmament's involvement.

Canada would hope that in such a process the other nuclear-weapon States, France and China, would join and would sign the partial test-ban Treaty.

The confidence which a veritable second-stage agreement would build should, in turn, bring within the realm of possibility whatever further agreements on limitations and reductions may be required to move towards a permanent comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The above ideas are being contributed in an effort to help focus the Committee's efforts on what seems to us to be possible — some positive and constructive movement in the negotiating process on nuclear testing. My delegation will be glad to work towards this end, the ultimate objective of which is the achievement of an important goal of the international community — a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In my closing remarks I wish to consider the relationship between the Committee and the second special session. We believe that it is in the interests of the Committee to bring to the second special session the greatest possible number of tasks for which it has been charged fully completed. Some have argued that those items not readily lending themselves to resolution in the Committee should be left to the special session itself. We should not have any illusion that matters unresolved in this negotiating forum can be any more readily dealt with at special session, whose functions and purpose are fundamentally different. We trust — and it is indeed our goal — that the Committee's contribution to the second special session on disarmament should be the greatest possible; its contribution should not be a burden, as indeed it might be should the Committee fall short of its goals. The Committee on Disarmament is, in a real sense, on trial and will be judged by the results it produces at this session. Let us therefore proceed with this firmly in mind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador El Reedy.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, you opened this meeting in the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate. We join with you in praying that God will help this meeting to contribute towards the achievement of a better world. We also take this opportunity to congratulate you on your direction of our work and to convey our best wishes to our brothers, the people of Iran, to whom our own people are linked by indissoluble bonds. We also wish to express our sincere appreciation to Ambassador Sani, our previous Chairman, for his wise and effective direction of the work of this Committee.

On behalf of my delegation, I would like to express our sorrow and condolences to the Italian delegation on the death of our dear colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo.

I also welcome all our new colleagues representing Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Nigeria and the United States of America.

As we begin a new round of work, it is only natural to pause for a while to take stock of the situation regarding the arms race, the halting of which is the *raison d'être* of our deliberations here. It is regrettable to note that, in spite of extensive discussions and numerous resolutions, the production of weapons of mass destruction has continued unabated; indeed it has gained further momentum and, thanks to the astonishing advances of science and technology, these weapons have increased in destructiveness. This state of affairs has given rise to the emergence of a new category of regular statistics, commonly known as over-kill statistics, directed at calculating the number of times the present arsenals can destroy mankind. In short, the present and potential destructiveness of existing arsenals and the expenditures towards further production are beyond imagination.

In this unreal atmosphere which prevails over the almost year-round discussions of disarmament issues, in which our discussions constitute an important element, we cannot but wonder at the gap between words and deeds, between promises and their fulfilment!

In the interval since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, which outlined an international disarmament strategy and rationalized the disarmament machinery by establishing a body for deliberations and another, namely, the Committee on Disarmament, for negotiations, not a single real achievement has been made in the field of disarmament. Indeed, we are practically today at an impasse.

If we add to this the worsening economic situation in the third world, and the absence of progress in the establishment of a new and equitable international economic order, then the continued waste of huge human and material resources on the production of more instruments of war and annihilation draws a picture which indeed calls for pondering on the sombre road taken by humanity.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

We as a developing country have responded to the calls addressed to us. Suffice it to note that a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States, the majority of which consist of developing countries not party to any military alliance, have adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty, which by the same token commits the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and to halt nuclear-weapon testing. But unfortunately this commitment has so far remained totally unfulfilled.

Moreover, in this Committee, my delegation, together with the group of non-aligned countries, has done its best and has submitted a number of proposals to advance our work. Yet we are unable to discern any tangible result during the four-year interval between the first and the second special sessions of the General Assembly. The greatest evidence of this is that in spite of our persistence and in spite of successive General Assembly resolutions, we have been unable even to establish the appropriate machinery for dealing with items 1 and 2 of our agenda.

It is axiomatic to say that there is a relationship between the international climate conducive to disarmament negotiations and international behaviour, the world having recently witnessed increasing violations of the rules of international law and international legality. The continued oppression of the brotherly people of Afghanistan is dire evidence of this. We would also add that there has been an increasing resort to the policy of force and the violation of the sovereignty of national independence of countries, as well as attempts to annex territories by force. Such violations undeniably affect the international climate and heighten the feelings of suspicion, mistrust and insecurity. In this context, we believe the Superpowers have a responsibility to see to it that their behaviour is in accordance with the norms of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. They also have a major responsibility for the strengthening of the international machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the deterrence of aggression and ensuring respect for the principles of the Charter.

In the light of these considerations, it may be necessary for the General Assembly, at its second special session, to examine the relationship between disarmament and all that relates to international behaviour, international security, the activation of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and guaranteeing respect for the principles of the Charter and the implementation of resolutions of the United Nations.

But at the same time disarmament issues have become so important and urgent that the continuation of negotiations is imperative, and we do not believe that they should come to a halt under any pre-text or circumstance -- for no one can deny that the accumulation and development of nuclear weapons constitutes the deadliest and most immediate danger to the survival of mankind as a whole.

Therefore, my delegation welcomes the opening in Geneva on 30 November last of negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the removal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe and believes that

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

it is an important and positive development. In spite of the worsening international situation, these negotiations have started, and we wish them all success. We share the desire of the two sides to achieve security in Europe under which the European peoples can live in an atmosphere free from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons on their territories.

Egypt is especially interested in these negotiations since the strengthening of European security would obviously have a positive impact on the security of our region and on our efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and Africa.

At the same time we strongly urge the two sides to reach agreement on an early commencement of the negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. This will no doubt enhance the glimmer of hope discernible in this climate, otherwise saturated with pessimism.

I wish now to make a few comments on the state of our work in the Committee. We cannot but start by reiterating our position of principle to the effect that this Committee has to discharge its responsibilities with respect to items 1 and 2, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which have been on its agenda from its first session. Egypt at almost the very same time last year, on the occasion of its ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, clearly stated that in taking this step and accepting the obligations arising out of its adherence to the Treaty, it hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would also meet their obligations. In this connection the statement of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued on that occasion and which was distributed as a document of the Committee on Disarmament read as follows:

"Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two Superpowers because of their failure to take effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament."

The statement went on to say:

"Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapon States are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end."

On the basis of this clear statement we once again urge the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the obligations they undertook. I would add that we believe that we also have a right to be enlightened about the fate of the trilateral negotiations, which we had hoped would have assisted this Committee in fulfilling its primary responsibility. In the same vein, we resolutely continue to call for the establishment of two ad hoc working groups on these agenda items to enable the Committee to discharge its mandate with regard to the most crucial and dangerous disarmament issues.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Turning now to the item on chemical weapons, on which a good measure of progress has been made in reaching agreement on specific elements and detailed formulations for incorporation in a treaty on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, we believe that the early conclusions of such a treaty has become an imperative and urgent matter in view of all the developments presaging a stepping up of the production of chemical weapons, a situation which would create additional difficulties if a speedy conclusion of the treaty is not forthcoming. Today we are at a critical turning point. Consequently, this Committee should gear all its efforts towards the finalization of a treaty on chemical weapons, taking advantage of the progress made last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group under the leadership of Ambassador Lidgard.

Only a few months lie ahead of us before the beginning of the second special session of the General Assembly. We are therefore working under the pressure of time to finalize consideration of certain issues before this deadline. Foremost among them is the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which hopefully will be finally agreed and formulated before the end of this session in April. The Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject has made considerable progress in exploring the various elements to be included in the programme. What remains is to reach agreement on some of the key issues, in particular those relating to "measures", the nature of the programme, and the time-frame for its implementation.

In addition to the CPD, which we hope will be finalized by the end of our current session, should we not also endeavour to finalize agreement on some other matters under consideration in order to submit the results to the second special session?

In this regard, one of the most important aspects is to reach agreement on a clear and categorical commitment whereby the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. At the first special session, the nuclear-weapon States issued their unilateral declarations. However, it is now generally recognized that these declarations are not sufficient and do not offer sufficient assurances. If we can, in this Committee, on the basis of the discussions which took place in the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group, the plenary Committee itself and the General Assembly, reach an agreement whereby the nuclear-weapon States commit themselves, clearly and unequivocally, to renouncing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States, then we will be able to claim a first significant achievement. Moreover, such a development will answer the legitimate demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the majority of which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option within a treaty framework and have subjected their nuclear installations to international inspection and verification procedures.

In addition, we believe that we have to pursue efforts to conclude a treaty prohibiting the production and use of radiological weapons. Although such a convention is not an urgent priority on the disarmament agenda, its conclusion, in our view, would be a contribution to our efforts to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. My delegation considers it essential

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

legally to prohibit attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. This question has acquired added significance as a result of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi peaceful nuclear reactor last summer. We hope that a solution can be found to this question and that the nuclear-weapon States and other States members of nuclear alliances will understand this just and reasonable demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States -- a legitimate demand which has been further substantiated by events.

For more than 20 years, specifically in the wake of the launching of the first space satellites, Egypt has, together with the group of non-aligned countries, been in the forefront of nations calling for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Although my delegation believes that the best way to handle this question is to establish a legal rule or international legislation prohibiting the use of outer space for other than peaceful purposes, the logic thus being the remittance of the issue to the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in response to the preference shown by many delegations for considering the subject in the Committee on Disarmament, we have agreed to its inclusion in our agenda. We would, however, like to emphasize two points:

First, the objective of our endeavours would be to reserve outer space for peaceful uses and to safeguard against its militarization. Consequently, we have to avoid the risk of finding ourselves being dragged into an exercise that may lead to the legitimization of some military uses of outer space.

Secondly, the consideration of this item should not be at the expense of the priority items on our agenda, particularly the questions of a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

In this connection it might be useful if the secretariat, at the proper time, could prepare a compilation of the relevant background material, including the various proposals made which may be of help to us in the consideration of this question.

The second special session of the General Assembly will be for us, as responsible members of the community of nations, an occasion to assess and evaluate the efforts being made to halt the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament. In this regard, our Committee has a special responsibility, through its evaluation, to help the General Assembly to be fully aware of the implications of the ever-deteriorating situation. This would help the second special session to chart a road which could make our planet a more secure and brighter world.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the words you addressed to the Chair and the kind reference you made to the people of my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Valdivieso.

Mr. VALDIVIESO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you assume the chairmanship of our Committee. During the fulfilment of this important and delicate task, you can count on our full, although surely modest, co-operation. I would also like to express, through you, our deep appreciation for the successful work of your predecessor, Ambassador Sani of Indonesia.

I would like to pay a tribute to the memory of our very distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo, who, as head of the Permanent Mission of Italy, represented his country with dignity, competence and decorum which earned him our respect and consideration. Our sincere condolences go to the Mission of Italy.

My delegation also welcomes the new representatives of Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United States of America, to whom we offer our co-operation.

We are meeting at a time when certain international events are causing deep concern among large sectors of world public opinion, which is alarmed by what some regard, not without reason, as a plain and simple return to the so-called cold war, that is, to a relationship between the Superpowers based on confrontation and uncontrolled competition.

In any event, it must be recognized that the international system is in the process of becoming increasingly unstable as a result of the crisis of confidence that seems to be developing between the worlds known as East and West.

For anyone who reads the international press, it is no secret that most of the current international tension and crises have gained momentum as a result of the change that has taken place in strategic perceptions at the level of the Superpowers.

For example, the apocalyptic hypothesis of Mutual Assured Destruction, whose initials make up the English word "MAD" in suggestive symbolism, is being replaced by the hypothesis of a "limited nuclear war" or a war whose effects can be controlled. At the same time, hurried efforts are being made to establish a force that will be permanently ready and capable of intervening in any part of the globe; and the old and creaking regional "mutual defence" alliances forged as a result of the cold war are being revived.

Such fundamental changes in strategic perceptions at the global level have serious repercussions not only on relations between East and West, but also on the South, i.e., on the developing countries as a whole.

Not only is the possibility of a nuclear war now accepted -- making the classical concept of deterrence obsolete -- but plans are being made in function of that possibility; and, in international relations, everything depends on the absolute predominance of the East-West crisis.

There is no time now for the North-South dialogue; nor place for international codes of conduct to govern the functioning of the existing international system. There is no need to codify the international law of the sea and no need for new orders, whatever their subject-matter. The concept of international co-operation for development is being redefined, with private and bilateral agreements prevailing over public and multilateral agreements. Action to combat underdevelopment, that is, the hunger, poverty, illness, marginality and denial of basic human rights suffered by two out of every three people on the planet, is no longer a priority for the international community.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

The priority issue now is "security", as defined by the North. It means more military expenditures and fewer social programmes everywhere, in times, moreover, of widespread recession.

Our countries cannot afford such a reversal of priorities; and we do not understand the distinction between the concepts of "security" and "development" because, as far as we are concerned, they are exactly the same. Our countries' present insecurity is a result of the underdevelopment of our societies. Accordingly, the achievement of our security requirements necessarily implies the achievement of our development, which is nothing less than being able to give our citizens standards of living compatible with the human dignity proclaimed in a solemn Universal Declaration.

This is our concept of security: we are now losing a war which is older and more destructive than any in this century and which kills thousands of our children, men, women and elderly people everyday.

We all tremble at the thought of how unbearable the neutron bomb is, but I wonder how many of us tremble with the same fear at the thought of the intangible bombs of hunger and illness, which are so harmless to things and so deadly to human beings and which, because of our failure to act, have constantly been dropped on every corner of the underdeveloped world ever since its history became part of that of the West as a result of the colonial phenomenon.

No, Mr. Chairman, we do not agree with the new strategic definitions. They put us on the second level or simply ignore us. They deprive us of our national identities and place our future in the hands of others, however friendly they may be.

It is painful, though not irrelevant, to see how the process of disarmament is affected by such developments.

The fact of the matter -- if indeed it lies in the statements of high Government officials and in specific military budget and sales figures -- is that there has been an escalation of the arms race and it has not been limited to the Superpowers or indeed to any of the Powers; it has, rather, spread to the developing world.

Developing countries such as mine have other, specific reasons for this concern, which is, in our case, overshadowed by the prospects for the North-South dialogue in which we, as a developing country, believe that we can better project our national interests in the international arena.

We are aware that some States question the very idea of this other way of looking at the international system. The issue is, however, not one of labels or words, but, rather, in our view, one of proving and stating one of the basic facts of the present world order, namely, the co-existence of developed and developing States in a structure of interrelations that places the latter, sometimes involuntarily, at the mercy of the former.

When one of the big ones sneezes, many of the little ones catch cold. This is the most common effect of so-called "interdependence", which few seem to remember, and it shows just how vulnerable and dependent the weaker countries really are.

One of the clearest examples of the asymmetrical relationship between the two groups of States is to be found in the field of security and armaments policy.

Contrary to what some people think, the third world countries do have direct and vital interests in the process that guides and defines relations between the political-economic-military blocs, whose strategic and security perceptions directly affect us, as shown by the escalation of the arms race and the international crises that have broken out in the developing world.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

As a rule, the largest concentrations of arsenals in developing countries and, consequently, the most violent wars that the world has known since the end of the Second World War have taken place in areas that were trapped in the clutches of East-West rivalry and tension.

Not even during the best of times of détente, whose absence today seems so tragic to us, did any significant change take place in this dynamic or, in other words, in the historically verifiable fact that the rivalry between the two blocs, with their mutual deterrent power, naturally tends to affect the peripheral regions of the third world, which thus become an impotent theatre sacrificed to foreign confrontations.

The Superpowers' definitions of their "vital interests", "strategic concerns" or similar concepts are based on the assumption that the natural setting for such definitions is the world as a whole.

The most important consequence of the way in which the Superpowers see themselves and international reality and which characterizes the positions they have adopted is the unequal distribution of security at the world level and, therefore, an order which is as unjust and out of proportion as that which characterizes the other structural levels of relations between weaker and stronger countries.

The latter, which are in an absolute minority in the community of nations and have a minority share of the world's population, nevertheless have a near-monopoly on security, while the former are condemned to live in constant insecurity because their right to define their own ideas of security is not respected.

This is the result of the fact that the security of the peripheral countries is almost always defined in terms of the strategic — and the economic, political and ideological — interests of the blocs which compete for universal supremacy and, as far as ideological-political models and international leadership are concerned, are held up to the developing world as the only two alternatives.

In accordance with our approach to international relations, our interests focus on the need to establish a new international security order which will guarantee the legitimate rights of the developing countries to develop in genuine independence and to follow the path of non-alignment vis-à-vis the East-West crisis, which is neither inevitable nor desirable.

It is understandable that we should be deeply concerned about the breakdown of the dialogue and the crisis of mutual confidence between the Superpowers because we know that, if events continue on their present course, the developing countries will have to pay for most of the damage.

We as Latin Americans are particularly concerned about the fact that Central America is well on its way to becoming a new critical trouble spot because of persistent attempts to subordinate its complex problems to the inadequate logic of the East-West dialectic and because of public speculation about the possibility of direct foreign intervention in the area.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

The peoples of this sister region, heirs to a common history, should not have to endure interference in their efforts to find solutions to the specific, age-old problems of achieving economic development, social justice and institutional growth and stability in a truly democratic and pluralistic climate in which human rights are fully respected.

We are, as stated on numerous occasions by my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, therefore opposed to any foreign interference in the affairs of this region.

And we are therefore also concerned about the noticeable increase in the flow of weapons to this area and about the introduction into Latin America of the highly sophisticated military equipment from which it has so far been spared.

Imports of modern high-technology weapons create problems and difficulties for all developing countries not only because it is scandalous to use valuable resources, which should be spent on social programmes and development, to purchase very expensive arms, but also because such imports increase the recipients' capacity for violence and make them technologically dependent on their suppliers and such dependence can be used to create political and strategic alignments.

This brings us to the relationship between disarmament and development, an aspect of the disarmament problem that is of the greatest importance to the developing countries.

According to the report of the international group of experts, a select group of eminent persons which was presided over by Mrs. Thorsson, whose presence we welcome, and was requested by the United Nations to explore the nature of that relationship, the links between disarmament and development include the following significant facts:

In the last 30 years, nearly 6 per cent of the world's available resources have been consumed every year by the arms race.

Since the end of the Second World War, the nuclear Powers have manufactured more than 40,000 nuclear warheads with a combined explosive capacity 1 million times greater than that of the bomb which, in one of the darkest chapters in mankind's history, was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

If we could recycle the materials used to build and station only 200 land-based intercontinental missiles, we would have close to 10,000 t of aluminium, 2,500 t of chromium, 150 t of titanium, 24 t of beryllium, 890,000 t of steel and 2.4 million t of cement.

More than 50 million people, including almost 20 per cent of the world's engineers and scientists, are employed directly or indirectly in the production of military goods and services.

More than half a million skilled experts are involved, at a cost of \$35 billion per year, in military research and development programmes on new deadly technologies.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

About 6 per cent of annual oil output is used for military purposes and to produce weapons systems which use more copper, nickel and platinum every year than all the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America consume for other purposes.

In the developing countries, more money is spent on tanks, aircraft, missiles and artillery than on public health or education.

There are more people in military uniform in the world than there are teachers and more research is carried out and capital invested for military purposes than for research on new energy sources, health care, pollution control and agriculture.

The modernization of a small air-to-air missile costs more than the \$100 million spent in 10 years by the World Health Organization to eradicate smallpox.

From various points of view, disarmament and development are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. And since both are basic to problems that affect the international community as a whole — and not only a few States, however powerful they may be — the United Nations, the most universal forum, has been recognized as the legitimate principal protagonist and rightful initiator of the process of disarmament.

Speaking on behalf of a small country which believes in international law, which supports respectful dialogue among States, pluralism and the subordination of individual interests to the greater good and which is therefore opposed to the use or threat of use of force and to arrogance and contempt for the rights of others, we strongly reaffirm our unswerving belief in the irreplaceable role of the United Nations and in the great respect due to its most democratic and representative organ, the General Assembly, whose will we see as the repository of the highest moral authority.

Various speakers who have taken the floor before me have noted that this session of our Committee is of particular importance in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is imperative that the second special session should not fail, for if it does, there will be no way of halting the worsening of the international situation or the acceleration of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race.

And if it is essential for the second special session devoted to disarmament not to fail, it is just as obvious that, in the work it will carry out between now and April, our Committee must achieve positive tangible results. In a very real sense, the destinies of both meetings are inextricably linked. We thus have a very heavy responsibility on our shoulders.

If we are to achieve positive results in our work in order to enable the second special session to make a substantial contribution to the process of

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

disarmament, there will have to be a radical departure from some of the trends which have emerged in the Committee in the last few years and have prevented it from fulfilling its mandate.

In this connection, there is no doubt that the primary obstacle to be overcome is the nuclear Powers' proven lack of political will to conclude specific, binding agreements designed to halt the current arms race and reverse it through a mutually agreed process of arms limitations.

It is this lack of political will — demonstrated, moreover, by the specific actions of States outside this body — which has virtually brought the negotiations in the four established Ad Hoc Working Groups to a stand-still and has delayed the establishment of working groups to speed up the work on items 1 and 2 of our traditional agenda, to which the General Assembly has repeatedly given the highest priority.

This is not a simple procedural matter. As we all know, there are no instructions which say that the only way of holding negotiations on specific questions of disarmament is to establish ad hoc working groups, but we also know that, in practice, ad hoc working groups are the only negotiating bodies we have. In the best of cases, plenary meetings are useful for broad exchanges of views on specific issues, but that is all. They are usually used more for a general and open debate on all the items on the agenda and even to air questions which basically have nothing to do with the agenda items.

Custom, which is more powerful than is usually believed, particularly in the United Nations, has thus created a de facto situation in which matters not dealt with in an ad hoc working group are "frozen", so to speak, as far as their effective handling is concerned.

Opposition to the establishment of ad hoc working groups to negotiate specific agreements on items 1 and 2 of the agenda is therefore tantamount to opposition to multilateral negotiations on these questions. This is, in our view, unacceptable, whatever the justification offered — not only because of the repeated mandates of the General Assembly, but also because of the intrinsic importance for the process of disarmament of the immediate prohibition of all nuclear tests and the achievement of agreements on the halting of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race.

We are also of the opinion that the ad hoc working groups that are already dealing in the negotiating process with items 3, 4 and 5 of the draft agenda must be authorized to resume their work as soon as possible. As they carry out their task, we hope that they will be able to remove the obstacles hampering the achievement of specific agreements. In this connection, we were encouraged to hear that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, presided over with such diligence and success by Ambassador Lidgard, will be broadened.

I also wish to repeat the fact that we consider it truly shameful that the nuclear Powers consistently refuse to grant the non-nuclear-weapon States formal and binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. For

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

us, this is a matter of principle because we consider it morally intolerable for the nuclear Powers to take such great care not to offer such guarantees in a formal manner; their refusal is like a sword of Damocles holding the developing countries hostage to the nuclear Powers and their disputes.

The nuclear Powers seem to have known what they were about when they coined the term "negative security guarantees" because they are in fact the ones which are claiming that the non-nuclear countries should grant them a negative guarantee of credibility that is conceptually different from the positive, genuine and binding guarantees we are asking of the nuclear Powers.

The elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will be the centre-piece of the political process to be set in motion at the second special session next June, is without a doubt the Committee's most important immediate responsibility at this session.

Fortunately, the wisdom and patience with which our very distinguished friend, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico, has guided the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has made it possible for its work to progress with a dynamism that is remarkable in this Committee.

That does not, however, alter the fact that the different interest groups still disagree on matters of substance. We hope that the fruitful exchanges of views that have taken place until now will have convinced all of us that the task at hand is not one of elaborating yet another document which is open to any interpretation whatever, contains no time-frame and depends on the goodwill of States.

Now is the time for us to be lucid enough to elaborate a comprehensive programme which is clear, contains time-frames -- even if they are only indicative -- and is able to generate effective agreements that will lead to specific disarmament measures.

This will, however, be possible if the nuclear Powers and, in particular, the Superpowers do not translate into action the desire they have proclaimed for international peace and moral commitment to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, which, as Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reminded us a few days ago, prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State.

As long as there is no such change in the conduct of the States which have a monopoly on force at the international level, we will still be able to say that the disarmament effort is a Utopian and quixotic activity, but it is none the less one from which we who can say that our sling is that of David will not flinch.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer you, the representative of the friendly non-aligned country of Iran, my congratulations on assuming the chairmanship of the Committee for this month and to assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation in carrying out your difficult task.

I would also like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia for a very well and efficiently done job as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the closing month of its last session and the opening phase of the current session. I also extend a very warm welcome to the many new colleagues who have joined us for the new session of the Committee. May I also take this opportunity to pay a tribute to our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, and wish him the best in his new and important responsibilities in the Hague.

It is with great sorrow that the delegation of Yugoslavia has learned of the passing away of our colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo. Expressing our sincere condolences to the distinguished representative of Italy, we ask him to transmit our sympathy to Ambassador Montezemolo's family.

This year's session of the Committee on Disarmament has started its work under the shadow of highly exacerbated international relations. The situation which we are facing today in international relations is extremely unfavourable and gives ground to the greatest concern.

In evaluating such a situation, we proceed from the fact that the existence of blocs and the pursuit of a policy from a position of strength on the part of the Great Powers inevitably leads to a policy of domination and hegemony. This, in turn, gives impetus to the increasingly accelerating arms race which leads to a confrontation of a global nature and the spreading of spheres of interest to which are subjected all developments in the world and all areas of international life. Although resistance to such a policy is constantly growing, it continues to be pursued to the detriment of peace, security and co-operation and causes insecurity and instability, which lead to a general aggravation of international relations. All this goes against the vital interests of the whole of mankind; constant pressure is placed on the national independence and security of particular countries, especially the non-aligned and developing countries, thus greatly hindering possibilities for economic development and jeopardizing world peace.

As a European, non-aligned and socialist developing country, Yugoslavia gives particular attention to developments in international relations. It strives to make a maximum contribution to the overcoming of bloc divisions and the attenuation of bloc confrontations by strengthening those elements in international relations that can ensure the reinforcement of peaceful coexistence among States, respect for the freedom of man and independence, as well as the prevention of interference in internal affairs of particular countries and the improvement of broad and equitable international co-operation.

Striving for the consequent implementation of the United Nations Charter and the authentic principles of the movement of non-alignment, Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries are aware that only along these lines is it possible to ensure

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

the creation of universal détente and a democratic system of international political and economic relations that will, inter alia, make it possible to halt the arms race and open the process of general and complete disarmament. In keeping with such policy, the highest political organ of Yugoslavia, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the political traditions of President Tito, devoted a separate session in January this year to the consideration of current questions in the area of disarmament in the light of the efforts being made to solve this vital problem and ensure peace and stability in the world.

Proceeding from the assessment that the present serious aggravation of the international situation has to a great extent been caused by the constantly increasing arms race, the session of the Presidency stressed, inter alia, the necessity to renew and intensify the activity of the entire mechanism of the United Nations for negotiations on disarmament and underlined the importance of the need to activate negotiations on conventional armament in Vienna, as well as the negotiations on strategic and theatre nuclear weapons. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to reach an agreement at the CSCE Meeting in Madrid on convening a conference on disarmament in Europe. In view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Presidency discussed the preparations for this session and the co-operation of the non-aligned countries, as well as the contribution that the session should make to the halting of the arms race and the opening of the process of genuine disarmament.

Similarly, when recently delivering his report on the foreign policy activity of Yugoslavia before the Federal Assembly, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Josip Vrhovec, accorded considerable attention to questions relating to problems of disarmament and international security. In his assessment of these problems, he said that they are "one of the most sensitive areas of international life which has a strong bearing on the global situation in the world. Here, we once again find ourselves in a critical stage, perhaps the most uncertain one since the world has emerged from the cold war. We can freely say that the feat of strength which is going on between the existing military giants shakes our planet and causes the most profound uneasiness not only in many Governments but also in the broadest strata of the population. Peoples are expressing their exasperation because of the continuation of this race in an increasingly direct manner and are asking the Governments of their countries to halt it".

"Nevertheless", -- he went on to say -- "the race continues while equilibrium is established and disturbed at a constantly higher level, which in fact is nothing other than an increase in the danger for the outbreak of the third, i.e. nuclear, world war".

The arms race, which is becoming a universal phenomenon, especially in present conditions of enhanced interdependence and interrelatedness of the world, has manifold negative effects. The consequences are particularly grave for the economic and social development of particular countries, as well as for the deforming of the structure of the world economy. The arms race not only absorbs huge human, natural and material resources, but also contributes to the deepening of the general crisis of the world economy and over-all international economic relations, entailing grave political and social consequences. This affects the developing countries particularly hard and many of them are in a very difficult position. The competition in armaments is directly transmitted to the developing countries in all parts of the world. They have great difficulties in bearing the costs for armaments which they

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

are compelled to spend in order to protect their independence and territorial integrity. This leads to a slowing down or postponement of the settlement of the urgent problems of their economic and social development, while the world economy is sinking into a deeper crisis. All this has a concomitant effect on increasing the general policy of instability in the world because questions of economic and political emancipation are essential components of peace and security in the world.

The many negative effects of the arms race are manifested in all other areas of international life. Many countries, as the protagonists of the arms race, forget that they jeopardize man's basic right, that is, the right to life.

Attempts are often made to justify the policy of armament by various doctrines "on the balance of power and security", "the balance of fear", deterrence, the need for suppressing or inflicting the "first, second" or similar nuclear strikes and the like. Quasi-theories are launched on the possibilities of a limited and local nuclear war, thus enhancing the production of corresponding new weapons of mass destruction. Claims are made that completely stable international relations or an ideal military balance or complete confidence must first be established, etc., and only then is it possible to come down to disarmament. Often, one's own exercising of pressure and interference are justified by some lofty goals or hidden intentions of others that should be forestalled and then these same acts committed by others are condemned and they are made responsible for the deterioration of relations and the arms race. We do not accept the arguments of any doctrine which boils down to the absurdity of the arms race and which cannot but end in destruction. For those, especially the Great Powers, which spread such doctrines, it would be better if they were to change their policy. Mutual accusation for various acts which serve to justify armament should be abandoned and political will should be shown in action.

There is no need to try to convince anyone that, for any race, and for the arms race as well, at least two competitors are required. Unfortunately, the present arms race involves a much greater number of participants. As concerns the responsibilities of countries, they are very clearly stipulated in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, as are the priorities concerning disarmament. Any assurances of one's own desire to reduce tensions in the world and negotiate about the reduction in armaments and towards disarmament sound very unconvincing if they are simultaneously accompanied by the publication of data in the daily press regarding the production of new lethal weapons of mass destruction or an astounding increase in military budgets.

For all the above reasons, the Yugoslav delegation cannot agree with the position of those who are saying that it is not possible to initiate the process of disarmament while the unfavourable and exacerbated international situation still lasts. We are of the opposite opinion. It is precisely in aggravated international circumstances that greater political will should be shown to make even greater efforts to halt the arms race and make use of all the possibilities, such as this Committee of ours, to move towards concrete results. They, in turn, will undoubtedly have a positive influence on the global state of international relations. There is no alternative to the process of disarmament in this respect.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

What can we expect this year from the work of this session of our Committee, the first part of which was rightly assessed as very important by many preceding speakers, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament?

It is evident that we are not working in a vacuum and that the general state of international relations is also reflected in the work of this Committee. We consider, however, that, despite the deterioration of the international situation and precisely because of it, the work of the Committee should be approached constructively, responsibly and efficiently. Any other approach would be harmful and would be conducive to negative, grave consequences. This is why we must not allow the Committee to become a venue for bloc rivalry and mutual accusations for the sins committed on the world scene, as this will render its work impossible. We should not reconcile ourselves to this state of affairs. Instead, negotiations should be approached as a means of achieving concrete results, which have been negligible thus far. The current international situation requires resolute efforts to contain the arms race and open a broad process of disarmament. After all, that is the main task of this Committee. Although there is very little time left until the second special session, we think that this Committee can play a significant role in the realization of some results that would considerably improve the record of its work and contribute to the success of the second special session. We are convinced that this Committee has sufficient strength and accumulated experience to carry out these tasks. It is only necessary to show political will and make a conscientious effort to overcome the difference of views which would be amply rewarded by lasting political benefits for all peoples of the world. All the efforts of my country and the countries of the Group of 21 are directed toward this end. The multilateral importance of the Committee on Disarmament and the advantages it offers should be used to the full, especially since the efforts invested so far have not yielded results that would give rise to a historical turning point from armament to disarmament.

The task of greatest priority for the Committee on Disarmament, on the basis of the consensus reached in the Final Document of the first special session, is to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. Three and a half years after the first special session, the Committee has still not begun to negotiate on nuclear weapons, which, as we have all agreed, pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. Some nuclear Powers persistently oppose the conduct of such negotiations in the Committee and the creation of an ad hoc working group for negotiations on which we continue to insist.

The case is similar with respect to the negotiations on a CTBT as well. The conclusion of such an agreement would represent an important aspect of the halting of the nuclear arms race and a first step towards nuclear weapons reduction. Solemn declarations and numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly urging the conclusion of such an agreement and a series of requests made by the Group of 21 and some other members of the Committee for the creation of an ad hoc working group for this purpose encounter the persistent refusal of some nuclear Powers. Those who, through their refusal, contribute in the most direct manner to the continuation of the nuclear arms race are assuming the greatest responsibility. The minimum that can be asked of the Committee is the creation, at the beginning of the session, of working groups for nuclear disarmament and a CTBT and the opening of the negotiating process which has been awaited for so long.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

The second question with regard to which further progress can be made in comparison with last year is the resumption of the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and the setting of its new mandate, which would enable the commencement of concrete negotiations on the text of a chemical weapons convention. The urgent initiation of negotiations on a convention is all the more necessary in order to eliminate in the most concrete manner the threat of the use of these weapons and threats to produce new types of the most lethal binary chemical weapons stockpiles. Any postponement of the initiation of this work provides an additional track for the arms race, whose consequences are difficult to perceive and control.

My delegation also considers that the work of the working groups on the ban of radiological weapons and on negative security assurances should be resumed as soon as possible.

We believe that, by the second special session on disarmament, the conclusion of a convention on the ban of radiological weapons can be achieved. The questions that remain to be solved do not represent insurmountable difficulties. The Yugoslav delegation is prepared, in a spirit of consensus, to contribute to the successful conclusion of the work of this group.

As regards negative security assurances, my delegation has always considered that this right should unconditionally and automatically refer to all non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced these weapons and do not have them on their territories. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States will be able to submit an acceptable formula on negative security assurances before the second special session.

The success of the second special session is also most directly linked to the elaboration, by the Committee, of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Working Group headed by the distinguished Ambassador from Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, has done a considerable share of the work. There still remains, however, much to be done and time is running short. The difficulties that the Ad Hoc Working Group encounters in its work are not to be underestimated, but they are not of such a nature that they cannot be overcome through patient work and mutual understanding of the positions of particular delegations, all the more so since the majority of delegations has the same or very similar views to those contained in document CD/223 submitted by the Group of 21. The framework for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is contained in many paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session and, in particular, paragraph 9, which, inter alia, specifies "that a comprehensive disarmament programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control"; paragraph 50, which speaks of "a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames"; and paragraph 109, which specifies that the "Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality" and that "the comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ... a continuing review of the implementation of the programme".

The Group of 21 has therefore initiated in its working paper CD/223 the elaboration of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which contains a detailed programme of disarmament measures to be implemented in stages and within the corresponding time-frames, which have been set in a flexible manner as they are of an indicative nature. The review mechanism which the Working Group has not considered yet in greater detail should represent an important link for the establishment and implementation of disarmament measures.

The Committee should not fail to submit the draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the second special session on disarmament. It is not necessary that it be perfect in all its parts, but it should be detailed enough to be able to be easily improved on at the session itself and for a decision to be made on its adoption.

Our spring session will take place in an atmosphere of preparation for the second special session on disarmament, which should, as stipulated in paragraph 128 of the Final Document of the first special session, "not be the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament".

The Committee on Disarmament can make its best contribution to that session if it achieves two results. First, to succeed in submitting a concerted proposal for a CPD. Second, to reach an agreement on some areas of disarmament which are on the Committee's agenda. By doing both of these things, we would create that constructive atmosphere which will indeed be needed for that universal gathering of members of the world community. It should trace new, comprehensive and concrete roads in order that we can finally and in effect embark upon the road to the systematic realization of those objectives for which an enormous majority of countries has opted innumerable times throughout the entire post-war period. This would be a definite break-through in halting the arms race and opening the process of general and complete disarmament. We have the full support of the entire world public for the achievement of this goal and it is something we owe to future generations. It is only by achieving this goal that mankind can avoid its own destruction and embark upon new roads of co-operation for development and the prosperity of all countries and people on earth.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Terrefe.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the current month and pledge to you my delegation's full co-operation in your heavy responsibilities. To your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, we are grateful for his able guidance during the Committee's work at the end of its 1981 session. I also wish to greet and welcome our new colleagues who have joined us this year. My delegation would like to associate itself with the other speakers in expressing condolences to the delegation of Italy on the passing away of Ambassador Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo.

My statement today will be of a general nature. Having listened with great interest to the statements made by various representatives in the plenary, we may draw two general conclusions from the statements of the majority of delegations. First, that the Committee is beginning its 1982 session at a time when the international situation is very disturbing. Secondly, that increasing concern about the questions of the arms race and disarmament is being expressed with intensity by peoples all over the world. Hence, growing world public interest is being generated in the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is unavoidable, therefore, that our negotiations will, to some degree, be conducted with this awareness in mind. Whether these reflections impede or induce our task, the performance of the Committee at this session will have significant bearing on the forthcoming special session on disarmament.

It is not the intention of my delegation to discuss international events which have their own fora outside this Committee. However, we do not negotiate in this Committee in an insulated capsule. There are certain developments that have a bearing on items on our agenda and which may be taken up with full validity. On the other hand, there are political situations which should be confined to other bodies, since their discussion here would in no way promote our negotiations. It is on this basis that my delegation examines international events in this Committee.

In many of the meetings on disarmament and related topics going back to many years, a number of references are made describing the then prevailing international situation as being critical, tense, dangerous or even grave. Indeed, there have been many world crises, including aggressions and conflicts, many of which have led to wars. But recently there is a new doctrine which makes the international situation far more dangerous, with the increased possibility of nuclear catastrophe. I am referring to the concept of a limited nuclear war and the feasibility of conducting such a war. For example, the modernization of artillery pieces which would be capable of firing nuclear shells. The possibility of a limited nuclear war enunciated by the leader of one of the major nuclear-weapon States is a cause of grave concern. Ethiopia joins the multitude of nations and international public opinion in rejecting such an irresponsible attitude, which constitutes an unprecedented threat to the survival of mankind.

The foreign policy of Ethiopia is guided by the well-known principles of the non-aligned nations: respect for peace, justice and equality, national independence, national unity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. These principles are also the cornerstone of the Charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity. Guided by these principles, my country views with great apprehension the recent arms build up and the unprecedented increase in the military budget of a major nuclear Power to the detriment of national and international socio-economic goals. It is equally disturbing for us, as a member of the Committee on Disarmament, to hear statements by high officials of this same Power rejecting the very basis of the principle of

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

respect for the equal rights of all nations and questioning our own working procedure in the Committee, namely, the principle of consensus. Within such a frame of mind, my delegation therefore fully understands if some members of the Committee showed displeasure and indignation at the propaganda directed against them and at the lack of respect shown for the sovereignty of the States that they represent or for actions taken by them with their own national sovereignty.

Turning briefly to the situation in our region, we view with particular concern the militarization and continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean. The policy of the United States to secure military bases and facilities for its expanding Rapid Deployment Forces as well as war games and exercise conducted recently by it in the region gives grounds for deep concern. As Ethiopia attaches great importance to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, it regrets the failure to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo last year, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 34/80 B.

I shall refer to another situation which my Government continues to be deeply concerned with, namely, the implications of South Africa's nuclear capability for the peace and security of Africa. Those Western States which assist South Africa with its nuclear programme and provide its nuclear material continue to turn a blind eye there to this regional concern of ours, yet call for the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. When we consider the nuclear item, my delegation shall highlight and focus on this particular threat.

However, enough has been said about the existence or non-existence of linkages between the present international political climate and disarmament negotiations. Our attention should focus on the danger of nuclear war posed by the existence of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads whose destructive capacity is millions of times greater than the atomic bomb which destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. It is a fact that the chances of using these weapons are rapidly increasing due to tense relations, particularly between the major nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, we cannot deny the urgency of concentrating seriously on our substantive negotiating work. This urgency is particularly evident in the fact that the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly adopted over 50 resolutions on disarmament and in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Without prejudging the outcome of the second special session or the performance of the Committee between now and the next few months, my delegation is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament should reactivate the three ad hoc working groups set up last year, so that they may continue their work while we continue to explore ways and means of reaching consensus on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2, namely on a CTB and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Useful suggestions have already been submitted as late as last Tuesday, for instance by the German Democratic Republic, indicating the mandates and duration of the new ad hoc working groups.

With the current international background and the growing risk of a nuclear war, the Ethiopian delegation welcomes, therefore, the recent commencement of talks on medium-range nuclear missiles between the Soviet Union and the United States. We express the hope that, with the beginning of the Geneva talks, a period of renewed disarmament efforts will be encouraged and that the SALT process will likewise resume.

My delegation is pleased also that under your leadership, consultations have led to a consensus on the inclusion of the item concerning outer space. In view of the great speed with which space research and technology is progressing, it is high time that we should be concerned at the growing dangers of the military use of outer space, while other United Nations bodies consider concomitantly the legal aspects

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

and the question of the peaceful uses of outer space, for herein lies an unlimited chance for mankind to direct its universal knowledge to benefit all countries of the world in the solution of their economic and social problems, particularly in the field of communications and the exploitation of natural resources. In the Committee on Disarmament, our immediate task is to negotiate measures of preventing the nuclear arms race from being extended into outer space, for the use of satellites for early warning system against nuclear attack and other uses of outer space suggest the likelihood of space war in the future. This concern, however, should not detract the Committee from pursuing its priority items.

In the light of the growing interest displayed by States and concerned people all over the world in the convening of the second special session devoted to disarmament, the work in the ad hoc working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament in its preparation of a draft comprehensive programme will most naturally command special attention in the Committee's work. In this connection, it is indeed good fortune that the working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament has the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, to steer its work with his characteristic comprehensive and skilful approach.

The views of my delegation on the number of issues pertaining to the CPD are reflected in the position of the Group of 21 as contained in its working papers CD/223, CD/229 and CD/230. Based on the provisions of the Final Document, these working papers, which have been the object of extensive examination by various delegations, provide a realistic and effective approach for ensuring a meaningful disarmament draft programme for the second special session.

On the question of nuclear weapons, the objective of some delegations to equate nuclear weapons with conventional weapons would be difficult for my delegation to accept. Also, attempts to question the priority accorded to the question of nuclear disarmament in disarmament measures would equally be difficult to accept.

With respect to the items on our agenda, I would like to reiterate that my delegation would like to see the ad hoc working groups established last year continue their work without delay. On the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which are items of the highest priority, we wish to reiterate our view and emphasize the urgent need to set up ad hoc working groups. It is unfortunate to note that, in view of the statement made on the nuclear question by the distinguished representative of the United States at the plenary meeting on 9 February, it may prove difficult to attain this particular objective at the present time. However, with respect to chemical weapons, we should be able to make more progress under the revised mandate of the working group. In this connection, we regard published reports of the decision by the United States to build a facility to produce chemical weapons, as well as the allocation of increased funds for chemical weapons production, as regrettable, as it will inevitably intensify the chemical arms race. We are fearful that, in view of this disturbing trend, the complexity of chemical weapons negotiations will only increase over time. Therefore, the urgent need to achieve rapid progress on a chemical weapons convention is self-evident.

In conclusion, I would like to take cognizance of the report of the Secretary-General on the study of the relationship between disarmament and development, which we received with great interest. Under the chairmanship of Madame Thorsson of Sweden, to whom my delegation wish to express appreciation for the valuable contribution made, the study will not only provide a useful basis for the examination of the socio-economic consequences of the arms race, but will also hold the key to potential resources for the development objectives of the developing countries.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation would like to express its views on the first item on the agenda, "Nuclear test ban".

It is not by chance that the Committee on Disarmament is starting its work with a consideration of the question of a nuclear-weapons test ban, because this priority issue is indeed extremely important and urgent and its practical solution would meet the vital interests of all mankind.

The question of a nuclear-weapons test ban is one of the most acute amid the complex of problems relating to nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests would place an obstacle in the path of the improvement and further proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the solution of this problem is further delayed, the accelerated development and production of new and even more destructive types of such weapons will continue.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have actively and consistently advocated and continue to advocate the complete and general cessation of nuclear weapons tests by all States in all spheres for all time; they are in favour of the speediest possible solution of this important and urgent problem.

For a number of years we have urged that the Committee on Disarmament should play an active role in bringing about the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. We have supported the proposal of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to carry out negotiations in this regard. In his statement on 15 February the representative of the German Democratic Republic proposed a wording for the mandate of such a working group. We share the approach of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite persistent efforts for many years by a large group of countries, and dozens of General Assembly resolutions on this question, multilateral negotiations in the Committee have still not been started owing to the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, which have blocked the establishment of an ad hoc working group and the commencement of negotiations on this item in the Committee.

As you know, at the end of the 1970s trilateral negotiations were conducted on the question of a complete and general nuclear-weapons test ban between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. From the very beginning the Soviet Union sought to ensure the success of the negotiations and to this end took important steps to meet its Western partners, introducing detailed proposals on various topics. These negotiations have been broken off by the United States and we can say nothing about their further destiny.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the same time, taking into account the great interest of the members of the Committee on Disarmament in this urgent matter, the Soviet delegation would like to inform the members of the Committee of the Soviet Union's position on some aspects of the question of the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear-weapons test ban.

We believe that the treaty should contain a commitment on the part of each party to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any test explosions of nuclear weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any sphere, as well as to refrain from the instigation or encouragement of or any participation in the conduct of nuclear weapons test explosions anywhere else.

We believe that the treaty should be supplemented by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty and would take into account the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Under the protocol, the parties to the treaty would institute a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and refrain from providing any inducement or encouragement to, granting permission for or taking any part in the carrying out of such explosions until an appropriate procedure for conducting them has been elaborated.

We support the idea that after the treaty enters into force the parties to it should continue without delay to examine the question of a procedure for the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions. Such a procedure could be embodied in a special agreement or special agreements and be brought into force through appropriate amendment of the protocol mentioned above.

We believe that in order to ensure that the treaty was without prejudice to any arms limitation agreements concluded earlier, it ought not to touch upon commitments compatible with it that have been undertaken by the parties under other international agreements. In our opinion the treaty should provide a procedure for its amendment and should contain a provision concerning withdrawal from it on grounds of higher national interests.

Recognizing the great importance of questions of verification of compliance with the treaty, we believe that the parties to the treaty should use the available national technical means of verification, as well as the possibility of the international exchange of seismic data. In the elaboration of such measures a leading role could be played and is being played by the Committee on Disarmament, under whose aegis a group of seismology experts has been working successfully for a number of years past.

Other means of co-operation could also be examined; in particular, the exchange of additional seismic data. This would be connected with the establishment and use by the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom of high-quality national seismology stations with agreed features.

This position was, of course, stated during the trilateral negotiations and it is reflected in the progress report on those negotiations which was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It can be affirmed that the greater part of the work of elaborating the treaty was done. There remained only two or three questions to be agreed on for the successful completion of the negotiations.

However, the adoption by the West of a policy of intensifying military preparations resulted in the negotiations on this extremely important matter being broken off, and the United States now declares that the entire problem of a nuclear-weapons test ban is not pressing.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the resumption of the trilateral negotiations without delay and is ready to do everything in its power for their successful conclusion. At the same time, as we have stressed many times, the Soviet Union has always supported and continues to support the idea that the possibilities of the Committee on Disarmament should be fully used for the successful conduct of multilateral negotiations aimed at putting a stop to nuclear weapons tests in all spheres and by all those who carry them out.

We are also prepared to support the proposals for the submission by the Committee of a report to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the situation as regards the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests.

In conclusion, we would like to stress here in the Committee that the Soviet Union would agree to the treaty's entering into force even if initially not all five nuclear-weapon Powers participated in it, but only three -- the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. In other words we reaffirm our readiness for the treaty to be signed initially by three nuclear-weapon Powers -- the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom -- and that we should not wait for the adherence to it of China and France. In that case the treaty would enter into force for a definite, agreed period of time and would remain permanently in force if the other nuclear-weapon Powers signed the treaty before the expiration of the fixed time.

Before concluding this statement, the Soviet delegation would like to dwell briefly upon another question, which has been raised several times here in the Committee. This is the matter of Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear arms limitation in Europe. In the course of the general debate the majority of delegations have welcomed these negotiations. The reason for this is obvious. The very fact of the commencement of these negotiations was received with satisfaction everywhere in the world and particularly in the European countries where the negotiations have given rise to hopes for the reduction of tension, the deepening of détente and confidence between peoples and the removal from Europe -- and indeed from the whole world -- of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

At the same time, the manifestly tendentious and biased evaluations of the progress of the negotiations given in a number of statements by representatives of the Western countries have not failed to attract attention. For example,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the United States representative said on 9 February that President Reagan's proposal for the abolition of all intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles, wherever located, was being considered at the negotiations. The United Kingdom representative said in his statement of 11 February that "achievement of the zero-level for land-based medium-range missiles on both sides would be a major contribution to international stability and therefore to progress in other areas of arms control endeavour".

The so-called "zero option" and the draft treaty based on it, which was submitted by the United States delegation on 4 February, is also widely propagandized as a "constructive" basis for the achievement of an agreement by the mass media of the Western countries.

In this connection allow me once more to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the report on the reception by L.I. Brezhnev of representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament, which has been issued as an official Committee document (CD/240), as well as to the article entitled "A new spiral in the arms race: to be or not to be?", both of which contain an analysis of the situation at the above-mentioned negotiations. The article was published in the newspaper Pravda on 10 February of this year and has also been circulated as a press-release of the USSR Mission in Geneva.

The article quotes the words of L.I. Brezhnev that the state of affairs at the negotiations "cannot but cause a certain watchfulness". The reason for this is the reluctance which is becoming increasingly evident on the part of the American side to seek solutions that would meet the principle of equality and equal security. The substance of the "zero option" proposed by the American side and propagandized in the Committee is that the Soviet Union should unilaterally liquidate all its medium-range missiles. As a result, "the number of NATO's medium-range nuclear-weapons would be in no way reduced, while the number of such weapons in the European part of the USSR would be reduced by more than half", and "NATO would gain more than a double advantage as regards the number of medium-range nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and triple as regards the number of nuclear warheads".

As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared to agree on a genuine "zero option" -- one that would mean, not unilateral disarmament by one side but the total renunciation by both sides of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe, and more than that -- the renunciation of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The article sets forth in detail the USSR position on all these questions and the proposals put forward by the Soviet side with a view to the speediest possible achievement of agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

As you know, we need to take decisions on the agenda and the programme of work for the first part of the 1982 session, as well as on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, radiological weapons and chemical weapons. I understand that the consultations held in connection with the mandate of the ad hoc working group on chemical weapons have been concluded and that we may be able to deal with this matter today.

I intend to suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it at 3.30 p.m. On that occasion, we will take decisions on those questions.

Immediately afterwards, we will hold an informal meeting to continue our consideration of pending matters.

The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1.20 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God the Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, the one hundred and fifty-sixth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. The representative of Zaire has asked for the floor and I give it to him.

Mr. BAGBENI (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, in taking the floor for the first time at this session, my delegation joins others in congratulating you on your brilliant election to the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of February 1982.

Your predecessor, Ambassador Sani of Indonesia, had the honour of closing the work of our 1981 session and his positive contribution to the Committee's work deserves our gratitude.

My delegation would like to express its most sincere condolences to the Italian delegation for the untimely death of Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo.

It welcomes the new colleagues to the Committee and much appreciates the presence of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, the Head of the Swedish delegation, in the Committee. Her comparative study of the relationship between disarmament and development is a very positive contribution to our Committee's work.

The current session is, in our view, particularly important because it is called upon to assess four years of work in the field of disarmament and to submit a full report on its activities to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is to be held in June 1982 in New York.

(Mr. Bagbeni, Zaire)

There is no denying the fact that the Committee on Disarmament will be held largely responsible for the success or failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- all the more so because the current membership of the Committee on Disarmament is significant in several respects. The Committee includes all the nuclear-weapon Powers and those which aspire to become nuclear-weapon States.

The nuclear-weapon Powers which are members of the Committee on Disarmament are also all permanent members of the Security Council and use their right to the veto to express their disapproval of positions which run counter to their interests. Under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, they are also responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

However, in order to carry out the mission entrusted to them in the Charter of the United Nations, which they signed voluntarily, the restoration of an appropriate climate for the re-establishment of confidence and understanding and even détente and co-operation, requires all States to abandon the illusive race for supremacy and their hegemonistic aims.

Making such statements before those who are primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security at a time when international relations are characterized by a breakdown of détente, the resumption of the cold war and hegemonistic rivalry between the great Powers, which are ever in pursuit of zones of influence, bases and raw materials, not to mention the arms race and, in particular, the nuclear arms race, is not unrealistic, because it is on the basis of political will alone that they have adopted attitudes designed to create a general climate of uncertainty and distrust which exacerbates the potential threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The nuclear holocaust is no longer a topic of theoretical speculation; it has become a credible hypothesis as a result of the proliferation and reduction in size of atomic weapons, whose use is seriously envisaged in the event of conflict.

The advent of tactical atomic weapons, such as the medium-range theatre nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, is entirely compatible with the concept of the use of atomic weapons in military strategy and renders the theories of deterrence and the maintenance of international peace and security through the balance of terror null and void.

The attention focused by the international community on the very concept of general and complete disarmament should encourage States to achieve their legitimate political, economic, social and cultural objectives without resorting to war or to a spirit of war and confrontation.

Is it necessary to mortgage the future of nations, peoples, generations and even mankind itself through the excessive accumulation of sophisticated weapons, of which mankind could easily lose control?

(Mr. Bagbeni, Zaire)

Mankind is currently living in a time when any promise or deed of destruction is possible because the potential annihilation of mankind has become an end in itself. In the past, war opposed adversaries who fought for a specific cause and, when the war ended, there was a winner and a loser, but with the weapons the world has today, it is possible and even certain that there will be no winners or losers because the world itself will be destroyed and, therefore, everyone will lose.

Commitment to the process of general and complete disarmament and, in particular, nuclear disarmament implies acceptance of the notion of control, especially effective international control. The nuclear-weapon States will therefore be called upon to allow the body responsible for control and verification to carry out its mission. Frontiers and installations must be open to it.

South Africa's acquisition of nuclear weapons with the complicity of certain Powers is a very serious threat to the security of the African States. It is contrary to the frequently voiced desire of our Heads of State to make the African continent a denuclearized zone. My delegation believes that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament should adopt measures to that end.

My delegation will have an opportunity to express its position on the various items on the agenda of the current session, but it would like to state at this juncture that, in its view, the substantive negotiations taking place in the ad hoc working groups should be continued, as should the working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament so competently presided over by Ambassador Robles of Mexico. The ad hoc working groups on radiological weapons, chemical weapons and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be re-established and the mandate of the group on chemical weapons should be broadened.

My delegation also fully supports the idea of creating two further ad hoc working groups, one to negotiate a nuclear-test ban treaty and the other to consider measures to halt the nuclear arms race with a view to promoting nuclear disarmament. The resolutions of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, for example, resolutions 36/84 and 36/85, should be taken into account by our Committee so that their implementation is guaranteed, particularly since the latest session of the General Assembly considered the first two items on our agenda to be matters of the highest priority.

My delegation is pleased to note that agenda item 7 will be considered separately from the other agenda items.

My country, Zaire, has always advocated the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes. It will continue to make its voice, that of a non-aligned country, heard in our Committee's discussions so that peace, the essential condition for progress and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, may be achieved.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

I would like now to take up the questions of the agenda and programme of work, as well as the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies.

In accordance with rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee, "the provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption".

The Committee has today before it Working Paper No. 47/Rev.2, which is submitted in conformity with rule 29. Before the Committee takes a decision on Working Paper No. 47/Rev.2, I wish to make the following statement:

"In connexion with the adoption of the agenda for 1982 and the programme of work for the first part of the session, it is understood that the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present can be considered under item 2 of the agenda, as was done last year.

Taking into account the views expressed, the Committee will decide to hold informal meetings at an appropriate time to consider item 7 of the agenda during the first part of the session. The further treatment of this item during the second part of the session will be decided in the light of the situation then prevailing. In considering this item the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 will be duly taken into account."

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts Working Paper No. 47/Rev.2.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation has no objection to the statement you have just made on the agenda and programme of work. It is the understanding of the Brazilian delegation that the further activity of the Committee during the 1982 session will be decided on the basis of the priorities established for its work.

The CHAIRMAN: Since there is no objection, it so decided.

It was so decided.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic) (translated from Russian): The group of socialist countries, anxious to see the Committee get down to considering substantive issues at the earliest possible moment, does not object to the adoption by consensus of the Committee's agenda for 1982 in the form proposed by the Chairman in his working paper. However, it regrets that, owing to the negative stand taken by the delegations of the United States and its close allies in NATO, it has not been possible to include in that agenda the important item on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

As you know, as long ago as on 9 March 1978 the socialist countries of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (document CCD/559).

Considering the importance and urgency of this question, the group of socialist countries in the summer of 1981 called for the earliest possible start of negotiations, with a view to elaborating such a convention and establishing an appropriate working group within the framework of the Committee. However, such establishment was blocked at that time by the United States delegation.

The extreme urgency of this question has been repeatedly stressed by numerous delegations both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly. In resolution 36/92 K, adopted at its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons without delay in an appropriate organizational framework, and to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The serious concern evoked by the emergency of the neutron weapon is also expressed in the communiqué issued by the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, held on 25 and 28 September 1981. The resolution adopted at the beginning of 1982 by the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) also calls upon interested parties to avert the danger inherent in the production of neutron weapons.

The group of socialist countries considers that the refusal to include in the agenda an item on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons runs counter to the view of the majority of States, as expressed, in particular, in United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/92 K.

The socialist countries, for their part, are resolved to continue to raise this question when the relevant agenda items are considered by the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like now to draw the attention of the Committee to Working Paper No. 48 containing a draft decision on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, radiological weapons and chemical weapons.

I put for decision of the Committee the draft contained in Working Paper No. 48. If there are no comments, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): As one of the delegations which has participated in the consultations preceding this decision, I want to express our sincere satisfaction that we have now taken this important step in the history of our negotiations on chemical weapons. The language of the mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons could, of course, have been further improved, but still I would like to express our appreciation, not least to the two States which participated in bilateral negotiations on the subject, namely, for accepting this broad mandate and thereby whole-heartedly agreeing to participate with restraints in these very important and difficult negotiations.

I sincerely hope that the earliest date referred to at the end of the paragraph dealing with the mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will mean a date in the not too distant future.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): I wish to state for the record, on behalf of my delegation, that the Yugoslav delegation understands that the mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons means that it covers all chemical weapons. I say so for the reason that all chemical weapons have been mentioned in the resolutions adopted in the United Nations, as well as in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session.

The CHAIRMAN: The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing a time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee during the coming week. The time-table is of course tentative, since there are a number of questions that need to be settled if we wish fully to utilize the time available to us. Provision is made for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to meet on Tuesday afternoon instead of Monday afternoon, at the request of the Chairman of that Working Group. We will continue to hold informal meetings to deal with those matters still pending and we have left open dates for meetings of the three Ad Hoc Working Groups established by the Committee today, since we still need to take decisions concerning the chairmanship of those bodies. In any case, as soon as consensus is reached on this matter, I would like to be so informed.

As agreed by the Committee, we will hold an informal meeting five minutes after the adjournment of this plenary meeting to continue our consideration of requests for participation by non-members.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 23 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLenary MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 February 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Mohammed Jafar Mahallati (Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. H. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Miss N. NASCHIBENE

Australia: Mr. D.H. SADLER
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T.C. FINDLAY

Belgium: Miss R. de CLERCQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POICHEV
Mr. K. PRANOV

Burma: U HAUNG NAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CHA

Egypt: Mr. E.S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. H.N. FAHIY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. T. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. H. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HENDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. J. MOELPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN
Mr. M. KLINGLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SILIANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. H. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KOBOI

Mexico: Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Foland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJMAS

Romania:

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLI
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y. NAZARKIN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.II. GANJA
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.D. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. GUIDERSEN
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. LEONARD
Mr. F. CORDEN

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. M. IJHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

(The Chairman)

The second request is from Finland, dated 18 November 1981, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 50. 2/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The third request is from Norway, dated 20 November 1981, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 51. 3/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The fourth request is from Austria, dated 18 December 1981, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 52. 4/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

2/ "In response to the request of Finland (CD/247) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Finland is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Finland".

3/ "In response to the request of Norway (CD/248) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Norway is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Norway".

4/ "In response to the request of Austria (CD/249) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Austria is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Austria".

(The Chairman)

The fifth request is from Turkey, dated 15 January 1982, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 53. 5/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The sixth request is from Spain, dated 30 January 1982, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 54. 6/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The seventh request is from Tunisia, dated 2 February 1982, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 55. 7/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

We have concluded our consideration of requests for participation of non-member States. In conformity with its programme of work, the Committee considers today item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia, Japan, the United Kingdom and Australia.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of India, Mr. Saran.

5/ "In response to the request of Turkey (CD/250) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Turkey is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Turkey".

6/ "In response to the request of Spain (CD/251) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Spain is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Spain".

7/ "In response to the request of Tunisia (CD/252) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Tunisia to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Tunisia is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Tunisia".

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all join you in offering the warm congratulations of my delegation to Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany on their appointment as Chairmen of the various Ad Hoc Working Groups that have been re-established for the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. We have every hope that, under their skilful guidance, the Working Groups will achieve significant and concrete results.

On 2 February 1982, the alternative representative of the Delegation of Czechoslovakia introduced before this Committee the agreed position of a group of socialist countries on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In my statement today, which is in conformity with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, I would like to offer our initial comments on some aspects of this agreed position and seek certain clarifications with a view to achieving a further convergence in our respective approaches.

My delegation has been gratified to note that, in several aspects, the proposals submitted by the Group of 21 largely coincide with the agreed positions of a group of socialist countries. We have also noted with satisfaction that the distinguished Ambassador of Poland, in his statement on 16 February, expressed complete agreement with the views put forward by the head of my delegation, Ambassador A.P. Venkateswaran, on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Several of the clarifications we seek, therefore, would in effect be aimed at confirming our points of convergence and identifying any significant divergences that we need to work upon in the future.

It has been stated by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia that the comprehensive programme of disarmament "should be an agreed complex of measures aimed at the cessation of the arms race and the implementation, by stages, of genuine disarmament within the framework of established time-limits". We agree with this view. However, we find that, in detailing the various measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament, no attempt has been made to indicate the stages within which these measures would be implemented. The interrelationship among the various measures as well as the sequence in which their implementation is envisaged can only become clear and manifest through the use of a framework of stages. We would be grateful, therefore, if the Czechoslovak delegation could clarify to us whether the four-stage approach adopted in document CD/225 is acceptable. If this approach is acceptable, then it would be most useful for us to have some idea as to how the various measures of arms limitation and disarmament envisaged by a group of socialist countries are to be ordered among the various stages. Until this information is available, it would be difficult for us to identify the common ground between us except in rather broad conceptual terms.

The distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia has listed the various measures "in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, the implementation of which would lead towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament". However, while these measures have been categorized under certain broad headings, no logical sequence has been followed in their ordering. For example, in what kind of sequence are the measures listed in paragraphs (a) to (i) under "Nuclear weapons" to be implemented? Which among these measures belong to stage I, which to stage II and so on?

(Mr. Saran, India)

The other difficulty we encounter in going through the list of measures lies in the mingling together of concrete and specific measures with those which are extremely broad and general in character. Thus, a broad-range measure encompassing the entire process of nuclear disarmament is included in paragraph (b) under "Nuclear weapons", together with a very specific measure such as the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (paragraph (e)). Similarly, a specific measure such as "the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space" has been lumped together with a non-specific and indeterminate category entitled "Further measures to prevent the conversion of outer space into a sphere of military confrontation".

The Group of 21 has tried to put forward as many concrete and specific measures as it could identify under each broad weapon category. Such measures are, for obvious reasons, more specific in character for the first stage, becoming more general for subsequent stages. The agreed position put forward by a group of socialist countries does not give us any clue as to how the every concrete and precise measures envisaged by it are to be related to the broad and general categories included in the programme. A related question here would be whether these socialist countries share the view expressed by the co-sponsors of document CD/205 that the specific agreements to be negotiated cannot be predetermined and must be left to be worked out among the parties involved in the negotiations themselves. Such an approach would point to adopting telegraphic and general formulations in the listing of measures in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the other side is the approach adopted by the Group of 21, which calls for specific and concrete measures, whose objectives, if not results, are predetermined by mutual agreement. To us, it appears that the socialist countries on whose behalf the Czechoslovak statement was made have adopted a bit of both approaches. We would be grateful if this point could be clarified.

We have all agreed that the ultimate goal of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In our view, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should therefore encompass measures for the cessation and reversal of the arms race in all its aspects, the reduction of armaments and armed forces and their final and complete elimination. However, the list of measures contained in the statement of the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia does not give us a clear picture of the final stages of the process of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In several cases, measures included under the various separate headings are, in this sense, incomplete. For example, under the heading "Armed forces and conventional weapons", we have one measure calling for the freezing of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and their allies, coupled with another measure entitled "The reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons". We do not have in the list an indication of when and how the complete elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments would be achieved. Similarly, under "The reduction of military expenditures", provision is made for a reduction in the military budgets of militarily significant States, as also for a freeze on military budgets in general. No indication is given as to how other States will reduce their military expenditures and how a total abolition of military appropriations would be achieved. In fact, if one were to go merely by the statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia, the complete elimination of military appropriations would not appear to be an objective of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Let me hasten to add that the list of measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot possibly be exhaustive. However, since the programme is to be a self-contained one, it must include measures, even

(Mr. Saran, India)

if indicative, for all the various stages of the process of achieving general and complete disarmament. Our colleagues from the socialist delegations could perhaps shed some more light on how they envisage measures required for the final stages of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Before turning to the measures themselves, I would like to comment briefly on some of the principles for the comprehensive programme of disarmament outlined by the representative of Czechoslovakia. One such principle he has mentioned is that of "equality and equal security". We would like to know how this principle would be applied in practice in the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In particular, we would like to draw attention to the fact that a vast imbalance exists between nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other. This imbalance is constantly increasing. How would the principle of equality and equal security be applied to such a situation?

Another principle mentioned in the statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia concerns the process of nuclear disarmament. It has been stated that at all stages of the process of nuclear disarmament, "the existing balance in the sphere of nuclear power must remain the same with a constant reduction of its level". Does this imply that the existing status quo would have to be maintained as among the five nuclear-weapon States? At what point would the nuclear arsenals of all the nuclear-weapon States be eliminated?

We have carefully studied the list of measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament as envisaged by a group of socialist countries. It is with satisfaction that we have noted a coincidence with respect to several of these measures. However, I would like to single out some of the items contained in the list which need further discussion and clarification.

Under the category entitled "Nuclear weapons", reference is made to the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. However, a complete prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which is broader and more universal in scope, has been omitted. This is despite the fact that the socialist countries, on whose behalf the statement by the representative of Czechoslovakia was made, all voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 36/92 I, entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war". We would be grateful if it could be explained to us why this important measure was excluded.

Still under the category "Nuclear weapons", it has been stated that "as a first step, the possible stages of nuclear disarmament with their approximate contents could be discussed, and in particular the content of the first stage". However, for my delegation, the various stages of nuclear disarmament have already been clearly spelt out in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. What we need to do now as part of the negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament is to elaborate these stages of nuclear disarmament.

The position of my Government concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is well known. We could not, therefore, accept the measure outlined in paragraph (f) under the heading "Nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Saran, India)

Let me now turn to the section entitled "The prevention of the proliferation of the arms race in new spaces explored by man" in the statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia. Under this section, one of the measures listed is "the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space". At the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, my delegation stated that any treaty for the prevention of an arms race in outer space must cover the development, testing and deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

Under the section with the heading "Regional measures", reference has been made to "the renunciation of the expansion of the existing military and political groupings and of the creation of new ones". As far as military alliances are concerned, India, as a non-aligned country, has consistently called for the dissolution of all such military blocs. We cannot, therefore, accept a mere freeze in the existing situation. Secondly, it is not clear why political groupings should also be the object of renunciation if they do not have military connotations. For example, would the non-aligned movement have to freeze its existing membership and at some point dissolve itself? What about other political bodies of a regional character? We would be grateful if it could be clarified to us in what sense the term "political grouping" has been used.

Under the same heading, provision is made for the "limitation and lowering of the level of military presence and military activity" in the Atlantic Ocean, in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean Sea and in the region of the Persian Gulf and "the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean". Such formulations make no differentiation between foreign military presence and military activity in these regions and the entirely legitimate military presence and activity of the States belonging to the region. Of course, in the final stage of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, all military activity in all regions would cease. However, when we speak of partial and regional measures, it is necessary to highlight the logical sequence of measures which would lead to disarmament on a truly global scale. In such a logical sequence, the establishment of a Zone of Peace, for example, in the Indian Ocean in terms of the Declaration adopted in 1971 by the United Nations is obviously a first and necessary step. Peace and security in the Indian Ocean are now threatened by the rapidly increasing military presence of outside Powers and the scramble for military bases in the Indian Ocean area. The removal of foreign military presence and the cessation of foreign military activity in the Indian Ocean cannot be put on a par and sought to be achieved together

(Mr. Saran, India)

with the cessation of military activity by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. Yet, this is precisely the impression that may be created by the formulation used in the statement by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia. We would be grateful if we could have a more detailed explanation of the sequence of steps in which measures under paragraphs (f) and (h) would be implemented and the responsibilities of littoral and hinterland States and extra-regional States at each stage.

As a State belonging to Asia, my delegation is naturally interested in the measure included in this section in paragraph (j) entitled "The conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in the relations between the States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean". We would be grateful for further details on the proposed convention. It may be explained to us how such a convention would be different from the responsibilities already undertaken by States of all regions under the United Nations Charter. We would also like to know whether what is being proposed here is a multilateral convention limited to the States of the region of Asia and the Pacific or whether a series of bilateral treaties is envisaged. How would breaches of the convention be dealt with and what would be the relationship of such a security system to the collective security framework already provided for under the United Nations Charter?

Under "Collateral and other measures", provision has been made for a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Is not adherence to the United Nations Charter itself a commitment by all States to the non-use of force in relations amongst them? What purpose would be served by a separate treaty on the non-use of force?

These are some of the comments that I wanted to make on the positions advanced by a group of socialist countries concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament. These comments have been made in the spirit of seeking further areas of convergence with our socialist colleagues on issues relating to the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We believe that it is only through a process of debate, a process of questioning, that we can arrive at better mutual understanding of our respective positions. It is our conviction that, in the replies and clarifications that we are certain will be provided to our questions, we shall be able to discover opportunities to broaden the already considerable area of agreement that exists between us.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Minister Strucka, who will introduce the working paper contained in document CD/245.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in its statement at the plenary meeting of the Committee on the occasion of the opening of its current session on 2 February (CD/PV.150), the Czechoslovak delegation had the honour, as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries on the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, to present the agreed position of the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the question of the content of the CPD.

We note with satisfaction that our statement has aroused serious interest among delegations and is proving useful in the consideration of the question of elaborating a CPD, both at plenary meetings of the Committee and in those of the Working Group on this question and the three contact groups concerned.

This was also shown in today's statement by the distinguished representative of India. We shall, of course, study Ambassador Saran's statement with the proper attention and in due course furnish an additional explanation. As regards certain points touched upon by the representative of India, the delegations of the socialist countries have already given some explanation in the CPD Working Group and in the contact groups. We shall continue to adopt a constructive approach in the search for a compromise solution to the problem of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In view of the interest shown in the agreed position of the socialist countries on the question of a CPD and in order to facilitate acquaintance with it, we decided to set forth that position in the form of an official document of the Committee. Accordingly, on 19 February, the Czechoslovak delegation, on behalf of the aforementioned socialist countries, transmitted to the Committee secretariat the text of a working paper, which has already been circulated among delegations under the symbol CD/245.

The said working paper submitted by the group of socialist countries reproduces all the main points of our statement of 2 February. To facilitate its use, we have divided it into the following sections: general provisions; objectives of the programme; principles; specific measures; disarmament and other global problems; time-limits and procedures for the implementation of the programme; monitoring of arms limitation and disarmament; mechanisms and procedures, and participation of world public opinion in efforts to achieve disarmament.

On the basis of the formulations contained in our intervention of 2 February and in document CD/245, the co-sponsors of that document have already begun practical work. In particular, having regard to the fact that in many cases our proposals coincided with points contained in documents issued by the Group of 21, we decided to adopt those documents as a basis for our work, adding to them those of our proposals which were absent from the Group of 21's documents. Thus we proposed additions to the proposals put forward by the Group of 21 on the subjects of the objectives, priorities and principles of the CPD. We shall continue to employ this -- in our view constructive -- method of work also in the future.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

Working paper CD/245 reflects the constant readiness of the socialist countries to make a substantial contribution to the elaboration of a meaningful draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, which the Committee may submit as a concrete achievement for consideration at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We are convinced that the implementation of the provisions in document CD/245 would represent a constructive contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem. Allow me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, to assure the Committee, once again, that we shall continue to play a fundamental and active role in the elaboration of a CPD. We shall adopt a constructive approach to the proposals of all countries, and above all those of the Group of 21, whose position coincides largely with our own.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I cannot help expressing my delegation's disappointment that, as we begin our substantive work at this 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament, a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons seems still to be eluding our efforts and receding even more into the future. Six months have passed since I made my last appeal in this Committee for a comprehensive test ban; approximately a year and a half has passed since the trilateral negotiations were suspended; and 19 years have passed since the partial test-ban Treaty was concluded with the promise that the three nuclear-weapon States would be continuing to seek a comprehensive ban.

On 9 December last year, the United Nations General Assembly again adopted two resolutions on nuclear testing; both of them reiterated the Assembly's grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated; and both of them reaffirmed the Assembly's conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority. The view of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations cannot be misunderstood or ignored. And my Government associates itself with this majority view on nuclear testing.

The Japanese Government has on many occasions made representations to the Governments of the nuclear-weapon States against the nuclear tests they have been conducting over the years. These representations spring from the fundamental position that Japan continues to be opposed to nuclear test explosions of any kind -- undertaken by any State. And that is why my Government has also spoken out several times in favour of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of a CTB.

The achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has always been regarded by my Government as the one measure of the highest priority in the whole field of arms control and disarmament. While welcoming the trilateral negotiations on a CTB, we have stressed the need for such a treaty to be achieved through truly multilateral negotiations in this Committee.

I am under standing instructions from my Government to reiterate our appeal for the commencement of multilateral negotiations in this Committee to achieve a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date. In this connection, I continue to hope that a consensus can be reached to set up a working group or other subsidiary body of the Committee to deal with this question in the most effective and concentrated manner. My delegation repeats its willingness to put forward a draft mandate for such a working group at the appropriate moment. As I stated in this room on 6 August last year, "The mere setting up of a CTB working group would be a very meagre achievement indeed, but if the Committee on Disarmament were able to report even that achievement to the special session next year, it would be of some significance".

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will be reconvening from the beginning of March to continue its important work of setting up an international system for the exchange of seismic data to help in detecting underground nuclear tests. My delegation looks forward to hearing the Ad Hoc Group's evaluation of the second trial exchange which was conducted in November last year, especially since more countries than at the first trial participated this time, including several socialist States. We understand that it would be possible to detect underground tests down to a yield of about 10 kilotons with a reasonable degree of accuracy if the detonation took place in hard rock, provided there is an appropriately deployed network of seismic stations. The detection threshold would be higher if the explosion were detonated in alluvium, for instance. We are told that such a network would render it possible to distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear explosions of a relatively low yield. If that were the case, surely it would be worthwhile to endeavour to achieve a ban on underground tests of a yield above, say, 10 kilotons. This would certainly be a welcome one step forward in the direction of a comprehensive ban of all underground tests.

There are apparently various ways of evading detection of an underground nuclear explosion by an international network of seismic stations. The experts will no doubt continue to seek ways of closing these loopholes. The effective functioning of a reliable verification system is of fundamental importance to any disarmament or arms control measure. However, the quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all. A reasonable balance has to be struck between the value of having a positive if not complete disarmament agreement, on the one hand, and the risk that certain violations may be theoretically possible in spite of the verification mechanism that has been agreed upon, on the other. Perhaps the adequacy of any verification system is ultimately a matter of political judgement and mutual trust.

While my Government refuses to abandon the hope that a truly comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions of any kind and by any State is an attainable objective, it also feels that, in the state of affairs where we are, even limited additional restrictions on nuclear-weapon testing would have the effect of at least slowing down the further development of new types of weapons or hindering the further sophistication of existing ones. And above all the political impact of such a step on international efforts devoted to the cause of disarmament would be undeniable. The very first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament would have been taken and this would give much-needed new hope and encouragement to those engaged in the disarmament process.

As a representative of a non-nuclear-weapon State, I can merely express the hope that the nuclear-weapon States bear in mind the pledges they made in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 "to seek

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

If an Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been allowed to conduct such useful work over the years, why can we not have an ad hoc group of administrative experts, for instance, to work out the necessary administrative arrangements for the proposed seismic data exchange? As Ambassador McPhail, the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, pointed out last week, the idea was originally proposed by the Australian delegation two years ago. My delegation has been in favour of that proposal. The Committee or a suitable subsidiary body should begin discussing the financial, legal and administrative aspects of the envisaged international seismic data exchange. These details should be worked out before the entry into force of the CTB treaty so that the data exchange can begin operating together with the treaty and not from an unspecified date after the treaty has entered into force.

Much has been said about the importance of a CTB in the context of maintaining the non-proliferation régime and I will simply recall the unhappy outcome of the 1980 NPT Review Conference and remind member States that the next Review Conference in 1985 could turn out to be crucial to the NPT régime.

My delegation understands that the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of 1974, and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of 1976 are under consideration by the signatories for ratification. I wish to reiterate my Government's view that the entry into force of these two instruments would constitute an important step towards the achievement of a CTB. May I also express my delegation's hope that the trilateral CTB negotiations can be reopened at the earliest possible date.

My delegation listened with interest the other day to the idea put forward by Mme Thorsson, the distinguished Under-Secretary of State of Sweden, in connection with the international surveillance of airborne radioactivity as a means of monitoring nuclear tests in the atmosphere. We look forward to receiving the working paper that Mme Thorsson promised us. We would also be interested in hearing the reactions of other delegations.

Allow me to conclude my statement by citing the following paragraph from the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations read out to us by our distinguished Secretary, Ambassador Jaipal, on 4 February: "Another important issue is the long-awaited conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This would provide a major impetus for further progress towards the limitation and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It would also be of significance in strengthening the non-proliferation régime." It is precisely such a "major impetus" that we are all seeking, especially as we move forward to the second special session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, who will introduce the working paper contained in document CD/244.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, as you have just said, I have asked for the floor this morning to introduce document CD/244, which we have entitled "Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention". We have put this document forward as a contribution under item 4 of our Committee's agenda. We tabled this new working paper to be available at the time when the Committee had just taken the decision to give a revised mandate to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We look forward to the resumption of the Group's work later this week under the leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland and we hope that our paper, which we have also asked should be circulated as a working document under the symbol CD/CW/WP.26, will be considered in detail in that forum as soon as possible. We understand that all language versions will be available this evening.

I will not take up much of the Committee's time now in describing the substance of the working paper, but I think it is useful to do so very briefly. As I made clear in my opening statement on 11 February, my Government has had a long-standing commitment to the achievement of a comprehensive, effective and adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We believe that verification is the central problem to be faced in drawing up a CW convention and that the Working Group will need to ensure that adequate attention is devoted to this key issue if we are to make progress. This is the reason why my delegation has concentrated on verification and compliance in the paper I have introduced; we are nevertheless very much aware that other important issues such as the definition of the scope of the convention will also need to be resolved and we hope that it will prove possible to work in tandem on these issues.

Perhaps I should now make a few explanatory remarks about document CD/244 which other delegations might find helpful in further considering our proposals.

The paper is set out in two sections: the first describes in the form of a memorandum the United Kingdom's view on the way in which a chemical weapons convention should be verified; the second sets out, in the form of draft elements, the type of provisions which a convention would need to include in order to fulfil the requirements set out in the first section of the paper. We will of course be happy to elaborate further upon the reasoning behind our proposals; the first section of document CD/244 gives a preliminary explanation of the provisions which are set out as what we have called draft elements.

In looking at the substance of document CD/244, delegations may find it helpful to know that we approach the verification of a chemical weapons convention from two directions: first, the verification of the destruction of stockpiles and, secondly, the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, which we have called "monitoring of compliance". We have divided verification into these two separate categories because the different activities to be verified will need different monitoring techniques. Moreover, for the vast majority of countries which, of course, do not possess any stock of chemical weapons, only the second category of verification measures, that is, those relating to the monitoring of non-production, would come into force.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

As our working paper makes clear, the verification of both these aspects of a ban on chemical weapons will require a combination of national and international measures. National measures of verification may in time be of increasing value in monitoring the non-production of chemical weapons.

Mr. SADLER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, may I, in this intervention, address myself to item 1 of the Committee's agenda, namely, the nuclear test ban. My remarks will to some extent amplify what I said briefly on this item in my general statement on 11 February. There should be no doubt that Australia deeply shares the widespread regret at the failure to make progress towards a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. The deadlock we have reached on the matter is a matter of priority for the Committee on Disarmament, for our Governments and the peoples they represent. Our task as negotiators and as diplomats is to find a way of resolving the problem. Clearly new ideas are called for. Several new ideas which deserve seriously to be looked at were made on 18 February by Ambassador McPhail of Canada.

All members of this body are committed to the aim of a nuclear-test ban. What we have all had in mind is one treaty which prohibits test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments, with related provisions covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is an aim which, as we have found, does not easily translate into negotiation. The tripartite report of July 1980 said this was because many of the issues are novel, sensitive and intricate, and because national security concerns are directly concerned. The question then arises: are we likely to make progress by continuing to urge that a CTB be tackled all in one go and all at once? My delegation, as committed as any in this room to a CTB treaty at the earliest possible date, is willing to consider alternatives to the all-or-nothing approach if such alternatives hold a serious prospect of leading to real, substantial progress.

The international climate, as those who have addressed the Committee this session acknowledge, is not encouraging. It does not seem to favour sweeping agreements, no matter how urgent the need for them. On the other hand lesser agreements ought to be within reach. Agreements on chemical weapons, radiological weapons, negative security assurances and, I even venture to suggest, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament are feasible, but only, it seems, on a step-by-step basis. There are many precedents for agreements of this sort which have had distinct value even when they have not gone the whole way -- the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, of course, the partial test-ban Treaty. Certainly they all leave gaps of one kind or another.

The concept of gaps is particularly relevant. The Treaties I have just mentioned, imperfect as they might be, do raise important barriers to the unrestricted testing of nuclear weapons. There are large gaps between each of them, but why, in the absence of any more encouraging prospect, should we not do our best to create further barriers? Clearly if the Tlatelolco principle, to take only one example, were extended, it would cut down the geographic area over which testing takes place. If extended everywhere, it would have the same effect as a CTB treaty. Similarly, one could consider a lowering of the permitted yield of nuclear tests, perhaps in a succession of treaties, until the zero target is reached: this again would achieve a CTB treaty.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The attraction I find in the Canadian statement of 18 February is that it offers a coherent approach to a CTB based on the closing of gaps. Ambassador McPhail drew attention, for example, to the possibilities existing in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions. These Treaties could also conceivably lend themselves to extension.

If for a moment we forego the all-in-one approach to a CTB, many thoughts are provoked. Might existing Treaties — whether bilateral or multilateral — be extended to those nuclear-weapon States which are not yet parties to them? Might the bilateral treaties be developed into multilateral ones? The Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibits explosions above 150 kilotons, but, if the public debate is a guide to national security concerns, then a threshold which is one order of magnitude lower could be quite quickly achievable. The verification provisions of the TTBT and the PNET, providing for a wide measure of detailed data exchange and direct co-operation between the parties, might be of great relevance in a wider context.

What would we be doing if we had been in a position to establish a working group on a CTB? My guess is that we would not be attempting to draft, not at an early stage anyway, on novel, sensitive and intricate issues. More likely we would, as in the Chemical Weapons Working Group, be drawing heavily on existing international instruments and the results of negotiations in restricted forums and, in general, following a step-by-step approach.

I have referred to barriers and gaps: it might be more explicit if I referred instead to the bricks necessary to make a wall. We have an opportunity to add more bricks with the aim of steadily building a total and complete barrier to nuclear tests. Australia in the past has suggested that we tackle the legal and administrative aspects of an international seismic data exchange. Other proposals have been made. An expanded scope for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been suggested. I submit that, if we can devise a way to relate each of these ideas, brick-by-brick to our final objective, the eventual wall, we will not attract negative reactions from those who, for one reason or another, shy at building a wall in one stroke and from those who, on the other hand, consider that one brick is too insignificant — indeed too distracting — an impediment to be worthwhile putting in place. Apart from the fact that the process of building can go on in different places at the same time, there is the practical need to get the lower ones cemented in place before adding higher ones. Here I am thinking again of the Australian proposal made in document CD/95.

Canada has proposed the establishment of a group of political experts, under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament, to discuss matters which were not at issue in the trilateral negotiations. My delegation feels this proposal has some merit, in the difficult circumstances in which we find ourselves on a CTB. The same group could discuss all the points I have made today and give the Committee an indication of whether new approaches may help it to tackle its priority agenda item.

I stress, in closing, that I commend for further study the ideas that Canada has put forward. I do so as a means of keeping movement towards a CTB alive in a climate which, in the absence of a step-by-step approach, is in danger of leading

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

to the CTB being shelved for a quite unacceptable period of time. In other words, I am attracted to the idea of maintaining, in the words of the Canadian Ambassador "some movement in the negotiating process to avoid risks inherent in a continued freeze in the negotiating process on nuclear testing". In saying this I also stress that the need which I see to have a closer look at what Canada suggests should not in any way be taken as replacing or diluting the ultimate and central aim that the Australian Government has, namely, that of developing a CTB.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 25 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI

(Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T.C. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss R. de CLERCQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
J THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. J. MOEPERT
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN
Mr. H. KLINGLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India: Mr. S. SARAI

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. S. MOHAMMADI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. K. TAHAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. van DÖNGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. S. ANDREI
Mr. R. NEAGU
Mr. D. ANINOIU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. C. GHIRDI
Mr. M. BICHER
Mr. I. MILITARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. LEONARD
Mr. P. CORDEN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the 158th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee continues today its consideration of item 2 of its agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relating to the work of the Committee.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, His Excellency Stefan Andrei, who has come to address the Committee today as our first speaker. Mr. Andrei has held several positions of high political responsibility in his country. Since 1975, he has been a member of the Grand National Assembly and, in March 1978, he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has participated in many international congresses and conferences and has published several studies and articles on political questions, including some on international relations. I am sure that all members of the Committee appreciate the interest that he shows in the work of this Committee by coming to deliver his statement.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Romania, the United States of America, Kenya, Nigeria, Brazil and the German Democratic Republic.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, Mr. Stefan Andrei.

Mr. ANDREI (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by offering you the Romanian delegation's sincerest congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February. The ties of friendship and co-operation between my country and yours are yet another factor that assures you of the Romanian delegation's constructive support in the performance of the important tasks entrusted to you. I should also like to congratulate Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia who served as Chairman before you and acquitted himself of his duties with such distinction and success.

First, I should like to say how pleased I am to be able to address the Committee on Disarmament, a body whose mission is a universal one and which is entrusted with the heavy responsibility of helping to initiate an effective process of negotiation with a view to achieving genuine progress on disarmament.

The international climate in which the Committee has resumed its work this year lends very special importance to the current session. I therefore deemed it advisable to address this distinguished body in order to inform it of the deep concern felt by the Romanian people and Socialist Romania at the intensification of the frenzied arms race and the grave threat it poses to mankind's very existence and to stress both the urgent need to achieve concrete steps towards disarmament and the heavy responsibility which the Committee bears in this connection.

The Committee has, indeed, resumed its work under the shadow of serious international tension resulting, in particular, from the intensification of the policy of force and diktat, the struggle for spheres of influence, continued and heightened conflicts in various parts of the world, the escalation of the arms race and an increasingly acute economic crisis.

(Mr. Andrei, Romania)

All-out military competition, which is now being waged in terms both of quantity and of quality, is strongly influenced and inflamed by advances in military technologies and strategic doctrines, which only go to show that the possibility of a nuclear war is, after all, not entirely unthinkable. The policy of force and arms build-ups is becoming an increasingly dominant feature of contemporary international life. The fact that these developments are taking place in conditions of growing international tension and in a climate darkened by so many complex and unresolved problems and by distrust and suspicion heightens the danger of war because, under the influence of such a psychosis, any major political confrontation may ignite the fuse, leading to partial or total recourse to the most lethal weapons, including nuclear weapons.

The unprecedented escalation of military expenditures and competition has brought about an alarming increase in the danger of a devastating nuclear war, to the profound and legitimate dismay of all peoples. As President Nicolae Ceaușescu has stressed, "Things have come to such a pass and the arms race has assumed such proportions that the life, the very existence of peoples, are threatened."

Mankind has reached the point where the pursuit of nuclear arms, far surpassing all security needs, has, in actual fact, become a factor of insecurity and instability that gravely imperils civilization. It is no exaggeration to say that never since the Second World War has the danger of a nuclear conflagration been as great or as real as it is today. The imperative need to act energetically, before it is too late, in order to reverse this disastrous trend is therefore the international community's highest priority. It is high time, as stressed in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament.

The recent resumption of the arms race is not only a grave threat to all mankind. Rocketing military expenditures are also becoming an increasingly difficult burden to bear for all peoples, including those in the industrialized countries, since arms build-ups have distorting and destabilizing effects on international political and economic life as a whole and on the economic and social development of every State.

Faced with this critical situation, Romania and the entire Romanian people have come out strongly on the side of disarmament and said a firm NO to the arms race, to war and to nuclear arms of all kinds. At his frequent political meetings, as well as from the rostrum of international forums, President Nicolae Ceaușescu has constantly advocated the definitive abolition of the use of force and the threat of use of force in relations between States, an end to international tension, the achievement of effective disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament measures, and the strengthening of international peace and security.

It is in this spirit that, in the United Nations and other international bodies and in its bilateral relations, Romania has consistently adopted a policy of actively promoting disarmament, submitting concrete proposals and taking resolute action to halt the arms race and secure the adoption of concrete disarmament measures, above all in the nuclear field. Thus, at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, Romania proposed a package of practical measures

(Mr. Andrei, Romania)

aimed at the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of specific steps to achieve disarmament; these measures reflect the Romanian people's unshakable desire for peace and constitute an appeal for the strengthening of co-operation among all States with a view to preventing war and ensuring a lasting peace. Some of these measures have been reiterated by the Romanian delegation in this Committee.

In acting thus, we proceed from the premise that the security, peace and progress of States cannot be ensured by an escalation of the arms race, increased military expenditure and the further stockpiling of weapons. Real security can be achieved only by re-establishing the military balance at the lowest possible levels, reducing military forces and arms, gradually cutting down military budgets and going over to disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, under adequate and effective international control. Genuine security demands that all States should promote a policy of broad international co-operation, strict observance of the fundamental principles and rules of international law, the establishment of a climate of mutual respect and confidence -- all of which are essential pre-conditions for any real progress towards disarmament.

Romania, which is eager to make an effective contribution to efforts to impart new momentum to the disarmament negotiations and to break the deadlock that has paralysed them for several years, has brought to the attention of the United Nations the question of a freeze and reduction in military budgets, as a practical way of initiating a genuine process of disarmament. The implementation of this Romanian proposal would release substantial funds that could be used both for the execution of development programmes in the countries which cut back their military budgets and to support the developing countries' efforts to accelerate their economic and social progress, eliminate underdevelopment and narrow the gaps which separate them from the industrialized countries.

In making this proposal, the Romanian Government, convinced of the positive effect which unilateral disarmament measures might have on efforts to halt the arms race and on the economic and social advancement of peoples, has itself made successive cuts in its military budget and used the funds thus released for economic and social purposes.

In line with its policy of actively promoting the fundamental goal of disarmament, Romania has paid and continues to pay special attention to the work of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, the sole United Nations multilateral negotiating body in this field. The new Committee began its work with the advantage of an enlarged membership and a more democratic framework; its activities are based on a programme of action that was accepted and adopted by all Member States of the United Nations. Quite legitimately, peoples and international public opinion expect the negotiations in the Committee to prove effective and to open up the way for the adoption of concrete measures to halt the arms race and initiate an effective process of disarmament.

Unfortunately, the results that can be notched up at the end of three years' activity fail to meet those expectations. Despite improvements in the functioning and methods of work of the Committee, despite the considerable number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations to intensify disarmament efforts and despite the participation of all five nuclear Powers, the pace of the negotiations

(Mr. Andrei, Romania)

has been particularly slow, often giving rise to fruitless debates, in striking contrast to the massive growth of military budgets and the frenzied acceleration of the arms race. For several years, the Committee has been unable to reach a single agreement on disarmament. Consequently, it is now faced with a grave dilemma: to continue, as it has so far, to hold meaningless discussions, while witnessing the incessant build-up of arms, particularly nuclear arms, which may -- by design, accident or miscalculation -- lead to catastrophe, or to opt for the only rational alternative, namely, serious negotiation in good faith, with a view to the adoption of effective disarmament measures, above all nuclear disarmament measures. The present critical international situation calls peremptorily for the latter option, all the more so because the spectre of nuclear war causes all peoples to feel deep anxiety and concern. The Committee cannot ignore the massive popular demonstrations which have been taking place in recent months throughout the European continent, including Romania, as well as in other parts of the world, against war and the arms race and in favour of disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, and the building of a lasting peace; and which are a new factor in international relations and eloquent testimony to such feelings of anxiety. It is becoming increasingly clear in the hearts and minds of people that, if we are incapable of arresting forthwith the senseless competition in nuclear arms, which threaten to destroy all life on the planet, our generation will bear the crushing responsibility of having failed to create the necessary conditions of peace for preserving human civilization and ensuring its steady development.

In this context, we cannot help but express our concern at attempts to divert the Committee's attention from the all-important objectives of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

The Romanian Government considers that the Committee on Disarmament has an obligation and a responsibility, as well as the capacity, to make an effective contribution to the achievement of the fundamental goal of disarmament -- which is the only way to remove the threat of a nuclear war and to secure and strengthen the peace and security of all nations. We regard it as the duty of the Government of each member State of this body to co-operate, out of a sense of responsibility for the destiny and future of mankind, so that tangible progress may be made in the disarmament effort. To that end, the prime need is to give new impetus to the activities of this Committee, which must embark resolutely on the path of negotiation and the conclusion of agreements aimed at the cessation of the arms race and the reduction of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The main objective of the Committee at its present session is to elaborate a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament for consideration and approval by the General Assembly at its special session. Under the Committee's mandate, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which must represent a serious commitment, is intended to become the main United Nations instrument for intensifying and co-ordinating the efforts of States to achieve the ultimate goal of general disarmament and, above all, nuclear disarmament. The adoption of the programme by the General Assembly should represent a radical turning point in the disarmament negotiations and a new approach to such problems.

(Mr. Andrei, Romania)

We also consider that there is a need to reactivate the negotiations aimed at achieving genuine progress on certain vital aspects of nuclear disarmament which have been under consideration by the Committee for some time now and include the conclusion of an agreement banning all nuclear weapons tests, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their gradual reduction to the point of complete elimination, the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of the development of other weapons and systems of mass destruction. It is necessary to agree on the adoption of measures to prevent the latest scientific and technological advances from being used for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction or for the improvement of existing weapons. It would be extremely useful if, pending the conclusion of an international treaty or convention banning new weapons of mass destruction, the powerfully armed States could adopt unilateral measures to prevent scientific and technological discoveries from being used for military purposes.

The Committee's efforts to hold negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting chemical weapons must also be intensified. Requests that it should honour, without further delay, its clearly assumed and often reaffirmed obligation to conclude such an international instrument are, in our view, perfectly legitimate.

One important question to which the Committee should continue to turn its attention and which calls for urgent solution is the conclusion of an international agreement on the granting of security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States. As already pointed out, Romania firmly believes that the best guarantee for all States lies in nuclear disarmament. But, pending the achievement of that objective, great importance would appear to attach, for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and building confidence between States, to the conclusion of an international agreement in which the nuclear-weapon States would assume a clear obligation never to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and not to threaten to use such weapons or to use force in general against the non-nuclear-weapon States.

We consider that the results of the negotiations to be held at the Committee's present session and the substantial contributions expected of it should be reflected in the special report which the Committee is to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its second special session this year. In our view, the report should contain both an analysis of the Committee's activities and proposals aimed at enhancing its future effectiveness.

The achievement of significant progress in the Committee's activities would contribute substantially to the easing of international tension, the renewal of the policy of détente and the creation of a climate conducive to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

To that end, Romania has welcomed the start of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the subject of medium-range missiles in Europe and has expressed the hope that those negotiations will lead to positive results. Considering the formidable military forces and highly sophisticated weapons which are now concentrated in Europe, the danger of a

(Mr. Andrei, Romania)

major conflict in that important area of the world is extremely grave. This situation, which is a matter of serious concern to the peoples of Europe, calls for energetic action by all States to prevent the stationing of new weapons and initiate a process of arms reduction on the continent. In expressing the Romanian people's deep concern about the future of peace in Europe and in the world, Romania has taken and continues to take a firm stand in favour of the non-stationing of, and a rapid reduction, to their lowest possible level, in medium-range missiles in Europe and the elimination of intermediate-range and any other nuclear weapons in Europe. It is our unswerving belief that disarmament is Europe's cardinal, vital and fundamental problem at the present time.

This consistent stand adopted by Romania has been vigorously reaffirmed in the messages which were addressed by President Nicolae Ceaușescu to the President of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, and to the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, and which have recently been circulated as official documents of this Committee, as well as in the messages addressed to the other Heads of State or Government of the countries which signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Since the presence of the aforementioned weapons affects and directly threatens the vital interests of the European countries, we consider that it is the legitimate right of all those States, whose very life is at stake, to participate, in one way or another, in the negotiations on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe. The Grand National Assembly of Romania, which shares this concern, has urged the Parliaments, Governments and peoples of Europe, the United States and Canada to take immediate energetic action and to use every available means, before it is too late, to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons from the European continent, in defence of the fundamental right of all peoples to life, liberty and peace.

"It is now," said President Nicolae Ceaușescu, "before the nuclear bombs begin to fall, while we are still alive, and before it is too late, that nuclear weapons must be halted and the transition must be made to general disarmament and, above all, nuclear disarmament. Once the nuclear bombs have fallen, it will be too late. There will be no one left to judge the guilty. There will be no more judges, and no more guilty persons. It is now that we must take united action to save mankind from nuclear war and protect life on our planet."

Romania's firm commitment to the cause of disarmament is also reflected in its active support for the conclusion, at the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of an agreement on the convening of a conference on confidence-building and disarmament in Europe.

The organization of such a conference would contribute greatly to the cause of peace, co-operation and understanding throughout Europe because, for the first time in the history of the disarmament negotiations, it would provide a democratic and representative framework in which all European nations could co-operate constructively with a view to the adoption of meaningful measures designed to build mutual confidence and promote disarmament.

(Mr. Andrei, Romania)

We regard the problems of disarmament and peace in Europe, and in every other part of the world, as matters of direct concern to the Committee on Disarmament because all measures aimed at disarmament, regardless of the body in which they are negotiated, must pursue the fundamental objective of general and complete disarmament, for the achievement of which the Committee is vested with particularly important responsibilities.

The achievement of positive results at the Committee's present session will depend on the political will of all its members to co-operate and negotiate in a constructive spirit, lucidly and realistically. We regard it as our duty to act with all the necessary responsibility to ensure that the Committee may, during its present session, produce results commensurate with the legitimate expectations of peoples. What is expected of all of us has been and continues to be clearly expressed during the mass demonstrations that have taken place in many countries, including Romania, against the threat of a nuclear war and in favour of disarmament and peace, a return to a policy of co-operation, détente and mutual understanding. Also directed towards that same goal are the ever firmer stands against war and in favour of disarmament adopted by scientists, who are the best qualified to know the destructive capacity of modern weapons and what disastrous consequences any outbreak of nuclear conflict may have for all of mankind and for the very future of civilization. It is appropriate to recall in this connection the appeal addressed to peoples by the participants in the recent Bucharest International Symposium "Scientists and Peace", in which they denounce the great danger of nuclear war, take a firm stand in favour of disarmament and state that they are determined to make their opinions known in the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and in all international bodies concerned with problems linked with disarmament, international peace, security and co-operation.

In this vitally important effort to halt the arms race and initiate a genuine process of disarmament in which it is the responsibility of all States, above all the major powerfully armed States, to participate, we attach great importance to the potential role of the non-aligned States, the developing countries and small and medium-sized countries, whether or not they belong to the military blocs. The strengthening of their co-operation and solidarity will serve to stimulate the disarmament negotiations and promote the elaboration of agreements on the cessation of the arms race and the effective reduction of forces and arms.

The potential of the Committee on Disarmament for fulfilling its mandate and really serving the cause of disarmament is far from being fully exploited. If all members of the Committee really wish, and have the political will, to contribute to the settlement of existing problems and, if the proposals of all States are taken into consideration, the available framework is entirely adequate for negotiating effective and equitable solutions that could, without placing any State at a disadvantage, serve the real interests of all nations and contribute to the reduction and removal of the threat of nuclear war, to substantial arms reductions and to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

Romania is determined to do its utmost, in co-operation with other delegations, to contribute effectively to the revitalization of the disarmament negotiations in the Committee in order to achieve concrete results designed to meet the expectations and aspirations of all peoples.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania for his statement, which I am sure has been followed by the Committee with particular interest. I also thank him for the kind words he addressed to me and for the kind reference he made to my country. I am certain that our two friendly countries will continue their common effort to achieve universal disarmament. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, this is the first opportunity which I have had formally to address this Committee. Accordingly, I should like to take this opportunity to express to you the appreciation of my delegation for your able and impartial service in your capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the opening month. I should also like to say that it is with considerable personal pleasure that I have assumed the role of the United States representative to this Committee, and I appreciate the expressions of welcome that have been tendered by my colleagues. I have already had the benefit of working closely in New York with a number of my colleagues present here today. I look forward to continued close collaboration with you all and others whom I have had the pleasure of meeting here since my arrival in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to associate my delegation with your warm welcome to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Romania, who honours our Committee by his presence.

Today I should like to address very briefly the question of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, which is scheduled to convene its 13th meeting here next week.

Last summer, the delegations of Italy and Japan addressed the question of what the future work of this group should be. Thus far during this session, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, has made the suggestion that the Committee on Disarmament should consider in an appropriate context the possibility of organizing stations which sample radioactivity in the atmosphere into a system for international surveillance. During this session also, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, has once again noted the ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts and reminded us that we shall be hearing from the Group its evaluation of the second international experiment related to the exchange of seismic data.

I would recall that, in addressing this Committee on 9 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Eugene Rostow, expressed the interest of my Government in discussing with other delegations the possibility of an enlarged mandate for the Group and, in particular, a mandate which would enable it to consider the feasibility and usefulness of exchanging data on nuclear explosions and other unusual events occurring in the atmosphere. This may prove to be an attractive effort in view of its relevance to the strengthening of existing treaty régimes and in anticipation of further agreements in this area.

My delegation believes that the Group of Scientific Experts has, and should continue to have, an important role in our work in this complex, but vital area of verification. From the outset of the modern era of agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament, the ability effectively to verify compliance

(Mr. Fields, United States)

with the terms of agreements has been recognized as a matter of the utmost importance. This is the case not only in the negotiation of the terms of a specific agreement, where scope and verification must be considered together, but also in the implementation of the agreement throughout the course of its existence. The Antarctic Treaty, for example, makes provision for on-site inspection, by any party, of any other party's facilities throughout the region, to ensure that the terms of the treaty are being complied with. It also provides for aerial observation over all of the region. Other treaties have more far-reaching provisions. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty provides for a system of safeguards operated under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are employed to ensure effective compliance. I might add that the United States and the United Kingdom, as nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, have also, on a voluntary basis, concluded agreements with IAEA placing their peaceful nuclear facilities under safeguards. These initiatives demonstrate that the NPT verification provisions are neither unduly onerous nor a threat to commercial activities involving nuclear energy. As well, they point up the fact that it is the responsibility of all of us to build confidence in international arms control and disarmament agreements.

The Group of Scientific Experts has not completed its current work. It would be premature for the Committee on Disarmament to take a decision now on its future activities. The Group has a considerable amount of work to accomplish in the field of an international seismological data exchange under the terms of its present mandate during its forthcoming meeting. And it has important tasks which will occupy it into the summer and possibly beyond. My Government supports fully the present work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and will continue to do so, so long as it is useful. We do believe, however, that the time has come to begin thinking and consulting on tasks which we should assign the Group for its future work. The time for decision will probably come during the summer meeting of our Committee, when we will have had an opportunity to review the report of the Group of Scientific Experts in response to its current mandate. We are indeed indebted to those who have already put forward concrete ideas and we look forward to hearing from and discussing with other delegations their ideas, in particular concerning the possibility of an expanded mandate for the Group of Scientific Experts. In consideration of ways of improving the monitoring of the atmosphere, this could make a useful contribution to our verification capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair and now give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Mr. Don Nanjira.

Mr. DON MANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is very pleased to see the distinguished Foreign Minister of Romania among us here and cordially welcome him and express our deep and sincere gratitude for the important policy statement which he has just delivered to this Committee.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament has been in session for three weeks already and during this time my delegation has made a good number of interventions. Since, however, this is the first time I am taking the floor in the plenary of this Committee, I wish to reiterate the satisfaction of the Kenya delegation for the manner in which you have been conducting the deliberations of the Committee. We are indeed grateful to you and to your delegation as well as to all the members of the Secretariat of this Committee, under the competent leadership of Mr. R. Jaipal, Ambassador, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the excellent job you are doing, and you can count on the fullest co-operation and support of this delegation.

The issues before us for discussion are broad in scope and very complex in nature, but I wish in my current intervention to share with you and with the distinguished representatives seated around this table some thoughts about some of these issues which I believe deserve the fullest attention of this session of the Committee. I have in mind the questions of:

- (a) the organization of the work of the Committee;
- (b) strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to deal with disarmament questions through the creation and/or effective utilization of competent mechanisms for disarmament negotiations;
- (c) the provisional agenda and work programme of the Committee for 1982;
- (d) preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- (e) nuclear disarmament;
- (f) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (g) the comprehensive programme of disarmament (CPD); and
- (h) disarmament and development.

Organization of the work of the Committee on Disarmament

On the organization of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, there is no doubt that the Committee's work needs to be better organized if the Committee is to carry out its mandate efficiently, effectively and speedily. This Committee might therefore consider seriously the possibility of allocating several of its informal meetings to the discussion of this question. I believe that, within the framework of rules 27 and 29 of the Rules of Procedure of this Committee, the inter-sessional Chairman should be empowered to conduct informal consultations both with delegations in Geneva and in New York, and with the incoming Chairman of the Committee, with a view to reaching agreement on the provisional agenda and work programme for the coming year, but such consultations should take place before the convening of the first or so-called spring session of the Committee in February. If necessary,

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

pre-sessional consultations should be held in Geneva for a few days in the last week of January. The purpose of such meetings would, of course, be to agree on the final draft agenda and work programme for the Committee's coming year. The practice hitherto of spending the first two or three or even more weeks of the Committee's sessions on procedural wrangling should be stopped at once, because it is not proper for the Committee to work on the basis of unadopted agendas and work programmes, as has been the case, for instance, with the agenda and work programme of the Committee for 1982, which was adopted only last week on 18 February.

The questions of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to deal with disarmament questions and/or the creation and effective utilization of competent mechanisms for disarmament negotiations are closely interrelated to the question of organization of the Committee's work. You will recall that the creation of effective mechanisms for disarmament was one of the main preoccupations of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At that session, the necessity of establishing both deliberative and negotiating fora for disarmament was emphasized. And as a result of that requirement, the United Nations Disarmament Commission was re-established as a subsidiary, deliberative organ of the General Assembly, while the latter itself remained the main United Nations deliberative organ and its First Committee became another deliberating forum for disarmament.

The current trend, then, of turning the Committee -- the main United Nations negotiating organ on disarmament -- into a debating forum is contrary to the requirements and provisions of the Committee's terms of reference. We should hence make every effort to halt and reverse this dangerous trend before it is too late. We need to spend more time negotiating on substantive disarmament questions, rather than politicking and talking about procedural issues, exercising rights of reply and the like. We must find ways and means of improving and strengthening the capacity of the Committee to discharge competently the negotiating functions entrusted upon it by the world community. And since the United Nations itself has primary responsibility in the disarmament field, it must play a significant role within the framework of paragraphs 114, 123 and 124 of the Final Document itself.

I believe that one way of assisting the Committee to execute its mandate effectively and efficiently is through subsidiary bodies which should be created in sufficient numbers to tackle the key issues of the disarmament process. This essentially calls for the continued functioning of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established by the Committee on 17 March 1980, which were re-established for the Committee's 1981 session and three of which were reinstated for the Committee's 1982 session only last week, on 18 February namely, the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Chemical and Radiological Weapons, and Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

My delegation is happy that these Working Groups have been reinstated and will be meeting shortly to organize their work programmes for this session of the Committee. The ones on radiological and chemical weapons have moved fast and, as we all know, they had their first organizational sessions yesterday under the

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

chairmanships of the distinguished Ambassadors of the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, to whom I hereby formally offer the congratulations and appreciation of the Kenya delegation. The work schedules proposed by the said Chairmen are acceptable to my delegation, provided, of course, that rigidity will be avoided and flexibility maintained. I believe that ad hoc groups, once established, should function uninterruptedly in their respective capacities and terms of reference until they complete their mandates, always bearing in mind, of course, the possibility of revising such mandates if and when necessary. The practice of setting up contact groups within ad hoc working groups is a very good one which should, needless to say, be maintained, but contact groups must work and complete their assignments within relatively short periods of time -- in any case not more than two weeks. It was on this understanding that my delegation accepted the creation, earlier at this session of the Committee, of the contact groups on objectives, priorities and principles of a CPD. I am grateful to the co-ordinators of these groups, the distinguished Ambassadors of France, Brazil and the German Democratic Republic, for their untiring efforts to achieve a meeting of minds on the various proposals. It is very gratifying to my delegation that the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has been guiding so competently and patiently the Ad Hoc Working Group on a CPD. This Group embarked upon its difficult work right at the beginning of this spring session of the Committee, but, as I said earlier, I should like to see the CPD Working Group spend more time on substantive questions rather than on procedural wrangles or on conceptual and philosophical exchanges among the learned representatives. This should apply to every working group set up by this Committee. This is a negotiating forum and I would hence like to see it spend more time fiddling with, and staring at, drafts, rather than representatives sowing the air with their considered rhetorical and philosophical compositions.

The adoption of the agenda and work programme of the Committee for 1982 has, in effect, paved the way for the concentration of our energies on such fundamental items as the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, a CPD, the denuclearization of Africa, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the establishment of other zones of peace in the world and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

At this session of the Committee, we have as one of our primary tasks to make a valuable contribution to the preparatory process for the second special session devoted to disarmament scheduled for 7 June to 9 July this year in New York, where, incidentally, the Preparatory Committee for the second special session will also meet from 26 April to 14 May. The time still available to us is thus very short and the sooner we start formulating the elements of the special report we are under a mandate to prepare for the second special session, under General Assembly resolution 36/92F of 9 December 1981, the better. My delegation listened attentively to the views expressed by various delegations at the informal meeting of the Committee held earlier this week on 22 February and we agreed with the general view that the special report to the second special session should be drawn up on the basis of guidelines given by delegations; that it should contain an accurate assessment of the problems, failures and successes of the disarmament negotiations and give practical proposals for the achievement of concrete results on disarmament issues; and that the special report should be one of the basic documents of the second special session.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

We are all agreed that nuclear disarmament has as its ultimate goal the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. It is in this regard that we have welcomed the commencement of bilateral discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate-range nuclear forces and we urge these Superpowers to initiate, as soon as possible, bilateral talks on the reduction of strategic weapons. Nuclear war must be prevented from occurring in all its possible forms and at all costs. It is therefore imperative that measures be promptly taken by all the concerned States to reduce and control nuclear weapons as a major step towards nuclear disarmament. The Committee must give this issue the highest priority and greatest attention. It is necessary that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom resume and intensify their talks on a complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, with a view to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty in this critical field. Also, I can hardly over-emphasize the urgency of reaching agreement on national and international verification and other measures through which, inter alia, the arms race in outer space will be halted and the ban on chemical weapons achieved.

My Government recognizes the need for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but such uses must be accompanied by nuclear safeguards and a confidence-building régime which will prevent States from using nuclear energy for military and other destructive purposes. Acts of aggression, foreign occupation and other violations of the United Nations Charter have a very negative impact on disarmament negotiations, including nuclear disarmament. How can we sit around this table to negotiate issues of disarmament, while fear, suspicion, mistrust, regional war and annexation, as well as international tensions and conflicts prevail in international relations?

As for effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, paragraph 59 of the Final Document is particularly relevant, and security guarantees for these States should be embodied in an international treaty.

On the critical comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Kenya delegation fully subscribes to the position of the Group of 21, as outlined in the following documents:

CD/CPD/WP.55 on the principles of the CPD;
CD/CPD/WP.56 on the objectives of the CPD;
CD/CPD/WP.57 on the priorities of the CPD; and
CD/223 on measures of the CPD.

I note with deep regret that some delegations here still have considerable difficulties with the position of the Group of 21, but the fact is that the provisions of those Working Papers have been derived from the Final Document itself, which was adopted by consensus at the first special session on 30 June 1978!

The significance of the CPD lies in the fact that it is the instrument through which general and complete disarmament under effective and sufficient international control can be attained. In the disarmament process, then, it is

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

imperative that the Governments concerned undertake, without delay, to eradicate the danger of war, especially nuclear war, and to stop once and for all the arms race and thereby ensure lasting peace and security throughout the world. We are obligated to formulate meaningful and balanced CPD provisions -- be they draft objectives, priorities, principles or measures -- for consideration and ultimate adoption at the second special session. The Group of 21 attaches great importance to this matter, but unfortunately, there are still many fundamental differences, as can be seen from the positions of the other Governments on these very issues. A lot of hard bargaining and negotiation is thus still needed in order to narrow the divergencies. Problems of definition of weapons; scope of agreements; time-frames and procedures; criteria and methods of verification; selection, ordering and classification of the objectives, priorities, principles and measures of the CPD, and so on and so forth, are indeed difficult to resolve, but we have no option but to tackle them systematically, earnestly and with dedication.

At this juncture, permit me to share with you and with the other distinguished representatives seated around this table, some thoughts about the kinds of measures my delegation would like to see incorporated in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I believe that the chapter on measures of the CPD will be the most difficult section to negotiate because disarmament measures have, as their ultimate goal, the attainment of the objectives of the CPD. The implementation of the measures will thus have to conform not only to the objectives, but also to the priorities and principles set forth in the CPD. The fundamental requirement is that the CPD must be truly comprehensive and global in character. In this regard, the Group of 21 proposal has, in our judgement, met this requirement. Therefore, apart from subscribing fully to it, the Kenya delegation calls upon the other groups of delegations to accept not only the logic and approach expounded in the Group of 21 draft chapter on measures, but also the structure and format of that paper.

Talking about the structure of the CPD, many options are open to us. For instance, there could be an introductory part to the measures chapter, which introduction would govern all the sections of each stage or we could have a chapter or short and concise introduction at the beginning of each section or subsection, as the case may be. In any case, I deem it necessary to indicate briefly at the beginning of each stage the general philosophy of the chapter and what it ultimately aims to achieve. Then the provisional time-frame should be given within which the measures of every stage should be fully implemented. Furthermore, the CPD should be legally binding on all States and this should be made quite clear in the introductory part of the programme.

Thus, there should be no ambiguity as to the objectives which the disarmament measures of the CPD will strive to achieve and which provide the basis for the classification of measures into various stages -- but bearing in mind, of course, the ordering of priorities of the CPD and of its objectives into immediate, intermediate or continuous, and ultimate objectives. As agreed in the Final Document, the main objectives of the CPD are to halt and reverse, prevent and prohibit the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, as well as to reduce the arms race and all kinds of armaments or weapons and armed forces and thereby totally eliminate the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and the danger of war, especially

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

nuclear war. It is this accepted reasoning which has led the Group of 21 to propose the four stages in document CD/223, dated 19 August 1981. The measures are interrelated and mutually supportive of one another. Furthermore, they have been patterned on the Final Document itself and structured in a logical sequence and take fully into account both the elements and the piecemeal nature of the disarmament process. Thus, the halting and reversing of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, must fall in the first phase of the measures of the CPD. The reduction of the arms race, armaments and armed forces, must fall in the second phase; the total elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons, plus very substantial reductions in other types of weapons, as well as prevention of an arms race in outer space, should be the aim of the measures of the third phase. Finally, the elimination of conventional weapons and armed forces, except for those mutually agreed to for internal security within their own territories, should be achieved by the end of the fourth phase. In each phase, stress must be given to the need to reallocate resources released from military to socio-economic purposes, especially for the benefit of the developing countries.

In identifying measures in the context of the objectives, priorities and principles of the CPD, we should also identify them in the context of their immediate or short-term, medium-term and long-term implementation requirements. We should further identify measures according to whether they are common to all phases of the CPD or only to each of the phases. In this undertaking, we should bear in mind the levels and kinds of measures which must be taken in implementation of the CPD, i.e. whether action needs to be taken at the national, subregional, regional, interregional or global level or whether a measure or measures ought to be taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally.

With regard to measures for regional disarmament and security, they require the establishment of zones of peace in South-East Asia and in the Indian Ocean area, as well as of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, e.g., Latin America in the Americas region, in Europe, Africa and Asia, the Middle East, South Asia and South-East Asia.

The question of the review and appraisal of the implementation of the CPD is critical and must therefore feature prominently in the disarmament programme. A phase-by-phase procedure would be best and there should be a review and appraisal at the end of each implementation phase in order to take stock of past performance and map out strategies for the future, accelerated implementation of CPD measures. In the review and appraisal exercise, two factors will be crucial: the factor of time-frames and the factor of review and appraisal mechanisms for the implementation of CPD measures.

On time-frames, provisional time-spans must be inscribed in the programme, both for each implementation phase and for the entire package of measures. The CPD is a development plan of disarmament action and, as such, it must have tentative time-frames within which it should be implemented and which will also be subject to review. This is the normal practice, whether in national development plans, or in United Nations plans or programmes, such as the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, the Vienna Programme of Action on Science and Technology for Development, the Nairobi Programme of Action for the Development and Utilization of New and Renewable Sources of Energy and many others.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

In most of these cases, reviews and appraisals occur every five years. Even the United Nations Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, annexed to General Assembly resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, provides for a review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration after five years. Paragraph 25 of the Declaration reads: "In addition, the General Assembly will undertake at its fortieth session, in 1985, a review and appraisal, through the Disarmament Commission, of progress in the implementation of the measures identified in the present Declaration".

When, therefore, the Group of 21 decided on an over-all CPD implementation period of 20 years, with five-year periods of review and appraisal of each implementation stage, they acted in good faith and in perfect and complete conformity with the generally accepted practice of the formulation of development plans of action.

As for review and appraisal mechanisms for the implementation of the CPD, the first priority should be to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to deal with disarmament questions along the lines proposed in paragraphs 114, 123 and 124 of the Final Document. The relevant organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system should be more deeply and seriously involved in the review and appraisal exercise of CPD measures, i.e., the deliberative organs of the United Nations -- the General Assembly, its First Committee and the Disarmament Commission -- and the negotiating organ -- the Committee on Disarmament. Contributions should be welcome and indeed encouraged from research centres such as the United Nations University based in Tokyo; the University of Peace based in Costa Rica; the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and its United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; as well as from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and appropriate and knowledgeable academic centres specializing in disarmament matters. Furthermore, special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, contributions made in the inter-sessional periods of the said special sessions and world disarmament conferences would also offer excellent opportunities for reviews and appraisals of CPD implementation. Provisional reviews, where necessary, could also take place even before the normal review periods proper, for example, half-way between the review periods of time.

Now that we have re-established the four Ad Hoc Working Groups, we should next create enough additional working groups to expedite the Committee's work, especially as the Committee prepares for the Preparatory Committee meeting and second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Our priorities must be clearly identified and they no doubt include:

(a) Attainment of a draft CPD for the second special session's consideration within the Working Group established on the item;

(b) Attainment of progress on chemical weapons within the Working Group re-established on these weapons;

(c) Attainment of progress on radiological weapons within the Working Group re-established on these weapons;

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

(d) Attainment of progress on negative security assurances within the Working Group re-established on these assurances;

(e) Attainment of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which, I am convinced, also deserves and should have a working group established as soon as possible; and

(f) Attainment of progress on the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, on which a working group should likewise be created, as proposed by the Group of 21 in 1981.

I must also reiterate at this juncture the necessity to intensify the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones through agreements concluded on a regular basis. We would in this regard call for and welcome the early denuclearization of the Indian Ocean and the declaration of it as a zone of peace. Such a measure would help promote effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, such as my own, Kenya, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Kenya attaches great importance to this matter for many reasons, including the fact that we are an Indian Ocean littoral State. The denuclearization of Africa, as decided upon by the OAU in 1964, was a very significant political act to which my Government attaches the highest priority and works for its earliest fulfilment. Nuclear weapons should not find any place in Africa and we would be totally opposed to the promotion of the nuclear arms race in Africa by the defenders of the inhuman and racist policies of "separate development" which have been pursued in South Africa for more than three decades already.

Finally, but not least, I should mention here that the question of the relationship between disarmament and development is of the uttermost importance to my delegation. Obviously, we shall have opportunities in the future to dwell at length on this crucial issue. For the moment, I just wish to point out that studies conducted so far on the interconnection between disarmament and development, including the Secretary-General's recent report on the topic contained in document A/36/356, present some shocking revelations about the colossal amounts of resources (more than \$500 billion) spent annually for military purposes, while hundreds and millions of people all over the world are dying, inter alia, of disease and chronic hunger and malnutrition, in particular in the historically and continuously exploited regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. This is a subject which developing nations are, and will no doubt continue to be, sensitive about and continue to call for their accelerated development through, inter alia, the elimination of the imbalances and inequalities existing in present international economic relations. I believe, that the attainment of a new international economic order must be part and parcel of the ultimate objective of a CPD. Kenya believes in the new international economic order because it is the instrument through which the basic needs of all nations, in particular the developing nations, can be met. I therefore reiterate the importance we attach to the need to release real resources now being very unwisely squandered on the arms race and reallocate them for socio-economic purposes, especially for the benefit of the developing countries.

This is all I have to say today, but let me reserve the right of my delegation to intervene again at later stages of this session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair and now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): We had the privilege of being addressed this morning by the Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Romania and my delegation is very grateful for this opportunity. His message was a most valuable one.

Mr. Chairman, I should also like to welcome my immediate neighbour to my right, the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Mr. Frans van Dongen, who joined us this morning.

My brief intervention today will be devoted to item 1 of the Committee's 1982 annual agenda -- the nuclear test ban -- which my delegation regards as the centre-piece of the disarmament negotiations.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations rightly set the tone of the current session when, in his message to us, he said:

"The world cannot afford to wait for the dawn of ideal conditions before undertaking measures of disarmament. Disarmament cannot be achieved through confrontation and condemnation. The short-term benefit of military advantage is invariably neutralized by the long-term harm of the arms race it provokes. We should recognize before it is too late that the most basic aspect of all peoples and nations is their shared humanity and consequently their shared responsibility for a world without war".

Indeed, my delegation believes that the time is long overdue for substantial progress towards the limitation and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. At the 136th plenary meeting of 9 July 1981, the Nigerian delegation noted with regret and dissatisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, had not been able to initiate substantive negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Nearly one year later, the situation remains the same with no prospects of a breakthrough in disarmament negotiations. I cannot but register here again my delegation's regret and total dissatisfaction that concrete multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban have not yet commenced in the Committee on Disarmament.

It is not because of the lack of interest by the international community that no agreement has emerged on this most burning and high priority issue of our time. For well over 25 years, there has been a continuous interest by the international community, expressed not only by protest marches, but also in the form of over 40 resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The latest expression of this concern was at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. At that session, two resolutions were adopted, namely resolutions 36/84 and 36/85 on the subject of a nuclear test ban.

In resolution 36/84, operative paragraph 4 urges all States members of the Committee on Disarmament:

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

(a) To bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee;

(b) To support the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc Working Group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests;

(c) To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament the multilateral negotiated text of such a treaty.

Resolution 36/85 reiterated the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing; operative paragraph 7 requested the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system. Operative paragraph 10 called upon the Committee on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session. It is clear from the above that the international community attaches great importance to a nuclear test ban, as the first step towards nuclear disarmament, and that CD has a vital role to play in the achievement of the goal.

It is therefore a matter of the utmost frustration for my delegation that two of the five nuclear-weapon-States sitting in this Committee have refused to join the consensus, in the Committee, to establish an ad hoc Working Group for no reasons other than that of their own idea of what constitutes their security interests and that of political expediency, which do not take into account the security interests of those States that have foregone the nuclear option. What are the reasons for this state of affairs? Part of the answer can be found in the statement of Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to the Committee on 9 February 1982. Mr. Rostow, having stressed the linkages between the international situation and disarmament initiatives, went on to state that:

"It is clear that any consideration of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces. It is equally clear that a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons". He continued: "Thus, while a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance".

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

My delegation has argued and will continue to argue against nations basing their security on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, which, together with doctrines of strategic balance and parity stem from the narrow security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon-States. It does seem to my delegation that, for international peace and security to be meaningful, the perception of security has to be broadened to take into consideration the stability of all nations irrespective of their regions. Above all, there must be regard for security from hunger and poverty, taking into account the close link between disarmament and development.

It is also relevant to refer to the Secretary-General's Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, which, in its conclusion, noted the following:

"Peace requires the prevention of the danger of a nuclear war. If nuclear disarmament is to become a reality, the commitment to mutual deterrence through a balance of terror must be discarded. The concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists".

My delegation agrees with the views expressed in the conclusion. We are all too aware that the technical barriers to the conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban have been completely exhausted. Its central importance in the urgent task of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been universally acknowledged in the consensus view expressed in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is now the lack of political will of two nuclear-weapon-States that holds back the essential work expected from the Committee, especially since the tripartite negotiations have not resumed and no longer can be cited as providing the best way forward.

In view of the paralysis of the trilateral negotiations and of the fact that consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a CTBT has been blocked, how is the Committee to proceed? Certainly, the impending second special session devoted to disarmament will call into question the credibility of the Committee on Disarmament as a negotiating forum if no progress is made on this widely-accepted highest priority item. Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden has, in her intervention on 9 July 1981, already informed "the unsuccessful trilateral negotiators" that they "had better prepare themselves for severe and adamant criticism of their failure at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

As a co-sponsor of document CD/204, my delegation feels the time is "ripe" to give consideration to an amendment to rule 25. We are convinced that man is living in a dynamic world in which nothing is static. A set of rules made by us, and for us, essentially to facilitate the work of the Committee ought to be re-examined and amended as desirable to suit the existing realities in the Committee.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

A situation whereby some countries tend to use the rule of consensus to perpetuate discriminatory interests not only negates the goals this forum seeks to achieve but obviously is dysfunctional to the system. We still firmly believe that working groups provide the most effective machinery for conducting multilateral negotiations in the Committee; hence we support the position of the Group of 21 on this subject. In his intervention, Mr. Rostow did note that the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, but unanimity has been lacking on questions of approach and timing. Document CD/181 of the Group of 21 presents an approach that deserves serious consideration by the Committee. A serious elaboration of the elements relating to the scope, verification and final clauses of a future treaty would be an effective contribution of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session.

Many delegations have defended their positions in this Committee on the basis of their respective security concerns. I merely wish to state that we in Africa also have grave security concerns. Resolution CM/Res.854 from the eighteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held in Nairobi in June 1981, clearly denounces the proposed South Atlantic Organization comprising South Africa, the United States and certain Latin American countries as a serious threat to the peace and security of the African continent. The same resolution also calls upon the United Nations Security Council to tighten its resolution No. 418 forbidding the supply of arms and related materials to apartheid South Africa and to ensure the strict observance of the arms embargo.

The international community is already aware of the nuclear capability of racist and terrorist South Africa. For my country, one of the first signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the days ahead are ones for sombre reflection. Horizontal nuclear proliferation appears all too real, coupled with the risk of accidental nuclear war. It is in this light that my delegation attaches great importance to a nuclear test-ban treaty. As we have stressed on several occasions, the lack of progress in the field of a comprehensive test-ban treaty constitutes a breach of faith by the nuclear-weapon Powers since such a treaty is, as it were the quid pro quo for the obligations which we the non-nuclear States, the nuclear have-nots, have assumed. We sincerely hope that the rigid positions which the nuclear-weapon States have tenaciously clung to for well over 25 years will bend. Failure not to do so may be apocalyptic.

Before concluding this short statement, my delegation would like to say that it was encouraged by the statement of Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom on 11 February to the effect that the United Kingdom had destroyed its entire stock of chemical weapons more than 10 years ago. This statement by the British delegation is particularly significant at a time when moral values no longer seem to be important in the war game.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, the item inscribed on the programme of work for today has been in the forefront of the preoccupations of the whole community of nations for almost four decades now. It would not be unwarranted to stress that all Member States of the United Nations once again recognized the crucial urgency of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament only four years ago, in a consensus document at the close of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

Since the inception of the Committee on Disarmament, the members of the Group of 21 and other delegations as well have deployed untiring efforts to ensure that this Committee be allowed to fulfill the expectations of the world community by starting substantive negotiations on this question. A few members of the Committee, however, have prevented the adoption of any procedural modalities for multilateral negotiations in this forum. Commitments solemnly undertaken in the Final Document as well as in international instruments of a legally binding nature have been simply ignored.

During the 1981 session of the Committee, the Group of 21 renewed its endeavours to secure the establishment of a working group on item 2 of the agenda. Once again the argument that the treatment of this issue by the Committee was "premature" because of the "complexity" and "sensitivity" of the problems involved was invoked by those who do not wish the world community to search for a multilaterally negotiated solution to a question that affects the very foundation of the security of every nation. Peace and security seem to be regarded by the Superpowers as their exclusive property. For them, the rest of the world has no other choice but to abide by their dicta on such "complex" and "sensitive" matters.

In what way have the Superpowers exercised their supposedly exclusive right to protect their own security? They have done so by jeopardizing the security of every other nation, through a prodigious escalation of their nuclear arsenals, a continuous increase of their military budgets to staggering amounts and a callous disregard for the very survival of mankind as a whole. The current session of the Committee on Disarmament has started with the now too familiar flow of accusations and counter-accusations between the two Superpowers. Each attempts to justify its armaments policies on the grounds that it was the other who started it all and that a perceived inferiority must be redressed. We have heard the strange contention that there is no arms race, but merely a sustained military effort by one Superpower to gain superiority over the other. In the light of the data that appears every day in the press and other public sources of one part of the world and judging by the information gathered on what goes on in the opposing camp; the claim that there is no arms race does not stand to reason. On the contrary, the two most powerful States in the history of mankind seem now to have overstepped all boundaries of restraint in their quest for absolute military power. Other boundaries are on the verge of being crossed by the ever-increasing plethora of new means of destruction: outer space might soon become the next arena of confrontation and hostility.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Policies that rely on the continuous increase of military might can hardly be reconciled with the universally accepted goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. For instance, the expression "disarmament" was replaced by the ambiguous phrase "arms control", which of course does not imply any reduction but merely some kind of leverage over the quantity of armaments — downwards as well as upwards. Such departures from the language and concepts formally accepted by all members of the world community raise justified apprehensions over the faithfulness with which the commitments embodied in international documents have come to be regarded by some States. Unequivocal and authoritative statements reaffirming adherence to such commitments seem thus to be urgently called for.

My delegation welcomes, in this connection, the statements made by the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR on 16 and 13 February, respectively, in the plenary meetings of the Committee. While Ambassador Issraelyan dealt with the question of the CTB and offered constructive overtures, Ambassador Herder suggested the text of a mandate for the proposed working group on item 2. He also stated that consultations as proposed in document CD/193 should be resumed without delay and that such consultations would facilitate the achievement of a consensus on an ad hoc working group on item 2. My delegation fully shares that view, which is consistent with the stand taken by the Group of 21 in document CD/180, and looks forward to the early start of such consultations. We would not, however, favour a solution that would merely provide the Committee with a setting for academic exchanges of views on the wide range of questions related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The experience of last year's two informal sessions on that item have strengthened our conviction that the negotiating character of this body must be respected. Adequate procedural arrangements must be actively sought to ensure that the Committee on Disarmament discharges the responsibilities entrusted to it by the United Nations with the consensus of all States represented here. Unless there is the will to search for a generally acceptable procedure to deal with item 2, there is nothing to be gained by engaging in a second round of academic discussions, from which no practical conclusion would be drawn and even the summary of which would then be suppressed as if unfit to be divulged to the remainder of the membership of the United Nations. We hope, therefore, that delegations will be prepared to engage in good-faith consultations with the aim of breaking the wall of intransigence and finally permit the Committee on Disarmament to exercise the priority functions with which it was entrusted.

For the achievement of this purpose, my delegation is heartened by the statement made by Mr. Rostow on 9 February, in which he said that "the United States fully shares the keen concern of members of this Committee to move forward rapidly in the effort to remove the burden of nuclear weapons from world politics", and that his country "will work constructively with the Committee in its efforts to achieve this end". We attach the greatest significance to this statement, coming as it did from an official in the high position held by Mr. Rostow. During the whole of the 1981 session, this Committee was promised by the then representative of the

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

United States, Ambassador Floweree, that his Government would eventually complete a thorough review of its defence policies, the results of which would find their reflection on the instructions to the United States delegation to the Committee. One could infer that Mr. Rostow's statement on 9 February indeed represents a summary of the considered views of his Government on the questions on the Committee's agenda. My delegation would expect that the delegation of the United States will indeed "work constructively with the Committee" and will come up with concrete suggestions on how "to move forward rapidly" so as "to remove the burden of nuclear weapons from world politics". Those nations which did not contribute to create that burden have diligently formulated innumerable proposals and have patiently awaited for constructive responses from those which have a special responsibility for that burden. My delegation still expects that the delegations directly concerned will, in the very near future, address themselves substantively to the subject-matter of item 2. It is high time for this Committee to receive adequate satisfaction.

Allow me to dwell now on another point which is directly connected with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and to which my delegation attaches great importance. As we know, the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 36/81 B, by which the nuclear-weapon Powers are urged to submit, for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war. By adhering to the consensus on the adoption of that resolution, every State has once again recognized "the threat to the very existence of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons" and that "the removal of that threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day". Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the States that have a special responsibility, that is, the nuclear-weapon Powers, to make full use of this opportunity to share with the world community, that is, those States which have chosen not to purchase their security at the expense of everybody else's security, their views and opinions on how that "most acute and urgent task" should be carried out. Reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence should not be construed as justification for the maintenance and the continuing improvement of nuclear arsenals; rather, the consensus recognition of the threat of nuclear extinction and of the special responsibility to avert it should provide added incentive to the nuclear-weapon Powers for responding in good faith to the call of the General Assembly.

No guarantee against the threat of nuclear weapons can be credible as long as a handful of States cling to the exclusive possession of such formidable means of warfare and seem determined not only to keep them but to make them even more dangerous and menacing. So far, the nuclear-weapon Powers have been reluctant to give unequivocal assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and have preferred to qualify their official statements on guarantees with conditions geared to serve their own security and military doctrines. As they are formulated, such formal statements by the nuclear-weapon Powers amount in reality to a guarantee of their nuclear status

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

and of their ability to make use of the weapons in those circumstances which they deem appropriate. As long as the nuclear-weapon Powers do not decide to review their stand on this question, there seems to be little point in trying to evolve a common approach based on the formal declarations, because any such common formulation would contain that fundamental flaw. Instead, by focusing our attention on the prevention of nuclear war, it might be possible to arrive at an agreed basis from which to proceed forward on the path towards the final elimination of nuclear weapons from the world environment. That would, of course, constitute the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Resolution 36/81 B, of which Brazil was a co-sponsor, thus provides another constructive approach to the difficult question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. My delegation hopes that this new avenue for finding multilateral answers to a problem that confronts all nations alike will not be misused by those to whom it is mainly directed. Once again the community of nations turns to the nuclear-weapon Powers in a spirit of good faith to invite them to work constructively for the removal of a threat whose acuteness and urgency is recognized by they themselves in no ambiguous terms. It would indeed be a most regrettable mistake if this call to reason and understanding is ignored or if, instead, the second special session is turned into yet another arena for bipolar confrontation and recrimination. History has a way of catching up with errors in perceptions of the political realities of the world. If a few States insist on making their exclusive possession of nuclear weapons an institutionalized part of reality, there may be soon nothing left for history to catch up with.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, it gives me particular pleasure to place on record at the beginning of my statement our welcome address to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Mr. Stefan Andrei, who represents a country with which the German Democratic Republic maintains close and friendly relations. I am convinced that this important statement he made will be studied thoroughly and contribute to help the Committee to discharge its high responsibilities. I would like to ask the representative of Romania to convey to him our best wishes for a pleasant and successful stay in Geneva. At the same time, I would also like to welcome Ambassador Frans van Dongen, the newly appointed new representative of the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament, who today is taking part for the first time in our meetings. We assure him that we are ready to continue the business-like and mutual advantageous co-operation we always had with his predecessor and his country's delegation.

These days, the Committee on Disarmament is concluding its debate devoted to item 1 of our agenda—a nuclear test ban. As is well known, the German Democratic Republic has always attached the highest importance to this question. On 16 February, my delegation reiterated this position. At the same time, we put forward some considerations on the future dealing of the Committee with a comprehensive test ban and submitted a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

It is now my intention to express in a preliminary manner the first conclusions we have drawn from the exchange of views in the Committee on a CTB and to elaborate on some concrete suggestions made in the course of the debate held on item 1.

It was of great satisfaction to my delegation that, from the very beginning of this session, the overwhelming majority of the member States of the Committee underlined the importance of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We fully agree with Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, who, in his statement on 2 February, pointed out that "achieving a CTB treaty would be a concrete, practical demonstration of how to come to grips with the many highly complicated aspects of the nuclear arms race" (CD/PV.150).

Furthermore, many a delegation stressed the useful role of the trilateral negotiations and called upon the three parties to resume them quickly and bring them to a rapid and successful conclusion. Unfortunately, at least one nuclear-weapon State seemed to be unprepared to follow this appeal.

At the same time, my delegation was very pleased by the frank and clear statement made by the representative of the USSR on the problems involved in the trilateral negotiations. Thus, the USSR responded to appeals and questions put forward by many delegations of non-nuclear-weapon States. We also welcome the renewed readiness of the Soviet Union to put a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests into force even if China and France do not adhere to it from the outset. Indeed, this is further proof of the constructive attitude of the USSR towards a CTB.

Last, but not least, a number of delegations once again stressed the necessity of enhancing the role of our Committee in the negotiation of a CTB treaty. Together with the groups of socialist and non-aligned States, most countries of the Western group — directly or indirectly — expressed their interest in establishing an ad hoc working group on item 1. Let me quote in this regard from the first statement (CD/PV.151) of the Japanese delegation in which Ambassador Okawa underlined that "the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is of paramount importance; and it is a concrete and tangible proposal. That is why my delegation is of the view that the question of a CTB should be dealt with systematically and with concentration — and the most effective way of doing so would be, in our view, in a special working group established for that purpose".

It was with deep regret that my delegation listened on 9 February to the statement of the United States delegation explaining the outcome of the recent United States review of CTB matters. Contrary to the clearly stated goals of the United Nations Member States, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the mandate of the Committee and many United Nations resolutions, the United States openly declared a CTB as not being "ripe". At the same time, we were told that the "United States will work constructively with the Committee in its efforts to achieve this end" (CD/PV.152).

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

However, no clear idea was expressed how this should be done. Moreover, as last year, the United States delegation, together with the delegation of the United Kingdom, opposed the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a CTB. At the same time we were offered to merge items 1 and 2 of our agenda. But the lumping together of both priority items could hardly help to solve the CTB issue. Moreover, such a step would be apt to divert attention from item 1, which has been explored for years and is now ripe for a political decision. The Committee was right in rejecting such a proposal.

In this connection, we listened with great attention to statements made recently by some delegations belonging to the Western group. With great astonishment, my delegation noted that some delegations of Western non-nuclear countries started moving away from a CTB, from a "priority task" to a "central and ultimate aim". What does this mean? Are these delegations ready to forget about a CTB as an immediate and urgent step to curb the nuclear arms race and conceive it as a "long-term objective", as was done by the United States? Such an approach, we fear, would provide for possibilities to create new, still more sophisticated nuclear weapons, as, for example, the so-called neutron bomb.

At the same time "new ideas" were expressed as "alternatives to the all-or-nothing approach" in order to maintain "some movement in the negotiating process" and "keep movement towards a CTB alive".

My delegation, of course, does not question the serious interest of the delegations of Australia, Canada and Japan in achieving a prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. We highly appreciate their resolve to seek a way out of the situation created by the stubborn attitude of some nuclear-weapon States towards a CTB.

On the other hand, we cannot but raise serious doubts about some of the ideas expressed recently with regard to the further approach to this item. In our view, these ideas pose a real danger of diverting the attention of this Committee from a CTB to issues of secondary importance.

Let me try to illustrate this by a few examples.

Firstly, it was proposed to establish "a political experts group under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament, to discuss matters which were not at issue in the trilateral negotiations from 1977 to 1980". What could be the contribution of such a group to the elaboration of a CTB treaty? While creating the illusion of having a CTB working group, would it not merely duplicate the discussions we already have and had in the plenary meetings? Our substantive interest should be the elaboration of a CTB treaty in an appropriate subsidiary body of the Committee; this cannot be achieved by setting up a new deliberative forum.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Having this in mind, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, on 16 February, tabled a corresponding draft mandate concentrating on the main task, that is, the elaboration of a draft treaty.

Secondly, ideas were put forward to reach a CTB, through a series of "limited steps", as, for instance:

the extension of existing treaties to those nuclear-weapon States which are not yet parties to them;

the development of bilateral treaties such as the TBT and PBT into multilateral ones;

the lowering of the permitted yield of nuclear tests in a succession of treaties.

The German Democratic Republic, of course, was always in favour of exhausting all possibilities which could bring a CTB within our reach. Thus, in 1963, it was among the first signatories of the TBT. For years, we have been appealing to the other States, in particular China and France, to adhere to this treaty. In 1974 and 1976, we welcomed the Soviet-American treaties on a threshold test-ban and underground peaceful nuclear explosions and are still waiting for their ratification. At that time, we hoped that the United States would change its attitude and that, over some period of time, it could agree to a more comprehensive solution. That is why we welcomed the beginning of the trilateral negotiations started in 1977. Unfortunately, after some success was achieved at these negotiations, the United States suspended them unilaterally.

Over more than 20 years, enormous efforts have been invested in achieving a CTB. Thus, this disarmament issue has occupied the uninterrupted attention of the Member States of the United Nations for a longer period of time than any other disarmament issue, as it was rightly stated in the United Nations report on a CTB (CD/86). Shall we now, after all, come back to an approach which has been discussed in this Committee for years -- from the late 1960s until the mid 1970s? My personal experience stemming from more than seven years of participation in the work of this Committee makes me believe that such a "threshold approach" hardly could bring us to the conclusion of a CTB treaty. Instead of having negotiations on a CTB, most likely we would be engaged in a peripheral issue with the illusion of making headway towards a so-called "long-term aim".

Thirdly, there have been proposals today; such a similar proposal has been repeated by the distinguished representative of the United States to enlarge the mandate of the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events and to concentrate on the administrative, legal and financial aspects of an international seismic data exchange. It was even proposed to establish a working group of administrative

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

experts. To be quite frank, my delegation is not against a discussion and solution of organizational aspects connected with an international seismic data exchange and other verification problems if this is done in close connection with the elaboration of a corresponding agreement, i.e. a CTB treaty. Thus, in 1977, after one year of reluctance, an expert from the German Democratic Republic was sent to the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events established in 1976 under a Swedish proposal, since we felt that this Group could lend assistance to the trilateral negotiations and the Committee in solving verification problems of a CTB. With the same understanding, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries took part for the first time in a trial exchange of seismic data last year.

Now, since we know the negative attitude of the United States towards a CTB, we may ask ourselves what would be the outcome of taking up the above-mentioned proposals. Would this not only be l'art pour l'art, i.e. "movement for the sake of movement"? Why should enormous resources be invested in the establishment and examination of a broad international seismic data exchange system if an early conclusion of a CTB treaty is out of sight? It is in this light that we will have to examine today's proposal submitted by the distinguished representative of the United States, in particular concerning the possibility of an expanded mandate for the Group of Scientific Experts.

Concluding my statement, I would like to reiterate the conviction of my delegation that the peoples of the world and the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament expect the Committee on Disarmament to come out with real ideas on a CTB. Vague considerations on a limited step-by-step approach as well as on administrative and other organizational matters of verification would hardly serve this aim. Perhaps it would then be better to be frank and honest enough and to state in our report to the second special session that the Committee, due to the attitude of some nuclear-weapon States, was not able to make headway concerning a CTB.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

Although I should have done this earlier, I should now like to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Dongen, who has joined us today. His previous experience on disarmament questions as leader of the Netherlands delegation to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will, I am sure, be of value to the Committee. I wish him success in all his functions in Geneva.

The Secretariat has circulated today at my request, an informal paper containing the time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee during the coming week. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and we can adjust it as we proceed. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Committee agrees to the time-table. The representative of the USSR has the floor.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The document to which you just referred makes no mention of a meeting of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons. I should like to know the reason.

The CHAIRMAN: I am informed that it does not want to have a meeting. The representative of Mexico has the floor.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico): Mr. Chairman, I see that Tuesday afternoon is free, so, if there are no objections, I would like that afternoon to be set aside, as Monday afternoon has been, for the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: As this is my last plenary meeting as Chairman of the Committee, I wish to express my appreciation to the members of the Committee for their co-operation and support during this month. We had to deal with a number of difficult questions relating to the organization of work for the present session, which as we all know is particularly important in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I wish my successor, the representative of Italy, a very successful chairmanship, for, as the Committee starts its consideration of substantive questions, progress that might be made during the month of March will be essential for the contributions that the Committee might make to the special session.

During the first month, we achieved some progress in the work of the Committee; it was, unfortunately, not of a substantive nature, but nevertheless of some significance. We are approaching the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament without a record we can really be proud of. The awakened conscience of mankind to realities beyond expressions of concern for humanity compels us to strive more than ever to bring our words and actions closer together, for, however strong we get militarily, this strength will not last forever, as the destinies of the previous military giants show. Moreover, history also shows that deception does not live long.

Perhaps our Committee is most aware of the social and economic cost equivalent of gigantic military expenditures, which have no other consequences than misery and poverty for millions of innocent human beings. And as we have the greatest responsibility for halting the arms race, we are responsible to God, to our consciences and to present and future generations for every unit of resource that we divert from its true use, that is, to provide for the economic and cultural needs of mankind, into the production of arms. Therefore, we should follow the issues with more care and determination and dispense, as much as possible, with political games.

Each one of us present here should try to avoid, as much as possible, being a one-way transmitter of official positions in this forum. If we ourselves believe in what we are doing here, then we should make it our primary objective to transmit back to those who make the ultimate decisions the true aspirations of the world community for permanent peace and convince them of the indispensability of this and similar fora to the achievement of that end and rid, once and for all, every human being on earth from the anxiety of annihilation. I can only hope that, in the coming months, we shall begin to take positive steps in this direction.

(The Chairman)

Before concluding, I would like to express my thanks to Ambassador Riki Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee, for his invaluable advice and assistance during this month; working with him was a pleasure as well as an experience. The Committee is most fortunate to have him as its Secretary and guide. I am also grateful to all members of the Secretariat of the Committee, as well as to the interpreters, the technical services and conference attendants for their co-operation.

Now I have an announcement: the contact group on "Priorities" will meet tomorrow at 9.15 a.m. and the group on "Principles" will meet on Monday at 10 a.m. in room C 108.

As agreed by the Committee last week, we will hold an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 10.30 a.m. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 2 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 2 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario Alessi

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T.C. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss R. de CLERQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. J. GAUDREAU
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. J. MOEPERT
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. MALITZA

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV
Mr. B.T. SURIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMNERHAYES
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. H. BUSBY
Ms K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. P. CORDEN

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUIAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Ms ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 159th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Under the rotation system, it is Italy's privilege and responsibility, and mine personally, to assume the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March. I first wish to address myself to the outgoing Chairman, who has had the difficult task of getting our work under way. I know that I speak for all members of the Committee when I express our gratitude to Mr. Mahallati, leader of the Iranian delegation, for the skill he displayed in guiding our discussions during the first month of this session. Thanks to his patience, courtesy and understanding, we are now in a position to begin the phase of substantive discussions.

I shall try to follow the example he has set in order to pave the way for any possible progress in the awesome task that confronts us. Since we have so little time left before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, March will in many respects be a crucial month for the tangible results the Committee is expected to achieve. With the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Chemical Weapons, Radiological Weapons and Negative Security Assurances, in addition to the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Committee will now be in a position to engage in substantive negotiations. I hope that all member countries will take full advantage of the opportunities these Working Groups offer and make every effort to achieve real progress during the first part of the session.

The Committee on Disarmament also has other tasks with which it has to deal. I am thinking in particular of the consideration of nuclear questions, which are of the highest priority; the discussion in informal meetings of problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the consideration of ways and means of revising the composition of the Committee and improving its working methods and functioning; and the preparation of the special report for the second special session.

We also hope that the delegations of non-member States of the Committee will make the interesting contributions to which they have accustomed us in the past.

In order to guide us effectively in our common effort, I, as Chairman, will always be ready to establish contact and hold consultations with all delegations. I am counting a great deal on the co-operation and indulgence of all and will constantly have to call upon both these attributes. My few months of experience as Permanent Representative of Italy to the Committee on Disarmament convince me that I will have the benefit of both.

I am also aware that I shall receive invaluable assistance from the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, to whom I wish to convey my warm appreciation, from his deputy, Mr. Berasategui, and from the secretariat staff and services, all of whom contribute to the continuity and effectiveness of our discussions.

In drawing attention to my determination to spare no effort to ensure the progress of our work, I am, in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to me, merely carrying out the will of the Italian Government, which has always attached fundamental importance to efforts to place international peace and security on more stable and equitable foundations.

(The Chairman)

Although the disarmament effort is fraught with disappointments, it continues to be one of the noblest and most important tasks that man can undertake. There is thus only one approach which is in keeping both with the deepest aspirations of our peoples and with the demands of international reality. It is based on the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter, which gives effect to the right of peoples to peace, security and the unceasing and unfaltering pursuit of the efforts we are making here.

It is in this light that Italy perceives its contribution to the advancement of the multilateral disarmament negotiations and in this spirit that I will make every effort to carry out the task entrusted to my delegation during the month of March.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Committee continues today its consideration of item 2 of its agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". As usual, in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, it is the right of any Member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention. I have on my list of speakers for today the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutresna. I give him the floor.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, it is indeed my privilege to be the first speaker at this meeting of our Committee today under your chairmanship. I should therefore like at the outset to express the congratulations of my delegation to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March. My delegation extends its full co-operation to you in carrying out your task. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that, after having devoted ourselves in February mainly to organizational matters, the work of our Committee this month will be of a more substantive nature in view of the urgent need for us to concentrate our work also on the preparation of the Committee's special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Jafar Mahallati of Iran, who presided over the Committee last month with distinction when we were engaged in the difficult work of paving the way to the stage at which the Committee finds itself today.

The fact that the "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" are inscribed for the fourth consecutive year as the first two items of the Committee's agenda undeniably indicates the great importance that the Committee attaches to these two questions.

Concerns about the dangers that emanate from continued nuclear-weapon testing, such as radio-active contamination, proliferation and the qualitative "improvement" of nuclear weapons, have been incessantly expressed in the past and will undoubtedly be expressed again. Figures and statistics on continued nuclear-weapon testing and the nuclear arms race have been repeatedly cited and will probably be cited again.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

Expressions of deep concern on the unrelenting nuclear arms race that brings the world closer to the danger of nuclear war have been made year after year, in this Committee, in the General Assembly, as well as in other forums. Feelings of disappointment and perhaps frustration have been and will certainly be manifested again as a result of the failure of the Committee to initiate substantive negotiations on those two items, in spite of the fact that all the members of the United Nations accorded by consensus the highest priority to those two questions during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Numerous working papers have been submitted in the past to this Committee and resolutions have been adopted year after year by the General Assembly calling for multilateral negotiations on those two items in this Committee and for the establishment of ad hoc working groups for that purpose. Expressions of disappointment and regret have been, and will continue to be made, on the failure of the Committee to arrive at a consensus on the setting up of two ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2, enabling the Committee in its previous sessions to initiate actual negotiations on the subjects. Proposals for the constitution of an ad hoc working group on item 1 for the current session of the Committee were again rejected.

My delegation has had the opportunity, on previous occasions, to state its position on those two subjects. Very recently, at the 152nd plenary meeting held on 9 February, my delegation stated again that, since an ad hoc working group has proved to be the most appropriate forum for the conduct of serious negotiations, ad hoc working groups respectively on nuclear test ban and cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have therefore to be established. The establishment of an ad hoc working group is of course not an end in itself. It will certainly constitute a sound start of a beginning; it is not a symbolic question; it is of a practical nature. My delegation continues to believe also that such an establishment in itself reflects the seriousness with which the Committee treats the subject-matter. Not only in this Committee, but also in all other multilateral negotiating bodies, working groups have proven to be the most suitable means for the conduct of actual negotiations.

I should not repeat at length, here and now, why my delegation continues to attach the greatest importance to those two questions. It suffices to state the following. Being a party to the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water of 1963, we note with disappointment that, today, more than 19 years after the conclusion of this Treaty, its objective, as stated in the second preambular paragraph of the Treaty, which reads "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and "to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radio-active substances", has not materialized. Being a country party to the NPT of 1968, thus renouncing the nuclear weapons option, we also have to note with disappointment that the provisions of the eighth preambular paragraph, wherein the parties declared "their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament", remain unimplemented, even though almost 15 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty. My

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

delegation shares the concern expressed by the distinguished representative of Nigeria, who, in his statement at the plenary meeting on 9 February, said that it is a matter of great concern for those States which were trusting enough to become parties to the NPT to realize that the provisions of article VI of that Treaty have become a dead letter.

It is therefore a matter of deep concern to my delegation, and I believe also to most delegations around this table, that our Committee has failed to set up an ad hoc working group for item 1 of our agenda. Few delegations prefer to deal with the matter in informal meetings. But my delegation submits that exchanges of views which would take place in these informal meetings, however useful they may be, would have no practical significance, considering that our Committee is not a deliberative body, but a negotiating forum. We are not engaged here in a seminar or a study group. We are here to negotiate, not just to deliberate.

It was further argued that the matter would be best dealt with by the nuclear Powers themselves. We of course agree that negotiations on nuclear-weapon tests among the nuclear-weapon States should be resumed; the Final Document itself states that they should be concluded urgently. But if we have agreed to put a subject on the agenda, we are also supposed to agree that substantive negotiations on the item should be conducted. I fail to understand, therefore, how can one agree to the inclusion of an item in the agenda, but refuse its negotiation.

It was also argued that a comprehensive test ban could not help reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and that this subject could only be dealt with when substantial reductions of the nuclear arsenal have been achieved. Does this mean to suggest that the trilateral negotiations would not be resumed at all and that item 1 should be taken out of the Committee's agenda? Does this also mean that one of the "original Parties" to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 is no longer determined to continue negotiations "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", as it pledged in the second preambular paragraph of the said Treaty?

If the Final Document attaches the greatest importance and accordingly gives the highest priority to nuclear weapons, it is because such weapons are of the most destructive nature and pose the greatest danger to mankind and civilization. While attaching the utmost importance to the necessity of halting nuclear-weapon tests and curbing and reversing the nuclear arms race, my delegation also realizes the great danger that the conventional arms race poses to international security, particularly since more States are now involved in such a race. The area where the arms race is taking place also seems to have been widening and the Indian Ocean is a case in point. Being one of the littoral States of the Indian Ocean, which was declared a zone of peace by General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), Indonesia therefore follows with great concern the arms race in the area, which takes place in the context or as a result of the Superpowers' rivalry, because of its adverse effect on the security interests of the littoral and also the hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

It is against the background of this growing Superpower rivalry and the ensuing tensions prevailing in various parts of the world that the danger of the continuous production of new and sophisticated conventional weapons has taken on a greater dimension and, as my delegation sees it, has forced countries in the region concerned to increase the quality as well as the quantity of their conventional weapons. For the conventional armament producing countries, exports of such weapons seem to be based, apart from perhaps political considerations, also on economic interests. Sales of conventional weapons seem to constitute one of the important sources of income for the producing countries. These sales seem to have become particularly important today when the world economic situation is deteriorating and when inflation and unemployment in certain countries are mounting. On the other hand, many of the developing countries, particularly in regions where tensions prevail, being the recipients of conventional armaments sold by producing developed nations, have been forced to increase their expenditures to obtain more up-to-date and sophisticated conventional weapons and some have been doing so at the expense of their development efforts. What seems to be happening thereby is in effect contrary to what was recognized in the Final Document concerning the close relationship between disarmament and development, on the basis of which one expects, rightly so, that released resources as a result of disarmament measures would go to economic and development purposes.

My delegation therefore does not lose sight of the importance of reversing the conventional arms race, particularly because the largest share of military expenditures reportedly goes to conventional armaments. According to an article which appeared in "ICDA News 1 - The Newsletter of the International Coalition for Development Action", January 1982, conventional weapons account at present for 80 per cent of total military spending. The article states further: "Thus if the world managed to destroy all nuclear weapons, global military spending would be reduced only by one-fifth, leaving the remaining four-fifths untouched". The article also quoted the Brandt Report, which states, inter alia, that:

"The military expenditure of only half a day would suffice to finance the whole malaria eradication programme of the World Health Organization and less would be needed to conquer riverblindness, which is still the scourge of millions.

A modern tank costs about 1 million dollars; that amount could improve storage facilities for 100,000 tons of rice and thus save 4,000 tons or more annually; one person can live on just over a pound of rice a day. The same sum of money could provide 1,000 classrooms for 30,000 children.

For the price of one jet fighter (20 million dollars) one could set up about 40,000 village pharmacies.

One-half of 1 per cent of one year's world military expenditure would pay for all the farm equipment needed to increase food production and approach self-sufficiency in food-deficit low-income countries by 1990".

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

It is obvious therefore that, if we speak about converting resources as a result of the disarmament measures in general and the halting of and reversing the arms race, in particular, the importance of such measures in the field of conventional armaments should not be overlooked. But, since nuclear weapons, as stated by the Final Document, pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization our most urgent task at present is to remove the threat of nuclear war and, because the immediate objective of the disarmament process is the elimination of such a war, it is imperative therefore for us to give the highest priority to the curbing of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. If the question of conventional arms has not been so far given the emphasis it might perhaps deserve, it is because the matter is not as pressing as the case of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, considering the immense destructive capacity of nuclear arms.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to stress once again the utmost importance it attaches to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the halting of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Much more can still be said ad infinitum on these subjects. Appeals for the demonstration of "political will" have been made year after year and will perhaps be made again and again, although they may perhaps sound pointless to some. We hope that all those statements and appeals will not fall on a deaf ear. How can we mobilize world public opinion and disseminate information about our efforts to curb and reverse the arms race if this Committee, which is supposed to be the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, cannot even start negotiations on items that have been accorded the highest priority? The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, stated, inter alia, at the first special session, that "it is necessary to explore frankly the dangers of the continuation of the arms race and to dispel illusions that lasting peace and security can co-exist with huge accumulations of means of destruction, or that economic development can go side by side with the accelerated arms race". Now nearly four years have elapsed since that statement was made and we in the Committee still have not been able to make even an initial step in our efforts to curb the arms race. I am afraid that additional year of failure of our Committee will make it more difficult for the Committee to achieve concrete progress in halting and reversing the arms race and in achieving disarmament, in the nuclear field in particular. If there will be only losers in a nuclear war, then there will be no winner in the arms race either.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Sutresna for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan, the representative of the Soviet Union. I give him the floor.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should like first of all, Mr. Chairman, to express my satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March. We hope that your knowledge and experience will enable you to organize the work of the Committee during this, as you rightly put it, crucial month in such a way that we can conduct our negotiations in an extremely effective and constructive manner.

I should also like to express my gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of Iran, Mr. Mahallati, whose difficult task it was to supervise the opening of the Committee's work at this session.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to dwell upon the question of the prohibition of neutron weapons. It is hardly necessary to prove that this is one of the most urgent questions in the limitation of the arms race, the protection of mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe. It is sufficient for each of us to study the materials of the various international anti-war movements in the world, in the West or the East, the North or the South, in order to understand the great concern which is now arising everywhere in connection with the decision of the United States Government concerning the production of nuclear neutron weapons.

For the first time, in December 1981, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a special resolution on this matter at its thirty-sixth session. Various bodies of the non-aligned movement have also repeatedly advocated the unconditional prohibition of this type of weapon of mass destruction. Thus, serious concern in connection with the appearance of neutron weapons was expressed in the communiqué of the meeting of foreign ministers and heads of delegations of non-aligned States at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 and 28 September 1981. The resolution of the OPANAL Council, adopted at the beginning of this year, 1982, also urges the prevention of the danger connected with the production of neutron weapons. The list of documents of various international bodies and organizations that are similar in content could be multiplied. In the Committee on Disarmament, also, many delegations, reflecting the concern of the international community at the decision concerning the production of neutron weapons, have urged the starting without delay of negotiations on its prohibition within the framework of our Committee.

True, there are also some delegations which are carefully by-passing this question. They consider it appropriate, for example, in the Committee on Disarmament, to touch upon matters relating exclusively to the sovereign competence of States and to their social systems. And one honourable representative, as you know, complained at great length about the ideology which has magnetic force for hundreds of millions of peoples but which he personally, it seems, does not like.

The activity of these delegations -- and I have no doubt the members of the Committee know which delegations I am referring to -- on the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons was aimed solely at blocking the possibility of negotiations on this urgent matter.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Speaking on this question, certain delegations put forward various arguments. Let us analyse these arguments.

The first and most commonly adduced one was the claim that neutron weapons are merely a "harmless", "humane" type of nuclear weapon and that there is therefore no need to single out this question from the whole complex of problems involved in the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the negotiations on which, by the way, also cannot commence through the fault of the same delegations. Let us examine the real character and quality of these "humane" weapons — nuclear neutron weapons.

First of all, neutron munitions are a new system of nuclear weapons with all the striking factors inherent in such weapons. Although some of the usual characteristics of nuclear weapons, such as the blast wave, are somewhat less marked in neutron weapons, they are still very important.

Thus, according to the estimates of the Western experts, the use of a relatively "low yield" neutron device of 1 kt would destroy all the buildings and installations within a radius of 300 metres.

Secondly, the nuclear neutron weapons have an initial radiation power 10 times greater than traditional nuclear weapons.

According to data published in the press, within a radius of 1 km from the epicentre of the explosion of a 1 kt charge, people would be subject to a radiation dose of 8,000 rad or more; at a distance of 2 km from the epicentre the dose would be 650 rad, while at a distance of 2.5 km it would be 200 rad. It may be noted that for human beings the lethal dose LD-50 is estimated to be 200 rad.

I should like to quote the words of our most eminent scientist and President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Academician A.P. Alexandrov. "Neutron weapons", he said, "do not merely kill. For each person killed there would be 10 times more people exposed to various doses of radiation. Some of them would die within different periods of time, while others, remaining alive, would produce abnormal offspring as a result of the damage caused to genetic, hereditary structures". The English geneticist G. Edwards entirely agrees with these conclusions. According to his opinion, the special feature of neutron weapons "consists in the fact that the period of time during which it can mutilate a person is unlimited, and even after several generations following the use of this weapon" — after several generations, gentlemen — "children would be born mutilated by radiation".

So, the assertions about the "humane" character of neutron weapons do not stand up to any criticism; they can be described as being blasphemous.

The second argument used by these delegations is that neutron weapons are, they claim, "defensive" weapons and will be used mainly to repel massive tank attacks. Let us examine this allegation too.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I have here an illustration from an article in the West German magazine, Stern. With the artistic expression worthy, it seems to us, of a better cause, it depicts the explosion of a nuclear neutron device with a 1 kt yield and gives information about its consequences. Only at a distance of more than 1,200 metres from the epicentre of the explosion would a man, as the article puts it, "have a chance to survive".

Let us look at this picture as non-experts.

The area of the "death circle" within a radius of 1,200 metres is about 4.5 km². The average density of the population in the heavily populated areas of Central Europe which is primarily where, it is said, it is planned to use neutron weapons, is about 250 persons per square kilometre (if we simply divide the total population of the Federal Republic of Germany by its area). This means that on the average as a result of the explosion of only one neutron bomb more than 1,000 civilians are doomed to death. The famous decision of the United States Administration envisages the production of 1,130 neutron warheads. (No one has said, by the way, that this is the final figure.) The existence of these bombs in the arsenal of the United States means literally the inevitable death of a minimum of one and a half million civilians — and I repeat, that is the minimum. Should the neutron bomb explode over the housing blocks of cities, the number of its victims would increase many times.

And how is it related to tanks, distinguished delegates? Even if we take the inflated figures given by the NATO countries for the number of tanks in the Warsaw Treaty countries, the total number of their crews is 10 times less than the minimum figure I gave for the losses among the civilian population.

It should be noted that many Western experts have already expressed their doubts about the possibility of the use of neutron weapons for so-called defensive purposes since tank attacks, according to modern ideas, will be carried out not in large compact groups but in a dispersed fashion.

It is also claimed that the decision on the full-scale production of neutron weapons is defensive in character since it is intended to store these weapons on the territory of the United States itself.

Allow me in this connection to quote the opinion on this matter of the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Charles Hernu, whose competence in this matter is hardly likely to be questioned by anyone in this room. On 10 August last year, three days after the adoption of the decision on neutron weapons Mr. Hernu stated the following: "The theory of the use of neutron weapons contains the idea that the United States and the USSR could start limited warfare on the territory of Europe. It is exactly in this sense, I have said, that the decision of President Reagan is ambiguous, for I do not believe that these weapons for theatre military operations can be of any use to them on their own territory. This fact, it seems to me, could lead the Americans to ask their partners in NATO to accept these weapons for storage".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The European continent is the main but not the sole region which may become the victim of the use of neutron weapons. According to the statement made by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the United States "will use neutron weapons everywhere in the world". They may be used by the United States "rapid deployment forces" which are, as is known, intended for actions in countries rich in sources of raw materials. Other regions of the world are also running a real and increasing danger. Today it is the Near or Middle East; tomorrow it may prove to be Africa, Latin America, southern Asia or any other area of the world that falls under the definition of "theatre of military operations".

Thus, the notion of the "defensive" character of neutron weapons is a pure invention and cannot be taken seriously. This weapon is very attractive to any potential aggressor as a means for a first nuclear strike. By exploding several neutron bombs over industrial centres and destroying first of all their inhabitants as well as their defenders, the aggressor would clear a way for himself and avoid a bloody battle, since in this case he would not have to fight for each building and there would be no destruction delaying his advancement.

The third argument. Some propagandists of neutron weapons, including those in the Committee on Disarmament, have tried to depict them as almost a "stabilizing factor", capable of slowing down and maybe even halting the arms race. What can be said in respect of this claim?

The particular danger of neutron weapons resides precisely in the fact that they eliminate the distinction between non-nuclear and nuclear warfare, lower the so-called nuclear threshold and are, in fact, the "ideal" instrument for unleashing a global thermonuclear war.

Many Europeans, who are those primarily threatened by neutron weapons, have understood this. For example, the eminent French physicist Paul-Marie de la Gorce gave a detailed and objective analysis of the evolution of American military doctrine in the light of the decision on the full-scale production of nuclear neutron weapons. He pointed out, in particular, that the direction of this evolution is towards finding possibilities for the use of nuclear armed forces against the nuclear forces of other countries. An article published in the newspaper Figaro of 17 August 1981 states the following: "Whatever the methods considered and their theoretical foundation, often confused and questionable, the object is to make 'atomic war' possible, that is, rational, admissible and winnable. The 'neutron bomb' is one of the most important means for achieving this end. This is the real state of affairs".

In an important research report by SIPRI on nuclear radiation in warfare it is clearly pointed out that the relatively "humane" character of neutron weapons in respect of material installations "may encourage the use of the neutron bomb on the territory of an ally in conditions under which the deployment of ordinary nuclear bombs would have been vigorously opposed. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons would thus be considerably lowered, with the danger of the conflict escalating into a full-scale nuclear war".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Thus, the appearance of neutron weapons in military arsenals represents a destabilizing factor, which will inevitably lead to a new and dangerous spiralling of the arms race.

The fourth argument. Lastly, some delegations in this room, and also at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, while not objecting to negotiations on the prohibition of neutron weapons, tried to link this question with negotiations on the limitation of medium-range missiles and, in particular SS-20s. If I am not mistaken, this idea was expressed in the statements of some delegations of neutral and non-aligned countries. Well, although we do not see any direct link between these types of weapons, nevertheless we have always stated that there is no area of disarmament and no category of weapon on which agreement cannot be reached.

The negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe have, as you know, already started here in Geneva, and we have repeatedly expressed our hope for their speedy and successful conclusion. But no negotiations are being conducted on the subject of neutron weapons, and we believe that negotiations on that topic too should be started without delay.

All the above observations go to show the complete untenability of the position of those States which, on various far-fetched pretexts, are preventing the initiation of negotiations on one of the most urgent aspects of the complex problem of the limitation of the arms race. There is no doubt that nuclear neutron weapons belong to those types of weapons of mass destruction which, by lowering the threshold of a nuclear war, are pushing the world towards a nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet delegation felt compelled to explain in detail again its views on the question of the prohibition of neutron weapons in view, in particular of the fact that this matter will be the subject of discussion at the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We do not see any justification for further delay in resolving this issue. Our delegation is ready to conduct serious negotiations on the basis of equality and equal security and of a genuine desire on the part of the participants in achieving positive results. The Soviet Union was the first to draw the attention of peoples to the danger in the emergence of this means of mass destruction, and took the initiative in proposing that it should be prohibited. As you know, President Leonid Brezhnev has stated that the Soviet Union will not embark on the production of neutron weapons if other States do not possess such weapons, and it is ready to conclude an agreement prohibiting these weapons once and for all. Here in the Committee, a group of socialist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR) as long ago as in 1978 submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons. This document (CCD/559) can still be the basis for constructive negotiations. It contains an undertaking by the States parties not to produce, stockpile, deploy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons. The draft also contains provisions concerning control, a procedure for consultations and the co-operation of the parties in the process of the implementation of the convention. We are prepared to take into account any suggestions or comments that may be made by the participants in the negotiations as regards the revision of this text.

We propose the establishment without delay of an appropriate ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament, for the preparation of a draft convention.

There is one more reason why our delegation is so insistently urging the discussion of the question of neutron weapons. We consider that never before in the history of disarmament negotiations have their participants been confronted with evil in such a "pure" form as in the case of the "pure" neutron bomb. This weapon is the direct product of a maniac conviction that all human beings are monsters and that war is the natural condition of human society. I am merely quoting the words of the American scientist Sam Cohen, the "father" of the neutron bomb. Consequently, the world community and the United Nations General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, are entitled to know and should be told the truth about who is preventing — and for what reason — the immediate starting within an appropriate organizational framework of negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. We consider it abnormal that, given the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly on the one hand, and concrete draft documents aimed at implementing the decisions of the General Assembly on the other, the Committee is obliged to stand helpless in the face of this tremendous danger because of the position of a certain number of delegations.

In conclusion, the delegation of the Soviet Union wishes, while it has the floor, to draw the attention of members of the Committee to a TASS statement of 19 February 1982 which we have had circulated as an official document of the Committee (CD/253). We shall be able to refer to this matter at greater length when the Committee discusses the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 157th plenary meeting, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria, His Excellency Ambassador Nettel.

Mr. NETTEL (Austria): Mr. Chairman, may I express my delegation's sincere satisfaction in seeing you assume the responsibility of guiding this Committee through its important work during the month of March. It gives me particular pleasure to welcome you, an eminent representative of our good neighbour, Italy, as Chairman of the Committee at this crucial stage in its work.

As regards the Chairman for the month of February, the representative of Iran, my delegation acknowledges with appreciation his efforts to overcome the procedural obstacles which are usually the prominent feature at the beginning of each year's session.

Taking the floor for the first time in the course of the 1982 session, I wish to put on record our gratitude that the Austrian delegation has again been allowed to participate in the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies.

By observing most attentively the work of the Committee and its working groups, my delegation demonstrated already last year its great interest in the work of this body. The representatives of Austria will not fail to intensify this learning process, the outcome of which will hopefully permit us to contribute actively to the future work to be undertaken in this forum.

My delegation is well aware that, according to the agreed schedule, the time for statements of a more general nature has already passed. With your kind indulgence, I shall nevertheless make some remarks of a more comprehensive character; this is of course due to the fact that non-member States obtained permission to make statements only a week ago.

So, permit me to look briefly into the past, upon which this new session of the Committee on Disarmament will have to build. The Austrian authorities have closely examined the 1981 report of the Committee and took note with satisfaction of some progress which was achieved regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons. Austria joined those States which welcomed this development during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, which, however, urged the Committee with no lesser degree of concern to continue sincere and meaningful negotiations on a convention prohibiting the development, production or stockpiling of all chemical weapons. My country, being located in one of the most sensitive areas of this globe, is conscious of the incredible danger it would encounter if such terrible weapons were to be used in its region. As a matter of fact, Austria itself has always been free of chemical weapons, by conviction and past experience, as well, later on, as a consequence of a legal commitment laid down in the State Treaty of 1955. We sincerely hope that the "Elements suggested by the Chairman", which are contained in last year's report, can soon be transformed into formal treaty provisions. Negotiations conducted in good faith and oriented towards an early conclusion should be one of the main tasks of the Committee during its 1982 session. In view of this overall objective, we consider

(Mr. Nettel, Austria)

the extension of the working groups' mandate, as decided recently by the Committee, to be an important step forward. Any concrete achievement towards the elaboration of a convention will be highly appreciated by the second special session, which will judge the Committee not by its words, but by its deeds.

As regards the consideration of nuclear disarmament by the Committee on Disarmament we learned with some apprehension that there had been no progress at all. Looking in particular for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, my Government regrets that the trilateral talks have not been resumed and that it has not been possible to establish within the Committee a working group, which, to a certain extent, might have been instrumental for the reopening of these trilateral negotiations. As a consequence, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, Austria joined those States which stressed the necessity to give high priority to the CTB issue and which requested the Committee to initiate substantive negotiations, which should be conducted in a working group established to that effect. It is therefore with much regret that we have learned these days that the Committee so far has again been unable to establish such a group. If the creation of a formal group is considered too far-reaching a step by certain delegations, all possibilities for intermediate measures should be explored so as to take appropriately into account the high priority mark assigned to this item by the international community as a whole.

May I also briefly mention our continuing interest in the issue of non-proliferation. This concern is clearly demonstrated by the fact that this year's International Seminar for young diplomats at Klesheim Castle in Austria will deal exclusively with the question of non-proliferation. We do hope that one or another junior representative to the Committee will be able to attend this Seminar.

May I refer again to the last General Assembly because that body is, for a non-member of the Committee, the focus of its disarmament policies and the main forum for the presentation of new ideas concerning international security in particular. In his statement delivered on 1 October 1981, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, W.P. Pahr, expressed concern regarding the continuing arms race and the failure with respect to balanced disarmament. He suggested that objective procedures for assessing and verifying the true level of armament in the world could contribute to a process of the progressive and balanced lowering of these levels. Our proposal to study mechanisms, to which could be entrusted the task of verifying and evaluating the state of armament on an objective basis, was the subject of consultations. In the light of the reactions received, the initial project was re-examined by my authorities and the revised version circulated in New York as a working paper (A/C.1/36/14), which might serve as a basis for further consideration, possibly within the framework of the second special session. I and my colleagues would be ready to discuss this matter informally with the members of the Committee and would welcome further reactions on this issue, which is related to the area of confidence-building measures, as well as to that of verification and, through these links, also connected to the concept of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Confidence-building constitutes an important feature of another subject-matter under consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, the so-called security guarantees, which my delegation prefers to label "commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States". May I refer in this connection to another proposal by the Austrian Government, which I had the honour to present to the Committee in July of last year. At that time, I referred in particular to certain doubts which arose with

(Mr. Nettel, Austria)

respect to the legal value and the operational character of the existing commitments. In order to dissipate these uncertainties, the Austrian Government proposed that the Committee should, through the General Assembly, approach the International Court of Justice, which could, by means of an advisory opinion, give its views on the legal nature of these declarations. Such an opinion would certainly not prejudice the further discussion of this question in the Committee, a discussion which will always be highly political in nature. Such a juridical opinion might however be considered helpful in a situation which seems to be blocked in many respects.

My Government is quite aware of the close link between the adverse international climate and the possibilities for progress in this Committee. A disillusioned and cynical approach to multinational disarmament efforts is, however, no reasonable alternative, especially not for the younger generation, which, leaving aside technicalities and strategic specifics, harbours idealistic aspirations for a peaceful world without weapons. Disarmament can certainly not be achieved by mere goodwill and wishful thinking; political realism teaches that lesson. Tensions have been mounting these last months in the European region as a consequence of behaviour inconsistent with the Helsinki Rules concerning the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Situations of foreign occupation and violations of international law have continued in other areas of the globe. The use of force in certain regions has created counterpressures. New armament programmes have been approved as a consequence of diminished security perceptions. There is, however, one glimmer of hope, since the dialogue between the Superpowers has been resumed on the question of intermediate-range missiles. We hope that this new dialogue augurs well for a certain improvement of the East-West climate, which might also give the Committee on Disarmament the opportunity to engage in real and meaningful negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Nettel for his statement and for the kind and friendly words he addressed to me and my country. The statement he has just made is the last on my list for today. I would like to know whether any other delegations wish to speak? If not, I suggest that we should now briefly consider the question of the request made by Switzerland. I have asked the secretariat to circulate the draft decision which concerns the request by Switzerland and is contained in Working Paper No. 56. The request was circulated to the members of the Committee last Friday in the document boxes and was also made available to delegations today at the opening of this plenary meeting. If there is no objection, I suggest that we should suspend this plenary meeting for a few minutes to consider Working Paper No. 56. I hope that we shall rapidly be able to reach a consensus on this matter; we could then immediately resume the plenary meeting to adopt the decision.

If there is no objection, the plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.05 p.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The 159th plenary meeting is resumed. The Committee has before it Working Paper No. 56.1/ containing a draft decision concerning Switzerland's request to be permitted to participate during the 1982 session in the discussions on chemical weapons. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

If no other speaker wishes to take the floor, I intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 4 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

1/ "In response to the request of Switzerland [CD/254] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1982 in the discussions on chemical weapons at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group established on that item."

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario Alessi

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. P. BATCHER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. WANIEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. J. MOEPERT
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN
Mr. N. KLINGLER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. B. RUSSIN

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. M.J. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
Mr. M.H. IPPOLITOV
Mr. V.A. KROKHA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. H. BUSBY
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. J. MISKEL

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEKA
Ms. ESAKA EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. OSIL GNOK

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASA TEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 160th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. Today, the Committee will continue its consideration of item 2 of its agenda: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. However, members who would like to make statements on any other subject relevant to the Committee's work are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure. I would now like to welcome Mr. Eivinn Berg, the Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who will address the Committee today. Mr. Berg is an experienced diplomat who has been posted in Geneva, Brussels and the United States. He was appointed State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in October 1981. I am sure that the Committee will appreciate the personal interest he takes in our work. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Morocco, China, Yugoslavia, Mexico, the German Democratic Republic and Norway. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Komives.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, as I have already had a chance to welcome you as a new colleague, permit me now to congratulate you also as Chairman of the Committee for the month of March. When I offer you the full support of my delegation, I also express the belief that a fresh hand is usually successful in steering the course, as has been illustrated by the example of your predecessor. Ambassador Jafar Mahallati of Iran deserves the expression of our appreciation for the way in which he presided over the Committee during its very difficult opening phase.

In my statement on 11 February, I gave a summary of my Government's position on most of the items before the Committee on Disarmament and laid special stress upon the two items that are at the head of our agenda. Today I want to reaffirm that, for the Hungarian People's Republic, for all its people as well as for the Government, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament continue to be questions of the highest priority and, within the complex of measures required to achieve that most important objective, we attach the greatest urgency to the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

This reaffirmation of our full commitment to the solution of the most burning problems of our generation -- which is, in fact, a commitment shared by the overwhelming majority of delegations -- is not at all superfluous in the light of what has been stated by the representatives of the United States, either in general before this plenum or in more detail in various subsidiary bodies. The policy of intensifying military preparations in a futile quest for military superiority has already hindered the work of the Committee for some time, but it is only in the last few weeks that even the most optimistic of delegations have come to realize the true nature of that policy, with all its consequences for the disarmament negotiations.

The Hungarian delegation fully shares the feelings of "regret and total dissatisfaction" and of "disappointment, ... even resentment" -- to quote only two of the numerous expressions of apprehension from recent statements by delegations from all quarters of the world. The infamous policy of "linkage" is now manifest not only in matters of global political affairs, but also in questions on the agenda of this Committee, as was rightly pointed out by Ambassador Ijewere of Nigeria, in his intervention of 25 February.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

We are not willing to accept any attempts which would relegate the nuclear test ban issue, making it but one of the elements "in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives". We are in full agreement with Dr. Rostow that "a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons"; we can also agree with him that a comprehensive test ban in itself would not help reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. But it would reduce that threat substantially if it was followed by other measures aimed at reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons.

The recipe offered by Dr. Rostow "for achieving progress towards the elimination of the nuclear menace" may sound attractive to outsiders, but not to the members of this body. "The negotiation of significant reductions in nuclear weapons, and the eventual elimination of the weapons themselves", as he suggested, without having first prevented the continuing improvement of nuclear arsenals, is nothing but a poor attempt at misrepresentation. Especially so when connected with concrete steps by his Government aimed at upsetting the balance of forces.

The Hungarian delegation always tries to remain within the limits of realities. Nevertheless, we cherished some hopes at the very beginning of this session that the Committee might perhaps be able to make headway, if not really in substance, at least in creating the necessary framework where negotiations could start in earnest. In view of the massive support of the non-aligned and neutral States, not to mention the socialist countries, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, on 15 February, even proposed a draft for the mandate of one of the working groups. Unfortunately, our hopes have been quickly dispelled by the obstinate position of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In such a situation, my delegation is not at all surprised by the strong wave of criticism that was given voice by several delegations. It is clearly a legitimate and not unwarranted reaction. However, any generalization of the responsibility for the lack of progress would only serve to cushion the impact of that criticism. The responsibility for blocking the efforts of the Committee must be born by those Governments that openly challenge the opinion, the will and the interest of all peoples. Good examples of such a critical stand were given by the representatives of Indonesia, Nigeria and Sweden.

At the same time, it is also our duty to welcome the "constructive overtures" which were offered by the delegation of the Soviet Union and to which attention was properly drawn by the representative of Brazil in his statement on 25 February.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

I hope Ambassador de Souza e Silva will not mind if I quote him twice in such a brief intervention, but I cannot help stressing how right he was in emphasizing the need for "will". First "the will to search for a generally acceptable procedure", then "will ... to engage in good faith consultations with the aim of breaking the wall of intransigence", and finally will to "permit the Committee on Disarmament to exercise the priority functions with which it was entrusted". This last remark, to my delegation, clearly means negotiations.

Before I leave the subject, let me mention briefly that my delegation understands the frustration of several delegations in face of the difficult situation which has developed in the Committee and that it appreciates the various attempts made to bring about some movement towards the negotiation of a test ban. Nevertheless, we are in agreement with the representative of the German Democratic Republic in his evaluation of the various proposals put forward by Canada, Japan and Australia.

In the context of a comprehensive test ban, several delegations referred to the non-proliferation aspect of such a measure or of the lack of such a measure. The Hungarian delegation is of the firm view that the prevention of the further geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important and timely question. This has been accentuated by the plans and practical steps leading to a build-up of nuclear arsenals on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

Under such circumstances, the elaboration and adoption of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would be of great importance.

Guided by these considerations, the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic have elaborated a working paper on the subject and transmitted it today for circulation to the Secretariat. The working paper is self-explanatory and needs no detailed introduction.

At the same time I would like to express the hope of the two delegations that the members of the Committee will give due attention to that working paper.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Minister Stručka.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): Allow me first of all to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, upon your assumption of the responsible office of Chairman of the Committee for the month of March. Allow me at the same time to express our delegation's thanks to the distinguished representative of Iran, under whose efficient guidance our Committee worked in February. We hope that, under your direction, the Committee will discuss all the questions before it in a businesslike manner and that all delegations are prepared to give you support towards that end. States which are not members of the Committee can undoubtedly also play a positive role in this respect, and we welcome their participation in our work. However, those States will, in our view, be able to give the most rational and efficient assistance to the efforts of States members of the Committee only if they make a constructive contribution towards the Committee's work in accordance with its Rules of Procedure. In particular, I should like to draw attention to rule 33, which provides that "States not members of the Committee may submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and may participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents".

We should like to draw your attention, Mr. Chairman, as well as the attention of the other delegations, to the need for strict observance of the Rules of Procedure so that the businesslike atmosphere in the Committee is not disturbed and delegations' attention is not diverted from the discussion of important and urgent items on the agenda.

Today the Czechoslovak delegation would like to comment on behalf of the group of socialist countries on some aspects of those countries' agreed position on the comprehensive programme of disarmament as contained in document CD/245 and to reply to a number of questions raised by some delegations in that connection. We note with satisfaction that the agreed position has aroused general interest and, as the statements by a number of delegations testify, has been attentively studied.

There is, I am sure, no need to explain in detail the meaning and nature of document CD/245; two statements by our delegation have already been devoted to that purpose. I should only like to emphasize one fact: our document is not a blueprint of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Rather, it is a set of reflections on the general outline and contents of the programme. We base our work in the Working Group and the contact groups on the ideas set forth in our document, putting forward, where necessary, related proposals in the form either of amendments to documents submitted by other countries or of developed and more specific versions of the provisions of our own text.

That, I dare say, is the main feature which distinguishes document CD/245 from the corresponding document of the Group of 21 (CD/223) and from the document of the western countries (CD/205). The sponsors of document CD/245 proceed from the principle that, in negotiations on individual sections of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is necessary to adopt a constructive approach with a view to reaching a universally acceptable compromise. As the work of the contact groups on objectives, priorities and principles demonstrates, the provisions of document CD/245 contribute significantly towards the elaboration of universally acceptable formulations.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

The sponsors of document CD/245 have heard with great interest the comments and questions of some delegations concerning the agreed position of the group of socialist countries. Various questions have been asked. It has to be said from the start that it still remains for all of us to seek satisfactory answers to some of those questions in our future work. That is the case, for example, of the question of the nature of the programme. That is, without doubt a very important issue. Preliminary considerations on that point were expressed last year and the year before last. But no more substantial exchange of views has yet taken place. The sponsors of document CD/245 hold the view that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not become yet another piece of paper in the archives of the United Nations, and that all States should show the political will needed for its implementation. At the same time, the socialist countries have not yet formed a definitive opinion as to how this responsible political approach towards the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be reflected in the nature of the programme. The answer to that question will no doubt be affected, to some extent, by the actual contents of the comprehensive programme of disarmament as agreed by delegations. We shall be interested to hear the views of all delegations on this question in greater detail.

A number of questions have also been asked concerning our attitude to the breakdown of measures into stages. The socialist countries already agreed at an earlier point in our work to proceed on the basis of a hypothesis whereby measures were provisionally spread over four stages. That working method is still acceptable to us, as are such other approaches as may meet with the Committee's approval and contribute to the efficient progress of the negotiations. As already pointed out, document CD/245 is not a precise draft of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Consequently, the fact that the measures listed in that document are not divided up according to separate stages does not mean that the socialist countries are against the stage-by-stage implementation of the programme. At meetings of the Working Group we have already stated our position on all four stages and have indicated what measures should, in our view, be implemented at each stage. In the course of the further work on the question of stages, we intend to strive to find mutually acceptable formulations on the basis of our proposals as put forward in the Working Group and of our joint working paper and taking account of proposals by other delegations.

With regard to the comment by the distinguished representative of India to the effect that we have not included in our document measures relating to the last stages of implementation of the programme, I should like to draw his attention to the fact that, in the course of discussion on all stages, including the last, we agreed, as fourth-stage measures, on full disbanding of armed forces and destruction of all types of armaments, and also on the prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes. That is precisely our understanding of the attainment of the final objective of general and complete disarmament.

As regards the ordering of the measures by stages, we are guided by their degree of priority, our aim being to ensure the earliest possible solution of the most immediate and urgent issues. Thus, for example, the prevention of nuclear war, the prohibition of nuclear tests and the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons should quite naturally be included in the first stage. Measures are also proposed whose implementation could only be embarked on under certain conditions, i.e. only after certain measures or sets of measures had first been implemented within the framework of the CPD. It is obviously advisable to include such measures

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

tentatively in the later stages. Take, for example, proposal (b) of the section on nuclear weapons of document CD/245: it is altogether logical that no start should be possible on the gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons until after the cessation, as a result of negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and the parallel adoption of measures for the strengthening of the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. The destruction of nuclear weapons, in turn, must be preceded by a process of gradual reduction of stockpiles of such arms.

I should also like to point out that the socialist countries do not think that the CPD should be excessively detailed. After all, we are not talking about drafting a treaty -- a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament -- but about a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which should realistically pinpoint specific measures whose implementation as an immediate objective would make a practical contribution towards the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, halt the arms race and pave the way towards enduring peace. The final objective of the programme is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. As for the details of each measure, these should be determined in the course of appropriate negotiations. In this connection, we have no objection to the setting of rough deadlines for the reaching of agreement on particular aspects of the limitation of the arms race. At the same time, the fact that, for one reason or another, negotiations in progress on one set of questions have not been completed cannot serve as grounds for postponing negotiations on other questions.

A number of specific questions were also raised concerning individual aspects of the agreed position of the socialist countries on the CPD.

Thus, the distinguished representative of India requested clarification concerning the principle we propose of equality and equal security. In the Working Group, the delegations of the socialist countries have already stated that principle in explicit terms, as follows: "In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily, the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed" (CD/239, CD/CPD/WP.60). We have also explained that this principle was not invented by us, but was taken from the "study on the relationship between disarmament and international security" prepared by experts appointed by the Secretary-General and approved by consensus by the General Assembly. In putting this question, the representative of India referred to the "imbalance which exists between nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other". First, as we understand it, disarmament negotiations are certainly not conducted between those two groups of countries. The political reality is quite different. We do not know of any disarmament negotiations where all the nuclear-weapon States are seated on one side of the table and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. On the contrary, in all negotiations, the watershed is determined, not by the principle of the parties' possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons, but by political criteria. Furthermore, I should like to add that, in its proposals, the Group of 21 envisages certain measures belonging to the sphere of bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. For example, document CD/223 of 19 August 1981 speaks of the continuation of negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments as one of the measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The principle of equality and equal security is fully applicable to that measure.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

In reply to the Indian representative's question as to what the socialist countries have in mind when they say that "the existing balance in the sphere of nuclear strength must remain undisturbed at all stages, with a constant lowering of nuclear strength levels", I should like to explain that this balance should not be understood simplistically. If, for example, the USSR understood this principle to mean that all nuclear-weapon States must simultaneously reduce their nuclear armaments by an equal number of units, it could hardly engage in strategic armaments limitation talks with the United States. I should like to recall that, under the SALT-2 agreement, which was signed but, unfortunately, has not entered into force, the Soviet Union was to reduce its strategic armaments by 250 units and the United States by about 30 vehicle units. I should also like to recall that, in its present negotiations with the United States on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe, the Soviet side also has in mind only bilateral measures. However, it quite justly considers that, although it is not a question of having those countries sign agreements, the corresponding armaments of the United Kingdom and France should be regarded as an integral part of the NATO balance. At the same time, the Soviet Union, for clearly understandable reasons, cannot consent to the impairment of its security vis-à-vis the other nuclear-weapon States as a result of the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures. In other words, when the socialist countries speak of the existing balance in the sphere of nuclear strength, they do not mean a purely numerical balance; rather, they proceed from the belief that, in defining that balance, account must be taken of a wide range of military and political factors.

We have also been asked why we included in our list of measures the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States but not the complete prohibition of the use of such weapons, even though, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, we voted in favour of the Indian proposal on the latter issue. First of all, I should like to stress once again that the proposal for the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons means that, if there is no first use, then there will be no second or third use and, consequently, no use of nuclear weapons at all. Thus, both proposals are, in substance, aimed at the same objective. Consequently, it would be legitimate for us, too, to ask a question of the representative of India and the representatives of other countries in the Group of 21: why do they have doubts about the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, even though they, too, voted in favour of a resolution on that issue at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. There is yet another question which we could put to them and to the Indian representative in particular: why do their proposals not include a proposal for the conclusion of a world convention on the non-use of force? After all, that proposal is wider than their proposal for the prohibition of the use only of nuclear weapons. Yet the representative of India in his statement on 23 February actually cast doubt on the desirability of concluding such a convention. At one and the same time, an instrument of the kind in question would prohibit the use not just of nuclear weapons, but of all other types of weapons as well. Of course, he is absolutely right in saying that the Charter of the United Nations already contains obligations concerning the non-use of force by member States, but, if we followed his logic, then there would not be any need to strive for a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons either, since that is only one of the forms -- albeit the most dangerous -- of the use of force in general.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

We should also like to draw the attention of the distinguished representative of India to the fact that the question of dissolution of political groupings which we are allegedly proposing appears to have arisen only as a result of imprecise translation. By the concept of military and political groupings as used in document CD/245 are meant such alliances as NATO, the Warsaw Pact and so on. The reference here is, of course, in no case to the non-aligned movement.

In concluding our statement, we should like to express the full agreement of the delegations of the socialist countries with the declaration by the distinguished representative of India to the effect that there is a considerable area of agreement between the positions of the Group of 21 and the group of socialist countries. We also believe that, by a process of questions and answers, we shall be able to explain our proposals in greater detail so as to bring those positions still closer together.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Mr. Melescanu.

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I should like to offer you the Romanian delegation's sincerest congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee.

Your vast experience as a negotiator at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is, for us, an additional guarantee of the best possible conditions for achieving tangible results during this month of March. I would like to assure you that you will have the Romanian delegation's constructive and friendly support for the fulfilment of your responsibilities.

Our congratulations also go to your predecessor, Mr. Mahalatti of Iran, on the courteous and patient way in which he carried out the important tasks assigned to him.

My statement today is devoted to the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which is part of our programme of work.

The participation of the Romanian delegation in this debate is based on the position of principle, expressed by other delegations as well, that the initiation of concrete negotiations on this subject, within the framework of the Committee, is not only urgently necessary, but also represents a real test of the viability of this multilateral body, which was established by the first special session devoted to disarmament. I should like to emphasize that, in my delegation's opinion, there can be no valid argument against the initiation of such negotiations. Many of the arguments we have heard stress the complexity of the measures concerning nuclear disarmament, a real Gordian knot on which the achievement of progress in all fields of disarmament depends. To our knowledge, however, there is no better -- or, indeed, any other -- way of solving complex problems than to engage in negotiations and patient research with determination and a will to find solutions acceptable for all.

(Mr. Melescanu, Romania)

We are, of course, aware of the complexity of nuclear disarmament, its importance for the security of the nuclear-weapon States and all States and the fact that such an undertaking cannot be accomplished all at once by some miracle, but we think that the Committee's task is precisely one of working out a strategy for the gradual containment of the nuclear arms race. In this Committee, we have often spoken about the need to define the time for curbing the arms race by measures such as a freeze, a halt to its development, etc. For us, this containment strategy is part of the process of halting the arms race, which, when completed, will lead to nuclear disarmament.

One essential element of this strategy is, no doubt, the need to stop the improvement and development of nuclear weapons and, in this connection, the prohibition of nuclear tests takes pride of place, as has so often been emphasized. The convincing and well-reasoned arguments put forward on this subject by the member countries of the Group of 21 and the socialist countries, as well as by other representatives, only persuade us that everything that should have been said already has been said. I will therefore merely place on record my delegation's support for the establishment of a working group of the Committee to negotiate the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests and stress that such a measure is of paramount importance in view of the forthcoming second special session.

It is also obvious that, in our discussions of practical means of halting the nuclear arms race, we cannot overlook the question of strategic doctrines. Indeed, as last year's debates showed, we must take a closer look at the concept of nuclear deterrence which provides the basis for the entire edifice that forces us to live under the constant threat of mankind's total destruction. It is perfectly obvious that, from a purely military point of view, nuclear weapons cannot be used for defensive purposes. Attempts to formulate strategic doctrines, such as the theory of deterrence, to compensate for this inherent defect of nuclear arsenals have done nothing but raise the stakes and make nuclear arsenals bigger and more sophisticated. From this point of view, the most dangerous situation by far is the one in Europe, where the great majority of States watches, helpless, as a new stage in the nuclear arms race is set in motion. As the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, recently pointed out "If we, the European countries, are unable to stop the stationing of new nuclear missiles in Europe, we will find ourselves the victims of these armaments. From a practical point of view, there is no nation, either in the East or in the West, or in the North or in the South, that will not be within range of these weapons."

Romania therefore welcomed the opening of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on medium-range missiles in Europe and expressed the hope that these negotiations will lead to positive results. Inasmuch as the strongest military forces and the most sophisticated armaments are concentrated in Europe, the danger of a major conflict in this important part of the world is extremely serious. In expressing the Romanian people's deep concern about the future of peace in Europe and the world, Romania has stated and will continue categorically to state that it is in favour of halting and speedily reducing to the

(Mr. Melescanu, Romania)

lowest possible level the stationing of medium-range missiles and any kind of nuclear weapons in Europe. It is our unshakeable belief that disarmament constitutes the fundamental, cardinal problem of Europe at the present time.

Since the presence of the above-mentioned weapons affects and directly threatens the vital interests of the European countries, we are of the opinion that it is the legitimate right of all States, whose very life is at stake, to participate, in one way or another, in negotiations on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe. The Grand National Assembly of Romania, sharing the same concern, has urged the parliaments, Governments and peoples of Europe, the United States of America and Canada, to take immediate and forceful action and to use every available means, before it is too late, to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons from the European continent, in defence of the fundamental right of all peoples to life, liberty and peace.

The Romanian delegation would like to reaffirm its view that the ultimate objective of all our efforts should be the adoption, as soon as possible, of concrete and practical measures for halting the production of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing them until they are completely eliminated and outlawed.

We therefore support the ideas on this subject presented by the Soviet delegation at the Committee's first meeting. However, with a view to achieving this ultimate objective, we also have to concern ourselves with other topics. First of all, there is the question of preventing a deliberate nuclear attack or a nuclear war caused by accident, error or miscalculation. In the present state of nuclear arsenals and in view of the present tension in international relations, this question is no longer a purely academic one; it is now of immediate importance to all countries, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. The adoption of such measures is therefore not only urgently necessary; it is also of paramount importance.

It clearly follows from all this that the priority task of the Committee on Disarmament is to take action with regard to the nuclear arms race. We have very little time left before this year's special session but we can at least show that we are determined to begin negotiations on the priority topics of nuclear disarmament. If the Committee is unable to show this willingness to act, we are convinced that important consequences will ensue. After all, what are at stake are the Committee's credibility and that of the multilateral negotiations in general.

In our statements, we have frequently pointed out that the establishment of ad hoc negotiating groups by the Committee is not an end in itself. This year, such a conclusion has to be qualified since a mere procedural decision such as one concerning the establishment of subsidiary negotiating bodies to deal with the topic of the cessation of the nuclear arms race may, in view of the special session, have a considerable impact because it will show that we all have the political will to co-operate and negotiate in a constructive spirit, lucidly and realistically.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind and friendly words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Skalli.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the Moroccan delegation is happy to see that the Chairman of our Committee for the month of March will be the representative of Italy, a great country and friend of Morocco. My delegation assures you of its full co-operation and is convinced that you will guide our work competently and effectively. On seeing the representative of Italy assume the chairmanship, we cannot fail to evoke the memory of Ambassador di Montezemolo, who was taken from us so suddenly and so tragically. We would like to express our condolences and all our sympathy to the Italian delegation. I would also like to congratulate the distinguished representatives of Indonesia and Iran, who spared no effort to speed up our work during their chairmanships. My delegation welcomes the new representatives of Australia, Bulgaria, the United States of America, Nigeria, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany and is pleased to be able to co-operate on a friendly basis with them, as it did with their predecessors in the Committee. We are also happy to be able to benefit by the competence and enthusiasm of Mr. Jaipal, the personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Secretary of our Committee. On this occasion, we also wish to express our great appreciation for the devotion and courtesy of Mr. Berasategui.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament is being held in exceptional circumstances.

The international situation is growing steadily worse: the unfavourable trends of recent years continue to prevail and persistent hot beds of tension in many parts of the world are becoming increasingly alarming. The climate of confidence has thus given way to a climate of suspicion, distrust and, hence, insecurity. As a result, the present state of international relations is, to say the least, not making our Committee's task any easier. It is, rather, likely to impart new momentum to the already unrestrained arms race.

I have no intention of dwelling further on this matter, since the seriousness of the situation is quite clear, as are its adverse effects on the process of disarmament and the efforts which our Committee is making to promote it.

And yet our Committee is meeting on the eve of an important event in which the international community has placed the greatest hopes. We are, in fact, only about eight weeks away from the start, on 9 June, of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As indicated in the provisional agenda drawn up by the Preparatory Committee last October, the second special session will have before it, inter alia, the report of the Committee on Disarmament and any draft texts submitted by it. This shows how much importance the international community attaches to the work of our Committee, which therefore has a political and moral duty to spare no effort to ensure that the hopes placed in the second special session are not dashed.

In view of these considerations, we cannot help but ask whether our Committee, which is the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, will be in a position to submit a report that is different from the unsubstantial report submitted in 1978 by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

There is no doubt that the Committee has some important advantages that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament did not have. It brings all the nuclear Powers together at the negotiating table. Its procedures, to which effect is given by Rules of Procedure, have been made somewhat more democratic. What is more, the Committee has a basic document, namely, the Final Document, which enunciates the principles and objectives -- and, in its Programme of Action, lists, by order of priority, the disarmament measures -- whose adoption and implementation might lead to general and complete disarmament. Since 1979, the Committee has thus been in a better position than the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to perform the difficult and complex task assigned to it with a greater chance of success.

We nevertheless recall that, at the end of each session held in the past three years, we have had to face the fact that no substantive results have been achieved. This encourages us to spare no effort this year to ensure that the report on our activities that we are to submit to the second special session is a positive one.

In this connection, my delegation welcomes the fact that, as a result of the spirit of compromise of the delegations which originally made certain proposals and then agreed to withdraw them, the Committee was able to adopt the agenda for this session and the programme of work for its first part in a relatively short time.

One of the contributions our Committee could make to the success of the second special session would be to elaborate the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The adoption of this programme is one of the most important items on the provisional agenda drawn up by the Preparatory Committee. It will be one of the centre-pieces of the second special session. The Working Group on this item, which, in 1980, had the benefit of the invaluable skills of Ambassador Adeniji of Nigeria and is now benefiting by the competence and experience of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, must therefore intensify its efforts if it is to achieve the desired goal on time. It has already gone a long way in the right direction. The resumption of the Group's work before the official opening of the current session is a clear indication of the extreme importance we attach to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We are of the opinion that, with the understanding and co-operation of all, the Committee will be able to complete its task within the required time limit. Its work is, moreover, facilitated by the fact that the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament were adopted by consensus by the deliberative body, the Disarmament Commission.

My delegation has already explained its point of view on the different elements of the programme, speaking either on its own behalf or together with the delegations of the neutral and non-aligned countries, both in the Commission and the Working Group. With your permission, we would nevertheless like to recall this point of view briefly.

We consider that the comprehensive programme of disarmament is an important element of the international disarmament strategy worked out by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

The programme must therefore cover all aspects of the question of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It must define the objectives of disarmament, the principles to govern the negotiations and the priorities that should apply. The programme must include all disarmament measures that may lead to the achievement of the ultimate goal, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Like any instrument of a strategic nature, the programme must indicate not only the time-frame for the achievement of all its objectives, but also the phases during which the measures provided for in the programme are to be implemented.

Implementation during these independent phases must take place in accordance with an indicative time-table that has been negotiated and agreed upon. The programme must provide for a review mechanism allowing for readjustment and changes in the light of the progress made in the implementation of each phase.

With regard to the legal nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, we are of the opinion that, if it is to be credible, this instrument must create legally binding international obligations.

As a developing country, Morocco has always stressed the fact that the comprehensive programme of disarmament must include not only disarmament measures proper, but also measures relating to the link between disarmament and development.

This is, briefly, the Moroccan delegation's point of view concerning the main aspects of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation, which takes part in the Working Group and in the contact groups chaired by the distinguished representatives of Brazil, France and the German Democratic Republic, wishes to affirm that, as in the past, it will continue to keep an open mind and to be resolutely determined to make every effort to speed up the work of these Groups.

In this connection, my delegation welcomes the agreement reached in the Working Group on the chapter relating to priorities. This is, in our view, an important step forward in the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and it has been made as a result of the spirit of compromise of all delegations and the praiseworthy efforts of Ambassador de Souza e Silva, the representative of Brazil, who so skilfully co-ordinated the work of the contact group on this chapter.

At its thirty-third session, which was held three months after the first special session on disarmament, the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/60, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to submit to it the text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at its resumed thirty-third session.

Although the Committee has, since the beginning of its work in 1979, placed this item at the top of its agenda, it has, until now, not been in a position to respond favourably to the request made by the General Assembly in its resolution 33/60.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

In the past three years, the Committee has merely continued to hold general discussions in the shadow of the negotiations conducted in 1979 and 1980 by the three nuclear Powers which are the depositaries of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It should be noted that the trilateral negotiations have not led to any results that might facilitate the task of the Committee, which has, so far, not been able to engage in genuine negotiations. The regrettable fate of the first item on our agenda is also that of the second item, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation, which believes that it is of the highest importance to continue to respect the Committee's status as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, considers that it is high time to move from the stage of exchanges of view to that of negotiations on the above-mentioned items.

My delegation continues to give preference to the establishment of subsidiary bodies and, in particular, working groups to conduct the negotiations on these two items. We hope that this problem will be solved this year so that the Committee can break the deadlock in which it finds itself.

The Moroccan delegation welcomes the fact that the Committee has agreed to re-establish the Working Groups on the items on our agenda relating to chemical weapons, radiological weapons and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively. I would like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's congratulations to the distinguished representatives of Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan on their appointment as the Chairmen of these Working Groups. It is a matter of particular satisfaction that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been revised and brought more into line with the goal we have set ourselves, namely, the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

In this connection, we note with appreciation the intensive efforts made and substantial results achieved by the Id Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons at the preceding session. My delegation is of the opinion that so much progress has been made in the work of this Group that we should, without delay, engage in the task of negotiating the text of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons. The conclusion of such a convention would undoubtedly be a crucial disarmament measure and it is one to which the international community attaches the greatest importance and highest priority.

With regard to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it would be highly desirable, particularly in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to intensify efforts to reach an agreement on an approach or a common formula to be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature. In this connection, my delegation has already had an opportunity to state that it is in favour of an international convention. We hope that the Working Group will take account of the fact that there is widespread support for the idea of such a convention.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

As to radiological weapons, we continue to be convinced that the Working Group on this question will be in a position rapidly to reach an agreement on a convention prohibiting such weapons if every member of the Working Group displays goodwill. We are, however, of the opinion that such a convention would be meaningful and credible only if it prohibited attacks on civilian nuclear installations, for it is quite obvious that there is a genuine danger of mass destruction as a result of emissions of radioactive substances caused by such attacks.

At the beginning of this statement, I said that, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, our Committee's current session is of particular importance. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the results achieved thus far do not measure up to the hope and momentum generated by the first special session. It is our duty to resolve our differences of opinion and do everything in our power to arrive at results acceptable to all. We must show much more determination, co-operation and political will to carry out the noble task entrusted to us by the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and am particularly grateful to him for the kind and friendly words he addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the current month. We believe that, under your guidance, the Committee will make progress in its work. I would also like, through you, to express our appreciation to last month's Chairman, the representative of Iran, for the contribution he made.

Today I would like to express our views on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The representatives of many countries have, in their statements, expressed their anxiety over the worsening international situation, the intensified nuclear arms race and the increasing danger of war. They have called for a halt to the nuclear arms race and the adoption of effective measures to reduce and eliminate the danger of nuclear war. The Chinese delegation shares this desire of theirs. We believe, that in order to reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear war, it is imperative to get a clear idea of the following: who is stepping up the nuclear arms race, where does the danger of nuclear war come from and how should we embark on nuclear disarmament?

In recent years, at the United Nations General Assembly and the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, we have often heard the two Superpowers accuse one another of stepping up the arms race and seeking military supremacy; and blame each other for preparing for a nuclear war. To shirk their responsibilities for the arms race, both the Soviet Union and the United States have published propaganda materials concerning their rival's military strength. Although the military build-up described and the figures provided in their statements and publications concerning each other may not be fully in keeping with the actual situation, people can still get a clear impression

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

that it is precisely the two Superpowers that are stepping up the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. According to the 1980 report of the United Nations Secretary-General entitled "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons", the nearly 50,000 warheads in the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States have a total yield of some 10 billion tons and a total explosive power about 1 million times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Their nuclear weapons are not only enormous in quantity, but also most sophisticated in quality. The new-type highly-accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles, which have a shooting range of over 10,000 km and are equipped with MIRV systems, are all to be found in the arsenals of the two Superpowers. Even they themselves admit that their weaponry possesses over-kill capacity. However, in order to seek world hegemony and gain supremacy over one another, the Soviet Union and the United States, while holding talks of one kind or another on limiting nuclear arms, are intensifying the development and deployment of new types of nuclear weapons and engaging in a new round of the nuclear arms race with qualitative improvement as its focus. It goes without saying that this does not jibe with their sweet talk of "preventing a nuclear catastrophe".

It should also be pointed out that, in the sphere of international relations, the Soviet Union and the United States, relying on their powerful military strength, vie with one another and attempt to squeeze each other out everywhere in the world, thus throwing the world into great disorder. One Superpower in particular, the one which clamours loudest for peace and disarmament, has a greater capacity and a momentum for aggression, expansion and hegemony. Disregarding the strong opposition of world public opinion, it has directly sent troops to occupy another country. It is borne out by the facts that that Superpower is the main threat to world peace and security.

From the stark reality that the USSR and the United States possess huge nuclear arsenals and that their intense rivalry threatens world peace and the security of mankind, people have come to the conclusion that the process of nuclear disarmament must begin with the two Superpowers. This is essential for reducing the danger of nuclear war and maintaining world peace.

For many years now, the people of the world have strongly demanded that the States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should halt their nuclear arms race. Many small and medium-sized countries have put forward various proposals for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. We are of the view that the Superpowers should immediately stop all activities aimed at the qualitative improvement of, and quantitative increases in, all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The cessation of the qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons should, apart from putting an end to all their nuclear tests, include the cessation of tests of non-nuclear technology such as those aimed at improving delivery systems and guidance systems. According to the statistics of renowned international research institutes, the Soviet Union and the United States have, from July 1945 until now, conducted more than 1,100 nuclear tests. In recent years, they have been carrying out nuclear tests as frequently as ever in order to meet the need of achieving nuclear supremacy. In the course of 1979, the Soviet Union alone carried out 29 tests, a number which surpassed the total of the tests conducted that year by other nuclear-weapon States and which broke its own annual record since 1963. Of all the 49 nuclear tests conducted in 1981, 21 tests, that is, almost half the total number, were conducted by the Soviet Union and 16 were conducted by the United States. The situation described above and the figures cited clearly demonstrate that the Soviet Union and the United States have no reason whatsoever to continue their nuclear tests. They should immediately stop any kind of nuclear tests. Paying lip service to the cessation of nuclear tests can in no way cover up the actual practice of stepping up nuclear tests.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

On the other hand, as is known to all, the mere cessation of the qualitative improvement of, and quantitative increases in, nuclear weapons by the Superpowers is insufficient to reduce the grave threat that their huge nuclear arsenals pose to the world. The cessation of the testing, development and production of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by a substantial reduction in and the destruction of nuclear weapons; only thus can the danger of a nuclear war be reduced. Therefore, the Superpowers should reduce as soon as possible all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Their being the first to cut nuclear armaments drastically will help reduce the nuclear threat without jeopardizing their security. As pointed out in the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "because of the vast number of strategic nuclear weapons in existence, it should be possible to undertake a major arms reduction without jeopardizing the national security of the two Superpowers". This is fully in line with objective reality. That the Superpowers should take the lead in reducing their armaments does not mean that other nuclear-weapon States should not reduce their nuclear weapons. After the two Superpowers have substantially cut their nuclear weapons and reduced the threat to the other nuclear-weapon States the other nuclear-weapon States should join them in reducing their nuclear weapons in accordance with reasonable ratios. In view of the present state of nuclear armaments, this is the only correct approach to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. However, one nuclear Power stressed with ulterior motives that "the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages", thus disregarding the huge nuclear gap between the nuclear-weapon States. Some representatives of non-aligned countries have aptly pointed out that there exists no such balance at all among nuclear-weapon States, but that there is a striking imbalance between the two Superpowers, on the one hand, and the other nuclear-weapon States, on the other. The so-called "balance" to be maintained at all stages is a pretext designed to perpetuate the Superpowers' position of nuclear supremacy and nuclear blackmail. It is evident that such a practice will neither advance the process of nuclear disarmament nor help to maintain world peace and eliminate the danger of nuclear war.

China is a developing socialist country. At present, we are fully engaged in economic construction and unwilling to use our resources for nuclear weapons. However, in the face of Superpower nuclear threats, we cannot but try to muster the necessary defensive strength to safeguard our independence, security and economic construction. The nuclear tests we have conducted are very limited in number. Being a nuclear-weapon State, China naturally bears a responsibility for nuclear disarmament. We have always stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons with a view to eliminating the imbalance between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and to removing completely the danger of a nuclear war.

The Chinese Government has on many occasions solemnly declared that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. In accordance with this stand, we will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear free-zones. All this fully demonstrates the defensive nature of China's very limited nuclear strength. We will, as in the past, make efforts for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war.

Nuclear disarmament is an important item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and it is also one of the central issues of deep concern to the world people. Regrettably, no substantive progress has been made on this issue over the past several years. As the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament draws near, it is incumbent upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts in this respect. Meanwhile, we call on the major nuclear Powers to act in conformity with the demands of world public opinion and substantiate their avowed desire for disarmament so that it will be possible for us to make progress on this item and on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, permit me, first of all, to congratulate you on your election to the post of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March and to assure you of the full support and co-operation of the Yugoslav delegation in the performance of your duties. I would also like to pay a tribute to the representative of Iran, Ambassador Mahallati, for the very successful work he achieved as Chairman for last month.

As was the case three years ago, so it is today, when the Yugoslav delegation once again takes the floor in order to express its profound dissatisfaction and concern at the fact that the Committee on Disarmament is not capable of initiating negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Since we consider this question as the most important and of the greatest priority in the overall work of the Committee, we would like to resolutely ask this time that the Committee start seriously to deal with the question of nuclear disarmament and open negotiations on the beginning of this process. If we do not succeed in doing this, all our disarmament efforts will be considerably diminished, thus affecting the importance of the Committee. It is needless to repeat that this is also our duty, one that has been accepted by all member countries of the Committee at the first special session.

Our request is all the more justified since, in parallel with the global arms race, nuclear armament continues to develop and even constantly to increase, regardless of the astronomical spending it requires and its frightening destructive effects.

For a long time, the attention of the international community has been focused on the danger posed by nuclear weapons to the very survival of mankind and the consequent need to adopt effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. A number of proposals have been made, both within and outside the framework of the United Nations, to diminish that danger. Nevertheless, the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons has continued, leading to a staggering growth in the number of nuclear weapons and the development and deployment of ever more complex and destructive weapons systems.

In spite of this, we are still told that the opening of the process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee is not possible because of today's widespread absence of confidence among States, especially between nuclear Powers. But do we not ask ourselves how this confidence and security can be achieved if the nuclear arms race goes on so drastically.

The measures proposed over the years cover the entire spectrum of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament problems and include limitations, reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; the cessation of production of nuclear weapons; and the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and so on.

The Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament affirms that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that effective measures of nuclear disarmament have the highest priority, that the ultimate goal in that context is

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and that all the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those that possess the largest nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility in the task of achieving nuclear disarmament.

The tenth special session adopted as one of its main objectives the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war. This objective is in great jeopardy unless negotiations are also held with respect to the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which would have particularly grave consequences of a strategic nature if used on the territories of small countries.

We therefore consider it necessary to take appropriate steps as soon as possible for comprehensive consideration of the entire nuclear disarmament issue. In our opinion, it is necessary to deal simultaneously within a single process with conventional armaments as well. It constitutes a very important component of what is usually termed as the overall balance of powers, particularly in regions such as Europe, where these weapons are very densely concentrated.

Existing international circumstances increase the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament to make a contribution to reversing current trends and averting a disastrous nuclear conflict.

Nuclear disarmament is the most important of all disarmament questions, singled out by the United Nations as the highest priority task, and it is incumbent upon the Committee, the single negotiating body, as defined in the Final Document, to undertake negotiations to that end.

The first task of the Committee is to find an acceptable basis for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

In asking this, the Yugoslav delegation does not stand alone. It is being insisted on by all members of the Committee from the Group of 21 non-aligned and neutral countries, whose positions relative to this issue are clearly expressed in documents CD/116 of 9 July 1980 and CD/180 of 24 April 1981.

The working paper of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/116 suggested some of the substantive issues that needed to be addressed in negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament on the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament": (a) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament; (b) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war; (c) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence; and (d) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and, in that context, its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted fora. The Group of 21, at the same time, proposed that the Committee on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc working group to begin negotiations during the 1980 session with a view to reaching agreement on the above-mentioned issues.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

In the opinion of the Group of 21, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue and the fundamental prerequisite for their success is the political will of States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to engage in such negotiations.

In the light of this assessment, the Group of 21, in its working paper contained in document CD/180 of 24 April 1981, expressed, inter alia, its firm belief "that the Committee on Disarmament, in which all nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States participate, must continue and intensify the search for a common approach that will enable it to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In particular, the Group of 21 expects that a growing awareness of the urgency of progress towards nuclear disarmament will facilitate the task of the Committee. Bilateral and regional negotiations, especially with regard to specific areas where the concentration of nuclear armaments increases the danger of confrontation, are useful and should be intensified, but multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament".

Similar attitudes are also contained in the working paper contained in document CD/4 submitted by the Group of East European socialist countries, which also favour the opening of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee.

It is therefore for the above reasons that we cannot understand why the United States and the United Kingdom are not only opposed to the creation of a working group on nuclear disarmament, but also to the idea that the Committee should deal with nuclear disarmament at all. How is this possible when these two countries have also readily accepted this responsibility at the first special session on disarmament? We again urge them to take heed of the numerous requests to change their position and now ask them again to accept the setting up of this working group and, thus, no longer prevent the Committee from dealing with this most important disarmament issue. We agree completely with the remarks of the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, Mr. de Souza e Silva, who, in his statement of 25 February, once again offered arguments for the need to open negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee and declared that the United States has no right to block this. So far we have not heard convincing arguments for such a refusal on the part of the United States; nor have we been given an alternative.

The Committee on Disarmament provides the most appropriate forum for multilateral negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament and it should, without delay, start to seriously deal with this problem. The creation of the working group is the best instrument for the initiation of such a process.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico)(translated from Spanish): I should like to begin, Mr. Chairman, by associating my delegation with the sincere congratulations that have already been expressed here as you assume the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March. Your outstanding personal qualities and recognized ability are a guarantee that you will be able to bring our discussions during this important period of the Committee's work to a successful conclusion. We also express our gratitude to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Iran, Ambassador Mahallati, who guided our work in the month of February with such distinction and efficiency.

The reasons which, from the outset, prompted the Committee on Disarmament to include the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" as one of the two priority items on its agenda are obvious. It was not for nothing that, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly, after solemnly declaring that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority", agreed by consensus to include the following unequivocal statement in paragraph 47 of its Final Document:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

It will be recalled that, in the same Document, the General Assembly expressly recognized that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuation of the arms race "pose a threat to the very existence of mankind" and proclaimed, in consequence, that "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations" and that "all States have the right to participate" in such negotiations, for which it was expressly provided that the Committee on Disarmament would be "single multilateral negotiating forum".

It was without a doubt for this reason that, starting in 1979, the first year after it was established with its present membership, the Committee dealt with the question of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, both in a number of statements and two working papers: document CD/4, co-sponsored by seven socialist States, and document CD/36, submitted by the Group of 21. In 1980, as is well known, there were two more working papers from the same sources as the previous ones, namely, documents CD/109 and CD/116, respectively, and statements on the question increased considerably. Finally, in 1981, faced with the alarming international situation that we have been enduring, the Committee seems to have given nuclear disarmament the same level of priority as the item on the nuclear weapon-test ban that comes first on its agenda. As an eloquent example of this, we can cite the fact that examination of the Committee's last report shows that, of the 120 paragraphs devoted to reviewing what is described as the "work of the Committee during its 1981 session", no less than 41 paragraphs, or more than one-third of the total, relate to the topic of the "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

This is a question on which the Group of 21 has expressed the justified opinion of its members with the greatest frankness. Thus, in the statement it circulated as document CD/180, dated 24 April 1981, the Group formulated the following view:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The discussions, for which Chapters V, VI and the Conclusions of the Secretary-General's 'Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons' (A/35/392) provided useful background material, have confirmed the conviction of the Group of 21 that the nuclear arms race runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would be beneficial to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of the international climate, which in turn would facilitate further progress; and that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world ...". Allow me to repeat those final words: "because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world". I shall now continue reading the document from which I have been quoting.

"The Group of 21 is further convinced, as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to great insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary, weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States."

And at the end of last year's session, the Group of 21, in the statement it issued on 19 August 1981 in document CD/222, also declared -- and I quote:

"The Group of 21 is convinced that the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear arms directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Convinced, therefore, that the issues of nuclear disarmament have a bearing on the security of the whole world", -- of the whole world, Mr. Chairman, -- "the Group of 21 has recommended in document CD/180 the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament to initiate without delay negotiations on certain concrete issues of nuclear disarmament, particularly the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. It is a matter of regret" -- the Group of 21 continues -- "that no consensus could be reached on this proposal during the 1981 session of the Committee, thus precluding the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament from undertaking concrete negotiation on an item of the highest priority on its agenda."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

At the same time, the General Assembly has continued to display uninterrupted and pressing interest in this matter. Thus, at its thirty-fifth session, it adopted two resolutions, resolutions 35/152 B and 35/152 C, in the second of which it urged the Committee on Disarmament "to establish, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, an ad hoc working group on the item which in its agenda for 1979 and 1980 was entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'".

At the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, which has just ended, the question was dealt with in three resolutions, namely, resolutions 36/92 E, 36/92 F and 36/92 M, which contain provisions that are basically the same as those of the second of those resolutions, in which the Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament, during its 1982 session, to undertake — and I quote the terms of the resolution — "substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda" and, in order to reach that goal — I quote again — "to establish, as a matter of urgency, ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests".

General Assembly resolutions such as those I have just quoted can seem quite dry and undoubtedly do not give an accurate picture of reality, especially since, according to the very human tendency to forget disagreeable things, people prefer not to think about what the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament are seeking to forestall, i.e., nuclear war and its horrifying consequences, which have only too rightly been called the "nuclear holocaust".

Last December, I had the privilege of making a short visit to Hiroshima which allowed me better to understand the meaning and scope of the words "nuclear holocaust". And yet the bomb that reduced Hiroshima to ashes can today be considered a toy, though certainly a macabre one, compared with those of which there are now so many in the arsenals of the nuclear superpowers and whose destructive power is, as we all know, measured in megatons, i.e. millions of tons of dynamite. I vividly recall, from that visit, the scorched stone steps on one of which there remained indelibly imprinted the only macabre vestige of a man who had been sitting there at the time of the atomic explosion of 1945. I repeat, there remained indelibly imprinted the silhouette of that man.

That is why it is worth emphasizing once again that at its first special session devoted to disarmament, which immediately preceded the second that is to open in New York on 7 June 1982, the body which fully represents the international community adopted by consensus a set of clear affirmations, some of which I recalled at the beginning of this statement. In these, the General Assembly stressed the fact that mankind currently faces an unprecedented danger of self-destruction, since, "existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth"; and, after drawing attention to the critical urgency of eliminating any possibility of a nuclear war, it expressed the following ominous opinion — and again I quote: "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

It would seem that the wind carried those words away or that they never even reached the ears of those who most needed to hear them. Since then, the news regularly brought to us by the so-called mass media, has, far from reassuring us, become increasingly disquieting -- or perhaps it would be more accurate to say "more outrageous" -- in view of the runaway arms race and the gigantic escalation of military budgets.

Not long ago, the New York Times devoted a whole page to the publication of a "Message to the leaders of the nuclear nations", as the message was entitled. That message, illustrated by a photograph of a mother grimly shielding her two small children in a protective embrace, was signed by more than 1,000 who identified themselves as "angry women who do not want our children to be the last generation" and who affirmed with particular emphasis that:

"We are angered by the continuing build-up of arsenals which threaten the world with nuclear extinction by plan or accident.

We are angered at the spectacle of men who claim they are for peace while they build for war -- who confuse their own political fortunes with the fortunes of humanity.

We are outraged that nations spend hundreds of billions of dollars for weapons while children starve by the millions.

We condemn the use of military force by one government against another for such acts can ignite into nuclear war.

We speak as American women who believe that no government should hold the power to condemn all humanity to death".

We are convinced that the anger displayed by the signers of that eloquent message is not their private preserve, but that it is shared by millions of human beings, that is, by all those who have any awareness, however basic, of the potential significance of the enormous nuclear arsenals which have been accumulated and whose destructive power is estimated to be equal to more than 1 million bombs of the type that destroyed Hiroshima or, if you prefer, to more than three tons of dynamite for every inhabitant on earth.

It has been said with ample justification -- it was said by the experts who drafted the Secretary-General's report -- that a nuclear war would represent "the height of human insanity". The latest issue of the authoritative publication "World Military and Social Expenditures", which has a foreword by George Kennan, contains the following brief description of the effects of a conflagration of this kind:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The immediate physical effects of nuclear bursts are monstrous explosive blasts and fire. An attack on cities and military facilities would create winds of hurricane force, sweeping firestorms across whole continents. The nuclear detonations would release not only their own radiation but the radiation in the reactors and nuclear weapons which would also be under attack.

People not immediately burned to death, blown apart, or asphyxiated in shelters would find themselves in a nightmare world, populated by the dying, dead, and insane. Food, crops, and land contaminated. Water undrinkable. Medical facilities, lines of communication and transportation obliterated.

In the quiet of a dying planet, radiation would sweep across oceans, and into the atmosphere, depleting the ozone layer, and releasing harmful ultraviolet rays. As these rays killed off all remaining animal life, the collapse of the ecosystem would leave a global wasteland".

When one reflects on descriptions such as the one I have just quoted, one can well understand why the 1978 special session of the General Assembly affirmed -- I quote once more -- that "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations", and that "removing the threat of a nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

We dare to hope that those of the nuclear Powers which have, until now, frustrated the efforts of the Group of 21 and of a considerable number of the other States members of the Committee on Disarmament will finally resolve to recognize the unimpeachable legitimacy of that "vital interest". That would inevitably mean that they would cease to be an obstacle to the initiation of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in the forum of the Committee on Disarmament and that, in response to the repeated demands of the Group of 21 and the persistent urgings of the General Assembly, they recognized the necessity and expediency of the immediate establishment of an ad hoc working group -- not, of course, in place of the one which we propose for the first agenda item on the nuclear test ban -- but in addition to that working group, the immediate establishment, I repeat, of an ad hoc working group to deal with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as a first step towards achieving the objective which I have just defined.

The CHAIRMAN: (translated from French): I thank Ambassador García Robles for his statement and am particularly grateful to him for the kind and friendly words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): In my statements on 16 and 25 February I outlined the principal position of the German Democratic Republic on a comprehensive test ban and on negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We reiterated our support for effective negotiations by the Committee on both items and suggested the establishment of corresponding ad hoc working groups. At the same time, we tabled draft mandates for these working groups, to be considered by the member States of this body.

Similar ideas were expressed by the majority of delegations which have taken part in our recent debate on items 1 and 2 during the last week and again today. The time has now come to see where we stand and which conclusions we should draw from our discussions.

Since the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom again expressed objections to the setting up of working groups on items 1 and 2, we would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, immediately to start consultations on our further proceedings with regard to items 1 and 2. Those consultations should be held with all members of the Committee, and, in particular, with the delegations of the nuclear-weapon States, individually or together. In this connection, the nuclear-weapon States which reject the creation of both working groups could come out with proposals they deem essential to further our work on items 1 and 2. It is our hope that, within a short period of time, you, Mr. Chairman, will be able to report to the Committee on the results of these consultations, so that we can take a formal decision on the proposal to establish working groups and consider further steps to be undertaken with a view to achieving progress on these issues of the highest priority.

I recall, in this connection, that a corresponding proposal was made last year by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic in the working paper contained in document CD/193.

Today the distinguished representative of the Hungarian People's Republic tabled on behalf of his country and the German Democratic Republic a working paper on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. My delegation fully supports the explanations given by Ambassador Kőmives in this regard. We hope that the Committee will respond favourably to the appeal contained in his statement and the corresponding working paper.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I have duly taken note of the procedural suggestion he made and would like, in this connection, to say that the question of the consideration of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on the agenda items will be the first to be discussed at the informal meeting tomorrow afternoon. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 157th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eivinn Berg.

Mr. BERG (Norway): Allow me first to thank you for the very kind words of welcome you extended to me this morning, Mr. Chairman, and permit me to join in congratulating you on behalf of my Government on your election to the important position of Chairman of this Committee for the current month. I can assure you that my Government attaches great importance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament as the central global negotiating forum in the field of arms control and disarmament. I am therefore happy to be able to address you this morning and present some of our views on the important issues presently before the Committee. In view of the late hour, I shall make a determined effort to be brief.

Let me, however, at the outset, outline some basic elements of Norwegian policy in the field of disarmament. The Norwegian Government places major emphasis on the importance of arms control and disarmament, as an integral part of our over-all security policy. Norway is situated in a geographical area of major strategic importance. Thus, developments in the over-all East-West relationship have a direct and significant bearing upon our security situation.

Our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is fundamental to our military security and our defence capability. This alliance is equally committed to a determined pursuit of meaningful arms control and disarmament. In our own security interest, we are supporting all efforts which will result in increased stability and predictability in the over-all military situation and in lower levels of armaments.

To be effective, we consider it vital that disarmament and arms control measures must comply with the important principles of:

balance;
reciprocity; and
verification.

These conditions are in the interest of all nations and should not be considered as unilateral concessions from one side to another.

Measures pertaining to disarmament and arms control are not negotiated in a political vacuum. Nor can such measures in themselves remove fundamental differences and conflicts between nations.

Recent developments in the international political situation, with increased tensions in East-West relations, may undermine the prospects for real détente and for arms control. The removal of the causes of international tensions would therefore be the most significant contribution we could make to the creation of more favourable conditions for disarmament and arms control. In spite of the present international climate, negotiating bodies such as this one should still make all possible efforts to arrive at results which might stem and reverse the process of the continuing arms build-up.

Let me in this connection emphasize that considerable progress could be obtained simply if individual nations exercised more restraint in their own military dispositions. Norway has for its own part imposed, as you may know, a number of unilateral restrictions inter alia as regards foreign military bases, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and military manoeuvres. These self-imposed restrictions are designed to secure a status of low tension and stability in our immediate geographical surroundings.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

In the view of my Government, the most important task of this Committee, as we see it, is to define common disarmament interests and to outline joint disarmament objectives and, on this basis, to negotiate commitments which formalize and safeguard these objectives. In the final analysis, this will be the major test of strength of the Committee and the standards against which its performance will be judged by the international community.

It is in this perspective that we expect also the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to play an important role.

The first special session in 1978 created expectations of real progress in the field of disarmament. These expectations, I regret to say, have not been fulfilled. In fact, political developments, the continuing arms race and the development of weapons technology give reason for deep concern. This enhances, on the other hand, the importance of the second special session devoted to disarmament. It is our sincere hope that the work of the second special session will be facilitated by the existence of the Final Document of the first special session. Much effort has gone into this document, which ought to serve as a guide in preparing for the next session.

Norway strongly supports the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. A balanced and forward-looking comprehensive programme can indeed provide a useful guideline for future action in the arms control and disarmament field and represent a valuable extension of the Programme of Action of the first special session.

In this way, a comprehensive programme of disarmament will assist us in making new progress towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is the stated objective of my Government to contribute actively and constructively to ensure the best possible results of the second special session.

Thus, we intend to submit a working paper in order to follow up an initiative taken at the first special session that countries adopt procedures for assessing the impact of major weapon procurements and military programmes on arms control and disarmament. Conversely, arms control and disarmament proposals ought to be submitted to a similar analysis.

We shall also follow up the United Nations study on disarmament and development, in which Norway took an active part. The release of resources through disarmament for economic and social development, in particular for the benefit of developing countries, must continue to figure among the priority items on our agenda.

We are, furthermore, preparing a paper regarding measures to detect and identify seismic events of relevance to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We also intend to present a working paper on institutional questions, including the activities of the Committee on Disarmament.

In our own preparations for the special session, we will draw on a number of expert studies recently commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

The cessation of the nuclear arms race must remain a priority concern today. Nuclear arms represent a challenge to the very existence of mankind. Permit me to offer some very brief observations on this priority item.

My Government attaches particular importance to the successful outcome of negotiations here in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Norway sincerely hopes that these negotiations will lead to positive results. We are encouraged to see that these negotiations continue despite the deteriorating international situation, which has complicated new progress in arms control and in disarmament negotiations as well.

We also attach particular importance to the continuation of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to reaching agreements on substantial cuts in the arsenals and deployments of strategic nuclear arms. We sincerely hope that the SALT negotiations will be resumed at an early date and note with satisfaction that preparations do indeed continue for this.

We view with the utmost concern the fact that attempts to terminate and reverse the nuclear arms race have so far not been successful. This enormous problem will be complicated and ominous if a similar arms race should develop between additional nuclear-weapon States. In this connection, the policies pursued by the nuclear-weapon States and the role which they assign to nuclear weapons in their strategy are of decisive influence. There is thus a close relationship between horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.

In this connection, I would like to recall that article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty commits each party to the Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date ...".

We consider the non-proliferation régime which has evolved since the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty the most important measure taken so far for the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. But the régime is both fragile and susceptible of erosion. Measures to prevent this erosion are urgently needed.

A comprehensive test ban is an important measure for halting the nuclear arms race and would also constitute a non-discriminatory instrument of essential relevance to the promotion of non-proliferation. By concluding such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States would take a significant step in the direction of meeting their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Progress towards a comprehensive test ban is slow and difficult. The technical issues are complex, especially those which relate to verification. However, the benefits of an agreement are substantial and far-reaching in their consequences and must weigh heavily in our over-all assessment. Here I would like to refer to the statement made by the Ambassador of Canada in this Committee on 18 February, in which he outlined Canadian thinking on how to avoid the risks inherent in a continued freeze in the negotiating process on nuclear testing. We share these concerns and associate ourselves fully with the suggestions made by the Canadian Ambassador.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

Norway has taken a special interest in the verification issue concerning the comprehensive test ban question, which we consider extremely important. Adequate verification is an essential element in any agreement of this kind. We have participated actively in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts set up to consider international measures to detect and identify seismic events. This is due to the expertise and instrumentation provided by the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR). Considerable progress has been made in this Group. In fact, the Scientific Group has done some pioneering work. Its proposed system of verification can be a model for verification mechanisms in other areas, in our opinion.

I would like to reconfirm the readiness of my Government to make NORSAR available as a station in a global seismic verification system to monitor compliance with a comprehensive test-ban Treaty.

Another important contribution to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be adequate security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack. Norway accepts the argument of those States that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide sufficient guarantees to non-aligned States. Those States which are not parties to alliance security systems involving nuclear security guarantees and which have been asked to renounce their option to acquire nuclear weapons have a legitimate claim to guarantees against being attacked or threatened by attack with nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States directly involved bear a special responsibility for finding a solution to this problem.

While, admittedly, there is a regrettable lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, we feel that such lack of progress cannot be accepted as justifying the rejection of non-proliferation measures. It is a matter of great concern to us that several threshold States in regions of tension and conflict have not yet abandoned the option to develop nuclear weapons.

For its part, Norway supports the principle that sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology should not be transferred or exported unless all nuclear activities of the recipient non-nuclear-weapon States are subject to IAEA safeguards or other similarly binding international commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices. Consequently, Norway has decided to restrict its own nuclear exports to countries that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Permit me also very briefly to reiterate our views on chemical weapons. - In view of recent reports on the use of chemical weapons, we consider it an urgent need to build obstacles against further developments in this field. We therefore urge intensified efforts to reach agreement on a chemical weapons convention.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons made significant progress last year. Every effort should now be made with a view to arriving at a draft text on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. For this reason, we have noted with satisfaction that the Committee has succeeded in arriving at a consensus decision on a new mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

A new convention must, in our view, contain provisions for adequate verification, to which we hope to make a modest contribution. The Norwegian participant in the expert meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has initiated a research programme on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents used under winter conditions. The objective of the programme is, inter alia, to develop international verification procedures for the purpose of finding evidence of the use of chemical agents. The results of this research project will be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

In concluding I should like to mention that we have recently strengthened our representation in Geneva in order to enable the Norwegian Government to follow more closely the activities of the Committee on Disarmament. Thus, for the first time, we will take an active part in all the working groups of the Committee on Disarmament.

Through our participation, we shall endeavour also to draw on the expertise available at Norwegian research institutions in recognition of the key role played by the working groups in the negotiations here in Geneva.

Finally, I note that, at its present session, the Committee will once more discuss the membership question in preparation for the second special session and the review to be undertaken there. Norway, for its part, would favour yet another limited expansion of the present membership of the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that such a limited expansion would increase the representative nature of the Committee without hampering its efficiency or its negotiating character.

Should the second special session recommend another limited expansion, Norway will actively seek full membership of the Committee. This would be in keeping with our long-standing interest in arms control and disarmament — an interest also influenced, as I said by way of introduction, by our strategic geographical location.

I would like to thank you for having accorded me this opportunity to address you this morning. In the name of my Government, I want to offer my sincerest wishes for the successful continuation of the Committee's important deliberations. I can assure you that Norway will continue to take part as an active observer in the work of this Committee and, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, may I add as my personal hope, that, in the not too distant future, a representative of Norway will have the privilege of addressing this Committee in the capacity of a full member.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs for his important and interesting statement and am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list; would any other delegation like to take the floor? If not I would like to announce that, at my request, the Secretary has distributed today an informal document containing the timetable of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this is only an indication and may subsequently be adjusted, if necessary, according to the requirements of our work. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee agrees to this timetable.

It was so decided.

(The Chairman)

The Chairman of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has asked me to announce that there will be a meeting of the contact group on the CPD this afternoon, at 3.30 p.m., in Meeting Room No. I.

In accordance with revision 2 of the timetable for this week, the Committee will hold an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 9 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 9 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario ALBESSI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. M. MATI
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.C. CARSALES Miss N. NASCIMBENE
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. D.M. SADLEIR Mr. R.W. STEELE Mr. T. FINDLAY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Miss de CLERQ
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. P. POPCHEV Mr. K. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL Mr. A.R. MENZIES Mr. G.R. SKINNER Mr. P. BASHAM
<u>China:</u>	Mr. TIAN JIN Mr. LIN CHENG Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. J. STRUCKA Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. I.A. HASSAN Mr. M.N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERREFE Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. J. MOEPERT
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVLS
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAMI
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN

Romania: Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. M.J. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON

Mrs. J.I. LIHK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M. BUSBY

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. MARTIN

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Mr. P.S. CORDEN

Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. H. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKA EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-first plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Today the Committee begins its consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, members who would like to make statements on any other matter relevant to the Committee's work are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Nigeria and Sweden.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March and to register our appreciation of the work done by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran.

My delegation followed closely the discussion on item 1 and item 2 of our agenda: nuclear test ban and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. After nearly three weeks of deliberations, it would be only precise to note, that due to the negative, indeed obstructive, attitude of certain delegations, the Committee has been impeded from initiating negotiations. I would like to associate my delegation with the overwhelming disappointment with the results of the consideration of the two highest priority items on our agenda, which are in the focus of the international community. Throughout the globe, literally hundreds of thousands of ordinary people have spontaneously rallied in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to stop nuclear weapon testing and for nuclear disarmament.

It is the conviction of my delegation that, under the circumstances, we, as Government representatives, have the right and the duty to weigh the implications of this situation in a broader political context and to attribute the responsibility in a clear-cut manner.

We were particularly alarmed by the intervention of the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Rostow. We are told that "a complete cessation of nuclear explosions must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces". To our delegation, as to many others, this statement sounds like an excuse put forward to block the start of negotiations on a CTBT in the Committee.

There is no denying the fact that nuclear weapon testing remains in the front line of the arms race. While a CTBT is presented to the Committee as a "long-term aim", the world is being kept hostage to the fierce competition among the United States nuclear weapon laboratories in creating a whole line of deadly products needed for "first strike", "limited nuclear war" and other absurd projections that could detonate a global nuclear catastrophe, so eloquently described by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.

On the other hand, the Soviet delegation, while reiterating its readiness for an immediate resumption of the trilateral negotiations, presented to the Committee

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

its positions on the elaboration of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and stated its favourable approach to the utilization of the possibilities of the Committee on Disarmament for multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of such a treaty. Our delegation looks forward to more comments of other delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, on the statement made on 18 February by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic proposed draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 which are another practical step on the part of the socialist countries to find a solution to the urgent necessity of starting meaningful negotiations.

Several socialist countries, among them Bulgaria, are taking an active part in the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events. At the same time, it is clear to all of us that the proposals to concentrate the attention of the Committee on the administrative, legal and financial aspects of an international data exchange system and other "limited steps" make sense only in close connection with the elaboration of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. To do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse. As pointed out in document CD/209 introduced by the delegation of India, "There can be no merit, either in sterile and abstract discussions of the complexities of verification issues, kinds of verification régimes, or in stressing the need for some kind of international verification organization, without reference to any concrete measure of real disarmament or serious arms limitations".

In connection with item 2 of the agenda, we have noted the wide convergence of opinion in favour of starting without delay negotiations in an appropriate subsidiary body of the Committee on halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We are deeply convinced that the most concrete step that the Committee can take in this direction is the beginning of negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons of all types and on their gradual reduction and final elimination. It is indeed regrettable that the Committee has failed so far to even begin consultations to prepare the ground for such negotiations.

In view of the explicit reluctance of a well-known limited number of delegations to endorse the creation of working groups and the initiation of negotiations on items 1 and 2, a new priority arises, namely, the consideration of the question of ensuring the prevention of nuclear war. This is a problem directly connected with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The delegations of Sweden, Brazil, Mexico, Yugoslavia and other countries have already stressed the importance of this question.

The Bulgarian people and Government are deeply convinced that today there is no more urgent task than that of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war and solving the problems of the nuclear arms race. There is no doubt that this will be one of the major issues at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is in this connection and from the point of view of an actual contribution to the beginning of negotiations on nuclear disarmament that one should examine the positions and the attitude of any State -- nuclear or non-nuclear -- towards the vital issue of securing the prevention of nuclear war. This is how we see the meaning of resolution 36/81 B, adopted by consensus at the last session of the General Assembly on the initiative of the non-aligned countries.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In light of the serious setback we are faced with in relation to the most important items on our agenda, we note with satisfaction the adoption of the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for the start of consultations under your leadership. My delegation is ready to support any meaningful idea that may come out of these consultations.

According to our programme of work, this week is dedicated mainly to item 3 of our agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Permit me, while I have the floor, to dwell briefly on this subject.

The interest my delegation takes in this question is well-known and I do not want to go over our position once again, particularly because it is closely connected with the views I have just stated on the problems of nuclear disarmament.

We have noted with satisfaction the consensus on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan. This step is in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 36/94 and 36/95.

The conclusion of an international convention remains the goal of the majority of the member States of this Committee and of the international community as a whole. The formula of guarantees proposed by the Soviet Union has widely acknowledged merits. We welcome the renewed pledges of the Soviet Union, made at the highest political level, concerning the guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States that do not have nuclear weapons on their territories. Here I have in mind the letters of President Brezhnev in response to the appeals of concerned groups and organizations in Japan and Australia.

As to the main direction of our efforts in this field, we believe that we should concentrate mainly on those aspects of the problem whose solution could enable us to achieve some meaningful steps forward, especially in the search for a common approach acceptable to all, the content and the character of the arrangements, the possibilities and parameters of interim arrangements, etc. The adoption of an interim measure of any kind would, however, not eliminate the need for an international convention or other appropriate international arrangements of a legally binding nature.

Along with all this, we should take into account other relevant and significant developments which are directly connected with the non-use of nuclear weapons and are thus aimed at solving the problem of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, such as General Assembly resolutions 36/100, 36/81 E and 36/92 I. Accordingly, we would like to stress the importance of the "Declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe", the main points of which should be taken into consideration when examining different aspects of elaborating effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

It is our conviction that the members of the Committee and, first of all, the nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate a spirit of constructiveness if we are to elaborate an international convention, which will go a long way towards strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

- The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Malitza.

Mr. MALITZA (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, my statement today is concerned with the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The fact that discussions on this topic have been going on for two decades makes it very difficult to introduce any new ideas at the present stage of the negotiations. Nevertheless, there is one factor which the Romanian delegation would like to underline with all due force, namely, the rapid increase in the danger of the use of nuclear weapons as a result of the tension evident today in the international sphere and the entry into a new stage in the nuclear arms race.

In this Committee, we discuss many matters related to international security, all of them extremely important. But can there conceivably be any greater source of insecurity for a small or medium-sized country than the possibility of being completely destroyed if someone merely presses a button controlling a nuclear-weapon system?

It is a well-known fact that, in addition to nuclear weapons, there are nuclear strategies represented by nuclear maps on which nuclear-weapon targets are plotted. Different colours for different scenarios indicate with astonishing simplicity acts fraught with tremendous consequences for the existence of entire nations and, first and foremost, the allies of the nuclear powers. These things are secret, but politicians and the general public have found out about them. This explains why there is today a current of unprecedented intensity whose purpose is very simple: nations do not wish to be the theatre of nuclear war; public opinion no longer wants to be an actual, potential or even alternative target for nuclear strikes.

The non-nuclear-weapon countries' insistence on being given security assurances going as far as the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is therefore just, logical and realistic. As was pointed out by the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, "It is the legitimate right of every State renouncing nuclear weapons to have the assurance that no one will encroach upon its national independence and sovereignty".

In last year's report of the Committee on Disarmament, it was recognized that there was an urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons while bearing particularly in mind the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

The negotiations on the substance of arrangements aimed at outlining a common approach acceptable to all and suitable for incorporation in an international instrument of a legally binding character have shown that there are difficulties which will have to be overcome this year by the Working Group presided over by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansour Ahmad.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

In the view of the Romanian delegation, the questions to be solved by the Working Group in its search for a "common formula" for inclusion in an international instrument are the following:

1. States covered by the assurances. - The very essence of security assurances is the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons and force in general against the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Romanian delegation is therefore of the opinion that all non-nuclear-weapon States should be given such assurances. Nevertheless, in the course of our discussions of this question, a number of qualifications have been put forward by various delegations and I would like to comment briefly on them:

(a) The undertaking by the non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from producing or receiving such weapons or acquiring control over them. Such a qualification may require either the participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or other instruments, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, or solemn declarations by States not parties to such international instruments;

(b) The stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. Although it reduces the number of States which will benefit from the assurances, this qualification is objective in character. If a non-nuclear-weapon State considers that its security is better guaranteed by the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, it can act accordingly.

(c) Non-participation in nuclear security arrangements concluded by certain nuclear-weapon States. At the present stage of our negotiations, this qualification raises problems of interpretation which make its practical application extremely difficult.

2. The content of the assurance or the substance of the commitment. Since 1965, the Romanian delegation has maintained that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake never under any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or force in general against the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Consequently, our position is that no exception or saving clause is acceptable as part of such an obligation. In our discussions, the condition that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not carry out or participate in an attack against the territory or the armed forces of a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State has, of course, been laid down and backed up by arguments whose sincerity and practical importance for their authors we do not challenge. Such an exception would, however, introduce a subjective element in favour of the nuclear Powers that would virtually negate the security assurances. We are, moreover, supposed to be negotiating measures to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, not specifying, by means of exceptions, the cases in which nuclear weapons may be

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

used. Such an approach is contrary to the Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1961. The fact that we find such an exception unacceptable does not mean that we are unaware of the concerns of the States which have put forward proposals on this subject. But the solution should, rather, be sought by way of a formula allowing for withdrawal from a commitment in the event of exceptional circumstances imperilling the highest national interests.

3. The legal form of the arrangements. It is quite obvious that, if they are to have any practical significance, security assurances must be of a legally binding character. The Romanian delegation considers that in this respect the best solution would be the conclusion of an international convention. While there has been no basic objection, during our discussions, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved have been stressed and the possibility has been studied of interim arrangements, such as a General Assembly resolution, a Security Council resolution or new unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States. I would like to assure you that the Romanian delegation is open to the idea of an interim arrangement as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention. I should also point out that in my delegation's view, this type of solution would imply that such an interim undertaking would be regarded as a first step along the road to the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances whatever, and that the nuclear-weapon States would undertake to implement as rapidly as possible effective measures for nuclear disarmament leading to the complete elimination of such weapons.

These are the few observations my delegation wanted to make at this stage in our work. Let me stress once again that, in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is urgently necessary to achieve tangible results in this field. The Committee cannot ignore the fact that the non-nuclear weapon States are determined to escape from the domination of armaments and the danger of their use, as is more than clearly shown by the growing number of proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. My country supports these proposals since it regards the establishment of denuclearized zones as a positive step in the direction of the elimination of nuclear weapons and as a promise of a world without the nightmare of nuclear war. That great monument to patience, foresight and legal precision -- the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- is a constant source of encouragement and a proof of the possibility of carrying out such measures. In this connection, the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans is a matter of special interest to us. As in the past, Romania consistently supports any initiative taken in this direction and is ready to make its own practical contribution to such a project.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, allow me at the outset to convey the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you preside over the work of this Committee for the month of March. The warm and very cordial relations that our two countries have enjoyed over the years and the strong commitment to the cause of peace have again been demonstrated in the recently concluded successful visit of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to my country. To us, the papacy is a symbol of peace and disarmament. We are confident that, under your able guidance, this Committee will make significant progress during this crucial month. I pledge to you the full co-operation of my delegation. My delegation would also like to express its appreciation to Ambassador Jafar Mahallati of Iran for the able manner in which he guided the commencement of this year's session of the Committee.

My statement today will be devoted to item 2 of the Committee's annual agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". My delegation is one of those that still believe that this subject is of the highest priority on the agenda of the Committee and this view is also shared by the international community, which, at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the item, namely, General Assembly resolutions 36/92 E and 36/92 F. Both resolutions called not only for multilateral negotiations on the items, but also specifically urged the establishment of an ad hoc working group early in the current session.

At our 158th plenary meeting held on 25 February 1982, I had occasion to register once again my delegation's regret and total dissatisfaction that, to date, the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum, had not been able to undertake concrete negotiations on a nuclear test ban and that it had not even taken the first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race. On that occasion, I concluded that failure to undertake such multilateral negotiations in the Committee could lead to serious consequences and that those nuclear-weapon States that have not seen their way to agreeing with the rest of us would bear the responsibility.

At our plenary meeting on Thursday, 4 March 1982, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, gave a moving on-the-spot account of a nuclear holocaust. In the view of my delegation, his exposition was an adequate scenario of an apocalypse. The young war poets of World War I did stress the horror and pity of war, but certainly a nuclear war begs description and can rightly be cited as a crime against humanity. The proponents of competitiveness and superiority in the arms race need to look beyond their parochial security interests and give further consideration to the universality and broader perceptions of security. It is in this context that the need for the "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" becomes imperative.

Nuclear disarmament becomes imperative when one recalls the numerous statements that we have heard in this Committee during the last month. These statements have clearly testified to the fact that we are living in times of strained international relations. The continued escalation of the arms race and the increasing danger of a nuclear war call for a large measure of sanity and reflection on the part of those whom Providence has made trustees of the future

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

of mankind. This is not the time for inaction and my delegation holds the view that the Committee on Disarmament can, through multilateral negotiations, play a vital role in lessening international tension. A major ingredient for success in the Committee is flexibility (or what some have termed "goodwill") on the part of delegations, especially those of nuclear-weapon States. But is this "goodwill" forthcoming even from those that preach it in this Committee?

It is important that, in all negotiations conducted in this negotiating forum, all delegations should bear in mind paragraph 2 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which reminds us that:

"Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind".

These are very chilling words which were adopted by consensus in 1978. For three years now, the Committee has, in varying degrees, been considering item 2. The time is now more than ripe to consider the item in depth and make concrete progress.

At its 1981 session, a detailed examination was undertaken of the prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, including the so-called doctrines of deterrence, balance and parity. While the majority of the members of the Committee were prepared for serious negotiations, two delegations deliberately refused to join the consensus in the Committee to establish an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. My delegation has consistently rejected the idea that security should be based on higher and higher levels of armaments, especially when such assertions are compounded by theories of flexible response, limited war and survivable nuclear war. The latest manifestation of that view that seeks security through greater and greater quantities of nuclear weapons was stated in this Committee barely five weeks ago, namely, that there should be "equal deterrence in order that no side would brandish nuclear weapons as an instrument of aggression or political coercion".

In the view of my delegation, only nuclear disarmament can really ensure equal deterrence. We believe that the greater the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the States that possess those weapons of high destructive and over-kill capacity, the greater the risk of a nuclear war, either by deliberate calculation or by accident. I therefore seize this opportunity to refer to General Assembly resolution 36/81 B which is entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" and urges the nuclear-weapon States to submit views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war to the Secretary-General by April 1982. As a co-sponsor of that resolution, my delegation hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will, with all sense of responsibility and genuine security concerns, respond objectively to this call because my delegation firmly holds the view that a nuclear war will affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

In previous interventions, we had cause to remind the nuclear-weapon States of their special responsibility and obligation to undertake nuclear disarmament. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, my country attaches great importance and significance to article VI whereby:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

My delegation is of the opinion that the two most important phrases in this article are "negotiations in good faith" and "an early date". They both underline the obligation which was assumed by the nuclear-weapon States and which, regrettably, they have been unable to discharge. Document CD/180 contains substantive proposals by the Group of 21 which could provide a firm basis for negotiations. While my delegation welcomes constructive proposals on how best to move forward, it is hoped that those nuclear-weapon States which have so far withheld their consensus will soon be able to agree to the establishment of an ad hoc working group.

At this juncture, my delegation would like to clarify once more its position with regard to the so-called nuclear neutron weapon. While we welcome the proposal that these inhumane weapons be prohibited, we reiterate what we stated in plenary on 21 August 1981, namely, that such a prohibition should be in the over-all package and context of the achievement of nuclear disarmament, which requires urgent negotiations of agreements at appropriate stages, particularly the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems. My delegation therefore sees the development of the neutron weapon in the context of the irrational race for armaments — a situation which underlines the urgent necessity of establishing an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation firmly believes, contrary to some views, that there is an arms race. It is an irrational race, fuelled by the presumed superiority perceptions of the two sides. The nuclear-weapon States are also, in my delegation's view, captives of an uncontrollable technological advance where competition is aimed at achieving an impossible end.

As we approach the second special session, the nuclear-weapon States cannot be insensitive to the cries of the international community outside this Committee. My delegation agrees with paragraph 520 of the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons that "So long as reliance continues to be placed upon the concept of the balance of nuclear deterrence as a method for maintaining peace, the prospects for the future will always remain dark, menacing and as uncertain as the fragile assumptions upon which they are based".

With the present impasse in the Committee on the establishment of an ad hoc working group to initiate substantive negotiations on the top priority questions, my delegation is ready to go along with the proposal by the German Democratic Republic for informal consultations as a way of finding solutions, but we do believe that such consultations are not and should not become substitutes for negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement, for the kind and friendly words he addressed to me and for his reference to the cordial relations enjoyed by Nigeria and Italy. I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for this month, a function which I am confident you will carry out with skill and efficiency, I wish to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. At the same time I want to express to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Mahallati, our great appreciation of the efforts he made during his chairmanship to give the Committee a good start at this year's session.

I have the honour to introduce today the working paper contained in document CD/257, which has been distributed this morning and which is entitled "An international system for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions".

This working paper should be seen as an effort on the part of my delegation further to prepare the ground for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The Swedish delegation deeply regrets the lack of consensus so far on the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the Committee on the negotiation of a CTBT. This must, however, not paralyse our efforts to prepare ourselves for the many difficult issues such a negotiation will no doubt entail.

A great deal of valuable work is being carried out in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. However, seismic methods apply primarily to underground tests. It would therefore, in our view, be useful at this stage to take up also other aspects of the verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, namely, the monitoring of airborne radioactivity.

The working paper proposes that the Committee on Disarmament should consider questions relating to the establishment of an international data exchange for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions. Such an international exchange would be complementary to a system for the international exchange of seismic data, as elaborated in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. The techniques for collecting and analysing radioactive substances are well advanced and a number of stations in at least 30 countries all over the world are already monitoring the atmosphere. The costs of establishing the new stations which may be required for a satisfactory coverage of the globe are likely to be modest.

A global network for the surveillance of the atmosphere would no doubt add substantially to the present means of verification of nuclear explosions. It would not only be of great importance for the verification of compliance with a future treaty banning all nuclear tests, but is also likely to make a valuable contribution to confidence in existing agreements, such as the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty. It would, furthermore, contribute to the identification of possible nuclear explosions carried out by countries which are not parties to any of these treaties. Thus, it is likely that the identification of the much debated event south of Africa on 22 September 1979 would have been considerably facilitated if a system of the kind envisaged in the present

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

working paper had been in operation on that occasion. Such a data exchange would not only add to the efficiency of present means of verification, but it would also be truly international and non-discriminatory in character, which is an important aspect for the vast majority of countries represented around this table, including my own.

With these words, I submit that the working paper contained in document CD/257 should be carefully studied and considered by the members of the Committee. As to the appropriate framework for dealing with this matter, it seems to my delegation that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts provides a suitable forum with an accordingly amended mandate. My delegation is, however, open to other proposals in this regard. One alternative might be to convene an ad hoc meeting of experts to discuss the matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I have no more speakers on my list. Would any other delegation like to take the floor?

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 11 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario ALESSI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. MAACHI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss de CLERQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U NGWE WIN
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. E.B. HAMBLIN

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Colonel GESBERT

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. J. MOEPERT
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CARRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. P. de KLERK

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.F. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. H.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Ms K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKA EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 162nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Today, the Committee continues its consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, members who would like to make statements on any other subject relevant to the Committee's work are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Burma, the United States, Yugoslavia, China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Sweden.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Burma, Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all take this opportunity to express to you our sincere appreciation for the able and conscientious manner in which the work of this Committee is being conducted for this month under your chairmanship. I am confident that your endeavours will contribute positively to the work of this Committee.

The subject I propose to deal with somewhat briefly concerns the test ban issue, which the international community has rightly considered as a matter of top priority and is foremost on our agenda for this session. Despite persistent efforts and attention in this multilateral negotiating forum, as well as in other fora, a comprehensive test ban has continued to defy solution for over a quarter of a century. While this state of affairs continues to prevail, new generations of nuclear weapons have come into existence, made possible largely by the continued testing of nuclear weapons. Despite legal and political commitments by the major nuclear Powers, not to mention the moral aspect, a comprehensive test ban continues to recede before us like a mirage.

If we look back at the course of events in the history of its negotiations, a comprehensive test-ban treaty was negotiated with all serious intent and purpose in the multilateral forum and in 1963 an agreement was tantalizingly near, the negotiations having reached a stage where measures on adequate verification were then negotiated in detail and only a small gap remained to be bridged between the position of the two sides. It could perhaps be said that a certain degree of political will did exist at that time on the part of the Powers concerned, but perhaps that will was not sufficiently strong enough to give the necessary impetus needed for an agreement. And to allay the pleas of an anxious world concerning the threat to mankind posed by radioactive fallout caused by atmospheric testing, expediency made it possible to reach agreement on a partial test-ban Treaty, which continues to remain partial despite the fact that 19 years have elapsed since its signature. Yet today this Committee is confronted with the situation of not being able to solve the procedural aspect of the issue and substantive negotiations are nowhere in sight. In this state of affairs, it is relevant to reiterate what this delegation has said in its statement on 16 February. We said at that time that, on an issue of such multilateral concern, it would be most propitious to seek solutions through a multilateral approach and that the establishment of an ad hoc working group would be most appropriate for such a purpose, particularly in view of the fact that other approaches have not yielded any encouraging results.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

We have been given an explicit mandate by the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly on how we should deal with this issue. Resolution 36/84 of the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly has clearly urged all members of the Committee to support the creation of an ad hoc working group, as from the beginning of 1982, which should begin multilateral negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. The resolution goes further on to say that this Committee should exert its best endeavours so that it may transmit to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament a multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty. We therefore have a mandate to comply with and the international community will not understand us if we could not even agree to negotiate on an issue of such importance.

It has recently been asserted in this Committee that a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons and that limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues. We do of course realize that neither the test ban itself nor, for that matter, other measures of nuclear disarmament, each by itself, can eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons. For the only way to remove such threat is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But each of these measures, including the ban on nuclear testing, could help eliminate such a threat. We feel that an attempt to link the solution of one measure with the solution of another would complicate the issue and to our mind would neither be practical nor desirable. The cessation of nuclear-weapon tests deserves to be treated on its own merit and not on the merit of other nuclear disarmament issues. This is the approach that has been taken all along and to depart from such an approach would make the solution of the test ban issue intractable.

Needless to say, in the solution of disarmament measures, the two principles that need to be resolved are the principle of equitable balance and the principle of adequate verification. The need for the principle of balance is mentioned explicitly in paragraph 29 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principle of adequate verification is stated in paragraph 31 of the same Document. Because the test ban does not involve any physical change in the armaments of States, the principle of maintaining an equitable balance has resolved itself and we can say that, on this score, a test ban has its obvious advantage and we fail to understand why such an advantage could not be seized upon. Perhaps the tendency to assert that a test ban cannot of itself reduce the threat of nuclear weapons arises from the fact that it involves no actual reduction of nuclear weapons. No doubt a test ban by itself cannot alter the existing state of affairs. But what we should bear in mind is that its significance lies in curbing the qualitative aspect of the nuclear arms race.

As to what the nature of a nuclear test-ban treaty should be, our long-standing attitude is that a direct approach to the main objective would be preferable to taking the road with detours. Nearly two decades have passed since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty and surely it is not too much to opt for the ultimate treaty that would leave no loopholes. I think we should be able to get our bearings if we look at the matter from an objective approach rather than a subjective one. Our objective should go further than putting additional technical constraints on testing while continuing to condone the search for new weapons through testing. Our objective should be to achieve a treaty that would completely halt one very important aspect of the nuclear arms race by the total prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests for all time.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Burma for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, our agenda for this week concerns the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, in light of the great interest evidenced in this Committee and the ongoing consultations being conducted by you, Sir, I will speak today regarding items 1 and 2 of our agenda, the nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

In this context, I want to address the numerous thoughtful questions and suggestions put to my delegation during our informal and plenary meetings on these items and to give the views of my Government on how the Committee on Disarmament might best proceed to consider the question of a nuclear test ban.

The position of my Government regarding a comprehensive test ban has already been clearly stated in this body. The achievement of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives. However, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, such a ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. The United States is actively pursuing the first steps of the programme outlined by President Reagan last 18 November to reduce nuclear weapons. These issues are the most serious issues which any nation -- nuclear-weapon State or non-nuclear-weapon State -- can address. The elements of United States nuclear arms control policy -- including the ongoing negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the preparations to begin strategic arms reduction negotiations -- provide compelling evidence of the seriousness which the United States attaches to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The issue now before this Committee is the most appropriate procedure to follow regarding items 1 and 2 of the agenda. A number of delegations have posed serious questions as to how the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States should be considered in the light of the need for nuclear-weapon States to address amongst themselves issues affecting nuclear disarmament. Doubts have also been expressed as to how this Committee can function as a multilateral negotiating body if it does not address nuclear issues, which we all agree are of primary importance. And, specifically, questions have been raised and suggestions made as to the best way for the Committee on Disarmament to proceed on the nuclear test ban issue.

Let me briefly give the views of my delegation on the issues underlying these questions.

First, my delegation believes the Committee on Disarmament should address every issue which relates to the vital security interests of all States, including the control, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The Committee on Disarmament, the only disarmament body in which all five nuclear-weapon States participate, is an appropriate forum for dealing with the interest in nuclear disarmament -- an interest deeply shared by all States. Nevertheless, my delegation continues to believe that establishing a subsidiary body to negotiate on nuclear disarmament would not be a productive step at this time, especially in view of the fact that such negotiations have begun among certain of the nuclear-weapon States. I also recall the numerous occasions on which the

(Mr. Fields, United States)

nuclear-weapon States have been reminded that they have the primary responsibility for undertaking such negotiations. Therefore, with regard to agenda item 2, while we recognize the legitimate role of the Committee, we continue to believe that these issues should be addressed in informal meetings, as we have done in the past.

Second, the United States fully shares the view expressed by many delegations that the Committee on Disarmament must effectively discharge its responsibilities. In evidence of this fact, my delegation is actively engaged in the efforts being made in the Committee to reach agreement on a multilateral convention on the complete prohibition of radiological weapons. Moreover, the Committee is also hard at work in laying the foundations for a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, whose use, sadly, is all too familiar to mankind and whose elimination is an urgent task. President Reagan has stated that achievement of such a prohibition -- effective and verifiable -- is a goal of the United States and we intend to pursue that goal vigorously in this forum.

Finally, I would like to speak briefly regarding the nuclear test ban issue which heads our agenda. My delegation has, on numerous occasions, made known its views on ways of dealing with this item and has stated that the establishment of a subsidiary body on the nuclear test ban issue did not appear to be the most effective way to proceed. At the same time, we have listened attentively to the numerous interventions made on this issue, in keeping with our pledge to consider carefully and seriously the views of other delegations. As is well known, our distinguished Chairman has been engaged in extensive consultations on nuclear questions, including the nuclear test ban. We have participated in those consultations and have carefully considered the positions of other delegations, particularly regarding agenda item 1.

I have already stated the position of my Government regarding the broad issue of a comprehensive test ban and that position remains unchanged. However, my delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament has a legitimate interest in all disarmament issues and an obligation to make a substantial contribution to the disarmament process in all its aspects, including consideration of the issues, such as agenda item 1, on which the negotiation of an agreement, for whatever reasons, may not be propitious at the time.

Foremost among the concerns which surround the question of a comprehensive test ban are the issues of effective verification of and compliance with such an agreement. Indeed, these concerns have been a constant preoccupation of this Committee and its predecessor body for at least a decade.

My delegation believes that the Committee can make a useful contribution in this regard and, further, that work in this area can begin now. Therefore, if a consensus can be developed to establish a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement, my delegation will join that consensus.

I believe that a serious examination of these extremely important issues, in all their aspects, in the Committee on Disarmament would be a step forward. My delegation looks forward to consulting with you, Mr. Chairman, as well as with other delegations on the establishment of such a subsidiary body and the mandate to be given to it.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and am very grateful to him for the very kind words he had to say about me and the relations between the United States and my country. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Mihajlović.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): In its statement today, the Yugoslav delegation intended to speak at some length on the item relating to the comprehensive test ban. In part of my statement, I wished to say that we are pleased that efforts have been made on your part through informal consultations with delegations to arrive at a satisfactory solution with respect to the Committee's handling of the two priority items, items 1 and 2, of its agenda. Whatever the outcome of your consultations, and we sincerely hope that it will be fruitful, we think that the Committee should take a decision as soon as possible with respect to the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/84, which calls for the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

However, what was just said, what was just stated by the distinguished representative of the United States of America -- part of which we were glad to hear -- requires that we should carefully study this proposal before speaking on the subject. I will therefore reserve the right of my delegation to speak on the issue of the comprehensive test ban at a later date.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today I would like to state briefly some views on the question of security assurances by nuclear States to non-nuclear States.

The provision of security assurances by nuclear States to non-nuclear States is a universal and urgent demand of non-nuclear countries as well as an obligation of nuclear States. This is an ineluctable requirement posed by the current state of world nuclear armaments. Of over 100 countries in the world, only 5 possess nuclear weapons and 97 per cent of the total number of nuclear warheads are concentrated in the hands of the two Superpowers. The two Superpowers are stepping up the arms race, ceaselessly expanding their nuclear arsenals and contending with each other fiercely, thus posing a grave threat to world peace and the security of all States. It is therefore evident that it is incumbent upon all nuclear States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear States and that the major nuclear Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals, in particular, bear a major and unshirkable responsibility in this regard.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

China's position on security assurances to non-nuclear States is consistent and unequivocal. We are aware of our responsibility as a nuclear State. We have on more than one occasion affirmed that the fundamental way to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and nuclear threat is the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. But since this is not something that can be readily achieved overnight, the least the nuclear States can do is to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones.

It is important to recognize that such negative security assurances by nuclear States to non-nuclear States are a minimal obligation, not an act of charity. Non-nuclear States want unconditional rather than conditional security assurances. They have rightly pointed out that conditional assurances often require non-nuclear States to guarantee the security of nuclear States first. This is obviously putting the cart before the horse and it is only reasonable that quite a number of non-nuclear States are strongly critical of this approach.

Last year, the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 36/95, launched a special appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. We believe that political will is a prerequisite. The key lies in the two major nuclear Powers. Without political will, the major nuclear Powers can find all sorts of excuses to obstruct the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear States. But with political will, it will be possible to find a solution to this question.

The situation in which we find ourselves in connection with this agenda item since the opening of the present session is not encouraging. We hope that the major nuclear Powers will truly demonstrate their political will by assuming their responsibility towards non-nuclear States so that progress may be made on this question before the opening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The delegation of China will join the representatives of other countries in continuing explorations in the search for a sound common formula which is acceptable to non-nuclear States.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, allow me to begin by congratulating you on your appointment as Chairman of this Committee. You have taken office at a key point in the approach to the second special session on disarmament and I am sure that under your wise guidance, the Committee will make most effective use of its time. It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity to pledge you my delegation's full support. I also take this opportunity to acknowledge the contribution made as outgoing Chairman by the distinguished representative of Iran, Mr. Mahallati, whose guidance during the first month of our work laid a firm foundation for the session.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

I wish in my statement today to address two important questions before the Committee, namely, the nuclear test ban and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In my statement at the 153rd plenary meeting on 11 February, I said that my Government well understood the disappointment which existed that it had not proved possible so far to achieve a comprehensive test ban. I said also that my Government would continue to seek progress on test ban issues. This remains the case today. Since I spoke on that occasion, many delegations have devoted time in their plenary statements to this issue, always eloquently and frequently very forcefully, and the strong sentiments voiced in these speeches have been registered by my delegation. We also studied carefully the remarks made by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Eugene Rostow, on 9 February.

The trilateral negotiations held here from 1977 until the autumn of 1980 clarified many of the issues involved in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The tripartite report which was made to the Committee on Disarmament in July 1980 showed where points of agreement had been reached, but it also pointed to important areas where difficulties still existed; there remained at that time serious problems, concerned particularly with verification, which had still to be resolved before further progress could be expected.

The achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an important goal of the British Government in the field of disarmament. The question was and still is how best to work towards that goal. Having reviewed the current situation, having studied the views expressed in the Committee and, in particular, recognizing that it is evident that, for the present, no further progress can be expected in the trilateral talks, my Government has concluded that, in addition to the expert discussions already being held, there would be advantage in holding discussions within the Committee on Disarmament which would concentrate on the key issue of verification. My Government hopes that such discussions would not only throw light on the nature of the problem, but would indicate detailed ways in which it might be resolved. My delegation therefore welcomes the statement made this morning by the distinguished representative of the United States of America that his delegation would be prepared to join in a consensus to set up a subsidiary body to consider some of the issues relating to a nuclear test ban. My delegation believes that this statement will be welcomed by all delegations as representing a significant step forward and hopes that we can proceed rapidly to reach agreement on a mandate for a working group -- or whatever other form of subsidiary body may be acceptable to the Committee -- in order that it can begin its work without delay.

a It goes without saying that my delegation will also continue to participate actively in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts in the belief that it is important to reach full agreement on the technical aspects of the detection and analysis of seismic events as they relate to the solution of the problems of verification of a nuclear test ban. We have taken note of the proposal of the distinguished representative of Sweden that the possibility of improving present

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

capabilities of monitoring radioactivity in the air should also be discussed in an appropriate context under the auspices of the Committee and believe that this suggestion should be carefully considered. Work in these technical areas will be a support and contribution to the wider examination of verification and other issues which I hope we shall now be able to conduct. With respect to item 2 of our agenda, I would emphasize that my delegation remains willing to contribute fully to the discussion on nuclear matters in the Committee and would be willing, as in the past, to participate in informal meetings.

I should now like to turn to the current item on our agenda, namely, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Much time has been given to this over the past three years and the importance which is attached to these security assurances has again been stressed in plenary statements during this session, for example, by the distinguished representatives of the Netherlands, Pakistan and Canada; my delegation has taken careful note of these statements and of the thoughtful contribution of the distinguished representative of Romania earlier this week. Moreover, a Working Group on Security Assurances has already begun its work this session under the able chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Pakistan. But, perhaps just because we have discussed this topic in such detail in the past, I believe that we should for the moment stand back and re-examine the principles which underlie our exchanges.

The reasoning behind the form of the British assurance given in 1978 was fully described in document CD/177 of 10 April last year, but I want again to emphasize that the assurance by the British Government was given because of the awareness that States which had renounced nuclear weapons had fears as to their security and, in particular, that they might be threatened with the use of nuclear weapons or might even be the object of attack with such weapons. The assurance we then gave showed that the British Government accepted that non-nuclear-weapon States were entitled to a specific assurance in this regard, even though such assurance was implicit in the British Government's long-established policy that nuclear weapons would never be used except in self-defence in extreme circumstances. The assurance given in 1978 of course remains fully in force today.

Discussion of the topic in the Committee and its Working Group now centres on the possibility of finding a "common formula" and the form and substance which a common assurance might take. As to form, my delegation is very much aware of the strong feeling on the part of many delegations that a more binding form of legal instrument than the existing voluntary assurances is required. We remain open to suggestions as to how this might be done and are willing to explore alternative possible legal forms. Last year the report of the Working Group noted that there was no objection in principle to a convention and my delegation did not disagree with this conclusion. Nevertheless, we think it would be premature to reach a decision on form before we reach an understanding on content; we should keep all our options open at this stage.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

As to substance, there are two principle questions, namely, to which States should the assurances apply and under what circumstances? My delegation continues to believe that the first question should be answered in a way which is ascertainable and easily understandable. It would of course be possible to adopt a negative formulation that the assurances apply to all States which are not recognized as nuclear-weapon States. But my delegation considers that there are strong arguments in favour of a positive definition which extends security assurances to those non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices. Not only is this criterion readily ascertainable, but it recognizes the obligations undertaken by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or other similar internationally binding commitments which have been supported by the great majority of the international community. Other proposals which may have the effect of excluding from the security assurances States which have renounced nuclear weapons for themselves are not acceptable to my delegation; and, as the distinguished representative of Romania pointed out earlier this week, there are serious problems of interpretation with definitions which seek to exclude from the assurances States which may be parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States.

The second point of substance concerns the conditions under which the security assurances should apply, or might be rendered invalid. Some delegations have argued that there should be no exceptions. Other proposals have included a generalized withdrawal clause. My delegation considers that assurances should be limited only under well-defined circumstances. The United Kingdom assurance contains only one qualification, that it would cease to apply "in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State." This limitation seems to us to be justified. It does not diminish the value of our assurance in any way for States whose intentions are peaceful; moreover, the assurance would continue to apply to any State or States which actually entered into conflict with the United Kingdom, provided only that they were not allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State.

My delegation believes that the problems of finding a "common formula" are already well understood and I do not propose to linger over them. The "common formula" proposal put forward by the Netherlands delegation in a working paper last year was based on principles broadly acceptable to my delegation, and my delegation is glad to see that it is once again before the Working Group. But there are some marked differences between the approach adopted in that paper and in others which are before the Working Group. These differences will have to be overcome before a "common formula" is achieved. It has been suggested that many of the difficulties that face us and, in particular, those that concern negative security assurances can be resolved by political goodwill. However, as the report of the Working Group last year pointed out, our negotiations on substance revealed that "specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a 'common formula' acceptable to all". The question of negative security assurances cannot in fact be divorced from the wider issues of security in general and we must bear this in mind while continuing our search for a "common formula".

My delegation will make every contribution it can to finding an agreed basis.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation, which is acting as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries for March 1962, has taken the floor in order formally to introduce the document of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/253) entitled "Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons". The sponsors of this document -- the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic -- have set themselves a modest but important objective: to draw the attention of the countries members of the Committee on Disarmament to the fact that the well-known decision of the United States administration concerning the large-scale development of the production of binary chemical weapons with their subsequent stationing on the territories of other States, primarily European, entails, apart from other negative consequences, substantial additional difficulties in the matter of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The socialist countries consider that the Committee on Disarmament -- a body in which the international community at present places great hopes with regard to the elaboration of a draft of such a convention -- cannot behave as though nothing had happened and ignore the consequences of the above-mentioned decision. That would be to close our eyes to reality. I do not wish to anticipate or prejudge the Committee's attitude, but the socialist countries for their part are firmly convinced of the need for the future convention to prohibit all chemical weapons -- both traditional and new -- and to leave no possibility for the retention of any such weapons, particularly weapons with a binary charge.

The working paper submitted by the socialist countries does not by any means list all but only some of the difficulties with which the participants in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons will be faced in the light of the prospect of the production of binary weapons. The questions prepared by the Bulgarian delegation in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons spell out some additional aspects of the problem. Other delegations, too, no doubt, will have questions and comments in this connection. It is important to look into all this. And if we want the negotiations to be successful, we should do this within the Working Group in a businesslike manner, calmly, neither dramatizing the situation nor simplifying it. It is the duty of all of us to proceed in this way.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, the Committee this week focuses on the question of so-called negative security assurances. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to offer a few general remarks on this topic and to state some views which my Government considers essential in this context. The Swedish position on this issue was outlined in great detail in my statement before this Committee on 16 April last year. I shall, therefore, be comparatively brief.

Let me first recall that the countries which have forsworn nuclear weapons have a legitimate right to expect legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon Powers not to be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. This has been recognized by all the nuclear-weapon States and has been laid down in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (paragraph 59).

The second special session is now approaching. It will provide an opportunity to review developments in the field of nuclear disarmament since the first special session. So far, there is virtually no progress in this field, as we all know. The most glaring of these shortcomings, in the view of my delegation, is the failure to agree even on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban in this Committee. I want however to express the great interest my delegation attaches to the statements made this morning by the distinguished representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. We shall study them carefully. My comment on them today is of course only of a very preliminary character. If there is basic agreement that the goal is to create a comprehensive or a complete nuclear test ban, naturally, the questions of verification and compliance are the ones which will require the most consideration in the negotiations. Therefore, maybe, with further efforts, a mutually acceptable solution to the problem can be found in a not too distant future. This we would very much welcome. The continued lack of progress as far as negative security assurances are concerned continues, however, to add to the feeling of general failure on nuclear disarmament.

True, there is no complete assurance as long as nuclear weapons exist and no guarantees can replace nuclear disarmament. It is, however, a source of deep disappointment to my country and no doubt also to the other non-nuclear-weapon States, which are entitled to adequate assurances, that no progress has been made. In the statement of 16 April 1961 to which I just referred, I emphasized that we, for our part, understood the intentions behind the existing unilateral declarations to be that States non-parties to nuclear security arrangements should permanently enjoy freedom from being the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. On the same occasion, I stated that Sweden considers itself covered, without any exceptions, by the unilateral assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States, in so far as they relate to individual non-nuclear-weapon States. My Government has taken note of the fact that none of the nuclear-weapon States has contradicted this interpretation.

It is, however, not only our own security situation in a region of the world where the nuclear threat seems most imminent that worries us. Many non-nuclear-weapon States have referred to the relationship between the attitudes of the nuclear-weapon States and the risks of horizontal nuclear proliferation. This should be an important aspect for all of us. In that perspective, it is in the interest not only of the non-nuclear-weapon States, but also of the nuclear-weapon States themselves, to give generally acceptable guarantees without further delay.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The Swedish position on the contents and form of negative security assurances were outlined in detail before the Committee last year. My statement then still reflects the views of my Government. Let me, therefore, limit myself to repeating that Sweden would indeed have objections to a convention which would make new demands on those countries which have committed themselves to a non-nuclear status, for instance by becoming Parties to the NPT. As a consequence of fundamental features of Sweden's policy of neutrality, we would furthermore find it difficult to enter into a bilateral agreement with any nuclear-weapon Power on this issue.

As the present assurances given by the nuclear-weapon Powers are in many respects unsatisfactory, they must be improved in substance. It is also important that they be given in a form so that they cannot be changed or repealed at short notice. This is one of the problems with the existing unilateral declarations. One possibility would be to record the assurances in a resolution by the Security Council of the United Nations. It might also be useful to consider this as an interim measure. It should, however, be made absolutely clear that such a measure cannot be regarded as a substitute for the final objective, namely, to agree on arrangements satisfactory to all States.

It is now time for the nuclear-weapon Powers to act. We know that, in present circumstances, one cannot realistically expect much in terms of agreements between them. They must, however, make a determined effort to improve their present formulas, taking the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear Powers into account in a much more direct way than has been the case so far. They will thereby serve not only the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States, but their own interests as well. The newly re-established Ad Hoc Working Group under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad provides a forum for negotiations on this matter. A good basis for its work has been provided in General Assembly resolution 36/95, which was adopted by 145 votes to none, with only 3 abstentions. It is the hope of my delegation that the nuclear-weapon Powers will not miss the opportunity of taking the many valuable comments and suggestions made in the Working Group into account in reconsidering their various positions. It is imperative that progress be made before the forthcoming second special session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden. I have no other speakers on my list. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? The representative of India, Ambassador Venkateswaran, has asked for the floor.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): I have asked for the floor in order to give my delegation's preliminary reactions to the statements made today by the distinguished

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom. While clearly we are not entirely satisfied with their response to the justifiable demand of other members for the establishment of working groups under items 1 and 2, we can also not fail to note that there has been a positive change in their attitude toward the manner in which the Committee on Disarmament may discharge its responsibilities under items 1 and 2. We feel that the Committee on Disarmament should take advantage of this change and see what progress we can make during the current session on this vital issue. In saying this, we are aware of the allergy of the two delegations to the word "negotiations". We do not of course share their allergy, but we feel we should take advantage of any course of action, such as discussion or exchange of views on any aspect of items 1 and 2, if it would show promise of leading us towards negotiations on actual texts of treaties. This remains to be seen, of course, and we should not delay the setting up of a working group under item 1. In a manner of speaking, my delegation believes that we should begin to work when the trilateral negotiations end, carry forward the discussions as far as possible and make a report to the second special session on disarmament. My delegation is willing to participate in consultations on an appropriate mandate for such a group which would naturally include consideration of questions relating to verification. As regards item 2, we would again urge the immediate setting up of a working group for the modest purpose of embarking on such discussion, on questions such as those contained in document CD/180 of the Group of 21 and document CD/193 of the group of socialist countries. Unless we proceed in this manner, we shall have little progress to report to the second special session on disarmament. We regard the statements made by the United States of America and the United Kingdom as providing an important opening which we should make use of in the limited time available to us. I earnestly trust that the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom will, for their part, keep responding positively.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his statement. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? If not, I would now like to go on to another matter.

At the request of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, a proposal has been submitted to us in Working Paper No. 57. This draft relates to an invitation to the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to nominate representatives to attend certain meetings of the Working Group. You will recall that a similar decision was taken last year by the Committee at its one hundred and thirty-seventh plenary meeting. This text was considered and agreed on by the Working Group at its meeting yesterday afternoon. I now submit it for the Committee's approval.

The representative of Argentina has asked for the floor.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Although my statement will be very brief, I cannot fail to express satisfaction at seeing you preside over the work of this Committee during the current month and to pledge to you the fullest co-operation of the delegation of Argentina, while at the same time expressing my delegation's appreciation to the Ambassador of Iran for the brilliant manner in which he guided the work of this Committee last month.

My delegation wishes to state that it agrees with the draft decision which was submitted to this Committee by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and which, as you will recall, is similar to that adopted by the Committee last year on the same question. I wish to place on record the fact that my delegation agrees with this text because it takes account of some of the concerns which my delegation had occasion to express last year on this subject. In the first place, the draft decision states that the co-operation requested from the two entities mentioned involves "providing technical information" and I stress the words "technical information", which are in conformity with rule 41 of this Committee's Rules of Procedure. In other words, the purpose of the invitation to those entities is not for them to give opinions or advice in general, but, rather, technical information, and on points specifically mentioned, as is the case in the draft decision now under consideration. Similarly, the invitation addressed to those two entities refers to attendance by their representatives at certain meetings, i.e. at a limited number, perhaps only one; with a view to providing the technical information requested. The invitation will not therefore result in permanent, or almost permanent, attendance by representatives of international organs at the Working Group's discussions; this, on grounds of principle which have nothing to do with the two particular entities mentioned in this draft decision, namely, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme, for which the delegation of Argentina has the greatest respect. The principle at issue, which my delegation is anxious to preserve and which is preserved in the draft decision under consideration, is the principle that international organs, whichever they may be, must not be directly or indirectly associated with the process of negotiation on disarmament questions, which is a matter exclusively for sovereign States. This is the principle which my delegation wishes to protect and which, as I have said, is taken into account in the draft decision under consideration; for that reason, my delegation supports this draft.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Carasales for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I am sure that the Committee has duly taken note of his comments concerning Working Paper No. 57 and the decision which the Committee is now called upon to approve.

The representative of the United States has asked for the floor.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I would like to propose formally that the draft decision be amended to include a reference to the International Atomic Energy Agency along the following lines: following the words "United Nations Environment Programme", my proposed amendment would insert the words "Director-General of IAEA" and then, further down, in the matter "of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons as well as consultations convened by its Chairman on toxicity determinations", I would substitute the words "on technical matters" for the words "on toxicity determinations" and then make appropriate adjustments to the end of that sentence by striking out the word "to" before the word "organizations" and ending the sentence with a full stop after the word "organizations". My rationale for this proposed amendment is as follows: the Committee will recall that, during the informal consultations with chemical weapons experts held by Ambassador Lidgard last summer (document CD/CW/WP.22/Rev.1), a presentation was made to the Group by the United States delegation concerning a system for remote continual verification, known by the acronym RECOVER. A number of delegations expressed interest in learning more about this concept. It is being developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in conjunction with its nuclear safeguards programme and a demonstration project is currently underway. My delegation and others have been very interested in the possibilities of remote continual verification and its possible application to CW verification problems. On behalf of interested delegations, I intend to request that time be allocated during the expert session next week for further informal discussions on this possibility. It would therefore seem appropriate to request that IAEA be invited to send a technical expert to participate in the appropriate session of the informal consultations for the purpose of providing technical information with respect to the work of IAEA in the field of remote continual verification and its possible application to a CW prohibition. In this regard, I think the same criteria would apply that have just been alluded to by the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina: this participation is only for the purpose of aiding the Working Group and the Committee in a derivative sense, concerning particular technical matters. It should be related solely to technical information without recognition of anything more than this contribution by technical experts from that body who have unique qualifications and expertise in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Before I give the floor to the representative of India, who has asked for it, I would like to request Ambassador Fields kindly to repeat his proposed amendments to the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I was apparently working from an earlier draft and therefore would merely add to this the phrase concerning the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The other amendment which I proposed would not be necessary as Working Paper No. 57 seems to have cured any problems that may have arisen in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States, who has proposed that, in the text of the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57, the words "and the Director-General of IAEA" should be added immediately after the words "the regional office for Europe of the United Nations Environment Programme". The representative of India has asked for the floor in this connection.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): We have heard with interest the proposal made by the distinguished representative of the United States. But, as I recall, last year we went into this subject in some detail and the new proposal regarding the inclusion of experts from IAEA will have to be considered, by my delegation at least, most carefully. If I may therefore appeal to the representative of the United States through you, I would suggest that the existing draft decision may perhaps proceed and that we could, if necessary, prepare a subsequent draft decision inviting experts from IAEA after we have had more time to consider this particular question.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has also listened with great interest to the proposal made by the Ambassador of the United States, but, as the Ambassador of India stated a moment ago, we consider that the Committee now has before it a draft decision which was discussed and proposed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and which involves a request for technical information from two entities with regard to two specific points, namely, the establishment of toxicities of chemicals and the international register of potentially toxic chemicals. As I understood the Ambassador of the United States, his suggestion has a different purpose, namely, to invite the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to send a representative to provide technical information on a point that may be described as the mode of operation of the RECOVER system at present underway on an experimental basis within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in co-operation with seven countries possessing installations with which the RECOVER system can be used. In other words, the subject is a different one and, in my opinion, it would therefore be preferable to separate the two questions by taking different decisions: we would approve the draft decision now under consideration if there is a consensus on it and we would then draft another decision, perhaps within the framework of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which is the body that will ultimately have to make recommendations to the Committee on this matter. In this connection, I would like to state that my delegation will consider the matter in the same spirit in which it has approached this draft decision. On that basis, I urge the Ambassador of the United States to consider this possibility.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I am fully prepared to consult with the delegations concerned on this matter and to see whether we cannot make some accommodation. As the matter was presented to my delegation only this morning, we have not had the time to consider it in detail here. However, we are certainly prepared to enter into discussions with the other interested delegations or to participate in a discussion on this matter within the Working Group. We would prefer that the decision await those consultations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States and would like to ask the Committee whether, in its opinion, it would be possible to solve this problem through rapid consultations between the delegations directly concerned. In this connection, I note that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons is to hold informal consultations tomorrow morning and that its next formal meeting is on Monday morning. It would thus be possible for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to reconsider the matter and, on the basis of the outcome of the consultations, to make possible new proposals at the beginning of next week with a view to solving this problem. Are there any objections to this way of proceeding?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): At my request, the secretariat distributed today an informal document containing the time-table of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this time-table is only indicative and it may, if necessary, be adjusted later according to the requirements of our work.

The representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, has asked for the floor and I give it to him.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, since you talked about the future consultations with the Working Group, I was persuaded that this meant that you are going in the direction of the motion made by the delegation of India, supported by Argentina, that we adopt this decision as it has been drafted by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and that the additional invitation should be the subject of other consultations. However, my neighbours have a different interpretation of your decision. I would therefore like to clarify the situation because the work of the experts begins on Monday and appropriate letters should be sent to the organizations which are mentioned in Working Paper No. 57, so as not to delay our work.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Sujka. The decision we have just taken was in line with the suggestion I made to the Committee, i.e. that, if there were no objections, the decision contained in Working Paper No. 57 would be submitted to consultations which I myself would like to be rapid and which could be completed in a very short time so that there would be no unreasonable delay in our work and our hearing of the representatives of WHO and the United Nations Environment Programme. It was on that basis that I considered that agreement had been reached in the Committee and, therefore, that the decision should cover all the problems at hand and it was on that basis that I announced it.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the matter of concern to me is the same as that stressed by the Ambassador of Poland. It was my understanding that what was going to be postponed was only the question of the suggestion made by the United States that the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be invited to send a representative for the purpose already mentioned and that this was what was going to be the subject of consultations. It was my understanding that there was no objection to the adoption of this draft decision, on which agreement exists and which refers to a different matter, since the date of the meeting of chemical weapons experts is very close at hand and time might be lost if we delay the sending of notes to these two entities, namely the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Health Organization, a question on which a consensus has been reached. Moreover, my delegation has stated that it prefers to see these two questions dealt with in two separate decisions.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, frankly speaking, the Soviet delegation, too, understood your decision as implying approval of the draft decision in Working Paper No. 57. In fact, a general agreement was reached in the Working Group yesterday and, as I understand it, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has submitted a recommendation. So far as I know, no one in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons objected to that recommendation. It seems to me, therefore, that the course to take is the one we have always followed, namely: questions are considered by the Working Group; the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Working Group recommends a decision to the Committee, and the Committee adopts that decision. I would be in favour of our adopting a decision on this question, leaving the new proposal that was made today to be considered separately. In any event, these are two different issues, and an invitation to experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency is quite unconnected with the work of the Group of Experts on toxicities of chemicals.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I am sorry if the way in which I presented the decision has given rise to different interpretations. I must put myself in the Committee's hands on this matter; and I think I can say that the amendment proposed by the distinguished representative of the United States does not have the Committee's full agreement. Some delegations would like it to be dealt with in a separate decision. I would like to ask whether there is a consensus that the text of the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57 can be accepted in the form in which it was transmitted to us by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons?

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I have listened to the concerns expressed here and I cannot myself distinguish the difficulty that people are having. The two organizations mentioned in this decision are both located here in Geneva, whereas IAEA is in Vienna and so the question of timing about an invitation and the arrival of appropriate technical experts would seem to me to be more keen in the direction of my amendment to this draft decision. We have sought to amend the paper through the Chairman of the Working Group, but that did not appear appropriate. I therefore think that we are perfectly sound in suggesting that this go back to the Working Group, where we shall have an opportunity to debate the respective merits of these proposals and then present the Committee with something on which we can agree.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Fields. I note from his statement that there is no consensus on the immediate adoption of the text of the decision contained in Working Paper No. 57. I therefore suggest that the matter might be taken up again as soon as possible at one of the forthcoming meetings, after consultations and a possible new decision by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

I come back to the question of the time-table of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week and, in this connection, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, has asked for the floor.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I have asked for the floor merely, with your permission, to make a brief announcement to prevent any mistaken interpretations. On Monday, 15 March, at 3 p.m., it will still not be possible for the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to meet. There will, rather, as during this past week, be a meeting of the contact group in the usual room, Meeting Room No. I.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Garcia Robles for his clarification; the time-table will be amended accordingly. I therefore take it that the draft time-table for the coming week is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would like to inform representatives about possible dates for the Committee's informal meetings on item 7 of its agenda, "Prevention of the arms race in outer space". My concern is to ensure that delegations which would like to take part in the exchange of views on this new item on our agenda have enough time to prepare their contributions. I therefore suggest Friday, 26 March, at 3 p.m. and Tuesday, 30 March, at 3 p.m. These dates seem convenient, in view of all the work the Committee has to do. I suggest that you should consider the possibility of agreeing to these dates so that we can take a decision in this connection when we adopt the time-table for next week or earlier, if possible.

You will also recall that, in this week's time-table, we tentatively planned to hold an informal meeting tomorrow afternoon, Friday, at 3 p.m. Today, we have heard statements in the plenary meeting, particularly the statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, who have introduced new elements whose importance for the Committee's work on items 1 and 2 of the agenda cannot be underestimated. I intend to continue, with all due urgency, the informal consultations that I have been holding since the beginning of this week, taking account of these new elements. Accordingly and bearing in mind the legitimate desire of delegations to have some time for reflection, I tend to think that the informal meeting which we had planned in principle for tomorrow afternoon could be more usefully held during next week when the Chairman's consultations have been completed, thus giving delegations time to reflect and to consult.

If there is no objection, we might therefore cancel, for the time being, tomorrow's informal meeting and postpone it until next week, if possible.

I would like to make an announcement: the Working Group on Radiological Weapons will meet here tomorrow at noon. If there is no other matter for discussion, the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 16 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario ALESSI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI
Mr. MAACHI
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss de CLERQ

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. B. GRINBERG
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. G. SZENTESI

India:

Mr. S. SARAN
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA
Mr. B. MAUNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. A. BAHRIN
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran:

Mr. A. SABZALIAN

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. van DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONS

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

Mr. B.T. SURIKOV

Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. M. BUSBY

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Mr. P.S. CORDEN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKA EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 163rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee today begins consideration of item 5 of its agenda, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so.

I should like first of all to welcome His Excellency Mr. Keijo Korhonen, Under-Secretary of State of Finland. There is no need for me to introduce him to the Committee on Disarmament because he was Finland's Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1976 to 1977. Furthermore, he was Chairman of the Group of Experts which prepared the Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. He has also had great experience in the sphere of education as Professor of History at the University of Helsinki. I am sure that the Committee will listen with very special interest to the statement he is to make to us this morning. I should also like to welcome the new representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Ambassador Vejvoda. I am sure that the Committee on Disarmament will have an opportunity to appreciate his qualities and the contribution he will undoubtedly make to its work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, the German Democratic Republic, Japan, Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany, Cuba and Finland.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, Ambassador Ahmad, the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, let me begin by expressing the deep satisfaction of the Pakistan delegation on your assumption of this Committee's chairmanship during the month of March. Italy's role in the pursuit of disarmament is well known. We are confident that your personal dedication to the cause of disarmament and vast experience will ensure that the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament take a positive turn during this month.

I would also like to express the Pakistan delegation's deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran, for the resolute manner in which he guided the critical opening phase of this Committee's 1982 session.

I have asked for the floor today to express Pakistan's view on the items of our agenda relating to nuclear weapons.

Of these items, the one concerning the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty enjoys the highest priority. The deep regret of my delegation at the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has been unable during the past three years to undertake concrete negotiations on this item has been expressed on previous occasions. We remain fully convinced that this Committee must play the central role in negotiating a nuclear test-ban treaty and that an ad hoc working group should be set up immediately to commence negotiations on a treaty.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation noted with satisfaction the statement made to the Committee on 18 February 1982 by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union expressing the readiness of his delegation to participate in negotiations on a nuclear test-ban treaty in the Committee on Disarmament. We equally appreciate the concrete indication of the position of the Soviet delegation on various aspects regarding the treaty, particularly its readiness to accept such a treaty for the present with the participation of the three nuclear-weapon States which were until recently engaged in separate negotiations on this question.

The Pakistan delegation has examined carefully the statements made in the Committee on 11 March 1982 by the distinguished representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of a nuclear test ban. We have concluded from these statements that these two delegations are now prepared to accept the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the item entitled "Nuclear test ban" and to open negotiations on this subject. If this understanding is correct, it would constitute a most positive development, particularly in light of the contentious history of this issue.

In the present circumstances, Mr. Chairman, we believe that the most logical step would be to open forthwith informal consultations under your chairmanship to formulate the mandate of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. We consider it indispensable that the mandate of such a working group should allow it to conduct negotiations and not be restricted either to informal or to expert examination of the issues involved. Of course, the question of the specific issues which the ad hoc working group should take up for negotiations in the first instance is the central subject that should be resolved through the informal consultations.

The distinguished representative of the United States has said that his delegation is prepared to take up "issues relating to verification of compliance with" a nuclear test ban. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom has also suggested that the Committee "concentrate on the key issue of verification". My delegation is aware that verification of compliance with a test-ban treaty constitutes one of the important issues to be resolved. Therefore, we would not be averse to taking up this issue in order to initiate negotiations on the nuclear test-ban item. Of course, it is self-evident that negotiations relating to verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban must be based on a prior understanding, if not agreement, on the scope of the treaty. It would appear from the report of the trilateral negotiations submitted to the Committee last year that at least as between the three negotiating powers, an agreement or understanding was achieved on the scope of the test-ban treaty. This was, in fact, reflected in the language of paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It may not be impossible, therefore, to reach an understanding on the scope of a nuclear test ban for which, as a first step, verification and control arrangements should be negotiated in an ad hoc working group of the Committee.

The initiation of such negotiations on aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would constitute an important, even if symbolic, contribution to the success of the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. Therefore, the Pakistan delegation will actively endeavour to achieve consensus on the creation of a working group on item 1 and the formulation of its mandate.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation hopes that the Committee will also reach consensus in the near future on an appropriate modality for concrete examination of the item relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The elaboration of an agreed scenario for nuclear disarmament, envisaged in the proposal of the Group of 21 in document CD/150, would permit the identification of specific possibilities for negotiations. It could also help to bridge the significant divergences in the present positions of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and thus make an important contribution to the success of the restricted and specific negotiations on various aspects of nuclear disarmament which are either under way or likely to be opened in the near future between the United States and the USSR.

The widely different positions which have been reportedly taken by the two sides in the so-called intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations currently under way in Geneva illustrate the absence of agreed premises on the basis of which nuclear disarmament should be pursued. My delegation hopes that at some stage in the near future the two States concerned will find it possible to inform the Committee on Disarmament of their respective approaches to the European nuclear talks. Need I say that the issues involved are of concern not only to the negotiating parties, nor even to the European Powers alone, but the entire international community. This Committee and the United Nations General Assembly at its forthcoming special session are equally entitled to be informed by the two major nuclear-weapon Powers about their intentions regarding the resumption and objectives of negotiations on strategic nuclear armaments.

We are all agreed that nuclear disarmament will have to be achieved through a slow and arduous process. At the same time, the danger of a nuclear war, by design, miscalculation or accident, has increased alarmingly owing to the climate of tension and confrontation in the relations between the Superpowers, their continuing accumulation of nuclear armaments, disturbing developments in technology and the evolution of dangerous doctrines of nuclear warfare. It has been our consistent view that while pursuing nuclear disarmament through specific negotiations in various forums, the international community must take decisive and early steps significantly to reduce the danger of nuclear war and to neutralize, to the extent possible, the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons.

The Pakistan delegation subscribes fully to the proposition which has been endorsed for the past three years by the United Nations General Assembly that the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and would constitute a crime against humanity. My delegation is aware of the political difficulties which are encountered by some States in accepting this principle at the present moment. Yet the national security of any State or group of States, no matter how important, cannot override the imperative of preserving mankind and our civilization from annihilation. It remains our hope that sooner rather than later, the primordial instinct for self-preservation will override dependence on nuclear deterrence.

An international agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons could form an important interim measure towards the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan therefore welcomed the proposal initiated by the USSR at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly for a declaration against the first-use of nuclear weapons. We would be most gratified to receive confirmation

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

that, as the proponent of this proposal, the USSR is itself committed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Taken together with the declaration made by China over a decade ago not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, such a commitment would in itself constitute an important contribution to peace and security in the Asian context. It may also produce a beneficial impact on the security climate in Europe and other parts of the world.

It is, of course, obvious that so long as some States continue to place primary reliance on nuclear deterrence for their security, the prospects for the negotiation of international agreements prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons or on the non-first-use of such weapons will remain bleak. However, such difficulties should not arise in relation to the modest and reasonable aspiration of the non-nuclear-weapon States to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Despite the consensus reached on this question in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, three years of negotiation on the issue have produced, unfortunately, only marginal progress.

During the past two sessions, work in the ad hoc group has focused on the central question of devising a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The Committee on Disarmament was also requested by the General Assembly to continue, at its current session, the efforts to devise a common formula or common obligation and the General Assembly appealed to the nuclear-weapon States in particular to demonstrate the political will required to reach agreement on this issue.

This appeal was directed at the right quarter. For the failure of the negotiations to devise a common formula or common obligation on negative security assurances arises, first and foremost, from the positions taken by four of the five nuclear-weapon States which are designed to satisfy their own security concerns and preoccupations while conceding next to nothing to the legitimate security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

For one thing, in their declarations these four nuclear-weapon States demand that non-nuclear-weapon States commit themselves legally and irrevocably not to acquire nuclear weapons or even "nuclear explosive devices" in order to be "eligible" for the negative assurance. On the other hand, these nuclear-weapon States themselves are unwilling to give any commitment that they will progressively reduce and eventually give up the possession of nuclear weapons; nor are they prepared to forswear the use of such weapons in certain circumstances. This aim of preserving the nuclear monopoly of certain States does not coincide with the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal. My delegation has repeatedly stated that all non-nuclear-weapon States should be eligible for negative security assurances. The acceptance or otherwise of legal non-proliferation commitments is irrelevant in the determination of the non-nuclear-weapon status of a particular country. To exclude any non-nuclear-weapon State from the scope of the assurances is to hold out an implicit threat of the use of nuclear weapons against it. Such discrimination itself could have significant consequences for non-proliferation.

Secondly, the unilateral declarations of the four nuclear-weapon States contain other limitations, conditions or exceptions which, taken together, have the effect of totally neutralizing any positive feature in these assurances. The proposition that non-nuclear-weapon States which have nuclear weapons on their territories

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

should not enjoy security assurances, or that such assurances would cease to apply to any State which participates, in "alliance" or "association" with a nuclear-weapon Power, in an attack on the nuclear-weapon State extending the assurance, have an internal logic which we understand. The problems raised by these propositions are twofold. The first point of principle is that the premises upon which these propositions are put forward arise from the security doctrines of the nuclear-weapon Powers concerned and from their reliance, in the context of their military alliances, on the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Acceptance of these propositions would imply acceptance of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The second difficulty is of a more practical nature. As we have learnt in the course of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group, the two propositions I have mentioned are very difficult to reconcile. This is not surprising since each of the propositions is geared to establishing a political and military advantage for its proponents. All this has very little to do with the security of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States which are outside, and wish to remain outside, the alliance structure and nuclear security arrangements of the nuclear-weapon States.

Pakistan's position of principle is that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be unconditional and unlimited in their scope, application and duration. But the Pakistan delegation has also demonstrated its readiness to reach a realistic compromise on the subject. While we deplore the prevailing doctrines of nuclear deterrence and their reflection in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers, my delegation has attempted to take the present situation into account by proposing a formula which would exclude for the present those non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two opposing military alliances. This may not be an entirely satisfactory solution. It is, nevertheless, a neutral formulation which can serve as the basis for compromise between all the nuclear-weapon States without prejudice to their respective positions. We can, of course, understand the desire of those non-nuclear-weapon States which are involved in the nuclear security arrangements of the two alliance systems not to be excluded from the scope of the assurances. But surely, the choice is for them to make, whether they wish to preserve their security through the nuclear protection offered by their allies, or if they would like to do so by dissociating themselves from such security arrangements.

In the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, we have as yet not seen a positive response by the nuclear-weapon States to the appeal of the General Assembly that they demonstrate the political will to reach agreement on a common formula which could be included in a legally binding instrument. On the contrary, they have once again reiterated their known positions on the subject. This is the stage at which we, the members of the Committee on Disarmament, must collectively decide whether we would like to report to the General Assembly at its second special session our complete failure to make any progress on this question or whether other options to register some progress are available. If the Committee on Disarmament after three years of efforts cannot make any progress on the question of negative security

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

assurances, it must not shirk from frankly informing the second special session of the specific reasons for its failure, that is, of the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their restrictive and conditional positions on this question. The Committee should strongly urge these States to review their policies and to present revised positions to the General Assembly at its second special session which fully take into account the views of the non-aligned and neutral States and are conducive to the elaboration of an international instrument on this item.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for his kind words about my country. I now give the floor to Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, it gives me particular pleasure to welcome today in our midst a new representative of Czechoslovakia to the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Miloš Vejvoda, who in his capacity today is taking part in our meeting for the first time. Ambassador Vejvoda has for many years devoted his efforts to disarmament, discharging different responsibilities here in Geneva, in New York and during the last years as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the capital of his country, Prague. We wish him success in his new appointment and are looking forward to a friendly and fruitful co-operation with him and his delegation here in this body. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the Under-Secretary of State from Finland, Mr. Kerhonen. For many of us, he is well known for the activities he carried out even long before the Committee on Disarmament was established. I have particularly in mind his role as Chairman of the Working Group of the CCD on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in 1975. We will listen carefully to his statement.

In the course of the first month of our spring session, great attention was devoted to the question of a CTB and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The overwhelming majority of delegations asked for concrete action with regard to both items before the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the fact that you, Mr. Chairman, have taken up our proposal and have started consultations on the further proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament concerning items 1 and 2. It is our hope that you will be in a position to report positively on the results of your consultations to the Committee very soon.

We share the view of most delegations that the outcome of the consultations should be the establishment of ad hoc working groups which will start real negotiations on both items. Guided by the firm will to reach this end, my delegation tables today in working document CD/259 draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2. We would appreciate it very much, Mr. Chairman, if you could take these drafts into account in the further course of your consultations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador Okawa, the representative of Japan.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, His Excellency President Sandro Pertini, the distinguished Head of State of your country, left Japan yesterday after a highly successful State visit to our country. During his one-week stay in Japan, President Pertini made a strong appeal in the National Diet for nuclear disarmament and also visited the city of Hiroshima at his own special request. It is against this auspicious background that I have particular pleasure in welcoming you to the chair of this Committee and in pledging to you the fullest co-operation of my delegation during your tenure of office as our Chairman.

At the same time I wish to express our warm appreciation of the unassuming but efficient manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran, presided over our work and overcame the difficult procedural problems we faced at the start of our 1982 session.

Finally, I wish to welcome amongst us the distinguished Under-Secretary of State of Finland, Mr. Korhonen, as well as our new colleague from Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Today, I would like to refer briefly to the second experimental exchange of seismic data that was conducted in November and December last year, utilizing the network of the WMO global telecommunications system. I am very pleased to notice that Dr. Ericsson has just arrived in this room and I wish to welcome him.

When we were discussing last year the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, I expressed on two occasions the hope that as many countries as possible would be able to participate in the second experiment. My delegation is all the more pleased to learn that some 20 countries I believe, including five socialist countries, participated in the recent experiment and that, consequently, the results showed considerable improvement over the results of the 1980 exercise, although a number of problems remain to be solved.

I understand that most of the problems that came up in the context of last year's experiment can be attributed to the fact that the utilization of the WMO global telecommunications system for the transmission of seismic data over a global network has not yet been officially recognized by the Congress of the World Meteorological Organization. Up to the present, the trial exchanges have been conducted only under provisional arrangements with WMO.

My delegation is therefore of the view that the Committee on Disarmament should formally request the World Meteorological Organization to co-operate in the global transmission of seismic data by authorizing the use of its global telecommunications system for that purpose; such a request should be made early enough to enable the WMO to consider it and take the necessary decision at its ninth Congress which is to be held in the early summer of 1983. My delegation is convinced that even more satisfactory results could be achieved if the next experimental exchange could be conducted with the official blessing and co-operation of the WMO.

Dr. Ichikawa, our expert on the Ad Hoc group, informs me that, while a certain degree of confidence has been obtained with regard to the exchange of so-called Level I data, the exchange of Level II data remains far from satisfactory. It has apparently become clear that the examination of Level II data can be highly effective in the detection of minor seismic events, and a workable method for exchanging Level II data

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

would appear to be essential in order to utilize such data to the maximum extent possible. According to Dr. Ichikawa, considerable progress has been achieved in recent years in the technology for data exchange of this sort and efforts should be made to apply such new technology to the exchange of Level II data.

Before concluding this brief statement, I wish to express our appreciation to the delegation of the United States for the significant one step forward in connection with item 1 of our agenda that it announced to us in this Committee last Thursday. Ambassador Fields has made a laudable effort, and I wish to offer him my personal congratulations. We wish to make the best of what has been put forward and strike while the iron is hot.

I therefore hope that we can quickly reach agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with issues relating to verification of compliance with a CTB, and that the working group can get to work immediately in order that we can report some progress to the General Assembly at its special session in June on this long overdue matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind and friendly words he addressed to the Chair. I am also grateful to him for his kind reference to the recent visit to Japan of the President of the Italian Republic.

The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Ambassador de Souza e Silva, the representative of Brazil.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, today I would like to offer the preliminary views of my delegation on the proposal made last Thursday by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, with regard to the long-standing call of the Group of 21 for the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee on item 1 of the agenda. My second purpose in this statement is to seek additional clarification of the American proposal in order to be in a better position to evaluate its potential advantages to the progress of the work of this Committee, with particular attention to the priorities assigned to it by the General Assembly. I would reserve my comments on the section of Ambassador Fields' statement dealing with item 2 for another opportunity.

I will not conceal that my delegation heard the proposal on item 1 with a sentiment of less than enthusiasm. For several decades now the international community has explicitly urged the nuclear-weapon Powers to live up to their commitments, both of a legal and of a political nature, to take serious steps towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The discontinuance of all tests of nuclear weapons, to which those Powers also committed themselves, has been unequivocally accorded the highest priority in countless resolutions of the General Assembly and in the Final Document of its first special session on disarmament. In the view of the overwhelming majority of States, only the lack of political will of a few stand in the way of the achievement of a CTBT. Political will, however, seems still to be in short supply. Since the inception of the Committee on Disarmament, the members of the Group of 21 and many other delegations have repeatedly stressed the importance and urgency of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The call for the establishment of a working group to start negotiations on such a treaty has intensified over these three years, both in this Committee and in other forums of the United Nations and in public

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

opinion at large. Yet such a call fell on deaf ears until it became clear that all but two members of the Committee were ready to join in a consensus on such a procedural decision.

Ambassador Fields' proposal of last Thursday provides, in our view, the first indication that his Government, having considered the arguments put forward over the span of so many years, has in fact reacted in a manner that might bring it closer to the stated wish of the overwhelming majority of States. We can hardly dismiss the importance of this fact, both for the future of disarmament negotiations and for the more immediate hopes of achieving the discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing in a multilateral instrument. Although it falls a long way short of such stated wishes, the United States' proposal must be examined in detail, in conjunction with proposals that have been on the table for a long time on the same subject, so that a consensus acceptable to all can be evolved.

My delegation welcomes, in this regard, Ambassador Fields' references to the function and responsibilities of the Committee on Disarmament, the discharging of which must be facilitated by all delegations, and his recognition of the fact that all members of this Committee share the same concern. We look forward, therefore, to the continuation of the process of consultations already started by you, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the proposals put on the table, on how to deal in the most effective manner with item 1 of the agenda. We also trust that the treatment of item 2 will not be forgotten.

It is my delegation's firm conviction that the strengthening of the negotiating function of the Committee on Disarmament and the enhancement of its responsibility and competence in disarmament matters must remain at the basis of any agreement that might be reached as a result of your consultations. My delegation is confident that these preoccupations will be present in the minds of all delegations during the consultation process, which we hope will be as brief as possible.

It is in the light of the position stated above that I turn now, through you, Mr. Chairman, to the delegation of the United States to seek additional clarification of its proposal of last Thursday. I trust that my queries will be taken in the same constructive spirit that I believe has guided the American delegation in formulating its proposal.

My first concern deals with the over-all purpose of the exercise which is proposed to us. The significance of the American suggestion lies, in our view, in its potential usefulness in bringing the international community closer to the achievement of a multilaterally negotiated ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. My delegation rejects the proposition that the present time is not "propitious" for the negotiation of such an agreement. We consider the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests not as a long-term goal but, on the contrary, as a most pressing issue. This opinion is shared by all but two members of the whole international community. Yet, if there is a chance that the Committee can usefully work toward the achievement of that goal, however distant it may appear in the eyes of those two delegations, my own delegation is fully prepared to examine that possibility in a positive spirit. By making it possible to move forward in the direction of the negotiation of a treaty, rather than merely establishing the existence of a stalemate, we will all be co-operating towards the discharge of the responsibilities with which this Committee was entrusted. By contrast, the mere exchange of academic opinions on general questions relating to the test ban might have the opposite and harmful effect of distracting the Committee from the fulfilment of

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

its role, thus compromising its effectiveness and its ability to achieve the results for which it was created. The institutionalization of an academic role for the Committee is tantamount to the negation of its function and purpose. If delegation would thus request the delegation of the United States to elaborate further on the relationship between its proposal and the actual negotiation of a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

Another set of questions that might be raised in connection with the American proposal relates to the way in which its authors conceive the procedural aspects of the decision to be taken by the Committee on the matter. Such questions will undoubtedly be brought into sharper focus during the process of consultation under your guidance, Mr. Chairman. I believe, however, that members of this Committee would benefit from a clearer understanding of the procedural implications of the proposal.

For instance, document CD/181, submitted last year by the Group of 21, clearly provides for an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1. We would welcome the comments of the United States delegation on the terms of such a mandate, in the light of their own view of the substantive and procedural questions involved. In this connection, it would also be useful to know what form they envisage their proposed subsidiary body to take, and how its activities would relate to those of the Committee itself, as its parent body. My delegation recalls the unfortunate experience of the refusal by some delegations to permit the membership of the United Nations as a whole to acquaint itself with the results of last year's informal discussions on items 1 and 2.

We also note the particular importance that the authors of the proposal attach to the questions of verification and compliance, the treatment of which is also contemplated in the proposal by the Group of 21. It could hardly be otherwise, since those questions are crucial elements of any agreement. But in the American proposal, how would the "discussion" and "definition of issues" relate to the scope of the prohibition that certainly constitutes the substance of any agreement on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests? In other words, are such discussions on verification and compliance to take place in the abstract? What is the link envisaged between those discussions and whatever the parties to a future treaty are supposed to verify and comply with? Finally, would the proposed subsidiary body, in dealing with the questions we agree to entrust to it, proceed with a view to the specific provisions of a draft treaty to be subsequently negotiated?

Let me close these brief remarks on a note of cautious optimism. Since the trilateral negotiations have now been interrupted for quite a long while, they can no longer be said to offer "the best way forward" for the achievement of a nuclear test ban. We can, however, assume that to proceed forward is the unanimous will of all members of the Committee. In presenting his proposal last Thursday, Ambassador Fields stressed his belief that the Committee "has an obligation to make a substantial contribution to the disarmament process in all its aspects". Following on, in his statement of support to the American initiative, Ambassador Summerhayes asserted that "the achievement of a comprehensive test ban remains an important goal". We are given reason to believe that both delegations are now prepared to seek the attainment of that objective by utilizing the potential of this Committee, as yet untried as regards a CTBT. Despite the remaining differences of opinion between those two delegations and the other thirty-eight members of this body, we trust that the common basic will to proceed forward should provide adequate momentum for a procedural solution to be agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador Wegener, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your chairmanship, allow me to express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you occupying that high office. Personally, I feel privileged not only to work under a particularly competent and efficient Chairman but to be presided over by a friend of many years' standing.

There is a never-ending turnover of delegates around this table -- such are the facts of diplomatic life. Among the several new distinguished members of this Committee, I should like to single out right across the table from me the new head of the Netherlands delegation, Ambassador Franz van Dongen, who I believe has joined us today for the first time. I should like to welcome him particularly as, coming from another very important multilateral forum where he has made a singular contribution, I am convinced that Ambassador van Dongen will equally distinguish himself at this Committee table.

The two plenary sessions of this week have been allocated to the subject of radiological weapons as the main item.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons I therefore thought it wise to take the floor at an early point in the debate to report to the Committee on the progress achieved since the Group was re-established on 18 February, and a new Chairman was nominated on 23 February.

In preparing for his new assignment, the Chairman first of all had to take account of General Assembly resolution 36/97 B which urges the Committee on Disarmament "to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted, if possible, to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982". This language by the General Assembly obviously enjoins the Ad Hoc Working Group and its Chairman to deploy every possible effort to achieve progress during the current spring session.

At the same time, a stock-taking of the work accomplished by the Working Group last year revealed that in spite of the unceasing efforts of the preceding Chairman, Ambassador Kórnives of Hungary, negotiations had become substantially blocked. It appeared that a major stumbling block had been the conflicting views as to how to handle the amendment, originally moved by the Swedish delegation, also to include in the text of a radiological weapons convention a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities. This proposal, designed to amplify the original United States/USSR draft (CD/32), seemed to beset the entire negotiation process with considerable difficulties and caused arguments to go around in circles.

Under these circumstances, the Chairman considered it his main task to get negotiations procedurally unstuck at the earliest possible time.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

With this objective in mind, and in lieu of holding formal meetings from the beginning of his task, he scheduled a series of extensive informal consultations with all delegations, in order to have their views on all relevant problems of procedure and substance in the working area of the radiological weapons Group.

A comprehensive report on these consultations is contained in the Chairman's statement of 9 March 1982 to the Working Group. This paper also contains his personal assessment of the state of negotiations, and proposals both for the procedure to be adopted for further negotiations and for the solution of a limited number of issues presently under controversy.

At the request of delegations, the Chairman's statement has been circulated as a working paper of the radiological weapons Working Group, and is now available for reference also to the members of the Committee. I do not intend to restate the contents of that statement, especially since it reflects, in large measure, the Chairman's personal views.

Rather, I should like to inform the Committee, with no little personal satisfaction, that the Working Group has now surmounted the initial procedural hurdles and has been able to agree on a procedural formula which allows it to carry on its negotiations with new vigour and unencumbered by the conflicting views which had partially blocked the negotiation process.

At its fourth meeting, on 15 March 1982, the Working Group, taking up and modifying the Chairman's procedural proposal, adopted the following decision:

"The Working Group agrees, as a procedural hypothesis and without prejudice to later decisions, to conduct separate meetings on the traditional radiological weapons subject matter, on the one hand, and on the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities on the other, according to the following programme:

Traditional radiological weapons subject-matter -- 16, 19, 23 March;

Question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities -- three meetings to be scheduled for late March and early April."

This procedural compromise in which all delegations have participated, displaying an unusual and welcome degree of flexibility, means that the two main problem areas under consideration are now separated for negotiation purposes, while all decisions on the number and form of final international legal instruments into which the negotiation results are to be incorporated are put off to a later moment. The Chairman has made clear to the Working Group that this procedural decision leaves the viewpoints of delegations on how to deal ultimately with the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities perfectly intact. In consequence, a number of delegations have gone on record before the Group restating their basic philosophy on the underlying issues, but allowing it to be understood that for the time being their views do not impede a rapid and forward-looking negotiating process.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

With this in mind, the Chairman has put before the Group a detailed working programme for the next few weeks, and concrete negotiations are to begin as of today's meeting of the Working Group. A number of working papers have already been put before delegates to assist in the process. It is the expectation of the Group's Chairman that within the next three formal meetings the principal remaining difficulties on the issues of definition of radiological weapons, scope of prohibition, peaceful uses, compliance and verification, and problems relating to the final clauses can be cleared up to a very large extent.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to thank all delegations for the fine co-operation they have displayed in the early difficult stages of the Group's work. I sense a general feeling that the path has now been cleared for a new vigorous effort to reach consensus in the field of the traditional radiological weapons subject-matter. There is reason for optimism that the Working Group may even move beyond that, and use the second half of its remaining time during the session to reach a breakthrough on the related issues of banning attacks on nuclear installations, where substantial technical and legal groundwork has to be laid and much additional drafting may have to be accomplished.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group has recommended that delegations make ample use of the plenary meetings allotted to the radiological weapons item to air their views on the remaining problems of substance, so that the forthcoming formal and informal meetings of the Working Group can be relatively free of statements of principle, allowing concentration on the actual drafting of texts. Reiterating this request, the Chairman takes the liberty of pointing to the second part of Working Paper 25 where he has tried to chart a course for the solution of some of the remaining controversial issues. The Chairman would equally be grateful if delegations could elaborate in more detail on their views as to the scope and modalities of the recommended ban on attacks on nuclear installations since it appeared in his consultations that this area would seem to require a substantial input of additional conceptual thinking.

Speaking, finally, for my own delegation, I would like to state, in a broad fashion, that on the subject of radiological weapons my delegation disposes of a considerable margin of flexibility on all the issues under consideration, and expects to make a good contribution to the promotion of consensus and a rapid pace of negotiation on all remaining problems.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I am particularly grateful to him for the kind and very friendly words he addressed to myself.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Solá Vila, the representative of Cuba.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March. You may fully depend on the support of our delegation in carrying out your tasks. I should also like, through you, to congratulate Mr. Mahallati, the preceding Chairman of our Committee, on the work accomplished under his guidance during the month of February. I wish, too, to welcome to the Committee the new representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands with whom, we are sure, we shall enjoy a fruitful co-operation towards the success of the work of the Committee. And I should like to offer a warm welcome to the Under-Secretary of State of Finland, who is to address us today.

The priority attached by the international community to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, concerning a comprehensive nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament, has repeatedly been recognized, in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly as in the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If we really wish to put a stop to the qualitative improvement and build-up of nuclear weapons, there is no better way than the adoption of a treaty for the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the great majority of delegations have made countless efforts in this negotiating body to initiate serious negotiations on these items, the Committee on Disarmament has found it impossible to carry out the requests of the General Assembly in this direction, because of the stubborn opposition of two delegations.

It is certainly true that working groups are not magic forums, able to resolve all the problems which may be submitted to them no matter how difficult they may appear; nevertheless, they represent the most effective means available to the Committee for the discharge of its functions. At the same time, and this is very important, they are a direct way of allowing the Committee to play an active role in the negotiation of any disarmament agreement.

This Committee has already held several sessions since the Group of 21 proposed the establishment of working groups to negotiate on items 1 and 2 of our agenda, taking account of their high priority in view of the ever greater accumulation and growing development of nuclear weapons and the well-known dangers they represent for civilization.

These are not mere words. My country belongs to the group of countries for which disarmament means not only a guarantee of the survival of humanity but also the possibility of greater resources being available for the economic and social development of the peoples who are now suffering the consequences of underdevelopment. Within this context, the greatest importance undoubtedly attaches to nuclear disarmament.

The group of socialist countries of Eastern Europe likewise, in a number of documents, has recognized the high priority attaching to these items and the need to start negotiations on them without delay. Working document CD/4 and the statements made by the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union on 16 and 18 February respectively, eloquently confirm this. In spite of all the above, the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to take the first step towards the consideration of these items. What has happened up to now, including the outcome of the informal discussions which were held during previous

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

sessions, has shown that in order to negotiate it is necessary to establish without further delay the working groups to which I referred, with an appropriate mandate, as suggested by the Group of 21 for it believes that other methods are unlikely to lead to satisfactory results.

Within this context, it may be noted that one of the delegations that have been most opposed to the starting of negotiations on these items in the last two years, is now proposing the setting up of a working group to consider issues relating to the verification of compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. This proposal, in my delegation's opinion, shows that that delegation's opposition to the starting of serious negotiations on these items remains unchanged.

According to the dictionary, to verify means to establish the truth or correctness of something, and to bear out, make good or fulfil something predicted or promised. Thus, before there can be verification, there must first be an agreement. The proposed working group is to negotiate on the verification of what? -- to conduct negotiations in order to verify -- what agreements? How is it possible to attempt to negotiate on ways of verifying something which does not exist?

If members of the Committee are really prepared to negotiate, why do we not set up a working group on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, with a mandate similar to the one proposed by the Group of 21? If the Committee were to take such a decision, matters relating to verification would undoubtedly be considered, in their proper context, together with the effective prohibition of testing.

I am taking the liberty of pointing this out to the Committee because we ought not to give the impression that we are negotiating when what we are actually doing is putting off what is urgently necessary -- the prohibition of nuclear tests.

It should also be borne in mind that in the course of the negotiations now proceeding on other items, for example, that of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, that same delegation has opposed the use of the words "negotiations" and "agreements" in the context of disarmament. In view of these facts, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion than the one I have stated.

In connection with the subject of nuclear disarmament, my delegation would also like to make some comments with respect to the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

Document CD/225, which reproduces a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba on 17 August 1981, gives my Government's views on the decision to begin production of neutron weapons and on the responsibility borne by those who produce them in view of the dangers they represent for peace and international security.

In consonance with these views the Cuban delegation co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 36/92 K, which requests the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The importance of this request lies in the fact that neutron weapons, by their very nature, are a reflection of current doctrines that envisage the possibility of a limited nuclear war, and thus further increase the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

My delegation supports the establishment as soon as possible of a working group of this Committee to draw up a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. This measure would help to eliminate real dangers confronting humanity and facilitate progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

In addition, there is document CCD/559, submitted by the group of socialist countries of Eastern Europe as long ago as in 1978, and it is to be hoped that other delegations would express their views and suggestions on this subject within an appropriate working group, and that concrete negotiations would be undertaken, in accordance with the wishes expressed by the world community.

Allow me now to make a few brief comments on an item which is becoming more and more a matter of urgency in this Committee; I am referring to that of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In the Final Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana in 1979, the Conference called for -- and this is the wording which my delegation supports with regard to the title of the instrument we are negotiating -- the urgent conclusion of "a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction".

For more than two years, the Committee on Disarmament has been making great efforts to secure the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in fact this year, it finally proved possible to establish a Working Group with an appropriate mandate, which will enable the Committee to attempt to fulfil its task.

Nevertheless, this year too, we have witnessed certain extremely dangerous decisions with regard to the production of a new generation of chemical weapons; I am referring to the so-called binary weapons.

In the document of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries which I mentioned earlier, the heads of State deliberately and specifically referred to "all chemical weapons", an expression which includes, without the slightest doubt, binary and any other type of chemical weapons.

The appearance of this new type of chemical armament will greatly complicate the achievement of the proposed instrument and will make the negotiation process concerning that instrument even more difficult.

This is something of which we should all be very much aware, for it means that the Committee is being faced with new situations which it must deal with, as, for example, those indicated by the Bulgarian delegation in working paper CD/CW/WP.29.

In conclusion, I would like briefly to revert to item 1 of our agenda. My delegation considers that the time has come for this Committee to consider, at one of its plenary meetings, the proposal of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/181 for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this important item.

Those were the comments my delegation wished to make at this plenary meeting -- at this stage of the work of the Committee. At later meetings we shall go into these and other items of our agenda in greater detail.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and I am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

In accordance with the decision adopted by the Committee at its 157th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, His Excellency Mr. Korhonen, Under-Secretary of State.

Mr. KORHONEN (Finland): I want to express my thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the previous speakers for the warm words of welcome that have been addressed to me. I would also like to thank the Chairman of February for the swift resolution of the question of the participation of non-members, Finland included. Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I am very grateful for this unique opportunity to address this distinguished audience.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly stated that, pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. The General Assembly called upon the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the question of effective security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States remains an important topic in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The Government of Finland attaches great importance to this question. This is why I have asked to speak today. Finland has, through international arrangements, committed itself to non-nuclear-weapon status. We expect that status to be respected by other States. As for any other country in a similar position, it is in our national interest that this status be complemented by effective international guarantees assuring us against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon status also implies that Finland should not be included in any nuclear strategic planning which technological development in nuclear-weapon systems and delivery systems may make possible.

For its part, Finland has endeavoured to make its contribution to efforts to reduce the dangers and risks of nuclear weapons. We have done so particularly in the fields of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In previous years we have contributed to the work of the Committee on the subject of security assurances.

Search for the form and content of non-use assurances that would command broad support has so far not been successful. All nuclear-weapon States have made unilateral statements describing situations in which they would not use nuclear weapons. These unilateral declarations are to be welcomed and they are not without value. But most of them suffer from defects. They fall short of the goal of effective international arrangements, not to speak of a legally binding instrument. They are diluted by political and legal reservations. They are functions of differing political perceptions and respective military doctrines. One might say that these reservations reflect more some security concerns of nuclear-weapon powers than the security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Korhonen, Finland)

Yet the commitment to work towards effective international arrangements holds. We have noted with satisfaction the work done by the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament especially during its deliberations concerning the systematic identification of the elements contained in the undertakings assumed by nuclear-weapon States and in the proposals made by non-nuclear-weapon States. As a result of these deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group has reached a deeper understanding of the similarities and differences between the various positions, which will surely help its work in the future. At its 1981 session the Ad Hoc Working Group decided to work out a so-called common formula. The Working Group was not able to record any substantial progress towards an acceptable solution. It is worth noting that there has been no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this issue.

In the view of the Government of Finland, efforts towards an effective and global form of security assurances should continue. Furthermore, in view of the lack of progress, we would see merit in a more pragmatic and gradual approach. If a binding common formula cannot be attained in the present circumstances, that should not block other methods. One acceptable method would be to elevate the status of the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States through a resolution of the Security Council. This approach deserves further study.

One particular aspect of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is connected with the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Through a zonal approach, agreement may be easier to reach than a universal guarantee comprising all nuclear-weapon States. The equation of reciprocal commitments is more clearly defined in a clearly limited geographical area.

The Tlatelolco Treaty is, without any doubt, a useful example of a zonal approach. Besides other aspects, this is underlined by the fact that the nuclear-weapon powers have been in the position to give security guarantees to the Latin American zone as a whole. We think that, in the context of the present item of the Committee on Disarmament more consideration should be given to the example of the Tlatelolco Treaty. At the very least, it encourages consideration of initiatives in other parts of the world.

Pending effective nuclear disarmament, the need to control nuclear weapons involves two equally urgent and closely interlinked imperatives: the prevention of the spread of those weapons to additional States, and the restriction of the uses and functions of the existing weapons. An internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zone together with adequate non-use assurances could meet both imperatives. Because new delivery technologies defy traditional concepts of territorial defence, geographical considerations are increasingly relevant for the elaboration of security guarantees.

In May 1978, Finland proposed a Nordic arms control arrangement, which is a further elaboration of the idea of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone, first advanced in 1963. Such an arrangement is aimed at isolating the Nordic region as completely as possible from the effects and functions of nuclear strategy in general and new nuclear weapons technology in particular. An integral part of it should be appropriate assurances concerning the status of the zone and the non-use of nuclear weapons given by the nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Korhonen, Finland)

The Nordic region has during the whole post-war era remained largely untouched by international tensions. This has been achieved by the efforts of the Nordic Governments and by the willingness of the great powers to preserve the stability of that region. At their meeting last autumn the foreign ministers of the Nordic countries reconfirmed the importance of the stable and balanced security situation of the Nordic region. Its contribution to the maintenance of peace and security also in a wider international context was underlined. The continued absence of nuclear weapons in these countries is regarded by my Government as a vital element in this respect.

The Government of Finland wishes to continue its participation in the Committee on Disarmament in the context of its effort to reach a broadly acceptable agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Summing up, I wish to stress the following basic considerations:

- Such arrangements should be designed primarily to satisfy the security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States;
- More specifically, they should be legally binding and should adequately provide for the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as for the respect of the status of those States;
- Such arrangements should be of a global nature and should be carried out as an integral part of United Nations disarmament and arms limitation efforts;
- In view of the lack of progress, it is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to come forward with ideas based on a more flexible approach;
- In pursuing a global solution, other approaches serving the same goal should not be neglected, among them, in particular, the zonal approach.

I have spoken on only one item of the agenda of this Committee. As you are aware, the interest of my country in the work of this Committee is not limited to that topic, important as it is. We have made efforts to contribute to the work of this Committee in many other fields by presenting statements on several subjects, by participating actively in certain ad hoc working groups and by presenting working papers and studies on certain subject matters.

We are grateful for the fact that the reform undertaken by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament and the rules of procedure of this Committee have given non-members a better possibility to make their views known. However, in order to intensify and deepen our contributions in future, Finland continues to seek full membership in this important Committee. We would be grateful if this interest were to be taken into account when the Committee addresses itself to the question of a review of the membership of the CD in the coming weeks.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State of Finland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. His presence here today and the statement he has just made bear witness to the interest -- as he himself emphasized -- of the Finnish Government in our work, an interest which is well known and which has been demonstrated in Finland's contributions to our efforts. I should like to thank him also on behalf of the Committee.

I have no further speakers on my list. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor? If not, I should like to inform the Committee that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has requested, after consultations, that Working Paper No. 57 should be put before the Committee for approval today. This document concerns the addressing of an invitation to the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to nominate representatives to attend certain meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. If there are no objections I shall consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57. 1/

The United States delegation has asked for the floor.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Very briefly -- as you recall, my delegation proposed at our last plenary meeting the amendment of Working Paper No. 57 to include an invitation to a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As you pointed out, we have had subsequent discussion within the Working Group on our proposal and it is obvious to my delegation that our amendment cannot command consensus at this stage of our work on chemical weapons. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would like formally to withdraw the amendment which we put forward at our last meeting and my delegation will join a consensus on Working Paper No. 57. I would note, however, that my delegation, and, we believe, others, think that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should examine any technical means which offers promise of being useful in resolving the difficult and complex issues in the field of verification of compliance with a complete ban on chemical weapons. We consider that the technology associated with the Reccver programme offers such promise and we do intend to pursue it. Further, we hope that the failure of our amendment to command consensus at this time does not represent, on the part of the objecting delegations, either an objection in principle to having a technical representative visit the Working Group at some time in the future, or reluctance to consider technical means to resolve the issues that are before us.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement and for the flexibility his delegation has shown on this occasion. I give the floor to Ambassador Lidgard, the representative of Sweden.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Last year, the experts representing the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme made quite a useful contribution in providing technical information during the informal consultations

1/ In response to the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the Committee decides to invite the Director-General of the World Health Organization and the Director of the regional office for Europe of the United Nations Environment Programme to nominate representatives to attend certain meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for the purpose of providing technical information, in respect of establishing toxicities of chemicals and the international register of potentially toxic chemicals.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

which took place under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Working Group. I therefore support the draft decision which is contained in Working Paper No. 57. However, we are, for objective reasons, interested in exploring the possibilities of using the verification system implied in what is referred to by the name "Recover", within the framework of a chemical weapons convention. We would therefore welcome the participation of one expert or several experts from the international organ that has experience of this particular verification system for the purpose of providing technical information on the subject. Consequently, my delegation hopes that this Committee will take a decision which will make it possible for such expert or experts to participate in the consultations which are going on this week under the leadership of the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. I am sure that the Committee has taken good note of the statements which have just been made by the delegations of the United States and Sweden. If there are no other comments or statements in this connection, I think that we can take a decision on Working Paper No. 57. May I consider that the Committee adopts this draft decision?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

DOCUMENT IDENTIQUE A L'ORIGINAL

DOCUMENT IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL