

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME II

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1982

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 2 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI (Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLEAlgeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. M. MATI

Argentina:

Mr. V. BEAUGE

Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Miss R. de CLERCQ

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. K. FRAMOV

Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. T. JIN

Mr. Y. MINGLIANG

Mr. F. ZHENYAO

Mr. H. XIAODI

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOIA VILA

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. El S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. B. d'ABOVILLE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALIATI
Mr. M. NOSRATI
Mr. S. MOHAMMADI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. J. MUIIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. G. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. IELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C. M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. ANDERSSON
Mr. S. THEOLIN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININ
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. B.T. SOURIKOV
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUCHIN
Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. LEONARD
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Miss L.M. SHEA
Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In the Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful,

I declare open the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament and its one hundred and fiftieth plenary meeting.

The procession of the English alphabet has brought the Islamic Republic of Iran to occupy the Chair of this Committee during the month of February, and the privilege of doing so has fallen to me as the representative of that country. With the help of God, I shall do my best to fulfil the duties and responsibilities of the Chairman in conformity with our rules of procedure and with the assistance of our distinguished Secretary, Ambassador Jaipal, whose counsel has been most valuable. Needless to say, I seek the co-operation of all members, for I am quite new to my task. But I hope that the moral and spiritual sincerity with which our Islamic revolution has armed me will suffice to compensate for any deficiency in my formal experience as a diplomat, as I believe that the cause of disarmament needs strong doses of moral concern for the future of mankind if it is to survive.

At the outset, may I thank Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia for his outstanding contribution to the work of the Committee during his tenure as Chairman. His skill and diplomatic experience guided the Committee through difficult discussions and have been particularly helpful to us all in the preparations leading to the present session.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, I would like to welcome the new representatives who join us for the first time as leaders of their respective delegations. May I also welcome the presence once again among us of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, head of the Swedish delegation, who will address the Committee today.

I also wish to note the presence of Mr. Ustinov, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs of the United Nations, and of Mr. Martenson, the Assistant Secretary-General of the Centre for Disarmament.

We are commencing our work for this year at a time when the winds appear to be blowing against the ship of disarmament, and therefore the crew will have to work with greater energy in order to keep the ship on its true course and prevent it from following the currents of the arms race. The diabolic weapons of mass destruction that ill-minded and immoral men have invented should make us stop and think how we can collectively prevent global catastrophe. For we cannot possibly live as rational human beings under the growing shadow of nuclear holocaust.

I come from a region in which my country has been defending itself against unprovoked and continuing aggression. We have personal experience of the terrible ravages of war and of the heroic sacrifices made by the flower of our revolutionary youth. Our sufferings have redoubled our faith in the noble cause of disarmament, just as the total failure of the political and strategic objectives of the aggression against us has proved the utter futility of war. We therefore consider it our duty to strive for the establishment of an international mechanism that could be mobilized against the destructive potentialities of the arms race. The human species was not created so that it might destroy itself. There is a higher destiny for mankind, but it cannot be fulfilled unless war and the instruments of war are renounced by all nation States, and especially by those which have the greatest capacity to wage war. This certainly requires man to rediscover the origins of the essence of his "raison d'être".

(The Chairman)

This is no longer the dream of philosophers. It has become the political imperative for man's survival. I hope that in our thoughts and actions we will be guided by the concerns and interests of mankind, and by faith in disarmament.

I now give the floor to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, who will read out the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. JAIPAL (Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament): The following is the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Committee on Disarmament at the opening of its 1982 session:

"It is with a feeling of profound disquiet and a deep sense of responsibility that I avail myself of this opportunity to address a message to the Committee on Disarmament. As I have only recently assumed office, I wish on this occasion to pledge my wholehearted and resolute devotion to the cause of disarmament, and my strong personal support for your endeavours. Fifty years ago today, here in Geneva, the first international conference on disarmament was convened by the League of Nations. Two basic premises were set forth at the very opening of that conference: first, that armed peace is no guarantee against war, and second, that the arms race, in itself a source of mutual fears and suspicions, paralyses the will to peace.

"As the Committee starts its 1982 session today, against a background of widespread public concern at the deadly dangers of the arms race, these two premises remain as pertinent as they were half a century ago, but the danger to mankind has grown immensely. The arms race has piled up weapons of incredible destructiveness and the existence of nuclear weapons has given particular urgency to disarmament efforts.

"It must be said, in sober truth, that the current levels of arsenals no longer bear any relationship to the rational requirements of self-defence. These arsenals are now so huge that, should they ever be used, they would menace the future of the human species. It is also true that the ever greater accumulation of armaments causes an enormous drain on resources desperately needed for reducing the burden of poverty on the majority of the world's population. The amount required to provide the basic necessities of the entire human race for one year is estimated to be less than the cost of the arms race in a month.

"At the heart of the problem of prevention of war is the question of disarmament, which has been stubbornly resisting the efforts of various organs, including the Committee on Disarmament. A favourable international climate is, of course, highly desirable for the success of disarmament negotiations. The building of mutual confidence, the correction of

(Mr. Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament)

misconceptions of one another's military capacities and intentions, the peaceful resolution of disputes, the adoption of verification measures, the promotion of mutual security through respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States -- even the reduction of economic disparities between North and South -- these are all as important as the technical aspects of disarmament.

"The world cannot afford to wait for the dawn of ideal conditions before undertaking measures of disarmament. Disarmament cannot be achieved through confrontation and condemnation. The short-term benefit of military advantage is invariably neutralized by the long-term harm of the arms race it provokes. We should recognize before it is too late that the most basic aspect of all peoples and nations is their shared humanity and consequently their shared responsibility for a world without war.

"The present session of the Committee on Disarmament takes place at a time when international relations are under severe strain. The understanding between East and West so painstakingly built over the last decade and so crucial to a stable peace has been eroded. The past year has witnessed major acceleration in the upward spiral of military expenditures around the world.

"At this stage in international affairs, there is a compelling need to make a credible and substantial advance towards arms limitation and disarmament. The United Nations is preparing, at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly, to breathe new life into disarmament efforts and to restore the momentum of progress in this field. There is no question that such an effort is vitally necessary if we are to halt the arms race and check the drift towards confrontation. The special session will be closely followed by a growing world audience increasingly alarmed by the prospects of a nuclear holocaust. In this endeavour, the role of the Committee on Disarmament is crucial. There is widespread interest in the comprehensive programme of disarmament that the Committee is engaged in formulating. The importance of such a programme for initiating a planned and progressive process of disarmament in stages would provide the General Assembly at the special session with a solid and encouraging basis for its efforts.

"Another important issue is the long-awaited conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This would provide a major impetus for further progress towards the limitation and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It would also be of significance in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

"Renewed and sustained efforts on the part of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly the nuclear powers, to make substantive progress on the complex issue of nuclear disarmament are also of paramount importance. It is clear that some States have a larger share of responsibility than others, and I hope that proposals and practical suggestions will be made in response to the resolution recently adopted by the General Assembly on the prevention of nuclear war.

(Mr. Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament)

"While the international atmosphere remains clouded at present, the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on intermediate-range missiles marks a step forward. I hope that negotiations will be resumed soon on strategic arms reductions as well. Progress on these questions is of vital importance for the entire world community. They would also have a favourable effect on the work of the Committee on Disarmament and contribute significantly to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament."

"I wish the Committee every success in its endeavours."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Jaipal and I would request him kindly to convey to the Secretary-General of the United Nations our appreciation for his important message.

In this connection, may I also draw the attention of delegations to document CD/231, entitled "Letter dated 1 February 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session".

I announce with deep regret the death of His Excellency Ambassador Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo on Monday, 1 February.

Ambassador Montezemolo had been the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations Office and the other international organizations in Geneva since July 1979. He was the Permanent Representative of Italy to the Committee on Disarmament until its 1981 session. On my behalf and that of the members of the Committee, I wish to convey my sincere condolences to the delegation of Italy.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and France.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): This is the second time in the history of the Committee on Disarmament that a member -- in the present instance, Iran -- of what is known as the Group of 21, to which my country belongs, has come to preside over the opening meeting of the annual session of this the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to offer you my delegation's sincere congratulations on that score, and to promise you our utmost co-operation in the performance of your important duties. I should also like to place on record once again our deep appreciation for the distinguished and efficient manner in which your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Sani, the distinguished representative of Indonesia, guided the work of the Committee during the final month of its 1981 session. My delegation associates itself with the warm words of welcome you expressed at the opening of our meeting, and also with the condolences which you have just extended on the occasion of the death of Ambassador Montezemolo.

It is the time-honoured custom for the delegation of Mexico to open the general debate in the Committee on Disarmament, and in doing so today I should like first to refer to one of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session: resolution 36/83, which the General Assembly adopted in December 1981 by 138 votes in favour and none against. In that resolution, the General Assembly, the international community's most representative body, after recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had become parties, in 1969 and 1971 respectively, to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, generally known as the "Treaty of Tlatelolco", noted also, with satisfaction, that the United States of America had likewise become a party to that Protocol on 23 November 1981, upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification. Consequently, there remains pending only one ratification, that of France, as the Protocol is open only to the four States which are "internationally responsible" for territories lying within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

Two reasons have prompted me to make this choice: the first, which is, I think, readily understandable, is that, as you all know, the Government of Mexico has the honour to act as the Depositary Government of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created the only nuclear-weapon-free zone covering densely populated areas which it has been possible to establish to date. The second is that the measure to which I have just referred, although modest, is the only concrete disarmament measure to have occurred since the Committee concluded its 1981 session on Friday, 21 August of last year.

Among the very many other resolutions on disarmament which the General Assembly adopted on the basis of draft resolutions referred to it by its First Committee, resolution 36/97 I on "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks" certainly deserves priority. I think it worth mentioning in connection with this resolution firstly that it was adopted by consensus, and secondly that in its preamble the General Assembly.

(1) Reaffirmed once again its resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978, in which it, inter alia:

(a) Reiterated its satisfaction at the solemn declarations made in 1977 by the heads of State of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which they stated that they were ready to endeavour to reach agreements which would permit starting the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and moving towards their complete, total destruction, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons;

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

(b) Recalled that one of the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority, included in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, which should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms;

(c) Stressed that in the Programme of Action it was established that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

Resolution 36/97 I of last December did not confine itself to the reaffirmations which I have just read out, important as they are; it went further:

(2) It also reaffirmed that, as stated in its resolution 34/87 F of 11 December 1979, it shares the conviction expressed by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Indeed, last December's resolution went even further:

(3) It recalled that, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, it proclaimed that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth; that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it; and that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race pose a threat to the very survival of mankind, for which reasons the General Assembly declared that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the sphere of disarmament.

In the operative part of the resolution adopted last December— which, it is worth stressing once again, was adopted by consensus, which means that it was adopted with the full assent of the two nuclear Superpowers— the General Assembly, inter alia:

(1) Urged the United States and the Soviet Union to ensure "that the process begun by the SALT I Treaty and signature of the SALT II Treaty should continue and be built upon";

(2) Likewise expressly urged those two States "to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, looking towards the achievement of an agreement which will provide for substantial reductions and significant qualitative limitations of strategic arms";

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

(3) ~~Welcomed~~ the commencement of negotiations at Geneva on 30 November 1981 between representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear arms in accordance with the joint communiqué issued by Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko on 23 September 1981" and expressed confidence that "such negotiations will facilitate the enhancement of stability and international security";

(4) Invited the two Governments to "keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly"; and

(5) Stressed "the need for both parties to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question".

We must confess that it has been a source of great disappointment to us that, despite the substantial changes which the delegation of Mexico and those of the other States which co-sponsored the original draft resolution— submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly as document A/C.1/36/L.42— agreed to introduce in the draft in order to make it acceptable to the United States and the Soviet Union and thus enable it to be adopted by consensus, there are those who now maintain that the negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons which have been taking place in this city and the negotiations on strategic nuclear arms (whether they continue to be labelled SALT or are henceforth known as START) which, in accordance with the provisions of the resolution I have just quoted should already have been or should be on the point of being resumed— there are those, I repeat, who maintain that there should be a "linking" or "linkage" of these negotiations with other events in international life.

Such an attitude could not be more discouraging. The international behaviour of the nuclear Superpowers, it must be acknowledged, often leaves much to be desired, whether on the part of one or of the other or of both at the same time. Obviously, then, to accept the "linkage" argument to which I have just referred would mean that there could never, or virtually never, be serious negotiations on disarmament. This is unjustifiable if it is agreed that, as was emphatically reiterated by the latest resolution which the General Assembly adopted by consensus less than two months ago, both parties must "bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question". The incompatibility of this argument with a policy of international peace and co-operation in keeping with the United Nations Charter is all the more evident if we recall what those parties solemnly declared in 1978 when they affirmed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that:

"The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful co-existence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The foregoing leads us to hope that the report which, pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document, the two nuclear Superpowers will surely submit to the General Assembly at its second special session which is to begin on 7 June next, will contain news of positive developments, not only with respect to medium-range nuclear weapons but also as concerns strategic nuclear arms.

Another item, also relating to an aspect of nuclear disarmament, which was on the agenda of the last session of the General Assembly and which has rightly occupied first place on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament—we are certain that it will do so again this year—is the cessation of all nuclear weapons test explosions. I shall now present some comments on this item.

Just as it had done at its thirty-fifth session, at its thirty-sixth session the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on this item, resolutions 36/84 and 36/85.

In the second of these resolutions, somewhat guardedly but nevertheless unequivocally, the Committee on Disarmament was requested "to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982".

The first of these two resolutions, which the Mexican delegation had the privilege of proposing for adoption, was unquestionably the clearer and more comprehensive, both as regards the background of the matter and with regard to the objectives pursued and the means of attaining them.

In its preambular part, assuredly in order to bring these facts well to the fore since they are essential to a correct evaluation of this question, the resolution recalls that the subject has been under consideration for more than 25 years in the United Nations; that the General Assembly has adopted more than 40 resolutions on it; that on seven different occasions the General Assembly has condemned nuclear-weapon tests in the strongest terms; that whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a treaty on that subject; that when the existing means of verification and the exhaustive technical and scientific studies that have been made of all aspects of the problem are taken into account, the only conclusion to be drawn is that all that is needed now is a political decision; that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of what is known as the partial test-ban Treaty undertook in that instrument, almost 20 years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time; and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In the preamble to that resolution the General Assembly also recalled that in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980 it had urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to "support the creation, as from the beginning of its session in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiations of the treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests", and deplored that, as stated in paragraph 44 of the Committee's report for that year, "the Committee on Disarmament was prevented from responding to that exhortation owing to the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In the operative part of the resolution the General Assembly, in addition to calling upon the States depositaries of the Moscow Treaty to institute a moratorium as a provisional measure, inter alia reiterated its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues "against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States"; reaffirmed its conviction that the treaty which has been the object of fruitless efforts for so many years "constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament"; and once again urged "all States members of the Committee on Disarmament":

"(a) To bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee;

(b) To support the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(c) To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty".

It is these three exhortations or recommendations of the General Assembly which we should seek faithfully to carry out when we embark on our substantive work. It should be recalled that on 30 July 1981 the delegations of Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia presented a working paper (CD/204) suggesting that if, "upon initiation of the Committee's session corresponding to 1982" -- that is, the session which we are beginning today -- "it were not yet possible to give effect to the repeated requests of the Group of 21" for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the item "Nuclear test ban", the proposal contained in that working paper should be formally considered in plenary session by the negotiating organ. The proposal in question is for the addition to rule 25 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament of the following:

"The rule of consensus shall not be used either in such a way as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary organs for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee, in conformity with the provisions of rule 23."

My delegation ventures to hope that it will not be necessary to resort to this revision of the rules of procedure in order to prevent any attempt to transfer the abuse of the veto, so frequently seen in the United Nations Security Council, to this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, which is of an essentially different nature.

While nuclear weapons have the highest priority, according to the provisions of the Final Document, next in order of priority, according to that same Document, come other weapons of mass destruction, the most important of these being chemical weapons, the only such weapons to be specifically mentioned.

Here again, as in the case of the test ban, the General Assembly adopted two complementary resolutions, 36/96 A and 36/96 B, on the subject of "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". From the combined content of the two resolutions it is clear that the Assembly wished explicitly and unequivocally:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

To reaffirm the necessity of "strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives" of the Geneva Protocol and "of the adherence by all States to the Convention" on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons;

To reaffirm also the need "for the earliest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction";

To call upon the United States and the Soviet Union to "resume at the earliest possible date bilateral negotiations" on the subject and to "submit their joint initiative" to the Committee on Disarmament;

Also to call upon all States to "refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present".

It should also be pointed out that the General Assembly appears to have wished to emphasize the importance it attaches to another appeal which should be of particular interest to all members of the Committee on Disarmament as it is addressed to the Committee itself. The Committee is urged, in connection with the proposed convention on the elimination of chemical weapons, "to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date".

My delegation considers that it is the inescapable duty of this negotiating body to heed this appeal by the General Assembly, which appears in identical terms in the two resolutions that were adopted. Resolution 36/96 A was in fact adopted by no less than 147 votes in favour and none against, with a single abstention.

The six resolutions which I have just rapidly reviewed constitute barely one eighth of the very large number of resolutions which the General Assembly adopted on disarmament questions last December at its thirty-sixth session. It would be out of place to try to examine here, however superficially, all the other resolutions. I should like to say, however, that certain of those resolutions, for example, the resolution on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, are of such particular significance as to merit an entire statement, and I hope to be able to make such a statement when the time comes in our programme of work for the consideration of that item. To conclude my address today, I shall confine myself to adding a few words about the World Disarmament Campaign and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

With regard to the former, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/92 C by 143 votes in favour and none against, with only 2 abstentions. In that resolution, after noting with satisfaction the contents of the study carried out by the Secretary-General on the subject of the Campaign, and commending its conclusions, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to it at its second special session both the study and the opinions thereon received from Governments, so that it might proceed to the solemn launching of the Campaign.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The resolution explicitly states that one of the main actions to be taken for the launching of the Campaign should be the holding of "a pledging conference" to take place at the initial stage of the special session, when Heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs will be in New York, and it is to be hoped that there will be many of them attending the session, as was the case for the first special session in 1978.

With regard to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I should merely like to recall what I have often said, both here and in New York, concerning our conviction that the success or failure of the special session which is drawing near will depend largely on what happens with respect to that Programme. This increases the responsibility of this Committee, to which the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament entrusted the elaboration of the draft text. As we all know, the Committee is endeavouring to prepare a draft programme in its Ad Hoc Working Group on that subject, which has now held 47 meetings: 10 in 1980, 24 in 1981, and 12 so far this year. I should also like to repeat what I said last October, upon opening the general debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly, when I ventured to put forward the two conditions which my delegation considers the Programme must meet, namely, faithfully to reflect the guidelines clearly set forth in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of 1978, and, not to contain any provision which, in letter or in spirit, could be interpreted as a step backwards in comparison with that Final Document.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): The Netherlands delegation wishes to congratulate you upon your assumption of the chairmanship for this first month of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament. In this function you will carry a heavy responsibility. We wish to assure you of the willingness of the Netherlands delegation to co-operate in all efforts that will be made to promote our common cause and I extend to you our best wishes for success. It is with sadness that I join in the words of condolence that you addressed on our behalf to the Italian delegation with respect to the demise of our good friend Ambassador Montezemolo.

In my statement today, at the opening of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, I shall first make some general observations and discuss the nature and the modalities of our work. Then I shall indicate what we see as our main tasks during this year's session.

But first I find myself obliged to make an observation of a political nature. It has been observed many a time in this negotiating body, and never contradicted convincingly, that disarmament negotiations are by their very nature highly sensitive to the general political climate since they are related directly to the security interests of member States. While it might be possible in certain other international forums to isolate oneself from the upheavals of international events in this restless world, this is not so in disarmament negotiations. Having said this, I should also add that on the other hand the Committee on Disarmament is not the proper place to deal substantively with the various international crises as they unfortunately occur from time to time in various parts of the world. If we did so, we would make still less progress in our work than unfortunately is the case, and we would not serve our cause well.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

It is from this balanced stance that I shall say today, in this forum, that my Government deplures the grave developments in Poland, the imposition of martial law, the massive violation of human rights and the suppression of fundamental civil liberties, which are in clear contravention of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Final Act of Helsinki. Moreover, if a great military power time and again deems it fit to impose its will upon its neighbours in the presumed interest of its own security, then this cannot but have adverse repercussions on a wide range of international relations, including disarmament negotiations. For the only conclusion one can draw from such behaviour is that, when all is said and done, the final, overriding factor in its relations with its neighbours is its own national security interest, at the expense of the national interests of others.

I now wish to make a few observations about the multilateral disarmament machinery as it exists today and as it concerns us, that is, the Committee on Disarmament here in Geneva on the one hand, and the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York on the other.

Those of us who participated in the General Assembly last year were witness to the fact that the First Committee again passed a growing number of resolutions especially dealing with disarmament. And those of us who have been engaged in disarmament work, or at least United Nations work, for a longer period of time will recall that the First Committee has not always been that productive, at least if one counts the proposing of resolutions as proof of productiveness. If we go back, say, twenty years -- to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly -- you will note that the First Committee at that time adopted only five resolutions, each with just two or three preambular paragraphs and a few operative paragraphs. Those resolutions were, each of them, negotiated during several weeks, and each word was weighed carefully. As a consequence those resolutions were taken seriously by all Members. Ten years later, in 1969, at the General Assembly's twenty-fourth session, the number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly had grown to nine and their length had grown considerably. Last year the General Assembly adopted no less than 48 resolutions under the title of disarmament, with a total of 623 paragraphs, both preambular and operative.

As I said and Ambassador Garcia Robles referred to this, but I shall not hide from you that I do not consider this development a positive one. The less so since several of these last year's resolutions, which were cheerfully adopted by the General Assembly, are meaningless, if not worse. In my personal opinion, some of these resolutions were propagandistic, or even ill-intentioned. Some I found rather foolish.

The Committee on Disarmament, which is expected to be a serious negotiating body, would do well to keep that in mind, and not to assume that just because there was a majority in the General Assembly for this or that resolution, its recommendations are necessarily useful to real disarmament. In any case, this delegation will treat a resolution just as seriously as we think it was proposed. And I can only express the hope that the First Committee will find a way to conduct its business in a more responsible manner than has unfortunately become its habit of late.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Having said this about the First Committee in New York, I should add in all fairness that it cannot be said that the Committee on Disarmament itself is entirely without blame as far as the conduct of its own work is concerned. We have at times witnessed in this Committee a tendency to use this negotiating forum as just another platform from which to issue declaratory statements. We have unfortunately also witnessed a growing tendency to employ certain tactical moves, sometimes of a deceptive nature, to prevent progress.

But fortunately we can also say that there have been some very serious attempts to improve on our working methods and procedures.

In this context I wish to recall the useful exchange we had last year on improving the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament. Upon reflection, we believe that ideally the Committee on Disarmament should be in session the year round, in three or four sessional periods with intermediate recesses for study, evaluation etc. If the Committee on Disarmament were to meet the year round, delegations could be staffed with negotiating experts who would not be bothered by deliberations elsewhere. Actually, it is a curious phenomenon that under the present system those responsible for conducting negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament are also called upon to judge the results of Committee on Disarmament negotiations in deliberative organs, such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Thus, the viability of the Committee on Disarmament suffers. Valuable time which could be used for negotiations is instead sacrificed to meetings of a purely deliberative nature.

We propose, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament should reach its conclusions on a more efficient work structure before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. For both practical and constitutional reasons, it is for the Committee on Disarmament itself to put its house to order rather than to leave this task to the General Assembly at its second special session.

We would suggest that the Committee on Disarmament should be given the function of a steering committee, a board of management, under which permanent, possibly perennial, working groups would operate. These working groups would enjoy a somewhat independent status, so that they could set their own schedules and create subsidiary bodies. They would have the same chairmen all along as well as a medium-sized bureau. There should be no obligation for the full membership of the CD to participate in each of them. At the same time, participation in their work should be open to States that are not members of the CD and that have an interest in the subject matter of the working group. This arrangement would go a long way towards solving the membership problem of the CD. The Committee on Disarmament secretariat could be expanded with experts. It might be desirable for the Committee on Disarmament to recruit again, as the EMDC and the CCD did for a while, a complete team of translators and stenographers. Then, verbatim records would come out at much shorter notice and delegations would no longer feel obliged to read out prepared statements. Serious negotiations would warrant the additional cost which I presume would be shared by members of the Committee. The working groups could report back to the Committee on Disarmament at regular intervals or as required. The Committee on Disarmament could then evaluate results and, where appropriate, supply further guidance to the working groups. At the same time, a Committee on Disarmament acting as a steering committee would be free to function as a clearing house for political tensions, so that the working groups would not be exposed to them.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

We realize that organizational improvement of the Committee on Disarmament does not in itself guarantee better results. Still, we cannot ignore the serious flaws in the present system under which each working group meets once a week. One of the shortcomings of this system is that it does not reflect the fact that during various phases of negotiations one subject might become much more time consuming than another.

Coming now to the second part of my statement, in which I shall outline the Netherlands approach to this year's work programme of the Committee on Disarmament, I should be remiss if I did not hail the initiation here in Geneva of bilateral talks between the United States of America and the USSR on intermediate range nuclear forces. We consider not less important the resumption as soon as possible of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the reduction of strategic weapons, since a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons would be the most important step towards nuclear disarmament. The Netherlands Government hopes strongly that the prospects for these negotiations will improve in the near future. We have always deplored the fact that the SALT-II Treaty did not enter into force. All the more, therefore, we now express the hope that the two new sets of negotiations I mentioned a moment ago will constitute between them a basis for further and broader arms control negotiations between the two States involved. We strongly urge the United States and the USSR to expand their joint efforts to other realms of no less vital importance, such as, firstly, a comprehensive test ban, where resumption of the trilateral talks together with the United Kingdom is called for, secondly, a convention banning chemical weapons, and thirdly, the arms race in outer space.

It stands to reason that most activities in the Committee on Disarmament spring session will be geared to contributing to successful preparations for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In that connection, priority should be given to the initiation in the Committee on Disarmament of practical discussions on a comprehensive test ban, to which item the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament attaches the highest priority. I shall not dwell at length on the reasons which bring us to focus on a CTB. In many forums we have repeatedly expounded them time and again. We hope for a gradual diminishing of the role of nuclear weapons. To that end a CTB treaty would make a significant contribution, helping to stop both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, achieving a CTB treaty would be a concrete, practical demonstration of how to come to grips with the many highly complicated aspects of the nuclear arms race. Another pressing reason for establishing a CTB treaty at short notice is that without a CTB the maintenance of a non-discriminatory and credible non-proliferation régime is difficult to achieve.

The Netherlands delegation calls for the opening of serious and constructive negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a comprehensive test ban, but we fear that in fact interest in a CTB treaty is on the wane. It is a matter of great concern to the Netherlands Government that every now and then, from various quarters, the relevance of a CTB treaty for all time is questioned or belittled.

In our view both the ripeness of the file and the urgency of the matter call for the establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of a CTB working group with a meaningful mandate. We hold the role of the Committee in achieving a CTB treaty for all time to be an essential one if the ensuing treaty is going to attract -- as it should -- the widest possible international support and adherence. In our view,

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

not only is it necessary to arrange adequate verification measures in a CTB treaty but we are convinced that adequate verification is also possible. As far as there are technical problems, we are confident that they can be overcome, inter alia, by drawing on the experience gained and to be gained in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events, in which the Netherlands participates. I may recall that significant progress has been made by this Group in the design of a global verification system. Effective continuation of these efforts, including a full scale test of the seismic system, is called for. The time is also ripe for working out the administrative elements for such a seismic system within a CTB treaty.

A corollary to a CTB treaty would be a so-called "cut-off" agreement which would ban the production of fissionable materials for weapons use. This, too, would be an effective step in curbing the nuclear arms race. We are not unaware of the verification problems involved, but a cut-off presents one of the few effective nuclear arms control measures for which in principle an international verification system has already been worked out, to wit: nuclear safeguards. It seems logical, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament should deal with this matter as well.

It stands to reason that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be re-established. The Netherlands delegation is one of those who hold that under the inspiring chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons came close to exhausting its mandate last year. We hope very much, therefore, that a new mandate can be agreed upon now, enabling the Ad Hoc Working Group to elaborate, as a matter of high priority, a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction.

Next to matters relating to the scope of a chemical weapons convention, the Ad Hoc Working Group will have to deal extensively with its verification provisions. We believe that verification should serve as one component in a system that, together with a meaningful scope and a reasonable amount of protective measures, will give a State more national security than the maintenance of the chemical weapon option would do. Without adequate verification, States will not be confident that the provisions of a convention will be observed. As we stated before, it is our considered view that within the framework of a chemical weapons convention, national and international verification are complementary. After all, we are dealing with a proven weapon system, ready and available in large amounts.

At the end of last year's summer session, at the 143rd meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, on 4 August 1981, I had the honour to introduce document CD/203 concerning consultative and co-operative verification measures and a complaints procedure in the framework of a chemical weapons convention. This document gives a complete outline of a reasonable, but effective, verification system and was designed in such a way as to take care especially of practical needs. Allow me briefly to recapitulate the main characteristics of our proposals:

Consultation, co-operation, verification and complaints are not treated individually but form elements of one integrated, consistent system;

National and international verification are therefore interlinked;

The establishment of national implementation agencies will be called for;

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

The national implementation agency will, inter alia, work closely together with a consultative committee to be established;

The consultative committee should permanently oversee the destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons;

The consultative committee must carry out the supervision of the destruction and diversion through on-site inspections on a permanent basis;

Through random on-site inspections the consultative committee will check periodically that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals does not exceed agreed quantities;

With a view to enhancing confidence, the consultative committee should undertake inspections on a random basis at facilities on the territory of States parties that will on a regular basis be assigned by lot;

The consultative committee shall be competent to enquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities in, or violations of, the compliance with the convention;

In the context of such an enquiry the consultative committee would be competent to undertake on-site inspections after consultation with the State party concerned. If the latter State party, however, does not agree to such an on-site inspection, it must provide appropriate explanations;

Each State party to the convention may use national technical means of verification;

Complaints can be lodged with the Security Council. Each State party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

In view of both the outcome of last year's activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances and of the massive support for General Assembly resolution 36/95, introduced by Pakistan, my delegation is certainly in favour of the re-establishment of the negative security assurances Working Group. In fact we were pleased and encouraged by the positive attention which we received when last year we proposed a model "common formula" for a Security Council resolution covering the common ground contained in the national statements of the nuclear-weapon States. It seems, however, that last year the Ad Hoc Working Group took things as far as we can carry them and that the ball is now also very much in the camp of the nuclear-weapon States. We call therefore for a joint effort by the nuclear-weapon States involved to bring their respective negative security assurances nearer to each other and possibly to harmonize them. As long as such a joint effort is not undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States involved, we can hardly conceive of room for much further work for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances. The Working Group would therefore be more or less on a stand-by basis.

During the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Netherlands delegation actively worked for the adoption of a draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The General Assembly decided to entrust this important

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

matter to the Committee on Disarmament. We would suggest that the Committee should adopt a two-phase approach to this complicated and rather sensitive problem. The first phase, during the Committee's spring session, would consist of a mapping effort aimed at establishing an inventory of all the problems which might crop up. To that end, next to giving statements in plenary and submitting working documents, the CD delegations might be well advised to hold a series of informal meetings with experts. After that, in the second phase, which might coincide with the CD summer session, further appropriate action could follow, e.g. the establishment of an ad hoc working group.

Developments in the Committee on Disarmament in relation to the so-called radiological weapons have not persuaded us to change our position from that which we defined in 1970 in working paper CCD/291 when we concluded that: "Judging by the available information, possibilities for radiological warfare do exist theoretically but do not seem to be of much or even of any practical significance".

We largely agree with the excellent analysis contained in the statement of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden at the 122nd meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, on 7 April 1981. We appreciated the Swedish attempt to beef up the otherwise skinny parameters of the draft radiological weapons convention. That is why, at the 137th meeting of this Committee, on 14 July 1981, the Netherlands delegation introduced a formula which slightly amended the original Swedish proposal.

Whatever the outcome of the negotiations in a re-established Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons may be, the Netherlands delegation is not eager to lend a hand towards producing a convention just for the sake of making a Committee on Disarmament product available to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. If there is going to be a radiological weapons convention, it will have to be one with real substance offering, inter alia, an effective prohibition against the dissemination of radioactive materials by attacks on civil nuclear energy installations with high radiation intensity.

We trust that the organizational arrangements required for the implementation of the work programme for this year's Committee on Disarmament session along the lines I have just set out will encounter no procedural difficulty. After all, the Committee on Disarmament can draw on experience gained in the past few years in the establishment of ad hoc working groups as well as in the selection of chairmen for them. The observations I made earlier on as regards the best work structure for the Committee on Disarmament are not meant to bear upon the tasks that lie immediately before us. The best procedure would seem to be to follow the course of action we took last year, while making a parallel endeavour to agree upon a better work structure for the future.

One of the agenda items of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament has set up an Ad Hoc Working Group which is engaged in preparing this comprehensive programme. The Netherlands delegation supports the approach contained in the working document (CD/205) introduced last year by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a group of Western delegations.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Perhaps I may make a few more personal remarks on this matter. To be frank, I am not entirely convinced that a comprehensive programme of disarmament can make a decisive contribution to disarmament. Of course, the world community can set priorities and goals and establish principles as was done in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, a text which we continue to endorse and uphold. Conceding that stages in the process of arms control and disarmament do exist, I am of the opinion, however, that one should not conceive of the relevance of these stages in their relation to time but rather in their relation to the prevailing degree of confidence, or the lack of it, in existing security arrangements. I still fail to see what over-all criterion could be applied to select a certain set of arms control measures to fit into a certain phase -- however important they may be as such -- if abstraction is made of the relevance of the arms concerned to a given particular security environment. In view of this, the introduction of necessarily vague deadlines seems somewhat useless and perhaps even harmful for the credibility of the whole enterprise. Arms control and disarmament is a painstaking job, requiring much devotion, where only a step-by-step approach, building on what has been achieved, will bring results. Obviously, the one important criterion that should be applied when embarking on negotiations on certain arms control measures is the verifiability of compliance with the provisions of the agreement that is sought. Such a realistic approach is conducive to creating confidence and without the constant nurturing of confidence there can be no progress in the pursuit of an arms control and disarmament programme which is meant to be taken seriously in both political and military terms.

In other words, for the Netherlands, the programme of action contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus, remains the guide for future actions. If a comprehensive programme of disarmament is to be meaningful, it should follow as closely as possible the programme of action contained in the Final Document. We are not prepared, however, to apply the degree of agreement reached on a comprehensive programme of disarmament as a yardstick for the success of arms control endeavours in general and of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in particular. Arms control is a matter of here and now, a task to be pursued, inter alia, in the Committee on Disarmament in detailed, often difficult negotiations.

Whatever may become of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will depend on the degree to which we all avoid superficial and unrealistic proposals and concentrate on the serious negotiation of effective and verifiable arms control measures that enhance security and stability.

In conclusion I wish to make a few remarks of a personal nature. It is now four years since I joined what was then called the CCD. During these four years I have had the privilege of serving my country in our efforts to promote arms control and disarmament, both here in Geneva and in New York. Soon I shall be leaving Geneva, perhaps not for good, but at least for the time being, and I shall relinquish my responsibilities as leader of the Netherlands delegation. Mr. Wagenmakers will be in charge until the arrival of my successor, Ambassador Frans van Dongen, probably within two weeks. I wish to place on record my very deep appreciation for the friendship and co-operation that I have enjoyed during the past four years from all my colleagues in the Committee on Disarmament and from the secretariat. And when I refer to my colleagues I mean not only those who represent countries allied to mine, but also others who belong to a different alliance, or to none at all. The fact that personal respect, esteem and friendship can exist side by side with an official relationship which sometimes puts us at odds, is perhaps one of the most gratifying and encouraging phenomena of our work in the Committee. I wish you all success in your work and happiness in your private lives.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me extend to you the congratulations and good wishes of the Swedish delegation on your taking up the high and important office of Chairman of this Committee for the month of February. I can assure you of the full co-operation of the Swedish delegation with you in the Chair. I would also like to thank you very much for your personal kind words of welcome to me. Furthermore, I would like to extend the thanks of the Swedish delegation to the head of the Indonesian delegation for functioning so effectively in the Chair during the last part of the Committee's 1981 session.

Allow me also, Mr. Chairman, to associate the Swedish delegation with your words of welcome to the new heads of delegations to the Committee on Disarmament as well as with your words of condolence on the death of the head of the Italian delegation. May I also join you in extending to Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands our great appreciation for having been able to co-operate with him as head of the Netherlands delegation for four years. We have had, in my view, an excellent co-operation between our two delegations, and I would like to extend my thanks to him for that and to wish him good luck in his new office.

When I addressed the CCD on 31 January 1978, four months before the start of the United Nations General Assembly's first special session on disarmament I said, inter alia, the following:

"During this session the CCD will face the greatest challenge in its 16-year history. What does the outside world, anxiously and impatiently awaiting decisive results of years of disarmament efforts, think of us as a negotiating body? Is our image one of a group of idle talkers achieving glaringly insufficient concrete progress? Or have we managed to get the world outside this body to see the complexities of the problems that we have been asked to solve, the many serious and various obstacles that we come upon in our search for solutions? Does this outside world doubt or does it believe in a sincere and sufficiently strong political will among the governments in the CCD negotiations to reach these solutions at long last?"

"I do not know the answers to such questions as I said four years ago. What I do know is that the efficiency and effectiveness of the CCD will be put under scrutiny in a few months from now by the most authoritative organ of the world community. It is up to us now, representatives of the two military blocs as well as of non-aligned and neutral States, to face this challenge and to work in such a way during this spring session that our special report to the United Nations will reflect lasting progress in the most important areas of our work."

When I reread these words I felt as if the past four years had disappeared, as in a dream, from the history of the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. No results have been reached since then. The Committee on Disarmament has worked hard, but in vain. Significantly, the situation is the same as -- and in some cases worse than -- in early 1978.

True, some small progress can be registered in some of the negotiating working groups. But this is due not to contributions from the major military powers, but to the steady and persistent efforts of delegations from other States, more aware of the

tremendously dangerous situation in which the world finds itself today, more anxious to relieve this world of ours of the threats to its future than, obviously, is the case with the major powers.

Quite frankly, I have some doubts about the sincerity of these powers in their attitudes towards multilateral disarmament negotiations. My impression, founded not least on my experience of the past three years of the history of the Committee on Disarmament, is that the Superpowers weaken and undermine these negotiations. They prefer secret and limited talks, shut off from the views of others. They expect the Committee to play the role of a mail-box for their draft treaties to the United Nations, rare as those may be. They deny the Committee the right and the possibility to negotiate the highest priority items on its agenda, e.g. and foremost the CTB. They limit the mandates of the negotiating working groups in accordance with their own interests. They disregard legally not binding but politically committing resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on which they themselves have voted in favour.

Recently, reports have reached us which seem once again to confirm what I have just said. It is indeed shocking to learn from official sources, through the press, that the United States is planning to propose additional treaty negotiations on chemical weapons — beside those conducted in this Committee at the request of the United Nations General Assembly -- in an attempt to head off criticism from the international community and to legitimize their preparations for the production of a new generation of exactly these weapons, should those negotiations fail. The talks proposed would be among the signatories of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. There is indeed a need to improve the Geneva protocol, which lacks a verification mechanism. But it is not acceptable that such negotiations be used as a smokescreen for the production of new chemical weapons.

According to the same information, it is planned to use the Committee on Disarmament for "discussing the issue", focusing on the contention that the USSR has been using a toxin against, inter alia, Afghan guerillas. Are we to understand that this multilateral negotiating body — the Committee on Disarmament, will be degraded to a forum for exchanges of allegations and that the considerable progress made in the Committee's ad hoc negotiating working group will be discarded? I should appreciate an explanation from the United States delegation on its current plan.

All this has had a devastating effect on the standing of the Committee in the eyes of world public opinion, so newly aroused to activities of protest against an abominable situation. While there were earlier expectations and hopes, there is now disappointment. While there were earlier interest and involvement, there are now shrugged shoulders. I spoke in 1978 about "the outside world", at a time when all our meetings were closed to world public opinion. Since January 1979 the Committee on Disarmament has opened its plenary meetings to the public. In the following early stages the plenaries were well attended. For a long time now, the public gallery is most of the time almost empty. Particularly at a time when world public opinion is awake and marching, all members of the Committee should be seriously concerned about this state of its affairs. Do the citizens of the world, whom these affairs ultimately concern, still have any confidence in what we may be able to achieve or do they shrug their shoulders at our work?

These serious questions are indeed before us, when we start to consider our possible achievements during the spring session of 1982. Not least when we look back on the year 1981, just passed. Let us be frank.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The year 1981 was another lost year for disarmament. Is there any reason to presume that the year which has just started will be more rewarding? The picture is, indeed, contradictory. In the political field, a sense of deep distrust, suspicion and fear permeates relations between the Superpowers and their military alliances. The occupation of Afghanistan continues on its third year with no nationally or internationally acceptable solution in sight. Regional war and tension, unilateral use of force and annexation characterize the situation in the Gulf area and in the Middle East, both areas of vital economic importance and the focus of competition and interference from the Superpowers.

In Europe, efforts at increasing confidence and co-operation, inter alia, at the Madrid follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, have received a rude reminder of the volatility of stability through the tragic suppression of freedom and democratic aspirations in Poland. Once again, the world has been reminded that the true face of Communism imposed on Eastern Europe is force, that it is fit for subjugating the lives and minds of people, but unable to survive in a society where free and unthreatened choice is possible.

At a time when an impressively increasing number of people are becoming aware of the threat involved in the militarization of society and in the accumulation and possible spread of nuclear weapons in particular, and would like to do something about it, the underlying causes of tension and conflict are thus intensifying and making solutions even more intractable.

Still, remedies of these tensions and conflicts must be sought and found. Sweden will continue to advocate the adoption of widened confidence-building measures aimed at reducing distrust, suspicions and fears among nations and increasing openness in international relations and the freedom of peoples.

Not only because of the disastrous effects of the present state of things politically. But also because of the subsequent effects of these tensions and conflicts on the arms race, itself a factor in increasing tensions and conflicts.

One, and perhaps the most important manifestation of these effects is the present trend in military research and technology. This is currently moving in directions which may well, unless they are checked, within a decade have rendered arms control, not to talk about disarmament, virtually impossible. Although this may possibly be the not so secret desire of armament protagonists, it is a course which can only lead to an alarming destabilization and decrease in security. The history of arms control is replete with lost opportunities and so-called bargaining chips, which turned out to be irresistibly tempting pieces of military equipment once developed. MIRVs were once one such negotiable commodity. They have now become a central feature of ballistic missiles technology. SALT II put a lid on their numbers but the sad failure to ratify the treaty may now lead to a further fractionation of warheads, which will frustrate not only defensive efforts but arms control as well.

The new cruise missile technology is even more ominous in this regard. Not only may the cruise missile, through its small size and its capacity for carrying nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons, ultimately become an utterly destabilizing weapon, particularly if, as plans indicate, these missiles are deployed in large numbers on mobile launch platforms and moving at supersonic speeds. Further, their flight characteristics and

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possible deployment areas may also negatively affect the security and sovereignty of neutral and non-aligned States. And finally, from the arms control point of view, they may well completely defy adequate verification. For all these reasons, cruise missile technology represents a quantum jump which, because of its dire consequences, had better not be taken. It would, indeed, be ironic if the same people who are, mostly for good reasons, the staunch supporters of stringent verification measures in the disarmament field, were, by betting on non-verifiable cruise missiles, very likely to dig the grave of, or, at least, to render nearly insoluble, international disarmament and arms control efforts. Incidentally, the military advantage of such missiles would, of course, be only temporary and soon be turned into a clear disadvantage, once the adversary has mastered the same technology. There is little reason to believe that he would not do so. The upward spiral of military technology, and consequently the arms race, will just continue.

Individual nations and the international community must make a decisive effort to find ways -- verifiable, of course -- to come to grips with military R & D. Not only does it devour enormous resources -- in 1981 at least \$40,000 million in Government spending only -- but it is currently on the verge of taking us beyond the point of no return, where arms control will have been rendered futile and the insecurity and mutual suspicion of States even more intense and dangerous than today. The quest for technological superiority in the military field, as well as military superiority generally, is a dead end, in the literal sense of the word.

I should like, here, once again, as I did two years ago in this body, to point to the fact that, because of the rapid and tremendous advances in military R & D, time is a crucial factor. Owing to increased difficulties in reaching agreement on sufficiently acceptable verification measures because of these advances, the longer negotiations and agreements are delayed, the more difficult results tend to become. There is a momentum here that we should all be aware of with legitimate horror.

And a word of urgent warning must be issued to the Superpowers: these two countries should seriously consider the grave responsibility that they carry, responsible as they are for 85 per cent of world expenses for military R & D.

Ways must indeed be sought in international co-operation to curtail R & D for offensive military purposes. It is well documented that many systems may be the subject of successful negotiations up to the testing but not beyond. Curtailing of such military R & D could be done through measures aimed at the early identification of new and dangerous trends in arms research and development with a view to precluding the testing and deployment of such weapons. There are precedents for this in the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, the biological weapons Convention, the ENMOD Convention, the talks on anti-satellite technology and some of the limits agreed on in the SALT II Treaty. Another complementary approach is to preclude the military or hostile use of certain geographical areas, as has been done, wholly or partially -- I should like to emphasize partially -- for the Antarctic, outer space and the seabed.

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Cruise missiles are one important part of the recently started theatre nuclear forces negotiations. It must, of course, be welcomed that those have got under way, although the climate of distrust which I have just referred to, and the complex substance, cannot make us confident about early results. On the other hand, talks on nuclear arms control and disarmament are of decisive importance to all nations. These talks, carried out between the Superpowers, should not be allowed to be contingent on changes in relations between any group of countries, and should, hence, be pursued vigorously.

The political and symbolic value of the TNP negotiations is enormous. And the reaching of a comprehensive agreement on the weapons in question is of paramount importance. The negotiations testify to an encouraging new sign in disarmament, the stronger involvement of many groups of free public opinion. This is certain in the West and perhaps some repercussion could follow even in the East. The madness of the nuclear arms race and the incalculable and disastrous consequences for all nations, including the Superpowers, of a possible future nuclear war is at last being brought home to everybody. It is, indeed, perplexing that this insight has not dawned earlier, since the nuclear threat has existed for decades, but it is all the more welcome.

The fact of the present situation seems to be, simply, that for both sides rough nuclear parity means that they cannot have complete confidence in the deterrent force of their nuclear weapons. A first strike attempt, however suicidal, cannot be completely ruled out. This leads to new attempts to increase survivability and even a quest for superiority, i.e. an assured first strike capability, which will be destabilizing. Furthermore, the pure deterrent function of the weapons is being eroded. This is caused by a flexible response doctrine which by stressing various theoretically possible selective or counterforce uses of nuclear weapons makes nuclear war appear more likely. This could, in theory, lead to strengthening pure deterrence, thus raising the threshold of use of nuclear weapons and of war itself.

In this field, however, using theory only is one of the most dangerous ways to approach the problem of peace or nuclear war. Without imaginative perceptions of the concrete realities of nuclear war, theories based on computers and war games will in fact tend to become factors lowering the war threshold. Loose references to the possibilities of actually using nuclear weapons in war have been made. And it is probably correct to argue that the alarmingly increased tendencies to stress the military usability of nuclear weapons -- as different from their political deterrent function -- will in themselves in practice lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold. This tendency may be further encouraged by the false belief that nuclear war, even if purportedly selective, can be "won" in any meaningful sense of the word. Again developing technology, to which I referred earlier, is making this perverted thinking more "credible" though, in fact, its basis is very shaky and unrealistic.

Since it has become obvious to everybody that even limited nuclear strikes will in most cases have widespread consequences and are unlikely to remain limited, the whole doctrine of flexible response is encountering increasing public resistance. Ironically, recent attempts on both sides to further develop this doctrine by the deployment of new types of intermediate-range weapons is having the unexpected result of exposing the contradictory and impossible consequences of the whole doctrine -- perhaps of nuclear weapons themselves.

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The terrible dilemma of our present situation is, however, that it cannot be excluded that in certain situations nuclear weapons would actually be put to their cataclysmic use, but the reply would, of course, be instant and equally cataclysmic. To ensure one's own defence, one would also ensure one's own utter and final destruction.

The need to rid Europe of this insane situation is obvious, but very difficult to achieve. What has almost light-heartedly been implanted in and around Europe during the last three decades, cannot be removed without upsetting an established balance of terror, however precarious and nefarious it may be. TNF negotiations will, of necessity, start with a limited number of issues. However, in the nuclear field all weapons are interlinked, and increasingly so, by virtue of developing technology, which tends to blur distinctions between tactical, intermediate-range and central, strategic nuclear weapons. If eventual results of TNF talks are to have any real significance, they must, therefore, subsequently be broadened to cover further categories of theatre nuclear weapons and their carriers. The complexity of this matter is evident but cannot be avoided.

In this context, a particular effort should be made, without too much delay, to approach the issue of lowering the number of tactical nuclear weapons, with the aim of their ultimate abolition. Their mission is unclear, as testified by many, their usefulness on a swiftly moving battlefield against a mobile adversary doubtful, if their use is not to be delegated to lower levels of command in contradiction to what is thought to be a matter of highest-level and, therefore, time-consuming decision-making. If, on the other hand, the use of tactical weapons were to be a matter of decision by local commanders, such weapons become a dangerous trip wire, which could far too easily lower the nuclear threshold and trigger an escalation to major nuclear war.

Tactical nuclear weapons, be they neutron or other, thus lack credible military usefulness and represent clear dangers of escalation. They should, therefore, gradually become prime targets of negotiations. No doubt, the question of verification would be particularly daunting. It would probably be difficult to imagine that satisfactory solutions could be found which would not foresee the abolition of these weapons. To ensure military balance, nuclear disarmament should be accompanied by appropriately balanced reductions in conventional weaponry.

Finally, TNF negotiations might be fairly meaningless unless seen in the wider context of strategic nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, our very earnest hope that the talks on strategic nuclear weapons will soon resume with the aim of preserving what can be saved from the wreckage of SALT II, but also of working towards sizeable reductions in the enormous overkill strategic arsenals of the Superpowers. It follows from what I said earlier that Sweden considers it urgently necessary to find ways to put a lid on further technological improvements and innovations in the technology of nuclear weapons and their carriers.

To sum up these lines of thought:

On the whole, considering the recent rapid developments in weapon technology, the role of nuclear weapons as usable military and, consequently, political instruments in a crisis situation seems to be put in question, not least due to the far-reaching waves of protests against these weapons as such. The whole doctrine

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of "flexible response" seems to be in doubt, considering the generally admitted risk of large-scale escalation. The credibility of "first use" would thereby be seriously endangered. Simultaneously the importance of the role of conventional weapons would seem to be enlarged. Thereby, the concomitant importance of wide confidence-building measures would be enhanced.

It seems necessary to remind everybody of the decisive role entrusted to the Committee on Disarmament in all aspects of disarmament negotiations. Nuclear disarmament in all its aspects -- which in the past was exclusively handled by nuclear-weapon States -- is a high priority item on the Committee's agenda in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is therefore of the utmost importance to establish a link between the work of the CD and the ongoing or pending negotiations between the Superpowers or the military blocs on all aspects of nuclear disarmament.

I revert now to a perennial on the Committee's agenda, the CTB. The question of a CTBT has been before the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva since its beginning. Owing to the stubborn resistance of some of the nuclear-weapon States, the Committee on Disarmament has, as we all know, been prevented from even starting concrete CTBT negotiations. Like several of my colleagues around this table, I have on numerous occasions stated that it is a quite unacceptable practice to use the consensus rule in order to prevent the establishment of subsidiary organs for the effective conduct of negotiations of an item on the Committee's own agenda agreed upon by all delegations. As members may recall, the Swedish delegation has supported proposals to the effect that the consensus rule should not apply to decisions relating to procedural matters.

It fills me with despair and frustration to note that in spite of all our efforts the CTB issue seems to be in worse shape than ever. The trilateral CTB talks, which at times were used as a pretext for preventing the Committee from fulfilling its duty to negotiate a CTBT, have been suspended for more than a year and a half. There is still no information available as to the future -- if any -- of these negotiations.

Continuing developments in the nuclear field underline the fact that the achievement of a CTBT is as urgent as ever, despite indications that some nuclear-weapon State is inclined to consider it a "non-issue". This view will never be accepted. The CTB is important in order to prevent, or at least render more difficult, the further improvement of existing capabilities as well as the attainment of nuclear explosive capability. This argument has been advanced repeatedly over the years and it remains as valid as ever. Sweden expects, therefore, that all sides will now accept the early establishment during this session of a working group on a CTBT with full powers to negotiate all relevant aspects of such a treaty.

As to the question of verification of such a treaty, the seismic expert group is well on the way to developing an international system for the seismic monitoring of a CTBT. This work has clearly demonstrated that from the technical point of view the question of control of a CTBT can be solved.

In this context, I should like to mention the possibility of identifying certain nuclear explosions by analysing samples of airborne radioactivity. There exist, in fact, already today a number of stations around the world where airborne

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radioactivity is collected and analysed. It seems to be worth considering the possibility of organizing these stations and future ones in a system for the international surveillance of airborne radioactivity. This system would, no doubt, constitute an effective and inexpensive additional method of obtaining information regarding nuclear tests and other forms of clandestine nuclear activities. We are furthermore convinced that such a system would have made it possible to obtain much clearer information about certain suspected events, like the one that occurred south of Africa on 22 September 1979. In the view of the Swedish delegation, this question should be considered by the Committee on Disarmament in an appropriate context. We are therefore planning to submit a working paper on this subject.

Nuclear weapons constitute a threat to mankind that can only be removed by the elimination of these weapons. Nuclear disarmament is, therefore, the most urgent concern of our time. As there are hardly any prospects for rapid progress in nuclear disarmament, it might be useful to consider certain other arrangements in order to reduce the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war. I wish, however, to make it quite clear that no such arrangement can replace nuclear disarmament.

The very complex and technologically sensitive nature of nuclear weapons systems is in itself a source of constant anxiety. There is always a possibility that sheer technical malfunction of the systems or human failure could precipitate a nuclear war. The need to take measures in order to reduce such risks is obvious. A great many incidents have happened already.

In the past some efforts have been made to reduce the risks of nuclear war by mistake or miscalculation. Suffice it to mention the agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the "hot line", "Accident Measures", "Prevention of Nuclear War" and certain provisions of the SALT agreements relating in particular to national means of verification. One basic element of all these agreements is that a reliable and credible line of communication must be maintained between States possessing nuclear arms.

Over the years several proposals have been made with a view to reducing the risk of nuclear war by prohibiting or restricting the use of nuclear weapons. The best known concepts proposed in this context are the ban on first use and the complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons. The problem with these interesting proposals is, as is well known, that owing to the different military doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and a deep-seated lack of confidence between them it has not been possible to reach agreements on the fundamentals of these ideas.

At its thirty-sixth session the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution requesting all nuclear-weapon States to submit their views and proposals for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war. In the absence of any tangible result in nuclear disarmament, I believe that peoples in non-nuclear-weapon States and in the nuclear-weapon States themselves have a right to know what further steps the nuclear-weapon States are prepared to take in order to alleviate the risk of nuclear war. This is in Sweden's view an urgent matter and we consider it very important that all nuclear-weapon States comply with the request of the General Assembly to submit their views on the matter.

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A number of the issues I have referred to in this statement are obviously relevant in this context. The suppression of nations and of the right of peoples and individuals must stop, for all kinds of reasons, inter alia, because it leads to increased tension and Superpower confrontation. Strategic arms reduction talks, theatre nuclear forces negotiations and the proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe must be vigorously pursued with a view towards a strong reduction in weaponry and a strengthening of confidence. Limitations, where possible, on new, destabilizing, arms technology must be sought by controlling and restraining military R & D. And strong efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms must be made. While all those goals are being sought, collateral measures to reduce the dangers of accidental nuclear war should be taken, both nationally and internationally. A concerted effort in this direction to create a web of strong and mutually interdependent relations could go a long way towards enhancing stability in the nuclear age.

In March this year, multilateral disarmament negotiations will have been pursued for twenty years. What kind of jubilee celebrations should we plan? What can we do during this 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament in order to meet the requests of a rapidly increasing and increasingly important world public opinion, what George Kennan recently called the most striking phenomenon of the beginning of the 1980s? How can we, irrespective of political doctrines and economic and social systems, co-operate in efforts to save the peoples of this only earth of ours from the danger of a new general war leading, in the nuclear age, to devastation?

We shall, all of us, have to answer these questions, in all sincerity, by effective action if we are to face our constituents straightforwardly and in good conscience. So let it be.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair.

We have practically exhausted the time available to us for the morning. If the Committee agrees, I would suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3 p.m. If there are no objections, we will proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 1.10 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The one hundred and fiftieth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. As agreed this morning, the Committee will now listen to the remaining speakers inscribed to take the floor today.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to congratulate you, the representative of a neighbouring country with which we are linked by long years of good-neighbourliness, upon your coming here and occupying the important post of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February. I hope that this month will be fruitful and that it will be marked by progress on the various questions on our agenda. At the same time I should like to welcome our new colleagues in the Committee on Disarmament on the start of their work in this the only multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

I should also like to wish Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands success in the new and important functions he is to take up in his country's capital.

Lastly, allow me to express profound condolences on the death of Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo of Italy.

The annual session of the Committee on Disarmament which has started today is taking place at a time that is very critical for the future development of international relations, for all mankind. It is with regret that we have to note a further deterioration of the international climate, an increase in the danger of war and mounting threats to the freedom and independence of peoples as a result of the intensified imperialist power policy. A policy that runs counter to détente and is aimed at the attainment of military superiority and the disruption of the established balance in favour of the West is the main cause of the aggravation of international tension in recent years. Special concern is caused by the mounting arms race, particularly in the nuclear sphere, the elaboration and introduction into the arsenals of States of new types and systems of weapons and the further increase in military expenditures.

Arguments based on the ideas of a so-called "limited nuclear war" and of "preventive", "demonstrative" and other types of nuclear strike have been put forward to justify the policy of increasing nuclear armaments. The purpose of such arguments is to erase the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, to remove the obstacles of a moral and political nature to the use of nuclear weapons and to establish the permissibility of their use for a first strike.

The thought is being implanted in world public opinion that a "limited" nuclear war in which, allegedly, only military targets of the opponents would be destroyed, will be humane and acceptable under modern conditions, and that it will make it possible to avert a general nuclear catastrophe. It is not necessary to be a military strategist to understand the artificial character of such scholastic exercises. By proposing to conduct a nuclear war according to certain preconceived "rules" which provide that nuclear missiles should explode in "gentlemanly" fashion, that is, not over cities, but over the targets which it would be deemed expedient somewhere to declare military objects, these so-called military theoreticians put themselves in a position of irreconcilable contradiction with reality.

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As for the socialist States, they are convinced that "a nuclear war cannot be limited". This was stated in the communiqué of the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member-States held on 2 December 1981.

The Soviet Union considers that to try to defeat each other in an arms race and to count on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous insanity. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, stressed in October 1981: "To start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging from it victorious is only possible for someone who has decided to commit suicide. No matter how much power the aggressor possesses, no matter in what fashion he chooses to start a nuclear war, he will not achieve his goals. Retaliation will inevitably follow."

Everywhere in the world an understanding of the necessity for intensive actions to eliminate the threat of a nuclear catastrophe is increasing. The mass anti-war and anti-missile demonstrations and rallies for peace and disarmament in countries of Europe and other regions of the world have become a sign of the times.

The question of how to save the world from sliding further towards a nuclear war was also the centre of attention at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly which took place recently. Various doctrines and conceptions of the use of nuclear weapons, first among them being the doctrines of a "limited or partial use of nuclear weapons", were condemned at the session as leading, as was indicated in one of the General Assembly's decisions, towards a renewed spiralling of the arms race.

The imperialist policy of further escalating the arms race, which has seriously complicated the relations among States, was subjected to criticisms of principle by a substantial majority of delegations. Participants in the session stressed that this policy was pushing East and West to a confrontation and thus creating a great danger, including the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The last session was characterized also by the intensity of the discussion on the burning problems of war and peace. Virtually no delegation abstained from this central discussion pertaining to the future destiny of mankind. It is no chance that the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session adopted a number of resolutions on the questions of arms race limitation and disarmament that was a record for the whole history of the United Nations. A substantial proportion of these were proposed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

We see this rather differently from the representative of the Netherlands, not as a matter of a mere itch to adopt resolutions, but rather as an expression of the alarm of all States, both large and small, members of alliances and non-aligned countries alike - countries of all the continents - at the deplorable situation in the matter of disarmament, an expression of their desire to make their contribution to the strengthening of peace and international security.

The General Assembly approved the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, the draft of which was submitted by the Soviet Union. In this document the United Nations authoritatively and resolutely proclaimed the first use of nuclear weapons to be the gravest crime against humanity. It also condemned as incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations any doctrines allowing such use of nuclear weapons, and called

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upon the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of nuclear conflict. The Declaration is justly considered to be an important step towards the removal of the threat of nuclear war, a measure directed towards improving the international climate.

This decision supports and acts in concert with the aspirations of the significant majority of States, in particular non-aligned States, which seek to prohibit the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons as a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity, before nuclear disarmament is achieved.

Some other important decisions were adopted at the session. They clearly demonstrated that a considerable majority of the States Members of the United Nations wish to prevent the further escalation of armaments in the world at large.

The Soviet Union's policy, which is directed towards the resumption of the arms limitation negotiations that were suspended by the United States, the intensification of ongoing negotiations and the commencement of a dialogue on questions which have not yet formed the subject of negotiations, has received the widest support in the United Nations. It is significant that practically all delegations which spoke at the session were in favour of the continuation of the SALT process and welcomed the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe which started on 30 November 1981. About a score of resolutions on disarmament matters that were adopted at the session provide for the conducting of negotiations (either within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament or through other channels) aimed at the elaboration of agreements, conventions and treaties limiting the arms race.

We have already stated more than once, including occasions at the highest level, that we are ready to resume the suspended dialogue on the entire spectrum of questions relating to the limitation of the arms race. We think that its speediest possible resumption is in the interests not only of the direct participants in the talks, the USSR and the United States of America, but of all States. Experience of the work of the Committee on Disarmament has shown more than once that a bilateral dialogue on the most urgent problems of disarmament contributes to progress in their solution within the framework of multilateral negotiations also.

We fully share the view of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico as to the untenability of the thesis that there should be a "linkage" or "linking" of arms limitation questions with other international issues. At the same time, however, we think that under present conditions it is necessary to intensify considerably the negotiations now being carried out within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. We have frequently reaffirmed in words and in deeds our interest in the intensification of the Committee's activity, and our desire that the Committee should seriously and in a business-like manner deal with the most urgent questions of disarmament. We have always wanted the Committee at last to become a real negotiating body instead of a discussion club, and to work efficiently and with complete devotion -- in fact in the way expected of it by the international community.

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As for Mrs. Thorsson's charge that certain powers "weaken and undermine" multilateral negotiations, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the truth is exactly the opposite. The Soviet delegation has not come to this session with empty hands. In this statement we would like to express briefly our position on the major items of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the present situation the task of curbing the nuclear arms race and eliminating the threat of nuclear war is particularly urgent. The position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on this question is reflected in document CD/4, which was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979. The document proposes the starting without delay of negotiations to halt the production of nuclear weapons and gradually reduce stockpiles of them until they are completely eliminated. Regrettably, owing to the obstructionist policy of some States, the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly for the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on the subject of nuclear disarmament has not yet been implemented, and the negotiations on this matter have not been started. We are in favour of the creation of an ad hoc subsidiary organ of the Committee and the starting of appropriate negotiations in accordance with resolution 36/92 E of the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled, "Nuclear weapons in all aspects". In view of the priority character and the importance of the question of curbing the nuclear arms race, the Committee should consider the possibility of setting up an ad hoc sub-committee on questions of nuclear disarmament.

Among the complex of nuclear disarmament issues, the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests is extremely urgent. The banning of all nuclear weapons tests would make it virtually impossible to improve such weapons or to develop new types of nuclear weapons such as the neutron weapon. Such a measure could favourably influence the creation of an international climate which would facilitate the solution of many problems of nuclear disarmament.

As you know, the group of non-aligned and neutral countries has put forward a proposal for the establishment within the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group to negotiate an appropriate treaty. The representatives of Mexico, Sweden and the Netherlands have spoken about this matter today. We do not object to this proposal. We believe that the Committee should actively study this priority question.

As for the tripartite negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the Soviet Union is in favour of the immediate resumption of these talks, and is ready to do everything in its power for their successful completion. Unfortunately, however, the resumption of these talks is blocked by the Western participants.

The peoples of the world are particularly concerned about the United States decision to produce and deploy nuclear neutron weapons, and this concern was reaffirmed at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

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The implementation of this decision poses an increasing danger to mankind; it leads to the emergence of a new means of mass destruction in the military arsenals of States and opens up new avenues for a further arms race.

We would like to stress once again that this is a matter of exceptional importance and urgency directly related to international security and disarmament. Resolution 36/92 K of the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly requests the Committee on Disarmament to "start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons". We urge the establishment of a working group of the Committee on Disarmament for the conduct of the above-mentioned negotiations. A basis for these negotiations already exists; it is the draft of an appropriate international convention which was submitted by the socialist countries in 1978. This is precisely what is called for in the relevant resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

This year mankind will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the start of the exploration of outer space -- one of the greatest achievements of science and technology in our century. Unfortunately it has to be noted that outer space is becoming not only a sphere for the peaceful efforts of States in exploring and utilizing it but also the arena of an ever increasing military confrontation.

Since the very beginning of the space era the Soviet Union has consistently urged and it continues to urge that outer space should remain for ever clear and free from any weapons, that it should not become a new arena for the arms race and a source of aggravation of the relations among States. In the opinion of our country the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space would promote the achievement of these goals. We suggest the starting in the Committee on Disarmament of negotiations on this issue, as is recommended in resolution 36/99 of the United Nations General Assembly. The draft of such a treaty submitted by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly could serve as a basis for the negotiations.

We would not object if the mandate of the working group were to include also the recommendations in General Assembly resolution 36/97 C concerning the negotiation of an agreement on the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. At the same time it must be clear that the main task facing the Committee is to solve the whole problem of the cessation of the arms race in outer space and therefore the question of anti-satellite systems must be examined in the context of other measures directed towards the achievement of this goal.

At the present time, when the world is being pushed towards a new and dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race, very great importance attaches to the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Last year the Committee accomplished a considerable amount of work in this direction. We are for the intensification of the Committee's efforts in this matter and for the implementation of resolutions 36/96 A and B adopted by the General Assembly. In our opinion the Committee should adopt urgent measures to prevent the production and deployment of new generations of chemical weapons, and in particular binary weapons, as well as the deployment of chemical weapons in countries where there are no such weapons

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at present. As regards the mandate of the relevant working group, the socialist countries last year recommended that it should be broadened. The new mandate of the working group should, we believe, provide for the possibility of beginning, at last, the drafting of the actual provisions of a convention.

Already for the third year the joint Soviet-American proposal concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons is on the negotiating table of the Committee on Disarmament. An agreed text of such a treaty has been expected from us for quite a long time. These expectations have been reaffirmed in resolution 36/97 B of the United Nations General Assembly containing an appeal to the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations in order to complete the elaboration of an appropriate treaty with a view to its submission to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The completion of the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons would not only be a real contribution to the accomplishment of the tasks before the Committee, but also have great importance as a step in a positive direction in the present greatly deteriorated international situation.

The principal obstacle in the way of agreement on the treaty is the question of an undertaking not to attack civilian nuclear facilities. We have stated time and again that we do not object to the elaboration of international measures to prevent attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. But the solution should be found outside the framework of the treaty on radiological weapons. We are ready to look for a mutually acceptable solution of this question together with the countries concerned.

Finally, I should also like to touch upon the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is a special task in view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The discussion and adoption of the CPD at the special session would give an impetus to the negotiations on specific issues of arms limitation and disarmament, and contribute to the improvement of the political atmosphere.

In its approach to the CPD the Soviet Union proceeds from the conviction that the arms race can and must be stopped. To fulfil this task it is necessary to work out and implement a programme of urgent and radical steps, which would not only halt the arms race in specific directions but also pave the way towards the main objective of general and complete disarmament. In our view the comprehensive programme of disarmament should consist of an agreed complex of measures, directed towards the cessation of the arms race and the stage-by-stage achievement of actual disarmament within a fixed time-frame. Its implementation must be conducive to maintaining and deepening the process of international détente, strengthening the basis of peaceful co-existence between States with different social systems and developing confidence and co-operation among them.

Attaching the greatest importance to the elaboration of concrete measures in the field of disarmament, we proceed also from the premise that the comprehensive programme of disarmament is directed towards the future. The present generation

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

must not only ensure a peaceful life during the remaining decades of our century but also guarantee man's entry upon the third millenium in conditions of peace and general security.

The success of the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament and in particular of its present session will in many ways depend upon the efficient and rational organization of its work. Last year the socialist countries set forth in detail their views on the question of how to increase the effectiveness and improve the organization of the Committee's work and they submitted a document on this subject (CD/200). The observations contained in that document to a large extent identify our approach to the organization of the work of the present session. The Soviet delegation listened with interest to the statement of the Ambassador of the Netherlands in this connection and notes with satisfaction the closeness of our views in many respects.

It seems to us that the question of the renewal of the mandates of the working groups which have existed in the past should be examined in the light of the effectiveness of the work they have done and their prospects for achieving agreements. At the same time we are in favour of the establishment of subsidiary organs of the Committee on such urgent problems as a nuclear weapons test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, as well as of an ad hoc group of experts on the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

With regard to the time of the termination of the spring part of the Committee's session, we think that it is necessary to make full use of the time at our disposal. We should not forget that the current part of the Committee's session is the last one before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, where we shall have, so to say, to give an accounting of the Committee's four years of work. Frankly speaking, the results will clearly be more than modest. It is probably true to say that during the entire twenty years of its existence the Committee has not had so empty a portfolio as now. But we would still like to hope that during the remaining two and a half months the Committee will take important steps in the right direction, will start negotiations on the most important aspects of disarmament -- the limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. We hope that the Committee will succeed in elaborating a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. We are sure that there is an adequate basis for completing the work on the draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. At least some important provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons could also be drafted, and the talks on the limitation of the arms race in outer space could start. To be brief, ladies and gentlemen, time is short and there is more than enough of work to do.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

For our part we would like to assure you that the Soviet delegation will make every effort to help achieve fruitful results at the present session of the Committee.

It is often said that in matters of disarmament a great deal depends upon the political will of States, and that is correct. The Soviet Union has such political will in abundance. It has more than once stated that it is ready to agree on the prohibition or limitation of any type of weapon, provided, of course, that the principle of equality and equal security is observed. We are convinced that even in the present difficult international situation it is possible, through a dialogue based on mutual respect and equality and through business-like and constructive negotiations, to achieve a relaxation of tension, to increase confidence in the relations among States and to develop mutual understanding and co-operation between them. However difficult may be the international problems confronting the world today, there is not one of them which cannot be resolved by peaceful means and with the interests of all States in mind.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community propose exactly this peaceful alternative to the policy of confrontation and the increase in the arms race that dangers peace. As L.I. Brezhnev stated in his answers to the American television network, NBC: "It is important that Governments and statesmen should fully realize that the main thing for the peoples of the planet is peace and confidence in the future. And of course it is of even greater importance that this should be embodied in the practical policies of States. It is necessary to restrain the dangerous eagerness to escalate the arms race. It is necessary to reduce the heat of tension, to extinguish the dangerous hotbeds of crisis situations, to renounce the policy of a senseless arms race, to return to the path of normal relations between States, of mutual respect, understanding and consideration for the lawful interests of each other. It is necessary seriously, in a business-like manner, to study the questions of the limitation and reduction of armaments. All these measures taken together will facilitate the elimination of the threat of nuclear war".

The Soviet delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament can and must make a weighty contribution to the accomplishment of this historic task, can and must justify the hopes placed in it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Before embarking on my statement I have certain duties to perform, some of them agreeable and others either nostalgic or sad and painful. I shall begin with the more agreeable ones. I should like first of all, Mr. Chairman, to offer you my good wishes in your present office and to assure you of the full co-operation of the Belgian delegation during this month. I should like next to thank Ambassador Sani for the way he guided our work during the final period of the 1981 session and again during the consultations which took place here in January, before the opening of this session. And lastly, I should like to welcome here all our new colleagues who are so numerous that I shall refrain from mentioning them by name, and to assure them, too, of our full co-operation.

The sad duty relates to a matter that was referred to this morning and has been mentioned again this afternoon by Ambassador Issraelyan. We learned this morning of the death of Ambassador di Montezemolo: I confess that I was very distressed to hear this sad news, and like other colleagues who have already spoken I, too, wish to offer my condolences to the Italian delegation, asking it to convey the expression of our sympathy to Mrs. di Montezemolo, the Permanent Mission of Italy and the Italian Government. Finally, the nostalgic duty relates to the departure of Ambassador Fein. Ever since my arrival here, I have had the great pleasure of maintaining with him very friendly and very close working contacts and I, too, should like to offer him my best wishes for the very important tasks which await him at The Hague.

The session of the Committee on Disarmament which has just opened cannot but be affected by the prospect of the forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That will be an event of exceptional importance. Belgium, which is presiding over the European Community during the present semester, made a solemn statement to that effect when, addressing the European Parliament on 21 January last, Mr. Leo Tindemans, the current President of the Council of Ministers of the Community, said that "the results of the special session will be largely decisive for the international situation".

Unhappily, this last session of the Committee before the special session is not opening under more promising auspices than those of 1980 and 1981. Once again, we must express before this forum our disappointment and our anxiety over the lack of moderation in the behaviour of certain States. The persistence of this attitude has a profoundly disturbing effect on the political climate, for it fails to create the confidence essential to the achievement of progress in the field of disarmament and arms control.

"Only consistent adherence to ... principles [of international conduct in relations among States] would provide a solid basis for lasting détente, far-reaching disarmament and sustained international security." The sentence I have just quoted is taken from the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security which formed the subject of General Assembly resolution 36/97 L, adopted by consensus.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

How, in these circumstances, can we remain silent in the face of the continuing foreign occupation of Afghanistan and, more recently, the sudden deterioration of the situation in Poland, where the attitude of the country's leaders constitutes, in more than one respect, a grave breach of the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki.

I should like to recall here the appeals made by various sectors of the international community for an early end to these situations, which may affect, in particular, the efforts being made in the disarmament field.

Yet the steady deterioration of the international climate justifies those efforts more than ever.

We have had occasion more than once to express the hopes we place in those efforts. My country regards the negotiations on medium-range nuclear forces now in progress in Geneva as offering a particularly important possibility for progress, jointly with the opening of new negotiations on strategic nuclear arms. We view those endeavours as the best method of ensuring, through negotiation, a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. We also earnestly appeal for the resumption of negotiations in the other fields which have up to now formed the subject of separate talks. But we fear that if the unfavourable political conditions I have just referred to continue to prevail, the progress we so greatly hope for will not be achieved.

We continue to believe that in the global process that disarmament represents, the elimination of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by a balanced reduction of conventional forces, a sphere in which we hope for progress, both within the framework of the United Nations, in particular through the implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/97 A, and in more restricted forums, such as the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions.

We also place our hopes in the Committee on Disarmament. Since becoming a member, my country has always endeavoured to increase the value of this outstanding instrument which has been created by the international community.

At the end of the Committee's 1981 session I suggested, without reference to the political developments of the moment, that we ought also to look into the reasons for the stagnation of our efforts in the Committee. On that occasion I mentioned some ways whereby our work might be made more efficient. I should like briefly to recapitulate the points I made:

We should concentrate to a greater extent on our programme of work and avoid politico-procedural arguments unrelated to the Committee's negotiating purpose.

In that respect, the 1981 session of the Committee represented a positive development which will, I hope, continue this year;

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

We should interpret our negotiating mandate more strictly than we have done in the past, that is to say, we ought also to avoid discussions that fall more within the competence of international deliberative bodies;

We should, to a greater extent than we have done over the past years, give preference in our negotiations to whatever offers the smallest chance of progress, however slight it may be, that is to say, we should give proof of our common will to succeed.

The imminence of the special session of the General Assembly confers a special character upon this session of the Committee. We ought more than ever, I believe, try to bring about all the conditions that might make the Committee more effective. That would surely be the best way of reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of the first special session, especially its paragraph 120 which refers to the "continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum".

We therefore think that the special nature of the Committee's present session calls for an effort of innovation on our part. The session's work should be contingent upon the special session. With that in mind, it seems to us that in the coming weeks we should concentrate on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which we are required to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session.

The early convening, at the beginning of this year, of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was a useful measure that clearly demonstrated the value of our adopting a flexible approach in our procedural decisions. As a result of the intensification of our work on this question, certain positions have already been clarified, more particularly as regards the concept of phases and that of the mechanism which is to govern this programme. It seems to me that this has created a climate of better understanding of the various views held. But as yet not all the groups composing the Committee have expressed their views on these issues. At the present stage, we have specific proposals from the sponsors of document CD/205, which include Belgium, and from the sponsors of document CD/223, namely, the Group of 21. It is imperative that the delegations which have not yet explained their views should do so rapidly if our work is not to suffer undue delay.

There is still a great deal of work to be done on this matter before the special session. We would find it difficult to accept the idea that the Committee could not complete its work on this question successfully and in good time.

We therefore hope that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will receive the requisite attention from all delegations and will enjoy the priority needed for the successful completion of its work.

There are other fields, too, in which the Committee has already achieved substantial progress and must advance further with an eye to the special session. I have in mind the other questions on which working groups were set up during the 1980 and 1981 sessions.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

We hope that those working groups will be quickly re-established, bearing in mind once again the shortness of this winter session.

I should like first to refer to the question of radiological weapons. Belgium has repeatedly stated its views on the subject, both here in Geneva and more particularly at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. This is a field in which we think more efforts could be made to reach the necessary compromises and find a solution other than those which have been repeatedly put forward, without success, for nearly two years and which are transforming our negotiations into a dialogue of the deaf. Belgium has already -- some time ago -- suggested a new approach, particularly as regards the delicate and important matter of the prohibition of deliberate attacks on nuclear installations.

I can only repeat here our desire to reconcile the position of those who want existing prohibitions of such attacks to be expanded forthwith with the views of those who prefer problems arising under humanitarian law to be kept separate from those relating to disarmament.

With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, Belgium greatly hopes that the recommendations made by the Working Group itself at the end of the 1981 session as well as those contained in General Assembly resolution 36/96 A will be rapidly implemented.

First of all, we shall have to agree on a suitably revised mandate for that Working Group so that the Committee can reach agreement as quickly as possible on the subject of a convention on chemical weapons.

The elements of a possible agreement, as identified by the Working Group last year and stated in the Committee's report to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, ought in any event to serve as the starting point for our work this year.

With regard to security assurances, we are aware of the importance attaching to the continuation of negotiations on this question. The vote on resolution 36/95 submitted by Pakistan at the last session of the General Assembly represents progress as compared with previous years.

Belgium recognizes the importance of seeking a common approach with a view to the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Here again, however, we believe that the Committee should seize upon every possibility for an agreement, even of an interim nature, that would help to achieve progress and to create a favourable climate with a view, in particular, to the gradual satisfaction of the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States which have chosen the path of non-alignment.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

It was with that in mind that Belgium and more recently Sweden, at the last session of the General Assembly, suggested that the Security Council should incorporate the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon States in a resolution, which would thus confer upon them international legal status.

Among the important items on the agenda which have not so far been entrusted to a working group is that of a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

At the last session of the General Assembly, Belgium had occasion to say how much importance it attached to the principle of such a prohibition. We also made the point that it was for the Committee on Disarmament to determine, on a consensus basis, the most appropriate manner of dealing with that matter. Belgium is ready to agree to any procedural decision that would enable us to deal with this question more effectively than in the past. In our search for a working method we ought not to overlook the possibilities offered by a review of the terms of reference of the group of seismological experts.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space formed the subject of a useful debate at the last session of the General Assembly. Belgium, which was a co-sponsor of resolution 36/97 C, therefore hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will take up that question at the present session, bearing in mind its current priorities. At this stage we feel that the holding of informal meetings of the Committee attended by experts might facilitate a first examination of the problem as a whole, subject to the eventual setting up of an ad hoc group of experts similar to the one set up for the detection and identification of seismic events.

This brief enumeration of the principal tasks which the Committee ought to complete before the convening of the special session clearly indicates the extent of the work lying ahead of us, and its political importance. If our contribution to the special session is to be effective, we ought therefore to try to avoid a dispersal of our efforts.

I earnestly hope that we shall, without delay, establish our priorities with this goal in mind and at once reveal the conciliatory spirit and the will to make progress which we expect to prevail at the meeting in New York next June.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all sincerely to congratulate you on your accession to the responsible office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for this month and at the same time to assure you that the Czechoslovak delegation will fully support you in your efforts to bring about constructive and business-like negotiations on disarmament questions.

I should also like to associate myself with the condolences offered to the Italian delegation.

The Czechoslovak delegation would like in its statement today to deal with an important question, the significance of which is increasing especially in the light of the approaching special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I refer to that of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The socialist countries support the initiative of the non-aligned countries for the elaboration of such a programme, which was approved by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They take an active part in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee dealing with this question. As is well known, the group of socialist countries has submitted more than a dozen working papers in the Working Group.

Today the Czechoslovak delegation, as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, would like to state the agreed position of the delegations of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Czechoslovakia on the question of the contents of the CPD.

The delegations of these countries are convinced that the solution of the problem of disarmament is of universal and historical significance: disarmament should play a crucial role in the prevention of war and in ensuring genuine security for the peoples of the world.

Disarmament, being the material guarantee of international security, should in present conditions represent the principal direction for the common efforts of all the countries of the world towards the elimination of international tension and the building of universal and lasting peace. The limitation of armaments and disarmament will open the way to the solution of the global problems of humanity.

Certain positive results in the field of arms limitation were achieved in the course of the 1960s and the 1970s. International agreements were concluded on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and on the prohibition of the military use of environmental modification techniques. Agreements were also concluded on strategic arms limitation, and certain measures were initiated for the purpose of strengthening confidence in Europe. A definite procedure was established for disarmament negotiations on both a multilateral and a bilateral basis. All this shows that real measures in the field of arms limitations are possible and practicable. What has been done has created a definite basis for further steps in the direction of arms limitation and disarmament.

At the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a complex of concrete tasks and measures aimed at the limitation of the arms race and disarmament was adopted with the agreement of all States Members of the United Nations, and these fully retain their relevance today.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

However, as the 1970s gave way to the 1980s, a new impetus was given to the arms build-up. The exacerbation of the arms race is accompanied by the propagation of doctrines proclaiming the "permissibility" and "acceptability" of nuclear war and justifying the effort to achieve military superiority. War hysteria is being spread, and animosity and hatred between States and peoples are being instigated. These actions have brought about the interruption of negotiations on the most important aspects of arms limitation.

The arms build-up represents a mortal danger for civilization and threatens to bring to an impasse the efforts aimed at the solution of vitally important international problems in the spheres of economics, social development, culture, health care and the preservation of the environment.

The task of reducing the scale of the arms race and curbing it has now become especially urgent because the instruments of war are undergoing profound changes. Qualitatively new types and systems of weapons are being developed, and especially weapons of mass destruction, which can render the control, and consequently also the agreed limitation and prohibition of such weapons more difficult and even impossible. The development of military technology has a constantly destabilizing effect on the world situation and increases the danger of war.

The arms race can and must be stopped.

To this end, it is necessary to elaborate and to implement a programme of urgent and radical measures that would not only halt the arms race in its various aspects but also pave the way for the achievement of the main goal, namely, general and complete disarmament.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be an agreed complex of measures aimed at the cessation of the arms race and the implementation, by stages, of genuine disarmament within the framework of established time-limits. The decision to elaborate such a programme, which was adopted at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is an expression of the yearning of the world's peoples to put a stop to the arms race.

As to the objectives of the CPD, the socialist countries consider that the programme's immediate aims should be the prevention of nuclear catastrophe and the implementation of urgent measures which would bring about the cessation of the arms race and pave the way to a stable peace. The ultimate goal is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The implementation of the measures envisaged in the programme should promote the strengthening of international security as well as the security of each individual State. Real security can only be ensured through the limitation, reduction and destruction of armaments, through disarmament.

One of the basic goals of the programme must be the consolidation and further development of everything positive which has so far been achieved in the field of the curbing of the arms race.

The implementation of the CPD should promote the maintenance and deepening of the process of the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of the bases for the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and the development of mutual trust and co-operation among them.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

The CPD must undoubtedly contain a section on principles. All States Members of the United Nations must reaffirm their adherence to the objectives of the United Nations Charter and their commitment strictly to observe the principles enshrined in the Charter in the process of the elaboration and implementation of measures aimed at the limitation of armaments and disarmament, and also to take into consideration the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The negotiations should be aimed first of all at the limitation and the cessation of the quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and of the creation of new means of waging war, so that ultimately scientific and technical achievements can be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. There is no type of weapon which could not be prohibited or liquidated on a mutually agreed basis.

All States are obliged to promote efforts in the sphere of disarmament. This applies first and foremost to the States possessing nuclear weapons and to other militarily significant States. At all stages the existing balance in the sphere of nuclear power should remain intact with a constant lowering of its level.

Side by side with the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, there should be a reduction in the sphere of conventional weapons. The States with the largest military arsenals bear a special responsibility in this process.

The adoption of disarmament measures must be carried out on a just and balanced basis so as to guarantee each State's right to security and so that no State or group of States can at any stage of the implementation of the programme obtain an advantage to the detriment of other States. The aim at each stage should be undiminished security with possibly lower levels of armaments and armed forces.

The principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.

The process of the limitation of armaments and of disarmament must be carried out without interruptions.

States must refrain from acts which might adversely affect disarmament efforts and display a constructive approach in the interests of achieving agreements.

The CPD must undoubtedly envisage measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament the implementation of which would lead towards the ultimate goal -- general and complete disarmament. These measures should include the following:

1. Nuclear weapons.

(a) The renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

(b) The cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons up to and including their complete elimination, and the immediate initiation, to that end, of appropriate negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. As follows from earlier proposals advanced by the socialist countries, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons must include the cessation of the production of means for their delivery and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; as a first step, the possible stages of nuclear disarmament with their approximate contents could be

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

discussed, and in particular the content of the first stage; the measures in this stage must include the cessation of the development and production of new types of nuclear weapons and new systems of such weapons; at the same time measures should be adopted for the strengthening of the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

- (c) The further qualitative and quantitative limitation and reduction of strategic armaments.
- (d) The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.
- (e) The conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.
- (f) The adoption of further measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of the universal accession of States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- (g) The conclusion of a convention on strengthening the guarantees of security of non-nuclear-weapon States and, as a first step, declarations by the nuclear powers, identical in substance, on the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against those States that have renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territories, with the approval of such declarations by the United Nations Security Council.
- (h) The conclusion of an agreement on the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of States in which none are now located; the renunciation by States possessing nuclear weapons of further steps aimed at the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States.
- (i) The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

2. Chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction

- (a) The renunciation of the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons as well as the emplacement of chemical weapons in those countries in which none are now located.
- (b) The conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.
- (c) The conclusion of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as well as of agreements on the prohibition of specific new types or systems of such weapons. As a first step towards the conclusion of the comprehensive agreement, as has already been proposed by the socialist countries, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and other militarily significant States should make declarations, identical in substance, on the renunciation of the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, with the approval of such declarations by decision of the Security Council.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

(d) The conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

3. The prevention of the proliferation of the arms race in new spaces explored by man

(a) The conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

(b) Further measures to prevent the conversion of outer space into a sphere of military confrontation.

(c) Further measures to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

(d) Further measures on the inadmissibility of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

4. Armed forces and conventional weapons

(a) The renunciation of the expansion of armed forces and conventional weapons by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and by the countries associated with them under military agreements, as a first step towards the subsequent reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

(b) The reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

(c) The limitation of the sale and supply of conventional weapons.

(d) Further measures on the limitation or the prohibition of the use of specific types of conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

5. Regional measures

(a) The further extension of the confidence-building measures in the military sphere contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the achievement of agreement on new confidence-building measures and disarmament. To these ends, the convening of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe.

(b) The mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe as well as in other regions of the world on a regional basis.

(c) The renunciation of the expansion of the existing military and political groupings and of the creation of new ones.

(d) The ending of the division of Europe into military and political alliances and, as a first step, the elimination of the military organizations of the two groupings, starting with a mutual reduction of military activity..

(e) The conclusion, among all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of a treaty on the non-first use against each other of both nuclear and conventional weapons.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

- (f) The limitation and lowering of the level of military presence and military activity in the relevant regions -- in the Atlantic Ocean, in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean Sea and in the region of the Persian Gulf.
- (g) The transformation of the region of the Mediterranean Sea into a zone of stable peace and co-operation: the extension to this area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, an agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of Mediterranean non-nuclear-weapon States, a commitment by the nuclear-weapon powers not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country not permitting the deployment of such weapons on its territory.
- (h) The limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean and the creation of a zone of peace in that region.
- (i) The elaboration of confidence-building measures in the Far East and, to this end, the conducting of negotiations between all interested countries.
- (j) The conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in the relations between the States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
- (k) The creation of a zone of peace and stability in South-East Asia.
- (l) The withdrawal of armed forces from the territories of other countries and the liquidation of foreign military bases.

6. Collateral and other measures

- (a) The conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.
- (b) Further measures for the prevention of the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.
- (c) Measures for the prevention of the possibility of a surprise attack.
- (d) The accession, by all States which have not yet done so, to the existing agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

7. The reduction of military expenditures

- (a) The reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and of other militarily important States, in absolute or percentage terms.
- (b) As a first step towards the implementation of this measure -- a freeze on military budgets.

The implementation of the measures listed above would facilitate the solution of the global problems of humanity. First of all we should like to note that the limitation of armaments and disarmament in themselves represent a global problem of primary importance. The implementation of measures in this field is the key condition for the ensuring of international security, an important condition for the economic and social development of all States and an indispensable precondition for the solution of the problem of the protection and the preservation of the environment and other global problems.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

A close interrelationship exists between disarmament and development. Disarmament can and must make an effective contribution to the restructuring of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis and to the establishment of a new international economic order through the reallocation of resources from military ends to the goals of development, particularly in the developing countries.

The resources released as a result of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction of nuclear weapons and the reduction of stockpiles of such weapons must not be used under other items of the military budgets of the nuclear-weapon States.

The distribution of resources for the benefit of the developing countries must be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the countries receiving the aid, without any discrimination. To these ends, a special committee on the distribution of these resources could be created.

As to the time-frame and the procedure for the implementation of the programme, the socialist countries consider that the CPD must be implemented so far as possible in the very shortest periods of time, in view of the urgency of the tasks contained in it. It is the duty of every Government to display the indispensable political will for the fulfilment of this historic task.

The CPD must be implemented in stages so as to ensure most effectively the earliest possible reduction and the ultimate elimination of the danger of war, a constant lowering of the level of confrontation and the subsequent limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and all other armaments up to and including their complete elimination.

Parallel actions are possible within the framework of each stage with respect to various aspects of the limitation of armaments and disarmament such as those involved in the specific and comprehensive measures in various spheres of armaments, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of armaments and armed forces, global as well as regional levels, confidence-building measures in the military sphere and steps aimed at the strengthening of the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

Primary attention must be paid to measures for the prevention of the threat of nuclear war and the curbing of the nuclear arms race. To this end it is indispensable to resume the interrupted negotiations as early as possible and intensify the ongoing negotiations on the limitation of armaments so as to conclude them by reaching appropriate agreements. At the same time it is necessary to embark on efforts towards the solution of other urgent questions so as to ensure a breakthrough in the matter of the cessation of the arms race and to lay the foundations for a real process of disarmament. The fact that the ongoing negotiations on certain questions have for various reasons not been completed cannot be used to justify the postponement of negotiations on other questions.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

In the process of the elaboration of the CPD, attention must be paid to the need to provide for verification of arms limitations and disarmament. Concerning this question we maintain that the agreements on arms limitation and disarmament must provide for an adequate and reliable verification of their implementation so as to ensure compliance with the agreements by all parties. The forms and conditions of the control will depend on the objectives, scope and character of a given agreement. The problems of control must be discussed and solved at the same time as and in organic connection with the negotiations on the concrete disarmament problems and not separately from them.

The experience gained so far shows that national technical means represent a reliable basis for the verification of compliance with the agreements. Various methods of verification and other control procedures should be combined where necessary, including international procedures on a voluntary basis. The strengthening of trust would create favourable conditions for the application of supplementary measures of control.

The primary precondition for the implementation of the various agreed steps in arms limitation and disarmament is the existence of political will on the part of Governments; references to the technical difficulties of verification must not be used as a pretext for avoiding the achievement of agreements on measures for the cessation of the arms race.

We are convinced that the CPD should serve as an impetus for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in this field on the basis of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, and for the resumption and intensive continuation of the negotiations which were under way in recent years and have now been interrupted. It is essential to use more actively all existing channels of negotiations -- multilateral as well as bilateral. Efforts should be made to increase the effectiveness of the work of the only multilateral body for negotiations on disarmament -- the Committee on Disarmament, in particular through the improvement of the organization of its work.

The convening of a world conference on disarmament -- an international forum with the widest possible participation by States -- would be of exceptional significance for the adoption of effective measures on the cessation of the arms race.

The United Nations, which bears a primary responsibility and plays one of the central roles in the matter of disarmament, should encourage all measures in this sphere. It is important that the United Nations should be kept regularly informed of the results of negotiations and on the implementation of the CPD, including all disarmament efforts carried on outside its framework, without detriment to the progress of those negotiations.

A substantial role in the maintenance of the viability and effectiveness of the implementation of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament is played by the conferences for the review of the functioning of these agreements. Taking this useful experience into account, it might be useful to provide for the possibility of a periodic review of the implementation of the CPD.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

Special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament could be convened when necessary.

The CPD must undoubtedly provide for the participation of the public in disarmament efforts.

The world community is called upon to play an important role in the implementation of the CPD.

The United Nations should promote public awareness of the danger of the arms race and all its consequences.

It is important to demonstrate the destructive consequences for humanity that would result from a nuclear war. To this end an authoritative international committee should be established to demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Of great significance in this connection also would be the conduct of a world disarmament campaign, the collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament and the implementation of the principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace. All States should adopt measures prohibiting the propagandizing of war in any form.

The CPD, while meeting the urgent needs of the present is at the same time future-minded. The present generation must not only ensure a peaceful life through the remaining decades of our century but also guarantee humanity's entering the third millennium in conditions of peace and universal security.

Such is the position of the group of socialist States, on behalf of which I am speaking, on the question of the CPD. As has already been underlined above, we are in favour of the division of concrete disarmament measures into stages. In the consideration of this matter in the Ad Hoc Working Group, our delegations there base their approach on this concept of stages. What the tasks of each stage should be and what measures should be included in it form the subject of negotiations in the Working Group. In these negotiations our approach is based, firstly, on the need for the CPD to be implemented within the shortest possible time and, secondly, on the real possibilities for the implementation of the different measures.

The socialist States have already, during this year's proceedings of the Working Group put forward appropriate working papers based on the views expressed in this statement. In doing so we took into account the fact that since the proposals submitted by the Group of 21 largely coincide with the agreed positions of the socialist countries, there was no need for us to submit formulations repeating the proposals of the non-aligned countries. We therefore thought it possible in certain cases to limit ourselves to submitting certain additions to the Group of 21's working papers. The socialist countries intend to continue to take the same constructive part in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and will help speed up to the utmost the process of agreement on a draft CPD and its timely submission by the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): The French delegation would like first of all, Mr. Chairman, to offer you our congratulations and good wishes. It is convinced that under your guidance the Committee will satisfactorily lay the foundations for its work during its fourth annual session. I should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Sani, the distinguished representative of Indonesia, for the great competence and courtesy he showed in conducting our discussions during the concluding phase of our last session. I should at the same time like to offer the Italian delegation my sincere condolences on the death of Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo. We were deeply saddened when we learned the news. I should be grateful to the Italian delegation if it would kindly convey to Mrs. di Montezemolo the respectful sympathy of the French delegation. Lastly, I should like to say to our distinguished colleague from the Netherlands, Ambassador Fein, how much we shall regret his departure. Since the establishment of the Committee, Ambassador Fein has made a particularly valuable contribution to its work. I shall always remember the friendly and for me very valuable co-operation he afforded us. The French delegation offers him its very best wishes for his success in the important tasks he is now to undertake and for his personal happiness.

The session we are inaugurating today will be marked by an important event: the convening, in July next, of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That session will give the international community an opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved in the sphere of disarmament, four years after the recommendations adopted in 1978. This assessment will relate, in particular, to the work of our Committee, which must submit a general report on its activities for that purpose.

Only a few months remain before that event takes place. We can scarcely expect to make extensive progress in such a short time, but it is undoubtedly sufficient for those States that are committed to disarmament to give concrete evidence of their willingness to act and thereby achieve some results in the ongoing negotiations. A feeling of urgency and the pressure of time must play their part, and more particularly the concern, that is common to all of us, to improve the conditions under which the special session will be meeting: we must ensure that trust is re-established and the credibility of the institutional system established in 1978 safeguarded. In this respect, the outcome will be very important for the Committee on Disarmament, the negotiating body and therefore the centre-piece of the entire system.

However, the success of the second special session and the opening up of better prospects for disarmament do not depend solely on the efforts made here or elsewhere in negotiations.

For we are not among those who believe that negotiations on disarmament or arms limitation can be undertaken or make any progress in isolation from the international situation.

Last year and the year before, this situation affected our work. The same is true today. The use of force is continuing in various parts of the world: in the Near East, South-East Asia and Africa. Afghanistan is still occupied by Soviet forces despite repeated international condemnations; those forces have recently been increased. Attacks directed against the civilian population, which have led one Afghan in five to seek refuge abroad, continue.

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

We are still receiving many reports from doctors and humanitarian organizations describing in particular the effects of the bombings on the civilian population, and the mutilations caused by the mines scattered from helicopters. The continued occupation of that traditionally neutral and non-aligned country by Soviet forces cannot but render unattainable the climate of minimum confidence necessary for the successful conclusion of the disarmament negotiations, because it violates the recognized principles of the international community without which no State can enjoy security.

Since our last session, the events in Poland have led to a further deterioration in the international situation. The meeting in Madrid, which is to resume in a few days, will give the Government of France an opportunity to repeat its unequivocal condemnation of the violation of the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki constituted by the repressive measures adopted in Poland following the events of 13 December, with the material and political support of the Soviet Union. Immediately after those events, the ten Ministers of the European Community noted "the serious external pressures and the campaign carried out by the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe against Poland's struggle for renewal".

The reason why we attach so much importance to the events in Poland is that there again the very principles which form the basis of security and co-operation among States are being violated; confidence, which is the essential condition for disarmament, is profoundly shaken by these events.

Thus, we are forced to note with regret that our annual session is once again opening in unfavourable circumstances: a worsening international situation; continued imbalances which jeopardize security; and the acceleration of the arms race.

Taking these factors into account, France, through the words of the President of the Republic, has confirmed its determination to act to bring about, through negotiations, the restoration of balance, in Europe especially, at the lowest possible level.

As for the Committee on Disarmament, the Government of France hopes that the session now beginning will succeed in making real progress towards verifiable agreements, and the French delegation takes this opportunity to reaffirm the high priority it attaches to the negotiations on the subject of chemical weapons.

For whatever the circumstances the Committee on Disarmament must fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the international community. It now has considerable experience and appropriate methods of work. Admittedly, the results of the last session were limited, but substantial work of high quality was accomplished and it constitutes a valuable basis for the resumption of our discussions. In this connection, the French delegation would like to reiterate its appreciation of the work done by the working groups and to thank their chairmen.

Our first concern this year should be to re-establish the four groups which were at work during the two preceding sessions. The principle of such a decision and the choice of chairmen are not, in our view, controversial matters. As for

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

the mandates of those groups, only that of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons need be reconsidered and, in our view, considerably broadened. It should be adapted to the stage already substantially reached in the negotiations; the principle of an appropriate revision of its mandate was in fact agreed upon last year in the Working Group.

As regards the substance of the questions on our agenda and our programme of work, we shall be required, during the current session, to make greater efforts and to work more quickly, owing to the timing of the special session.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament has a special place in our work this year. Indeed, I do not need to stress its importance for the successful outcome of the special session. The French delegation has expressed its view on this matter on many occasions, and in particular at the conclusion of the work of our last session. It will not repeat those views today, but merely express the hope that the work in progress, which has been proceeding very actively, will lead in due course to agreement on a balanced and credible text that takes full account of the many conditions involved in the disarmament process. In view of the urgency of this task, we should organize our work in such a way as to give the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament sufficient time.

The negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons is, in our view, one of the Committee's principal and priority tasks. Substantial difficulties remain, particularly with regard to the scope of application and verification. The solutions to these two problems are interdependent; we ought not, therefore, to wait for agreement to be reached on the scope of application before beginning negotiations on the provisions concerning verification. This is a vital aspect of the convention. We hope that the convention will be discussed in detail during this session, and that sufficient progress will be made in the forthcoming months to enable the Committee to submit tangible results to the General Assembly at its special session in the form of the elements of a future convention.

With regard to the question of radiological weapons, some members of the Committee do not consider this to be a matter of high priority, but it certainly falls within the Committee's mandate; furthermore, the subject may well take on greater importance in the light of possible technological developments. Lastly, this is an example of a case where a specific agreement could prevent the appearance of a new weapon of mass destruction. We therefore consider this the appropriate method for dealing with the problem posed by such weapons.

The difficulties which have hampered the negotiations are the result of the attempts, of which we are all aware, to include in them matters unrelated to their immediate object, for example, matters which involve prejudging the solution of other problems, such as the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, or the solution of problems which fall within another field of international law, such as the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear installations. While it does not deny the importance of these matters, the French delegation would wish the Working Group to keep within the exact terms of its mandate and to reach a conclusion before the special session.

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

With regard to negative security assurances, the French delegation intends to continue its participation in the search for ways of achieving a common approach. It maintains its interest in this question, and it particularly welcomed the adoption of the resolution proposed by Pakistan, which it supported, at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The first two items on our agenda, concerning nuclear questions, have not been discussed in working groups; but last year they were the subject of useful and serious discussions at informal meetings of our Committee. These discussions revealed the complexity of the problems involved and the diversity of views held as regards the prospects for and the organization of negotiations.

In view of the vital importance of the nuclear aspects of disarmament, the French delegation attaches great value to these discussions and feels that they should be continued on the substance of the matter in order to explore the possibilities for progress. It hopes that this session will bring a useful contribution in that direction.

There are two new items on our agenda for this session: the cessation of the arms race in outer space, and our report to the special session.

With regard to outer space, the General Assembly resolution which we co-sponsored calls for priority consideration of the question of anti-satellite systems. We hope that this can be done during the first part of the session.

As for the report we are to submit to the special session, the French delegation considers that it should be different, both in character and purpose, from our annual reports to the General Assembly. We believe that it should provide a picture of the Committee's work, subject by subject, since our first session in 1979.

It should concentrate on the results achieved and, in mentioning the difficulties encountered, should confine itself to a brief analysis without seeking to reflect every discussion and position. Lastly, the report could present whatever conclusions the Committee deems appropriate as regards its future tasks, methods and membership. All in all, we feel, the report should be a fairly simple and brief document. In any case, it would be neither possible nor desirable for us to spend too much time on its preparation.

In conclusion, the French delegation wishes to reaffirm its wholehearted commitment to the goals we are pursuing here; the French Government elected on 10 May attaches high priority to the cause of disarmament. It believes that disarmament is in the interests of the two major objectives of international co-operation -- security, and economic and social progress, particularly for the underprivileged.

We shall endeavour to make our full contribution to that cause.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That completes my list of speakers for today. Before I speak briefly on some pending matters, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, I shall have an opportunity to congratulate you later on, when I shall be taking the floor during our debate. At the present moment, I feel I have to focus the attention of the Committee on the attempts made here to misinterpret the events and facts concerning life in my country and to mislead the members of the Committee as to the role of Poland in the deterioration of the international climate, allegedly causing complications and obstacles in constructive disarmament talks.

The purpose of my intervention is to place it on record that the references in this forum to the totally internal affairs of my country, as well as the false interpretation of the events in my country, serve only as a pretext for diverting attention from the essential and statutory tasks of the Committee and from the recently undertaken, and realized, new course of intensification of armaments.

The raising in this forum of subjects concerning my country's affairs will be regarded by my delegation as a flagrant interference in Poland's internal affairs and, as such, an unfriendly move. I wish to reserve to myself the right to take a position, at a later stage, regarding any interventions which my delegation may recognize as having such a character.

At this moment, and in connection with the contents of the statements made by two delegations, namely, by the distinguished representatives of the Netherlands and France, I should like to limit myself to a very short quotation from the statement made by my Prime Minister during the session of our Parliament on 25 January: "We reject the insinuation that allegedly the decision on instituting martial law was imposed upon us and inspired. Attempts are being made to spread the conviction that a socialist, sovereign country with a one-thousand-year-long history of statehood, a country having a strong army, is a child led by the hand."

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in a number of statements today, and in particular that of the French delegation, slanderous attacks were made on the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegation cannot allow them to pass without comment. We firmly and categorically repudiate the allegations attributing to the Soviet Union responsibility for the introduction of martial law in Poland, as also the insinuations regarding the situation in Afghanistan.

The anti-Polish and anti-Soviet statements made in the Committee today confirm the correctness of the conclusion that the opponents of the détente are now openly trying to disrupt the mutually beneficial trade, scientific and technical, cultural and other relations between European countries which have been established for decades, and to poison the atmosphere wherever negotiations are going on on the most urgent problems of the day -- in Geneva, in Madrid and in Vienna. Imperialist circles are using the campaign they have unleashed against Poland and all the socialist countries as a means of distracting the attention of the peoples of the world from the solution of the most important problems of peace and war and the cessation of the arms race, and as a pretext for going ahead with their military programmes and their plans for the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in western Europe.

That, in our view, is what lies behind the attempts to drag even the Committee on Disarmament into the campaign of slander against socialist Poland. We should like to warn the instigators of confrontation in the Committee that the responsibility for the consequences of this will rest with them.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil). Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Jaipal this morning read out the message addressed to the Committee on Disarmament by Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the opening of the 1982 session of the Committee.

In view of the significance and timeliness of the Secretary-General's views, as expressed in his message, to the conduct of our business during this year's deliberations, I would formally request that the message by Mr. Perez de Cuellar be circulated as an official document of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I am sure that there are no objections to the issuance of the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as an official document of the Committee.

Mr. JESSI (Italy) (translated from French): I shall have an opportunity later, Mr. Chairman, to offer my good wishes to you in your present office. For the moment, I should simply like to say how touched I have been by the expressions of sympathy and the condolences which you yourself, on behalf of the Committee, and the members of the Committee who have spoken today, have kindly extended to my delegation on the sad occasion of the death of Ambassador Vittorio Cordeiro di Montezemolo. I should like to assure you, Mr. Chairman, and all the members of the Committee that I shall faithfully transmit these sentiments and expressions of sympathy to my Government and to the di Montezemolo family.

The CHAIRMAN: As members are aware, the Committee decided at its last session that the ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should resume its work on 11 January. This it did, and it now remains for the Committee to confirm that it may continue its work during the first part of this year's session. It is my understanding that the Committee is in agreement that this Working Group should continue to meet. After consulting the Chairman of the Working Group, I wish to announce that, pending other organizational decisions, the ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will regularly meet on Mondays and Thursdays in the afternoon.

The secretariat has circulated today at my request an informal paper containing a time-table for meetings to be held during the present week. The informal paper, as usual, is merely indicative and subject to changes if the need arises. If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee agrees to the time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: As you know, according to rule 29 of the rules of procedure, "the provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption".

(The chairman)

In conformity with that rule, I have requested the secretariat to circulate Working Paper No. 47, which contains a draft provisional agenda and draft programme of work. At the informal meeting tomorrow at 5 p.m., we shall consider that working paper.

In that connection, may I note that the secretariat has circulated informally today a number of communications received from States non-members of the Committee who wish to participate in our meetings. I intend to submit the relevant draft decisions at our informal meetings, bearing in mind the practice followed by the Committee.

If there are no other comments, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 4 February, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed by the Committee, an informal meeting will be held tomorrow, Wednesday, at 5 p.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Mohammad Jafar Mahallati (Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. H. MATI
Mr. A. TATFAR

Argentina:

Mr. V. BEAUCE
Miss N. MASCHIBENE

Australia:

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss. R. de CLERCQ

Brazil:

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRANOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma:

U HIAUNG HIAUNG GYI
U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. TIAH JIH
Mr. YU MINGLIANG
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba:

Mr. P. MUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY
Mr. A. CHA

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. H.N. FAHY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. de BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. M. NOSTRATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.H. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:
Mr. C.G. MAINA
Mr. D. NANJIRE
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:
Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:
Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands:
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:
Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:
Mr. N. AHMAD
Mr. H. AKRAN
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:
Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:
Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:
Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:
Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:
Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. ANDERSSON
Mr. S. THEOLIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: . Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININ
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom: Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America: Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. LEONARD
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Miss L.M. SHEA
Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Venezuela: Mr. R.R. NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia: Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire: Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In the Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the one hundred and fifty-first plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ALLOSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes first of all to extend to you its warm congratulations on your assumption of the office you are to fill during the month of February, and to assure you of its full co-operation during this period which is of particular importance for the organization of the Committee's activities.

At the same time I wish to associate myself with all the delegations which have expressed their appreciation to Ambassador Sani for the competent manner in which he presided over our work during the preceding period.

Finally, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the warm expressions of esteem which have been addressed to Ambassador Fein. I have had the privilege of witnessing his activity during only a very brief period, but it has nevertheless been long enough for me to appreciate the contribution that he has made to the Committee.

The established practice of prefacing statements in the general debate in the Committee on Disarmament with comments on the international political situation reflects an awareness of the fact that any effort in the very sensitive field of disarmament is affected by the quality of the relations between States and by the climate of confidence, or lack of confidence, among them.

We therefore consider it quite legitimate to refer here to the deep disquiet caused by the recent events in Poland. This is yet another source of tension in addition to other crisis points, particularly that created by the continuing foreign military occupation of Afghanistan. Our intention is not to distract the Committee's attention from the genuine problems of disarmament, but on the contrary to situate the latter in their proper context. Nor can we accept the argument that events of this kind are purely the internal affairs of a State. The principles whose violation my Government has deplored and continues to deplore -- respect for human rights, observance of the right of all peoples to determine their internal and external political status without foreign interference and freely pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development -- these principles are the heritage of the entire international community. In the particular case of Europe, the Final Act of Helsinki, which solemnly binds the 35 signatory countries, indissolubly links the effective respect for those rights with security and the development of normal friendly relations. The Madrid Conference which is to resume its work in a few days' time will allow my Government the opportunity of once again deploring the repressive measures adopted in Poland and of repeating its call for the revocation of such measures.

Even though events such as those I have mentioned are bound to have an adverse effect upon efforts towards disarmament, those efforts must nevertheless be pursued unremittingly and without hesitation.

In this connection I should like to point out that the opening of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament is marked by two elements of potential progress: the resumption of negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and the approach of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The opening last November of bilateral negotiations on medium-range nuclear forces within the framework of the strategic arms control process between the two Powers possessing the largest arsenals, is of great importance. Although the international political climate has deteriorated, these negotiations are continuing.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The Italian Government fully shares the United States' approach in embarking on these negotiations, an approach which was elaborated in the course of intensive consultations among the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

The conclusion of a treaty limiting the number of medium-range nuclear missiles to the lowest possible level, and preferably the "zero level", is an optimum objective, which is entirely in keeping with the nature of the negotiations and the aspirations of the peoples of Europe, especially the younger generations, which have forcefully expressed, wherever they have been free to do so, their deep concern.

The negotiations on medium-range nuclear forces should initiate a process which can be extended to other categories of weapons and to other measures, with the over-all maintenance of a balance of forces and reciprocal security. We hope that bilateral negotiations on the reduction of strategic arms will soon begin and lead to substantial reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will certainly represent a major occasion for taking stock of the achievements of the disarmament effort. The four years of activity of the Committee on Disarmament will represent a significant part of that balance sheet.

At the start of this session, we should ask ourselves how and to what extent our Committee can contribute to the success of the second special session. At the organizational level, our first concern should be to re-establish without delay all the working groups which functioned last year. The question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons can be settled separately, without delaying a decision on the principle of the re-establishment of the Group itself.

Our joint reflection upon the organization and methods of work of the Committee and the search for consensus on the improvements to be made should also be pursued. I should like to take note in this connection of the interesting suggestions made by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Fein, in his statement last Tuesday. As for the substance of the items to be placed on our agenda, the Committee should above all pursue the consideration of the nuclear questions, and give them the priority they deserve.

While recognizing the real difficulties standing in the way of the conclusion of a verifiable treaty completely banning nuclear tests, I would not wish to miss this opportunity of reaffirming the importance which my Government attaches to that objective. It is an element of what must be a broader approach; but nevertheless a particularly significant element which the international community has for many years singled out, and to which it rightly attributes the highest degree of urgency. We remain convinced that the Committee and the Group of seismic experts can provide a practical counterpart to the efforts made by the States parties to the trilateral negotiations. We are prepared to support any solution at the organizational level which is likely to advance our work, including the setting up of a working group.

We believe that the work of the Group of seismic experts is of very great practical importance. That is why, in our plenary statement on 13 August 1961, we referred to the desirability of broadening the Group's mandate to enable it to discuss the substance of the question of the identification of seismic events.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Another priority subject on which our Committee should make a decisive contribution is that of chemical weapons. The Committee ought to be in a position to provide, at the time of the second special session, proof that its negotiating capacity is equal to the task entrusted to it. To that end, we must embark on a new stage in our negotiations and begin the drafting of a convention on the basis of the elements worked out last year.

At its thirty-sixth session the General Assembly renewed, by a significant majority, the mandate conferred upon the Secretary-General to carry out an impartial investigation, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts, concerning the alleged use of chemical weapons in different parts of the world. At a time when respect for certain international agreements and the pertinent rules of customary international law is called into question, it seems to us more urgent than ever to complete the system of measures prohibiting an entire category of particularly odious weapons of mass destruction with a treaty on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons and on the destruction of stocks of such weapons, which would eliminate once and for all any danger of their use.

All the delegations which have spoken so far have expressed their conviction that a revision of the Working Group's mandate is justified. A formulation must be found on which a consensus is possible. The final report of the Working Group for the 1981 session contains, in the section entitled "Recommendations and conclusions", useful suggestions for solving this problem.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will be one of the key elements of the forthcoming special session, must also be given an important place in our work.

Italy, as one of the sponsors of General Assembly resolution 2602 E, adopted in 1969, which lies at the basis of today's negotiations, hopes that the second special session will mark the completion of the work begun more than 12 years ago. During the month of January the Working Group, which has the benefit of the experienced and distinguished guidance of Ambassador García Robles, began discussions which have proved extremely useful, if somewhat unbalanced owing to the very stinting participation of one group of delegations. The statement made by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia on 2 February last serves in part to fill this gap: we are awaiting the further development of the ideas he put forward, particularly as concerns the questions of the nature of the Comprehensive Programme, the division and duration of the phases, the transition from one phase to the next, the machinery for the review of the implementation of the programme, and so forth.

Allow me to say that my delegation, while remaining open to solutions which may be found by common agreement, continues to prefer a comprehensive programme divided into three phases. Each of the phases would include various measures on the basis of a functional criterion. The first phase would thus include the measures considered necessary to halt the arms race, with the maintenance of security levels undiminished. The third and final phase would consist of the measures for the complete elimination of arms and armed forces; while the middle phase would comprise the measures necessary to link the point of departure to the point of arrival, that is to say, measures providing for the gradual, balanced reduction of the different types of arms and armed forces. A more detailed breakdown of this structure -- into sub-phases, for example -- could be carried out by review conferences or other review machinery set up to monitor and promote the implementation of the comprehensive programme.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Other important questions traditionally appear on the Committee's agenda and will doubtless continue to appear thereon. My delegation intends to use the time set aside specifically for the consideration of those items to give its views on them. However, I should like to take this opportunity to express the hope that this year a suitable place will be given in the agenda and programme of work of the Committee for a new item concerning further measures to be adopted to prevent an arms race in outer space.

One of the special features of the discussions at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly was, in fact, the interest shown in the problems of arms control and disarmament in outer space. The many speeches made on this subject highlighted the conviction that the international community should urgently take further efforts to prevent an arms race in this new sphere of man's activity.

This interest led to the adoption of two resolutions which, for the first time, indicate the General Assembly's desire that the Committee on Disarmament should deal with this question, which is wholly in keeping with paragraph 80 of the Final Document.

Resolution 36/97 C, of which Italy was a sponsor, in its paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament "to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space". It would be perfectly appropriate to envisage an initial exchange of views, in plenary, during this part of the session.

After such a survey or preliminary consideration of this very complex and sensitive issue, we shall be in a better position to decide on the most suitable procedures for taking concrete steps to follow up the discussions in the General Assembly. The rapid development of space technology in recent years raises clear and precise threats: some applications are no longer in the domain of scientific hypothesis but have already begun to be included in military arsenals. These must be identified, and efforts must be made to remedy this situation through the speedy negotiation of concrete, verifiable and effective measures.

That, in our view, is the meaning of the request made by the General Assembly to the Committee, the multilateral negotiating body in matters of disarmament, and the role which it could play in this field.

It would be vain to think it possible to resolve at once and effectively all the problems involved in the prevention of an arms race in space by means of some few articles of a treaty of a general character. Such an approach would merely delay our efforts and draw us away from our objective.

In this connection resolution 36/97 C, to which I have already referred, suggests the path to be followed: in its paragraph 4 the Committee on Disarmament is requested "to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems, as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives set out in paragraph 3 above".

It is generally acknowledged that the most threatening development, and the one that calls for the most immediate action, is the development of anti-satellite weapons systems. If this development were to remain uncontrolled, the basis for an arms race in outer space would already exist. This prospect should spur us to make a determined effort to avert, before it is too late, the real and immediate risks which exist in this field.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, my delegation joins others in congratulating you upon your accession to the Chair. Our first formal and informal meetings have already permitted us to appreciate the courtesy and fairness with which you preside over our work. My delegation is looking forward to working under your guidance. We are confident that we will all benefit from the earnest and noble objectives which you bring to your high office. My delegation also recalls with gratitude the exceptional contribution which our previous Chairman, Ambassador Anwar Sani, made to our work.

From the vast array of topics that are of immediate relevance to this session of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to select only three for this initial statement. I intend to touch briefly upon the political environment in which we commence our work, on some aspects of the chemical weapons problem, and finally on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

This Committee is convening at the half-way mark between the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and its second special session devoted to disarmament. It is wise at this juncture to assess both the tasks ahead, in view of the forthcoming special session, and our past record in the bilateral and multilateral fields. I need not be specific. Looking through the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, we must all acknowledge that only fragments of the Programme of Action set out in that document have been achieved. Naturally, there are praiseworthy achievements, like the United Nations Convention on particularly inhumane weapons, and many other concrete steps and elements. But the remaining challenges are formidable; the lack in our achievement is all too manifest. In this situation it is useless to attribute blame and level accusations. Indeed, it is now more important to look at the state of attainment of our work, unsatisfactory as it may be, and to plan ahead in a sober fashion, assessing the possibilities of what can be done in the few remaining months. Work in the Committee on Disarmament must be concentrated on essential items, and procedural debates must be cut to the bare minimum. We must all make an extraordinary effort not to come to the second special session on disarmament empty-handed, but we must remain realistic in terms of attainable goals.

Realism is also the key word for the second special session itself. Lofty objectives must be measured against reality; review and appraisal of achievements in the past period must lead to careful planning for the next few years. Reasonable prospects for concrete results within this period will have to take precedence over the promulgation of over-ambitious ideas.

While the Committee on Disarmament is an autonomous international forum, the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly has, of course, an important bearing upon the work of this session. Apart from other relevant results the General Assembly, in one important new field, namely, measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, has given this Committee a new and significant assignment which my delegation is looking forward to debating at an early point as a follow-up to resolution 36/97 C, of which my country was a sponsor.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Turning now to the larger political environment in which we have to work, my delegation joins others in expressing grave preoccupation with the international security situation. We all agree that the chances for substantial progress towards arms control and disarmament depend, essentially, on confidence among States and a consistent policy of restraint and moderation in the pursuit of external interests.

Yet we cannot but state that there is a further substantial deterioration in East-West relations, and the climate of confidence has been seriously affected.

Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan continues unabated in defiance of the condemnation by an overwhelming majority of the international community, as repeatedly evidenced in resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

There are no indications of a change in the attitude of the Soviet Union, which is responsible for this violation of the principle of self-determination and non-use of force in international relations.

On the contrary, there are signs that military repression in Afghanistan is on the increase, causing the suffering of an untold number of victims, especially among the rural population. My delegation has taken note with the utmost concern of reports concerning the use of chemical agents.

Another more recent event has shaken the basis of mutual confidence and the prospects for peaceful co-operation.

Obviously, I refer to the imposition of martial law in Poland. Its consequences and repercussions signify a clear breach of the Final Act of Helsinki. What has happened in Poland is not just an internal affair. On the contrary, the violation of the 1975 Helsinki document, of fundamental human rights and of the international legislation of the ILO make the tragedy of the Polish people a matter of legitimate concern for the entire international community.

The responsibility for this breach of international commitments and for the decision to reverse the process of renewal and reform in Poland lies with the Polish military authorities, but no less with the Soviet Union.

What has happened in Poland is more than just a turbulence in political atmospheric conditions: it reveals a general unwillingness to respect the principles of human rights, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Final Act of Helsinki, and to accept peaceful evolution.

Contrary to assurances given by the Polish military régime, there have been no signs of improvement. A long shadow falls on the prospects for the arms control process. Inevitably, the security climate in Europe is directly affected. It is imperative that the climate of confidence be restored. Confidence is a prime prerequisite for our very task as negotiators in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

My Government, in full agreement with the Final Act of Helsinki, has repeatedly urged the Polish leaders to lift martial law in order to re-establish the Polish people's civil rights, to release those who are arrested and to resume a genuine dialogue with the Catholic Church and legitimate representatives of the independent trade union in Poland. We also request that Poland be enabled to solve its problems autonomously and without external interference.

If these overriding requirements are met, mutual confidence will revive and the prospects for progress in terms of concrete results in disarmament and arms control will be substantially enhanced.

Grave as the events in Poland are, they are not the only threats to the international security climate. The military balance in Europe still gives rise to undiminished concern.

The Federal Republic of Germany therefore welcomes the fact that the negotiations here in Geneva between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces have been resumed after the Christmas recess. We are convinced that a positive outcome of these negotiations will contribute to greater international stability and progress in other arms control endeavours. We fully support the far-reaching American proposal -- thoroughly prepared within the Western Alliance -- aiming at a zero level outcome for all land-based intermediate nuclear missiles on both sides.

A treaty which honours this unique offer would eliminate the weapons category of greatest concern. We feel that such an outcome would be the most promising and tangible way of strengthening international peace and security. We welcome the commitment on both sides to spare no effort to reach agreement. In the same spirit, my Government attaches a high value to continued negotiations in this Committee.

Turning to the second part of my intervention, I should like to highlight once more the importance which my delegation attaches to the question of chemical weapons. In my country, a comprehensive chemical weapons prohibition is a matter of concern not only to the Government but to all political parties represented in the German Bundestag. On 3 December 1981, the Federal Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution urging the immediate conclusion of a chemical weapons convention to operate under effective international control.

Looking at the achievements of the Committee during its 1981 session -- and that means at the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons -- we can pride ourselves on having produced, under the efficient leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, a considerable degree of specificity in what comes very near to being treaty language. However, progress is so far less apparent in the field of verification. But verification is the centrepiece on which the ultimate success of our negotiations depends and on which, therefore, we should focus particular attention during this year's debate.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Experience of agreements lacking a proper verification mechanism, such as the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, stresses the need for a comprehensive solution to this question.

My delegation has on many occasions set out its views on the essentials of an effective international verification system. Let me just recapitulate:

Verification must follow a regular, pre-established procedure so as to be non-discriminatory and take place in a businesslike and co-operative atmosphere;

It must provide for impartial investigations into events which require clarification; and

It must protect legitimate economic interests.

In order to advance work in this direction, my delegation will, during this session, introduce a working paper which will set out in greater detail the mechanisms and procedures which are, in our view, necessary for an effective verification of a chemical weapons convention. This working paper will, inter alia, specifically deal with the problems of binary weapons. In particular, we intend to propose a way whereby -- contrary to certain allegations that the non-production of binary weapons is not verifiable -- verification can also be extended to and include binary weapons.

The vital contribution of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament need not be underscored. From the documents it appears evident that the Committee on Disarmament must come to terms with the CPD issue, and that at least a negotiable text, with or without a limited number of alternative options on specific problems, must be ready for the larger New York audience by the time this Committee winds up its spring session. The matter is urgent, and the credibility of this Committee is at stake.

The CPD Working Group which met through most of January has done good work and, while no firm results are in sight on most issues, it has deepened the insight and understanding of all delegations concerned. My delegation is grateful to the participants and to the Working Group's Chairman, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. The work accomplished in January allows us to identify the areas where consensus is well within reach, and, conversely, those areas where major controversies loom which we must jointly settle in the next few weeks.

From the viewpoint of one of the sponsors of document CD/205, the only complete draft programme before the Committee at this time, my delegation is under the impression that the following three issues of principle have arisen and need creative negotiating in a spirit of compromise:

1. Nature of the CPD

It is obvious that the CPD will need a mode of adoption and promulgation commensurate with its overriding significance for the success of the second special session on disarmament. It must, at the same time, correspond to

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its basic purpose as a politically relevant framework for a comprehensive negotiating process. It is, however, equally obvious that an instrument of this kind is unsuitable for a normal process of international ratification. Even the advocates of a "legally binding" CPD have so far been unable to show how this binding effect could technically be achieved. Our search for an adequate solution in the spirit of compromise should therefore go in the direction of endowing the CPD, when adopted by the General Assembly at its second special session, with a special degree of solemnity in order to raise political commitment. My delegation is ready to help in the search for such modalities in a positive and constructive way. You will recall that the sponsors of document CD/205 have proposed the inclusion of a paragraph in the resolution to which the CPD would be annexed, "calling upon all States to declare that they will respect the objectives, principles and priorities set out in the programme and express their firm will and determination to implement the programme through the negotiation of specific and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements."

2. Designation of disarmament measures

One major difference between the catalogue of measures proposed in CD/205 and the corresponding catalogue proposed by the Group of 21 in CD/223 is the degree of specificity. There is also a basic difference in approach. In most instances, when document CD/223 describes a particular negotiation measure, the tenor of the description already implies the desired outcome of these very negotiations. It does not limit itself to indicating the main thrust of negotiations, but anticipates detailed results, thereby prejudging the future decisions of Governments and negotiators. I submit that this is a dangerous course, since no delegation is in a position at this time to predict the outcome of future negotiations and since nobody can reasonably and responsibly declare himself bound in great detail over what may easily be a time-span covering 20 years or more. In most cases this approach also runs counter to the agreed "Elements" of the CPD as adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This document makes it clear that the CPD should only constitute a framework for substantive negotiations, but should not substitute itself for results that require a concrete negotiation process.

My delegation is under the urgent impression that this approach begs the question and will not be conducive to consensus on any list of disarmament measures. It is perfectly legitimate for each delegation and regional group to attach specific objectives and hopes to a given negotiation item; but it would be futile to press such individual views on all potential partners to a negotiation right from the beginning. Realistically, a consensus on the list of measures will be achieved only if all delegations agree to couch their particular predilections in shorter and more neutral language, taking a cue from the "Elements" of the CPD as adopted by the Disarmament Commission.

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5. Calendar of events

While both the western and the non-aligned groups of countries appear to structure the CPD in terms of several phases, there is a marked tendency on the part of the authors of CD/223 to provide for a tightly planned negotiation calendar with detailed prescriptions as to what should be negotiated and achieved in later stages, quite independently from the outcome of preceding negotiation phases. In the Working Group, the co-sponsors of CD/205 have pointed out in detail why this sequence of several phases has little potential for becoming operational. This criticism should not be construed as a flat refusal to accept a rational structure of the CPD process over time. The contrary is true. No doubt, there must be a dynamic time function build into the CPD. But in the view of my delegation, this structural element must be found rather in the periodicity of review meetings than in the magic and automatism of a calendar which future events could render useless and futile. My delegation is open as to the number and rhythm of such reviews.

Review meetings with their accompanying public attention and dynamic impact will certainly do more to maintain the momentum of the multilateral and bilateral negotiating process, each time, than a mechanical calendar of negotiating assignments which, if overtaken by reality, would embarrass its former authors. Let me therefore submit that the calendar issue, one of the most important points of controversy in the negotiations on a CPD, needs a fresh and unbiased approach, a new injection of realism, to yield useful results. Maybe the time has come to go back to our common point of departure, that is, to start anew from the agreed text of the Elements, and to examine how they can best serve to work out satisfactory solutions.

Let me pass on to, and conclude with, a more general remark on the CPD. In our view, the comprehensive programme can develop an impact on multilateral and bilateral disarmament only if the international community can truly rally behind it. Negotiations can get under way and yield results only if the framework in which they are to be imbedded meets the security interests of all concerned. There must be a constant incentive to abide by the programme and to realize its potential fully on a step-by-step basis. This incentive function will be lost if participants come to consider it as unrealistic. In the end, the worth of the CPD will be measured not by the degree of noble intentions embodied in it, but by the real momentum it creates and by the negotiations which it facilitates and fosters. On the human level, I could well sympathize with those who, suffering from the frustrations of an excruciatingly slow movement in world disarmament affairs, want to go on record with an ideal CPD, showing the elevated nature of their own feelings and projections. That, alas, would not help us to get on with the arms control issues on hand. The key word is credibility. Only a CPD which keeps attainable goals and schedules in mind can meet this test. For my Government, arms control and disarmament rank high on the priority scale. It will endeavour to make its contribution to the CPD in this very spirit, and beyond that, unceasingly work for peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Japanese delegation I wish to express my warm congratulations to you as our new Chairman for the month of February. I wish to express also my equally warm compliments to Ambassador Seni who has served us so effectively and conscientiously since the month of August last year. May I also extend a very cordial welcome to our new colleagues around this table.

May I present my sincere condolences to the Italian delegation and through them to the family of the late Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo. I shall miss the Ambassador all the more because we have been neighbours in this Committee and I have had the pleasure of sitting next to him on many occasions during the past two years.

In saying goodbye to our esteemed colleague, Ambassador Fein, I cannot but express my delegation's respects to him, and our deep appreciation of the outstanding contribution he has made to the work of this Committee during his four years in Geneva.

Only a few months lie ahead of us before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be convened in New York. And as we begin our work in the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament, I cannot help stressing the role and the responsibility of this Committee in contributing to the success of that special session.

Under our Constitution, which is dedicated to the cause of peace and the three non-nuclear principles -- not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan -- the fundamental policy of Japan has been to avoid becoming a militarily significant State and to devote its national energy and resources towards world peace and prosperity. We have been consistently adhering to this policy for the past 36 years, since the end of the war -- supported by the strong aspiration towards world peace and stability that has been nurtured among the Japanese people over those years.

The Japanese people are convinced that arms control and disarmament can play and should play a substantial role in building and achieving peace and stability in this world. In this sense, arms control and disarmament are matters of genuine national concern. Indeed, Japan considers that arms control and disarmament should be matters of world-wide concern, and the nation is united in praying that this is the case.

However, when we look around ourselves, we find that, quite contrary to our aspirations, the world in which we live, the actual international situation, is deteriorating year by year. What is happening in Poland is seriously affecting the

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international situation as a whole, and Japan hopes that the disturbing state of affairs in that country can be normalized as soon as possible. Japan also has strong apprehensions that the current course of events there will even further destroy what remains of mutual trust among nations -- the very foundation for disarmament negotiations.

On the other hand, the monumental accumulation of nuclear weapons and the interminable arms race continue unabated. This agonizing trend, coupled with the aggravating international political situation, is of grave concern to the peoples of the world and we simply cannot stand aside, doing nothing. This is why the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly is commanding such strong interest and expectations among the Japanese people and indeed the peoples of other countries as well. The Japanese nation is determined to spare no efforts in order to lead the second special session on disarmament to a successful conclusion.

In his opening address on 25 January 1982 at the current regular session of the National Diet, Prime Minister Suzuki himself indicated his intention to attend the special session and stated the following:

"There is no hope for human happiness if East and West continue to vie with each other in accumulating armaments. We must face reality and recognize that it is the balance of power that sustains peace and stability; we must work to maintain that balance. At the same time we must continue our efforts to hold this balance at as low a level as possible.

"The issue of disarmament and arms control is one which the whole world should work for together, and true peace will be unattainable unless we direct the surplus resources generated by disarmament to co-operation with the developing countries and the development of the world economy.

"The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament this June will be a timely opportunity for the further strengthening of such international efforts."

This keen interest in the second special session is by no means limited to the Japanese Government. A non-partisan group of members of the Diet, over 200 strong, which formed the Parliamentary Association for the Promotion of International Disarmament in May last year, is actively preparing for the special session. A large number of Japanese non-governmental organizations are busily engaged in a wide range of activities in preparation for the special session, and are planning to send a large group of their representatives to New York to observe and to address the special session, as was the case in 1978 when the first special session was held.

The Committee on Disarmament has to respond to the expectations of our people. But the time at our disposal is limited. In order to be able to contribute

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to making the forthcoming special session a truly meaningful exercise, our Committee must make good use of the 11 or 12 weeks we have at our disposal and try to achieve maximum success under the circumstances.

In the first place, the Committee should limit its discussion of procedural matters to the minimum and embark on substantive matters at the earliest possible date.

With regard to subsidiary bodies, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should naturally resume its work immediately.

The CPD Working Group has already been meeting since early January under the distinguished chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles, and these extra meetings have proved to be very useful. The elaboration of a CPD is of course an extremely complicated and difficult task, and with regard to both the various measures to be incorporated in it and the establishment of so-called "stages" or "phases", my delegation feels that it would be wiser to avoid too ambitious an approach and to try to draft a programme that would be feasible and workable. It goes without saying that work in this Working Group should be pursued as a matter of priority, considering the fact that the adoption of a CPD is one of the principal objectives of the special session.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was able to make substantial progress last year under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Lidgard, and this is an additional reason for my delegation to continue to urge that its mandate be revised to enable it to make even further progress this year. However, the drafting of a new mandate should by no means be allowed to become an obstacle to the continuation of the substantive work of the Working Group; therefore, while we discuss the text of such a new mandate, the Working Group should on a temporary basis recommence its work under the previous mandate.

Turning to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, the problems at issue were boiled down to a considerable extent under the conscientious chairmanship of Ambassador Kónives of Hungary. This Working Group should avail itself of the approaching special session of the General Assembly to generate a momentum to wind up its work with despatch. It was proposed last year that a prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear facilities should be incorporated into the text of the radiological weapons convention: this problem is of great interest to my country. The realistic approach to solving our difficulties would be to devise some other formula -- a separate instrument of some kind -- to deal exclusively with this matter. If it could be thus disentangled from the radiological weapons convention, the drafting of the latter could theoretically be speeded up. Once that convention is out of the way we would be free to devote greater attention and efforts to the more urgent matters, such as nuclear disarmament.

As to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, my delegation feels that a much greater degree of understanding was achieved last year on the various

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concepts involved, thanks to the painstaking efforts of Mr. Ciarrapico of Italy, and we think this Working Group should be allowed to continue its work under the mandate it had last year.

In addition to these four working groups, the Japanese delegation wishes to call once again for the establishment of a new working group on a comprehensive test ban, in order that we may work effectively for the realization of a CTB. I very sincerely hope that a consensus may be reached in the Committee on this matter. I am well aware that the setting up of a working group is not the only way of addressing any specific item in our Committee. However, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is of paramount importance; and it is a concrete and tangible proposal. That is why my delegation is of the view that the question of a CTB should be dealt with systematically and with concentration — and the most effective way of doing so would be, in our view, in a special working group established for that purpose.

In accordance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly last year, this year the Committee on Disarmament is also to consider further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. My Government has a deep interest in this question and my delegation hopes to be able to make a positive contribution to our discussions on this item.

Before concluding, I wish to welcome the recent opening of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces. Those two States have begun these important talks in spite of the deterioration in the international situation in recent years, and they are all the more to be commended. Although the negotiations are perforce taking place outside the Committee on Disarmament, they are being held in this same city of Geneva. Their progress can have salutary effects on multilateral negotiations in our Committee -- at least this delegation certainly hopes so. And so we express the hope that the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States will be gracious enough to inform this Committee from time to time, and as they see fit, of the progress they are making in their bilateral negotiations. My delegation also looks forward with great anticipation to the early commencement of the other set of bilateral negotiations -- those on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons -- which will be of such vital importance to us all.

In concluding, I wish to repeat our earnest hope that the Committee on Disarmament will approach its work during this session with a full recognition of its great responsibility vis-à-vis the approaching second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation is determined to make its utmost contribution to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Czechoslovak delegation has come to the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament with clear instructions from its Government to engage in business-like and constructive negotiations in this important and, as yet, the only international forum for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on global disarmament questions.

At its thirty-sixth session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted nearly a score of resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament. It may be said without overstatement that the Committee is faced with a colossal task if it is honourably to discharge all its duties.

In these circumstances, every effort must be made to set about substantive work without delay and to organize the entire activity of the Committee in such a way that literally every minute is spent usefully. The delegation of Czechoslovakia notes with great satisfaction that it is precisely in this way that you, Mr. Chairman, intend to organize our work. In your efforts to achieve positive results in the Committee's activities, as I already had the opportunity of saying in my earlier address, the delegation of Czechoslovakia will give you its full support.

We wish to support you not merely with words. At the first plenary meeting of the Committee, the Czechoslovak delegation presented the agreed position of the group of socialist States on the question of the contents of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I should like to remind you that in conformity with paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 36,92 F, the Committee on Disarmament should complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and submit the programme in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, which is to open in only 122 days' time. This is our concrete contribution to the performance of one of the many tasks facing the Committee. The delegations of the socialist countries are prepared to take a similarly constructive approach to the discussion of the other agenda items. This is fully in keeping with General Assembly resolution 36,92 D, adopted on the initiative of Czechoslovakia, which, in its second operative paragraph, "calls upon member States to be guided in all disarmament negotiations by the generally recognized principles of international law and to submit and constructively to consider, with full responsibility and in the spirit of co-operation, proposals and initiatives aimed at promoting speedy progress in disarmament negotiations and facilitating the achievement of mutually acceptable concrete disarmament measures". I should like to believe that other delegations, too, intend together with us to seek solutions for the problems before us and to present concrete results to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

We deeply regret the fact that the delegation of some countries are seeking to divert the Committee's attention from the conduct of constructive and fruitful negotiations and to entangle us in sterile political confrontations. Attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in this forum are out of place, and call for unmitigated censure. The delegations which have decided to follow that path should realize that they thereby jeopardize the Committee's performance of the tasks facing it, for which they must bear the full responsibility. As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, said yesterday when receiving representatives of the consultative council of the socialist international for disarmament "... diplomacy calls not for entangling situations but for disentangling them. The Gordian knot of conflict situations and controversial issues in the world today cannot be cut with any sword. The sole path to that end is the path of patient and constructive negotiations, negotiations ensuring the genuine reduction and elimination of weapons".

Allow me to recall one more provision of General Assembly resolution 36/92 D to which I referred earlier, in which the General Assembly calls on States "... not to hinder possible progress in negotiations on disarmament by the discussion of unrelated issues".

Despite the fact that the statements of a number of delegations on Tuesday and today, particularly that of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, contained attempts to disrupt the normal course of the Committee's work, it is nevertheless to be hoped that this the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament will embark without undue delay on the business-like discussion of the items on its agenda. We do not doubt that this is the wish of the overwhelming majority of delegations in the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: As is usually done at each plenary meeting held on Thursdays, I have requested the secretariat to circulate an informal paper containing a time-table for meetings to be held during the coming week. In addition to the two weekly meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on Monday and Thursday afternoons, it is suggested that two informal meetings of the Committee be held to continue consideration of the questions listed in the informal paper. Those meetings would be held on Wednesday afternoon and Friday morning. If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee agrees with the time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no other comments, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 9 February, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed by the Committee, an informal meeting will be held tomorrow, Friday, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 9 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI

(Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. V. BEAUGE
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADDLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. RAEYMAEKERS
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss R. DE CLERCQ

Brazil: Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. YU MINGLIANG
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. J. MOPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. M. NOSTRATI

Italy: Mr. E. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. T. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C.G. IAINA
Mr. D. NANJIRE
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. H. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. G. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. ANDERSSON
Mr. S. THEOLIN
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININ
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUCHIN
Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. E.V. ROSTOW
Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. LEONARD
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Miss L.M. SHEA
Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the one hundred and fifty-second plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament and now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Eugene Rostow, who has come to Geneva to address the Committee today.

Mr. ROSTOW (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, being in this beautiful room is always a moving and a chastening experience. The memories of many battles lost and won hover in the air, reminding us that good intentions are not enough. It is an honour for me to be here today and I thank you for your welcome. My delegation looks forward to a constructive and fruitful month in the Committee under your chairmanship. We wish you success in these undertakings and I pledge the support and co-operation of the United States delegation over the coming month. I should also like to add a word of appreciation on behalf of our delegation for the manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, carried out his demanding duties during the month of August.

Many of you present today participated in the meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly last fall, at which I presented the position of the United States. I shall try not to repeat here what I said on that occasion. But a certain degree of repetition is inevitable in the interest of continuity and desirable in the interest of emphasis. For that I apologize, Mr. Chairman, and ask you and my other colleagues to forgive me.

Before the First Committee, I noted the abiding support of the United States for the work of the Committee on Disarmament. That Committee has taken one practical step after another to reduce the danger of war, and particularly of nuclear war. We can all draw resolve as well as pride from this record, which has given a powerful impetus to the arms control movement in general and to the role which the Committee, and its predecessors, have played in the diplomacy which led the nations to a series of agreements: the limited test-ban Treaty of 1963; the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of 1968; the sea-bed arms control Treaty of 1971; the biological weapons Convention of 1972; and the environmental modification Convention of 1977.

The Committee on Disarmament is unusual among multilateral organizations both in its mandate and in its methods of work. Its objective is not only to exhort nations but to develop consensus looking to realistic action on the matters which come before it.

In noting the importance of the Committee's work I do not wish to be misunderstood. The Committee cannot and should not force consensus where none exists. A willingness to compromise on non-essentials is one of the most vital and appealing qualities of democracy; it is the basis for social and political life in democratic societies. It is equally important to the possibility of international co-operation. The United Nations exists, after all, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of the Member States in seeking to attain the purposes of the Charter. But compromise on non-essentials cannot and must not mean submerging fundamental differences. The Charter is founded on the principle of respect for the equal rights of nations large and small. Consensus should never be sought by asking any nation to sacrifice its fundamental and inherent rights.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

While it may seem paradoxical, the way toward consensus can often be eased by a frank and thorough airing of differences. And, where consensus is not possible, a clear understanding of why this is the case can make an important contribution to eventual agreement. For this reason among others, the United States will not hesitate to set forth its views on the controversial issues with which this Committee deals. We expect others to be equally frank. I assure you that in developing our future positions we shall give respectful attention to views which differ from our own.

In the spirit of that precept, I should like now to direct attention to the key relationship between the state of world politics and a number of arms control projects which are, or should be on our agenda. The arms control effort, after all, is an integral part of world politics. It should be a formative influence in the process of world politics and a catalyst for peace. But the converse of that sentence is also true. At any given moment, the state of world politics can all too easily frustrate and overwhelm the potentialities of arms control. That is the challenge faced by all who are working in the cause of peace today.

In my remarks last fall before the First Committee, I made the point that there is a certain unreality in the traditional discussion of many perennial items on the arms control agenda of the General Assembly and of this Committee. The reason for this tone of other-worldliness, I said, is that it has become the habit of the United Nations to ignore the central issue in any objective study of the problem of peace -- the declining influence of Article 2(4) of the Charter on the behaviour of States. This momentous sentence is necessarily the first commandment of the Charter. It forbids the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Its prohibition is qualified only by the "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defence, protected categorically by Article 51 and by the powers of the Security Council.

Yet the last two decades and especially the last decade have witnessed a rising tide of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggressions -- actions which have involved the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States in every part of the world. From south-east Asia to the Caribbean, State after State is under threat or under actual attack. Unprovoked aggressions occur without even the pretext of the excuse of self-defence. Armed bands and terrorists cross political boundaries with impunity to assault the political independence of States.

The habit of shameful silence or impotent protest in the face of aggression has many consequences, all bad. Perhaps the most insidious in the long run is its impact on international law. Law reflects the pattern of behaviour which a society deems right. Legal norms can survive if they are not perfectly or instantly obeyed, so long as society seeks to enforce them and does so effectively in the end. But when the breach of declared legal norms becomes the rule rather than the exception; when a society gives up any serious efforts to insist that its legal norms be obeyed, those declarations cease to be norms in any meaningful sense, and become no more than pious platitudes. I ask you to look at a globe and count the number of places where war is raging in violation of Article 2(4), and then consider whether our failure to defend that article strictly and impartially is not in fact repealing it as a constitutional principle for the society of nations.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

In the view of the United States, this question should be the first item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. If Article 2(4) should become a dead letter, the quest for disarmament would be a quixotic and Utopian activity. These are not words I use in a pejorative sense. The spirit of Cervantes and St. Thomas More are indispensable to civilization. Even so, we want arms control to be more than a dream, more than an aspiration. With the world in a state of anarchy, the effort to negotiate arms control agreements would cease to be a practical way for reinforcing and safeguarding peace. It would be nothing more than a despairing protest of the human spirit, a *cri du coeur*, expressing man's yearning for reason and decency in a world which was becoming more irrational and more menacing every day.

Driven as they are by fear or by the lust for power, large and small nations rush to arm, although they continue to recite the litany of disarmament and arms control. It is no wonder, under such circumstances, that we have achieved no significant arms control agreements or arms reduction agreements for nearly 10 years.

The basic cause of the declining influence of Article 2(4) in world affairs, and the corresponding eclipse of arms control, is the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union and the extraordinary military build-up on which it is based.

Soviet propaganda recognizes that the world lives under threat, but it proclaims that the threat to the peace is caused by a supposed "arms race", which takes the form of a Western effort to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union and then start a nuclear war. There is no arms race. The history of the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is clear for all to see. For many years after 1945, the Soviet Union had larger conventionally-armed forces than the United States, and the United States had larger nuclear forces. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union continued to increase both its conventional and its nuclear forces, while the United States remained stable in the nuclear sphere and reduced its conventional forces. The United States did not race. On the contrary, it accepted what it described as an effort by the Soviet Union to attain parity and equality, a place in the sun, recognized status as a great power. Once the Soviet Union reached equality, many people in the West believed it would end its military build-up and settle down to peaceful co-existence under the rules of the Charter.

No one in the West can accept such views now. The Soviet Union has attained military parity with the United States by any measure, yet it continues to build its armed forces and to expand its empire by means of force.

In response, the United States, its allies, and many other nations have reluctantly undertaken the burden of modernizing their armed forces in a belated effort to restore the military balance.

The Soviet Union does not initiate all the turbulence in the world. A great deal occurs without benefit of Soviet intervention. But the Soviet Union does exploit and manipulate regional turbulence in the interest of enlarging its sphere of dominance. And the Soviet example tempts other States to commit aggression also, hoping for the immunity from effective response which the Soviet Union has thus far enjoyed in its imperial adventures.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

Soviet expansion is not a marginal nuisance at the periphery of world politics. It is, on the contrary, one of the dominant elements determining the course of events. Soviet expansionism seeks to destroy the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends. In that quest, the Soviet drive has gone too far. It has produced a wave of fear which will become a wave of panic unless we move promptly and effectively to restore Article 2(4) as part of the living law of international politics.

It is the conviction of the United States that the time has come for the peoples of the world and their Governments to demand that the Soviet Union accept the only possible rule of true détente, that of scrupulous respect for the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the international use of force.

When that view is explained to Soviet representatives, they sometimes respond that we are asking them to give up a foreign policy "rooted in their nature as a society and a State". To that claim, the United States replies that we recognize the right of the Soviet Union to preach the creed of Communism at will and in perfect freedom. No democracy could ever consider a different position. What we cannot accept -- what the State system cannot tolerate -- is the thesis that the Soviet Union has a special -- and exclusive -- right to spread its faith by the sword. No United Nations body, no scholar in any country has been able to reconcile this basic Soviet position with the Charter or with the corpus of international customary law which is the context of the Charter. No State can accept a doctrine which would authorize its neighbours to send armies or armed bands across its frontiers or to send arms to those who would challenge its authority. The Soviet doctrine is an attempt to square the circle. This doctrine has failed as a theory. And in practice it stands revealed as incompatible with the necessary conditions for co-operation in the international society of States.

The leaders of the Soviet Union may imagine that they have made great progress in recent years towards their goal of dominion. But that belief is an illusion. At enormous cost, the Soviet Union has made significant gains during the last three decades in its quest for empire. But the Soviet effort has transformed its strategic position. It has called into being a vast coalition of nations determined to retain their freedom. It is clear that the Soviet Union can never achieve its purpose, even through war.

The moral of this tragic chapter in twentieth century history is clear, and we stress it now while there is time to change course, and return to the way of peace.

The highest national interest of the United States in world politics is a system of peace in which all the nations respect the rules of the Charter regarding the international use of force. All our other ambitions in world politics -- economic stability and progress; the vindication of human rights; the advance of literacy, of education and of culture; and the encouragement of progressive peaceful change -- depend in the end on the achievement and maintenance of peace in that sense.

It is our view that the achievement of a system of peace is equally the highest national interest of every other State. Indeed, through the Charter, every State has solemnly promised every other State that peace in this sense is its highest

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

national interest. It should now be obvious -- to recall a phrase once used by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov -- that peace is indivisible. The dynamics of war permit no sanctuaries. As President Reagan has said, the world cannot justify or tolerate a double standard with regard to the international use of force. All must obey the same rules. In the words of Secretary Haig, "the rules of the Charter governing the international use of force will lose all their influence on the behaviour of nations if the Soviet Union continues its aggressive course".

We hope that this session of the Committee on Disarmament will make a powerful contribution to the cause of peace by calling on the members of the United Nations to rededicate themselves to a policy of strict and unwavering respect for the rule of Article 2(4). The discussion of the problem here, and the pursuit of that discussion at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should help to crystallize a new state of public opinion throughout the world -- a state of public opinion which could compel all nations to accept the vision which dominated the Conference at San Francisco where the Charter was approved in 1945, in the shadow of an appalling war.

The significance of what we propose here is brought out by the pattern of Soviet policy in Poland.

It has been clear for several years that, except for a thin layer of Party and State officials in Poland, the Polish people has been seeking a new order of things in its homeland -- an order characterized by freedom and pluralism in every aspect of the life of the nation. Above all, the Polish people have made it clear that the spirit which sustained the Polish nation between 1792 and 1918 is still unconquerable.

Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe were promised a free choice by the three victorious allies who met a generation ago at Yalta and Potsdam. President Kennedy said on a famous occasion that "our two peoples, which now live in danger" would not be able to live in peace until the Soviet promise of free choice in Eastern Europe was kept.

But the Soviet promises of Yalta and Potsdam for Eastern Europe have not been kept. Those promises of themselves transform the crisis in Poland into a matter of deep and legitimate international concern, especially since the other terms of the post-war understanding have also eroded.

There is another and even more basic international dimension to the crisis in Poland. The military coup d'état in Poland and the imposition of martial law by the military dictator of Poland were acts done with Soviet complicity and participation, under the compelling threat that, if the Polish armed forces did not act, the Soviet Union would do so itself. This is a threat and use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, a flagrant breach of the peace in one of the most sensitive and important strategic areas of world politics.

Finally, the United States and its NATO allies have stressed that events in Poland violate the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which was signed at Helsinki in 1975. The assurances and the hopes embodied in that document give further ground for the conviction that what is happening in Poland is not a purely domestic problem.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

It has been the objective of the United States in the Polish crisis not only to stress the gravity of what is happening, but to offer the Soviet Union a peaceful and constructive way to reconcile its security concerns with the legitimate demands of the Polish people. The State system as it developed after 1945 must accommodate itself to peaceful change. If it fails to bend, it will surely break. Therefore President Reagan, in his statement of 23 December, offered the co-operation of the United States in large-scale programmes for effective action that would restore the vitality of the Polish economy, without in any way threatening the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. He recalled the American offer of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, an offer which Poland first accepted, and then was forced to reject. At the same time, President Reagan warned against steps that could let loose the dogs of war. No man can foresee or control the consequence of such developments.

The United States has high hopes for a fair and reasonable outcome of the crisis in Poland. Such a turn in Soviet policy could make many other agreements possible, and help prepare the way for a genuine improvement in the climate of world politics and the fabric of the international community.

One of the principal means on which we rely to achieve that goal is the negotiation of fair and balanced agreements for the reduction of nuclear arms, and particularly of offensive nuclear arms. Our policy in such talks, as President Reagan made clear in his speech of 18 November 1981, is to propose whatever reductions are necessary to achieve for each side an equal capacity to deter nuclear war. The policy of equal deterrence would deny to either side the capacity to use or to brandish nuclear weapons as an instrument of aggression or political coercion. Measuring deterrence, and distinguishing retaliatory weapons from those capable of use as weapons of aggression, are complex problems. With good will, they can be solved.

The United States policy with respect to nuclear weapons currently includes several different elements. With respect to intermediate range land-based nuclear missiles, negotiations have begun in a constructive atmosphere, and consideration is being given to President Reagan's proposal to abolish all such weapon systems, wherever located. American arms control policy is by no means limited to this aspect of the problem. In his speech of 18 November 1981, President Reagan also proposed the early resumption of Soviet-American negotiations on the reduction of intercontinental range missiles, the revitalization of the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a vigorous attack on the problem of measures for reducing the risk of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation. All these proposals, the President said, are based "on the same fair minded principles -- substantial, militarily significant reductions in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification".

This, then, is the policy framework within which the United States is working toward arms control. I can assure you that the United States will play its full part in devising solutions for these problems if the Soviet Union, by adopting policies of restraint, makes it possible for the full range of arms control negotiations and other co-operative activities in this field to continue.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

These basic pillars of United States arms control policy are fundamental to the issues on which this Committee has focused much of its attention since its establishment. Foremost among these has been the question of a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. In the many discussions of this problem here, the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, but unanimity has been lacking on questions of approach and timing.

The United States Government has reviewed the question of nuclear testing in the context of its impact not only on arms control efforts but also on the need to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance, bearing in mind in particular the importance of achieving effective verification measures and ensuring compliance with any agreed restrictions.

It is clear that any consideration of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces. It is equally clear that a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues. Direct means for achieving progress towards the elimination of the nuclear menace are the restoration of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter as a reality in world politics, the negotiation of significant reductions in nuclear weapons, and the eventual elimination of the weapons themselves. Thus, while a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. The United States fully shares the keen concern of members of this Committee to move forward rapidly in the effort to remove the burden of nuclear weapons from world politics. The United States will work constructively with the Committee in its efforts to achieve this end.

In the area of chemical weapons, the Committee on Disarmament has already done useful work, and the United States commends the Chairmen of previous chemical weapons working groups and the delegations that have participated so effectively in this effort. President Reagan has now reaffirmed United States support for efforts to achieve a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons and has directed United States representatives to participate actively in this important quest. The United States believes that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for work toward a chemical weapons convention. Therefore, it is the United States' intention to concentrate its efforts toward the elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons in this Committee. We believe the Working Group has successfully completed the bulk of its initial task and, in so doing, has identified important areas of agreement and disagreement. The next step is to see if it is possible to harmonize views on the major elements of an eventual agreement. Such a step is a prerequisite to the achievement of our ultimate objective, and the United States delegation, therefore, will support a revised mandate for the Working Group that will allow it to undertake this essential task.

It is no secret that views diverge widely on the subject of verifying compliance with arms control agreements. The United States believes that the chemical weapons Working Group should devote particular attention to verification and compliance

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

issues, from both a political and a technical standpoint. I urge the members of the Working Group to apply their expertise and imagination to finding ways to overcome the many complex problems which face us in this area. One such problem is that of undeclared stocks and undeclared chemical weapons production, filling and storage facilities. Further, when the chemical weapons experts meet, I urge that, in addition to continuing their work on toxicity standards, they be asked to examine promising technical methods for monitoring the shutdown of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. In this manner the Committee can make use of our collective expertise to try to surmount a major hurdle relating to verification of an eventual agreement. It is the conviction of the United States that in this, as in other areas, the problem of verifying compliance with arms control agreements requires active co-operation among the signatories and not reliance on national technical means alone.

While I am on the subject of expert groups I should dwell for a moment on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, whose efforts thus far have been pointed toward the international exchange of seismic data. As you are aware, the United States has been an active participant in all the activities of this Group. We want this work to continue for as long as useful results are being produced and we intend fully to support its ongoing efforts. We are aware of the interest which has been expressed by other delegations in an enlarged mandate for the Group, one that would enable it to consider the possibility of exchanging data on nuclear explosions and on certain other unusual events occurring in the atmosphere. We have also examined this possibility and want to share our views informally with other delegations. The idea here is to increase the ability of the Group of Scientific Experts to make a useful contribution to improving our verification capabilities.

At the last session of the General Assembly, the question of controlling arms in outer space was the subject of a lively debate which resulted in the adoption of two resolutions, both of which put the problem on the agenda of this Committee. The United States believes that this was an appropriate step. This is a difficult, complex issue that cannot be separated from broader arms control issues. Because of the magnitude of the problems involved, we must not expect immediate progress in this area. The problem is one that must be approached with extreme care. The ramifications are legion; so are the pitfalls. Too quick a plunge without adequate prior reflection could be fatal to our objective of achieving a stable environment in outer space. At this stage, the United States is prepared to discuss the issue in an informal and general way at informal meetings of the Committee where various points of view and proposals could be thoroughly vetted before any further steps are taken.

I have not yet mentioned three items that have been on the Committee's agenda in the past and which await final action. I refer to the draft radiological weapons treaty, the question of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons will not be used against them and the development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The United States would like to see the radiological weapons treaty completed soon. As we have said many times before, it would not be a major step toward putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle, but it would be a step, and anything we can do in this area should surely be done. More delay can only mean more difficulty in achieving ultimate agreement on this treaty.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

In connection with another issue which has been under active consideration by the Committee during its past three sessions, that of the so-called negative security assurances, I would like to reaffirm the unilateral assurance given by the United States at the time of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. As we said at that time:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

The United States stands by this statement as a reliable and firm assurance. We have nonetheless participated, and are willing to continue to participate in the Working Group which deals with this issue, and would join a consensus to re-establish the group. The United States believes that development of a common assurance, as has been suggested, would be extremely difficult, although of course we are not opposed to this concept.

The Committee's task of developing a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as mandated by the first special session on disarmament, is extremely important. We strongly support this effort and will continue to work constructively toward enunciation of a meaningful programme to be presented to the General Assembly at its second special session. The United States believes that to achieve the necessary consensus, such a programme must be realistic and must reflect the security needs of all States. It should provide guidelines for the actions of States, with an over-all goal of promoting world stability and peace.

Both the increased complexity of modern weapons and the turbulent condition of world politics have highlighted the special importance of compliance with treaties as a factor among the responsibilities of this Committee. Trust is an essential ingredient of the condition of peace. Montesquieu spoke of peace as a state of tranquillity in which no man need fear his neighbour. Alas, that criterion is not satisfied today in many parts of the world. None of the neighbours of the Soviet Union can say that it feels comfortable about the inviolability of its borders. And more generally, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union radiates anxiety far beyond the States in its immediate neighbourhood, to States which fear the fate of Afghanistan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the German Democratic Republic, or Bulgaria. Troubling questions have arisen about Soviet compliance with international agreements concerning chemical and biological warfare. Those questions affect every State in the world community. And they cast a shadow over the possibility of verifying Soviet compliance with treaties on the control of other arms, and particularly of nuclear arms.

In 1967, the International Red Cross published disturbing evidence about the use of Soviet chemical weapons in the Yemen. Now, initial circumstantial evidence that lethal chemical weapons have been used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

been confirmed by new evidence from south-east Asia — evidence of the use of prohibited lethal mycotoxins, which are particularly cruel and inhumane weapons of war. The production and use of such weapons raises most serious questions about compliance with existing international constraints on such activities, including the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972 and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which the Soviet Union is a party. This development demonstrates the necessity of further consideration of the adequacy of applicable verification and compliance provisions.

It is vital that all countries concerned co-operate to the fullest extent with the work of the United Nations Group of Experts investigating this matter. It will not suffice simply to call attention to the problems. We deserve answers. The 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk has never been adequately explained. The Soviet Union and its friends and allies have vehemently denied that the Soviet Union is engaged in any way in the use of toxins or other chemical weapons. But it remains altogether unwilling to discuss these matters in detail or to offer the kind of co-operation that might alleviate the legitimate concerns of the world community. Soviet behaviour in the face of such inquiries has simply deepened the suspicions and anxiety of all persons of goodwill. This is a fact of particular importance to the work of this Committee.

It is therefore essential that the verification of compliance with arms control treaties be made a central feature of our work programme here. Until the nations agree on the principle of far-reaching international co-operation in monitoring and enforcing compliance with such agreements, arms control and disarmament cannot begin to achieve their full potential as programmes of peace. The Soviet Union has recently stated that while it continued to rely primarily on national means of verification of compliance with arms control treaties, it was willing to accept co-operative means of verification where circumstances make such procedures necessary and desirable. The United States welcomes this assurance. And it recalls the fact that in 1947 the Soviet Union made a far more comprehensive statement of its readiness to accept inspection and other co-operative means of verification in the interest of arms control during the consideration of the United States' proposal for the international control of nuclear energy, known as the Baruch Plan. The volatility and fragility of the international atmosphere make it essential that the Soviet Union go beyond President Brezhnev's statement of 23 November 1981, to Foreign Minister Gromyko's earlier and more ample offer.

Thus far, I have alluded only in passing to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That is because in many respects its shape and the nature of its contribution to our common endeavours cannot yet be clearly foreseen. In no small part, what happens in New York in June will depend upon what happens here between now and then. The Committee's work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament will be a major input. In that effort, the United States wishes to play an active and energetic role. But, obviously, all does not rest on what we do here. Much will depend on whether the behaviour of States conforms to their professed goals and intentions. The work of the second special session will be particularly sensitive to this factor. Let us hope that, to the extent that we can influence events, this Committee will contribute to a special session which should be marked by a realistic appreciation of the role of arms limitations in the effort to maintain peace and security for all mankind.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, please accept my sincerest congratulations, on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament at the very beginning of this important and crucial session. You may count on our co-operation in the performance of your task.

Allow me also to extend my warmest thanks to you and to all our colleagues for welcoming me as the new representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and at the same time to state that it is my sincere desire to maintain friendly relations with you all, based on mutual respect, as befits the noble objectives and tasks of this important body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. Most of you have enormous worldly, political and diplomatic experience, combined with special experience in the disarmament field, and it is therefore an honour for me to join your ranks, in the expectation of and counting on your co-operation.

In this, my first statement in the Disarmament Committee, I propose simply to make some comments on behalf of my delegation, without going into the details of the negotiations on particular issues.

We all note with regret that the international situation in which our Committee is called upon to work remains complex and tense. Instead of disarmament and the easing of tension, of late we have been hearing more and more frequently about a further upward thrust in the arms race, about the new doctrines of "limited nuclear war", "preventive" and other types of nuclear strikes, and about the increase in military budgets. The United States military budget proposals for 1983 is the latest example of these trends. All of which, of course, also increases the likelihood of the outbreak of conflicts, including nuclear war.

In our view, the reason for this state of affairs in present-day international relations is the policy of increasing confrontation, of achieving military superiority and exerting political and military pressure on a global scale, and of subduing forces fighting for their national and social freedom -- the policy which has been pursued in recent times by the imperialistic circles of a leading Western country.

This policy is unacceptable not only to us and to other socialist countries; it is unacceptable to the billions of inhabitants of our planet; it is disastrous even for its authors themselves. Consequently, we will not cease to repeat and to warn that, in the present difficult international situation, fraught with manifold dangers for peace, we ought all to refrain from following the path which leads to deeper confrontation and instead to take the one which leads to practical actions for the solution of international problems, the path of negotiations towards the conclusion of international agreements and treaties on the limitation, reduction and elimination of arms.

Guided by this basic principle, the socialist countries members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization declared at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, held on 1 and 2 December 1981 at Bucharest: "The States represented at the meeting consider that in present-day conditions it is the supreme duty of every State, every responsible statesman, to show restraint, and to match their actions to man's vital requirements, by preserving and strengthening peace,

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

and using material and scientific advances not for purposes of exterminating people and destroying civilization, but in the interests of solving the social and economic problems facing the various nations, enhancing their well-being and permitting the flowering of their culture".

Today, more than at any time in the past, the most urgent task is to achieve an immediate cessation of the arms race and to adopt real and concrete disarmament measures, particularly in the nuclear field.

Convinced of the pressing need for measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war, including the danger of such a war on a regional scale, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, as you know, proposed that the idea of converting the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone should be considered at the practical level. In this connection, Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in his speech on the occasion of the 1500th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian State, expressed our country's readiness to organize at Sofia a meeting of leaders of Balkan States on this question. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans and in other parts of Europe would be an important measure for the strengthening of confidence between States on the old continent.

We welcome the resumption of Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, and the USSR position as set forth in the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev at his meeting with the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament. We associate ourselves with his urgent demand for an early resumption, also, of the strategic arms limitation talks, based on strict observance of the principles of equality and equal security of the parties.

The emergence at the Madrid meeting of a decision concerning the convening of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe would be of particular significance for peace and security on our continent. Such a decision, rather than attempts to turn the Madrid meeting into a forum for attacks and interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries, would help to strengthen security and co-operation in Europe.

I will not conceal the fact that, as a newcomer to the meetings of this Committee, I was disagreeably surprised to hear in this hall certain statements about entirely different aims and approaches at Madrid and here in Geneva. How can the open attacks and interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State like Poland be explained? Some representatives even went so far as to criticize the ideology and internal systems of the USSR and other socialist countries.

Unfortunately, the same note was struck in today's speech by the head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow, from whom we expected -- not a long political lecture, full of accusations against the Soviet Union and other countries, including my own -- but more concrete proposals on questions relevant to the Committee on Disarmament.

We disapprove of and protest against such attempts to represent the constitutional measures adopted by one particular Government as a hindrance to our work. For us, that is another example of the usual propaganda campaign, a smokescreen, behind which certain individuals are desirous of concealing the multitude of concrete and dangerous decisions adopted in NATO on the production and deployment of never and never types of weapons.

(Mr. Todorov, Bulgaria)

Do the authors of such actions believe that the campaign against the socialist countries can serve as a cover-up for them and as justification for their lack of political will to achieve real measures for the limitation of the arms race and disarmament?

We associate ourselves with the view expressed here that it would be highly undesirable and a great pity if this Committee -- the only body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament -- were to be converted into a debating club, a place for recriminations and attacks, instead of concentrating on its responsible tasks.

For these reasons, our delegation associates itself with the appeal of the Soviet delegation and a number of other delegations for an intensification of the Committee's work with a view to achieving real results in the negotiations so as to be able to make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international security and the establishment of a sound basis for the holding of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria sets a high value on the role the Committee on Disarmament could play in the elaboration, in a business-like and responsible manner and on the basis of a sound organization of its work, appropriate agreements on a number of disarmament questions.

The very great importance which States attach to negotiations on disarmament was reflected in the adoption of numerous resolutions at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Many of the previous speakers have rightly emphasized that our Committee is faced with new tasks and new responsibility in the implementation of the will of the overwhelming majority of countries Members of the United Nations. The world community and the peoples of the world are demanding this of us.

There can be no doubt that, among the items we are to consider, priority must be given to nuclear disarmament and the entire range of questions concerned with the limitation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of the danger of nuclear war. In this connection, the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, adopted at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly upon the initiative of the Soviet Union, is particularly relevant.

The group of socialist countries in the Committee has suggested a number of concrete measures, including the establishment of a working group to initiate negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session. The proposal for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and for the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated, has been on the negotiating table for the last three years.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is another extremely important issue. Our delegation shares the concern of the overwhelming majority of delegations in this Committee and associates itself with the demand for the setting up of an ad hoc working group. We have always attached great importance to the tripartite talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, but our hopes that the Western partners would at last respond positively to the Soviet Union's constructive steps have also not been realized.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Our delegation will continue to make its contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on problems of the seismic monitoring of the observance of the future treaty.

The question of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is closely linked with that of the development of new types of nuclear weapons. An example of this gloomy prospect is the decision of the present United States administration to start production of nuclear neutron weapons. In endeavouring to resolve this issue, we ought not to be put off by artificial excuses, such as the argument that neutron weapons are not basically a new type of weapon and that there is therefore no need to consider them separately.

It is important that we should embark at once on negotiations for the elaboration of a convention prohibiting this type of weapon, for many specialists categorically affirm that it lowers the "nuclear threshold."

Another question which is closely bound up with the nuclear weapons issue is that of strengthening the security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Our delegation's interest in this matter is well-known. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries we have been taking an active part in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group concerned. Our aim continues to be the conclusion of an international convention, taking into account, also, other proposals in this direction. In this connection, we believe that it is time to begin negotiations on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

Our delegation is convinced that the Committee should concentrate its attention on and contribute to the elaboration of a treaty for the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. We fully support the proposal made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan, concerning the setting up of an ad hoc working group to negotiate with the aim of reaching agreement and the text of such a treaty.

The progress of negotiations on chemical weapons is an example of how the Committee's efforts lag behind the development and deployment of new and yet more dangerous types of such weapons. Together with other socialist countries and the vast majority of members of this Committee, we are in favour of the intensification of negotiations within the framework of a mandate which would open the way to the drafting of the actual provisions of the future convention.

We supported the General Assembly's appeal for a speedy resumption of the bilateral negotiations and we consider that the Committee, for its part, ought to pay particular attention to binary and other new types of chemical weapons, and also to the matter of non-stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present.

Our delegation attaches great importance to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We would urge the setting up of a group of qualified governmental experts, bearing in mind the development of the question at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. It is our belief that the setting up of such a group would permit an in-depth study to be made of the question within the framework of a permanent and purpose-oriented organizational structure.

(Mr. Tollalov, Bulgaria)

I will not dwell on the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, since the Czechoslovak delegation has explained the common position of the socialist countries. We hope that all delegations will adopt a constructive approach which will allow the Working Group to fulfil its mandate under the guidance of one of the most brilliant statesmen active in multilateral negotiations on disarmament, the distinguished leader of the Mexican delegation, Ambassador Robles.

As I approach the end of my first statement in the Committee, I should like to quote some remarks made by Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which admirably reflect our positions on arms race questions and our efforts towards the adoption of real measures in the sphere of disarmament. In his recent interview with Robert Maxwell, the Chairman of Pergamon Press, Todor Zhivkov said the following:

"Bulgaria is a small country and it is not a matter of indifference to us whether we have to allocate additional funds for our defence in view of the new upward thrust in the arms race or whether we may direct those funds to peaceful construction, thereby bettering the life of our people. We are by no means indifferent to the question whether the new American nuclear 'cruise' and 'pershing-2' missiles are to be stationed in Western Europe, especially as Bulgaria too comes within the range of their action. Our attitude is the same as regards the decision to produce neutron weapons which, in accordance with strategic plans, are also to be stationed on our continent.

It is not a question of whether Bulgaria and other socialist countries are equipped with such types of weapons or facilities for producing them. The point is that the piling up of ever newer types of weapons, each more dangerous than the last, more and more expensive, does not make for a more stable peace. On the contrary, the growing mountain of arms is itself becoming a monstrous threat to mankind".

In conclusion, I should like to state once again that, during this session, and in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, the Bulgarian delegation will present its views in detail on the various questions on our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SANI (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, may I join the speakers who have preceded me to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your accession to the chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation wishes to pledge to you its fullest co-operation in the discharge of your functions. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to thank the distinguished colleagues who, in their statements, have referred with kind words to my chairmanship. For my part, I wish to express once again my deepest gratitude for the co-operation and assistance extended to me by all delegations and by the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, and his collaborators during my term of office.

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

During all the years since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, the international community has ceaselessly affirmed the necessity of disarmament. The need to achieve disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, has been expressed again and again. It has not been possible, regrettably, to translate those expressions into concrete actions. Although everybody clamours for disarmament in their statements, in fact the arms race, including that in the nuclear field, has continued unabated. The number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nuclear-weapon Powers has been growing incessantly, in quantity and in their unimaginable destructive capacity, thus increasing, instead of diminishing -- much less eliminating -- the danger of nuclear war. The impatience of the international community to see concrete disarmament measures speedily taken, particularly by those nuclear-weapon Powers and nations having the largest military arsenals, has been frequently manifested. Especially during the last few years, non-governmental circles and individuals in various parts of the world have organized meetings, adopted resolutions, made statements and issued appeals; popular demonstrations have taken place demanding the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. The problem today does not seem to be so much to attract the attention of all peoples, to further mobilize world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarmament, as formulated in paragraph 99 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but rather how the States Members of the United Nations, and this Committee, will concretely react to the demand of international public opinion and how they will translate the solemn reaffirmation into concrete and positive acts to work, in the words of paragraph 126 of the Final Document, "for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries". What is necessary today is the translation of those solemn words into concrete acts, not a continued repetition of the same statements without following them up with the sorely-needed political decision to act.

Being a developing country in the process of accelerating its own endeavours to raise the well-being of its people, Indonesia has a vital interest in the success of disarmament efforts. We believe that concrete achievements in the disarmament process will result in the strengthening of peace and security, at the international as well as at the regional level, a condition indispensable for the unhampered process of successful national development. There is, indeed, a close relationship between disarmament on the one hand and international peace and security and development on the other hand. As stated in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Final Document, progress in any of these spheres would have a beneficial effect on or help greatly in the realization of the other. We have taken note of the two interesting studies relating, respectively, to the relationship between disarmament and development and that between disarmament and international security, prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of groups of experts, which were submitted last year to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the relaxation of international tension, progress in détente, mutual confidence between nations and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter will again prevail, creating an atmosphere which will enable the Committee on Disarmament to work more successfully and effectively in the discharge of the responsibility entrusted to it by the international community, namely, to exert all efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is the task of all nations, the most powerful in particular, to create an international political atmosphere which would be conducive to the process of

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

disarmament. The holocaust caused by a nuclear war will not be limited to the nuclear Powers alone; it will not stop at their frontiers. It is, therefore, with a feeling of great frustration that we have to watch, practically powerless, the power-game between the nuclear Powers, the stake of which is the very existence of the whole of mankind. We observe with the deepest concern the worsening international political climate marked by continued political confrontation and rivalry between powerful nations armed to the teeth, the aggravation of international tension and the intensification of the arms race. It is in this context that my delegation would like to express the hope that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union will bring about positive results which will be helpful to the process of disarmament.

Allow me now to refer briefly to the question of the agenda and programme of work of the current session of our Committee. This first part of the 1982 session is of a special nature because we are meeting just before the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Our work should therefore be geared towards contributing as much as possible to the success of that session. It is only logical that the Committee on Disarmament, being the machinery established at the first special session should submit to the General Assembly at its second special session an assessment of its contribution to the implementation of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the first session. As is called for by resolution 36/92 F, the Committee on Disarmament is required in particular to submit to the second special session a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will be a valuable contribution to the work of that session. The Committee is also requested, in that resolution, to intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and to submit to that session a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions that are under consideration by it. In organizing our work we have therefore to keep in mind the contribution we are expected to make to the second special session. The approximately twelve weeks at our disposal should therefore be utilized in the most efficient manner. In view of the special nature of the second special session, the report to be drawn up by the Committee for submission to that session should have a special character, in terms of its format as well as its contents, which we will have to discuss in detail as soon as possible. In the view of my delegation, the report should also contain an assessment of the performance of the Committee since its restructuring by the General Assembly at its first special session, nearly four years ago.

As to the agenda, my delegation has no problems with the draft as proposed by the secretariat. We agree with the inclusion of further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space as a new item on the agenda. We feel, however, that, in view of the limited time available, the Committee should determine carefully the order of priority and the time to be allotted to the discussion of each of the agenda items, in order that the Committee will indeed be able to make a worthwhile contribution to the second special session. Accordingly, the programme of work should be drawn up in such a way that the maximum amount of time is allotted to negotiations on items which, in the opinion of the Committee, have the best chance of producing concrete results to be submitted subsequently to the General Assembly at its second special session for consideration and, hopefully, for adoption, such as, for example, the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

As regards the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items relating to the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the position of my delegation is well known. My delegation continues to believe that, since an ad hoc working group has proved to be the best forum for the conduct of serious negotiations, ad hoc working groups on those two items, which have been accorded the highest priority by the Final Document, should be established, as requested repeatedly by the Group of 21 since the commencement of the work of this Committee three years ago and urged most recently by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in resolution 36/92 F. The establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban has become the more urgent because apparently we cannot expect the trilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban to be reopened in the near future. My delegation also agrees with the reconstitution of the ad hoc working groups on negative security assurances, chemical weapons and radiological weapons, and their immediate resumption of work. We are glad that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been enabled to continue its work without interruption under the able and competent chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. We hope that the Committee will also be able to submit the results of negotiations on the last three subjects I have mentioned to the second special session, as called for by resolutions 36/96 A, paragraph 4, 36/97 B, paragraph 1, and 36/92 F, paragraph 2. My delegation is of the view, however, that, as I stated earlier, the allotment of time for these working groups should be determined in a realistic manner in accordance with the degree of priority accorded by the Committee to the items concerned on the basis of a realistic evaluation of its possible contribution to the work of the second special session. My delegation hopes that it will be possible to give the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons a more extended mandate, entrusting it with the actual elaboration of a draft international instrument on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as urged by resolution 36/96 A, paragraph 3, and 36/96 B, paragraph 3. It will be a valuable contribution to the second special session if we succeed in doing so even partially. My delegation attaches great importance to the comprehensive programme of disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament is expected to submit to the second special session. With regard to the CPD, may I make some brief observations on two questions, namely, "Priorities", and the so-called "time-frame" for the implementation of the programme. The CPD is, of course, not an end in itself. What is decisive for disarmament is its concrete implementation. The implementation of the programme would, as stated in paragraphs 9 and 109 of the Final Document, lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the ultimate objective of the disarmament process.

As to the priorities in negotiations to achieve the ultimate objective of the disarmament process, they should correspond:

Firstly, to the immediate goal of the disarmament efforts, that is, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Final Document, "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace";

Secondly, to the types of weapons and disarmament measures which are referred to by the Final Document as priorities. May I quote in this connection paragraph 45 of the Final Document, which states: "Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces".

The proposal made by the Group of 21, to which my delegation belongs, contained in document CD/230 reflects the relevant provisions contained in the Final Document, such as paragraphs 8 and 45.

With respect to the implementation of the programme, if a specific period of time is not set for the CPD as a whole as well as for every stage of the programme, it will lose its value as a programme. The political commitment made by States to implement the CPD will then not have much practical significance, and the CPD will constitute merely a document containing a list of recommendations without any indication as to when their implementation should be completed. This is certainly not what the international community expects. Declarations, statements, pledges and other forms of expression of intentions to make serious disarmament efforts have been made during the last three and a half decades. The international community is certainly expecting more; it expects concrete action on the basis of an agreed programme. It certainly wants to see that concrete results in the disarmament process could be expected to materialize in a specific period. It also expects that, after a certain period of time, if not the present generation at least the coming generation will be living in a world where lasting peace prevails. The setting of a specific time-frame for the implementation of the CPD is therefore essential. The stages would imply the necessity of having a review system, where the international community can take stock of the state of the implementation of the measures envisaged in every stage of the programme. In the light of such a review, a decision could be taken to prolong the implementation of certain unfinished measures into the subsequent stage. In the event that certain measures were completed before the end of the period of the stage concerned, decisions would have to be taken as to which measures relevant to the next stage could begin being implemented immediately. Of course, a certain flexibility will have to be observed in the actual implementation of the stages of the programme.

It has been our hope that it would be possible for us to look forward to the next millenium as an age of peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the world, when the threat of nuclear war to the survival of mankind would have been eliminated because we would have achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate objective of the disarmament process, and when the immense possibilities of technological progress and the availability of funds can be put exclusively to the service of increasing the welfare of mankind. However, in view of present realities, I doubt very much whether it will be possible to realize that hope by the year 2000. But in any case we have to do our utmost to ensure that it will be achieved as early as possible in the first years of the new millenium. Whether we will be able to do so does not depend so much on countries like Indonesia, but rather on the nuclear-weapon Powers, and especially the two superpowers, and the militarily significant nations with their immense arsenals of nuclear weapons and sophisticated conventional arms. It has become a cliché to say that for each individual man, woman or child, there is the equivalent of three tons of TNT available ready to blow him or her up. According to the

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"Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons", document A/35/392, more than \$500 billion a year are spent for military purposes which, according to the "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development", document A/36/356, represents some 19 times the official assistance provided by the OECD countries in 1980 to meet the needs of the developing countries where two-thirds of mankind live, amongst whom, 570 millions suffer from malnutrition, 800 millions are illiterate, one and a half billion have little or no access to medical services and 250 million children do not go to school. My delegation notes with deep concern the Secretary-General's remarks in his message to the Committee of 2 February which state, inter alia, that "the amount required to provide the basic necessities of the entire human race for one year is estimated to be less than the cost of the arms race for one month". But perhaps we must hammer again and again upon these facts to make those with the primary responsibility for disarmament aware that it is indeed already extremely late in the day to reverse the arms race and to work seriously towards disarmament and peace.

As to the closing date of the current session, in view of the fact that the Preparatory Committee for the second special session will start its meeting on 26 April, and that the second special session itself will begin on 7 June 1982, my delegation would prefer that this first part of our 1982 session should be concluded on Friday, 16 April 1982, with the possibility, however, that it could be extended by a couple of days, if by adding those few days we shall indeed be able to produce a more positive and a more worthwhile contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We shall be working under pressure of time if we want to submit a meaningful contribution to the second special session as this is the last session of our Committee before the special session of the General Assembly. The Committee will have to prove not only its usefulness but also its effectiveness as the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. It will have to submit a factual report on its success or lack of it, and to justify its existence to a very critical and most impatient world forum. That we have not yet been able to produce concrete results cannot, in all fairness, be blamed on the Committee. As we all know, the Committee has worked hard, but the international political climate has prevented it from achieving the results we all want. It is perhaps necessary to look into our working methods to see whether improvements cannot be made. The distinguished representative of the Netherlands referred at length to this aspect in his intervention at our first plenary meeting.

I shall conclude my statement by expressing the hope of my delegation, under the circumstances perhaps unrealistically, that the international political atmosphere will improve in the near future and will thus be conducive to the success of the efforts exerted by this Committee to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as the ultimate objective of the disarmament process. I am in no way suggesting, however, that we should wait for that improvement in the international political climate to take place. On the contrary, the deteriorating international political atmosphere should strengthen our determination to attain as many concrete results as possible in our negotiations. We have to persist in our efforts to achieve disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. There is no other choice: the alternative is the destruction of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of deep satisfaction to my delegation to see the representative of friendly Iran guiding the deliberations of our Committee during the current month. Iran and India share a long history of intimate bonds that encompass culture, tradition and language. It is in the spirit of our common heritage that my delegation pledges to you its full co-operation and support in your difficult task.

I would also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, who so skilfully presided over the closing stages of our Committee's work during its 1981 session.

The untimely passing away of our distinguished colleague from Italy, Ambassador Montezemolo, has deprived us all of a seasoned diplomat with rich experience. May I convey to the delegation of Italy our deep and sincere condolences.

May I also take this opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, who has often enlivened this Committee with his incisive statements and earned the respect of all those who have worked with him. I wish him every success and personal happiness in his new assignment and, since he is not present today, I would request the representative of the Netherlands to convey my delegation's sentiments to him.

On behalf of the Indian delegation, I would also like to welcome in our midst our colleagues from Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Nigeria and the United States of America, who have joined us for the first time this session. I am sure that the work of our Committee will be considerably enriched and enhanced by their contributions.

The first half of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament has acquired special significance and importance in view of the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to be held in June this year. Within a few months' time, our Committee and its work will be the focus of intense scrutiny and evaluation by the international community. If the results of the recently concluded thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly are any indication, we may expect some searching questions as to the practical relevance and usefulness of our body as the sole multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament.

In his thought-provoking statement of 2 February, Ambassador Fein referred to certain disquieting trends in the work of the First Committee in New York as well as in our Committee here. If the First Committee does at times seem to be unproductive in terms of concrete results, the responsibility surely lies with those who have, over the years, not paid any heed whatsoever to the solemn resolutions of the General Assembly. Ambassador García Robles of Mexico has reminded us, for example, of the many resolutions of the General Assembly, adopted by overwhelming majorities or even by consensus, calling for a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. It certainly does not add to the prestige and authority of the General Assembly if certain nuclear-weapon States continue brazenly and contemptuously to disregard those very resolutions to which they themselves have been a party.

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The Committee on Disarmament finds itself in a similar quandary. Over the past two years we have been treated to the sorry spectacle of a determined minority preventing this body from fulfilling its solemn negotiating mandate. Despite the fact that a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament are items of the highest priority on our agenda, multilateral negotiations on specific and concrete issues under these items have yet to commence. If other members of this Committee have resisted the attempt to turn this body into what Mrs. Thorsson of Sweden has aptly called a "mailbox" for draft treaties of low priority, such as the radiological weapons convention, prepared by the major Powers, then their attitude should not be taken merely as tactical moves to prevent progress.

I would like to add a note of caution here. It is all too easy to dismiss the concerns of other States as "foolish" or "ill-intentioned", while reserving the glory of "sincerity" and "realism" to one's own initiatives. Let us not fall prey to that kind of myopia which preaches that the gun in one's own hand is for peace while that in another's hand is for war.

In the same context, while proposals to improve the efficiency and working methods of this Committee deserve serious consideration, the fundamental question still remains a political one -- are the major Powers ready to accept, without reservations, the principle of multilateral negotiations on disarmament? As long as only lip service is paid to this principle, I am afraid that no reform of working methods would yield the concrete results we all desire.

In the several statements we have heard so far, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament has justifiably been a major theme. However, whether in their approach to the programme or to the question of disarmament itself, some of our colleagues have once again underlined the need for so-called "realism". Ambassador Weyoner of the Federal Republic of Germany in his statement of 4 February, said:

"Realism is also the key word for the second special session itself. Lofty objectives must be measured against reality; review and appraisal of achievements in the past period must lead to careful planning for the next few years. Reasonable prospects for concrete results within this period will have to take precedence over the promulgation of over-ambitious ideas."

The Ambassador of Japan, too, spoke in the same vein in his statement of 4 February. He too thought it would be "wiser to avoid too over-ambitious an approach and to try to draft a programme that would be verifiable and workable".

In the past, our delegation has questioned this seemingly practical and reasonable emphasis on "realism". What this brand of realism, in effect, implies is an indefinite perpetuation of the present status quo; worse, it implies an even further worsening of the security climate for the developing and non-aligned nations of the world. In the name of this realism we are asked to accept the

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notion of a pernicious balance of nuclear terror and to live indefinitely under the threat of a thermo-nuclear war. When non-aligned and non-nuclear-weapon States voice their legitimate security concerns and seek to safeguard the survival of their peoples, they are dismissed as starry-eyed idealists, who are asking for the moon. I would like to emphasize that this is not so. We are not moralists who are pushing "lofty objectives" or peddling "over-ambitious ideas". We are simply seeking our survival in a world which technology has compressed into one small neighbourhood, a world in which the security of each nation lies in collective security for all. No longer can one's security be defined solely in terms of one's region or neighbourhood. Any neighbourhood today is global in scope and one's adversaries, real or potential, may as often lie beyond the oceans as across one's own borders. As Dr. Eugene Rostow, speaking this morning on behalf of the United States has conceded, in the present-day context, "the dynamics of war permit no sanctuaries". The realists among us have still not answered a question that has been posed to them repeatedly: is it permissible for any State or group of States to pursue its security interests in a manner that jeopardizes the security of all other States and threatens the survival of the human species itself? In the Final Document of the first special session, it was acknowledged by consensus that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for belligerents and non-belligerents alike. How are we expected to live with the reality of the growing threat of a nuclear disaster? Is it just a "lofty" objective to seek to eliminate this danger? Is it "over-ambitious" to seek even one's survival? One would have thought that this was a matter of plain common sense, and that all acknowledge that the right to live is the first and most fundamental of human rights.

Another aspect of this peculiar brand of "realism" that is being foisted upon us concerns the relationship among various measures of disarmament. It has long been acknowledged, universally, I might add, that the highest priority in disarmament negotiations must be accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is clearly and unambiguously endorsed in the Final Document. However, during negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, some delegations have sought to overturn this order of priorities and to argue that it is unrealistic to expect that nuclear disarmament can take place without an integral linkage with conventional disarmament. We are told that the reality of nuclear deterrence and the disposition of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe, for example, makes it impossible to conceive of nuclear disarmament without a concomitant and so-called balance reduction in conventional forces.

There is another aspect of the "reality" of nuclear deterrence which some of our colleagues may have missed. I can quote no better authority on this score than Mr. Iklé, formerly Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States and now United States Under-Secretary for Defense. Addressing a Joint Harvard-MIT Seminar on 26 February 1974, Director Iklé said:

"The seemingly rigorous models of nuclear deterrence are built on the rule, 'what you can't calculate you leave out'. For example, the 'missile duels' usually ignore fallout. And the calculations are unable to cope with critical details regarding unreliability."

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Mr. Iklé added:

"Our entire structure of thinking about deterrence lacks empiricism. Like no other field of human endeavour, nuclear deterrence is unique in demanding -- absolutely compellingly -- that we work out successful solutions without directly relevant experience, without experimentation. There can be no trial and error here, no real learning."

We have been told that nuclear deterrence has, in fact, prevented a nuclear war, that were it not to exist the very disaster we all seek to avoid may befall us. Is this a valid argument? Here is what Mr. Iklé had to say:

"Our efforts to prevent nuclear war could fail, as all of you know, not only because of an inadequate retaliatory capability to deter a deliberate attack, but for other reasons, such as an accident, an unintended process of escalation, or a combination of failures and causes we could not have anticipated or even imagined. Put in such terms, no one even disagrees with the proposition that a situation of mutual deterrence does not by itself guarantee the prevention of nuclear war."

The non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States have taken the lead in recommending several measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account precisely the reality which many of our colleagues refuse to acknowledge. We have suggested a total prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament. We have called for negotiations on urgent measures of nuclear disarmament. These unfortunately have been met with stone-walling tactics. In resolution 36/81 B the General Assembly has asked nuclear-weapon States to come forward with their own ideas on this vital issue at the second special session devoted to disarmament. This resolution, of which India was a co-sponsor, was adopted by consensus. We hope that the second special session will not have to listen to the same old theory that nuclear deterrence will prevent nuclear war. Enough has been said on the subject to underline the need for other more genuinely realistic measures and we trust that the nuclear-weapon Powers will come forward with their constructive proposals on this vital issue.

Our delegation looks upon the comprehensive programme of disarmament as embodying an international strategy for disarmament. If this strategy is to be meaningful, then it must map out not only the starting point and the destination, but the route to be followed as well. To map out the route as we go along, as some of our colleagues suggest, would hardly amount to a strategy. It is true that the route we now chart for ourselves may require some detours and deviations in the light of the actual terrain we must traverse. However, to embark on a journey with no idea of the route, except merely to follow our noses, is what should be called over-ambitious and adventurous. And this latter course is exactly what CD/205, presented on behalf of a group of Western countries, has asked us to do.

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany has objected to the fact that the Group of 21 has, in document CD/223, which contains a list of measures for a draft CPD, gone beyond indicating the main thrust of negotiations, and anticipated detailed results. The essence of strategy lies in anticipation.

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If the measures included in a CPD were broad and general in character, there would be no strategic plan, no chart to guide our progress. And I am sure that members will recall that during the 1981 session of this Committee, the Group of 21 recommended certain broad, though concrete and substantive, issues for negotiations on nuclear disarmament in an ad hoc working group of the Committee. The reaction of several of our colleagues was that these issues were too broad in character, that negotiations could not take place until we identified specific measures. Well, this point has been taken into account, gentlemen, and the Group of 21 has identified specific items for negotiations. If States themselves have to decide what they are going to negotiate, and when they are going to negotiate, why have a CPD?

Reference has been made to the fact that progress in disarmament requires painstaking, step-by-step negotiations, that negotiators must not operate under any time-pressure. This would have been valid if decisions concerning the development and deployment of armaments were also being taken in a similar painstaking, step-by-step manner, with small increments over long periods of time. But to fight a flood, which is what the arms race is, by planting a slow procession of faggots is what bespeaks of an idealism and ambition, which members of the Group of 21 are certainly not guilty of!

The Group of 21 envisages a CPD divided into four phases, whose implementation must take place within an agreed and negotiated time-frame. However, this time-frame will be flexible in character. The sponsors of document CD/223 do not believe in a mechanical time-frame nor in the "magic and automatism of a calendar which future events could render useless and futile" as has been claimed by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is a measure of the communication gap which seems to separate us that despite repeated clarifications and explanations from members of the Group of 21, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany can still continue to make such observations. We in the Group of 21 do not conceive of a rigid or automatic calendar for the completion of the CPD. However, we do believe that if the programme is to have any meaning, if it is to be a politically operational document, it must have at the very minimum at least an indicative time-frame for the completion of the various measures. The priorities set forth in the programme can only be conceived of and given practical meaning in terms of time-sequences for the implementation of categories of measures. The interrelationship among the various measures also can only be elaborated in terms of time-frames for their implementation. This ought to be self-evident.

Above all, we must bear in mind the purpose of adopting a CPD. If the adoption of the CPD will have no impact whatsoever on the decisions of States concerning armaments; if States cannot anticipate with any degree of confidence that the global security environment would improve as a result of the gradual but planned implementation of the CPD, then would it not be like one of those unproductive resolutions of the General Assembly that Ambassador Fein spoke of? All States plan their armaments and defence posture years in advance. This is realism. Would it be realistic to expect that an open-ended CPD with not even an indicative time-frame for implementation would have any impact on the armament plans of States?

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The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany seems to have again misunderstood another aspect of the approach adopted by the Group of 21 towards the CPD. He alleged that document CD/225 provides for a tightly planned negotiation calendar with detailed prescriptions as to what is to be negotiated and achieved in later stages, quite independently from the outcome of preceding stages. This is simply not correct. What is contained in each state of the programme, as conceived of by the Group of 21, is on the assumption that measures contained in the previous stage have been implemented. All plans necessarily follow such a practice. However, the sponsors of CD/225 have never suggested that what should be negotiated and implemented in later stages would be quite independent of the outcome of preceding stages. I am surprised that this charge has been made in spite of the fact that in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, my delegation and a number of others in the Group of 21 have repeatedly explained that the review mechanism would provide for readjustment and modifications in the programme in the light of the progress made in the implementation of the previous stages. The details of the review mechanism remain to be spelt out, but the principle is quite clear and unambiguous.

I trust that my statement today will have cleared up once for all the various misconceptions which seem to exist regarding the approach of the Group of 21 to the elaboration of the CPD. The disarmament philosophy of the non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon States rests on firm and realistic foundations. It is oriented towards practical results and is rooted in a sober appraisal of the dangers which confront us. Those who so readily charge us with lack of realism and lofty ambition would do well to carry out a searching examination of the assumptions on which they themselves have based their approach.

Before concluding, I would like to say that we have taken note of the detailed statement made by the representative of Czechoslovakia on 2 February in which the views of a group of socialist countries on a draft CPD were set forth. We are in the process of examining the specific proposals made in that statement, and will offer our considered comments at a later date. At the same time, we hope that the sponsors of document CD/205 will reconsider their positions in the light of the clarifications given by us today.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to me and for the kind reference you made to my country.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, allow me to join other delegations which have congratulated you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee for the first month in the 1982 session. My delegation pledges its full co-operation with you, a representative of a fellow non-aligned country, in the accomplishment of your onerous task. Your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, also deserves our appreciation for the very able manner in which he concluded the work of the Committee in the last part of the 1981 session. Also, I wish to associate myself with the deep condolences already conveyed to the delegation of Italy on the death of our friend and colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo. May his soul rest in peace.

At this juncture, I would like to express my warm gratitude to you and to all those who have welcomed me to the Committee, and I look forward to working closely with members.

It is now a truism to state that we are living in times of grave international tension. Man's vision of right and wrong is blurred; his concept of the noble idea of human rights has been prostituted in a cold war atmosphere. Nowadays, whether or not one is guilty of the violation of human rights depends upon one's ideological label. There is very little honesty about human rights. If there was sufficient objectivity about it, the racists in South Africa would have been the first to qualify for economic sanction.

From the standpoint of a developing country like Nigeria, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that we believe that its continuation runs counter to the attainment of meaningful economic co-operation among the different nations of the world. Indeed, if the arms race continues at the present pace it will reach a point at which it generates so much suspicion and tension among nations that all reasonable forms of interaction will cease. My delegation agrees with the conclusions voiced by Ambassador de la Gorce of France in his statement last Tuesday, that "disarmament could also serve the two important objectives of international co-operation, namely, security, and economic and social progress, particularly for the benefit of the less favoured countries."

We are living in a world where there is a real danger of a nuclear war, and my delegation shares the concern of those who have expressed the view that such a nuclear war will produce "no winners but only losers". The threat of mankind's self-extinction owing to the colossal accumulation of nuclear weapons by a few States has never been so pronounced.

During the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, my delegation took the initiative on the declaration of the 1980s as the second disarmament decade. Our concern then, as it is today, was to see by the end of the 1980s a world more secure through effective disarmament measures and much more economically equitable. Present trends clearly indicate that this objective is in danger of not being realized. This would be a disaster for mankind, and as my President, His Excellency Alhaji Shehu Shagari stated at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1980:

"The armaments race has assumed a new and dangerous momentum, at a time when the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has failed. The North-South dialogue on the economic problems of the world is stalemated, as a consequence of a most regrettable inability to agree even on procedures to begin negotiations. The present stalemate in the climate of negotiations between the developing and the developed countries holds terrifying prospects for all. Perhaps, more than is realized, the world is poised delicately on the brink, that critical margin, between survival and disaster."

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My delegation has always argued against nations basing their security on doctrines of nuclear deterrence because we, the nuclear-have-nots, also desire to survive. We will continue to hold the view that doctrines of deterrence, strategic balance and parity are all based on the narrow security interests of the nuclear-weapon States which stubbornly refuse to take into consideration the vital security interests of third States. As my delegation has stated on several occasions, it is a fact that the greater the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the greater is the risk of nuclear war.

In Africa, the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons are increasing because of South Africa's nuclear capability, and in spite of the fact that the Organization of African Unity as far back as 1964 took a decision on the denuclearization of Africa, these developments can only place a serious obstacle in the path of peace on the continent. Paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament states:

"Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm."

My country is only too aware of the dangers posed to the African continent by South Africa's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Also, through the report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, document A/35/402, the world community has a clear picture of the dangers posed by the racist régime in Pretoria. Indeed, as is stated in paragraph 89 of the report:

"The diplomatic and political costs of South African acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons would be high, and quite possibly disastrous, if those weapons were ever used. Nevertheless, desperate to preserve the apartheid system, South Africa's leaders may eschew a rational weighing of costs and gains."

My country has always taken the opportunity in different forums to deplore the collusion between South Africa and her Western allies, and we seize the opportunity to do so in this Committee.

Allow me now to dwell briefly upon some of the substantive items that my delegation feels should preoccupy the Committee's attention this session, particularly as we approach the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

A nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament constitute the two most central and priority items which the Committee should urgently address itself to. It is almost a cliché to state that everything that can be said in favour of a test ban treaty has already been stated. The numerous

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resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly testify to the continuing interest of the international community in the matter. The latest United Nations resolution, 36/85, entitled, "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B", in its operative paragraphs, not only reiterates the indispensable role of this Committee in the negotiation of a nuclear test ban, but also in its paragraph 6, requests

"the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982."

My delegation supported this resolution and we hope that the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive test ban treaty will be possible this session.

We are in agreement with those who state that all technical barriers to the conclusion of the treaty have been fully explored and that what remains lacking is the political will of the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate. The nuclear test ban has a central importance in the urgent task of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of such weapons, and of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. This fact is clearly embodied in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

Bearing in mind that the second special session is only a few months from us, it would be very useful if the Committee on Disarmament could, without further delay, agree on the establishment of a working group on a CTBT. This achievement would be an indication of a positive contribution that this Committee could make towards the implementation of the negotiating responsibility conferred upon it by the international community. In this context, my delegation calls upon those nuclear-weapon States that have so far withheld their consent, to join in the consensus otherwise existing in the Committee on the subject.

As one of the sponsors of working paper CD/204, my delegation also feels that the rule of consensus in the Committee should not be interpreted in such a way as to impede the progress of the work of the Committee, especially in such a crucial and vital area as that of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

For those of us who were trusting enough to sign the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the fact that the provisions of its article VI have become a dead letter is a matter of great concern.

I have already highlighted the dangers of a nuclear war. My delegation cannot support the view that nuclear weapons should be used as a means to offset perceived asymmetries in conventional armaments. This view is untenable, since for one thing nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction and cannot be compared with conventional armaments.

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My delegation welcomed the structured informal meetings held last session on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and believes that at this session further meetings should be held to keep alive the momentum generated by these meetings. In this context, the working paper of the Group of 21, document CD/180, should provide a firm basis for structured discussions that should lead to the establishment of a working group.

My delegation believes that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be the beginning of a new concept of special sessions, and this is why my delegation continues to attach great importance to the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The special sessions should not be a mere periodic get-together but should have an organic link to the review of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We are confident that under the guidance of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, the Working Group on this subject will make the necessary progress. However, my delegation is all too well aware that it is the political will to negotiate that will determine the outcome of the ongoing negotiations. In this connection, my delegation associates itself with the views expressed by the representative of Mexico in his opening statement, that any deviation from the letter and spirit of the Final Document of the first special session in the elaboration of the CPD will be a step backwards in the cause of disarmament.

The intensive negotiations carried out in January produced some useful results. My delegation noted with interest a growing convergence of views between the different groups and we believe that this trend, if continued, will augur well for the successful elaboration of the CPD.

A crucial aspect that my delegation feels that the CPD should take account of is the relationship between disarmament and development. The recently concluded United Nations study on the subject stated, inter alia, in paragraph 391 of the conclusions:

"This investigation suggests very strongly that the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both."

During the last three years it has become evident that the nuclear-weapon States are more concerned with their narrow security interests than in giving credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened with or have nuclear weapons used against them. The present attitude of the nuclear-weapon States can only lead to a perilous increase in the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and all the inherent dangers that such an escalation would contain.

I will refrain from going into great detail in my intervention today as to why the present declaratory statements made by the nuclear-weapon States do not suffice as credible guarantees. My delegation holds the view that Article 51 of the

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United Nations Charter is of limited application, not only in the context of conventional warfare but also as to those it covers, since it appears to cover only allies of the respective nuclear-weapon States. Security Council resolution 255 is also not meaningful, since problems again arise if the threat to use nuclear weapons is made by or directed against one of the allies of the nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation believes that the Ad hoc Working Group on Security Assurances should continue to try to find a "common formula" of universal application. The alternative approaches considered in the Working Group at the last session should in our view be further explored. Alliance relationships, troop deployments and dissemination of nuclear weapons give very limited assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. However, a concrete international convention on negative security assurances will ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be the victims of nuclear blackmail. In resolution 36/95 of the General Assembly entitled, "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", an appeal is made

"to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character."

My delegation hopes that the much required political will will be evident during the work of the Working Group.

With respect to the other existing working groups, my delegation believes that during this session it will clearly be necessary to advance the mandate of the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to cover something more than mere "consideration". An appropriately revised mandate in our view will steer the Working Group on the right course towards elaborating the text of a convention. In this connection, we welcome the United States offer made this morning by Mr. Rostow to support a revised mandate on chemical weapons. Further elaboration is still required, however, on the role of the consultative committee, the complaints procedures, the scope of the convention, and verification. This is also true of the Ad hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. The present state of the negotiations calls for greater efforts on the part of various delegations to narrow down their differences on the question of scope and definition, and move progressively forward to the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

Permit me now to offer some few comments on the inclusion of new items on our annual agenda. My country is one of those that has expressed deep concern about the increased militarization of outer space. The increase in the use of anti-satellite weapons, high-energy lasers and particle-beam weapons make outer space a battlefield of the future. In view of the fact that this development runs counter to the spirit and the letter of the outer space Treaty of 1967, which seeks to promote its peaceful

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uses for the benefit of mankind, my delegation believes that the subject needs to be given the status of consideration within the context of the priority items listed for examination in the Committee.

My delegation also attaches considerable importance to the special report that would emanate from the Committee to the General Assembly at its second special session. In the view of my delegation, the report should be an evaluation of the contribution of the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body, to disarmament negotiations. An early consideration of this subject in the Committee would be necessary to enable a decision to be taken on the format of the special report.

There is very little time left between now and the second special session. The task before this Committee is monumental, and the expectations are high. Therefore we cannot afford to waste any of this precious time on procedural discussions. My delegation hopes that the Committee will this week adopt the draft provisional agenda and the work programme, and proceed immediately to substantive negotiations on the items on the agenda.

Finally, permit me to conclude by quoting once more from the address of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the General Assembly in 1980. On that occasion, he said:

"The present uncertain international situation challenges all those entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the destiny of mankind to pause and think. Times have changed. Conditions have changed. The concepts and structure which precipitated some of the current international crises cannot remain unchanged. Any organic institution without the means to adjust to change is without the means of survival. The sum of over 500 billion dollars, which the developed countries have spent on military research and development since 1960, far exceeds what two-thirds of mankind require to banish poverty and degradation. There must be disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, to save mankind from untold anxiety and indeed a holocaust. There must be disarmament to release resources for development."

This is a view that my delegation intends to pursue. I wonder if those countries that have built their economic policies around the battle against inflation have ever given thought to the view that such a battle cannot be won as long as the arms race continues at the present level.

The CHAIRMAN: We have practically exhausted the time available to us for the morning. If the Committee agrees, I would suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3.15 p.m. If there are no objections, we will proceed accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 152nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. The Committee will now listen to the remaining speakers inscribed to take the floor today.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in its statement of 2 February the Soviet delegation presented its position on the basic questions on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. We deemed it necessary to do so on the opening day of the current session as we seek, from the very beginning, to participate in the work of the Committee in a constructive spirit. If the Committee on Disarmament manages to make progress on specific aspects of the curbing of the arms race and disarmament, it will make a not insignificant contribution to the solution of the basic global problem now facing mankind: the removal of the danger of war. This danger has, unfortunately, not diminished in recent times but increased, which imposes an even greater responsibility on the Committee.

In view of the present international situation, the task facing the Committee is already rather complex. We therefore vigorously condemn the actions of those delegations which seek to render the negotiations in the Committee even more difficult by introducing into them problems totally unrelated to the content of the negotiations and mixing up questions of completely divergent character into a single tangled skein. We are deeply convinced that the Committee's task is to concentrate all its attention on questions relating to the limitation of the arms race, objectively analysing the real difficulties arising in disarmament negotiations, and together to work towards overcoming them.

Who will deny that the fundamental danger to the cause of peace at the present time is the reckless acceleration of the arms race and the development of ever newer systems of weapons designed primarily for first strike capability, which is accompanied by the promotion of doctrines based on the waging and winning of nuclear war?

It is true that -- improbably -- the American delegation in its statement today claimed that there is no arms race. This claim would imply that the United States is not engaging in an arms build-up, is not expanding its arsenals, is not inflating its military budget to gigantic proportions. All this, apparently, is simply an illusion. Let us now turn to the facts as they stand today.

In recent days we have heard about the submission to the legislative bodies of the United States of its draft budget for fiscal year 1983, which clearly reflects a policy of escalating the arms race. It has already become rather a tradition in the United States, as well as in the NATO countries, to greet special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament with sudden increases in military budgets. This was the case in 1978 when, during the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the NATO countries adopted a decision systematically to increase the military budgets of the member countries of that military-political alliance in the succeeding years. This time, too, there is a decision to increase military expenditures -- even more. On the eve of the second special session the United States is preparing to adopt a military budget that sets a record for all of the post-war years. According to the budgetary message of the President of the United States, in fiscal year 1983 expenditures on United States strategic nuclear forces alone are to increase from \$16 to \$23 billion and expenditures for so-called general purpose forces from \$88 to \$106 billion.

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The naval and rapid deployment forces will also receive multi-million-dollar increases. Some \$6.8 billion are to be spent merely on the construction of aircraft carriers. A total of \$258 billion has been requested for military appropriations for the coming year. Clearly, President Reagan's decision to begin producing new types of chemical weapons on a large scale, with an allocation for that purpose of \$700 million, can only be seen as some kind of "surprise present" for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Mr. Rostow's statement that the United States agrees to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the banning of chemical weapons can hardly sweeten this bitter pill. The result of all this is that the United States' total military expenditures for a period of five years will amount to the truly unbelievable sum of more than \$1.6 trillion.

On what, precisely, will these billions be spent?

In early October 1981, President Reagan of the United States announced his "strategic programme" for the 1980s, which not only strengthens and expands previously confirmed plans but also envisages the development and deployment of new weapon systems. The American strategic programme has assigned a special place to the deployment of MX inter-continental ballistic missiles, each of which will be armed with 10 warheads of extremely high accuracy, which will make it possible to destroy heavily-defended targets, i.e. to use these rockets for a "disarming" strike.

The ballistic missiles aboard Trident-2 submarines, the construction and emplacement of which has been approved by the American leadership, will have practically the same military capabilities as the MX missiles. It is also planned to produce, in the 1980s, a qualitatively new strategic bomber, the "B-1B", and to equip the B-52 bomber fleet with strategic cruise missiles of various types. At the same time, intensive activity is under way towards the development of effective anti-missile defence equipment, the creation of the means for waging war in space, the significant expansion and renewal of the chemical warfare potential of the United States and the re-equipment of its land forces at a qualitatively higher level.

An important part in the United States' plans to achieve military superiority is undoubtedly played by the decision to deploy nearly 600 American medium-range missiles in western Europe, which will give the NATO bloc a 3-2 superiority in delivery vehicles of this category and a 2-1 superiority in the corresponding nuclear payload.

All in all, it would seem that the American leaders have great hopes of achieving "victory" in the arms race through qualitative superiority. No less than two-thirds of all federal government expenditures in the United States on scientific research and experimental design work in the coming years will be devoted to the laying of the scientific and technical foundations for the development of new and ever more destructive types of weapons. The production of new weapons systems is also being actively pursued. A clear example of this are the plans relating to cruise missiles. The possible results of such calculations based on technological leadership in armaments was quite correctly pointed out in the statement made here by Mrs. I. Thorsson, the head of the Swedish delegation, on 2 February. It is difficult not to agree with her warnings.

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We may legitimately ask, why does the United States need such a gigantic military budget? Why has it adopted numerous programmes for the development of new generations of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction? This question is often answered by a claim that the United States, and in fact the entire NATO bloc, has fallen behind the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries. This claim is entirely false and it can easily be refuted by consulting the facts.

Despite the fact that after the Second World War the world had already witnessed a number of very dangerous upsurges of the arms race, initiated in each case by the United States and its allies -- we have several times already provided examples confirming this -- in recent years an approximate military balance has nevertheless been reached and it still exists, both between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty countries and those of NATO. This equilibrium exists both in the field of strategic nuclear forces and in the sphere of conventional armaments and armed forces, on a global scale as well as at the regional level.

When the SALT-II Treaty was signed, the USSR and the United States exchanged detailed data on the quantities of their strategic arms. These figures are familiar to the members of the Committee. The Soviet Union had approximately 2,500 strategic delivery vehicles and the United States 2,300. However, in terms of numbers of strategic warheads, the United States had considerable superiority over the USSR -- by more than one third. Over-all, however, there was an approximate balance in this field, which was to be further strengthened through the implementation of the Treaty. The situation of approximate equality in this field was, moreover, recognized both in 1979 and later by the most authoritative American leaders.

What has happened since the signing of the SALT-II Treaty? Is it possible to imagine that within the space of one or two years the Soviet Union has been able to achieve superiority, and even more, substantial superiority, in strategic weapons, the development of which requires many many years? The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, was forced to admit, at a meeting with American newspaper editors in Washington on 5 June 1981, that the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in this field was a deliberate invention. "In strategic nuclear forces", he said, "approximate parity continues to prevail between our two countries".

Approximate equality also exists as regards medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, i.e. the basic rocket-borne and airborne nuclear weapons of the NATO countries that can reach targets in the Soviet Union from the territories of western European countries and the waters adjoining Europe, that is, weapons with a range of 1,000 kilometres and more, and the corresponding Soviet weapons of similar range deployed in the European portion of the USSR. The NATO countries have 986 such delivery vehicles for use on the European continent. This includes 723 American planes, 64 ballistic missiles and 55 British bombers, as well as 98 rockets and 46 bombers belonging to France. The Soviet Union has 975 similar military units, including 461 planes and 514 rockets.

As regards the negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe now under way in Geneva, to which Mr. Rostow referred in his statement, an exhaustive evaluation of the situation with regard to those negotiations was given by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in

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his talk with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament, which took place recently in Moscow. In view of the importance of what Mr. Brezhnev said on that occasion, the Soviet delegation intends to circulate the text of his remarks as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

No less revealing, too, are the facts about the numbers of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. It is, of course, more difficult to make a comparison in this sphere because of its varied and diverse nature, and the differences in the structure and organization of these forces. But a look at the basic components shows a picture of approximate equality. For example, there are 4.9 million men serving in the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc countries, while the number serving in the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is rather less than 4.8 million. As far as the number of tanks goes, NATO has 24,000 units while the Warsaw Treaty countries have scarcely more -- 25,000 units. As regards air forces, despite the somewhat larger number of military aircraft in the forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries (by a 1.2 to 1 ratio), NATO has superiority in air support capacity (by a 3 to 1 ratio) and in the number of helicopters (by a 1.8 to 1 ratio). The exchange of numerical data at the Vienna talks, the last of which related to the situation as of 1 January 1980, confirms that there is approximate equality in the numbers of land and air forces of the two sides in Central Europe, where the NATO countries have 991,000 men and the Warsaw Treaty countries 979,000.

We could continue this comparison of numerical data confirming that there is an equilibrium. Detailed comparative data on the various types of weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO can be found in a book prepared by the Soviet Ministry of Defence entitled, "Where does the threat to peace come from?". This book was published in Moscow in January 1982 and we can acquaint interested delegations with it. The information given in the book convincingly demonstrates that the balance exists not only on paper but also in fact. Thus, there is no need for the United States to catch up in weaponry as it has not fallen behind the Soviet Union.

Do Western strategic planners know all this? Of course they do. Nevertheless their plans for the building up of armaments of all kinds that are being prepared and adopted today are without parallel in the entire post-war period. And why is all of this necessary? For the very purpose of destroying the balance that has been created and securing military superiority for the United States and the NATO countries over the Soviet Union and its allies. President Reagan stated this goal of the United States rather clearly during his meeting with editors of provincial American newspapers on 17 October 1981, in which he said quite frankly that "the Russians will not be able to keep up with us". Many comments in the same vein have been made by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, most recently during his current trip to the Middle East region.

The United States' plans to achieve military superiority are matched by actual American policy with regard to the negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. The United States broke off negotiations with the Soviet Union on such important problems as the limitation of strategic weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean, and so forth. In the

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Committee on Disarmament the initiation of serious negotiations on many key aspects of arms limitation and disarmament has been blocked for as much as a year now.

Any initiative, any step in the sphere of the limitation of armaments that might in some way affect the American programmes relating to the arms race are declared inappropriate. Today we heard that the same applies to the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests -- a measure which the overwhelming majority of States have long sought to bring about but which, apparently, "must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces." This, it should be noted, was to apply only to Western States. As soon, it seems, as it is decided in Washington that the establishment of a working group on the prohibition of tests would destroy the entire theory and practice of deterrence, the group cannot be established.

Arthur Cox, writing in today's issue of the International Herald Tribune, says the following about the reasons for the United States' negative attitude vis-à-vis disarmament negotiations: "But the more fundamental reason for not moving towards serious negotiations is an unresolved policy debate in the Reagan administration. The majority position is still held by the hawks, who are opposed to genuine arms control and reductions. They prefer to seek the chimera of nuclear superiority. Instead of reducing nuclear weapons, they want to build and deploy the MX, the Trident-2 and the Pershing-2, which some of them claim would enable the United States to fight and win a nuclear war. They are struggling to make the use of nuclear weapons a rational means of warfare. The effort is not only extraordinarily dangerous, it is insane."

The NATO countries are trying to cover up their unconstructive approach to disarmament negotiations by making references to events in various regions of the world. In connection with the references to Poland made by Mr. Rostow in his statement today, I should like to state the following.

Attempting in some manner to justify their interference in Polish affairs, the NATO countries vary their story in various ways, claiming that martial law was imposed in Poland under pressure from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and that the Soviet Union is generally involved in the current development of the situation in Poland. This is a fabrication from beginning to end.

The measures introduced by the highest authorities in Poland are the result of a national Polish decision; it is the business of the Poles, and only theirs. What could be more authoritative on this subject than the statements made by the Polish leadership?

It should, at the same time, be clear that the fate of neighbouring socialist Poland is not a matter of indifference to the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people gave their lives to liberate Poland from fascist slavery and this cannot be erased from the memory of either the Soviet or the Polish peoples.

Of course, if one's purpose is to disrupt negotiations and to use every means of dragging out the solution of urgent problems in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race, then of course, any device will do, including references to the situation in one country or another.

The statement we heard today from the representative of the United States, Mr. Rostow, is typical in this respect. Like many of his predecessors in the days of the "cold war", he sees the root of the evil only in "the hand of Moscow".

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How many such statements have we heard in our time! His statement would also lead one to believe that there are only two States in the world, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and that all other States and peoples have no particular influence on the world situation.

In essence, Mr. Rostow's statement assembled all the basic themes of current American propaganda by means of which that country attempts to justify the United States policy of a gigantic build-up of arms for the purpose of achieving military superiority.

We do not intend to enter into polemics with Mr. Rostow, for that would only distract the attention of the Committee from the vital issues it should be dealing with. I would like, however, to draw attention to the following facts.

Under the smokescreen of completely false statements about an alleged Soviet military threat, the United States is attempting to achieve a military superiority which would be a threat not to the Soviet Union alone. Any country might be or could become the victim of American military might, if the system in that country did not please American ruling circles. We do not wish to follow Mr. Rostow's example by going into a discussion of the situation in various countries where American interference in their internal affairs is now taking place. These countries and regions that are now the sites of crisis situations brought on by the actions of the United States are well known. We would also draw attention to the fact that the proponents of linkages in studying the international situation did not feel it necessary to mention the annexation by Israel of the Golan Heights -- an act of aggression that was decisively condemned by the United Nations General Assembly a few days ago, or the continued occupation of Namibia by the South African aggressors, or the bloody crimes of the military junta in El Salvador, or the bloodshed in Ulster that has been going on for years now, and many many other Gordian knots in international life that truly demand immediate solution. We do not, however, think that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate place for discussing these problems, burning issues though they may be, because they are not directly related to the question of the limitation of the arms race. It would not be a realistic approach.

A genuinely realistic approach would be to solve the most acute international problems at the negotiating table, on the basis of equality and equal security, with regard for the legitimate interests of each side. This is the method the Soviet Union advocates, and it was once more authoritatively stated by L.I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the occasion of his meeting with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament last week. As L.I. Brezhnev stated, the Soviet leadership is firmly convinced that "for any State to base its policy on an assumption of a nuclear war and of victory in such a war is madness, irresponsibility and adventurist gambling with the fate of mankind. Diplomacy demands not entanglements but disentanglements. The Gordian knot of conflict situations and controversial issues in today's world cannot be cut by any sword. The only course is one of patient, constructive negotiations, negotiations ensuring a real limitation and destruction of arms."

This is the approach called for by the Soviet Union.

Mr. DE GUEIROZ DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your accession to the Chair of our Committee and to pledge to you on behalf of my delegation, and also on behalf of Ambassador Souza e Silva, the full co-operation of my delegation during your chairmanship.

My delegation's statement today will be devoted to some of the procedural aspects of the 1982 session of our Committee, in particular those related to the agenda and programme of work and to the organization of the activities of the Committee itself.

My delegation believes it is very important for the Committee to arrive at an early decision on these procedural aspects. This does not mean, however, that such decisions should be taken lightly or that their implications and the reasoning behind the several proposals should not be thoroughly examined. Procedural discussions should not be viewed as somehow belonging to a lesser category of questions, which could be treated in a hasty and superficial manner. All of us know that the structured organization of work, particularly in multilateral bodies such as the Committee on Disarmament, is a fundamental step toward the completion of the substantive task involved. Therefore, procedural discussions should not be regarded as a mere waste of time. Not without reason, incidentally, are we engaged in the exercise of trying to put together a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will function as the necessary framework for the substantive work of disarmament itself.

Accordingly, my delegation considers the discussion of the agenda and programme of work as a serious and important issue, because it affects the very substance of our work. My delegation does not, for that reason, agree with those who have urged the Committee to do away quickly with the discussion on procedure, on the grounds that the Committee should concentrate on elaborating its report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as if the presentation of such a report would constitute an end in itself. In our view, the most important business here is to ensure substantive progress in the priority issues under consideration in this Committee, so that the results achieved in this forum on such priority issues themselves constitute a positive contribution to the second special session, to be then incorporated in our report to that session.

My delegation thus regards the discussions that took place last week at informal meetings of the Committee as very relevant to the swift completion of our task. We would hope that the insight on the different positions, as provided by those discussions, will soon produce satisfactory results that will enable the Committee to attend more efficiently, and in an orderly fashion, to its substantive business.

With these thoughts in mind, let me proceed by discussing briefly some of the points that were made in those meetings. Many delegations, particularly those belonging to the western group, have supported the secretariat's suggestion for the inclusion of a new item, dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Incidentally, may I suggest that for the future the secretariat confine itself to drawing up a proposed agenda consisting of those items carried over from the preceding session of the Committee on Disarmament, together with a comprehensive list of General Assembly resolutions that call for specific

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action by the Committee, unless expressly instructed otherwise by the Committee itself. This would help to avoid misunderstandings and would allow the Committee to give precise directions as to what the draft agenda should look like. I do not intend to dwell here on suggestions to improve the effectiveness of the Committee but maybe a few simple measures might help a lot in the achievement of that objective, such as, for instance, taking the necessary administrative steps to provide a faster processing and circulation of documents and verbatim records, particularly when statements are not previously prepared.

In the present stage of the debate on the agenda, the supporters of the secretariat's draft have stated, as the basis for proposing the inclusion of the item on outer space, the fact that two resolutions of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly have requested that the Committee on Disarmament be seized of this question. Although the two resolutions differ slightly in their treatment of the subject, thus originating divergent views last Friday, it seems possible to arrive at a compromise on the formulation of the proposed new item. The stand of the Brazilian delegation, however, is based on other, and to our mind very fundamental, considerations. We have no quarrel with the request made by the General Assembly to this Committee, and indeed we did not object to the substance of either resolution at the time of their discussion and vote at the Assembly. Brazil has always considered that the decisions of the General Assembly must be complied with by this Committee, and that delegations represented here have an obligation to abide by such decisions. I would only like to recall that during the last session of the General Assembly, the representative of Brazil in the First Committee, Ambassador Souza e Silva, had the following to say with regard to the two draft resolutions on outer space, tabled respectively by some socialist and by some western delegations: "Brazil, together with other Member States, has advocated for many years now the need for prompt action in assuring the demilitarization of outer space. It is high time for responsible multilateral efforts to ensure that outer space is preserved for peaceful uses alone". In the same statement, Ambassador Souza e Silva discussed the request to the Committee on Disarmament to take up the question with the following words: "We would only argue that the Committee on Disarmament is currently seized with six substantive questions on its annual agenda, including two subjects to which the General Assembly has repeatedly assigned the highest priority: the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The Brazilian delegation to the First Committee even considered proposing amendments to the two draft resolutions suggesting that the question of outer space be entrusted to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, rather than to the Committee on Disarmament. In our exploratory contacts on the idea of such an amendment we met with sympathy from the group of sponsors of one resolution, but with resolute objection from the group of sponsors of the other. We finally decided not to move any amendment, and voted in favour of both resolutions with an explanation of vote that set forth our thoughts about the best available forum to ensure effective and speedy negotiation on the substance of this issue.

I felt compelled to recount those events because unfortunately the apprehensions and misgivings we expressed last fall in New York seem to have now become a reality. Here we are confronted with a suggestion, advocated by delegations of both East and West, to include a new item on our agenda on the grounds that a

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specific decision of the General Assembly has requested the Committee on Disarmament to do so; but what has happened to those items already included in our agenda to which so many decisions of the General Assembly have assigned the highest priority and urgency and on which they have repeatedly and poignantly requested both this Committee and three of its members individually to take speedy and concrete multilateral action?

With regard to such priority items, which as we all know refer to the ban on nuclear-weapon testing and to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, we have seen the efforts deployed mainly by the Group of 21 to initiate concrete negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament systematically thwarted by the staunch objection of two of its members. Neither of those two members has so far made any specific proposals on how to deal effectively with such questions in this multilateral body, despite the repeated requests by the General Assembly I have mentioned above, among which, of course, we must also count the Final Document itself. What we heard this morning from the distinguished representative of the United States, Mr. Rostow, does not point to any change in this posture.

During Friday's discussion on the agenda and programme of work, a suggestion was put forward by the distinguished delegate of the United States, Ambassador Fields, to the effect that items 1 and 2 be combined in a single formulation. If I recall his words correctly, Ambassador Fields said that this could elicit "creative proposals" on both issues. I do not intend to elaborate here on the reasons why his suggestion is unacceptable to my delegation, and I believe to a large majority of other delegations as well. I would only recall that we have been repeatedly told, in this and in many other forums, that nuclear matters are highly complex. The merging of items 1 and 2 would only add to the complexity of the issues. Thus, a "composite" item made up of the present items 1 and 2 hardly seems the most adequate way to deal with the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, an issue to which the world community has devoted many years of attention and study and which awaits only the political will of two nuclear-weapon States to be the subject of multilateral negotiation in this forum. But I am indeed looking forward to hearing what creative and concrete proposals the delegation of the United States has to present on this item.

I will close these remarks by stating again my delegation's belief that the procedural discussions in which we are engaged are of the utmost importance to the success of our endeavours. On our part, we intend to continue to participate in them in the same constructive spirit that has been shown so many times in this Committee by our delegation and by many other delegations. But at the same time we will exert our best efforts to see to it that the agenda and the programme of work we finally approve are in keeping with the responsibilities and the duties that the General Assembly has entrusted to this Committee and with the priorities defined by its resolutions. In so doing, we are confident that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to offer the best possible contribution to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, namely, the initiation of substantive negotiations on the priority issues that are before it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TIAN JIH (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, I wish to begin my statement by congratulating you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the first month of its 1982 session. It is my sincere hope that under your able guidance the Committee will make a good beginning in its work. I wish also to express my thanks to your predecessor, His Excellency Ambassador Sani, for his contribution to the work of the Committee. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend our welcome to the new representatives who have come to participate in this year's work of the Committee. The Chinese delegation expresses its deep condolences on the passing away of Ambassador Vittorio Cordero de Montezemolo of Italy.

During this spring session of the Committee, which comprises the last round of meetings before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Chinese delegation is ready to co-operate with other delegations in a common endeavour to fulfil the important tasks entrusted to the Committee.

Three years have elapsed since the first special session on disarmament, held in 1978. During this period, a number of grave events have taken place in the world, and the international situation is becoming more tense and turbulent. Particularly over the past couple of years, the situation has been extremely volatile. The danger of war is growing, and international peace and security are under greater threats. All these have caused concern and anxiety among the peoples of the world. It is disappointing that in spite of the great efforts made by many of the delegations, no substantive progress has been made at the past three sessions of the Committee. The two superpowers, far from slowing down their arms race, have now entered into a new round of the arms race. One superpower, while making a fanfare about its "peace programme for the 1980s", has been drastically increasing its military strength, striving to achieve complete military supremacy. After achieving a rough nuclear parity, it has spared no effort to develop and improve MIRVs, to continue to deploy mobile medium-range missiles and to build new types of missile-carrying submarines, with the intention of outstripping its rival in military technology. In the field of conventional armaments, while maintaining its quantitative supremacy, it is vigorously improving their quality. The other superpower, in fear of being outdone, has been increasing its military expenditures, developing new types of strategic missiles and missile-carrying submarines and strengthening the combat capabilities of its conventional forces. All this clearly indicates that the root cause for the lack of real progress in disarmament lies in the failure of the superpowers to substantiate their avowed intention for disarmament with concrete actions, in total disregard of the world people's ardent desire and reasonable demand for disarmament.

Furthermore, parallel to the intensifying arms expansion of the two superpowers is their increasing rivalry all over the world. In Asia, one superpower is forcefully pushing its strategy of a southward drive. It continues its military occupation of Afghanistan and reinforces its troops there to suppress and massacre the Afghan people. Meanwhile, it supports regional hegemonism in its continued occupation of Kampuchea. It has obstinately refused to implement the

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several solemn resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly demanding its unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Thus it has come under strong condemnation from justice-upholding countries and peoples. In Europe, both superpowers are updating their armaments, strengthening their military deployments and frequently staging large-scale military manoeuvres. Recent developments show that the situation in central Europe has become more tense and complicated than before. Even North Europe, a relatively peaceful region in the past, saw the grave incident in which the territorial water of a neutral State was encroached upon by a foreign submarine. It should also be noted that in the Middle East, Israel, following the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor, has recently flagrantly annexed the Syrian Golan Heights, causing new tensions in this region, in total disregard of the strong opposition of world public opinion. The deterioration of the world situation has inevitably damaged the international atmosphere needed for disarmament negotiations.

Numerous small and medium-sized countries are deeply concerned about and dissatisfied with the worsening world situation, the intensifying arms race and the growing danger of war. They staunchly oppose the hegemonist aggression and expansion which are menacing world peace, demand a halt to the arms race and work actively for disarmament. We believe that to achieve progress in disarmament it is imperative to establish suitable principles and effective approaches to disarmament in the light of the international situation, including the actual state of the arms race. The present situation of world armaments is that the two superpowers possess the highest levels of armaments in the world. According to the United Nations Secretary General's report in 1980 to the General Assembly entitled, "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons", and the statistics of internationally reputed research institutions, the two superpowers possess 48,000 nuclear warheads of all types, comprising 97 per cent of the total number of nuclear warheads in the world today. Their military expenditures account for four-fifths of the annual total of about \$500 billion spent in the world for military purposes, far exceeding the total of the military expenses of over one hundred other countries. And the destructive and lethal power of their nuclear and conventional weapons is even more stupendous, not to be matched by that of all the other countries combined. The seriousness of all this lies not merely in their military strength, but in particular in the grave threat they pose to world peace and to the security of various nations. In this connection, that superpower which is noisily advocating détente and disarmament has in fact committed acts of aggression, expansion and hegemonism which are particularly glaring. Therefore, in order to safeguard world peace and diminish the danger of war, it is imperative to oppose hegemonism and demand that the two superpowers take the lead in carrying out disarmament.

During our discussion on the question of disarmament, reference has also been made to the imbalance existing between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. In the world today, there are only a few countries which possess nuclear weapons, while the great majority of nations have no such weapons. It is only reasonable, therefore, that the non-nuclear-weapon States should demand that the nuclear-weapon States carry out disarmament so as to cut down and eliminate such an imbalance. We agree to the idea that all nuclear-weapon States should assume their respective responsibilities for nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

We have all along favoured and supported the efforts made by the people of the world towards the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. As to the specific steps to be taken, bearing in mind the real and grave threat to international peace and security posed by the two superpowers, we believe that only after they have actually and substantially reduced and destroyed their armaments will favourable conditions be created for the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States to reduce their armaments. When the huge armaments gap between the two superpowers and other States has been narrowed, other nuclear-weapon States should join them in reducing their armaments according to rational ratios until the total destruction of nuclear weapons is realized. During this process, as the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons is halted, and the nuclear threat faced by the numerous small and medium-sized countries reduced, favourable conditions will be created for the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It should be pointed out that any indiscriminate demand for simultaneous disarmament by all the nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States, regardless of the huge imbalance in armaments between States and regardless of the source of the threat to international peace and security, would only help serve the purpose of the superpowers to perpetuate their military superiority and maintain their capability for aggression, expansion, threat and blackmail. The superpowers are precisely playing this trick of clamouring for simultaneous disarmament with other countries and using it as an excuse for their refusal to reduce armaments.. That is why the representatives of many countries emphasized at various relevant conferences of the United Nations that the superpowers should undertake primary responsibility for disarmament. The proposals on disarmament measures submitted by the Group of 21 also reflect the idea that the superpowers should take the lead in disarmament. The Chinese delegation endorses these reasonable demands. We hold that the two superpowers with the largest arsenals taking the lead in disarmament should constitute a basic principle for disarmament and is an important criterion of judging whether disarmament is genuinely carried out.

I now wish to turn to some other items on the agenda of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. The comprehensive programme of disarmament will be an important item at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At its current session the Committee is to elaborate a draft CPD and to submit it to the special session for consideration and adoption. The experience of the last two years shows that great efforts are still needed for the elaboration of a satisfactory programme. The Group of 21, with the aim of accelerating the process of disarmament, has actively initiated the elaboration of a programme and advanced reasonable suggestions and proposals, of which we express our appreciation.

It is our view that in order to accelerate the process of disarmament, the elaboration of the programme should proceed in the light of the international situation and actual state of the arms race, and it should fully reflect the fundamental principle that the two superpowers should be the first to reduce armaments. The programme should be carried out in stages so as to ensure its

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

effective implementation. For each stage, an indicative time-frame should be provided. And the verification machinery and procedures necessary for reviewing its implementation should be established. Since the programme is to be worked out through serious negotiations, States should undertake obligations and responsibilities arising therefrom and implement the programme in earnest.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has always been an important issue at the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. The continued use of such weapons of mass destruction in massacring people has aroused grave concern on the part of the world public opinion. Over the past year, there have again been many reports on the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and other places. It is disturbing to note that the superpowers which possess large arsenals of chemical weapons are stepping up the production, development and deployment of these weapons. All this commands greater urgency in the task of formulating an international convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. We agree with the proposal of many countries that the mandate of the Working Group be extended.

We maintain that the scope of the prohibition in the future convention should cover the use of chemical weapons. To emphasize anew the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons would supplement and strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In order to ensure implementation of the future convention, we maintain that stringent and effective measures for international verification be provided for, including on-site inspections on the use of chemical weapons, the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons and the dismantling of facilities for their production.

Let me turn now to the question of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. In the face of the grave nuclear threat, the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States demand that, pending nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon States unconditionally undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and that on this basis, negotiations be started as soon as possible to conclude an international convention in this regard. The Chinese delegation supports this demand. We are ready to give positive consideration to proposals made or to be made on this item, provided they are truly conducive to the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In our view, the nuclear-weapon States should consider the reasonable demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States for the guaranteeing of their security. Basing themselves on their own narrow interests, the major nuclear-weapon powers are putting various conditions to non-nuclear-weapon States, and demanding that non-nuclear-weapon States ensure the security of the major nuclear Powers first. Such a practice of putting the cart before the horse is bound to prevent the Committee on Disarmament from making progress on this item.

The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session call upon the Committee to consider at its current session the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. In recent years, the two superpowers have been energetically developing military technology used in outer space. They have in their hands some outer space weapons which are near the operational stage. The fact that the arms race between them has already extended into outer space is another salient feature in the new round of their arms race.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

The development of outer space weapons poses an additional threat to world peace and security and has aroused anxiety and vigilance in the international community. It is appropriate for the Committee on Disarmament to consider the issue of preventing the militarization of outer space. We hold that outer space, the common heritage of mankind, should be used for peaceful purposes in the interest of humanity. We are opposed to any military activities in outer space which jeopardize peace and security. At the same time, we are opposed to the practice of paying lip service to the prevention of the militarization of outer space while actually working hard to develop various types of outer space weapons.

Before concluding my statement, I wish to point out that there is not much time left before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is the hope of the Chinese delegation that the second special session will achieve practical results, thus giving a new impetus to the cause of disarmament. At its current session the Committee should expedite its work so as to make its due contribution to the second special session. The Chinese delegation is ready to make its efforts for the success of the current session of the Committee as well as the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak?

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): I have asked for the floor only in order to make one brief comment, Mr. Chairman. In the statement he made a little while ago, our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union gave some figures designed to prove that in the nuclear sphere there is an approximate equality between the number of devices in the possession of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and the number possessed by the United States and the NATO countries. My delegation heard Ambassador Issraelyan include France's nuclear forces in this evaluation. In this connection, my delegation wishes to repeat that France's nuclear forces cannot be counted together with those of other States. The French nuclear forces are not under the control of any outside authority but are responsible solely to the Government of France. That is all I have to say on this point.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been asked by the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 to inform members that a meeting of the Group will be held tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. in this room.

I wish to inform the Committee that we have a long list of speakers for our plenary meeting on Thursday. I do not think that all members listed for that day could complete their statements during the morning meeting. At the same time, we should bear in mind that the Committee has already agreed that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet on Thursday afternoon. Therefore, I believe that we should hold a third plenary meeting this week, on Friday morning. On Friday morning we can conclude the statements pending from Thursday, and if there is time we could still hold our

(The Chairman)

informal meeting immediately after adjournment of the plenary meeting. If necessary, on Friday afternoon we could continue the informal meeting. If there are no objections, we will proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 11 February, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed by the Committee, an informal meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.153
11 February 1982
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI (Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. V. BEAUGE
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. RAEYMAEKERS
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss R. de CLERCQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG
Mr. LIN CHEN
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. J. MOPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KÖMÍVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. M. NOSTRATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. T. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C.G. MAINA
Mr. D. NANJIRE
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. G. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. ANDERSSON
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. CHICK
Mrs. J. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Miss L.M. SHEA
Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA

Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament
and Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the 153rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

As agreed by the Committee at our last plenary meeting, we will listen this morning to as many speakers as possible and hold another plenary meeting tomorrow morning so that members unable to deliver their statements today may do so on that occasion.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer you my congratulations on assuming the responsibilities of the chairmanship of this Committee and to assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation in carrying out your task. At the same time I wish to express our appreciation to Ambassador Sani for the firm and wise guidance he gave us both at the end of last year and at the beginning of this one. I also extend a very warm welcome to the many new colleagues who have joined us for the new session of the Committee.

My delegation shares the feeling of many distinguished representatives who have spoken before me that the session of the Committee on Disarmament which we have now begun is of special significance because it will be followed by, and is in a sense preparatory to, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are all most conscious that the expectations aroused by the first special session have not been fulfilled, that armed conflict continues to cause widespread suffering in many parts of the world and that the military potential of many States continues to increase.

Against this troubled background, the British Government continues to believe that its first responsibility is to preserve its country's security. In this connection, it remains committed to seeking balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and, in this, it reflects the wishes of the British people. My delegation is conscious of the magnitude of our task here and the difficulties and differences that remain to be overcome; we are aware that arms control is a field where we must be both imaginative and realistic. In this spirit, my delegation is ready to play a full and constructive part in the discussions of the Committee and of its working groups in the hope that significant advances can be achieved before the second special session opens. To fulfil this hope, it is important, in our view, to pay special attention to those areas where progress has already been made and where there seems a better prospect of coming rapidly to agreement. The agreements we all seek will have to be built on confidence and will have to ensure undiminished security for all concerned. For that reason, verification procedures, in which both sides can put their trust, remain an essential key to success in our work. The need for agreements to include adequate verification machinery is underlined by the difficulties that have faced the United Nations Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons. Its inability to produce a conclusive report at the end of its first year of investigation was due in large part to the difficulties it had faced in gaining admission to areas where the alleged treaty violations were taking place. We sincerely hope that the Group will meet with greater co-operation now that its mandate has been extended by General Assembly resolution 36/96 C.

(Mr. Summcrhaves, United Kingdom)

There is also a wider aspect to the question of confidence. Governments, with which decisions on arms control ultimately rest, are constrained by considerations of policy at the international level. It is an inescapable fact that over the past two years, our work in this Committee has been overshadowed by the continuing military occupation of a non-aligned country, Afghanistan, and now the imposition of martial law in Poland has further contributed to tension in the world. Soviet pressure on Poland during the last 18 months has been intense and has included threatening military manoeuvres around Poland's borders, as well as encouragement of, and support for, the imposition of military rule. This is a violation of a number of internationally accepted principles including those dealing with sovereignty, non-intervention, the threat of force, and self-determination. Such violations are bound to affect our work for they undermine mutual trust, which must be the basis for progress. The fact that talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on limiting intermediate nuclear forces have begun is, however, a most encouraging development. My Government attaches the highest importance to progress in these negotiations. The United Kingdom believes that achievement of the zero-level for land-based INF missiles on both sides would be a major contribution to international stability and therefore to progress in other areas of arms control endeavour in which the work of this Committee should figure substantially. We also look forward to the opening of the strategic arms reduction talks with emphasis on deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. We believe that these talks should get under way at an early opportunity.

My Government well understands the views put forward in this Committee and the disappointment that it has not proved possible so far to achieve a CTB. My Government will continue to seek progress on test ban issues.

I turn now to other aspects of the work of the Committee. It is clear that we have a great deal to do in a short space of time. In particular, we have little time to fulfil the responsibility, entrusted to the Committee by the first special session, of preparing a comprehensive programme of disarmament. For this reason, the United Kingdom joined with other Western States in the presentation of a draft programme, contained in document CD/205, during the summer session last year. My delegation has played an active role in the Working Group under Ambassador García Robles' chairmanship since meetings were resumed in January and we believe that these meetings have been most useful in clarifying different approaches to some of the key issues and, in particular, the problem of stages for implementation and of review mechanisms. My delegation welcomes the fact that the Group has now begun work on the drafting of texts for some of the sections of the programme, in particular the section on objectives, where there seems to be a fair degree of concordance in the working papers presented by the various groups and individual States. It is our firm intention to have a draft programme completed by the end of this spring session -- that is, in eleven weeks' time or within a space of perhaps not much more than twenty meetings of the Working Group. The task should be possible, but we shall have to keep our expectations within reasonable and practical limits if we are to accomplish it.

As always, my delegation listened with interest to the remarks made by Ambassador Venkateswaran of India in his statement of 9 February, which he devoted mainly to the comprehensive programme. Not surprisingly, there are a number of

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

points upon which we hold a different view from that expressed by the delegation of India. In particular, we are surprised to find that he considers that document CD/205 does not provide an idea of the route along which we must travel towards general and complete disarmament. In our view, document CD/205 does provide such a route, particularly for the first part of the journey. Thereafter, we have sketched out some possible paths to follow; but we do not consider that it is feasible, when the map is largely uncharted, to go further without adequate review. As I have indicated, however, we believe that the possibility of reaching agreement on the comprehensive programme does exist and that we should now concentrate our efforts in the Working Group on this aim.

Although, as I have made clear, my delegation attaches particular importance at this time to the CPD negotiations, we also believe that members of the Committee should not lose sight of the more direct contribution they can make to progress on arms control through the Committee's work on radiological weapons and, still more, on chemical weapons.

My delegation demonstrated its belief in the value of the early completion of negotiations on a final text of a convention to ban radiological weapons by its support for resolution 36/97 B at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. We are again ready at this present session to play a constructive part in discussions aimed at achieving a generally acceptable text; success in these discussions could provide a useful, if modest, step further forward in arms control. The importance of the measure lies not so much in the likely imminence of the introduction of such weapons -- for radiological weapons would certainly be very difficult to employ -- but in the incalculable and uncontrollable nature of their effects, which could persist long after a war in which the weapons were used, thus affecting future generations. That is sufficient reason for banning this potential class of weapons. I believe that we are most likely to achieve our objective by concentrating on the specific and well-definable issues which were still to be resolved at the end of last year rather than by attempting to cast our net too wide.

I should like now to turn to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which covered a great deal of ground last year under the able and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. The United Kingdom destroyed its entire stock of chemical weapons more than 10 years ago and my Government remains committed, as it has been since negotiations first began in the CCD, to seeking a comprehensive, effective and adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons. My delegation therefore very much welcomed the intensive consideration of the range of issues covered last year. The report of the Working Group showed that there is still a great deal to be done, but it also pointed to a number of areas where a convergence of views is beginning to develop. We hope that the momentum created last year will be maintained during this session; we would, in particular, think it highly regrettable if the work of this Group were in any way to be held up by procedural considerations. We look forward to further substantive progress to report to the second special session devoted to disarmament and, in this connection,

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

we intend shortly to put forward some detailed suggestions on the question of verification. The United Kingdom's views on this subject are already well-known. While the various elements of a convention are clearly bound up with each other, the purpose of the working paper, which, while focusing on verification, will be to build on the progress made on this issue since the United Kingdom tabled its views in 1976. Verification is still the central problem we face in drawing up a convention. Satisfactory resolution of this problem is the only way in which the parties to a convention can have confidence in it.

The United Kingdom considers that verification provisions would be necessary for each stage of implementation -- that is, for the declaration and destruction of stockpiles and production facilities -- and thereafter to monitor the compliance of States, including the monitoring of permitted peaceful uses of chemical warfare agents and dual-purpose agents. It is essential also that the convention should have an effective complaints procedure.

We believe that the verification of implementation of the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities must be under international control. Thereafter, verification of compliance could be by a mixture of bilateral and multilateral contacts between States parties, with an international body -- the Consultative Committee, on which we have already made detailed proposals -- having ultimate responsibility.

Among the other items of business before the Committee to which we attach much importance is a subject commended to our attention by General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99, namely, the question of further measures of arms control in outer space. My delegation hopes that this subject is to be included in the agenda of the Committee for this session and that time will be allocated in our work schedule for discussion of the technical issues which will have to be addressed in this new area of work.

The question of our work schedule to which I have just referred brings me back to the point I mentioned in connection with the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We are faced with a formidable amount of work in a relatively short period, since, for practical purposes, I believe we should finish our session by the middle of April. I believe that we must be guided by the actual possibilities for making progress on particular items and not necessarily by the theoretical allocation of priorities to certain subjects according to their over-all importance in the disarmament field. I also suggest that we might consider reverting to a practice used to good avail during our 1980 session, namely, that of holding less than the usual number of plenary meetings, at least during the latter part of the session, to allow time for extra informal meetings, sessions of the Working Groups and so on. This might be particularly useful when we begin to prepare our reports. If we are to complete the work of this session in good order, it will be necessary to make proper dispositions even at this early stage for our special report to the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, may I offer you my congratulations on your appointment to preside over us for this important, opening month of our negotiations and on the tone of firm and friendly guidance that you have already set. I offer you the co-operation of my delegation in your difficult task.

Though, personally, I did not have the honour of working here under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sani, the distinguished representative of Australia's great northern neighbour, I also wish to express on behalf of my delegation and that of my predecessors our appreciation of the able manner in which he discharged the office of Chairman towards the end of last year's session and early this year.

May I, too, on behalf of the Australian delegation and those who have preceded me in leading it, convey to the delegation of Italy our deep and sincere sympathy on the sad loss of Ambassador Montezemolo. His wisdom and extensive experience will greatly be missed, especially at this moment in history when those qualities are sorely needed.

I take also this opportunity formally to say goodbye to Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands who, with his qualities of common sense and foresight, contributed so much to the work of this Committee. I ask the delegation of the Netherlands to pass on to him our best wishes for every success and happiness in his new work.

Finally, may I thank those who have welcomed me as a newcomer to this key body in international life. I have no illusion that the mantle I assume is easy, but it could not be more worthwhile. With the ready help and encouragement I have received from so many in all quarters of this room, I set myself to contribute to our common task.

Many of our colleagues in this room -- in fact most of them -- have already addressed this session of the Committee on Disarmament. In everything they have said I detect a common theme, and it is an important and encouraging theme, namely, the need for the Committee urgently to get down to business. All of us are sharply aware that the second session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is almost on us. All of us know that at that session the work of this Committee will be judged. The judgement will canvass the structure of the Committee as it was fashioned at the first special session. Inevitably, the way in which the Committee has discharged its mandate, as the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, will also be judged. Those to take the floor before me have pointed out that, for a range of political and procedural reasons, the Committee has not realized its potential. They have also stressed, however, that it is not too late for progress. That is the theme I bring to you in this statement by Australia.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Looking to the special session, it is clear that the Committee on Disarmament has continuously sat in judgement on itself. That is evident from the manner in which the Committee has continued, from year to year, to evolve. As the Secretariat so graphically showed at the end of our last session, we have become progressively more busy, to the point where most delegations are fully stretched to staff all the meetings now scheduled. We have, moreover, been assiduous in adding to our agenda and imaginative in refining the way we work. All that is not only to be welcomed, but encouraged.

So long as the process of evolution continues so long as the Committee still has a potential to realize, there seems to my delegation to be no reason why either its membership or its fundamental structure should be changed.

Already at this session, and frequently in the past, delegations have urged the Committee to focus on items of priority in the sphere of disarmament. In so doing, delegations have urged, above all, that the Committee get down to substance. It is a sentiment I share.

It is not possible for the Committee -- and it is by no means either too small or too unwieldy a Committee -- to tackle the full range of items on the international disarmament agenda: we have no choice but to be selective. Equally, if there are to be results and, as a negotiating body, that is why we are here, we shall need to be economic in the time that we give to matters of procedure.

In the three years since the Committee on Disarmament took shape, it has developed, to an impressive degree, its diplomatic skills. Sadly, they have too often been squandered. We have been busy, but we have done little work. A different approach is needed. We should certainly not attempt to copy the First Committee in New York. We should not be impressed with quantity. We should not puff out our agenda with matters which have not the least chance of successful pursuit. What we have on our agenda we should seriously, soberly, but energetically, address. Meeting obstacles we should be ingenious and versatile. If a working group is too ponderous a frame for our negotiation we should resort to leaner and looser structures. If a mandate cannot be made precisely to fit all, we should seek something more general that allows us, nonetheless, to address substance. There is nothing I see that inherently prevents us from producing results, and concrete results, on every item on our agenda.

I shall cover briefly the main items on our agenda. I preface my remarks on the items by drawing attention to two broad aspects of international disarmament activity.

The first aspect to which I draw attention is the political climate in which such activity takes place.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Many delegations contend, and rightly contend, that substantive progress on arms control, arms reduction and disarmament can take place only if there is trust, if there is a spirit of confidence and mutual respect. In short, can only take place in the right international political climate. Other delegations assert that progress in this sensitive and crucial area can only occur if there is a political will for progress. That also is correct; but it is not different. Political climate and political will are no more than two descriptions of the same thing: agreement is only possible if circumstances and dispositions permit. Since circumstances and dispositions are determined neither by the inanimate nor the abstract, but by human beings, by you and me, Mr. Chairman, the issue is inescapably one for all of us.

Governments cannot and do not hazard their security -- and agreements to disarm or deny require an element of risk, even though that risk cannot but be reciprocal -- without substantial assurance that no harm to their interests will result. Political will is meaningless if the assurance is not there and, in the absence of that assurance, the political climate can only be stormy.

The assurance, in a world of dramatic transitions and of turbulence, is no longer there. The hopes of a decade dissolved in the agony of Afghanistan, even though those who manufactured that agony seek to present it as a kind of public spirited, even generous, contribution to international stability and security. With Afghanistan, a pattern of international co-operation was wrecked, with immediate effects on progress on arms control here in our Committee and elsewhere.

International security, the network of interlocking assurances, is seamless. The breaching of that network anywhere inevitably breaches it everywhere. The dynamics of war, as two speakers of very different standpoints acknowledged, permit no sanctuaries. The force that tatters and tortures Afghanistan continues to be applied and, in its application, damages us all.

Force of another kind, but not so very different, has also, since mid-December, been applied in an area of no less central importance, namely, Poland. The pressures and circumstances that brought about military rule in that country strike at the very heart not only of the United Nations Charter, the testament on which the modern world, its stability and progress have been built, but the Helsinki Final Act and accepted principles of human rights. In so doing, the circumstances surrounding Poland, together with continuing war in Afghanistan, open up the most serious implications for international stability and peace. Poland remains, not only for the reasons I describe, a legitimate cause of international concern, not least for Australians, who with, I venture to say, most, if not all the peoples represented in this room, paid with their lives in many hundreds of thousands in the course of two World Wars touched off by the inability, indeed the reluctance, of the States of Europe to solve their regional and domestic problems without resort to violence or, as we witness in Poland today, the half-naked throat of it. It is for these reasons that my Government states categorically and clearly that there should be an early end to military rule in Poland, the restoration of civil and trade union liberties and a rapid return to circumstances in which the people of Poland are free to solve their own difficulties on the basis of consensus and reconciliation.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

If the political climate is bad and if the assurances, the prospect of security are not as firm as they might be, it is not for us here in this Committee to collapse into despair. We, above all, are charged by our Governments, by our peoples and by the United Nations system to work towards disarmament. That is a key responsibility. It is precisely when the political climate is most difficult, when the assurances each of our States seeks are most lacking, that we of the Committee on Disarmament should be making the most urgent efforts to press our responsibilities and bring forward agreement when none seems possible. I venture to suggest that one substantial achievement, only one achievement, on our part at this session would do much to restore that spirit of optimism in the international community which in recent years has so sadly been lacking.

I turn now to the items on our agenda. For Australia, the first item, the nuclear test ban, has always held special importance. Of the several dozen disarmament resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, few can be said to have much importance for negotiating disarmament. One, however, resolution 36/85, is sufficiently balanced and sufficiently constructive to show the way ahead in tackling the question of a nuclear test ban. I am happy both that Australia played a leading role in drafting this resolution and that it attracted 140 positive votes and no negative votes in plenary. The resolution stresses the indispensable role of this Committee in negotiating a test ban. It also asks the Committee to determine the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system.

In the context of resolution 36/85, the Committee's attention should be drawn again to document CD/95, which my delegation introduced in 1980 and which provides an illustrative list of subjects which might, in this context, be examined by the Committee. Many delegations have, in the past, urged us to be more ambitious and to hold out for immediate, full-scale negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Many delegations have, in the past, considered that only in the forum of a working group could substantive discussion on a CTB take place. It is the view of my delegation that rigidity will not help us in present circumstances, either as to the context or to the way we go about our work. We consider that detailed and practical consideration of the elements of a nuclear test ban can and should take place, at an early date, in one of a range of possible formal or informal sub-groups of this Committee. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has long been a model of patient industry, on just one aspect bearing on an eventual nuclear test ban. There is no reason why other aspects cannot now be addressed with similar efficacy.

The subject of chemical weapons is the other agenda item of particular importance to my delegation. Here again there is a strong and valuable United Nations resolution to guide us. Here, I draw attention to resolution 36/96 A. Here again is a chance for the Committee to be imaginative in the method of its work and to avoid needlessly standing square-on and stationary before a roadblock. There is no doubt that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has run its course and needs revising. So long as a new mandate permits progress its precise terms should not greatly matter: the "elaboration of a chemical weapons convention" seems to us to be our task and there is no earthly use in wasting time on semantics before getting down to it.

There is absolutely no question that the need to ban chemical weapons is urgent. Because such weapons are militarily effective -- providing as they do a flexible and stunning option, particularly for surprise attack -- they are widely

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

deployed in Europe. The asymmetry of deployments is, unfortunately, such that we read reports of plans to add to the stockpiles and systems of chemical weapons there. How much better if the reports were instead of plans for symmetry involving a unilateral reduction of chemical weapon readiness. Since, moreover, chemical weapons are specially effective against the unprotected, there is a constant temptation to use them against less equipped adversaries. This, very likely, lies behind reports from South East Asia and Afghanistan of the use of chemical agents in conflicts there. The reports are a cause for serious distress. The ban for which we call should resolve the ambiguities and close the loopholes which mar related prohibitions, namely, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. Such a ban should, above all, be fully verifiable. Progress here in the next months towards a ban on chemical weapons is one of the achievements which could, in one stroke, both justify the existence of this Committee and constitute a tonic for the world.

Another area where progress is possible is the effort to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This item, the third on the Committee's agenda, was the first to be entrusted to an Ad Hoc Working Group. Although movement has been slow, a real opportunity exists now for acceleration. At the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the delegation of Pakistan introduced a resolution, adopted as resolution 36/95, with 145 favourable votes and no negative votes, which indicates how this important issue may be managed. My delegation will co-operate with others in efforts to ensure a successful outcome on this matter. It would be appropriate if the nuclear-weapon States, whose positions, as set out at the first special session on disarmament, gave impetus to our efforts in this area, were able to advance it for recognition by the second special session.

Turning to the comprehensive programme on disarmament, I should like simply to state our belief that the time has come to start serious drafting. The Working Group spent three rewarding weeks in January thoroughly studying all major issues at stake in the projected programme. However, time is short, the general debate has nearly run its course and intensive drafting is now required. We therefore welcome the establishment of open-ended drafting groups, under the able guidance of Ambassadors de la Gorce of France and de Souza e Silva of Brazil, on those sections of the programme dealing with objectives and priorities. The establishment of the drafting groups reflects, we believe, recognition that, in this case, a working group is too cumbersome an instrument for speedily advancing the Committee's work. We suggest, accordingly, that perhaps only one formal meeting a week of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be sufficient and that the other working period allotted to the CPD should be set aside for drafting or informal consultations.

As to radiological weapons, I say only that the Australian delegation sought last year to play a helpful role in bridging the differences that have so far prevented the Committee from bringing this limited disarmament measure to a conclusion. It is a role which, on behalf of my delegation, I pledge ourselves to maintain this year.

Australia, in part because of geographical circumstance, has long been involved in the adventure of exploring outer space. It is a source of concern to us that that new frontier of man should not be abused. It was for this reason that Australia, at the recent General Assembly, co-sponsored resolution 36/97 C. We consider that, in this first half of its 1982 session, the Committee could best advance its work on the issue of outer space by engaging in a broad exchange of views on the question in all its aspects. This would enable the Committee to take, at a later stage, a more informed approach in dealing substantively with the topic.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Mongolian delegation warmly welcomes you as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February and wishes you success in this important task. We should like to express our appreciation to the Indonesian Ambassador Anwar Sani for his valuable contribution to the work of the Committee during the concluding stage of its last session.

We also welcome our new colleagues, representatives of States members of the Committee, and would assure them of our close co-operation.

Two decades having passed since the establishment in Geneva of the sole multilateral body for disarmament negotiations, and almost four years since the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is time for us to glance backward and consider what the Committee on Disarmament has achieved during this period, what are its present concerns and what they will be in the future.

In the period when a spirit of realism and co-operation prevailed in this forum, accompanied by political will and decisiveness, long and complicated negotiations were held which in the end led to concrete results. I do not intend to dwell on the over-all results of the Committee's work in the past, for those are known to all. I should merely like to observe that if at the present time it is proving impossible to work out, sufficiently effectively, one or other international agreement on partial disarmament measures, that is because of the obstructionist policy and actions of certain States.

As you know, the Committee on Disarmament, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session, and the recommendations made to it by the United Nations General Assembly at its recent sessions, has identified the particular aspects of disarmament on which negotiations should be conducted, and each year it draws up its agenda accordingly.

Numerous draft documents on almost all the items on the agenda are already on the negotiating table. It should be noted that predominant among these are specific proposals and initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They also include a number of valuable proposals by the group of non-aligned and neutral States members of the Committee.

The socialist countries have consistently and firmly urged the earliest possible initiation of effective negotiations on the key disarmament issue --- that of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Their position of principle and concrete approach to the problem are set forth clearly and exactly in document CD/4, which is based on the Soviet proposal for the ending of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they have been completely eliminated.

The socialist States have frequently set forth their views on the situation in this respect, in joint statements containing a general appraisal of the results of the work of recent sessions of the Committee on Disarmament.

(in. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The main point is that the Committee should embark immediately on preparations for negotiations on this top priority question for which purpose it is essential to set up an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate.

The socialist countries believe, in fact, that the adoption of effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have overriding importance in the present-day difficult conditions of the international situation. The peoples of the world are profoundly alarmed at the increase in the risk of a nuclear catastrophe as a result of the unbridled nuclear arms race and the notorious doctrine of the limited or partial use of nuclear weapons.

This situation has given rise in various parts of the world, including the United States and many western European countries, to increasingly widespread mass anti-war demonstrations in which the people are energetically demanding that the danger of the outbreak of a war in which nuclear weapons are used should be averted in time.

In this connection, I should like to emphasize that the Mongolian People's Republic attaches great importance to the Soviet American talks now going on in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The People's Republic of Mongolia sets a high value on the new proposal put forward by President L.I. Brezhnev at his recent meeting and conversation with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament. Those proposals, which are in line with the Soviet Union's consistent attitude on the question of the reduction of nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe, are essentially designed to promote the desired results of the negotiations on the basis of the principles of equality and equal security and the adoption of a mutually acceptable decision for the purpose of averting a nuclear catastrophe.

In this connection, too, I should like to stress the importance of the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union. In this historic document, the United Nations solemnly proclaimed that first resort to the use of nuclear weapons constituted the gravest crime against humanity, vigorously denounced any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons as incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations, and called upon the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

This Declaration emphasizes that the nuclear arms race must be stopped and reversed by joint efforts through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality, having as their ultimate goal the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Such is the will of the majority of the States members of the United Nations.

The United States and its allies in NATO and other military groupings showed a negative attitude towards this important Declaration, and they are continuing to block efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to prepare for and initiate negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Erdenbileg, Mongolia)

At its last session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 36/92 E entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects". This resolution contains a number of provisions which could serve as a basis for defining the range of questions to be dealt with by one of the subsidiary bodies of our Committee. It recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed, as a first step, to the consideration of the stages of nuclear disarmament and their approximate content, and in particular the content of the first stage. It also states that the General Assembly deems it appropriate that the Committee should consider, within the framework of the discussion on the content of the measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons.

The Mongolian delegation, together with many other delegations in this Committee, is resolutely in favour of consultations being vigorously continued in this forum, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon powers, so that we may embark as speedily as possible on negotiations on the substance of the question. The unwillingness of certain nuclear-weapon powers to proceed to serious negotiations on this issue is the main reason for the Committee's postponement of the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The situation is no better as regards the tripartite negotiations. As may be remembered, these negotiations were interrupted through the fault of the Western participants. We call upon them to emulate the readiness of the Soviet Union to resume those tripartite negotiations without delay, so as to facilitate a positive decision on other important measures in the sphere of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian People's Republic has supported and continues to support the urgent appeal to all States which have still not done so, to accede without delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and until such accession to refrain from carrying out tests in the media to which this Treaty applies. The negative attitude of China and its followers towards this appeal by the overwhelming majority of the world's States is a matter of profound concern not only to Mongolia, but also to countries in other parts of the world. This negativism should be roundly condemned.

We are firmly convinced that the Committee on Disarmament, in which all the nuclear-weapon States are represented, is called upon to make a decisive contribution towards the achievement of an international agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. For this purpose it is urgently necessary to set up an ad hoc working group, as has repeatedly been proposed by the socialist countries and the Group of 21.

If the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom again prevent the start of negotiations on the substance of the question, the efforts of the vast majority of the members of this Committee will once again have been in vain. But the responsibility for the absence so far of any effective negotiations may be laid at the door of those who do not wish to contribute to the adoption of an important measure towards the halting of the further improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Erdembiler, Mongolia)

In this connection, I should like to draw attention to the United States decision concerning the full-scale production and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons, the barbaric nature of which I do not need to describe to you. This reckless decision on the part of the Washington administration has aroused great alarm and anxiety among the peoples not only of western Europe but also of other parts of the world, because these weapons constitute the greatest danger to mankind, add a new means of mass destruction to military arsenals and further escalate the nuclear arms race.

In view of this development, the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for the first time adopted by a majority vote (the United States and its few NATO allies opposing) resolution 36/92 K, in which it requests the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations without delay with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

The Mongolian delegation recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should adopt a decision to set up an ad hoc working group and get down to negotiations. The draft convention on this question submitted to the Committee by a group of socialist countries could serve as a useful basis for this purpose.

The question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present is another issue calling for the adoption of an immediate decision. This would help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would facilitate the subsequent implementation of important measures for the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States.

Unfortunately, it must be noted that the General Assembly's request to the Committee at the end of 1980 to start negotiations on this question without delay is still thrust into the background, for reasons of which we are all aware in this forum.

The Mongolian delegation would like to remind members of this Committee that at its thirty-sixth session the United Nations General Assembly adopted a similar recommendation. We do not think that there can be two opinions in this forum about the need to start negotiations as soon as possible on the substance of this issue and to adopt a decision to set up an appropriate subsidiary body.

A quarter of a century has passed since man first began to explore outer space. His concern to prevent that space from being used for military purposes dates from that very same time. More than one international agreement has been elaborated and adopted prohibiting any objects equipped with nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction from being placed in orbit around the Earth or stationed in outer space by any other method.

However, these measures have been insufficient to avert completely the danger of the militarization of outer space. For use has been made to this end of the absence, in the relevant international agreements, of any provision

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

banning the stationing in outer space of types of weapons which do not come under the definition of "weapons of mass destruction". As you know, various military preparations and a whole range of programmes for conducting war in outer space are being elaborated in the United States. Such attempts to turn outer space into an arena for the arms race are fraught with far-reaching consequences for peace and international security.

In the interests of the future peaceful use of outer space for the good of all mankind, and averting the danger of an arms race in outer space, the Soviet Union has put forward an important proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

In our view, the Soviet proposal is based on a comprehensive approach to the solution of the problem. General Assembly resolution 36/99 requests the Committee in unambiguous terms to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty.

It seems to us that the Committee should reach agreement on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this question and on a clearly defined mandate for its work.

The Mongolian delegation again shares the concern of other delegations at the Committee's failure to reach agreement on a complete and effective ban on the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and their destruction. At the same time the continuing activities in respect of the production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons are a source of deep concern.

In this connection, I should like to stress the importance of the provision in General Assembly resolution 36/95 B which, inter alia, calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present. We are also in favour of giving the re-established Ad Hoc Working Group a broader and more specific mandate.

In the view of the Mongolian delegation, what is necessary for the achievement of positive progress both in bilateral and in multilateral efforts towards the complete prohibition of chemical weapons is a demonstration of political will and realism, and an honest and conscientious approach to the substance of the problem, and it is these that are insufficient, if not entirely lacking, in certain Western participants in the negotiations.

Other questions which are now the subject of further consideration in this multilateral forum also call for a constructive and realistic approach. It seems to us that the difficult negotiations on the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons, and also on that of the strengthening of the assurances of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, should be continued.

(Mr. Erdenbileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation considers that, when the Committee comes to consider the agenda item dealing with new types of weapons of mass destruction, it should pay special attention to paragraph 7 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/69, calling upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject, bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council.

As regards the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, I should like to point out that the general attitude of the socialist countries is based on the principles by which they are guided in their over-all efforts in the cause of peace and disarmament, and they are in particular in favour of the idea of elaborating and adopting agreed sets of measures aimed at putting an end to the arms race and achieving genuine disarmament by stages within the framework of established time-limits. This clear and precise position was set forth in detail at a recent plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

We also strongly support the view that the disarmament process would undoubtedly be furthered by the implementation of practical measures to strengthen international peace and security and by the creation of a climate of trust and mutual understanding among States. The assumption by States of an undertaking strictly to implement confidence-building measures, not to use force or the threat of force, not to commit acts of aggression -- all this could be of great value in furthering the cause of disarmament.

The Mongolian People's Republic had this interrelationship very much in mind when it proposed the conclusion of a convention on non-aggression and the non-use of force in the relations between Asian and Pacific Ocean States.

The head of our State, Mr. Y. Usdenbal, in his message of 21 September 1981 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which he offered some specific suggestions regarding the basic provisions of such a convention, in particular emphasized that "an important place must be given to provisions providing for energetic action by the participating States on such crucial aspects of the strengthening of peace and security as measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation and to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament".

We believe that this essential interrelationship should be given concrete expression in the appropriate section of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament now being elaborated in this forum.

The Mongolian delegation intends to continue to co-operate closely with the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group, which is working intensively under the able and experienced guidance of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles.

(Mr. Erdenbileg, Mongolia)

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament is taking place in continuing conditions of world tension. The opponents of peace, détente and disarmament, who are actively pursuing a new round in the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, are endeavouring to achieve military superiority and to destroy the existing military parity.

It is impossible not to notice, also, the growing aggressiveness of the forces of imperialism and reaction in certain parts of the world. The United States and its main allies are not only impeding the equitable settlement of explosive situations, but are openly intensifying their expansionist policy and actions.

The Mongolian People's Republic, as a peace-loving Asian State, is seriously concerned at the marked exacerbation of the situation in the Middle East as a result of the annexation by Israel of the Syrian Golan Heights, which it has been occupying since 1967 unlawfully and in defiance of the decisions of the United Nations, including a Security Council resolution. These acts of banditry on the part of Israel were perpetrated only thanks to the military and diplomatic support of the Washington administration. It is a well-known fact that the United States veto in the Security Council prevented the adoption of the measures authorized by the Charter against this wanton aggressor and is enabling him to spread his wings even further. It is against this background of wicked mockery of the intelligence of the members of the Committee that we see the United States representative weeping crocodile tears here over the violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.

In an attempt to divert attention from the actions of its protégé in the Middle East, the United States is now stirring up the so-called Polish question, although the internal events in that country do not and never can constitute any kind of international problem. However, Washington has found these events entirely suitable as a means of diverting attention from Israel's aggressive actions and from a constructive dialogue and the solution of the most urgent international problems.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, together with other socialist States, firmly believes that questions relating to the sovereign rights of socialist Poland should cease to be used as a pretext for increasing international tension and diverting the attention of peoples from the solution of the vital problems of strengthening peace and security, ending the arms race and achieving disarmament.

Equally disturbing is the continued aggression of South African racists against the freedom-loving African peoples. As in the Middle East, the source of tension in South Africa would already long since have been eliminated and all Africa would have been free, had it not been for the direct assistance of the United States and other imperialistic States --- assistance which has already been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations General Assembly.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

With the coming to power in Washington of the new Administration, which has no scruples about publicly proclaiming its racist sympathies, the Pretoria régime has finally cast off all restraint, as is shown, inter alia, by its suspension of plans for a settlement of the Namibia question and its ceaseless acts of aggression against Angola and other neighbouring States.

All these facts undoubtedly have an extremely adverse effect on the international climate. And I repeat the word facts, for these are not just idle conjectures and examples of a double standard like those that could be found in such abundance in the recent statement of the United States representative.

Apropos, I should also like to say a few words about that statement by Mr. Rostow. I have been participating in the work of the Committee on Disarmament for many years and am familiar with its previous activities from what my colleagues have told me. I and many others have come to the conclusion that never before in all the twenty years of the Committee's history was there a statement so gross in form and so slanderous in content as the one made by the United States representative at the last plenary meeting and directed against a whole group of States members of this Committee. That speech consisted almost entirely of a succession of varied anti-socialist and anti-Soviet insinuations.

The Mongolian delegation, together with the majority of delegations of member States, would like to see an increase in the effectiveness and an improvement in the organization of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. It is also necessary to take into account the special character of the present stage in the Committee's work in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

While it is in favour of continued negotiations in the Committee on the key problems of disarmament the Mongolian delegation together with other delegations of socialist countries considers that the emphasis in such activities should be placed on the work of subsidiary bodies. That is to say, negotiations on the substance of these questions should take place in ad hoc working groups, with a view to their elaborating the texts of appropriate agreements. To this end it will be necessary, in our view, to provide for the possibility of longer working periods for the Committee's subsidiary bodies, regardless of the scheduling of the work of other international conferences.

In conclusion, the Mongolian delegation would like to express its readiness to co-operate closely with members of the Committee during this particularly crucial session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, first of all, allow me to offer the good wishes and congratulations of my delegation to you, the representative of a fellow non-aligned country, on assuming the chairmanship of this Committee. May I pledge the support and assistance of my delegation to you in your arduous task this month.

I would also like, on behalf of my delegation, to express appreciation of the service that was given to the Committee by our former Chairman, Ambassador Sani. He very skilfully and tactfully assisted the Committee in accomplishing a great deal.

Permit me to add a word of welcome to all the distinguished representatives who have taken their seats in this Committee for the first time. Our good wishes go out to them for success in their work here.

At the commencement of every session of this Committee, we are privileged to listen to authoritative assessments of the current international political situation. Since last week, that privilege has been renewed for us and there has been unanimity in the views expressed in this Committee on the worsening state of world politics. The distinguished representatives who have spoken earlier have drawn attention to the fact that tension in the world has visibly increased and there has been a steady drift away from an era of détente and relaxed relations. New shadows are appearing and the prospects for peace and security seem to be receding. My delegation is in accord with these assessments.

At the same time, we have been given various interpretations of why the current international situation has evolved in the way it has during the last year. A variety of diagnoses has been offered to us. My delegation finds it difficult to agree fully with all these interpretations. In our view, the causes that have brought about the current situation go back to over thirty years. It is our belief that international security and peace is not the product of piecemeal accommodation and limited co-operation in a few areas, but of a sustained process of détente -- a process that is not limited to the leading Powers in blocs or to blocs, but is universal in scope and functional in character. Such a process can spring to life and progress only in conditions where arms control and the will to implement genuine disarmament are at the very centre of the policies pursued.

As long as there is unremitting and unlimited reliance on baroque theories of the balance of power with its calculus of terror, there can be no lasting peace process. The limitless reliance on arms and the striving for parities and superiorities in defensive and offensive weaponry are in our view the very causes that generate and increase international tensions. This point of view has been expressed in this Committee many a time. It seems to have convinced no one. We, however, still hope that over the years new approaches to national security can be developed and accepted.

The debates in this Committee since it commenced work last week have given rise to two questions in the mind of my delegation. It will come as no surprise to me if others share the doubts that are in my own mind. The first question that has arisen, at least for me, is whether this session of the Committee will turn out to be the

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

forum for a continuing exchange of charges and counter-charges as to who caused the arms race, who is in it and who is ahead or behind. I am sure that no conclusions on this issue could be arrived at by this Committee. The fact of the matter is that there is a continuing increase in military expenditure, in the accumulation of arms, nuclear and conventional. In the light of this, what is the Committee ready to accomplish? We can debate till the end of April or beyond on the level of armaments and how rapidly they proliferate and who proliferates how much, but, at the end of the session, the volume of arms would certainly have increased and we would not have arrived at a consensus answer to the question.

The second question that troubles me is: will this Committee finally be transformed into a mere barometer that reads every nuance of temperature change in East-West relations. Will it cease to be the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations and become yet another forum where we shall deliberate on the current international situation, what brought it about and how it can be improved?

The word "linkages" has been used in this Committee. Whether these so-called linkages will become the most influential determinant of what takes place in the Committee in the coming weeks is a question that must surely be in the minds at least of some of us. My delegation hopes that the Committee's work will not be shackled by the so-called linkages, which, if pursued to their logical end, will surely link us all to failure in the Committee.

My delegation hopes that in the very testing times that we are passing through the Committee's efforts will be directed towards replacing polemics with persuasion that can pave the way for genuine and purposive negotiation. If we fail to achieve this spirit at this session of the Committee, we will be approaching the second special session devoted to disarmament on an unsure footing.

I speak on disarmament today from the viewpoint of a small, non-aligned developing country that is totally insignificant as far as military expenditures are concerned. Sri Lanka has held, and holds, that its national security is attained and safeguarded not by high military preparedness to deter any future adversary. We believe that the economic security of the country and all its citizens in conditions of freedom and equality is the most reliable safeguard and defence of the sovereignty of the State and the people. This security can be achieved and sustained only through a deliberate policy of development which will ensure for our millions an opportunity to work gainfully and honourably and to profit from their labours.

But our economic development is not something that we can implement successfully in a vacuum of our own. We live and work in an interdependent world. As a small island State, we are perhaps more dependent on the outside world. The international environment, political and economic, is therefore of paramount importance to us and it is a critical factor that influences and conditions the success or failure of our own efforts. As long as there are tensions, crises and conflict situations, the environment in which we make our efforts is adversely affected.

Genuine arms control and disarmament can and do affect the international climate swiftly and positively and therefore have an important link with and a bearing on our own development efforts. To us, the link between disarmament and development is

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

obvious, strong and inescapable. It is not my intention to embark on a discussion of the complex question of disarmament and development, though the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly has, in paragraph 7 of resolution 36/92 G, recommended that this Committee should take into account in future disarmament negotiations the report on disarmament and development which is contained in document A/36/356 and Corr.1 and was prepared by a Group of Experts chaired by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson.

All I wish to do is to touch on one aspect, namely, the contribution that disarmament can make in improving the international climate in which all countries seek economic development. It is our view that it is very difficult for us to pursue our perception of national security, which is national economic development, in the context of international insecurity. The arms race, the gradual militarization of all parts of the world and the resulting insecurity affects us adversely, creating concerns and fears which detract from our domestic effort.

Let me illustrate this. Fifteen years ago, the Indian Ocean was a pacific ocean which served every maritime user of it and the littoral States of the Indian Ocean had little or no cause for concern. Since then, that ideal situation has been greatly eroded. In 1971, Sri Lanka, along with several other States, sought the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. But what has taken place? The Indian Ocean is now crowded with all manner of naval vessels bristling with conventional and nuclear weapons. Tension in the region has increased. Regional stability is undermined. We in Sri Lanka have been involuntarily catapulted into the range of a possible nuclear exchange. The sum total of all this is the emergence of new concerns and anxieties for us. These are not imaginary, but they are real ones. Such situations can be found elsewhere around the world. There are many developing countries which find that international insecurity is impairing their development efforts. In our view, it is only under conditions of great security and peace that we can fully assert our freedom and independence and achieve progress. That is our objective and a tension-free disarming environment is a prerequisite for our success in achieving it.

My delegation therefore wishes to urge the distinguished representatives of this Committee to give greater weight in their deliberations and negotiations to disarmament as a factor that is imperative for the peaceful and sustained implementation of economic development in countries such as mine.

We in this Committee may differ on various aspects of the question of disarmament and development, but, in our view, there can be no dispute between us on the link between disarmament and its impact on creating a tension-free international political environment in which development can take place.

In urging this point of view, we neither underestimate nor ignore developments in other regions of the world. What happens in East-West relations, in the security situation of one region or more of the world is of critical importance to the issue of disarmament. But, in our view, the importance attached to these factors should not be at the cost of other factors, which should also not become the sole determining influence on the scope, direction and pace of disarmament negotiations in this Committee and elsewhere.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

I wish to express the appreciation of my Government to the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for their decision to commence and continue talks on the reduction of intermediate-range theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. In our view, this is a favourable development which we hope will end in success. We also hope that these talks will lead to a start on strategic arms reductions negotiations and that both countries will not be diverted from the course they have chosen to follow this year. Success in the current and future talks could, in our view, lead the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics away from their current strategies for annihilation towards new strategies of peace. This is what the whole world expects of them.

In exactly four months from today, the lights in this chamber will have been dimmed, the seats will be empty and the scene will have moved to New York. It is superfluous to speak on the importance and significance of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We all attach great importance to it and hope for its success. It is the first special session to be held in the Second Disarmament Decade and it will be watched by millions who hope that it will turn out to be a very significant milestone on the tortuous path towards general and complete disarmament. It is not an exaggeration to say that never before in human history has there been so much pressure for the success of a meeting on disarmament. Never before have so many hopes and expectations been focused on an international forum for securing a real, genuine breakthrough on the road to disarmament.

In this context, the current session of this Committee is invested with a tremendous responsibility. Everyone in this Committee is aware of that responsibility and the thrust and rhythm of the Committee's work will no doubt reflect this awareness.

Coming to the agenda before us, my delegation is in general accord with Working Paper No. 47 that has been circulated by the Secretariat. I would like to make a few observations on some of the agenda items at this stage.

In our view, items 1 and 2 are still the highest priority items, despite our failure to set up working groups on them at the last session. There can be no lessening of the desire of the overwhelming majority of members of this Committee for such a course of action. It is our view that discussion and debate on the two items have clearly demonstrated that they are mature and ripe enough for consideration in separate working groups. This point of view was reinforced at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and we hope the opposition to the proposal will not continue to repeat itself.

There was a proposal to join items 1 and 2 together, but the Chairman was kind enough to inform the Committee yesterday that there was no consensus for this proposal and items 1 and 2 will therefore remain as they are. My delegation feels that is the wisest decision that could have been taken.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

The centre-piece of the second special session will be the comprehensive programme of disarmament. What is this Committee's contribution going to be in this regard? The Committee has been served with working papers by the Group of 21, a group of Western countries and, last week, by Czechoslovakia on behalf of a group of socialist countries. The Ad Hoc Working Group, under the indefatigable chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles, who has with tact, skill and many years of expertise helped to guide the Working Group, has discussed at great length the varying perceptions, concepts, measures, time-table and some of the practical problems of implementing a CPD. We fully support the working paper contained in document CD/223, which, although it does not cover all aspects, is a comprehensive presentation not of a utopian programme, but of a strategy that is oriented towards a continuing, progressive and balanced process of general and complete disarmament. My delegation agrees that the adoption of a CPD by itself will not open the flood-gates of sudden and universal disarmament. But it is a necessary instrument if we are to move decisively and progressively towards general and complete disarmament. It will help to avoid "stop-and-go" situations, which have characterized previous disarmament efforts. We see in it a solemn commitment to the systematic pursuit of disarmament negotiations.

True enough, such an instrument cannot be negotiated without difficulty. The deliberations in the Working Group have proved this to be so. The distinguished Ambassador of India has explained and clarified a number of issues that were raised in this Committee. I am sure his explanations will now contribute towards more progress in the Working Group.

The Group of 21 will present further working papers on areas not covered in document CD/223 and these, I am sure, will help the Working Group arrive at early decisions. The CPD is a novel exercise and therefore must break new ground. It necessarily calls for flexibility in our thinking and creative innovation in our approach. My delegation is confident that these attributes will not be lacking in the Working Group.

Item 7 of the draft agenda suggests that we discuss further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. My delegation fully supports all measures designed to safeguard outer space as the common heritage of mankind that should not become the scene for an arms race the like of which we are unable to control here on earth. My delegation can therefore live with this item being on the agenda. But, we would like to underline the need for this Committee to give the highest priority to the items that have already been before us for so long. Whilst recognizing the emergence of new dangers, we must not overlook our failure to tackle serious dangers, **that** have been with us for so long. My delegation therefore hopes that we can arrive at a mutually agreeable decision on item 7 without protracted debate.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, may I touch on agenda item 3(a) -- the special report of this Committee to the second special session. My delegation is of the view that the Committee should allocate reasonable and adequate time for a discussion of this item. This is a special kind of report. It is the first of its kind. It will have to serve the second special session in its deliberations on disarmament and the question of machinery for disarmament. It can therefore not be just a narrative or cataloguing of the success or failure of the Committee's work. It has to be evaluative at least to some extent.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

The report should, in our view, give a clear profile of how the Committee functioned in relation to the mandates that were given to it. The format and contents of the report should reflect adequately and accurately the functioning of the Committee. We are all interested in improving the machinery of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Our report can be supportive of the quest for the optimum machinery towards that end.

In conclusion, even at the cost of generalizing, may I say the following. When His Holiness Pope John Paul II was in Hiroshima, he said that: "In the past, it was possible to destroy a village, a town, a region, even a country. Now it is the whole planet that has come under threat. This fact should finally compel everyone to face a basic moral consideration: from now on, it is only through a conscious choice and through a deliberate policy that humanity can survive". We are in this Committee because our Governments have made that choice and adopted the deliberate policy of support for disarmament. Our task is to implement what our Governments have opted for. Whether this millennium ends in war or in peace will depend to some extent on whether we contribute to the disarmament process. My delegation is here to assist this Committee in its tasks because we in Sri Lanka want peace for all, East, West, North and South. This, we believe, is the commitment of all of us in the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, as I am taking the floor for the first time at a plenary meeting, I wish to congratulate you as Chairman of the Committee for the first month of the 1982 session and offer you the full support and co-operation of the Hungarian delegation. Our words of appreciation are addressed to Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia who held the chair with success from the beginning of August 1981 to the opening of the present session. When I extend my sincere welcome to our new colleagues, I wish to assure them that my delegation stands ready to maintain the good relations it had with their predecessors.

A significant part of the statements made so far have been devoted to an assessment and evaluation of the international situation. The general tone of the evaluations, I must note with regret, is dark and heavily loaded with worry and disappointment. The alarming trend which had been characteristic of the last years is still prevalent today. The international climate continues to worsen and the danger of war is growing. The attempts of extreme imperialist circles, aimed at upsetting the balance of forces and attaining military superiority, have caused another escalation of the arms race, thus increasing tensions in the world, particularly in Europe. The rude and hostile propaganda campaigns of those circles, their continued interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, the mounting anti-Sovietism and anticommunism poison the atmosphere, destroy confidence and thus hamper the solution of the most important political problems and conflicts. This trend of events, as a direct consequence, renders more difficult than ever the conduct of negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

In the last few days, this Committee was subjected to a barrage of lectures whose sole purpose was to divert attention from the real intentions of certain circles and to distort facts that have long been part of history books. For the sake of those who may have forgotten the hard facts of the history of the arms race and who want to create a scare concerning Soviet military threats, may I be allowed to recall briefly which side was the first in the post-war period to introduce various new weapons and systems of such weapons, which side launched new waves of the arms race and which side was forced to respond:

the atomic bomb was introduced in 1946 by the United States and only four years later by the Soviet Union;

the hydrogen bomb was introduced in 1953 by the United States and one year later by the Soviet Union;

the strategic bomber: introduced in 1953 by the United States, four years later by the Soviet Union;

the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): in 1953 by the United States, four years later by the Soviet Union;

the tactical nuclear weapon: in 1955 by the United States, one year later by the Soviet Union;

the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): in 1955 by the United States, two years later by the Soviet Union;

the nuclear submarine: in 1956 by the United States, six years later by the Soviet Union;

the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM): in 1959 by the United States, nine years later by the Soviet Union;

the anti-ballistic missile (ABM): in 1960 by the United States, one year later by the Soviet Union;

the MRV warhead: in 1964 by the United States, six years later by the Soviet Union;

the MIRV warhead: in 1970 by the United States, five years later by the Soviet Union;

the cruise missile: in 1976 by the United States;

the neutron weapon: in 1981 by the United States.

The list of uncontested facts speaks for itself.

The history of multilateral disarmament negotiations, on the other hand, proves that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and the conduct of serious talks between them on arms limitation and disarmament questions have a direct influence on multilateral negotiations. We must note therefore with the deepest regret that the United States has halted or frozen all such previous talks and persists in blocking their renewal. Since such talks directly affect the security of all States, the Hungarian Government urges the earliest possible renewal of Soviet-American negotiations, especially those on the limitation of strategic arms.

(Mr. Kömivás, Hungary)

We recently noted with satisfaction the reopening here in Geneva of the Soviet-American negotiations on the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and sincerely hope that they will lead to the expected results in the near future.

As I represent here the Government of a European State, may I be allowed to make a brief remark in connection with the reopening of the Madrid meeting. Despite the attempts of the NATO countries to poison the atmosphere right from the start, we still have some hopes that the participating States will be able to overcome the difficulties they face. The Hungarian Government attaches outstanding significance to the decision expected from the Madrid meeting, which would call for the earliest possible convocation of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe.

The sense of urgency relayed by the massive demonstrations and public actions in favour of peace and disarmament also was manifest at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. The overwhelming majority of the Member States clearly expressed their determination to preserve the results achieved so far and to proceed with new initiatives for meaningful negotiations.

The representatives of the Hungarian People's Republic at the thirty-sixth session explained in detail the position of my Government on all the major items and contributed actively to the adoption of several important resolutions. I can therefore limit myself today to a few questions which we consider, at this juncture, to be of outstanding importance. At later stages of our debates, we shall return to them and to other items on our agenda with more details and, whenever possible, with practical suggestions.

The question of the highest priority for the Committee continues to be that of halting the nuclear arms race, eliminating the threat of nuclear war and providing for a decisive turn to measures of nuclear disarmament. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly bear witness to that urgency.

Among the resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, one of the most significant is the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe. On the initiative of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly proclaimed the first use of nuclear weapons the "gravest crime against humanity", for which there cannot be and "will never be any justification or pardon". In the view of the Hungarian Government, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfil the "supreme duty and direct obligation" expressed in the resolution to conduct negotiations "in good faith and on the basis of equality" leading ultimately to the "complete elimination of nuclear weapons".

Numerous proposals have been made to that effect, such as the one presented in 1979 by the group of socialist delegations in this Committee. According to the programme contained in document CD/4, business-like negotiations should be started without delay on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually

(Mr. Kórmives, Hungary)

reducing their stockpiles until their complete destruction. Subsequently, it was also proposed that an ad hoc working group should be established to provide the appropriate framework for the negotiations. In my delegation's view, those proposals are still valid, topical and timely, as confirmed by General Assembly resolution 36/92 E.

One of the most urgent aspects of nuclear disarmament is the general and complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. My delegation, like the vast majority around this table, has long been advocating the establishment of an ad hoc working group entrusted with the elaboration of a treaty on the subject. That has become even more pressing since the trilateral negotiations are not likely to be resumed in the foreseeable future, due to the obstinate position of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the field of nuclear disarmament, the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons calls for urgent attention. Delegations of the socialist group therefore made a proposal last year to set up a subsidiary body with the task of working out an international instrument for that purpose. The General Assembly in resolution 36/92 K called on this Committee "to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework". An ad hoc working group would, in our view, constitute that framework and a solid basis for its activity is provided in the draft convention submitted by the socialist delegations in 1978.

Still in the domain of nuclear disarmament, the Hungarian delegation suggests that the Committee should pay appropriate attention to such aspects as the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and to the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, let me refer to the proceedings of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, where special emphasis was placed "on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the European continent, including Northern Europe and the Balkans". In the context of the negotiations on the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, participants in that meeting favoured "ultimately making Europe totally free of nuclear weapons."

The problem of negotiations on the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction is of equally great importance because the ongoing new round of the arms race would have very dangerous consequences. Reports on plans to start the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, known as binary chemical warfare agents, and to deploy them in Europe have caused great alarm on our continent and elsewhere. Such steps may destroy the results achieved so far.

(Mr. Kórníves, Hungary)

My delegation considers that the work on a treaty to prohibit the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons should be greatly intensified this year. We have a solid basis for a substantial advance, provided by the Ad Hoc Working Group entrusted with that task last year. The Working Group should therefore be re-established at the earliest possible date with an appropriately revised mandate, which should envisage raising our activities to a qualitatively new level to start the elaboration of at least some of the provisions of the future treaty.

Resolution 36/96 B adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in the context of the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons contains at least two new elements which should be kept in mind by the Working Group. The resolution "calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present".

The Committee on Disarmament has to pay proper attention to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The General Assembly, in resolution 36/89, requested the Committee "to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement ... and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons". Taking into account the positive results of our proceedings conducted in the framework of informal meetings with experts, my delegation proposes that the Committee should consider the holding of similar meetings also this year. In the course of such meetings, thought might be given to the possible mandate of a group of governmental experts to be set up, we hope, in the near future.

The holding of such meetings would be beneficial also from the point of view of the implementation of paragraph 3 of resolution 36/89 calling upon "the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject; bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council". The Committee could consider concrete formulations for such a declaration, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. The Hungarian delegation is prepared to present at a later stage further details in that respect.

(Mr. Kóníves, Hungary)

Beyond the substantive importance of the problem, I, as a former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, feel strong personal attachment to the subject. However, I do not wish to go into details, but to reiterate my conviction that the Committee is in a position to reach agreement on the subject in a few months, given greater flexibility by certain delegations. In our view, the problem of the protection of civilian nuclear facilities, which is undoubtedly an important and timely one, should be handled and solved separately. That is the way to achieve results in both respects. That is the way to fulfil the duty described in General Assembly resolution 36/97 C.

The provisional agenda of the Committee has been enlarged this year to include a new item in accordance with the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 36/99. The Hungarian delegation fully supports the inclusion of the item and suggests that the Committee should decide without delay to set up a subsidiary organ to be charged with the consideration and elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

Before turning to the last subject of my intervention, I wish to make a few short comments on some organizational matters. Contrary to what we succeeded in achieving at a very early stage of our spring session last year, we have been so far unable to reach consensus, or even to identify the bases of such a consensus, on our agenda and programme of work. Unfortunately, no signs of speedy results are visible on the horizon in respect of the establishment of working groups.

This is really a serious phenomenon because we must, this year more than before, considerably intensify our efforts at negotiations. We must speed up the informal discussions on organizational and procedural matters and make full use of the precious time we have at our disposal so that the report we are to submit to the second special session will not be an admission of total impotency.

As we have stated on various occasions, the Hungarian Government attaches great importance to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In our view, that session will have to be a source of new momentum for disarmament efforts by all States. It should encourage the preparation of realistic proposals, promote negotiations on such proposals and create the constructive atmosphere which is so necessary to the solution of numerous problems.

We are looking forward to an action-oriented session and want to contribute to its success. We want to assure that the results achieved at the first special session are preserved and further developed. We want to promote the

(Mr. Kömíves, Hungary)

maintenance of the principles enshrined in the Final Document and, on that basis and in accordance with the programme of action contained therein, we want to be instrumental in the preparation and adoption of a comprehensive programme on disarmament — a programme which is realistic, properly balanced and also capable of mobilizing massive public support. Our position on the details of such a programme was presented at the opening meeting by the representative of Czechoslovakia; therefore, I need not repeat them now.

Before concluding my statement, I wish to make a few remarks on a very dangerous trend which started at the very beginning of this session. On the pretext of evaluating the international situation, the representatives of certain Governments allowed themselves the liberty of using this Committee as a platform for political invectives. The Hungarian delegation rejects most categorically every attempt at interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, as well as allegations concerning "outside pressure and campaign".

I am convinced that I express the feelings also of the other socialist delegations when I consider it even more regrettable that some representatives did not content themselves with a simple exercise of throwing slander and accusations at other States. They went further and tried to pass judgement on the nature of a social system which others, including the members of a number of delegations around this table, consider as their own.

The statement delivered by Mr. Rostow of the United States was a most outrageous one, unprecedented in the history of this Committee. Instead of giving us a detailed description of the disarmament policy of the new United States administration, which the Committee has long been waiting for, he devoted about two-thirds of his time to attacks on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including my own. My delegation rejects that attempt, which can only poison the atmosphere in the Committee and only serves to hinder our work in a situation where the vast majority around this negotiating table is ready to do its best to achieve tangible results.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

We have exhausted the time available to us this morning. We will therefore continue with the list of speakers tomorrow morning.

The representative of the United States wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I therefore give him the floor.

The representative of the USSR has asked for the floor on a point of order.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We have not yet heard all the representatives whose names are down to speak at this meeting and I therefore see no ground for giving the floor for a reply. On Tuesday of last week you refused that right to a delegation which had asked to speak in the morning. The decision which the Committee took yesterday signified the following: if all those whose names are on the list of speakers do not manage to speak today — the list includes the delegations of the United Kingdom, Australia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Hungary, Pakistan, Canada, Peru, Cuba and Kenya — then we will continue to hear the speakers according to this list tomorrow morning because, this afternoon, it is intended to hold a meeting of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. As far as I recall, Pakistan is sixth on the list. The representative of Pakistan was unable to speak this morning. Consequently, when we have heard all the speakers on the list, beginning with the representative of Pakistan, then we can go on to statements in exercise of the right of reply.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to ask the representative of the United States whether he is prepared to wait until the end of the list of speakers — in other words, until tomorrow morning?

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I do not wish in any way to disrupt the procedures of this body, as we mean to deliberate. My purpose, of course, would be to respond to a rather vicious attack, unparalleled, I think, in my short memory in this body, but my longer memory in international bodies dates back some 20 years. I would prefer to reply to the charges made by another delegation in such a vicious manner while they are still fresh in people's minds and they understand what I am replying to. However, I would be happy to abide by the ruling of the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Since the hour is late, we may adjourn the meeting now. The representative of Japan has the floor.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Not in exercise of the right of reply, but to rectify a small error that slipped — most inadvertently, I am sure — into the statement just made by my dear friend and most distinguished colleague, Ambassador Kómives.

The first atomic bomb used against human beings was dropped on 6 August 1945.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held tomorrow, Friday, 12 February, at 10.30 a.m. Immediately afterwards, we will hold an informal meeting on the organizational matters under consideration by the Committee.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.154
12 February 1982
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 12 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Mohammad Jafar Mahallati (Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. V. BEAUGE
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.W. STEELE

Belgium:

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU LEIJIANG
Mr. YANG HINGLIANG
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:
Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:
Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. S. MOHAMMADI

Italy:
Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:
Mr. T. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:
Mr. C.G. MAINA
Mr. D. NANJIRE
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:
Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:
Mr. D. ERDENEBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:
Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands:
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:
Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:
Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. H. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:
Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:
Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. G. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:
Mr. T. HELESCANU

Sri Lanka:
Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:
Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.H. IPPOLITOV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. S.B. BAT'SANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON

Mr. CHICK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Miss L.M. SHEA

Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the one hundred and fifty-fourth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, Cuba and Kenya. The representative of the United States of America will speak at the end of the meeting in exercise of his right of reply.

In that connection, I would like to clarify for the record one aspect of the procedural question raised yesterday. At its one hundred and fifty-second plenary meeting on Tuesday, 9 February, the Committee decided that, in view of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the long list of speakers for the plenary meeting on Thursday, 11 February, two different plenary meetings would be held, one on Thursday, 11 February, and the other on Friday, 12 February. At the beginning of yesterday's plenary, I recalled that decision. I was therefore correct in giving the floor at the end of that first meeting for rights of reply.

The situation was different from that of the previous week, when the plenary meeting that started in the morning continued in the afternoon of the same day. The morning meeting was suspended and the afternoon meeting was a resumption of the earlier meeting. That is why I gave the floor at the end of that meeting for rights of reply.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, with regard to your clarification, the Soviet delegation would request that in future lists of speakers should not cover two meetings at once. The list of 10 speakers given yesterday was intended to cover two meetings, something never before done in the practice of the Committee. Lists of speakers cover one meeting and not two. The fact that this list of 10 speakers was meant for two meetings also led to the misunderstanding which you have now cleared up. I would request that the secretariat's attention should be drawn to this.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, may I begin by saying that the delegation of Pakistan was grieved to learn of the passing away of our colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo. I would request the distinguished representative of Italy to accept our heartfelt condolences and to convey them to the bereaved family.

May I take this opportunity to place on record our tribute to one of our most distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, and to wish him the best in his new and important responsibilities at the Hague. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to representatives who have joined us for the first time in the Committee this year. My delegation looks forward to co-operating closely with all of them.

We sincerely appreciate the very important and effective role played by Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia when he guided the work of the Committee on Disarmament during the closing month of its last session and the opening phase of the current session. It was a difficult task which Ambassador Sani carried out with great skill.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

As we open the fourth annual session of this Committee, it is most gratifying for the Pakistan delegation to see in the chair a distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The peoples of our two countries share a common faith, culture and history. They share the aspiration to order their national life in accordance with the precepts of Islam. I am confident that our two countries will continue to co-operate in establishing a climate of durable peace and security in the larger region of South West Asia on the basis of strict respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter, especially those concerning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.

It is self-evident that the international community has a vital stake in achieving a political solution to the tragic conflict in Afghanistan on the basis of the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from that country. This would enable the Afghan people to determine their own destiny and form of Government and thus create the conditions necessary for the more than 5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran to return to their homeland in safety and honour. Pakistan remains committed to the evolution of such a political solution for which efforts are being made currently under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The people and Government of Pakistan sincerely desire to live in lasting peace and friendship with all neighbouring countries. The importance of the current consideration of an agreement between Pakistan and India for an exchange of mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force is self-evident.

Pakistan is deeply concerned about the climate of confrontation and acrimony which characterizes relations between the two superpowers at the present time. It is axiomatic that international tensions can be removed only if States scrupulously follow the principles of the United Nations Charter. An endeavour to achieve rapid and appreciable progress in halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, must also be made since the arms race itself contributes to building up international tension.

Pakistan therefore welcomes the initiation of the Geneva talks on medium-range nuclear weapons and hopes that both negotiating parties will make every effort to ensure that an early agreement is reached, representing a real and significant step towards nuclear disarmament. Similarly, Pakistan hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union will soon agree to the commencement of negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons with the objective of achieving real and meaningful reductions in their strategic arsenals.

The importance of these two sets of inter-linked negotiations for the success of the entire process of disarmament is self-evident; equally clear is the primary responsibility of the two parties for the initiation of the process of genuine disarmament. At the same time, we would do well not to underestimate the political opportunity presented by the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Despite the current inhospitable political

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

climate, this session can give an impetus to setting in motion the disarmament process. Nor should we underestimate the important part which the Committee on Disarmament can play in ensuring that the opportunity of the second special session is not missed. My delegation therefore agrees with those speakers who have suggested that our work during the next 12 weeks must be aimed principally at ensuring that the Committee makes an optimum contribution to the success of the special session.

The conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty would undoubtedly contribute immensely to the success of the second special session. But hopes of this happening have dimmed. It should be possible at the very least for the Committee to establish a working group on the CTB at the current session and to make some progress towards the treaty which can be reported to the special session. There is, of course, a direct link between nuclear disarmament and a test ban treaty. But it was our impression that the test ban was an immediate rather than long-range objective of all Governments of nuclear and non-nuclear States. We would do well to ponder, at this stage, the risks which any further delay in concluding a test ban treaty would entail. It would also be relevant to recall once again the link between measures to halt the vertical as well as the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Another issue on which this Committee has been asked to conclude an agreement for submission to the second special session is negative security assurances. My delegation was most gratified at the overwhelming support for Pakistan's resolution on this subject at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. In accordance with the recommendation made in that General Assembly resolution, my delegation is prepared to undertake further intensive efforts to search for a common approach or a common formula "including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981". May I recall that these include principally the one proposed by the Netherlands and the three formulations informally suggested by my delegation. The discussions last year, however, have made it amply clear that an agreement would become possible only if the nuclear-weapon States reconsider their divergent positions and respond in a more forthright and credible way to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The General Assembly has appealed, "especially to the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". I can do no better than to reiterate this appeal. As Ambassador Fein put it, "the ball is in the court of the nuclear-weapon States". We look forward to a serious and considered response from them, not merely a reiteration of positions which are conceived only in the context of their narrow self-interest and nuclear doctrines.

My delegation would welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We hope that it will be given a new mandate which will enable it to commence the concrete task of negotiating the text of a chemical weapons convention. This goal has become all the more urgent in the light of persistent reports about the use of chemical weapons in some parts of the world and other reports regarding decisions taken to augment and modernize chemical weapons stockpiles. Further delay or ambiguity regarding the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention could well erode the existing international consensus on the subject and add the spectre of general chemical warfare to the nuclear shadow which already hangs over mankind.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation is prepared to work diligently to conclude a convention prohibiting radiological weapons in time for the second special session. However, we remain fully convinced by the Swedish argument that the only feasible means of using radioactivity for hostile purposes, at present, is through the destruction of or damage to nuclear facilities. This issue must be addressed squarely in the radiological weapons convention. The Committee should not spend its limited time and resources on preparing a treaty which has no significance for the present or the foreseeable future.

It has been said that the comprehensive programme of disarmament would constitute the "centre-piece" of the second special session. The Working Group on this item has conducted considerable and important work under the able and experienced stewardship of Ambassador Garcia Robles. As yet, however, we do not see the light at the end of the tunnel.

The main positions involved in the negotiations so far are basically defined in document CD/223, submitted by the Group of 21, document CD/205, presented by some West European countries, and the agreed position of the socialist States expressed on their behalf by the representative of Czechoslovakia on 2 February. While in the process of evaluating the socialist presentation, my delegation notes with satisfaction their own assessment that "the proposals submitted by the Group of 21 largely coincide with the agreed position of the socialist countries ...". Unfortunately, there is rather a considerable divergence in concept and substance between the position of the Group of 21 and that of the West European delegations.

I would like to take this opportunity to elaborate somewhat on the rationale underlying the position of the Group of 21 and to answer some of the criticism which we have heard directed to document CD/223.

The "measures" to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament constitute the most substantive part of the programme. Paragraph 109 of the Final Document states that "the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality ...". The measures proposed in document CD/223 reflect this agreement. They encompass measures firstly, to halt the arms race, secondly, to reduce the level of armaments and, ultimately, to achieve the final goal of general and complete disarmament. In contrast, document CD/205 provides only for measures in the first stage which, according to its sponsors, would be restricted to ongoing negotiations. As for the rest, it provides a list of issues on which subsequent negotiations would be undertaken, but without any indication of their substantive content or sequence. In our view, a programme would be less than comprehensive if it did not encompass all the measures necessary to achieve general and complete disarmament.

It has been said in criticism of document CD/223 that the measures provided therein are too detailed and specific. I would like to draw attention to paragraph 9

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

of the Final Document, which states that "for disarmament ... to become a reality, it was essential to agree on a series of specific disarmament measures". In many parts, document CD/223 repeats and only slightly elaborates upon the provisions already agreed upon in the Final Document. This is particularly so with regard to the measures in stage 1. Perhaps the only substantive addition contained in this section of document CD/223 is the elaboration of paragraph 50 of the Final Document relating to the process of nuclear disarmament by defining the objectives of various negotiations. It is our understanding that disarmament negotiations are always held with a view to a predetermined and more or less definite objective. As the distinguished representative of India stated last Tuesday, if we are to leave everything to be determined by the negotiating parties themselves, there is perhaps no need for a CPD. Those who favour the identification of measures in more cryptic form base themselves, inter alia, on the proposition that the CPD is to constitute a "framework" for negotiations. However, a framework for negotiations should not be confused with an outline of negotiations, which is what is suggested in document CD/205. We are prepared to "take the cue" from the elements of the CPD proposed by the Disarmament Commission, as recommended by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, but we cannot restrict ourselves to these "elements" since the Committee has been asked precisely to "elaborate" the programme. In any case, most of the "elements" are a summary of provisions more elaborately reflected in the Final Document.

As regards the question of stages or phases of the CPD, paragraph 9 of the Final Document states that the "programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament". We felt this was quite evident. There is also no difficulty in identifying the measures with which the programme should begin and those with which it should end. What it is necessary to determine is a logical sequence for the intermediate stage or stages.

I must confess that we were rather surprised to see that the sponsors of document CD/205 did not deem it possible to provide for anything in their programme except measures in the first stage. The paper in fact does not even contemplate any measures in the final stage which are implied by the very objective of the CPD, i.e. to achieve general and complete disarmament, and it enumerates the intermediate measures only in outline with no indication of sequence. On the other hand, the specific measures, contained in document CD/223 in four stages, reflect agreed disarmament priorities and a rational sequence from beginning to end. We do not claim, however, that this is not susceptible to improvement or to a categorization which may be somewhat different.

Much has been made of the impracticability of introducing "time-frames" for the implementation of the CPD and its various stages. By definition, a programme implies a planned sequence of actions to be undertaken over a period of time. For example, the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the first special session does contain a time-frame. Paragraph 44 says that that Programme "enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years ...". Of course, these "next few years" have passed and not much has been done to implement these measures; but this does not mean that "time-frame" indicated in paragraph 44 was "impractical" or "unrealistic". Rather, it signifies the failure of certain States to live up to their solemn commitments under the Final Document.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Since the measures in the first stage of the CPD will, by and large, include the unimplemented measures of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document, there is already an indication of the time-frame in which these are to be implemented, i.e. the next few years. We can argue whether this means three, five or seven years. Moreover, with regard even to some of the measures in the second stage, a "time-frame" has also been indicated. The Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade enumerates those measures which should be achieved by the end of the decade. Extrapolating from these already accepted "time-frames" and bearing in mind the more ambitious periods envisaged in the 1962 draft treaties of the United States and the Soviet Union on general and complete disarmament, the Group of 21 has suggested the accomplishment of the CPD in four stages over the course of two decades.

The Group of 21 is, of course, not so unrealistic as to believe in the "magic and automatism of the calendar" in the disarmament field, just as we are not convinced about the "magic of the marketplace" in the economic sphere. Criticism of the Group for proposing "rigid" or "inflexible" time-frames is, I hope, the result of a misunderstanding rather than a deliberate misinterpretation of our position. The time-frames we have suggested for the CPD and each of its stages are, as we have stated repeatedly, "indicative", i.e. they connote what we regard as the desirable period for the implementation of certain measures. It may turn out that these measures are not achieved during the indicative period due to various reasons, for example, the absence of mutual trust and confidence among the States concerned. But this does not mean that the indicative time-frame for their achievement was "unrealistic" or undesirable. On the contrary, the existence of a time-frame would act as an impetus for negotiations, representing as it would the agreed expectation of the international community.

Moreover, there is nothing to prevent the realistic readjustment of the time-frame for any subsequent stage in the programme in light of the progress made in its implementation. This could well constitute an important task of the mechanism which is to be established to review the implementation of the programme. My delegation is therefore happy to note that the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has accepted the need for a "dynamic time function [to be] built into the CPD" and envisages a role for the review mechanism in this process. Perhaps there is room for compromise on this point.

Another contentious issue is the nature of the CPD or, more specifically, the kind of obligations or commitments it would create for States. The Pakistan delegation has repeatedly expressed the view that the CPD should create legally binding obligations. We base our proposition on the conception which has been attached to the CPD ever since it was proposed in the wake of the stalemate over the draft treaties for general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States. This understanding of the CPD, as something that would create obligations for States, has been repeatedly confirmed by the resolutions of the General Assembly and, in particular, in the Final Document of the first special session. For example, paragraph 109 of the Final Document states: "Negotiations (and I stress the word 'negotiations') on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament ...". Negotiations, especially negotiations

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

in this Committee, are, without exception, directed towards achieving agreements which would legally commit States. The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has said that "even the advocates of a legally binding CPD have so far been unable to show how this binding effect could be technically achieved". The normal procedure would be for the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate and adopt the CPD, just as the CCD negotiated such instruments as the non-proliferation treaty, after which it would be approved by the General Assembly, either by consensus or a majority vote, and commended to States for signature and ratification in accordance with their national procedures.

My delegation is prepared to give full consideration to other views on this point. However, we would seriously question the value and necessity of a document which does not create concrete and binding obligations for States to implement the comprehensive programme. Mere "solemnity" in the adoption of the CPD cannot create confidence among States that interlinked responsibilities will be discharged by other States. And without such a clear commitment, the CPD is likely to meet a fate similar to previous solemn declarations and programmes adopted in the United Nations. To pretend otherwise is to deceive each other and perhaps to deceive ourselves and our peoples.

It is, of course, quite evident that the CPD will be implemented "only if the international community can truly rally behind it" and if it reflects "the security interests of all concerned". However, it must be realized that the international community is composed today mainly of the non-aligned and developing countries, which represent two-thirds of humanity. Their security interests have been ignored, not for decades, but for centuries. If the process of disarmament conceived in a CPD is to be "realistic", it must respond to their security interests, now and in the future. It must provide the assurance of balance and security not only to those who are maintaining this through the deployment of significant levels of armaments; but also to that large majority of States which is relatively unarmed and militarily vulnerable. Sooner or later, a new and more equitable balance of power will evolve, not so much between East and West, but between North and South. Disarmament, obviously, should be the preferred path to the achievement of such a balance. But if it becomes evident that militarily powerful States are not prepared to give up their military advantage, whether to preserve balance with each other or to exercise domination over weaker States, it is likely that the arms race will become truly global in character and immensely more dangerous in its threat to the survival of mankind. Unfortunately, history seems set upon this course; the challenge before us is to reverse it. This is the "reality" we must confront.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind reference he made to my country. I, too, am confident that the peoples of our two countries will continue their close co-operation in accordance with the precepts of Islam.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time my delegation is speaking at a plenary meeting of the Committee, allow me to extend to you our most sincere congratulations on seeing you, Ambassador Mahallati, the representative of revolutionary, non-aligned Iran, preside over the work of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of February. We are sure that, under your guidance, the work of the Committee will follow a sound course and, needless to say, you may rely at all times on the co-operation of the Cuban delegation.

Allow me likewise to congratulate your predecessor as Chairman, Ambassador Sani of Indonesia, on the very wise manner in which he guided the Committee when concluding its work for 1981.

I should also like to add my voice to the words of condolence extended to the delegation of Italy on the death of Ambassador Montezemolo.

Finally, allow me to welcome on behalf of my delegation the new representatives of Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Nigeria and the United States of America, from whom we hope the Committee's work will benefit.

The Cuban delegation is opposed to the raising in this multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, unique of its kind, of political matters which are unrelated to the substance of its work and, far from being helpful, slow down the process of negotiation and tend to divert the Committee from its true functions.

It should be stressed, in particular, that some of the speakers whom we have recently heard, supposedly analysing the international situation and its possible effects on the Committee's work, are the very ones who remain shamefully silent in the face of the massacre of tens of thousands of people in Central America.

In El Salvador, in particular, the genocidal Junta which has usurped power from the legitimate interests of that heroic people has murdered more than 32,000 people since January 1980 with unqualified support from Washington. It is no accident that, according to press reports, for every nine Salvadorian soldiers, there is one United States officer in El Salvador.

Some of the speakers who have claimed to evaluate the international situation are those who remain silent before the provocative and aggressive attitude of the United States in the Caribbean Sea and who support the staging of threatening and intimidatory military manoeuvres in that area, as well as the continuing and illegal acts of military, political and economic hostility and aggression carried out by the United States Government against the States of the region.

These same speakers are the ones who, in one way or another, support the occupation of Namibia and the outrages committed by South Africa in southern Africa and who once again remain silent in the face of the annexation of territories in the Middle East and the aggression against the Palestinian people by the Zionist régime.

It must be acknowledged that the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament which we are now holding are taking place in a steadily worsening international atmosphere whose roots must be sought in the continuing arms race and the steady growth of military budgets.

(Mr. Colt Vils, Cuba)

The international community has seen how some States are striving to continue the armaments spiral; how they introduce new types and systems of weapons of all kinds in their arsenals, despite the growing repudiation of public opinion; how they develop and expand new military concepts and doctrines, such as those of "limited nuclear war", which, in the long run, serve only to increase the danger of a nuclear holocaust; and how they pursue policies aimed at avoiding co-operation among States and at fomenting confrontation and intrigue.

In these circumstances, the disarmament negotiations are of enormous importance and this is why we must spare no effort to avert the danger of nuclear war and ensure stable and lasting peace and international security.

In this context, my delegation attaches great importance to the negotiations aimed at bringing about nuclear disarmament. The priority of this item was not only recognized in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but the necessity and urgency of averting the danger of nuclear war and achieving nuclear disarmament appear as constant throughout the Final Document.

Because of their undeniable impact on the progress of the arms race and the dangers of nuclear weapons for the survival of mankind, the priority items in the Committee's programme of work itself continue to be the nuclear weapon test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

In this connection, at the last plenary meeting of the Committee, on 9 February, we heard a distinguished representative say that there is no arms race, that it is the product of some kind of propaganda.

Is it possible that there are people who believe that progress can be made on the road to peace with an attitude of that kind? How can there be such a step backwards in relation to the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament? How can there be such shameless disregard for everything that is stated in the Final Document concerning the need to halt and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race?

On a number of occasions, reference has been made in this Committee to the need for political will on the part of all States participating in the Committee; political will is, however, something that we cannot create here in this forum; it is something that we must bring with us from our own countries.

The priority which has always been given to the items of nuclear disarmament and the nuclear test ban must be made clear by the Committee at the very start of its work.

When considering the establishment of the Committee's subsidiary bodies for its spring session this year, these priorities must undeniably be taken into account and we therefore firmly support the establishment without delay of two working groups to deal with matters relating to the nuclear weapon test ban and with nuclear disarmament, respectively. Needless to say, all States which possess nuclear weapons must participate in those working groups, in view of the responsibility they bear; and we hope that they will adopt the attitude which their status as nuclear-weapon States requires.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Perhaps it is necessary to point out once again that the establishment of working groups as subsidiary bodies of the Committee has been recognized as one of the most effective means of carrying on work within this forum.

In this connection, my delegation supports the immediate establishment of the working groups which will continue advancing on the road already opened up in previous years to agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the prohibition of radiological weapons and the granting of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation welcomes the fact that the Committee has already decided, at the very start of its 1982 session, that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will continue to work under the guidance of Ambassador Garcia Robles. This provides an immediate guarantee that this negotiating body will succeed in presenting a draft programme for adoption at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation is also of the opinion that the Committee on Disarmament is under an obligation to seek ways of complying with the requests by the United Nations General Assembly that it should begin negotiations with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons and with a view to drawing up a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

Although at future meetings we shall speak in detail on the items before the Committee, I should like to make a few brief comments on the procedure to be followed for their consideration.

The need to prepare a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons is becoming increasingly pressing in view of the escalation of the chemical arms race, as is made clear by the recent decisions of the United States Government to authorize the continuation of the manufacture of such weapons.

Last year, the relevant Working Group made considerable progress, which should be continued this year so that such a convention may be adopted with the necessary urgency.

The adoption of urgent measures to prevent the development of chemical weapons, including binary weapons, calls for the establishment of a working group with an appropriate mandate that will enable it to enter into the substance of the preparation of the convention in question.

My delegation hopes that, this year, a decision to this effect can be taken at an early date.

With regard to the preparation of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons, there can be no justification whatsoever for any further delay.

In the relevant resolution of the General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament is called upon to continue negotiations so that the text of the agreement may be submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

(lfr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, particularly at the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament for this year, would not only comply with the General Assembly's request, but would also constitute a very positive element in relation to this Committee's work.

With regard to the granting of security guarantees for non-nuclear weapon States, my delegation considers that the Committee on Disarmament should not delay its work by considering compromise proposals, which will not enable it successfully to adopt an international instrument on this major question.

Declarations, identical in substance, by all nuclear-weapon States should not be viewed as a goal that we must set ourselves, but, rather, as one possible interim measure that may be taken pending the adoption of the above-mentioned instrument.

I now feel obliged to make a few brief remarks on the preparation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Firstly, it has been amply acknowledged in this Committee that, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, this is one of the special tasks that we have to carry out.

The adoption of the CPD at the special session would impart great momentum to the disarmament negotiations and make it possible to channel them more securely towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

In my delegation's opinion, the comprehensive programme of disarmament consists of a set of interrelated disarmament measures which must be implemented in a series of phases over a specific period of time.

The implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not only ensure the success of disarmament negotiations in all forums, but also make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of an international climate of understanding and co-operation among States, in which the strengthening of international détente will be permanent and peace and security will be enjoyed by all on an equal footing. In this respect, we place special emphasis on the implementation of the New International Economic Order.

In its resolution 36/92 F, entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament", which my delegation sponsored together with a large group of member countries of the Committee, the United Nations General Assembly not only requested the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on priority questions, but also invited members of the Committee involved in separate negotiations on priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations.

It is in this context that my delegation welcomes the start of the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe which began on 30 November last year.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

In keeping with the importance which my delegation attaches to the negotiations taking place outside this framework and in view of the positive impact they will have on the Committee's negotiations, we consider it both necessary and urgent to resume the bilateral and or trilateral talks which were taking place on the control and limitation of arms and have now been unjustifiably suspended.

The resumption of those negotiations would not only allow the international community to see a glimmer of hope for all the disarmament negotiations, but would also, we are convinced, help a great deal to smooth the way for the Committee's work and the achievement of the results expected of it.

In conclusion, I would merely like to say that my delegation has placed all its hopes on the success of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly which is to be held in June and July this year in New York and will be the second session that important forum has devoted to disarmament questions during its 36 years of existence.

This special session should represent a step forward in relation to the session held in 1978 and its results should serve to foster the implementation of the Final Document adopted at that session. Needless to say, our Committee bears no small responsibility in the achievement of that objective and that is why our efforts must commence forthwith.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind reference he made to my country.

Mr. MAINA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, since I am taking the floor in the plenary of the Committee for the first time during this session, I would like to offer my congratulations to you for assuming the chairmanship of the Committee for this month. We commend the way you have been guiding our deliberations and my delegation will extend to you full support and co-operation.

May I also pay tribute to my distinguished friend, Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, for the role he played as leader of the Committee since August 1981. My delegation missed the summer session of the Committee for reasons beyond our control, but the reports of the work done show that we missed an exciting session.

May I also offer sincere condolences to the delegation of Italy and, through it, to the family of the late Ambassador Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo. He was a valuable colleague in the Committee on Disarmament and those who had the opportunity to work with him will miss his friendship and the contribution he made to the work of this Committee.

We are meeting at a time when the international political and security situation is precarious and full of tension. There is every indication that the events shaping up in the world today could lead to serious consequences unless these developments are arrested and defused. We cannot sit in this Committee and say nothing about these developments, since they are directly related to our work. We cannot see any justification for silence. We cannot believe that our work here can produce any results when the principal parties delcare everywhere, even in this Committee, that they are promoting armaments, the very thing this Committee is dedicated to eliminating.

It would have been very impressive and exciting to observe the way in which the two superpowers manipulate and seek to shift the blame between them for current developments, if it were not so terribly tragic. My delegation accepts the

(Mr. Maina, Kenya)

proposition that this is not the proper forum for raising all the problems that have contributed to the present tensions in the world. We also know that, if it were necessary to do so now, each one of us in this Committee could allocate the blame to different parties, as we see fit. But allocating blame is not the role or function of this Committee.

Constrained by these considerations, my delegation was wondering what to make of the very important statement by the distinguished delegation of the United States of America and the equally impressive response of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union earlier this week. Leaving out the unhappy fact that neither of them can claim a good, clean record in international relations over the last 30 years, we felt that another message, more important in the work of this Committee, was perhaps coming through both interventions. I refer to the dispute over the balance of forces between the two camps. There was first a claim that a balance of forces was arrived at, but that it has now been upset; hence the need to rectify the situation by producing more armaments. Then came a denial that there had been an upset. Figures were produced to support the contention that the balance of forces continues to exist. Neither the alleged balance nor the data used to assess the balance is under international control or verification. These two elements are at the heart of the work of this Committee and it is pertinent to ask whether the climate and time are opportune for this Committee to formulate an international mechanism for verification, even if control comes later. This would be a constructive approach to the current dispute and tense calls everywhere to increase armaments and prepare for war. If embarked upon, it could defuse the current situation and possibly produce the first tangible confidence-building measure so basic to the work of this Committee.

In singling out this one theme in the important statements by the two delegations, we have not underrated the other elements in those contributions to our debate. We cannot, in any way, divert attention from the basic obligations of all States under the Charter of the United Nations, to mention but one.

In this first statement, I would merely wish to add a few remarks to what many delegations have already said regarding our work. This Committee has already been in existence for three years now. It is a matter of disappointment that it will have nothing to show in June in the way of a completed international treaty covering any aspect of our work. Nothing we can say regarding the difficulties of our work or comparisons with the predecessors of the Committee on Disarmament will assuage the disappointed hopes of the international community when the Committee on Disarmament was created nearly four years ago. This does not in any way gainsay all the dedicated work that the Committee has done so far but it does underline the need to give top priority to the preparation of our report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. There is no need, at this late hour, to expand the agenda or to spend too much time discussing procedures, not even the lively issue of the creation of new working groups, before progress is made in the work of the existing groups. Our human resources, as a delegation, are quite limited and I believe other delegations are in a similar situation. My delegation therefore urges the Committee to consider this fact in determining priorities of work and the timing of each programme of activity.

May I conclude my remarks by stating that my delegation is full of optimism and hope in the work of this Committee. We are not discouraged in any way by what appears to us to be but passing dark clouds on the international scene. We believe sooner or later that we shall have a breakthrough in our search for the road to disarmament. We think we have no alternative but to keep going with a determination

(Mr. Maini, Kenya)

that never sags in our efforts. The elements necessary for success appear to us to be all there. What appears to elude our grasp, for now, is the skill to put them all together.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the United States of America to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I wish to take note, at the outset of my remarks, Mr. Chairman, of your comment this morning concerning the continuation of yesterday's meeting and of the explanation you gave concerning the ruling you made yesterday.

It is not the practice of my delegation to delay the important work of this Committee by frivolously exercising its right of reply. In fact, we have heretofore deliberately avoided taking the floor in the interest of economizing the Committee's valuable time. Thus, I will not waste any more of our time today by dignifying the baseless and ludicrous charges against my country just made by the Cuban representative. However, I am constrained to reply briefly to the vicious and unsubstantiated accusation made yesterday by the representative of Mongolia.

The distinguished representative of Mongolia called Mr. Rostow's speech "crude, gross and slanderous". This was an attack of a personal nature on an official of a Member State who came as a guest to this Committee to present the views of the United States of America. This attack violates every code of decorum in the collegial bodies, such as our Committee, with which I am familiar. It is demeaning, not only to a guest of this Committee, but to the Committee itself. I noted, however, that the representative of Mongolia did not and, indeed, could not refute any of the substantive points made in Mr. Rostow's statement.

The representative of Mongolia expressed surprise that the delegation of the United States, like many others in recent days, should mention the aggression in Afghanistan and the loss of human rights in Poland in the context of the work of this Committee. I frankly marvel at this statement, which implies that the international community should ignore these threats to world peace. We certainly do not ignore these shameful acts.

I would like briefly also to set the record straight on three other subjects. First, I would remind the representative of Mongolia -- and indeed the representative of Cuba -- that the United States has repeatedly and resolutely opposed the abhorrent doctrine of apartheid and that it condemns racism in any form. The United States has never been, and never will be, in sympathy with any form of racism. In fact, we fought our bloodiest war -- our Civil War -- to rid our nation of the scourge of slavery and thereafter embodied in our Constitution a prohibition against this base form of racism and took steps in that Constitution to assure the equal rights of every citizen. Secondly, I would point out that, even as we are talking in this room today, the United States is actively engaged in consultations to bring peace to the region of southern Africa and independence to Namibia.

Finally, I would recall for the benefit of the representative of Mongolia that the United States has condemned Israeli actions in the Golan Heights in all appropriate fora.

I hope we will not be diverted again from our important work in this Committee by unfounded charges and insults to officials who come before this Committee to present their Government's views.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia): Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to burden members of the Committee with another long statement, but my delegation feels obliged to state its position again, as regards the statement we have just heard from the distinguished representative of the United States of America.

We listened to the United States representative's statement, in which he once again made a number of attacks on my country, with unfounded accusations. However, if the substance of that statement is examined, it can be seen that the United States representative was able to refute hardly any of the points put forward in our statement yesterday. In fact, who will deny that the aggressive policy of Israel, supported and encouraged by the United States of America, has for decades now been one of the main sources of tension not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. At its emergency special session held only a few days ago, the United Nations General Assembly in adopting a decision condemning the aggressor, i.e. Israel and its United States protectors, once again clearly demonstrated that because of the continuing acts of international piracy committed by Israel, the Middle East is one of the hottest spots on our planet.

Who will dispute that outrages have been committed for a number of years by the South African racists who receive unlimited moral -- and not only moral -- support from many western States, and especially the United States of America? It seems to us that a great deal could be said about this by our colleagues from the African countries.

The Mongolian delegation in its statement yesterday confined itself to mentioning these two areas in which the situation has truly given cause for serious concern. But it is not only in those two areas that the United States pursues its activities aimed at crushing national liberation movements, disrupting international co-operation and supporting reactionary dictatorial régimes. The delivery of United States weapons to the Kuomintang clique in Taiwan, in keeping with the "two Chinas" theory, is nothing more than an attempt to create yet another hotbed of tension in the world. The Mongolian People's Republic, one of the peace-loving States of Asia, is a neighbour of the People's Republic of China. We have considered and we continue to consider that there is only one China -- the People's Republic of China. Recently the situation in the Far East region has been aggravated by the fact that the United States of America, through delivering weapons to Taiwan, is increasing tension in the area. In his statement today my colleague from Cuba, Ambassador Solá Vila, has already revealed the role of the United States in supporting terrorist anti-national régimes in Latin America, in particular that of the Salvadorian junta, which is slaughtering the Salvadorian people in large numbers, using American weapons and with the participation of so-called American advisers. Thousands and thousands of Salvadorians have perished at the hands of the junta, which is holding on to power only through the financial, military and political assistance of the United States. In recent days angry and vigorous protests have been heard throughout the world against the inhuman acts of terror being committed in El Salvador by the Salvadorian junta with the support of the United States of America. Lastly, it is not possible to ignore the continuing interference of the United States in the internal affairs of Asian countries, including Iran, and the attempts to change the course of events in that country to the advantage of the United States. In my opinion, all this is clearly related to the questions of the non-use of force, the inadmissibility of expansion, non-interference in the internal affairs of countries and international terrorism.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We did not wish to deal with other questions which would divert the attention of the Committee from its tasks, but we were obliged to do so, I repeat, because the distinguished representative of the United States and several representatives of other countries, preferred to involve the Committee in a discussion of the causes of international tension, in an attempt to create confusion. I wish to stress, in this connection, that the Mongolian delegation, like other delegations which are seeking to make progress in the sphere of disarmament, firmly opposes the linking of these questions with the disarmament negotiations and with the achievement of genuine results in them. We appeal to the delegations of the United States of America and of other countries to allow the Committee to deal with the issues for the solution of which it was in fact established.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, José Martí said that words were made to tell the truth, not to cover it up. The facts contradict the words used in the reply. Which member of the Security Council vetoed the just sanctions called for against Israel and South Africa for their continuing violations of the United Nations Charter? I again state that this Committee is not a forum for polemics. We neither fear nor shrink from polemics, but, in our view, there are other places in which to engage in them. Our Committee was set up to negotiate. Out of respect for all its members, including the United States delegation, that is all I have to say for now.

Mr. ISSRAELIYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation would like to refer to a matter which we consider important, namely, the incident which occurred yesterday and which seriously upset and disturbed us. I am referring to the threatening shouts of a visitor at the meeting. I could not understand what he was shouting nor in fact could I make out exactly in what language he was shouting, but he obviously perturbed the Committee's work. In view of the conditions of terrorist violence in this part of the world, we feel that consideration should be given to security measures and measures to ensure normal conditions for the Committee's work. I do not know whether any supervision is normally exercised in the United Nations over the behaviour of visitors. In any case, we would ask the secretariat to take the necessary steps to ensure that such incidents do not recur, because not only do they disturb the normal working of the Committee but they could also in a general way represent a threat to any one of the persons sitting around this table. Some of my colleagues said that the man appeared to be not in perfect health, and perhaps he got here by accident. We do not think this is the best place for sick people.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia): Mr. Chairman, I would like to express the Mongolian delegation's support of the comments just made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

As you know, the Mongolian delegation is perhaps the smallest in the Committee on Disarmament and we have to take part in many international conferences, including the current session of the Commission on Human Rights. Heated debates take place there in fact and whenever I enter the room, I see two, three and even more security officers stationed there. Every time they check not only my identity badge but also my personal identification papers. As a result, yesterday after that incident, I drew the secretariat's attention to this and requested that the visitors sitting in the public gallery should be called to order.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

I fully support the comments made by the representative of the Soviet Union. The Committee on Disarmament is, of course, an important international forum and its members represent Governments. I think that for the normal functioning of this body, it is essential for appropriate security measures to be taken. I would like to draw this to your attention, Mr. Chairman, and to that of the secretariat.

Mr. JAIPAL (Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament): Yesterday, immediately after this unfortunate incident, in fact while it was happening, I dispatched by deputy to go outside and, with the help of the Security officer, to intercept the man and find out his identity. His particulars have been obtained. He was evidently a tourist from France who had come here with his wife and child. He apologized for the incident and was found to be unarmed. However, we have asked the Chief of Security to tighten up security measures here -- because they were obviously not adequate yesterday -- and I think that is going to be done. If you like, we shall ask the Security Unit to provide the same sort of strict security check that is applied in the Commission on Human Rights. I do not think that should be difficult, but, certainly, control over access to the public gallery has to be stricter.

The CHAIRMAN: Today, the secretariat has circulated an informal paper containing an indicative time-table for meetings to be held next week. Of course, since much will depend on the results of our discussion of organizational matters, the time-table is tentative and we may subsequently have to adjust it. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the informal paper.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one brief remark and a suggestion. For reasons beyond my control, I will have to be away from Geneva on Thursday, 18 February, as of 2 p.m., so it will be impossible for me to be here that day for the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which, as you know and as indicated on the list prepared by the secretariat, usually meets on Thursdays at 3 p.m. I would like to know whether the informal meeting of the Committee now scheduled for Wednesday, 17 February, at 3 p.m. could be held on Thursday, 18 February, at 3 p.m., so that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament could meet on Wednesday, 17 February, at 3 p.m., rather than on Thursday, 18 February, at 3 p.m.

Mr. MAINA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, I took note of your remark that the programme might be adjusted, but I am concerned about the items appearing for Wednesday and for Friday. The items we are supposed to dispose of today after our plenary meeting are the establishment of subsidiary bodies and the participation of States non-members of the Committee. About this, you are going to provide a new draft of what the programme is going to be like and some of these items have been disposed of. I hope that the remark that the programme is to be adjusted refers to this particular aspect; otherwise, we would be prolonging decisions or putting off decisions on some very simple items.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has no objection to the proposed programme of work, on the understanding that it is a tentative one, because the inclusion here of one item of the draft agenda, namely, the nuclear test ban, might imply that the agenda has been adopted, but this is not the case, at least not for my delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: As I mentioned, the ~~time-table~~ is tentative, so there is no problem. If there is no objection to the proposed informal paper, we will adopt it.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: As agreed by the Committee, I will convene an informal meeting five minutes after the adjournment of this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 16 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
On Tuesday, 16 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI

(Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M.A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. V. BEAUGE
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T.C. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINA
Miss R. de CLERCQ
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U NGUE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TEREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de La GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. J. HOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A. P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. S. MOHAMMADI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. T. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C.G. MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands: Mr. H., WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. G. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M. BUSBY

Ms. S. BURKE

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Mr. J. MISKEL

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRIJUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA

Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I decalre open the 155th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Venezuela, Algeria, Burma, Argentina and Sweden.

We might not be able to listen to all statements in the morning and, therefore, we will resume the plenary meeting this afternoon in order to conclude the list of speakers. Immediately afterwards, we will hold an informal meeting to continue our consideration of those organizational matters which require decisions by the Committee.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, at the very beginning of my statement, I would like to offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament during this month. I assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in carrying out the tasks for which you are responsible. May I also pay a tribute to Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia who so ably guided our work last August and actively contributed to the preparation of the present session. Furthermore, I would like to extend my sincere welcome to the many new colleagues who have joined us recently. I wish to assure them that my delegation looks forward to maintaining the same excellent relations it had with their predecessors. I also wish to associate myself with the deep condolences already conveyed to the delegation of Italy by many other representatives on the death of our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo.

This year's session of the Committee on Disarmament is of particular significance. It is called upon to live up to its responsibilities at a time when the arms race has reached tremendous dimensions. Only a few weeks separate us from the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to which the Committee will have to report on the results of its activities.

In my statement today I would like to touch mainly on two problems: the general international situation and its impact on the Committee on Disarmament; and the CTB and nuclear disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament is holding its 1982 session under very complicated international conditions. Never since the Second World War has peace been in as much danger as now. Two major approaches to world affairs are becoming more and more evident, as shown at the first meetings of the Committee on Disarmament during this spring session.

One approach strongly supported by the German Democratic Republic aims at the maintenance of peace, at mutually advantageous co-operation among States, at the cessation and reversal of the arms race and at the prevention of a nuclear holocaust. It favours the continuation of the policy of détente by concrete steps in these directions. All international problems should be solved by means of a constructive dialogue.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

One of the recent expressions of this approach was the latest proposal of the Soviet Union on a step-by-step reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The implementation of this proposal would lead to a reduction of two-thirds of these weapons by both sides until 1990. It is our conviction that, given the political will of the parties to negotiate such an agreement on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security, the Geneva talks on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe can and should be brought to a successful conclusion.

Only a few days ago, the Head of State of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Erich Honecker, expressed a strong support for this proposal. He stated that, despite the campaign of slander led by the "overarmers", the Soviet Union in full agreement with its allies to proceed with the course aiming at the solution of the most important question of our time -- the maintenance of peace. This approach should also guide the work of our Committee when discharging its responsible tasks. My delegation is strongly working for that.

At the same time we cannot close our eyes to the revitalization of another quite different approach to international affairs. At the threshold of the 1980s, certain well-known circles have strengthened their efforts to replace détente by confrontation, arms limitation and disarmament by overarmament or, as they call it, "additional armament". Indeed, the cornerstone of this policy is an attempt to achieve military superiority by means of gigantic armament programmes. One cannot but assume that these forces are striving for the creation of a real pre-war situation, both in the material and in the propaganda fields. Wherever international conferences or negotiations are being held -- in Geneva, Madrid, Vienna or elsewhere -- the enemies of détente have considerably multiplied their activities. Part and parcel of this policy is the campaign which has been started recently on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean against the Soviet Union and other socialist States and which was also introduced into this Committee some days ago. The arrogant statements made by the representatives of the United States and other Western States and aimed at telling a sovereign State how it should build its social order constitute grave interference in the internal affairs of Poland, a friendly neighbour State of the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, this campaign is a clear attempt to make the Committee believe that Poland's internal problems have provoked an international crisis.

In more than one regard, these attempts represent a violation of the United Nations Charter and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Besides the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, such basic guidelines for international conduct as the principles of sovereignty, fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law and co-operation among States were violated. There should be no doubt: such an approach is not likely to promote reliability, calculability and stability in international relations. It is more than ironic that such attempts are undertaken by a State which not only supports the apartheid régime of South Africa and the annexationist policy of Israel, but also does not rule out, as announced by a member of its Government, the possibility of using military force in the Caribbean region and regards Central America as the "heart of its strategic concerns". Unfortunately, those are not only mere declarations.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Last year, the majority of the members of the Committee, with full justification and on the basis of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, rejected the attempts of some States to make the Committee's activity a function of the international situation, which, in the opinion of those States, was "not ripe" for disarmament. This year again, we were told by those who are responsible for the recent aggravation of the international situation that there should be a link between disarmament and the so-called "restraint" of certain States in international affairs.

At least two basic factors seem to underlie this dangerous "linkage concept". Firstly, it implies that only socialist, non-aligned and other States are interested in disarmament, but that the United States would do them a favour by joining disarmament negotiations. But are not the maintenance of peace and the achievement of disarmament the common objectives of all States and peoples? Secondly, whereas other States should conduct their foreign policy in a way conducive to the United States, the latter claims unrestrained rights and world stability to its own taste, similar to the "Pax Americana" of the cold war years.

In this connection, one cannot but agree with the well-known American politician, W. Averell Harriman, who, in an article published in November 1981 in the "International Herald Tribune" wrote: "In place of the 'real arms control' that was promised a year ago, we have only the promise of endless talks on nuclear arms in Europe and no talks at all on strategic arms until next year". After recent events here in Geneva we have to ask whether we will see, even this year, the start of the negotiations in question.

It is quite obvious that such linkage not only hampers disarmament negotiations, but is also in clear contradiction with the Final Document, paragraph 1 of which states that: "The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future".

Just one week ago, we were given a lecture on the United Nations Charter, international behaviour and "a realistic appreciation of the role of arms limitations". We were told a lot about a "new approach to arms control", "significant reductions" in nuclear weapons and so on. Yet there was no clear commitment to such priority items on the international disarmament agenda as the continuation of the SALT process, with the preservation of all the positive accomplishments already made and there was no mention of a comprehensive test ban and a complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Moreover, there have been attempts to downgrade these vital issues. But does this approach correspond to the letter and spirit of the Final Document of the first special session; Is this the right way to contribute to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to prepare for the second special session? What "system of peace" is to be constructed by such an approach? Except for rhetoric, nothing was actually said about the role of the Committee as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. No concrete proposals were submitted or even mentioned.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In addition, an attempt has been made to transform the Committee into some kind of court to condemn socialist society. It is not our intention to start here lengthy discussions on the pros and cons of socialist and capitalist societies. But I assure those who were so keen to raise this subject here that the people of my country are very proud of the achievements of more than 30 years of socialist development. It is a matter of fact that, during this historically short time, the German Democratic Republic, a small socialist country with but a population of 17 million, has developed into one of the 10 leading Powers in the world, with a highly developed industry, modern farming and a high income growth rate. It is not under socialism that social programmes have constantly been reduced to augment military budgets. It is not under socialism that millions of workers are out of work while a thin layer of people is making huge profits. Moreover, due to the policy of the socialist countries, Europe is now experiencing the longest peace period in its history. For years, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty strove for and finally achieved the convening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This policy was reaffirmed at the end of last year at the Bucharest meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The States represented at this meeting declared that for them "there was, is and will be no strategic doctrine except a defensive one. They do not intend to build a first-strike nuclear capability. Such was not their intention in the past nor will it be in the future. They do not seek military superiority and never will. They are in favour of ensuring military parity at a lower level by implementing disarmament measures, and for lessening and eliminating military confrontation in Europe. The States represented at the meeting are convinced that nobody stands to gain in the arms race. Should anyone resolve to unleash a nuclear war in the hope of winning it, he would conjure up a nuclear catastrophe for mankind and would inevitably be destroyed in it himself. A nuclear war cannot be limited." As far as the people of the German Democratic Republic are concerned, this was mentioned just one week ago by the distinguished representative of the United States, so let me assure him that the people of my country do not feel at all threatened by the country which liberated us from fascist rule and lost 20 million people in the Second World War. The real threat to the very survival of my people emanates from the West. Thousands of nuclear weapons are already deployed in our Western neighbourhood. According to NATO plans, still more nuclear missiles should be added in 1983 and thereafter.

We are nevertheless convinced that a policy which endangers peace and international co-operation has no chance of success. The broad peace movement developing now in Europe and in other regions of the world demonstrates that people are becoming increasingly aware of the dangers involved in the development and stationing on their soil of new, ever more sophisticated systems of weapons of mass destruction. We in the Committee should not neglect this movement.

In this regard, allow me to quote the Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Erich Honecker, who emphasized at the beginning of this year: "Reason and goodwill must prevail to save mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. The answer to questions of war and peace is too important to be left to those forces striving for military superiority and deflating the word 'disarmament' to an empty fine phrase".

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Let me now turn to the two priority items on our agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; and a comprehensive test ban.

Nuclear disarmament continues to be one of the priority items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. In view of the mounting danger of a nuclear war, effective steps in this field are more urgent than ever if we want to avoid the risk of being pushed into a nuclear catastrophe. Let me recall in this connection the unanimous view of the participants in the first international congress of "physicians for nuclear disarmament" that the interests of the present and all future generations require the prevention of nuclear war.

The Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe submitted by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly takes account of this urgent necessity of our time. It is an expression of a consistent and continuous course directed towards safeguarding peace. The resolution declares the first use of nuclear weapons the gravest crime against humanity and condemns any doctrine envisaging the first use of nuclear weapons and thereby provoking the risk of a nuclear war. If all nuclear-weapon Powers accepted the idea of the Declaration, it would be an effective step towards averting the danger of such a war. May I be permitted to recall what was said by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union: "If there is no first nuclear strike, there will, of course, be no second or third strike". It is only logical that unanimous support for this declaration would impart a strong impetus to efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, this seems not to be the case. We cannot hide our deep concern about statements trying to accustom mankind to the idea of the possible use of nuclear weapons. As an example, I would only like to mention a statement made by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, E. Rostow, in January this year. In this statement he said that "for us deterrence means two things: it means deterring nuclear war and it also means -- with reference to our supreme national interests -- retaining the possibility, if necessary, of using nuclear weapons if our supreme interests are threatened by conventional attack. This is a fact," Mr. Rostow stressed, "that many people forget sometimes -- both in the United States and in Europe and in Japan -- but it is a fact". But it is also a matter of fact that mankind does not need new doctrines on deterrence, on a "winnable" nuclear war or whatsoever. In that regard, the Committee on Disarmament has to play a more active and efficient role. It has to meet its responsibility and to start without delay negotiations on nuclear disarmament in full accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session.

As before, my delegation is in favour of using all the possibilities available to the Committee on Disarmament for the initiation of negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them. Our basic approach to this problem is contained in document CD/4.

Such negotiations could be prepared by an appropriate body of the Committee, such as an ad hoc working group or any other subsidiary organ.

The establishment of such a body could be considered during the consultations proposed in document CD/193. These consultations should be resumed without delay. They should facilitate the achievement of a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on agenda item 2.

General Assembly resolution 36/92 E has given the Committee a concrete mandate to this end.

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At the beginning of its work, such a group could, on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session, consider all aspects connected with the stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content. Thereafter, the group could concentrate its attention on the first stage. Within the framework of the discussion on the content of measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons should be addressed.

Thus, it should be the aim of the first stage to stop the nuclear arms race in its qualitative dimension, thereby creating favourable prerequisites for nuclear disarmament measures in the next stages.

In general, the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament should be based on the following major principles:

All nuclear-weapon States should participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament and corresponding agreements;

The degree of the participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in the measures of each stage is to be determined by taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and the other States concerned;

Each individual step should be part and parcel of an over-all nuclear disarmament programme which would guarantee the necessary comprehensive approach to solving the problems connected with the elimination of nuclear weapons;

The measures of each stage could be implemented gradually according to a predetermined order or in parallel according to a time-table;

These disarmament measures should be backed up by appropriate political and international legal guarantees.

These principles are fully in keeping with the security interests of all States. They do not contain any preconditions, but are aimed at maintaining the undiminished security of all sides concerned during the whole process of nuclear disarmament.

Proceeding from these considerations the delegation of the German Democratic Republic suggests the following mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 2: "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an Ad Hoc Working Group to elaborate, on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session, the stages of nuclear disarmament with the aim of preparing appropriate multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Ad Hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of the first and second parts of the Committee's 1982 session".

The development of the nuclear neutron weapon underlines the need for a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. We are now more than ever before convinced that this item continues to deserve the highest priority in our work. Year after year in the United Nations General Assembly, in this Committee and in other forums, the urgency of such a step has been emphasized. Unfortunately, at least one of the participants in the former trilateral negotiations has, in contravention of the Final Document and the Committee's agenda, now declared that a CTB is no longer on

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the order of the day. Why? What has changed in recent years? It may be assumed that, now, more than in recent years, the country concerned is interested in using nuclear tests for the build-up of its forces, which is necessary in order to maintain "credible deterrence", as we have been told. Obviously, there is an established interest in precluding in this way the following effects cited in a 1978 hearing before the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed Services: "In general, a CTB is highly likely to preclude any new warhead development and the stockpiling of any warhead design which has not been previously tested. Therefore, during the period a CTB is in effect, future strategic force modernization is likely to be influenced by, and limited to, those warhead designs which have been tested and which can be adapted to meet requirements ... A gradual degradation rather than a disintegration of the nuclear weapon community is the more likely consequence of a CTB of unlimited duration. Based on experiences during the test moratorium prior to 1964, it will be difficult over time to retain our best nuclear scientists and technicians, to maintain the high level of expertise of those who do remain, and to attract and train new people".

I think there is nothing left to add. In view of the great importance attached to a CTB, we appeal to the participants in the trilateral negotiations to resume them immediately and to bring them to an early and successful conclusion. The time has now come for the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on all aspects of a CTBT. Therefore, it would be most appropriate to establish an ad hoc working group for negotiations on the text of a CTBT. All nuclear-weapon States would have an appropriate opportunity to explain their positions and to participate in the fulfilment of this vital task in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The ad hoc working group to be established should take into account all proposals and initiatives advanced in recent years on a CTB, as well as the tripartite reports to the Committee on Disarmament.

To promote the early establishment of an ad hoc working group on agenda item 1, we propose the following mandate: "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee to negotiate a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. The Ad Hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of the first and second parts of the Committee's 1982 session".

In addition to nuclear disarmament and a CTBT, the Committee will have to deal with the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon. In this connection, the Committee has to implement General Assembly resolution 36/92 K, which explicitly requests the Committee to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. It is not my intention to elaborate on this item. I would only add the voice of my delegation to that of the delegations which proposed that immediate steps should be taken with a view to negotiating the text of such an agreement.

Due attention should also be paid to the problem of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. In concluding, I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, to make the necessary arrangements to ensure thorough consideration of items 1 and 2 of our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, with your permission, may I first of all convey to the delegation of Italy the sincere and deep condolences of my delegation on the untimely passing away of our distinguished colleague from Italy, Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo.

My delegation and I join all the distinguished speakers who took the floor before me in welcoming you most warmly as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. Together with our best wishes and congratulations. I offer you full co-operation and support on the part of my delegation in your difficult task.

May I also take this opportunity to express the thanks and appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Sani of Indonesia for his contribution to the successful conclusion of its 1981 session and for his effort in the preparation of this year's session.

On behalf of my delegation, I welcome in this room our new colleagues, the ambassadors of Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, as well as the new representatives of Czechoslovakia and Italy, who have joined us for the first time at this session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Let me also, Mr. Chairman, bid farewell to Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, with whom, despite political differences, I shared excellent personal contacts. I wish him every success in his new assignment and would appreciate it if the delegation of the Netherlands would kindly convey these wishes to Ambassador Fein.

Mr. Chairman, we hope that the negotiations we are going to continue here in the next two months or so will significantly contribute to the results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation came to Geneva with instructions to make every possible effort to be constructive and flexible wherever possible in order to contribute here to the noble cause of disarmament and peace. Therefore, I would like, first of all, to elaborate on the topics which are on our agenda since, in the considered view of my delegation, this is and should be the substance of our deliberations in this Committee.

For my delegation, the constructive negotiations here in the next two months would mean: the elaboration of a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, specific accomplishments at least in the process of the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, at least the commencement of work on the text of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as negotiations in the ad hoc working groups on such vital agenda items as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the nuclear disarmament and the comprehensive test ban treaty. I would like to highlight some of these priority topics:

The Final Document of the first special session as well as countless resolutions and different disarmament initiatives aim at specific negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Some of them were initiated by Poland and it sponsored many others. We are determined to work in accordance with their letter and spirit. We give our full support to the recommendations of resolutions 36/92 E and 36/92 F adopted at the last session of the General Assembly. More specifically, my delegation lends its unqualified support to the call by the General Assembly for the establishment at this session of the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc

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working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries, my delegation has actively participated in this Committee in all debates and in the preparation of the appropriate documents on this agenda item, starting with document CD/4 at the beginning of existence of the Committee on Disarmament in its present form. We shall continue to do so with a deep conviction that the establishment of the working group would constitute the next and necessary step forward in fulfilling the Committee's mandate on this agenda item.

I would like to support the draft mandate for the working group just proposed by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic.

It is equally so with the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Committee should not delay any longer the establishment of the ad hoc working group on this item, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions that have been adopted in the last several years and, most recently, resolutions 36/84 and 36/92 F. We should, indeed, bear in mind the fact that, as stated in General Assembly resolution 36/84, "... since 1972 ... all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary ...". It is deplorable that, as emphasized in the reports from its last year's session and in the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution the Committee on Disarmament was prevented from responding to the general wish for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this item only as a result of the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States. The working group should be established without any further delay and should consider all the aspects of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests and aim at the early elaboration of the text of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Speaking on the complex problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, I must touch on the question of nuclear neutron weapons. In its resolution 36/92 K, the General Assembly requested this Committee "to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons". My delegation believes that the best organizational framework for elaborating such a convention would be an ad hoc working group which could be established by this Committee. We have at our disposal a comparatively good background for such an exercise: the draft convention submitted by the group of socialist countries to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and a broad exchange of views on the subject matter which could be continued and deepened in the working group.

With regard to the agenda items on which we concentrated our efforts last year in the work of the working groups, I would like to present the views of my delegation on chemical weapons and the comprehensive programme on disarmament.

With regard to chemical weapons, we note with great concern the news of dangerous developments in the chemical arms race. The United States Government is making preparations for the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, specifically binary weapons. As the members of the Committee are aware, we have so far not been able to start concrete negotiations on the draft text of a chemical weapons convention. This was so mainly because of the position of at least one delegation which favoured a rather limited mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group

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on chemical weapons. Now, we have learned with satisfaction that the United States would be ready "to support efforts to achieve a ban on chemical weapons". My delegation welcomes such a statement, which we take as an expression of the consent of that delegation to a broader mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. In view of the above, my delegation believes that a proposal on the broadening of the mandate will achieve consensus. With an enlarged mandate, which will oblige us to start the elaboration of a draft convention, the working group should obviously base its work on the solid foundations that have been built at the Committee's last two sessions under the very able chairmanship of the Ambassadors of Japan and Sweden. How to proceed further? As we all realize, the present stage of negotiations makes it possible to determine the level of convergence and divergence of views on numerous issues around the table. From this point on, this year's group should start elaborating specific provisions of the convention on issues where convergence or unanimity of views has been reached and try to narrow the gap on issues where the views still differ. The group could possibly work in turns, that is, concentrating at a time on elaborating specific provisions and, at another time, on narrowing the gap between the diverging views.

My delegation, which was a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 36/96 B, wishes to refer to its operative paragraph 5, which "calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present". We are convinced that this stipulation should be clearly reflected in our work on the future convention on chemical weapons.

The distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, who spoke on 2 February, expressed in considerable detail the views shared by the socialist countries, including Poland, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament as a whole, as well as on its particular chapters. I do not have much to add, except to underline and emphasize once again that, in the light of the coming second special session which will approve the programme, my delegation belongs to those very many others who consider that the draft CPD should be elaborated by this Committee at its current spring session. What we need is a realistic and genuine approach to the main objective: to negotiate for general and complete disarmament. In this connection, I totally share the view expressed here one week ago by the distinguished representative of India.

In fact, I have one remark to add to the discussion of the principles of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I have in mind the "linkage" argument. If each of us in this room is to apply the "linkage" approach, then, indeed, we shall not be able to work out a genuine comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation therefore suggests that the disarmament negotiations, known from past experience as a time-consuming and painstaking process, should not be linked with other events in international life. We are of the opinion that that should become one of the principles of the future CPD.

This is the position on the main topics that my delegation has brought with it in coming to participate in the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament. We are ready to co-operate with every delegation, as we think it essential that tangible progress should be made this year. For socialist Poland's foreign policy, there is no objective more important and urgent than to secure lasting peace and multilateral co-operation for all nations of the world. This can be done only by stopping the mad arms race with a view to arriving at a general and complete disarmament.

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This is why we become more and more concerned about the increase of tensions. There are, indeed, numerous causes for this concern. Unextinguished fires of international armed conflicts are still glowing. There are cases of annexation of foreign territories, of various forms of foreign interference and of pressure on States and nations. These are realities. We are also witnessing manoeuvres aimed at creating artificial centres of tension, at using various pretexts for justifying the policy of intensified armaments, including the production of new kinds of weapons.

Right from the first day of this year's session, we have witnessed here, in the Committee on Disarmament, attempts to play the Polish card. True enough, some of those playing this card recognize that the Committee is not the right forum for such a game, but they nevertheless go on playing it.

My delegation feels all the more compelled to raise this subject since, until now, it has limited itself to patiently listening to all the false accusations directed against my country, my Government and my nation. We have done so because our main concern has been to save precious time to enable the Committee to go on with the work it is expected to do.

Formally, those who bring into this forum the affairs of my country argue that they are not merely an internal matter. By lowering the level of confidence in international relations and by threatening international security, the events in Poland are allegedly hindering all disarmament talks.

This is a one-sided, politically biased interpretation, convenient to those who would be glad to seize any pretext for their own aims and who will not hesitate to take advantage of every move which is not in line with their own politics and make it into a handy excuse for their actions. Today, we hear that the responsibility for the new United States policy on armaments falls not only on the Soviet Union, which "has gained a considerable advantage in nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons", but also upon Poland, which is accused of "undermining the climate of international confidence so indispensable for disarmament negotiations".

Why is it that Poland should deserve such grave accusations? All this, because of the institution in Poland of martial law, in full agreement with the Constitution and with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by the constitutionally empowered authority. Martial law, instituted in the name of the highest national interest, does, indeed, stipulate temporary derogation from some constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. But leaders of some delegations to this Committee seem to ignore the fact that the Prime Minister of the Polish Government stated on 13 December 1981 that "I wish for all to understand the motives and objectives of our action. We are not heading towards a military coup, towards military dictatorship. The nation has enough strength, enough wisdom to develop an efficient democratic system of socialist Government. In this system the armed forces will be able to stay where is their rightful place -- in the barracks. None of the Polish problems can be solved by force in the longer run;" and that "I address world opinion as a whole. I appeal for understanding of the exceptional conditions which occurred in Poland, of emergency measures which have become necessary. Our actions endanger nobody. Their only objective is to remove internal threats and thereby to prevent dangers to peace and international co-operation. We intend to keep the concluded treaties and agreements." Those speakers also did not heed what was stated earlier by representatives of their own countries who, rationally motivated, were showing much concern over the destiny of

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Poland, overwhelmed at that time by chaos and anarchy. Let me at this point quote again the words of the Prime Minister of my Government when he spoke on 24 December last year: "Let every one of us in his own conscience find a frank answer today to the question: what was Poland heading for? How long could a country survive torn every day by strikes, hot from tensions, immersing in the climate of artificially flared up hatred? I address this question also to those foreign quarters which already about a fortnight ago advised the Poles to set to work, to restore order and discipline. Today the same quarters noisily deplore the measures which have been taken precisely to this end. One can have the impression that it is in somebody's interest to make Poland a country of chaos, an insolvent debtor, a sick organism of the continent".

To some delegations in the Committee, all this is of little importance. They have their own information from their own sources, which are not the only credible ones, and nobody is entitled to know where and who it comes from. Right here, at this forum of multilateral disarmament negotiations, we are being accused of violations of human rights, but slyly ignored is the fact that the Polish authorities have notified the United Nations Secretary-General of the introduction of martial law, in full conformity with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which admits the right of derogation from its obligations if public emergency requires it.

We are being subjected to pressures, blackmail and economic restrictions, threatened and accused of violating the Helsinki Final Act. And yet, this very document solemnly states, inter alia, that: "The States Parties shall respect the sovereign equality and individual character of each of them, as well as all the rights constituting sovereignty and comprised in it, including, in particular, the right of every State to equality before the law, territorial integrity, as well as freedom and political independence. They shall equally respect the right of each of them to freely determining their political, social, economic and cultural systems, and the right to promulgate laws and regulations". I would like to ask who is the one who is violating the Final Act of Helsinki? Is it the one who promulgates laws that he considers as indispensable for the salvation of his nation's statehood and for maintaining stability on the continent, or rather the one who announces the world over that such an action is not what he likes and brutally demands, even in this room, to change these laws according to his wishes?

In the interventions of some delegations here, we have heard polemics casting doubt on the fact that the introduction of martial law in Poland is exclusively Poland's internal affair. But today, after having listened to the statement by Mr. Rostov, I think I understand better the purpose of such polemics. They serve to create in this Committee artificial problems which would provide a screen to make us believe how greatly justified are military budget increases, the production of new kinds of weapons and how important is the struggle of the "free world" against the "threat of communism".

Are we not given to understand that the Committee on Disarmament is not much more than just a group of "noble and bold defenders of democracy, justice and freedom in the world" and, on the other hand, a group composed of an "oppressor with

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imperial ambitions" and a handful of "oppressed" States, so oppressed that they do not even dare admit it? The rest are those non-informed ones who are in need of guidance and instruction from the "wise free world" as to who is who and what he is aiming at.

The attempts to make the situation in Poland an international issue also serve some delegations as grounds for giving us advice, directives and conditions, which, they think, should be fulfilled by Poland to bring back her credibility and restore a good climate for disarmament negotiations. The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has done so in the clearest way. One is almost tempted to remark that advice and recommendations, if they are not asked for, can only be given in one's own house. However, it is rather unbecoming to offer them to others without being invited to do so. This has particular importance in international relations. My delegation has asked neither the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany nor any other for advice or recommendations as to when and why and with whom we are to negotiate in Poland. If the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has presented himself here as an expert in the sociology of human relations, may I ask him why he did not advise his own Government how to cope with unemployment or how to prevent discrimination in the employment of "politically suspected" elements in his own country? We in Poland still remember very well the advice and instructions regarding the so-called Gdansk corridor given to Poland 45 years ago by a State whose succession was claimed after the war by those political forces which contributed to laying the foundations of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of Poland of that time did not follow that "advice". History knows what followed.

We remember this lesson of history remarkably well and this is why we firmly demand that no country should ever offer such instructions to another and that States and nations should co-operate with each other in an atmosphere of mutual respect. The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany even availed himself of the opportunity of calling the constitutional Government of my country a "military regime". Such a term is not even being used by the members of his own Government. Ironically enough, he used this term when expressing hope for a "return of the atmosphere of confidence". Mr. Rostow, in turn, could not help calling the Prime Minister of my constitutional Government a "military dictator". This seems, indeed, a peculiar way of restoring mutual confidence.

I come from a country which may be poor and is certainly much poorer than the country Mr. Rostow comes from, but it possesses a high sense of dignity and I will therefore not take advantage of the right of reciprocity and will not use abusive terms when referring to the Chief of Mr. Rostow's Government. To my mind it is inadmissible to use offensive language in the mutual relations of representatives of States, because, when epithets come in, then, obviously, arguments must be lacking. Let me remark that it was quite easy for the United States representative to wield the arguments of power when he tried to indoctrinate us on matters unrelated to the agenda of the Committee. It was much more difficult for him, as

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pointed out by the distinguished ambassadors of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic, to use the power of his arguments when he, although briefly, touched upon the agenda items.

I would not like to take more of the Committee's time for matters unrelated to the agenda and will therefore confine myself in the final part of my intervention to quoting a small excerpt from the statement made by the Prime Minister of my Government, Wojciech Jaruzelski, at the session of the Polish Parliament held on 25 January this year: "We are acting in a highly complicated international situation. I shall speak openly without diplomatic subtleties. It was here, in Poland, that the process of dismantling the post-war balance of force in Europe and, by the same token, in the world, was to start. In the drive for destabilization, for gaining unilateral supremacy, it was staked on crushing the foundations of peace in Europe, i.e., on the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. The cost of that plan would have to be paid by the Poles. This objective was made impossible to be implemented before 15 December. It is now tried to be achieved by means of threats, boycotts and the so-called sanctions.

We welcome with recognition the realistic, far-sighted policy of those Governments and those political, economic and financial circles which have opposed the dictate, and which are determined to defend the right to taking sovereign decisions. We note this today and we shall well remember it for the future.

Unfortunately, other States of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance have launched a psychological and propaganda war against Poland. The economic and the food weapon has been applied. It is being maintained that the economic sanctions are directed against the Government of the Polish People's Republic, against the Military Council for National Salvation. This is not true. In the final count those sanctions are directed against the Polish people. Against every Pole. The target of the sanctions is clear: to paralyse the Polish economy, to make impossible coming out from the crisis, to starve the nation into surrender, to provoke an internal conflict. That is the measure of the so-called humanitarian approach. That is a lesson which we have to learn by heart. The Poles are to be punished because they did not let construct in the heart of Europe a sacrificial pyre on which their State was to be burned, because at least once they turned out to be wiser before the loss.

Hypocrisy knows no boundaries. A Government which for years has been torpedoing the application of sanctions against the greatest concentration camp, that is, the Republic of South Africa, does not hesitate to apply sanctions against Poland.

The head of the Polish Government has not demanded the release from American prisons of hand-cuffed leaders of the air traffic controllers union, the Polish Government did not make statements concerning an assessment of the respect for human rights in Northern Ireland. The Polish Parliament has not discussed whether a ban on performing a job by people of inconvenient views, in force in the Federal Republic of Germany, is compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. We have the right to expect reciprocity. Dictates by certain countries as to who in Poland is to negotiate and with whom are simply ridiculous and anachronistic. It was like that in the past century when the metropolises spoke in such a manner to their colonies.

Never in history have the Poles yielded to a foreign ultimatum. Apparently, not every one abroad can understand our history, our sense of pride and dignity. There are controversies and conflicts in our country, but no outside forces will settle them.

Likewise, we reject the insinuation that allegedly the decision on instituting martial law was imposed upon us and inspired. Attempts are being made at spreading the belief that a socialist, sovereign country with a millenary history of its statehood, a country having a strong army, is a child that must be led by the hand. The truth is that the decision was ours, that it was taken on the basis of our own assessment and implemented on our own.

It is to be regretted that the role of the main organizer of anti-Polish actions has been taken on by the present Government of the United States, a country with which Poland is linked by bonds of traditional friendship. We are not giving up hope for a return to realism there." I trust that the quoted text provides a clear reply to each of those who have touched here upon my country's affairs.

Before concluding, I would like to return briefly to the question of "linkage". Sharing the critical view on "linkage" expressed here by many delegations, my delegation wishes to reiterate its position that the Committee on Disarmament has been called upon by the international community to conduct multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the arms race, on disarmament agreements in a world just as it is, with the membership of States as decided four years ago, in mutual respect for their equality and partnership, as well as for the specificity of their socio-political systems and membership in military and political blocs or the non-aligned movement. Let no one try to teach or change anyone. We have enough work and the time is short. I fully agree with the distinguished representative of Mexico who, in his statement on 2 February, said, inter alia, that: "... to accept the 'linkage' argument ... would mean that there could never, or virtually never, be serious negotiations on disarmament." As to some "experts" who try to impose on the Committee the "linkage" argument, I would like to ask them the following question: if every one of us applies such a method, and everybody has such a right, shall we be able to fulfill the expectations which the international community has linked with the Committee on Disarmament? Such a question is justified not only because of our previous experience, but also because of the perspectives which emerge from some statements made so far in our debate.

Guided by the supreme interest of peace and international security, my delegation declares its readiness for active participation in the common endeavour for the Committee to keep its role of a negotiating forum. We would like to express our deep conviction that it is not too late for this yet.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Ibarro.

Mr. NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this Committee; we also extend our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Sani of Indonesia, for the skill with which he has guided our work at last month's meetings. We also welcome the distinguished colleagues who have joined us to carry out the important work of the Committee on Disarmament and wish to express our sympathy to the delegation of Italy on the death of Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo.

The purpose of our statement today is to give a brief introduction to the document which our delegation has seen fit to present to the Committee on Disarmament and which, thanks to excellent co-ordination by the Secretariat, is available in all working languages.

This is document CD/238, which is entitled "Statement concerning the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons" and is the result of the study on this subject requested by Pope John Paul II from the Pontifical Academy of Sciences.

The study was prepared by a group of 14 specialized scientists from different countries and, as soon as it was completed, His Holiness John Paul II transmitted it directly to the leaders of the nuclear Powers and, through the Papal Nunciature, to the other countries of the international community.

Thanks to its content and especially to the spiritual authority of His Holiness, this study, which was carried out by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, supplements the other studies prepared by governmental and non-governmental organizations in this field.

After reading this document, we reaffirm our conviction that nuclear weapons are unjustifiable and that it is also unjustifiable to claim that peace can be achieved on the basis of a threat of such magnitude.

We consider that peace is to be found in the union of peoples in all aspects of human life and that acceptance of this fact will enable us to achieve the objective of disarmament and the other great goals mankind has set itself with a view to complete development.

The problem of nuclear weapons is not only that they threaten the survival of mankind, but also that they hamper its over-all progress.

With these few words, we have tried to draw attention to the relationship between disarmament and the other aspects of human life, with the intention of putting disarmament back into its proper perspective so that we may work for disarmament in this Committee, but with our sights set on mankind's supreme ideals.

In conclusion, I should like to say that our delegation will address the Committee at another time in order to explain its position with respect to the items on the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the Floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing the representative of Iran occupy the office of Chairman of the Committee. I congratulate you wholeheartedly and assure you once again that my delegation is fully prepared to co-operate with you. My congratulations are also addressed to Ambassador Sani of the Indonesian delegation on the manner in which he presided over our work. It also gives me pleasure to welcome our colleagues to the Committee on Disarmament and wish them every success in their task. One of our former colleagues, Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo, has passed away; I should like to associate my delegation with the condolences which have been addressed to the delegation of Italy, and request that they be transmitted to Ambassador di Montezemolo's family.

All the member delegations of the Committee on Disarmament agree that the international situation has worsened since the end of the Committee's summer session. Of course, opinions vary as to the reasons for that deterioration. We all seem to agree that discussion of this point need not be prolonged, but it is still worthwhile to emphasize once again that there is a relationship between the arms race and the worsening of international tension and, consequently, worthwhile to raise the question of the real purpose of the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament.

Speakers periodically take the floor to explain to us that, since international tension is on the increase, this Power or that is obliged to build up its means of destroying or deterring its potential adversary.

Similarly, we are assured that what is conventionally called the arms race is nothing more than the legitimate pursuit of military parity.

My delegation has had occasion to state the reasons why it refuses to recognize the inevitability of the arms race and the pursuit of military parity or superiority, which both lead to the unacceptable conclusion that all genuine disarmament efforts will be unsuccessful.

We note that there has not been any session of the Committee on Disarmament at which delegations have not drawn attention to the worsening of international tension. Unfortunately, our Committee's work suffers from the fact that the major military Powers continue to stir up international tension and to escalate the arms race.

The Committee on Disarmament is beset by a number of dangers. The danger of paralysis is certainly the most obvious, as it would set the seal on the futility of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Our work has not reached this terminal stage, even though virtually no progress has been made on various agenda items and, in particular, the first two.

The second danger would be to turn this Committee into a platform that would relay the attacks and accusations made by one side against the other. Such attitudes are exactly the opposite of negotiation and polemical exchanges are no substitute for negotiations. We cannot but consider them a screen that ill disguises the refusal genuinely to tackle the fundamental items on the Committee's agenda.

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

The dramatic trend towards confrontation highlights the deadlock of a system of international relations that is based on zones of influence divided between the two blocs. This approach, whereby international peace and security depend solely on trust between the blocs and the fate of the majority of mankind is linked to that of a particular region, cannot fail to have direct consequences on the disarmament effort and the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

A concept of international peace in which the settlement of disputes necessarily involves accommodation between major Powers is dangerous, for, when it is successful, it restricts the relative benefits of détente to a particular region, at the expense of the rest of the world.

The so-called period of détente, which has been confined to the political sphere and has involved attempts to establish a balance of power, has proved incapable of preserving peace and still less of slowing the arms race. What is least surprising is that, during this period, there has been a qualitative and quantitative acceleration of the arms race.

Every year, we have watched, helpless, as increasingly sophisticated, increasingly murderous and increasingly costly weapons have been developed. The arms race in outer space and in the oceans is taking on new dimensions that are a further source of tension. New weapons technologies lead to dangerous tactical and strategic changes which, with every passing day, lower the probability threshold of nuclear disaster. We seem to be moving further and further away from the objective of general and complete disarmament, which has been on the agenda of the international organizations for several decades.

The existence of nuclear arsenals is now regarded as the most serious threat to the future of mankind. The strategy of nuclear deterrence, allegedly standing as a guarantee for the maintenance of international peace and security, carries with it the seeds of endless competition in the sphere of nuclear weapons. Instead of encouraging détente, it increases mistrust between the partners and stirs up the ideological differences of the two blocs. It underpins the policy of zones of influence and feeds the rivalry between the blocs.

Still more absurd, the enormous waste of human, material and financial resources, to which this policy gives rise is a huge drain on the world economy, to the detriment of economic and social development.

It is true that a system of international security cannot be built on nuclear arsenals and undeniable that any progress made in the disarmament effort will create favourable conditions for widening and strengthening genuine détente.

In painting a rather grim picture of the international situation, our aim is not to add to the general pessimism; but the gravity and seriousness of the situation do not allow us to overlook the dangers that threaten us.

Anxiety and concern at the arms race which is now part of our daily environment increasingly find expression in the form of collective awareness of the need to avert nuclear catastrophe.

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

The demonstrations in favour of disarmament that have taken place in many countries in recent months are encouraging symptoms of the refusal passively to accept the risks for the survival of mankind created by the policy of nuclear deterrence.

In my delegation's opinion, this widespread protest movement which has no political, ideological or geographical frontiers cannot be regarded merely as a demonstration by fringe elements which have lost contact with reality. It is, on the contrary, "one of the greatest political promises of the day" and we must take account of this deep and legitimate desire to live in a world without constant fear of catastrophe.

This demand for genuine, immediate disarmament, which is being voiced by ever wider sectors of public opinion, echoes the many recommendations and resolutions of international bodies in favour of disarmament. Is there any need to recall, in this connection, as many speakers have done before me, that, at its latest session, the General Assembly adopted some 50 resolutions on disarmament problems?

Without any doubt, the present session of the Committee is of particular importance, as it is being held on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. While we believe that the Committee is not obliged to carry out all the tasks entrusted to it before the second special session, we do not see how it can go before the General Assembly with no significant results whatever to report.

It cannot be denied that the absence of positive results would considerably reduce the Committee's credibility and give rise to doubts about the effectiveness of the machinery set up at the first special session. And yet, at the outset, this machinery seemed bound to succeed: for the first time, the five nuclear Powers were seated around a negotiating table; the framework for achieving general and complete disarmament was outlined in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session and the principles, objectives and priorities were clearly defined; and many studies were carried out in various disarmament spheres.

How then can we explain the fact that, after four years of negotiations, none of the recommendations of the first special session devoted to disarmament has really been implemented?

We can, unfortunately, see no other explanation than the lack of political will and determination on the part of the major Powers. We are more and more convinced that political will is, at the present stage, the decisive factor for genuine negotiations on disarmament measures.

How is it that, after three annual sessions, the Committee on Disarmament has not even been able to begin formal negotiations on the top priority items of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the cessation of the arms race which have been on the agenda for negotiations for two decades and all aspects of which have been explored?

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

Furthermore, how can one fail to judge severely the intransigence of some nuclear Powers which have not changed their unilateral declarations aimed at providing security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States, but have imposed further obligations upon the latter! How can the nuclear-weapon Powers be so indifferent to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, those which have refused to throw in their lot with either of the two superpowers, without thereby incurring harsh judgements of their attitude?

Now that the dangers of a resumption of the chemical arms race are becoming clear, we wonder what logical basis there may be for refusing to give the Working Group on Chemical Weapons a more specific mandate to enable it to negotiate the text of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are, however, aware that, thanks to the results obtained by the Working Group, we are closer to an agreement on chemical weapons than to any other measure within the purview of the Committee on Disarmament.

We also wonder whether we shall be in a position to submit for adoption at the second special session devoted to disarmament the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament whose elements have been defined by the Disarmament Commission? Because of the little time we have left and the remaining differences of opinion, we see no cause for optimism, despite the efforts made by the member countries of the Group of 21.

These are questions to which we can find no other answer than the lack of will to hold genuine negotiations.

The fact is -- and this is what is most regrettable -- that some Powers obstinately continue to regard disarmament as something which depends on their mission in the world and give no credit to the multilateral approach.

My delegation has had occasion to reject this conception. It has also had occasion to stress the fact that the great military Powers bear particular responsibility for safeguarding peace in the world.

My delegation is thus of the opinion that the Committee on Disarmament must fully shoulder its responsibility in the preparation of disarmament measures. Bilateral or regional efforts should, of course, be encouraged and we welcome any agreement reached within such a framework. Such efforts can, however, not be a substitute for the work of the Committee on Disarmament and, still less, serve as a pretext for preventing this negotiating body from carrying out its principal task.

My delegation is convinced that the system of ad hoc working groups is the only means of conducting substantive negotiations on the various items on the Committee's agenda. It is therefore of the opinion that the four ad hoc working groups should be re-established so that they may immediately resume their work under their existing terms of reference, while the Committee on Disarmament considers the question of widening those terms. We have in mind, in particular, the terms of reference of the Ac Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

We also firmly hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to reach a consensus without delay on the creation of two working groups to negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty and to work out measures to halt the arms race. As we all know, these are two questions of the highest priority that lie at the heart of the disarmament issue. Is there any need to recall that, last year, the United Nations General Assembly again urged, in its resolutions 36/84, 36/85, 36/92 E and 36/92 F, that negotiations on these two questions should take place as a matter of priority at the 1982 session of the Commission on Disarmament?

With regard to chemical weapons, another important question whose priority is second only to that of nuclear weapons, we are convinced that, thanks to the remarkable work carried out by the Working Group, positive results may be achieved if all the participants accept the necessary mutual concessions on pending issues.

Despite the scant progress made by the Ac Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances, my delegation believes that this Group should continue its work because we are convinced that an agreement can be reached if some nuclear-weapon States reconsider their positions from the standpoint of the general interest and take into account the concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States for their security.

The Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should seek to reach a comprehensive agreement on concrete disarmament measures in clearly defined stages according to a specific time-table. To be effective, this agreement should embody a formula that creates an obligation for States in relation to the implementation of the agreed measures. My delegation firmly supports the proposals contained in working paper CD/223, which is, in our view, realistic and constructive. We sincerely hope that an agreement can be submitted for adoption at the second special session devoted to disarmament, as we are sure that this would be an essential element for imparting new momentum to disarmament.

Finally, although we do not attach top priority to negotiations on radiological weapons, we consider that progress can be made if the positions of the various groups are taken into account in a genuinely constructive spirit.

My country has always militated in favour of reducing the tension between the blocs, the disappearance of military alliances and the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. My delegation represents a non-aligned country, which, together with many other countries, defends the right of the vast majority of the population of our planet to benefit from economic and social progress and to live without fear of the threat of world war.

Many studies have stressed the close dependent links between development and disarmament and we share the conviction that disarmament and the pursuit of peace are indissolubly bound together. Despite the difficulties and obstacles that stand in the way of decisive progress in our work, my delegation fervently hopes that the ideals of peace among nations, the development of peoples and the establishment of a more just international society will carry the day against the temptations of power and domination.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Burma, Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): First of all, may I take this opportunity to express the Burmese delegation's appreciation for the effective and impartial manner with which the business of this Committee is being conducted by you, Mr. Chairman. My delegation is confident that progress will be made under your able chairmanship.

Before I embark upon the substantive part of my statement, I would also like to thank those distinguished representatives who have spoken before me for their kind words in welcoming me to their midst, together with those of our colleagues who, like me, have recently joined this Committee. I feel that it is my privilege to assume my responsibilities as my country's representative to the Committee on Disarmament and to participate in its work, which is so important for the future of the entire mankind. Despite the many obstacles we may encounter and the challenges we may face, it is our earnest hope that progress can be achieved during this session which is commensurate with the devotion and effort that all delegations are putting into our work.

In every field of human endeavour it is necessary at certain times to take stock of the situation. For this reason my delegation feels that we should also make our views known like the many other delegations which have done so in their interventions since this Committee began its present session on 2 February. This, we feel, is all the more necessary considering that the Committee will be approaching during the present session the twentieth year since its original inception. We must also bear in mind that there is little time left before we report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If we look at our achievements, in retrospect, we are obliged to join the chorus of voices that is heard around this table since the Committee began its present session that our achievements fall far short of our goals and objectives. In saying so, we do not underrate the importance of agreements reached so far for it has taken years of painstaking efforts in their negotiations. No doubt they are significant in themselves. However, substantive measures on disarmament have to be realized if we are to make headway towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament. At the same time we are not operating in a static environment. The momentum and magnitude of the continuing arms race far outweigh this Committee's efforts on disarmament and is making our task ever more difficult.

As the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, this Committee, though technically autonomous, owes its responsibility to the international community and its link with the United Nations through its resolutions is an indispensable element of its functioning process. Without the guidelines set out

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

for us by the international community, we would be sailing in an uncharted sea. Minimizing the importance or underrating the significance of United Nations resolutions will not do justice to our work.

The mandate which the international community set out for us at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and which is embodied in the Final Document provides an integrated and universal strategy for disarmament that has the widest support and approval of the international community. It is incumbent upon us to translate the principles embodied in the Final Document into an integrated programme of action. The work that we do here during the time that is left before the opening of the second special session will have a significant bearing on its outcome. It is important that we do our utmost to fulfil our commitments which the international community so anxiously expects of us. We should also bear in mind that the essential ingredient that is necessary for progress on negotiations is the political will of States, without which all our efforts here will not amount to very much.

Much has been said about the deterioration of the international political climate and its bearing on disarmament. It cannot be doubted that a favourable political atmosphere creates mutual trust and confidence between States which is conducive to the success of disarmament negotiations. This logic has equal validity in its reverse application. The recourse to a vast build-up of military arsenals by the major Powers, which was due to lack of mutual confidence, has now become, by the very nature of the arms race and the threat to their vital security interests, the major obstacle to improvement of relations between them. Tangible results on disarmament could in turn create conditions favourable to mutual trust and confidence. Therefore, the deterioration of the international political atmosphere should not be considered as a reason to defer negotiations on disarmament, particularly in the field of strategic armaments.

The foremost concern of the world today is the possibility of a general nuclear war and the vital importance of avoiding such a catastrophe to ensure the survival of mankind. So long as nuclear weapons exist, their threat will hang over mankind like the sword of Damocles and the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications will always be possible, for no one can say that the machines that control these weapons and the men who control the machines are infallible. The search for security by States through the acquisition of nuclear weapons and their ever-increasing accumulation threatens the security of mankind. For these reasons, nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race are the crux of the disarmament issue. The cause of world peace and security will not therefore be served if we tend to minimize the danger of a nuclear war or diffuse the solution of nuclear disarmament matters with other aspects of disarmament.

The limitation of the strategic components of nuclear armaments is an indispensable element in the nuclear disarmament process. Meaningful restraints on the strategic arms race could create favourable conditions that could have a positive effect on the prevention of the danger of a nuclear war and facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament. High expectations were placed by the international community on the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. However,

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

these expectations were not realized due to shifts in the orientation of strategic doctrines and the political level decisions taken in their wake and a feeling of deep concern by the international community is reflected in resolution 36/97 I adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament declared that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. It is therefore incumbent upon this Committee during its present session seriously to consider this all-important issue. The establishment of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament, which is long overdue, would provide an appropriate body to conduct multilateral negotiations on concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

The prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is a priority item that must also be effectively resolved by this Committee. International negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear tests began more than two decades ago -- well before the inception of this Committee -- and, despite persistent efforts in this as well as in other forums, it has persistently defied solution. Hopes were raised when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed that it would be a step towards a comprehensive test ban, but these hopes were not to be realized and nuclear testing, particularly by the major nuclear Powers, continues without respite. It has been stressed time and time again that nuclear testing by the major nuclear-weapon States is being conducted with a view to further sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the effect that the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons have on the horizontal spread of such weapons is also an important factor that cannot be ignored.

What is now needed for an agreement on a test ban is the political will of the major nuclear Powers. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall that, in 1972, the Secretary-General declared that all the technical aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve a final agreement. This has been mentioned again in resolution 36/84 of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

In the past, failure to achieve a consensus for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in this Committee, as proposed by the Group of 21, has inhibited substantive negotiations. While the responsibility for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests lies with the nuclear-weapon States, there is a universal concern by all States for the early conclusion of a test ban treaty. Therefore, in an issue of such universal concern it would be most propitious to seek solutions through a multilateral approach and the establishment of an ad hoc working group under an effective mandate would be most appropriate.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

I wish now to make a few comments on the topical subject which many of the distinguished speakers before me have appropriately referred to as one of the most urgent issues that is before this Committee. The international community places great expectations on what sort of a comprehensive disarmament programme this Committee will present. We must live up to its expectations if we are to prove our worth as an effective multilateral negotiating forum and justify our commitments to disarmament by the resolution of this all-important issue. In our task we must first realize that fundamental approaches and concepts must be reconciled if we are to move forward in working out the details of what a CPD should constitute.

In this regard, my delegation would like to join other representatives, particularly those of the Group of 21, in urging all concerned to show political will in our joint endeavours for the evolution of an acceptable comprehensive programme.

My delegation shares the consensus view of the Group of 21 that a tangible framework could be evolved in accordance with proposals contained in the working papers submitted by the Group. We feel that this is a step in the right direction when we take account of the fact that these papers were formulated on the basis of United Nations General Assembly resolutions relevant to the work of this Committee, particularly the Final Document, the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

These are some of the thoughts that we would like to express as the Committee begins its work for this session. We will, of course, during the course of the present session, elaborate our views further on these and other matters which are on the agenda of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

We have exhausted the time available for the morning. If there is no objection, I would suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful, the 155th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. The Committee will listen to the remaining speakers inscribed to take the floor today. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I should like first, Mr. Chairman, to express my satisfaction at seeing you preside over the work of this Committee and to assure you of the fullest co-operation of the delegation of the Argentine Republic in helping you to carry out your important task. At the same time, I should like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Sani of Indonesia for the very efficient and cordial manner in which he presided over our deliberations until the beginning of this month. I should also like to add my welcome to the new representatives who have joined this Committee and to assure them that they will receive the fullest co-operation from the delegation of the Argentine Republic. What I have said so far has been a source of satisfaction to me, but now it is my painful duty to convey to the distinguished delegation of Italy the condolences of my delegation on the death of the distinguished Ambassador Cordero de Montezemolo. I would ask the Italian delegation to convey these sentiments to its Government and to the family of Ambassador Montezemolo.

In the statements which have been made so far in this Committee, there have been two common themes, as I am sure we have all noticed. In the first place, speakers have emphasized the ineluctable fact that in four months' time the international community, as reflected in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will embark on an in-depth study of one of the fundamental problems of our time, disarmament, and inevitably, it will pronounce judgement on the task accomplished by the body especially responsible for achieving concrete results in this field, namely, the Committee on Disarmament.

The second common theme which has marked this debate has been the general recognition of the deterioration in the present-day international political climate, with a readiness to attribute responsibility for that situation. Accusations and counter-accusations, criticisms and rebuttals, have succeeded each other with unusual frequency and have radically changed the tone of the deliberations which, in principle, should revolve around the items on our agenda or, at any rate, around questions which are specifically within the competence of the Committee.

True, none of the remarks I have just made is original. They merely highlight a reality which we cannot ignore, one which we must face.

The politicization of a discussion intended to be technical is not, per se, a negative factor. Disarmament is not a subject that can be dealt with outside the context of international events and their protagonists, particularly those who, by their power and influence, play a fundamental role in the process. Disarmament and security are two sides of the same coin.

The perception each of us has of the international situation in which we are all involved is certainly a valid element in our work. In any event, awareness of the international situation helps to prevent us from becoming too immersed in the consideration of the topics within our competence, in isolation from the reality which surrounds us, a reality which we must take into account if we are not to be disappointed through attempting the impossible.

But if a political debate occasionally has its value, this value ceases if it is prolonged in time, absorbs our energies and becomes the constant theme of our deliberations. All or nearly all representatives have already expressed their

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

views, have evaluated the circumstances which dominate the international scene in various parts of the world, have appraised situations and judged those responsible. To continue that exercise would be repetitive and counter-productive. It is to be hoped that, once this stage which is perhaps necessary and even useful has been passed, the debates will return to their normal course and enable us to devote our attention, without distractions, to what constitutes our short-term challenge: to make the maximum possible contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly within the limits of the meagre results achieved as a result of our efforts in recent years.

Unfortunately, we cannot escape that reality. The results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament will certainly not earn warm praise, and that is particularly serious in the field of nuclear disarmament.

There ought not to be any doubts about the urgency and priority of this problem, and I have used the words "ought not" purposely because my delegation has heard with surprise and bewilderment, particularly in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, certain interpretations in the opposite sense.

The very concept of "priority" implies an order of preference and importance. To assign priority to a series of questions covering nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, including those which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, without establishing a degree of hierarchy among them, is to deprive the concept of priority of its content, for if the entire range of questions is assigned priority, then in actual fact nothing has priority.

We have heard, in justification of this position, a somewhat strained interpretation of the Final Document. While it is true that that Document, like any other product of a compromise, may contain some ambiguous phrases, there are many others of such crystal clarity as to preclude any variations in the interpretation of them. I will not quote them textually, for the sake of brevity. In any case, we are all familiar with them, and we cannot ignore them without violating the basic principle of any analysis of an international instrument: good faith.

But over and above the priorities assigned in the Final Document, and over and above what is propounded in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, all of which declare the urgent need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, there is one undeniable reality: the whole world is concerned -- deeply concerned, judging by the daily press -- at the possibility of a nuclear war and at the continuous increase in the number and destructive power of the weapons capable of unleashing such a war.

One question which will dominate the work of the special session of the General Assembly from the very outset will be: what has the Committee on Disarmament done on this question, to which the most important items on its agenda relate? Regrettably, the reply to this question could not be more negative. Not only has the Committee on Disarmament failed to negotiate anything so far as regards the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, much less on the wider issue which forms the subject of item 2 of its agenda. It has not even managed to establish the machinery which is recognized as to be the most effective means for the conduct of negotiations, namely, appropriate working groups.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

We should not delude ourselves. This will be the most serious shortcoming which will influence any critical assessment of the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. Although other questions with which the Committee is actively concerned may have more intrinsic importance, in public opinion and in fact, no question is more momentous than that of nuclear disarmament.

We fervently hope that, at its current session, the Committee on Disarmament will succeed in making real progress in this field. The Group of 21 has striven unremittingly and submitted written proposals for translating into action that concern which all claim to share. It is not too late to take a first step. Let us do so and let us initiate a process of genuine negotiations which the international community is demanding and our mandate requires of us.

Precisely because the "prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", the General Assembly adopted, by consensus, at its recent session, resolution 36/81 B, from one of the preambular paragraphs of which the above words are taken.

It was the Argentine delegation which, together with the delegations of other, friendly countries, presented the original draft of resolution 36/81 B. That resolution -- which also reproduces expressions from the Final Document -- recognizes "the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race" and the fact that "removal of the threat of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

"Aware of the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States", the General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of the resolution, "Urges all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982, ... their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war".

Paragraph 2 of the same resolution contains an identical request to all other Member States that so desire to do likewise because "it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war". But precisely because they possess arsenals of weapons capable of inflicting nuclear war, it is for the nuclear-weapon countries in the first instance to make suggestions and proposals for the prevention of such a war.

30 April 1982 is not far off. We earnestly hope that the nuclear-weapon States will not ignore the appeal made to them by the General Assembly and will ensure that when the most important question of our time is discussed at the special session of the General Assembly -- as it inevitably will be -- this can be done on the basis of serious, viable and meaningful proposals. It is unlikely that further disappointments will be accepted passively.

General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99, likewise adopted by consensus, entrust the Committee on Disarmament with fresh responsibilities pertaining to the prevention of the arms race in outer space. Although it has already established priorities which must be respected -- those to which I referred earlier -- the Committee on Disarmament must not hesitate to take up a new item of undeniable relevance. A preliminary discussion will no doubt be necessary in order to map out the road to be followed, identify the principal issues at stake and indicate the procedures to be adopted. But obviously, the main objective should be the early establishment of a working group. If the function of the Committee is to negotiate,

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

each item must be placed on its agenda with the intention of conducting negotiations on that subject in due course, and not simply so that it can be discussed indefinitely. This applies to each and every one of the items on our agenda. Sooner or later, at the appropriate time, the adoption of a new item, relating to outer space, must lead to the establishment of the machinery best suited for conducting negotiations, namely, a working group.

It is barely two months to the end of the first part of the Committee's current session. There is certainly not much time left in which we can try to achieve something concrete to place before the General Assembly at its second special session. The least we can submit is a sufficiently detailed and really meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament. Fortunately, the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject has been working since the beginning of January, under the expert guidance of Ambassador García Robles. It has made progress, but much still remains to be done. We must concentrate our efforts on this item, because of the inexorable time-limit. If necessary, the Working Group or its contact groups should be given additional time for their meetings. Although in general it is debatable whether all the working groups should have exactly the same working hours, irrespective of the state of their deliberations, in this particular case I believe there can be no doubt that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament calls for special consideration.

In due course, it will be necessary to revert to the consideration of the Committee's methods of working. Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands -- whose departure from this Committee I sincerely regret -- made some very interesting comments on this topic on 2 February last. On this occasion, I should like to reiterate and support one of them: the need for the Committee to have at its disposal the resources necessary to ensure the rapid distribution of the verbatim records of plenary meetings.

Debate means dialogue and for that dialogue to be meaningful, each speaker must be able to reflect without delay on what the others have said. The distribution by each speaker of the text of his speech cannot replace the almost immediate provision of the complete verbatim records, among other reasons because not all speakers circulate their interventions, or only those prepared beforehand or -- and this is common practice -- only speeches delivered in a generally known language are distributed.

The First Committee of the General Assembly has its records practically the next day. It is not too much to ask the same for the Committee on Disarmament.

The methods of work of this Committee are being constantly improved, and while procedural matters cannot replace substantive issues, they can help towards their successful solution.

The Committee has a great deal to do and must do it quickly. One effective measure which would contribute towards that end would be to lighten speeches, and for that reason I will not make any comments on other items, which I shall refer to later.

On this occasion, I will merely express the hope that the results of the current session will constitute a valuable contribution to the cause of disarmament and to the work of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to this supreme and all-important subject. That is the spirit which will always preside over the action of the delegation of the Argentine Republic.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking the floor for the second time at this early stage of the session and I shall be very brief. The reason for my statement today is what the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Rostow, had to say about the CTBT issue in his statement on behalf of the United States delegation a week ago. Against the background of the requests of the overwhelming majority of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament that it should now, finally and long overdue, establish a working group on this the highest priority item on its agenda, I should like to review the part of Dr. Rostow's statement dealing with the CTB.

In 1977-1978 we were given to understand that the achievement of a CTBT might well be imminent. The three nuclear-weapon States, which had entered into negotiations on the issue in the summer of 1977, all voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution of autumn 1977 which established certain time-frames for such an achievement. It should therefore not be difficult to understand the feelings of disappointment, yes, even resentment, among many of us around this table, when, more than four years later, we cannot even discern the establishment of a Committee on Disarmament working group on the subject. Of course, adding to the depth of our feelings is the fact that the trilateral preparatory negotiations have been dormant for more than one year and a half. The veto right ensuing from the consensus rule in the Committee has been applied ad absurdum when it is used to block procedural decisions on setting up subsidiary bodies to deal with items on our agenda.

Now, I want to devote my attention to what Dr. Rostow had to say on this matter in his statement a week ago. True, he did state the United States position in principle, that the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue; unanimity has been lacking, however, on questions of approach and timing.

But he went on to say the following, which seems quite startling to me: "Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues." Would this statement imply the United States position to be one of refusing negotiations on a CTBT except in the context of and as a subitem to nuclear disarmament? If that is so, would that be the reason underlying the United States proposal that, in the Committee's agenda for 1982, items 1 and 2 should be merged into one agenda item? I am happy to note that this proposal has been withdrawn; Sweden for one would have opposed it most firmly. Against the prolonged resistance of the United States to establishing a CTBT working group, and against the sentence just quoted, one could easily foresee what would have happened, had the Committee on Disarmament agreed to the United States proposal. The CTB issue would have been sunk to the bottom of the morass of the very complex nuclear weapon issues, not to be raised to the surface until we have reached the millennium of complete nuclear disarmament.

True again, the statement goes on to say that "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives". I take note of the word "long-term", as the United States has joined repeated decisions to make the CTBT the highest priority item on the Committee's agenda. And it is very difficult to understand how the lumping together of the CTBT and "the broad range of nuclear issues" can be in conformity with the legally binding commitments of, inter alia, the United States to a CTBT as expressed in the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which reads as follows:

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"Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end ...",

as well as in the tenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, which reads:

"Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end ...".

There is nothing in these legally binding documents, which were signed and ratified by the United States, that links the CTBT to "the broad range of nuclear issues". On the contrary, a CTBT is explicitly said to be sought for on its own merits. The United States has not abrogated these preambular paragraphs, nor made any announcement of its intention to interpret them in a new and less binding way. The United States is thus, as far as I can see, committed to multilateral negotiations on a CTBT on its own merits.

Let me also note the rather surprising fact that Dr. Rostow's statement did not in any respect take the non-proliferation aspect of a CTBT into account. The risk of nuclear proliferation is, I would have thought, one of the main concerns in this context.

Furthermore, in times past one of the arguments put forward against establishing a CTBT working group in this Committee was the uselessness and the difficulties of running multilateral negotiations in parallel with the trilateral preparatory talks. This is now an invalid proposition, as the trilateral talks have, as I stated earlier, been dormant for one year and a half. It is in fact, in a completely unacceptable situation that the Committee on Disarmament finds itself -- one in which the highest priority item on its agenda is not at present and has for quite some time not been under negotiation anywhere.

Two members of the Committee on Disarmament have been blocking the efforts of this 40-nation body to fulfil its obligations under its mandate and agenda. They challenge an increasingly stronger world public opinion in their unyielding resistance to the most reasonable of all requests -- that this body live up to its duties and commitments.

I believe that for most Governments represented in this room the present situation is totally unacceptable.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Poland has asked for the floor. I give the floor to Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very brief statement in my capacity as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries. As I announced during our last informal meeting, my delegation was in the process of preparing a working document consisting of some considerations relating to the organization of the work of the Committee on Disarmament at this session and I would like to place on record that the group of socialist countries will be ready very soon to transmit this document to the secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I will now adjourn the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Committee in five minutes' time to continue our consideration of those organizational matters still pending.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 18 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.

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