

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME III

List and text of documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament



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SPECIAL REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN VIEW OF  
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons

I. INTRODUCTION \*/

1. Taking into consideration paragraph 76 of the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, which stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, the Committee on Disarmament considered the question of concluding a treaty on radiological weapons in its 1979 session. During this session, the USSR and the United States submitted their joint USSR/United States proposal on major elements of the treaty (CD/31 and CD/32). Other proposals were also submitted.

2. Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 34/87 A entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", the Committee on Disarmament at its 69th Plenary Meeting held on 17 March 1980 adopted the decision reading, inter alia,

"The Committee on Disarmament decided to establish for the duration of its 1980 session an ad hoc working group of the Committee with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons."

3. The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981 at its 105th Plenary Meeting on 12 February 1981 to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.

4. During the 1980/1981 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Imre Kórnives (Hungary) held further discussions on the main elements of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons on the basis of the Chairman's Consolidated Text (CD/RW/WP.20) and other documents and proposals submitted with a view to elaborating the draft provisions for the treaty on radiological weapons (CD/135 and CD/220).

5. The activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group during that period showed that, while further efforts were made to narrow down the existing difficulties, divergencies still existed, particularly on the scope of the prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses and the relationship of the proposed treaty with other international agreements and other measures in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

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\*/ A list of Documents, Working Papers and Conference Room Papers (1979-1982) submitted in connection with the question of radiological weapons is attached as Annex I to this report.

6. In 1980 and 1981, several specific suggestions were put forward in the Working Group in connection with the scope of the treaty. It was stated that the work of the Committee on Disarmament should be oriented towards the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of use of radioactive material for hostile purposes.

7. Some delegations argued that there existed a very real risk of mass destruction from dissemination of radioactive substances through attacks on nuclear facilities. Those delegations believed that the treaty on radiological weapons would form an appropriate legal framework for an undertaking not to attack nuclear facilities or to deliberately damage such facilities.

8. Other delegations considered that an obligation to this effect would fall outside the framework of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. It was also felt that an attempt to deal in the same negotiations with the prohibition of radiological weapons and with the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities would complicate the negotiations and make elaboration of any agreement on either matter impracticable. They believed that the issues relating to nuclear facilities were already covered by the Geneva Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol 1), 1977, and that any additional measures to protect nuclear facilities should be considered within the framework of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.

9. Other delegations expressed the view that the existing international instruments on the subject were partial and ambiguous, and that the Committee on Disarmament was fully competent to consider the matter.

10. Some delegations also expressed the view that as a compromise the idea of holding separate negotiations on this question should be reflected in the text of the treaty or in a separate statement.

## II. Present state of negotiations on elaboration of the Treaty prohibiting radiological weapons

### A. Organization of work and procedures

11. In pursuance of the Committee's decision on subsidiary bodies, on 18 February 1982 (CD/243), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons was re-established on the basis of its former mandate. The Working Group held 11 meetings between 20 February and 16 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany). Mr. Guennady Efimov of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament served as Secretary of the Working Group.

12. At their request, representatives of the following States, non-members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the Working Group during its 1982 session: Austria, Norway.

13. In addition to the earlier resolutions the Working Group also took into account resolution 36/97 B of the General Assembly which contained an appeal to complete its negotiations in order to allow a treaty to be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament.

14. Following consultations, the Chairman, on 9 March 1982, gave a comprehensive report (CD/RW/WP.25), advancing on a personal basis a certain number of suggestions as to the procedure to adopt, and as to possible compromises for the still unresolved problems.

15. At the suggestion of the Chairman, on 15 March 1982 the Working Group agreed, as a procedural hypothesis and without prejudice to later decisions, to conduct separate meetings on the "traditional" 1/ radiological weapons subject matter, on the one hand, and on the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities on the other (CD/WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1).

16. In this connection, some reservations were expressed. Some delegations maintained that such a procedural hypothesis should not be interpreted as signifying the commencement of negotiations on the subject of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Some delegations, while prepared to participate in the meetings, expressed doubts as to the competence of the Committee on Disarmament (or competence of the Working Group) to negotiate the question of protecting nuclear facilities from attack. Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter. Some other delegations made clear that the consideration of that question could, in their view, only be of an exploratory nature at this time. Some delegations believed that the two subjects on which negotiations were being conducted in accordance with the proposed procedure should be treated equally on a non-discriminatory basis with a view to incorporating them in the same legal instrument. Other delegations expressly reserved their position with respect to the number and form of the future legal instrument(s) on the subjects under consideration.

B. "Traditional" RW subject matter

17. The Working Group on Radiological Weapons held three meetings devoted to consideration of the matters related to the "traditional" radiological weapons subject matter. While some new possible compromise formulations were advanced, the negotiations showed that differences still exist regarding, in particular, the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of prohibition, verification and compliance, peaceful uses, relationship of the treaty on radiological weapons with nuclear disarmament, and some aspects of the final clauses. Some delegations reminded the Working Group of their view that some draft articles might have to be revised, in view of their intention to have the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities included as an integral part of the Treaty.

18. With regard to the formulation of a definition of radiological weapons and because of the objections by some delegations to the inclusion of an explicit clause excluding nuclear weapons from the treaty, attempts were made to develop a "positive definition" which would not include such a clause. Some specific suggestions were made in this respect (CD/RW/WP.26, 30, 31 and Add.1).

19. Although no formulation was found to be entirely acceptable, from either the technical or legal point of view, the Working Group felt that efforts in this direction should be continued. While some delegations expressed their readiness to participate in those efforts, they still believed that the most effective way to define radiological weapons could be through maintaining an exclusion clause. Other delegations continued to believe that this would amount to a legitimization of nuclear weapons. Some delegations maintained their doubts as to the feasibility of including certain radioactive materials in the definition of radiological weapons.

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1/ The Working Group agreed that for the purposes of this report the term "traditional" should be employed as a convenient reference to the scope of prohibition envisaged in the joint proposal contained in documents CD/31 and CD/32.

20. In connection with the scope of prohibition some delegations maintained that the use of the term radiological warfare would depend on the scope of the future treaty. Other delegations felt that the concept of radiological warfare has no place in the framework of such a treaty.

21. The view was also expressed that the treaty should not only address the prevention of the emergence of radiological weapons as a specific type of weapon, but also to the prohibition of the use of radiation from the decay of radioactive materials for hostile purposes.

22. Some delegations maintained that the future treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons should contain an explicit commitment to urgently pursue negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this connection the text of an article for inclusion in the treaty was proposed by the Group of 21 \*/ (CD/RW/WP.36). Other delegations were of the view that this article was inappropriate for inclusion in a radiological weapons treaty.

23. As regards peaceful uses, there was widespread recognition that the treaty should contain an appropriately balanced article which would include a provision relating to the strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of sources of radiation from radioactive decay and a provision stating that nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to international co-operation in this field; the Working Group, however, had not completed its consideration of the precise wording of these provisions.

24. On the question of compliance and verification, some delegations were of the view that the procedures provided in the joint USSR/United States proposal correspond to the subject and scope of the treaty on prohibition of radiological weapons and should be fully maintained, including the provision for lodging complaints, in case of an alleged breach of the Treaty, with the United Nations Security Council.

25. Some delegations disagreed with these views and held that the procedures for lodging complaints under the Treaty should not refer to the Security Council or other organs of the United Nations, since such procedures were, in any event, available under the United Nations Charter, and that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be the focal point for complaints and verification matters under the treaty. It was suggested that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be provided with broad investigatory powers so as to include, in the view of some delegations, provisions for on-site inspections. Some delegations advocated a two-tiered structure for the verification régime under the treaty, with a Consultative Committee of Experts as a fact-finding and evaluating body, and a General Assembly of States Parties as a political forum for consideration of alleged breaches of the treaty. It was agreed that the issues of compliance and verification under the treaty needed further consideration.

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\*/ Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

26. Some delegations pointed out that the detailed elaboration of the provisions on verification and compliance would require the prior solution of the outstanding issues relating to the scope of prohibition.

27. With regard to the final clauses, the proposal was made for a more elaborate procedure to act upon proposed amendments (CD/RW/WP.20/Add.9/Rev.1); the general idea of this amendment was supported by some delegations. While some divergencies persisted as to the time intervals between entry into force and holding of a first and subsequent review conferences, the view was expressed that these differences could, perhaps, be overcome.

28. The view was widely held that the treaty should enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a lower number than 25 hitherto discussed and the number of 15 was advanced in this context, while some delegations reaffirmed their position that the treaty should enter into force upon its ratification by 25 governments, including the nuclear weapon States.

C. Consideration of the question relating to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities

29. The Working Group also held three meetings devoted to consideration of some issues of relevance relating to the question of protecting nuclear facilities. During these meetings a number of delegations reiterated their reservation as stated in paragraph 16 above. One delegation did not take part in the meetings.

30. The discussion on the prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities followed the outline in the working paper CD/RW/WP.33 proposed by the Chairman and centered around the definition of facilities to be protected and the scope of a possible prohibition.

31. The Working Group heard technical explanations from some delegations as to the destructive effects that could result from attacks on nuclear power reactors exceeding a certain minimum thermal power, reprocessing plants and storage facilities of irradiated material and waste. It was pointed out that attacks on such facilities could possibly result in mass destruction, whereas in the case of certain other facilities, attacks on them would not result in mass destruction because of their low inventory of radioactive material or the lack of such inventory. A certain number of divergencies in relation to these issues appeared.

32. Some delegations proposed that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be as comprehensive as possible. Since the basic objective was, in their view, to prevent mass destruction, there could be no justification to differentiate between civilian and military facilities. They also believed that mass destruction would result from attacks on either kind of facilities. However, in their view, mass destruction was not the only criterion relevant to this issue. They argued that an important objective of the proposed instrument was to restore confidence among the countries regarding their peaceful nuclear programmes. This confidence had, in their opinion, been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities of a developing country. Therefore, they argued that the scope of the prohibition should include not only the larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities but also the smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter, in their view, would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries. In this connection, a specific proposal on the definition of facilities to be protected was put forward by one delegation (CD/RW/CRP.16).

33. Some other delegations felt that it would create serious and possibly insuperable difficulties to grant protection to all nuclear facilities and that in this context it would be appropriate to introduce a threshold of minimum inventory of radioactivity (and of a minimum thermal power in the case of nuclear reactors) so as to eliminate from the protection facilities which, in case of attack, would not cause mass destruction. In this regard, it was particularly emphasized by these delegations that a prohibition of attacks on facilities, which would not result in any radiological damage, would provide a disincentive to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to the benefit of mankind. Some delegations held that the inclusion of military installations would entail very complex problems. A working paper on definition and scope of prohibition was put before the Working Group by one delegation (CD/RW/WP.34).

34. Some delegations noted however that this very working paper stated that "there may be good arguments that all facilities of the kind mentioned above should be protected by a radiological weapons convention be they civilian, military or dual purpose". A partial ban could, in their view, legitimize attacks on certain nuclear facilities resulting in mass destruction and thus contravene the main objective of the prohibition and increase the difficulties of compliance and verification. They also pointed out that the promotion of nuclear energy, at least in the developing countries was not being impeded by public opinion in these countries but by the restrictive policies of certain industrialized countries.

35. On the other hand, it was pointed out that such a comprehensive ban could not be reasonably expected to be successfully negotiated or, alternatively, to receive the necessary number of ratifications to make it a viable and effective instrument of international law, and thus to remove the danger of mass destruction. The delegation, whose Working Paper had been quoted in the preceding paragraph, drew attention to the fact that the Paper in this context also contained the following statement: "The political difficulties of protecting military facilities in an international instrument are obvious, and such facilities therefore seem to have to be excluded from a convention".

36. It was, however, stated by some delegations that such political difficulties as may be involved were not sufficient reason for a partial prohibition. In their view such an approach would leave open the possibility of legitimizing mass destruction in the conduct of warfare.

37. Some other delegations believed many of the arguments advanced above were inaccurate and further had little to do with the issues at hand.

38. The divergencies could not be settled in the course of the three meetings of the Working Group. Some delegations felt that the topic needed further clarification and discussion. They also felt that a detailed discussion on the remaining issues of the Chairman's provisional checklist (CD/RW/WP.33) would also require a solution of these basic differences of view on definition of facilities and scope of prohibition.



ANNEX I

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT--  
Ad Hoc Working Group on  
Radiological Weapons

CD/RW/WP.13/Rev.3  
21 April 1981  
ENGLISH only

LIST

of Documents, Working Papers and Conference Room Papers

I. Documents and Working Papers

1. CD/31 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
2. CD/32 United States of America: Agreed joint United States-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
3. CD/40 Hungary: Working paper on the draft preamble part of the Treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
4. CD/42 German Democratic Republic: Working paper on draft paragraph XI, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
5. CD/104  
(also as CD/RW/WP.1) Secretariat: Compilation of relevant documents on radiological weapons covering the period 1979-1980.
6. CD/133 Report to the Committee on Disarmament: Ad Hoc Working Group established with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. (1 August 1980)
7. CD/218 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons (14 August 1981)
8. CD/RW/WP.2/Rev.1 Chairman: Main elements in the negotiations of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.
9. CD/RW/WP.3 Canada: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
10. CD/RW/WP.4 Federal Republic of Germany: Proposed new Article V.

11. CD/RW/WP.5 Federal Republic of Germany: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
12. CD/RW/WP.6 Sweden: Proposals for Articles I, II, and III of a treaty prohibiting radiological warfare including the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
13. CD/RW/WP.7 Italy: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons (Document CD/31 and CD/32).
14. CD/RW/WP.8 France: Proposed amendments to the agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a Treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
15. CD/RW/WP.9 Pakistan: Revised Article V; new article after Article V.
16. CD/RW/WP.10 Yugoslavia: Proposal for an article of the treaty related to the definition of radiological weapons.
17. CD/RW/WP.11 Argentina: Observations of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.
18. CD/RW/WP.12 Venezuela: Proposals for amendments to the "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".
19. CD/RW/WP.14 Sweden: Proposal for a study on IAEA safeguards.
20. CD/RW/WP.15 Tabulation of proposals submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons (prepared by the Secretariat).
21. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.1/Rev.1 India: Proposals for amendments of Article I, II, III, V and VII of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons.
22. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.2 Indonesia: Statement delivered by the delegation of Indonesia at the fourth meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 13 March 1981.

23. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.2/Supp.1 Indonesia: Comment on the agreed joint USSR-United States CD/31-CD/32 especially paragraph 3, Article VIII concerning compliance and verification and on the French proposal contained in CD/RW/WP.8.
24. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.3 Yugoslavia: Proposal for amendments to Article II of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons.
25. CD/RW/WP.16/Rev.1 Report to the Committee on Disarmament.
26. CD/RW/WP.17 The Chairman's brief delivered at the First meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 20 February 1981.
27. CD/RW/WP.18 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on definition and scope of prohibition of a future treaty.
28. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.1 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on activities and obligations and peaceful uses.
29. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.2 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on relationship with other Disarmament measures and agreements and compliance and verification.
30. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.2/Supp.1 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative text for Annex.
31. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.3 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on Amendments, Duration and Withdrawal, Review Conferences, Adherence, Entry into Force, Depository.
32. CD/RW/WP.19 Sweden: Memorandum on certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare.
33. CD/RW/WP.20 The Chairman's Working Paper containing consolidated text based on proposals submitted by the Chairman.
34. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.1 Sweden: Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
35. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.1/Supp.1 Morocco: Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
36. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.2 Japan: Proposed amendment to Article V of CD/RW/WP.20.
37. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.3 Federal Republic of Germany: Proposal for Article VII and Annex of the consolidated text by the Chairman.

38. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.4 Sweden: Proposal for Article VIII of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
39. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.5 Venezuela: Proposed amendment to Article IX of document CD/RW/WP.20.
40. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.6 Morocco: Proposed amendment to Article VII of document CD/RW/WP.20.
41. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.7 The Chairman's Working Paper on definition and scope of prohibition.
42. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.8 The Chairman's Working Paper on peaceful uses.
43. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.9/Rev.1 The Netherlands: Proposed Amendments to Articles VIII and X.
44. CD/RW/WP.21 The Chairman's Working Paper containing time-table for the work of the Working Group during the Second part of the CD 1981 session.
45. CD/RW/WP.22 Australia: Working Paper on scope and definition of the future Treaty on Radiological Weapons.
46. CD/RW/WP.23 Group of 21: Working Paper on certain elements of the Convention on the Prohibition.
47. CD/RW/WP.24 Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.
48. CD/RW/WP.24/Rev.1 Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.
49. CD/RW/WP.25 Chairman's Statement (9 March 1982).
50. CD/RW/WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1 Chairman's Amended Proposal for the organization of work during the opening session (adopted by the Working Group on 15 March 1982).
51. CD/RW/WP.26 Chairman's Working Paper: Positive formulations of an RW Definition (Synopsis).
52. CD/RW/WP.27<sup>\*</sup> Tentative Programme of Work (Submitted by the Chairman).
53. CD/RW/WP.28 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulation of the provision on scope of the Radiological Weapons Treaty.
54. CD/RW/WP.29 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulations of the provisions on peaceful uses.
55. CD/RW/WP.30 Yugoslavia: Definition of Radiological Weapons - Article II.

56. CD/RW/WP.31 Australia: Proposal on Definition and Scope of Prohibition (giving two alternative texts).
57. CD/RW/WP.32 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested mechanism of compliance and verification (following on Document CD/RW/WP.20).
58. CD/RW/WP.33 Chairman's Summary of suggested issues of initial relevance relating to protection of nuclear facilities for discussion during Working Group meetings on 26 March and 2 April 1982.
59. CD/RW/WP.34 Sweden: Memorandum of certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare (5 April 1982).
60. CD/RW/WP.35 Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament: submitted by the Chairman (Introduction (Parts A and C).
61. CD/RW/WP.35/Add.1 Discussions on the provisions of the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons ("traditional" RW subject matter): submitted by the Chairman (Part B).
62. CD/RW/WP.36 Group of 21: Text proposed for an Article in the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons (14 April 1982).

## II. Conference Room Papers

1. CD/RW/CRP.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Netherlands, France, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, Canada and Italy.
2. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by Egypt, Pakistan, Italy and Australia.
3. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.2 Definition: Proposals by India.
4. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.3 Definition: Proposal by Yugoslavia.
5. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.4 Definition: Proposals by Venezuela and Argentina.
6. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.5 Definition: Proposal by Morocco.
7. CD/RW/CRP.2 Scope of Prohibition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands and Australia.
8. CD/RW/CRP.2/Add.1 Scope of Prohibition: Proposal by France.
9. CD/RW/CRP.3 Activities and Obligations: Proposals by USSR-United States, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Pakistan and India.

10. CD/RW/CRP.3/Add.1 Activities and Obligations: Proposals by Australia and France.
11. CD/RW/CRP.4 Peaceful Uses: Proposals by USSR-United States, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Pakistan.
12. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.1 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by France.
13. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.2 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Pakistan.
14. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.3 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Romania.
15. CD/RW/CRP.5 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposals by USSR-United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Canada and France.
16. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.1 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Australia and France.
17. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.2 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Pakistan.
18. CD/RW/CRP.6 Compliance and Verification: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, France and Sweden.
19. CD/RW/CRP.6/Add.1 Compliance and Verification: Proposal by Pakistan.
20. CD/RW/CRP.7 Annex: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
21. CD/RW/CRP.8 Amendments: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
22. CD/RW/CRP.9 Duration and Withdrawal: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
23. CD/RW/CRP.10 Review Conferences: Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia and France.
24. CD/RW/CRP.10/Add.1 Review Conferences: Proposal by Morocco.
25. CD/RW/CRP.11 Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary: Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia, France and Pakistan.
26. CD/RW/CRP.12 Preamble: Proposals by Hungary, Sweden, Egypt and Belgium.
27. CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.1 Preamble: Proposal by Bulgaria.

28. CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.2      Preamble: Proposals by Sweden and Federal Republic of Germany.
29. CD/RW/CRP.13      Invitation to the International Atomic Energy Agency: Proposal by The Netherlands.
30. CD/RW/CRP.14      Scope on Prohibition: Proposal by The Netherlands.
31. CD/RW/CRP.15      Amendments to text of Draft Report.
32. CD/RW/CRP.16      Definition of facilities to be protected:  
Proposal by Pakistan.
33. CD/RW/CRP.17      Draft Consolidated Radiological Weapons Treaty Provisions: Submitted by the Chairman.





SPECIAL REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN VIEW OF  
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons

CORRIGENDUM

page 2, paragraph 11

The second sentence of this paragraph should read as follows:

"The Working Group held 12 meetings between 20 February and 21 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany)."



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SPECIAL REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT PREPARED IN VIEW OF  
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO  
DISARMAMENT

Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements  
to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or  
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

I. Introduction

1. At its 156th plenary meeting on 13 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament requested the Ad Hoc Working Group to report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Pursuant to that request, the Ad Hoc Working Group submits its report to the Committee regarding the present state of negotiations on the subject, taking into account negotiations conducted in the previous Ad Hoc Working Groups during 1979, 1980 and 1981 sessions.
2. At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, unilateral declarations were made by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group have been conducted primarily on the basis of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, in which "... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document provided additional guidance on this question. During the course of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group also took into account the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its thirty-third, thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions namely: resolutions 33/72 A and B, 34/84, 34/85, 34/86, 35/46, 35/154, 35/155, 36/94 and 36/95. In addition, the various proposals on the subject submitted by delegations in the Committee on Disarmament and in the Ad Hoc Working Group were taken into account, as listed in document CD/SI/WP.1/Rev.4. 1/
3. At their request, representatives of the following States not members of the Committee on Disarmament were invited to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group during its 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Switzerland.

II. Substantive Negotiations During 1979, 1980 and 1981 Sessions

4. In the course of consideration of item 3 of its 1979 annual agenda, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", the Committee on Disarmament, at its 39th plenary meeting on 5 July 1979, adopted the following decision:

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1/ See Annex I of this report.

Reissued for technical reasons.

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its present session, an ad hoc working group open to all member States of the Committee to consider, and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The ad hoc working group will present a report to the Committee on Disarmament before the conclusion of the 1979 session. The Committee further decides, in accordance with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, that representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during the meetings of the ad hoc working group."

5. During the 1979 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group devoted its efforts to identifying the elements to be considered and negotiated on with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements. Extensive discussions were held on the relationship of the non-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, the non-use of force in international relations, as well as the over-all question of strengthening of international peace and security, to the mandate of the Working Group. There was broad agreement that these elements could be divided into two general categories: (a) Scope and nature of the arrangements, and (b) Form of the arrangements, their number and binding character. There was also agreement that the arrangements had to be effective and international in character. In this connection, a series of relevant questions were considered, in particular the question of rationale, scope and nature of the arrangements, as well as the question of the definition of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, the criteria to be applied in such definition and the prerequisites for the extension of the arrangements. With respect to the latter, a number of ideas were submitted; related questions were raised and comments were made on these ideas. The Working Group also discussed the form, number and binding character of the arrangements, particularly the question of an international convention to which there was no objection, in principle, although the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Draft conventions were submitted for consideration by the delegation of Pakistan (document CD/10) and the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (document CD/23). Moreover, the idea of interim arrangements was also considered. As a result of its deliberations the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/47.

6. In the course of consideration of item 3 of its 1980 agenda concerning the same subject, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, adopted the following decision as contained in document CD/77:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1980 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The ad hoc working group will report to the Committee on the progress of its work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1980 session."

7. During the 1980 session, the Working Group decided to focus its attention primarily on the scope and nature of the arrangements on the understanding that an agreement on the substance of the arrangements could facilitate the agreement on the form. Accordingly, a working paper (CD/SA/WP.2) was submitted by the Chairman as a basis for negotiations. It contained the different formulas which appeared in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear weapon States and in the proposals and ideas

presented to or expressed by other States, and which had a direct bearing on the scope and nature of the arrangements. The in-depth analysis of these formulas considered in juxtaposition helped the Working Group to clarify and amplify the various positions and to detect areas of agreement and divergence. The Working Group further considered the question of the form of the arrangements. In this regard, there was recognition that search should continue for a "common approach" acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. In that connection, notwithstanding the fact that there was once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. In this regard, no agreement was reached. The possibility of interim arrangements was considered. It was broadly suggested that a Security Council resolution might serve as a useful interim measure towards the effective international arrangements and pending agreement on such a "common approach". In this connection, it was suggested that the value of a Security Council resolution would depend on its substance. On this point, different views were expressed. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/125, \*/ which recommended that ways and means be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations.

8. At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons with the same mandate as at the previous session in 1980.

9. During the 1981 session, the Working Group decided to concentrate essentially on the examination of the substance of the assurances on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on the form. In the course of deliberations, various positions and ideas, relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (also referred to as security assurances or security guarantees), were expressed, namely:

- pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, since any use of nuclear weapons, which constitute the greatest threat to humanity, would affect the security of belligerents and non-belligerents alike, there should be an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this connection a view stated was that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations; another view was expressed that a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only in the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament, as part of progress towards general disarmament;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons without any conditions or limitations as an integral part of and initial step towards the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which have no nuclear weapons on their territory;
- the extension of security assurances to those States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territories. In this connection, a view was expressed that reaching an agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would be a step conducive to the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the nuclear-weapon State extending the assurance, its territories or armed forces or allies by such a State allied to, or associated with, a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.
- the extension of security assurances to any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them provided that that State does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces) a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers;
- the extension of security assurances by means of concluding conventions with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to a nuclear-free zone, in order to give these assurances a mutually binding character.

The Working Group attempted the identification of the various features of assurances and considered the possible alternatives which could be explored in the search for a "common approach" or "common formula". During the final stage of its work, the Working Group, without prejudice to further exploration of other alternatives, decided to concentrate its efforts on those alternatives which called for: (a) a "common formula" for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and agreed upon by all concerned and (b) a "common formula" which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States. In this connection, working papers were submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands (CD/SA/WP.6) and by the delegation of Pakistan (CD/SA/WP.7), containing draft "common formulas" for consideration by the Working Group. The delegation of Bulgaria also submitted a working paper in this regard (CD/SA/WP.8). Different approaches to the question of developing a "common formula" became apparent in the discussion. Nevertheless, the Working Group regarded the efforts devoted to the search for a "common approach" or "formula" as a positive step towards the agreement on the question of security assurances. Against this background, it recommended to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. The Working Group added, "in this context further efforts should be devoted to the search for a 'common approach' acceptable to all and in particular for a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/215 and Corr.1.

### III. Present State of Negotiations on the Subject

10. In pursuance of the Committee's decision at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, as contained in document CD/243, the Ad Hoc Working Group was re-established to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or

threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Working Group held 10 meetings between 26 February and 19 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, representative of Pakistan. Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

11. In carrying out the task entrusted to it, the Working Group decided to continue its efforts on the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group established during 1981 session (CD/215) which stated that: "... the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. In this context, further efforts should be devoted to the search for a 'common approach' acceptable to all, and in particular for a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character." The attention of the Working Group was drawn to resolutions 36/94 and 36/95 adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its thirty-sixth session, as contained in document CD/231, and as referred to in paragraph 2 above.

12. In the conduct of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group decided to concentrate, as at the previous session in 1981, on those alternatives which called for: (a) a "common formula" for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations in the Committee and agreed upon by all concerned and (b) a "common formula" which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States. The Working Group noted that three working papers were previously submitted in connection with the examination of these alternatives by the delegations of the Netherlands, Pakistan and Bulgaria, as contained in documents CD/SA/WP.6, CD/SA/WP.7 and CD/SA/WP.8, respectively.

13. Some general positions were outlined. Certain delegations, members of the Group of 21, expressed their view that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and, pending this, the complete prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. A group of socialist States noted that the implementation of measures provided for in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe would be a reliable safeguard for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear conflict and contribute to the strengthening of the security of all States in particular of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Different views were expressed in this connection. Other delegations maintained that these questions were outside the scope of the mandate of the Working Group.

14. During the course of deliberations, the positions and ideas relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which were put forward at the previous session, as contained in paragraph 9 above, were reaffirmed in the Ad Hoc Working Group by various delegations.

15. The discussion of proposals for a "common formula" focused on the substantive elements involved. Regarding the substance of a "common formula" to be elaborated, different approaches became apparent in the discussions. Under one approach, the nuclear-weapon States would provide assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States

without any conditions, qualifications or limitations. In this connection, a working paper (CD/273<sup>2</sup>) 2/ was submitted by the delegation of China, in which China reaffirmed its position to provide unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and urged other nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their political will necessary to reach agreement on a "common approach" or "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Under other approaches, various criteria would be provided to describe the conditions for the inclusion of non-nuclear-weapon States in the scope of the assurances. The sponsors of documents CD/SA/WP.6 and CD/SA/WP.7, the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan, explained their suggestions for a compromise approach to a "common formula" contained in these working papers. The proposal for reaching an agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present was also underlined. Various views were expressed on these suggestions and divergent ideas continued to be maintained.

16. The question of an appropriate form was extensively considered in connection with the efforts to develop a possible "common formula". As in the previous sessions, there was again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. A view was expressed that the Working Group should proceed to the concrete elaboration of such a convention. As in previous sessions, however, it was pointed out that an agreement on the substance of the assurances could facilitate an agreement on the form.

17. The Working Group subsequently took up the idea of interim arrangements, particularly the proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution. A working paper, containing a draft Security Council resolution embodying a "common formula" for security assurances (CD/SA/WP.9), 3/ was submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands. The delegation of Pakistan also submitted a revised working paper containing a draft resolution for possible adoption by the Security Council (CD/SA/WP.5/Rev 1<sup>st</sup>), 4/. A group of socialist States expressed the view that declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have no such weapons on their territories, could be examined and possibly adopted in the form of an appropriate resolution by the Security Council. Different views were expressed on these ideas and various comments were made on these proposals. On the one hand, it was held that appropriate interim arrangements would represent progress and create a favourable climate with the view to satisfying progressively the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the question of security assurances. On the other hand, however, the view was expressed that interim measures, particularly in the form of Security Council resolution, would have no utility and that they fell outside the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group and would merely undermine the necessary climate for elaborating credible security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of delegations stressed that interim arrangements should not be a substitute for an international convention or other international arrangements of a legally binding character. In this context, it was emphasized that, while considering alternative ways, the final aim of reaching an international convention on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be constantly kept in mind. Any interim measure or other alternative means for strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be judged against its substance and could be justified only in so far as it would constitute a step forward towards this direction.

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2/ See Annex II of this report.

3/ See Annex III of this report.

4/ See Annex IV of this report.



18. Other ideas were submitted regarding action that could be taken at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on this question. It was suggested that nuclear-weapon States should appropriately revise their unilateral declarations, which could then be taken into account at the second special session. It was pointed out by some nuclear-weapon States that their unilateral assurances had been offered in response to, and given in recognition of, the security concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that these assurances were credible and reliable and represented firm declarations of policy.

19. A statement by the Group of 21 was circulated to the Working Group, as contained in document CD/230, 5/ which inter alia, stated that: "The declarations (of some nuclear-weapon States) do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons". It further stated that there is every reason for the neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances to be covered by legally binding assurances and enumerated principles on the basis of which an agreement on this question should be reached. It expressed the view that "further negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear-weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement". The Group of 21 therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States, and which would facilitate agreement on an international instrument of a legally binding character.

#### IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

20. The Ad Hoc Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. During the past three sessions, negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a "common formula" acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Although the negotiations on the subject in the Working Group have clarified many of the issues involved, the Working Group has been unable to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

21. In the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations of the Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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5/ See Annex V of this report.



ANNEX I

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT  
Ad Hoc Working Group on  
Security Assurances

CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.4  
19 April 1982

Original: ENGLISH

List of Documents on the Question of Effective International  
Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the  
Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

I. Official documents of the Committee on Disarmament

- (1) CD/1 - containing General Assembly resolutions 33/72A and B.  
(24 January 1979)
- (2) CD/10 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Conclusion of an International  
Convention to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use  
or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (27 March 1979)
- (3) CD/23 - submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic  
Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics, entitled "Draft international convention on the  
strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear  
States". (21 June 1979)
- (4) CD/25 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Effective International  
Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the  
Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (26 June 1979)
- (5) CD/27 - submitted by United States of America, entitled "Proposal for a  
CD Recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly  
Concerning the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against  
Nuclear Attack". (2 July 1979)
- (6) CD/47 - containing Report of the "Ad Hoc Working Group to consider and  
negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure  
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of  
nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (7 August 1979)
- (7) CD/55 - containing General Assembly resolutions 34/84, 34/85 and 34/86.  
(5 February 1980)
- (8) CD/75 - submitted by Finland, entitled "Letter dated 12 March 1980  
addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from  
the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations  
Office at Geneva submitting a working document containing the  
views of the Finnish Government". (14 March 1980)
- (9) CD/77 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to  
establish an ad hoc working group to continue to negotiate with  
a view to reaching agreement on effective international  
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use  
or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (17 March 1980)

- (10) CD/120 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft resolution for adoption by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'". (17 July 1980)
- (11) CD/125\* - Report of the "Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (7 August 1980)
- (12) CD/140 - containing General Assembly resolutions 35/154 and 35/155. (3 February 1981)
- (13) CD/151 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under its former mandate during 1980 session. (13 February 1981)
- (14) CD/153 - submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (18 February 1981)
- (15) CD/161 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (4 March 1981)
- (16) CD/176 - submitted by USSR, entitled "Letter dated 7 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, Ta Nea." (10 April 1981)
- (17) CD/177 - submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled "United Kingdom working paper on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (10 April 1981)
- (18) CD/184 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 June 1981", containing "Resolution No. 28/12-P: Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (15 June 1981)

- (19) CD/207 - submitted by China, entitled "Working Paper on the Question of Security Assurances". (6 August 1981)
- (20) CD/215 - Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate and reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (14 August 1981)
- (21) CD/231 - containing General Assembly resolutions 36/94 and 36/95.
- (22) CD/243 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under its former mandate during 1980 session. (19 February 1982)
- (23) CD/278\* - submitted by China, entitled "Working Paper on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (15 April 1982)
- (24) CD/280 - submitted by the Group of 21, entitled "Statement of the Group of 21 on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (14 April 1982)
- (25) CD/285 - "Special Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament, prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (19 April 1982)

II. Working papers of the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- (1) CD/SA/WF.1/Rev.3 - List of documents on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (23 February 1982)
- (2) CD/SA/WF.2 - submitted by the Chairman, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: A. Scope and nature of the arrangements". (25 June 1980)
- (3) CD/SA/WF.3 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft resolution by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' ". (15 July 1980)

- (4) CD/SA/WP.4 - submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Forms of arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (17 July 1980)
- (5) CD/SA/WP.5 - submitted by the Chairman, entitled: "Stages of consideration of the substance of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (26 March 1981)
- (6) CD/SA/WP.6 - submitted by the Netherlands, containing a suggested  
(CD/SA/CRP.6) "common formula" for negative security assurances to be incorporated in a Security Council resolution. (8 July 1981)
- (7) CD/SA/WP.7 - submitted by Pakistan, containing proposals in connection  
(CD/SA/CRP.7) with Alternative D in Stage Two of document CD/SA/WP.5. (15 July 1981)
- (8) CD/SA/WP.8 - submitted by Bulgaria, containing considerations in  
(CD/SA/CRP.8 connection with "Alternative D, Stage Two, document  
and Corr.1) CD/SA/WP.5" and the suggestions made under it. (21 July 1981)
- (9) CD/SA/WP.9 - submitted by the Netherlands, entitled "Draft resolution of the Security Council embodying a 'common formula' to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (1 April 1982)
- (10) CD/SA/WP.3/ - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft  
Rev.1\* resolution for adoption by United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' ". (7 April 1982)

III. A compilation of material for the use of members of the ad hoc working group established by the Committee on Disarmament on 5 July 1979 to consider and negotiate on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- (1) Statements made at the plenary and ad hoc committee meetings of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- (2) Statements made at the plenary and the First Committee of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.
  - (a) Plenary
  - (b) First Committee (General)
  - (c) First Committee (Soviet Draft Convention);

- (3) Declarations made by the five nuclear weapon States containing assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;
- (4) Security Council resolution 255 (1968);
- (5) General Assembly resolutions on the non-use of nuclear weapons;
- (6) Resolution on security assurances adopted by the Non-nuclear Weapon States Conference of 1968;
- (7) Part of the 1975 NPT Review Conference Final Document, relevant to security assurances;
- (8) Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, paragraphs 56-59 on security assurances;
- (9) Addendum and supplements to the Compilation:
  - (i) "Proposal of the United States of America on strengthening confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/33/7, 17 November 1978);
  - (ii) General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII): Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;
  - (iii) "Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty" (NPT/CONF/22, 15 May 1975);
  - (iv) Declarations made by the United Kingdom, China, France, United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

IV. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly

V. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly

VI. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly

VII. Unofficial transcriptions of the proceedings of the ad hoc working groups on security assurances

- (1) Unofficial transcriptions of seven meetings of the ad hoc working group during 1979.





ANNEX II

CHINA

Working Paper

On Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon  
States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

Since its establishment over two years ago, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has held detailed and intensive discussions on the substance and form of negative security assurances. Faced with grave nuclear threat, numerous non-nuclear-weapon States call upon the nuclear-weapon States to provide unconditional assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, and to conclude an international convention of a legally binding character. The Chinese delegation supports this reasonable demand. In the past two years and more, because the major nuclear powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals imposed various conditions on non-nuclear-weapon States, no concrete result has been achieved so far in the negotiations on security assurances. The Chinese delegation believes that it is a minimum obligation of all the nuclear-weapon States to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with adequate security assurances, and in particular that the major nuclear powers with the largest nuclear arsenals bear primary responsibility in this respect. What the non-nuclear-weapon States ask for is unconditional assurances. They have rightly pointed out that demanding conditional assurances is tantamount to seeking security assurances for nuclear-weapon States from non-nuclear-weapon States. This is obviously unfair and unjust.

The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate its position as follows: the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and nuclear threats. Pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear free-zones. China has already, on its own initiative and unilaterally, declared that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. In connection with this fundamental position, China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Resolution 36/95 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. It is our hope that the major nuclear powers shall not proceed from their own narrow interests and shall refrain from imposing various conditions with regard to security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, they should respond positively to the reasonable demands voiced by a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States and demonstrate their political will to shoulder responsibilities with a view to ensuring progress in negotiations on security assurance. Together with the representatives of other countries, the Chinese delegation is ready to make further efforts to seek a "common formula" in consonance with demands of non-nuclear-weapon States and acceptable to all States.

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\*/ Reissued for technical reasons.



ANNEX III

CD/SA/WP.9  
1 April 1982

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Original: ENGLISH

Ad Hoc Working Group on  
Security Assurances

THE NETHERLANDS: WORKING PAPER

Draft Resolution of the Security Council embodying a common  
formula to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use  
or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The Security Council,

Considering the devastation that would be inflicted upon mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Convinced that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

Further convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) remains a vital element in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

Welcoming therefore the acceptance by a large and growing number of States of internationally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices),

Recognizing the need to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and in particular to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming in this respect the adherence by five nuclear-weapon States to additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

Acknowledging that States find themselves in different security situations, and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of different States,

Reaffirming the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security,

Welcomes the solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them, provided that State does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces of) a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State.



ANNEX IV

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT  
Ad Hoc Working Group on  
Security Assurances

CD/SA/WP.3/Rev.1\*/  
7 April 1982  
Original: ENGLISH

PAKISTAN: WORKING PAPER

Possible draft resolution for adoption by United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continued escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States urgently to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Noting the negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament on the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons".

Noting the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

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\*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

Further noting the general support expressed for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that there is no objection, in principle to the idea of an international convention,

Acting under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in response to the threat to peace posed by the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

1. ~~Calls upon those States possessing nuclear weapons to undertake in a legally binding instrument not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;~~

2. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to pursue negotiations for this purpose and conclude, without delay, a binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

3. Requests the nuclear-weapon States to pursue these negotiations in good faith and to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a legally binding instrument, in particular by appropriately revising their respective unilateral declarations on this question, taking into account especially the views and positions of the non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two major military alliances;

4. Urges the nuclear-weapon States, as a provisional and immediate measure, to confirm, in a legally binding manner, that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two major military alliances;

5. Decides to remain seized of this matter.

CD/280  
14 April 1982

Original: ENGLISH

ANNEX V

STATEMENT<sup>1/</sup> OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL  
ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AGAINST  
THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. The Group of 21 believes that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon States should refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear weapon States. The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Group of 21, therefore, welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc Working Group to reach agreement on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

2. Most regrettably, three years of negotiations in the ad hoc Working Group have produced only marginal progress. This is due principally to the inflexible positions taken by some nuclear weapon States.

3. The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in the unilateral declarations of some nuclear weapon States reflect their subjective approach and that these declarations are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Taken together, these conditions, limitations and exceptions have the effect of severely restricting such positive features as may be contained in these unilateral declarations and they are, therefore, unacceptable to members of the Group of 21. The declarations do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

4. The Group of 21 notes that in accordance with paragraph 62 of the Final Document, the nuclear weapon States have given undertakings to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which are members of the existing nuclear weapon free zone. Besides these States, other neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances are committed not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. There is therefore every reason for these States being covered by the same legally binding assurances, especially if one takes into account that the nuclear weapon States were urged in paragraph 59 to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. The Group of 21 emphasizes that an agreement on the question of "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" should be based on the following principles:

- (i) The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

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<sup>1/</sup> The Statement represents the common denominator of the positions of the members of the Group of 21.

- (ii) Non-nuclear weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (iii) Such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21 notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention;
- (iv) A common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21 stated above;
- (v) The agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. The Group of 21 considers that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States. Such an undertaking would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also contribute towards progress in achieving an international agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament.



# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/286  
19 April 1982

ENGLISH  
Original: SPANISH

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STATEMENT MADE BY AMBASSADOR ALFONSO GARCIA ROBLES, CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT, ON THE OCCASION OF THE SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THE REPORT OF THE GROUP AND THE DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME ANNEXED THERE TO

I have the honour to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, over which I have had the privilege of presiding during the Committee's sessions in 1981 and the part of 1982 that has already elapsed, together with a draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is annexed to the report.

Since the content of the report is what is customarily termed self-explanatory, I shall confine myself to making just a few comments. Firstly, I should like to say that this has been one of the most industrious working groups of what the United Nations General Assembly has described as the "single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament" since, as is well known, it began its work in the current year by holding daily meetings during the last three weeks of January, before the Committee met, and, after the resumption of the Committee's work on 2 February, it held an average of three meetings a week, without counting the very numerous meetings of its subsidiary bodies. Thanks to this, the Group has been successful in carrying out the task which was entrusted to it, albeit with the inevitable limitations imposed by the circumstances known to all.

In the report to which I am referring, there already appear the names of those who merit special mention for the valuable contribution which they made to the group's work: Ambassador Olu Adeniji of Nigeria, who presided over the first 10 of the 59 meetings held, Ambassador François de la Gorce of France, Ambassador Gerhard Herder of the Democratic Republic of Germany and Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva of Brazil, who co-ordinated the work of their respective contact groups, and Mr. Tariq Altaf of Pakistan, who acted as co-ordinator of an informal drafting group. I should simply like, therefore, to record my especial gratitude to someone who, as a result of having undertaken to draft the report in consultation with the Chairman, was obviously unable to make an appropriate reference in the report to her participation in the Group as its Secretary. In the light of the experience which has enabled me to observe her at work at very close quarters and to rely on her untiring co-operation for approximately a year and a half, I consider it only just to take this opportunity of placing on record my view that Miss Aída Levín can serve as a model for the discharge of any office such as that which she has held in this Group, by virtue of her absolute objectivity, her knowledge of disarmament matters, her outstanding drafting abilities and her lively intelligence, which has so frequently produced formulas that have gained general acceptance.

GE.32-62259

With regard to the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which the Working Group transmits to the Committee as an annex to its report and which, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 36/92 F adopted by the Assembly on 9 December 1981, has to be submitted "in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament", I do feel that it is my duty on this occasion to make a few comments on the basis of my lengthy and intimate connection with the efforts made to prepare the Programme.

I shall begin by emphasizing that the structure of the document which the Group is submitting to the Committee corresponds to that which has been approved since 1980 and which, as indicated in paragraph 66 (7) of the Committee's report to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, should comprise — in addition to an introduction or preamble which would be prepared last of all — six chapters dealing with objectives, principles, priorities, measures, stages of implementation, and machinery and procedures, respectively. The only change that has been made in this structure is that, for reasons which would appear obvious, two of these headings have been merged to serve as a title for the fifth chapter, which deals with both "measures and stages of implementation".

As for the contents of the Programme, the Working Group has endeavoured to keep as faithfully as possible to the mandate clearly defined in paragraph 109 of the Final Document, in which it was stipulated that the Programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated", reiterated word for word in paragraph 7 (b) of the "elements" approved, also by consensus, by the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 34/83 H of 11 December of the same year, and confirmed by the Committee on Disarmament when it adopted the report which the Working Group submitted to it in 1980, in paragraph 10 of which it was expressly agreed that "the Comprehensive Programme will have to be self-contained."

The fact that a considerable number of the provisions of the Programme are still between square brackets should not be a reason for discouragement but, on the contrary, should serve as a spur for efforts to find texts capable of gaining general approval. To this end, it should not be forgotten that the draft Final Document which the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament transmitted to the Assembly as a result of five meetings — three of which were held in 1977 and the last two in the first half of 1978 — had also been riddled with square brackets but that that did not prevent the Assembly from finally approving by consensus a document which was completely free of those symbols of differences of opinion.

However difficult the efforts required to achieve this purpose may be, this will probably not be one of the most difficult tasks that has ever been brought to fruition, especially if no delegation tries to renege on the commitments undertaken in the Final Document in 1978. It would also seem that it will be by no means impossible to reach an agreement on the number of stages that the programme should comprise, in the light of the flexibility that has been evidenced by many of the delegations that have formulated the main working papers submitted to the Group, since, with general acceptance, the Group has been able to channel its deliberations, as it were in the nature of "working hypotheses", firstly on the basis of four stages and subsequently on the basis of three. A similar comment might be made concerning the revision machinery or procedure, in respect of which too there already appears to be a more or less general acceptance of a five-yearly régime and of the fact that such revision or examination should be undertaken through specific special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If the foregoing is taken into account, there would appear to be some justification for concluding that the two most difficult problems still outstanding are that of determining whether or not the Programme should have a calendar for its implementation and that of determining the extent to which the Programme should be of a binding nature. If one accepts, as we think it reasonable to do that all the States participating in the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament may be expected to give evidence of goodwill and good faith in the formal and informal negotiations taking place at that session, there will be a solid basis for expecting that a satisfactory solution to these problems will be found.

With regard to the question of time-limits to be included in a possible calendar, it should first of all be pointed out that, for the moment, no one is thinking of rigid time-limits like those which appeared in the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962 by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. In this connection, it is also encouraging to note that reference has been made in the deliberations on this subject -- and, above all, that the reference was made by the representative of one of the most important members of the group known as the Group of Western European and Other Countries -- as an example of recommendable terminology to that used in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, in which the time factor undoubtedly occupies a prominent place.

With regard to the nature of the Programme, although, on the one hand, it would seem that the hypothesis that it may be possible to obtain a consensus in order to give the Programme the legal status of a multilateral treaty will have to be discarded, it is clearly apparent, on the other hand, from the comments made at the various meetings which the Group devoted to consideration of this subject, that there is a general trend towards finding formulas which will enable the Programme to be placed at a level far above that of the resolutions annually adopted by the General Assembly. This will undoubtedly require the inclusion in the Programme of provisions similar to those contained in paragraph 126 of the Final Document, in which the States that participated in the first special session "solemnly" reaffirmed, inter alia, "their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear

war;" and "implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race". This will certainly require also that the Programme make an express provision along the lines of the statement in paragraph 17 of the Final Document emphasizing the pressing need to "translate into practical terms" the provisions adopted and to "proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament". Furthermore, in view of the fact that, unfortunately, the Final Document has been to a considerable extent treated by the nuclear Powers as a dead letter, consideration must be given to the possibility of including in the introduction and final paragraphs alike of the Comprehensive Programme, provisions which both politically and morally impart the greatest possible, though freely accepted, binding character to the text, a binding character which, it is to be hoped, will be greater than that achieved in 1978.

In this connection, it is worth remembering that, at the Group's meetings, representatives submitted a number of valuable suggestions aimed at highlighting, through symbolic acts, both the importance of the Programme and, more particularly, the political commitment of Governments to execute its provisions. Among these suggestions, pride of place -- in view of its originality and potential effectiveness -- should perhaps go to the suggestion that the Programme should be signed by the Heads of State or Government of all the States Members of the United Nations. In my opinion, the fact that most if not all of them will almost certainly not be in New York at the closure of the Assembly's session should not be an obstacle to an acceptance of this suggestion; quite the contrary, in fact. A special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations might very well be given the responsibility of taking the original text of the Programme to all the capitals of those States for the purpose of collecting the signatures of their respective Heads of State or Government. This could, at the same time, help to ensure that public opinion in each of those countries has a true awareness of the significance of the Programme.

Recently, particularly during the last year or so, there has been throughout the world an increasing number of acts of all kinds which reveal the concern that the nuclear arms race and the emergence of doctrines such as the credible possibility of a limited nuclear war or the illusory hypothesis of a nuclear victory, have aroused throughout mankind. If, as the Assembly stated in 1978, all peoples have a vital interest in the success of the negotiations on disarmament, it may be asserted without any exaggeration that the thousands of millions of human beings who make up these peoples will follow very closely the work of the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament which is to be held at United Nations Headquarters from 7 June to 9 July 1982. This may very well be the decisive element in making the representatives of those peoples deliberating in New York realize the need to approve by consensus a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which, starting from the text which the Ad Hoc Working Group is today submitting to the Committee, may give new life to the pressing objectives which, for four years, have been set out in paragraph 109 of the Assembly's Final Document. It must never be forgotten that, as stated in the Final Document itself, the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a nuclear war, since this threat has confronted mankind with a choice between proceeding to disarmament or facing annihilation.

# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/287  
20 April 1982

Original: ENGLISH

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BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC,  
HUNGARY, MONGOLIA, POLAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc  
working group under Item 1 of the agenda entitled  
"Nuclear Test Ban"

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral negotiating forum in accordance with para. 120 of the Final Document of the SSOD I, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item I of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban".

The elaboration of the mandate of the working group will be completed at the very beginning of the summer session of the Committee, taking into account the results of the SSOD II.



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STATEMENT MADE BY AMBASSADOR BOGUMIL SUCKA, CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ON THE OCCASION OF THE SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THE REPORT OF THE GROUP

In my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I have the honour to introduce a special report of this Group to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The text of the report is contained in the document CD/281 which, I hope, is available to all the distinguished representatives to this Committee.

I would like to be as brief as possible, as I have always been during our meetings. First of all, I wish to state, that in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, number 36/92F, this Committee has been requested to submit to the second SSOD, "a special report on the state of negotiations on various questions under consideration by the Committee." In a similar way, a specific requirement by the General Assembly has been stated in paragraph 4 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution number 36/96A, as far as chemical weapons are concerned. I hope that the report as contained in document CD/281, does reflect the present state of negotiations in the Committee's Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The report itself being self-explanatory, I would like to share briefly with the Committee some important points of the discussion in the Working Group which led to the elaboration and adoption of this report. Thus, in its introductory part, the Group wished to refer directly to the paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament which, let me recall, stresses the importance and urgency of negotiations on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. On the other hand, the Group wished to refer, rather generally, to all other proposals and documents on the prohibition of chemical weapons which in the past had been presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee itself, assuming that merely listing them all would be a space taking and not very productive task, especially in view of the second special session.

The same approach has been displayed by the Group in elaborating the other parts of the report. Without going into details of its discussions in 1980 and in 1981, under its previous mandate, the Group emphasized the most significant points discussed in those two years as they, indeed, mark very important stages of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As far as the present state of the work is concerned, the Group has underlined the importance of a new mandate which allows the elaboration of a convention and succinctly described the topics of discussions for the first half of its 1982 session and the main differences of views and problems which emerged in the discussion in the past two months or so.

There is one thing I would like to make as clear as possible: the Group wished to avoid repeating in this report, all over again, all the various views of particular delegations or groups of delegations on countless smaller and/or bigger problems that emerged during the over three-year long discussions. These are sufficiently reflected in the Working Group's report of 1980 contained in document CD/131/Rev.1, and of 1981 in the document CD/220. Both latter reports are specifically mentioned in the present report of the Group.

In my concluding statement to the Group, I described in considerable detail a possible course of action for the Group during the second half of the 1982 session. In this connection, I appealed to the members of the Group asking them to do specific preparatory work for the summer session if we are to approach as close as possible the stage of drafting the provisions of the convention. I do not want to repeat myself because that statement, in view of the interest shown by members of the Group, has been circulated by the Secretariat as a Working Paper of the Group on Chemical Weapons. But, with your permission, I would like to appeal again for displaying serious efforts by all delegations during the summer session so that we could translate as many dissenting views as possible into the alternative elements and then elaborate compromise elements. A compilation of draft elements and proposed new texts has also been made available to all delegations to facilitate the kind of exercise I am appealing for.

I would like to apologize to my predecessors: Ambassador Okawa and Ambassador Lidgard, for not mentioning their names as chairmen of the Group in 1980 and in 1981 respectively, in the introductory part of the report. I personally was of the opinion that that kind of introduction should not contain all the details I have noticed in the reports of other working groups. But certainly I am for uniformity of reports of all working groups in this respect and I hope that the Committee will agree to cover these problems in paragraphs 61 and 62 of its own report. The same proceedings could be also applied as to the participation of non-member States in the work of the Working Group.

Finally, let me refer to some recent discussions in the CD drafting group. My reply is brief: the Working Group, indeed, has not been directly reflecting in its activities the Committee's plenary discussions. It has conducted its work on the basis of a new, I repeat, new mandate which was adopted with the consent of all delegations. On the basis of that mandate and the programme of work, also adopted by consensus, the group has acted and its activities have been reflected in this report. Let me also say that, exactly, this is the principal aim of the Committee's report to reflect the course and trends of discussions that have been taking place in plenaries. The Group's report, in my view, had to be limited to the discussions in the Working Group itself. References to the discussions in plenary have been, of course, reflected in the Group's work, when such discussions contained specific proposals relevant to the subjects of negotiations in the Group.

As the distinguished members of the Committee are well aware, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, has entered, with a new mandate, another, sensitive phase of its work. We have held another series of thorough examinations and complex problems. I wish to emphasize, as chairman of this Group, that despite the whole sensitivity and complexity of our negotiations, the work has been conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding, respect and co-operation. For this understanding, mutual respect and co-operation I thank at this moment cordially once more all the members of the Group.

I would like to ask that this statement be distributed as an official document of the Committee, as document CD/286 of the distinguished Chairman of the CPD Working Group, Ambassador Garcia Robles.



STATEMENT MADE BY AMBASSADOR HENNING WEGENER, CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC  
WORKING GROUP ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, ON THE OCCASION OF THE SUBMISSION  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THE REPORT OF THE GROUP

The Working Group had chosen to make use of its time for substantive negotiations as late into last week as possible. As a consequence, only one meeting was available for discussion and adoption of the report. This has placed a considerable burden upon the Secretariat who had to put in extra hours to reproduce the report from a somewhat heterogeneous collection of oral and handwritten amendments designed to supplement the original draft. The members of the Secretariat have done an excellent job under these difficult circumstances, and I should like to thank them on behalf of the Working Group.

However, it was unavoidable in this situation, that a small number of errors or ambiguities have crept into the printed text. With your permission, I should therefore like to read this limited number of amendments, which have become necessary, none of which changes the general thrust and structure of the report, but which will help to clarify it. None of the amendments adds to the text a sentence or thought that was not already part of the Working Group's decision to adopt the report. I then refer to CD/284, and, in the English version to CD/284\*. I quote from the English text, on page 2, in the penultimate line we should strike out the words at the end of the line, "radiation from the decay of". On page 3, in paragraph 16, in the seventh line after the sentence ending with "from attack", kindly insert the following additional sentence: "Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter". On page 5, in the last sentence of paragraph 27, there is a mere printing error, please replace words "points of view" by "differences". And on the last page, it has become necessary to clarify that some of the sentences written here are quotations from what delegations said. In paragraph 32 therefore, in the second sentence, the words "in their view" should be put in, the sentence should then read, "Since a basic objective was, in their view, ..." on to "prevent". The following sentence should be prefaced "they also believed", the sentence then to read, "They also believed mass destruction would result from attacks, etc." In paragraph 34, the second sentence, the words "in their view" should be put in, the sentence then to read, "a partial ban could, in their view, legitimize, etc." In paragraph 33, in the fourth line, the term "thermal effect" for mere technical reasons of correctness, should be replaced by "thermal power".

As delegations will recognize, while taking note of the contents of the Report, the record of the Working Group is far from brilliant. While a promising start was made in early March with a practicable procedural decision that did much to unblock a deadlock situation, the sense of urgency which General Assembly Resolution 36/97 B had initially instilled into the Group and which raised hope that convincing progress could be made at least on the "traditional" RW subject matter, rapidly vanished, and the Working Group is now still faced with some of the same problems that made its work difficult in the preceding year. The willingness of delegations to consider compromise formulation, and to join in a common effort to reach consensus results, faded away at least when the time came

to draft this Report. Instead of proudly going on record with the measure of progress achieved, delegations preferred to restate their earlier positions, in a clear attempt to keep their stance intact for the next round of negotiations. Some delegations even used the opportunity to phrase their demands with new vigour, although it must have been abundantly clear to them their proposals harboured no promise of adoption by the Working Group. The Chairman, in various instances, attempted to put forward texts which in his view took a maximum number of positions into account, but he generally remained unsuccessful. When he, in the closing stages of the session offered to submit an integral draft text of a future NW treaty, covering the "traditional NW subject matter, a draft which, in his perception could have served as a suitable for compromise on which all delegations could eventually agree, he was given to understand that such an initiative was unwelcome, he thus abstained from circulating the text.

The several parallel meetings on questions relating to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, provided an opportunity for discussion in depth of some highly relevant issues. A number of delegations contributed to an elucidation of the technical problems involved, and it is fair to say that the Working Group as a whole gained considerable insights into the problems at hand. However, major divergencies as to the scope of possible prohibition appeared at an early point, and proved to be so considerable as to impede further progress even on the level of initial discussion.

While the Working Group's Session has certainly contributed to providing a clearer perspective to all delegations on the issues and on certain options for solution, the field is still wide open. Once again, the Working Group, dealing with a subject matter of only limited significance for the global disarmament process, has been unable to live up fully to its responsibilities. That constitutes a serious challenge for the forthcoming summer session. It will still be my privilege to preside over the work at that time. When work is resumed, I will urge all delegations to renew their efforts to come to grips with the still unresolved problems, and I would already ask them now to clear their minds and to use the intermediate period for reflection about how some of the outstanding problems of principle can be tackled without undue loss of time.

While the Spring Session was disappointing in its results, I yet have to acknowledge that many delegations, and many colleagues personally, offered the Chairman an exceptionally fine co-operation and bore with him in the search for results and compromise. I should like to express my gratitude to them, just as I thank the Secretariat and the interpreters for their fine work.

Should a mode be adopted according to which all the introductory statements by Working Groups' Chairmen be circulated, I would not want to be excluded, however, I would think that in my special case a rendering in the verbatim record would be sufficient.

STATEMENT MADE BY AMBASSADOR MANSUR AHMAD, CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC  
WORKING GROUP ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, ON THE OCCASION OF THE  
SUBMISSION OF THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP TO  
THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

It is my honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the special report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons contained in document CD/285.

In accordance with the Committee's decision, the special report contains a reference to the origin of negotiations on this item and covers the work done during the previous three sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, besides describing the present state of negotiations on the subject and outlining certain conclusions and recommendations.

The subject of "negative security assurances" has a fairly long history which includes the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States in 1978 and the consensus reached at the first special session to conclude effective arrangements on the question. At its first session in 1979, the Working Group agreed that negotiations on the subject would need to cover both the form and the substance of the arrangements. At its sessions in 1980 and 1981, the Working Group concentrated mainly on the examination of the substance of the subject, on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on the form. During the final stages of its work, last year, the Working Group concentrated its efforts on evolving a "common formula" for security assurances containing such elements as may be raised in the negotiations and agreed upon by all concerned or a "common formula" which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States.

At the beginning of its work during the present session, the Working Group decided to continue these efforts taking into account inter alia previous recommendations as well as resolutions 36/94 and 36/95 of the General Assembly. The general positions of delegations remained unchanged, although some new ideas and suggestions were advanced. Apart from hearing the reiterations of such general positions, the Working Group further considered proposals submitted to it for a possible "common formula" or "common approach" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. As in the past, there was once again no objection in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Subsequently, the Working Group considered proposals for interim measures, particularly a possible resolution of the Security Council on the subject. Furthermore, other courses of action which could be taken in the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were also examined. Some nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed that their declarations were credible and responsive to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States while some other delegations suggested that these should be appropriately reviewed and revised at the forthcoming special session.

The conclusions of the Working Group speak for themselves. There is consensus that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that agreement on this item should be reached urgently. However, the evident divergence in the perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States continue to persist. And, although many of the issues involved have been clarified, the Working Group has been unable to fulfil its mandate. The Working Group was able to recommend, in the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations on this item.

On a personal note, I am constrained to express my disappointment and concern at the failure of the Committee on Disarmament to make any substantive progress towards evolving an agreement on this question which is satisfactory to all concerned and particularly to the non-nuclear-weapon States. May I take this occasion to appeal to all States, in particular, to the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach an agreement on this question. I hope that this political will shall be evident at the forthcoming second special session.

In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Working Group for their co-operation which was indispensable for the work of the Group. I would also like on behalf of the Ad Hoc Working Group, to express our deep appreciation for the very able assistance provided to the Working Group by Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung, the Secretary of the Working Group, as well as the entire secretariat staff, throughout the session and particularly in preparing this special report.

Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on  
the establishment of an ad hoc working group, under  
item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban"

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban".

Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard.



SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO  
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 36/92 F of 9 December 1981, requested the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee.

2. Pursuant to that request, the Committee on Disarmament submits its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Its annual reports for 1979, 1980 and 1981 1/ may be referred to for further information concerning the Committee's work.

## II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

### A. Work of the Committee from January 1979 to April 1982

3. During this period, the Committee held 174 formal plenary meetings at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Committee. The Committee also held 163 informal meetings on organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

### B. Participants in the Work of the Committee

4. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Committee: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

### C. Rules of Procedure

5. The Committee elaborated and adopted its Rules of Procedure early at its 1979 session. 2/

### D. Agenda of the Committee

6. In conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee adopts its annual agenda within the following framework which was established at its 1979 session:

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1/ Documents CD/53, CD/139 and CD/228.

2/ Document CD/8/Rev.1.

"The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate, disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

7. The following substantive agenda items have been considered by the Committee during its annual sessions:

1. Nuclear test ban;
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
4. Chemical weapons;
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons;
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament;
7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

8. While the first five items have been inscribed in the annual agenda since 1979, item 6 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament was first discussed in 1980 and item 7, dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space, was included for the first time in the agenda for 1982.

9. On the basis of its annual agenda, the Committee establishes its programme of work at the beginning of each part of its annual session. The programme of work includes a schedule of the activities of the Committee in relation to the substantive items on its agenda and organizational matters, as necessary.

D. The Establishment of Subsidiary Bodies of the Committee

10. The Committee has established, at various stages of its work, ad hoc working groups on the following substantive questions on its annual agenda: effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and comprehensive programme of disarmament. A summary of the activities of those subsidiary bodies is given in Chapter III, sections C to F, of this special report.

11. Early during its 1979 session, the Committee decided that the arrangements made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in connection with the work of the ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, should be maintained.

F. Participation by States not Members of the Committee

12. In addition to those States not members of the Committee attending its plenary meetings in conformity with rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee received and considered requests to participate in its work from a number of States not members. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, the Committee invited representatives of the following non-members to participate in the discussions in the Committee on substantive items on the annual agenda:

(a) in 1979 Denmark, Finland, Spain, Switzerland and Viet Nam;

(b) in 1980 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Spain and Switzerland;

(c) in 1981 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland;

(d) in 1982 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Switzerland.

13. As from 1980 invitations were extended to the States not members listed in (b) to (d) of the preceding paragraph, which had requested to participate in the discussions held in ad hoc working groups established under substantive items on the annual agenda.

G. Modalities of the Review of the Membership of the  
Committee and Related Matters

14. General Assembly resolution 36/97 J, taking into account the relevant parts of the report of the Committee for its 1981 session, 3/ states that "the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed following appropriate consultations among member States during the second special session devoted to disarmament".

15. The Committee on Disarmament, at present composed of 40 members, has carefully reviewed the question of its membership, bearing in mind paragraph 113 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which declared, inter alia, that the negotiating body for the sake of convenience should have a relatively small membership. The Committee also took into account paragraph 28 of the Final Document which says, inter alia, that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as well as paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document. Since 1980, the Committee devoted a number of informal meetings to the consideration of this question.

16. At those informal meetings, views were expressed by members concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Committee. The Committee had before it document CD/200, dated 24 July 1981, submitted by a group of Socialist countries 4/ and entitled "Increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament", as well as other proposals put forward by members.

17. The Committee is in the process of increasing its effectiveness and improving the organization of its work. To that end, it continues to examine ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of its operations by streamlining the organization of its work and procedures and by increasing the activities of its subsidiary bodies through the allocation of more time, by holding more informal meetings and consultations with the participation of experts. The Committee agrees to continue its consideration of these questions during the second part of its 1982 session.

18. In accordance with rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the strengthening of the Secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as of the services needed, should be considered in view of the increase in the workload and the requirements of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

19. The Committee is aware of the need to facilitate still further the participation of non-member States in its work and will continue to interpret flexibly its Rules of Procedure and in such a manner as to enable interested non-member States to take part in its work more fully than at present.

20. As to the question of membership, many delegations are of the view that the present composition of the Committee is adequately representative of the world community of States for effective disarmament negotiations and, in their opinion, there is no strong reason at the moment for modifying or enlarging the present membership. Some delegations expressed themselves in favour of a small increase in the Committee's membership, while others mentioned the possibility that membership might rotate within

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3/ Document CD/228.

4/ Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

the respective regions or groups. Some delegations are of the opinion that non-aligned and developing countries are not adequately represented in the Committee, particularly in view of their security concerns in the present international climate and that any consideration of expansion should take this inadequacy into account. Some other delegations consider that, for the same reasons, the neutral countries are not adequately represented in the Committee. Other delegations believe that the membership of the Committee is now and should continue to be based on the principles of political balance and equitable geographical distribution. Some delegations expressed sympathy for the aspirations of certain States which they felt had shown a readiness to make a significant contribution to the work of the Committee.

21. The following States have formally informed the Committee of their interest in joining it: Austria, on 15 April 1982, Finland, on 16 March 1982, Norway, on 4 March 1982, and Turkey, on 16 April 1982.

22. The members of the Committee intend to continue consultations on the question of the review of the membership during the second special session.

#### H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

23. In accordance with rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure, lists of all communications from non-governmental organizations and persons have been periodically circulated to the Committee.

### III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

24. The substantive work of the Committee has been based on its agenda and programme of work. At the beginning of each annual session, the Committee had before it a letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting all the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its previous regular session in particular those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Committee. The Committee also received, at the opening of each annual session, a message of the Secretary-General conveyed by his Personal Representative and Secretary of the Committee.

#### A. Nuclear Test Ban

25. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering the question of a nuclear test ban as item 1 of its agenda since June 1979, and continues to recognize that among measures in relation to disarmament, a nuclear test ban has always been regarded as a matter of highest priority. Several proposals have been made in this connection in statements at plenary meetings as well as in official documents of the Committee. 5/

26. It was generally recognized that, while nuclear-weapon States bear special responsibility for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, all States have a legitimate interest in the early conclusion of a treaty that could inspire universal adherence. There is recognition of the Committee's indispensable role in the negotiations of a treaty which could attract the widest possible adherence, but there have been differences of approach.

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5/ Documents, CD/7, CD/45, CD/72, CD/73, CD/93, CD/95, CD/130, CD/181, CD/192, CD/194, CD/257, CD/259 and CD/287.

27. The Group of 21 <sup>6/</sup> expressed the conviction that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed without delay to undertake multilateral negotiations on the question of a nuclear test ban. Having stated the view that working groups are the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of 21 urged the setting up of an Ad Hoc Working Group to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft Treaty on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Group of 21 considered that such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come; should be equitable and non-discriminatory and thus be able to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system to which all States will have access. During the general discussion on this item, the view was expressed that the banning of nuclear testing would be instrumental in reducing nuclear threats only when carried out in conjunction with the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures. In this context, it was also stated that a nuclear test ban should be an integral part of an effective process of nuclear disarmament and should be considered in that framework. A group of Socialist countries has advocated that an early conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time would improve the international climate, create favourable conditions for curbing the nuclear arms race and promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

28. The first specific proposal for work on this agenda item was that the Committee could begin its work by examining the institutional arrangements for the verification aspects of a treaty. Others took the view that the technical and scientific aspects had already been fully explored and that only a political decision was necessary to achieve agreement on a treaty, taking into account the existing means of verification.

29. The view has been expressed that there should be an immediate moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests, which could be verified through existing national technical means. Others have pointed out that since a moratorium would not be based on international means of verification, it could therefore not promote mutual confidence.

30. Appreciation was expressed for the report transmitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CD/86).

31. On 31 July 1979 and 30 July 1980, the Committee received reports made on behalf of the tripartite negotiators, i.e. the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the negotiations they had been having on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, in which they re-affirmed their strong political commitment to completion of the nuclear test ban treaty and stated that several matters, including verification measures, were still under detailed negotiation. The trilateral negotiations have been suspended and the Committee has not received any further report.

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<sup>6/</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

32. Several specific questions were addressed to the trilateral negotiators seeking information on the scope, verification, compliance and other clauses of the treaty they had under negotiation. The Socialist countries recommended that the tripartite negotiators jointly elaborate answers to the questions put to them by the Group of 21. There was the view expressed, when the trilateral negotiations were in progress, that the most effective pursuit of a treaty would be through their continuation. Other members felt that the Committee itself should commence negotiations on the text of a treaty, since multilateral and restricted negotiations were not mutually exclusive, and to that end proposed in 1980 the establishment of a working group of the Committee. One of the participants in the trilateral negotiations, a member of the Socialist group, supported the proposal for a working group of the Committee for negotiating a treaty and at the same time expressed its readiness to resume the tripartite negotiations. The proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group were revived in 1981 but there was again no consensus on them.

33. The view was also expressed that the trilateral negotiators should resume their negotiations as soon as possible.

34. Thereafter, on the initiative of the Group of 21, a group of Socialist countries and other delegations, the Committee decided to hold informal meetings to undertake substantive examination of concrete issues under this item. At the informal meetings held on 6 and 13 April 1981, many delegations expressed views reinforcing previous proposals to proceed at once to negotiations in a working group on the formulation of a draft treaty.

35. On 24 April 1981, the Group of 21 submitted a proposal (CD/181) for the establishment of an ad hoc working group for the purpose of negotiating the provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and final clauses of a draft treaty, taking into account existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as the reports on the trilateral negotiations among the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That proposal also drew attention to the specific questions addressed to the trilateral negotiators during the first part of the session and sought further information concerning the role envisaged by them for the Committee in the multilateral negotiation of a nuclear test ban, as well as on the scope, verification of compliance and other clauses of the treaty they had under negotiation.

36. A number of delegations said that there was an urgent need for the Committee to commence work on a comprehensive test ban. To that end, many explicitly supported the establishment of an ad hoc working group. Several noted that the international situation had not been conducive to reaching agreement on how to proceed on this priority agenda item. Some expressed the view that even if it could agree on nothing else, the Committee should begin to work on institutional arrangements of an international system for exchange of seismic data.

37. The question of a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests continued to engage the attention of the Committee in 1982 and various proposals were made for the establishment of an ad hoc working group under agenda item 1. The Group of 21 reiterated its proposal (CD/181) for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to

negotiate a treaty on a nuclear test ban and its view that whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of such a treaty. A group of socialist countries also proposed that a working group be established to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives (CD/259). Other delegations also expressed their support for proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to negotiate a treaty. One nuclear-weapon State expressed the opinion that the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee to undertake negotiations on a treaty would not be propitious at present, but that the Committee could make a useful contribution by beginning work on the issues of effective verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban. That member State declared its consent to a subsidiary body being set up to discuss and define the issues relating to verification and compliance, which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test ban agreement.

38. The Committee established a drafting group to formulate an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda. At the 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee decided as follows (CD/291):

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban'.

Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

39. Within the framework of the discussion of this question, the Committee has considered the successive progress reports of the Ad Hoc Group on Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which was set up in 1976. An overview of the work done by the Ad Hoc Group since 1976 is given in the annex to document CD/260. The final report of the Ad Hoc Group is awaited with interest and the value and importance of an international system for exchange of seismic data for the purpose of identifying seismic events, so as to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban treaty is generally recognized.

40. A proposal was made that the Committee should consider the possibility of establishing an international system for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions (CD/257). It was argued that such surveillance could play an important role in the monitoring of nuclear tests.



B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and  
Nuclear Disarmament

41. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this question as item 2 of its agenda since April 1979 and has continued to bear in mind the high priority given to it in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It has had before it a number of proposals, substantive and procedural, made in statements at plenary meetings as well as in official documents of the Committee. <sup>7/</sup> One of the proposals concerned a cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles until their final elimination. Other proposals related to the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the prohibition of further flight testing of strategic delivery vehicles.

42. The documents relating to the SALT II Agreements were presented to the Committee during its 1979 session (CD/28 and CD/29).

43. The Committee has attempted to identify the prerequisites and elements for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to delineate the appropriate course of action for the achievement of this objective. The Committee held during its 1981 session informal meetings on 23 and 30 March to examine the prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons. It also had substantive discussions aimed at clarifying issues and concepts so as to facilitate negotiations in the Committee.

44. While the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States is recognized as essential for attaining nuclear disarmament, an agreed basis for negotiations in the Committee has not been achieved. Several members held the opinion that multilateral negotiations would contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and that participation of all the nuclear-weapon States as well as of non-nuclear-weapon States in negotiations was essential, since nuclear disarmament was of general concern. Other members emphasized that multilateral negotiations with the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States were essential, since the very existence of nuclear weapons directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of all States. It was also emphasized that the Committee provided the most appropriate forum for such negotiations. Some other members were of the view that suitable conditions do not exist for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. An appropriate degree of trust and confidence among nuclear-weapon States in particular was regarded by them as essential for making progress in negotiations.

45. At the two informal meetings referred to above, the complex character of this item involving security concerns and strategic doctrines, the wide range of the difficult issues it encompasses, its relationship to the international situation and the need for urgent action to reduce tensions and eliminate the danger of nuclear war were generally acknowledged. The discussions, inter alia, referred to consultations and preparations for multilateral negotiations, the importance of political will to engage in them, and the risks involved in the nuclear arms race, deterrence policies, and the use of nuclear weapons. Some delegations criticized doctrines of deterrence as tending to escalate the nuclear arms race and increase

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<sup>7/</sup> Documents CD/4, CD/36/Rev.1, CD/90, CD/109, CD/116, CD/143, CD/171, CD/180, CD/188, CD/193, CD/213, CD/216, CD/219, CD/225, CD/226, CD/227, CD/238, CD/256 and CD/259.

the risk of nuclear war. Many members stressed that international peace and security would be considerably enhanced by the cessation of the nuclear arms race and measures of nuclear disarmament, including the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Secretary-General's report "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons" (A/35/392) was taken into account in the consideration of this item.

46. Some members, while emphasizing their belief that efforts should be made to reduce tensions and the level of nuclear confrontation, expressed the view that the existence of nuclear weapons had been a critical factor in preserving stability in a large part of the world for many years. They believed that negotiations on nuclear arms limitation and disarmament issues should be undertaken initially by the nuclear-weapon States concerned, and drew attention to the complexities of undertaking such negotiations in the Committee as a whole.

47. Certain nuclear-weapon States expressed the view that nuclear disarmament should take place as part of a general process of disarmament involving conventional armaments and armed forces in their entirety. Otherwise, serious military, and hence, political destabilization could result. They considered that this process of disarmament could not be isolated from the security requirements of States and from the international political and military situation. In their view, the first aim of the maintenance of a military capacity, including nuclear capacity, was to prevent war by demonstrating the ability to defend a State against any level of potential attack, and convincing an adversary that the risks of launching such an attack far outweighed the potential benefits. They considered that in this way deterrence had served and continued to serve as an essential component in maintaining equilibrium between the two major military alliances, and thereby contributed to stability on a global scale.

48. The Group of 21 opposed this view, arguing that doctrines of deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lay at the root of the nuclear arms race and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. It stressed that, unlike conventional arms, nuclear arms were weapons of mass destruction. It rejected as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world and the survival of mankind should be made to depend on the state of relations between nuclear-weapon States. While acknowledging the usefulness of bilateral and regional negotiations on nuclear issues, it further stressed that all States had the right to participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament so as to eliminate the risks of nuclear war, since such a war would have global consequences.

49. A group of socialist States, including one nuclear-weapon State, stressed the urgent need for measures related to the prevention of a nuclear war. In this connection they drew the attention of the Committee to their proposal relating to an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to their support of proposals on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In their view, any attempt to launch a preventive nuclear strike was bound to provoke a not less powerful retaliatory attack and no region would be spared from the consequences of nuclear war. It was their belief that the most radical solution of the problem of a danger of a nuclear war is the cessation of the production, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons which should be implemented on a stage-by-stage and mutually acceptable basis. To this end, they proposed the immediate initiation of negotiations with the participation of all the nuclear weapon States. The degree of participation by nuclear-weapon States in measures at each stage should be determined with due regard for the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of individual nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned. The existing balance of nuclear arms should, in their view, remain undisturbed during the gradual lowering of levels of arsenals, and the security of all States should also remain undiminished. They stressed that parallel with the above, measures should be

taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. They further proposed that there should be no deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present and suggested that a working group or any other subsidiary body should be established in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a corresponding agreement.

50. The view was expressed that the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament was dominated by two fundamental realities: nuclear weapons were to an overwhelming degree in the hands of two Powers, and the existence of nuclear weapons was a fundamental element of balance and hence of security in a certain region of the world. In accordance with this view, any progress therefore depended on a two-fold effort: that of the two Powers towards the reduction of their nuclear means, and the effort to be made within the geographical area of Europe to improve conditions of security and confidence and then gradually reduce the level of conventional weapons; these objectives were closely related, for an over-all balance was inseparable from balance in the European theatre; in view of the disproportion among nuclear arsenals, it was only after a radical reduction of armaments by the two major Powers that the other nuclear-weapon States could accept undertakings concerning the reduction of their own armaments.

51. The view was expressed that the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and that, in view of the wide gap in the size and quality of their arsenals and those of other nuclear-weapon States, it was only after there had been a significant reduction of the nuclear arsenals of these two States that other nuclear-weapon States could undertake reductions in their own arsenals according to rational procedures and ratios.

52. Others pointed out that there also exists a very grave imbalance between nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and non-nuclear weapon States on the other, and that this imbalance must be addressed in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

53. The main points made by delegations at the two informal meetings referred to above are contained, inter alia, in paragraphs 65 to 79 of the 1981 Report of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/228).

54. It was stressed by all members that acts of aggression, expansion, foreign occupation and other violations of the Charter of the United Nations have an adverse impact on negotiations on disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. In the context of promoting the goals of disarmament, the necessity of eliminating such manifestations and of resolving existing international disputes through negotiations was underlined.

55. Many delegations also stated that the aggravation of the international situation should not be an excuse for a weakening of efforts at negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

56. The group of socialist States put forward a proposal that the Committee undertake negotiations on a convention banning the nuclear neutron weapon. They stated that the prohibition of this weapon should be given prominence in the over-all framework of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, since, in their view, the production and deployment of the neutron nuclear weapon would trigger a qualitative leap in the arms race, would lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold and increase the possibility of escalation of armed conflict to the level of all-out

nuclear war. In this connection they referred to the draft of such a convention submitted by them to the Committee and suggested the establishment of an ad hoc working group for this purpose. This proposal failed to obtain consensus.

57. Some delegations stressed that since the enhanced radiation weapon was only one particular type of nuclear weapon it fell within the general context of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. There was therefore no reason for giving it special treatment or for making specific provisions with respect to it in treaty form. Thus the establishment of a working group for the purpose of negotiations on that subject appeared unjustified.

58. Apart from differences over approach and over the basis for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee, there has also been no consensus on the establishment by the Committee of a subsidiary body for the conduct of those negotiations. Informal contacts and consultations that were held to identify the prerequisites as well as the issues for negotiations have led to no agreement. A proposal was also made by the Group of 21 for the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee to undertake multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. A similar proposal was made by a group of socialist countries to elaborate, on the basis of paragraph 50, the stages of nuclear disarmament with the aim of preparing multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. These proposals did not secure the consensus of the Committee.

59. Those who are opposed to these proposals continue to point out that nuclear weapons questions are primarily matters of a bilateral and regional nature and fall within the competence of the States directly concerned, which should undertake negotiations in the first instance. They believe, however, that the Committee should continue to address questions relating to nuclear disarmament in its plenary and informal meetings for the present, and not embark on negotiations in a working group. This view is not shared by other members, particularly the Group of 21 as well as a group of socialist countries, who feel that the need for urgent multilateral negotiations under item 2 had been amply demonstrated.

60. The Committee will pursue the search for a common agreed approach in conformity with the responsibility entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly.

### C. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

61. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this question as item 3 of its agenda since June 1979, most of the time in an ad hoc working group of the Committee. A description of the work done on the item is given in the report of the ad hoc Working Group prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/285).

62. During the 1979 and 1980 sessions, Mr. M. El Baradei (Egypt) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Mr. A. Ciarrapico (Italy) and Ambassador M. Ahmad (Pakistan) were, respectively, Chairmen during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. In the course of its 1979-1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 49 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Switzerland.

63. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

## "I. Introduction

"At its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament requested the Ad Hoc Working Group to report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Pursuant to that request, the Ad Hoc Working Group submits its report to the Committee regarding the present state of negotiations on the subject, taking into account negotiations conducted in the previous Ad Hoc Working Groups during 1979, 1980 and 1981 sessions.

"At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, unilateral declarations were made by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group have been conducted primarily on the basis of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, in which '... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'. Other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document provided additional guidance on this question. During the course of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group also took into account the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its thirty-third, thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions, namely: resolutions 33/72 A and B, 34/84, 34/85, 34/86, 35/46, 35/154, 35/155, 36/94 and 36/95. In addition, the various proposals on the subject submitted by delegations in the Committee on Disarmament and in the Ad Hoc Working Group were taken into account, as listed in document CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.4. a/

"At their request, representatives of the following States not members of the Committee on Disarmament were invited to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group during its 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Switzerland.

## "II. Substantive Negotiations During 1979, 1980 and 1981 Sessions

"In the course of consideration of item 3 of its 1979 annual agenda, entitled 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons', the Committee on Disarmament, at its 39th plenary meeting on 5 July 1979, adopted the following decision:

'The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its present session, an ad hoc working group open to all member States of the Committee to consider, and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The ad hoc working group will present a report to the Committee on Disarmament before the conclusion of the 1979 session. The Committee further decides, in accordance with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, that representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during the meetings of the ad hoc working group.'

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a/ See Annex I of this report.

"During the 1979 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group devoted its efforts to identifying the elements to be considered and negotiated on with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements. Extensive discussions were held on the relationship of the non-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, the non-use of force in international relations, as well as the over-all question of strengthening of international peace and security, to the mandate of the Working Group. There was broad agreement that these elements could be divided into two general categories: (a) Scope and nature of the arrangements, and (b) Form of the arrangements, their number and binding character. There was also agreement that the arrangements had to be effective and international in character. In this connection, a series of relevant questions were considered, in particular the question of rationale, scope and nature of the arrangements, as well as the question of the definition of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, the criteria to be applied in such definition and the prerequisites for the extension of the arrangements. With respect to the latter, a number of ideas were submitted; related questions were raised and comments were made on these ideas. The Working Group also discussed the form, number and binding character of the arrangements, particularly the question of an international convention to which there was no objection, in principle, although the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Draft conventions were submitted for consideration by the delegation of Pakistan (document CD/10) and the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (document CD/23). Moreover, the idea of interim arrangements was also considered. As a result of its deliberations the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/47.

"In the course of consideration of item 3 of its 1980 agenda concerning the same subject, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, adopted the following decision as contained in document CD/77:

'The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1980 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The ad hoc working group will report to the Committee on the progress of its work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1980 session.'

"During the 1980 session, the Working Group decided to focus its attention primarily on the scope and nature of the arrangements on the understanding that an agreement on the substance of the arrangements could facilitate the agreement on the form. Accordingly, a working paper (CD/SA/WP.2) was submitted by the Chairman as a basis for negotiations. It contained the different formulas which appeared in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and in the proposals and ideas presented to or expressed by other States, and which had a direct bearing on the scope and nature of the arrangements. The in-depth analysis of these formulas considered in juxtaposition helped the Working Group to clarify and amplify the various positions and to detect areas of agreement and divergence. The Working Group further considered the question of the form of the arrangements. In this regard, there was recognition that search should continue for a 'common approach' acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. In that connection,

notwithstanding the fact that there was once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. In this regard, no agreement was reached. The possibility of interim arrangements was considered. It was broadly suggested that a Security Council resolution might serve as a useful interim measure towards the effective international arrangements and pending agreement on such a 'common approach'. In this connection, it was suggested that the value of a Security Council resolution would depend on its substance. On this point, different views were expressed. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/125, which recommended that ways and means be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations.

"At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons with the same mandate as at the previous session in 1980.

"During the 1981 session, the Working Group decided to concentrate essentially on the examination of the substance of the assurances on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on the form. In the course of deliberations, various positions and ideas, relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (also referred to as security assurances or security guarantees), were expressed, namely:

- pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, since any use of nuclear weapons, which constitute the greatest threat to humanity, would affect the security of belligerents and non-belligerents alike, there should be an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this connection a view stated was that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations; another view was expressed that a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only in the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament, as part of progress towards general disarmament;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons without any conditions or limitations as an integral part of and initial step towards the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which have no nuclear weapons on their territory;
- the extension of security assurances to those States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territories. In this connection, a view was expressed that reaching an agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would be a step conducive to the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States;

- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the nuclear-weapon State extending the assurance, its territories or armed forces or allies by such a State allied to, or associated with, a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack;
- the extension of security assurances to any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them provided that that State does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces) a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers;
- the extension of security assurances by means of concluding conventions with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to a nuclear-free zone, in order to give these assurances a mutually binding character.

The Working Group attempted the identification of the various features of assurances and considered the possible alternatives which could be explored in the search for a 'common approach' or 'common formula'. During the final stage of its work, the Working Group, without prejudice to further exploration of other alternatives, decided to concentrate its efforts on those alternatives which called for: (a) a 'common formula' for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and agreed upon by all concerned and (b) a 'common formula' which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States. In this connection, working papers were submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands (CD/SA/WP.6) and by the delegation of Pakistan (CD/SA/WP.7), containing draft 'common formulas' for consideration by the Working Group. The delegation of Bulgaria also submitted a working paper in this regard (CD/SA/WP.8). Different approaches to the question of developing a 'common formula' became apparent in the discussion. Nevertheless, the Working Group regarded the efforts devoted to the search for a 'common approach' or 'formula' as a positive step towards the agreement on the question of security assurances. Against this background, it recommended to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. The Working Group added, 'in this context further efforts should be devoted to the search for a 'common approach' acceptable to all and in particular for a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character'. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/215 and Corr.1.

### "III. Present State of Negotiations on the Subject

"In pursuance of the Committee's decision at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, as contained in document CD/243, the Ad Hoc Working Group was re-established to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Working Group held ten meetings between 26 February and 19 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, representative of Pakistan. Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group.



"In carrying out the task entrusted to it, the Working Group decided to continue its efforts on the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group established during the 1981 session (CD/215) which stated that: '... , the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. In this context, further efforts should be devoted to the search for a 'common approach' acceptable to all, and in particular for a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.' The attention of the Working Group was drawn to resolutions 36/94 and 36/95 adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its thirty-sixth session, as contained in document CD/231, and as referred to in paragraph 2 above.

"In the conduct of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group decided to concentrate, as at the previous session in 1981, on those alternatives which called for: (a) a 'common formula' for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations in the Committee and agreed upon by all concerned and (b) a 'common formula' which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States. The Working Group noted that three working papers were previously submitted in connection with the examination of these alternatives by the delegations of the Netherlands, Pakistan and Bulgaria, as contained in documents CD/SA/WP.6, CD/SA/WP.7 and CD/SA/WP.8, respectively.

"Some general positions were outlined. Certain delegations, members of the Group of 21, expressed their view that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and, pending this, the complete prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. A group of socialist States noted that the implementation of measures provided for in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe would be a reliable safeguard for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear conflict and contribute to the strengthening of the security of all States in particular of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Different views were expressed in this connection. Other delegations maintained that these questions were outside the scope of the mandate of the Working Group.

"During the course of deliberations, the positions and ideas relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which were put forward at the previous session, as contained in paragraph 9 above, were reaffirmed in the Ad Hoc Working Group by various delegations.

"The discussion of proposals for a 'common formula' focused on the substantive elements involved. Regarding the substance of a 'common formula' to be elaborated, different approaches became apparent in the discussions. Under one approach, the nuclear-weapon States would provide assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States without any conditions, qualifications or limitations. In this connection, a working paper (CD/278) b/ was submitted by the delegation of China, in which China reaffirmed its position to provide unconditional security

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b/ See Annex II of this report.

assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and urged other nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their political will necessary to reach agreement on a 'common approach' or 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Under other approaches, various criteria would be provided to describe the conditions for the inclusion of non-nuclear-weapon States in the scope of the assurances. The sponsors of documents CD/SA/WP.6 and CD/SA/WP.7, the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan, explained their suggestions for a compromise approach to a 'common formula' contained in these working papers. The proposal for reaching an agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present was also underlined. Various views were expressed on these suggestions and divergent ideas continued to be maintained.

"The question of an appropriate form was extensively considered in connection with the efforts to develop a possible 'common formula'. As in the previous sessions, there was again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. A view was expressed that the Working Group should proceed to the concrete elaboration of such a convention. As in previous sessions, however, it was pointed out that an agreement on the substance of the assurances could facilitate an agreement on the form.

"The Working Group subsequently took up the idea of interim arrangements, particularly the proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution. A working paper, containing a draft Security Council resolution embodying a 'common formula' for security assurances (CD/SA/WP.9), c/ was submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands. The delegation of Pakistan also submitted a revised working paper containing a draft resolution for possible adoption by the Security Council (CD/SA/WP.3/Rev.1). d/ A group of socialist States expressed the view that declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have no such weapons on their territories, could be examined and possibly adopted in the form of an appropriate resolution by the Security Council. Different views were expressed on these ideas and various comments were made on these proposals. On the one hand, it was held that appropriate interim arrangements would represent progress and create a favourable climate with the view to satisfying progressively the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the question of security assurances. On the other hand, however, the view was expressed that interim measures, particularly in the form of Security Council resolution, would have no utility and that they fell outside the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group and would merely undermine the necessary climate for elaborating credible security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of delegations stressed that interim arrangements should not be a substitute for an international convention or other international arrangements of a legally binding character. In this context, it was emphasized that, while considering alternative ways, the final aim of reaching an international convention on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be constantly kept in mind. Any interim measure or other alternative means for strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be judged against its substance and could be justified only in so far as it would constitute a step forward towards this direction.

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c/ See Annex III of this report.

d/ See Annex IV of this report.

"Other ideas were submitted regarding action that could be taken at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on this question. It was suggested that nuclear-weapon States should appropriately revise their unilateral declarations, which could then be taken into account at the second special session. It was pointed out by some nuclear-weapon States that their unilateral assurances had been offered in response to, and given in recognition of, the security concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that these assurances were credible and reliable and represented firm declarations of policy.

"A statement by the Group of 21 was circulated to the Working Group, as contained in document CD/280, e/ which inter alia, stated that: "The declarations (of some nuclear-weapon States) do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons'. It further stated that there is every reason for the neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances to be covered by legally binding assurances and enumerated principles on the basis of which an agreement on this question should be reached. It expressed the view that 'further negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear-weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement'. The Group of 21 therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States, and which would facilitate agreement on an international instrument of a legally binding character.

#### "IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

"The Ad Hoc Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. During the past three sessions, negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a 'common formula' acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Although the negotiations on the subject in the Working Group have clarified many of the issues involved, the Working Group has been unable to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"In the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations of the Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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e/ See Annex V of this report.

"ANNEX I

"List of Documents on the Question of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

"I. Official documents of the Committee on Disarmament

- (1) CD/1 - containing General Assembly resolutions 33/72A and B. (24 January 1979)
- (2) CD/10 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Conclusion of an International Convention to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (27 March 1979)
- (3) CD/23 - submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States". (21 June 1979)
- (4) CD/25 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (26 June 1979)
- (5) CD/27 - submitted by United States of America, entitled "Proposal for a CD Recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly Concerning the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against Nuclear Attack". (2 July 1979)
- (6) CD/47 - containing Report of the "Ad Hoc Working Group to consider and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (7 August 1979)
- (7) CD/55 - containing General Assembly resolutions 34/84, 34/85 and 34/86. (5 February 1980)
- (8) CD/75 - submitted by Finland, entitled "Letter dated 12 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva submitting a working document containing the views of the Finnish Government". (14 March 1980)
- (9) CD/77 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (17 March 1980)

- (10) CD/120 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft resolution for adoption by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'". (17 July 1980)
- (11) CD/125\* - Report of the "Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (7 August 1980)
- (12) CD/140 - containing General Assembly resolutions 35/154 and 35/155. (3 February 1981)
- (13) CD/151 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under its former mandate during 1980 session. (13 February 1981)
- (14) CD/153 - submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (18 February 1981)
- (15) CD/161 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (4 March 1981)
- (16) CD/176 - submitted by USSR, entitled "Letter dated 7 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, Ta Nea." (10 April 1981)
- (17) CD/177 - submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled "United Kingdom working paper on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (10 April 1981)
- (18) CD/184 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 June 1981", containing "Resolution No. 28/12-P: Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (15 June 1981)

- (19) CD/207 - submitted by China, entitled "Working Paper on the Question of Security Assurances". (6 August 1981)
- (20) CD/215 - Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (14 August 1981)  
and  
Corr.1
- (21) CD/231 - containing General Assembly resolutions 36/94 and 36/95.
- (22) CD/243 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under its former mandate during 1980 session. (19 February 1982)
- (23) CD/278\* - submitted by China, entitled "Working Paper on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (15 April 1982)
- (24) CD/280 - submitted by the Group of 21, entitled "Statement of the Group of 21 on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (14 April 1982)
- (25) CD/285 - "Special Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament, prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (19 April 1982)

"II. Working papers of the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- (1) CD/SA WP.1/  
Rev.3 - List of documents on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (23 February 1982)
- (2) CD/SA/WP.2 - submitted by the Chairman, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: A. Scope and nature of the arrangements". (25 June 1980)
- (3) CD/SA/WP.3 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft resolution by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' ". (15 July 1980)

- (4) CD/SA/WP.4 - submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Forms of arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (17 July 1980)
- (5) CD/SA/WP.5 - submitted by the Chairman, entitled: "Stages of consideration of the substance of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (26 March 1981)
- (6) CD/SA/WP.6 - submitted by the Netherlands, containing a suggested "common formula" for negative security assurances to be incorporated in a Security Council resolution. (8 July 1981)  
(CD/SA/CRP.6)
- (7) CD/SA/WP.7 - submitted by Pakistan, containing proposals in connection with Alternative D in Stage Two of document CD/SA/WP.5. (13 July 1981)  
(CD/SA/CRP.7)
- (8) CD/SA/WP.8 - submitted by Bulgaria, containing considerations in connection with "Alternative D, Stage Two, document CD/SA/WP.5" and the suggestions made under it. (21 July 1981)  
(CD/SA/CRP.8 and Corr.1)
- (9) CD/SA/WP.9 - submitted by the Netherlands, entitled "Draft resolution of the Security Council embodying a 'common formula' to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (1 April 1982)
- (10) CD/SA/WP.3/ - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft resolution for adoption by United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' ". (7 April 1982)  
Rev.1\*

"III. A compilation of material for the use of members of the ad hoc working group established by the Committee on Disarmament on 5 July 1979 to consider and negotiate on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- (1) Statements made at the plenary and ad hoc committee meetings of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- (2) Statements made at the plenary and the First Committee of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly
  - (a) Plenary
  - (b) First Committee (General)
  - (c) First Committee (Soviet Draft Convention);

- (3) Declarations made by the five nuclear weapon States containing assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;
- (4) Security Council resolution 255 (1968);
- (5) General Assembly resolutions on the non-use of nuclear weapons;
- (6) Resolution on security assurances adopted by the Non-nuclear Weapon States Conference of 1968;
- (7) Part of the 1975 NPT Review Conference Final Document, relevant to security assurances;
- (8) Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, paragraphs 56-59 on security assurances;
- (9) Addendum and supplements to the Compilation:
  - (i) "Proposal of the United States of America on strengthening confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/33/7, 17 November 1978);
  - (ii) General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII): Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;
  - (iii) "Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty" (NPT/CONF/22, 15 May 1975);
  - (iv) Declarations made by the United Kingdom, China, France, United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

"IV. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly

"V. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly

"VI. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly

"VII. Unofficial transcriptions of the proceedings of the ad hoc working groups on security assurances

- (1) Unofficial transcriptions of seven meetings of the ad hoc working group during 1979.



"ANNEX II

"CHINA

"Working Paper

"On Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

"Since its establishment over two years ago, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has held detailed and intensive discussions on the substance and form of negative security assurances. Faced with grave nuclear threat, numerous non-nuclear-weapon States call upon the nuclear-weapon States to provide unconditional assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, and to conclude an international convention of a legally binding character. The Chinese delegation supports this reasonable demand. In the past two years and more, because the major nuclear powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals imposed various conditions on non-nuclear-weapon States, no concrete result has been achieved so far in the negotiations on security assurances. The Chinese delegation believes that it is a minimum obligation of all the nuclear-weapon States to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with adequate security assurances, and in particular that the major nuclear powers with the largest nuclear arsenals bear primary responsibility in this respect. What the non-nuclear-weapon States ask for is unconditional assurances. They have rightly pointed out that demanding conditional assurances is tantamount to seeking security assurances for nuclear-weapon States from non-nuclear-weapon States. This is obviously unfair and unjust.

"The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate its position as follows: the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and nuclear threats. Pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear free-zones. China has already, on its own initiative and unilaterally, declared that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. In connection with this fundamental position, China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

"Resolution 36/95 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. It is our hope that the major nuclear powers shall not proceed from their own narrow interests and shall refrain from imposing various conditions with regard to security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, they should respond positively to the reasonable demands voiced by a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States and demonstrate their political will to shoulder responsibilities with a view to ensuring progress in negotiations on security assurance. Together with the representatives of other countries, the Chinese delegation is ready to make further efforts to seek a "common formula" in consonance with demands of non-nuclear-weapon States and acceptable to all States.

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"INDEX III

"THE NETHERLANDS:- WORKING PAPER -

"Draft Resolution of the Security Council embodying a common formula to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

"The Security Council,

"Considering the devastation that would be inflicted upon mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

"Convinced that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

"Recognizing that pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

"Further convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) remains a vital element in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

"Welcoming therefore the acceptance by a large and growing number of States of internationally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices),

"Recognizing the need to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and in particular to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

"Welcoming in this respect the adherence by five nuclear-weapon States to additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

"Acknowledging that States find themselves in different security situations, and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of different States,

"Reaffirming the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security,

"Welcomes the solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them, provided that State does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces of) a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State.

"INDEX IV"

"PAKISTAN: WORKING PAPER"

"Possible draft resolution for adoption by United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

"The Security Council,

"Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

"Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and the survival of civilization,

"Deeply concerned at the continued escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

"Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

"Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

"Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

"Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States urgently to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"Noting the negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament on the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons".

"Noting the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

"Further noting the general support expressed for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that there is no objection, in principle to the idea of an international convention,

"Acting under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in response to the threat to peace posed by the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

"1. Calls upon those States possessing nuclear weapons to undertake in a legally binding instrument not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

"2. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to pursue negotiations for this purpose and conclude, without delay, a binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

"3. Requests the nuclear-weapon States to pursue these negotiations in good faith and to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a legally binding instrument, in particular by appropriately revising their respective unilateral declarations on this question, taking into account especially the views and positions of the non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two major military alliances;

"4. Urges the nuclear-weapon States, as a provisional and immediate measure, to confirm, in a legally binding manner, that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two major military alliances;

"5. Decides to remain seized of this matter.

"ANNEX V

"STATEMENT a/ OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL  
ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST  
THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

- "1. The Group of 21 believes that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Group of 21, therefore, welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc Working Group to reach agreement on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".
- "2. Most regrettably, three years of negotiations in the ad hoc Working Group have produced only marginal progress. This is due principally to the inflexible positions taken by some nuclear-weapon States.
- "3. The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in the unilateral declarations of some nuclear-weapon States reflect their subjective approach and that these declarations are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Taken together, these conditions, limitations and exceptions have the effect of severely restricting such positive features as may be contained in these unilateral declarations and they are, therefore, unacceptable to members of the Group of 21. The declarations do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.
- "4. The Group of 21 notes that in accordance with paragraph 62 of the Final Document, the nuclear-weapon States have given undertakings to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which are members of the existing nuclear weapon free zone. Besides these States, other neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances are committed not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. There is therefore every reason for these States being covered by the same legally binding assurances, especially if one takes into account that the nuclear-weapon States were urged in paragraph 59 to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- "5. The Group of 21 emphasizes that an agreement on the question of "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" should be based on the following principles:
- (i) The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

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a/ The Statement represents the common denominator of the positions of the members of the Group of 21.

- "(ii) Non-nuclear weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
  - "(iii) Such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21 notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention;
  - "(iv) A common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21 stated above;
  - "(v) The agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- "6. The Group of 21 considers that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States. Such an undertaking would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also contribute towards progress in achieving an international agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament."

#### D. Chemical Weapons

64. The Committee on Disarmament has been dealing with the question of chemical weapons as item 4 of its agenda since April 1979. As from 1980 this item has been mainly considered by an ad hoc working group of the Committee. The latest report of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which was prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, contains a description of the work of that subsidiary body (CD/201 Rev.1).

65. During the 1980 session, Ambassador Y. Okawa (Japan) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador C. Lidgard (Sweden) and Ambassador B. Sujka (Poland) were, respectively, Chairmen during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. In the course of its 1980/1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 54 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland.

66. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

##### "I. Introduction

"Taking into consideration paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament which, while noting that negotiations had been proceeding for several years stated that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations, the Committee on Disarmament has consistently included the item 'chemical weapons' on its agenda since 1979. In 1979, before the establishment of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the item was dealt with in plenary meetings. In considering this item on its agenda, the Committee has been taking into account the provisions of existing international instruments on the subject as well as all proposals and documents, including draft texts of chemical weapons conventions and joint United States-USSR reports on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, (CD/48, CD/112) presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. A list of all the documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted under the agenda item entitled 'Chemical Weapons', as well as of the documents of the Working Group which included working papers and conference room papers, is contained in the annex to this report.

##### "II. Mandate and substantive considerations of the Working Group in 1980 and 1981

"In 1980, the Committee on Disarmament established an ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons by the following decision.

'In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1980 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives.'



"Under its 1980 mandate, the Working Group having agreed to structure its work under the three general headings of 'scope', 'verification' and 'other matters', undertook a substantive examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. On the basis of this examination, the issues on which convergence of views among participating delegations emerged and those where no convergence of views existed were ascertained (document CD/131/Rev.1).

"The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981, to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.

"In 1981, the Working Group carried out a detailed examination of draft Elements of a chemical weapons convention, as proposed by the Chairman. These draft Elements covered the following issues: general provision; general definition of chemical weapons; prohibition of transfer; declarations; destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion; super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes; relationship with other treaties; international co-operation; general provision on verification; national legislation and verification measures; national technical means of verification, consultation and co-operation; consultative committee; amendments; review conference; duration and withdrawals, signature, ratification, accession, and the distribution of the convention. The questions related to definitions and criteria, declaration of possession of stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of chemical weapons, plans for their destruction or diversion for permitted purposes in time frames as well as forms of making such declarations were dealt with in annexes to the Elements. The same approach was suggested by the Chairman with respect to the destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production, the recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system, as well as the details of the organization and procedures of the consultative committee. The Chairman revised the draft Elements on the basis of statements as well as of that of oral and written comments of delegations. These Elements, as revised by the Chairman, did not, however, reflect all the views which emerged on certain issues. The revised text of the Chairman's Elements, together with comments reflecting views put forward by delegations, were attached to the Group's 1981 report to the Committee (document CD/220).

### "III. Present state in the elaboration of a convention

"In 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided on the following mandate for the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons:

...'In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiative with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date.'...

"The Group, during the first part of its 1982 session began the elaboration of the provisions of a convention. At the suggestion of the Chairman, it carried out another detailed examination of the revised Elements and of the Comments thereto, with a view to elaborating alternative and supplementary formulations in particular corresponding to the views originally expressed in the Comments. These considerations of the revised Elements were grouped under the three previously agreed headings of 'scope', 'verification' and 'other matters'. A number of delegations submitted conference room papers containing new wording corresponding to their views originally reflected in the Comments. In addition, some delegations submitted related proposals in plenary statements and CD documents. Wording was also proposed for certain Elements and Annexes which had not been dealt with during the 1981 session. The Chairman submitted a proposal for the Preamble to a future convention.

"The process of resolving differences of views continued. There was common understanding that the scope of the prohibition should include all existing and possible types of chemical weapons. The ad hoc Working Group examined in greater detail the major outstanding problems of the scope of the prohibition and of questions related to verification. The main differences regarding the scope concern the inclusion of provisions in the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, provisions regarding the applicability of the convention with respect to animals and plants, whether it should include the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the purpose of utilizing the toxic properties of chemicals in combat, and provisions on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States. Questions regarding the balance between national and international verification the appropriateness of the inclusion of a provision on the use of national technical means of verification, the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and the national verification or implementation system, as well as the issues of when on-site inspection shall take place and how a prohibition of binary chemical weapons should be verified remain to be agreed upon. A better understanding was reached of the need to ensure that verification of compliance with the convention be based on an adequate combination of national and international means. Measures relating to the implementation of the convention, such as declarations, were examined in more detail. Specific proposals were also put forward by a number of delegations with a view to improving the possible structure of a future convention. The revised Elements and Comments included in the 1981 report of the Working Group to the CD as well as the proposals and suggested texts submitted during the first part of the Committee's 1982 session will constitute a valuable basis for the Group's future work.

"Following the practice introduced in 1981 by the Chairman to hold consultations on certain technical questions relevant to the future convention, the Chairman, at the Group's 1982 session, convened consultations on issues recommended for further examination in the Group's 1981 report. The 1982 consultations dealt specifically with methods to be agreed upon for toxicity determinations in connection with a chemical weapons convention. The Chairman reported to the Working Group that the participants in these consultations unanimously recommended standardized operating procedures for two specific types of toxicity determinations. The Working Group took note of the Chairman's report on the consultations and of the recommendations for standardized operating procedures. The Group agreed on the desirability of continuing consultations to allow for the examination of additional technical questions including some outstanding toxicological issues in relation to a chemical weapons convention.

"The urgency of achieving real progress towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was unanimously recognized by the Working Group especially in the light of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Accordingly, the Working Group endorsed the appeal of its Chairman for even more substantive contributions to advance the process of elaborating provisions of the convention at the earliest possible date.

"ANNEX

"List of Documents on Chemical Weapons

"A. Documents of the Committee on Disarmament

In 1979

- Document CD/5, dated 6 February 1979, submitted by the delegation of Italy, containing a working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations.
- Document CD/6, dated 6 February 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, concerning some procedural suggestions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons.
- Document CD/11, dated 9 April 1979, submitted by the Group of 21, containing a working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.
- Document CD/14, dated 25 April 1979, submitted by Finland, containing a working document entitled 'Chemical identification of chemical weapons agents; a Finnish Project'.
- Document CD/15, dated 24 April 1979, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom, on a visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts (14-16 March 1979).
- Document CD/21, dated 20 June 1979, submitted by the delegation of Poland, containing a working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction.
- Document CD/26, dated 1 July 1979, submitted by the Secretariat in compliance with the decision of the Committee at its 31st plenary meeting, containing a compilation of material on chemical weapons from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1979.
- Document CD/37, dated 12 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Working Paper on Some Aspects of International Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons: Experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany'.
- Document CD/39, dated 16 July 1979, submitted by Finland, concerning the identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents — an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data.
- Document CD/41, dated 25 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled 'A working paper containing questions relevant to a Convention prohibiting chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/44, dated 26 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of Poland, containing a working paper on an outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

- Document CD/48, dated 7 August 1979, submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, entitled 'USSR-United States Joint Report on Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/49, dated 8 August 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled 'Chemical Weapons -- Answers to Questionnaire contained in CD/41'.
- Document CD/52, dated 13 August 1979, submitted by the delegations of France, Italy and the Netherlands, entitled 'Chemical weapons -- Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to a prohibition of chemical weapons'.

In 1980

- Document CD/59, dated 12 February 1980, submitted by the delegation of Australia and entitled 'Chemical weapons: Proposal for Informal Meetings with Experts'.
- Document CD/68, dated 28 February 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled 'Chemical weapons -- a possible procedural approach to the tasks facing the Committee on Disarmament: working paper'.
- Document CD/82, dated 20 March 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 18 March 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam transmitting a document entitled 'Memorandum on the use of chemicals by the United States of America in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea'.'
- Document CD/84, dated 26 March 1980, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, containing a working document entitled 'Draft Initial Work Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/85, dated 27 March 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 26 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea transmitting two documents entitled 'Statement of 5 February 1980 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea on the intensification by Hanoi of the use of chemical weapons and other activities to exterminate the Kampuchean People' and 'The use of chemical weapons by the Vietnamese aggressors in Kampuchea; Report issued by the Ministry of Information of Democratic Kampuchea on 25 February 1980'.'
- Document CD/89, dated 14 April 1980, and entitled 'Telegram dated 13 April 1980 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan transmitting a 'Declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan issued on 11 April 1980'.'
- Document CD/94, dated 18 April 1980 submitted by the delegation of Belgium and entitled 'Proposed definition of a chemical warfare agent and chemical munitions'.
- Document CD/96, dated 22 April 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled 'Ad Hoc working group on CW -- Initial Work Programme: Working Document'.

- Document CD/97, dated 24 April 1980, submitted by the delegation of Sweden and entitled 'Working Paper on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare Capability'.
- Document CD/102, dated 19 June 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 19 June 1980 from the Acting Head of the Chinese delegation, transmitting a working paper on the 'Chinese Delegation's proposals on the main contents of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons'.'
- Document CD/103, dated 24 June 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 24 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland transmitting a document entitled 'Identification of degradation products of potential organophosphorus warfare agents'.'
- Document CD/105, dated 27 June 1980, entitled 'Elements of a reply by the French delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/41)'.
- Document CD/106, dated 27 June 1980, submitted by the delegation of France, containing a working paper entitled 'Control of the non-manufacture and non-possession of agents and weapons of chemical warfare'.
- Document CD/110, dated 2 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia and entitled 'Working Paper on Medical Protection Against Nerve Gas Poisoning (Present Situation and Future Possibilities)'.
- Document CD/111, dated 2 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia and entitled 'Working Paper on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA)'.
- Document CD/112, dated 7 July 1980, submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, transmitting a document entitled 'USSR-United States Joint Report on the Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/113, dated 8 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Canada and entitled 'Organization and Control of Verification Within a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/114, dated 9 July 1980, entitled 'Reply at this stage submitted by the Australian Delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament in Document CD/41'.
- Document CD/117, dated 10 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Canada and entitled 'Definitions and Scope in a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/121, dated 17 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled 'Some of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a CW convention: working paper'.
- Document CD/122, dated 21 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Morocco and entitled 'Proposed definition of chemical weapons'.

- Document CD/123, dated 21 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Mongolia, containing a working document entitled 'Interrelationship between the future convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925'.
- Document CD/124, dated 24 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Indonesia and entitled 'Some views on the prohibition of chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/131/Rev.1, dated 4 August 1980, entitled 'Report to the Committee on Disarmament - Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/132, dated 1 August 1980, containing a working paper entitled 'Views of the Government of Pakistan submitted in response to the circulation of Document CD/89'.

In 1981

- Document CD/142, dated 10 February 1981, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled 'Working Paper: Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/164, dated 19 March 1981, submitted by Finland, entitled 'Creation of chemical weapons control capacity - present phase and goals of the Finnish project'.
- Document CD/167, dated 26 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled 'Verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities'.
- Document CD/168, dated 27 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled 'Working Paper - Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents'.
- Document CD/169, dated 27 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled 'Working Paper: Dismantling of Production Facilities/Mean of Production for Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/173, dated 3 April 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled 'Disposal of Chemical Agents'.
- Document CD/178, dated 16 April 1981, submitted by Finland, which addressed an invitation of the Finnish Government to a Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop.
- Document CD/124/Rev.1, dated 24 April 1981, submitted by the delegation of Indonesia, entitled 'Revision of CD/124 on the Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical Warfare Agent'.
- Document CD/179 and Add. 1, dated 23 April 1981, entitled 'The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.

- Document CD/183, dated 12 June 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled 'A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification'.
- Document CD/195, dated 14 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper: Incapacitating Agents'.
- Document CD/196, dated 16 July 1981, submitted by Finland, entitled 'Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents'.
- Document CD/197, dated 17 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Romania entitled 'Working Paper - Suggestions for Elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention: Definitions and Criteria'.
- Document CD/199, dated 24 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Czechoslovakia, entitled 'Working Paper: Definition and Characteristics of the Toxins'.
- Document CD/203, dated 30 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled 'Consultation and Co-operation, Verification Measures and Complaints Procedure in the framework of the Convention on the complete and effective Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of all Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction'.
- Document CD/212, dated 13 August 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled 'Some Viewpoints on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/220, dated 17 August 1981, entitled 'Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament'.

In 1982

- Document CD/244, dated 18 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled 'Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/253, dated 25 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Tass statement'.
- Document CD/258, and Corr.1, dated 9 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/263, dated 22 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Finland, entitled 'Working Paper on the Relation of Verification to the Scope of a Ban on Chemical Warfare Agents'.

- Document C D/264, dated 23 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled 'The United States Programme to Deter Chemical Warfare'.
- Document CD/265\*/, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Working Paper on Principles and Rules for Verifying Compliance with a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/266, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification'.
- Document CD/270, dated 31 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Indonesia and The Netherlands, entitled 'Letter dated 31 March 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of Indonesia and The Netherlands transmitting a document entitled 'Indonesia and The Netherlands - Working Document - Destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java, Indonesia'.'
- Document CD/271, dated 1 April 1982, submitted by the delegations of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia, entitled 'Technical Evaluation of 'Recover' Techniques for CW Verification'.
- Document CD/275, dated 7 April 1982, entitled 'Letter dated 5 April 1982 from the Deputy Representative of Canada to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament forwarding a document entitled 'Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals - Second Edition'.'
- Document CD/277, dated 7 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled 'Working Paper - The concept 'precursor' and a suggestion for definition for the purpose of a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/279, dated 14 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled 'Working Paper - Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/281/Rev.1, dated 26 April 1982, entitled 'Special Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament - Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/288, dated 21 April 1982, entitled 'Statement made by Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group'.



"B. Working Papers and Conference Room Papers of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons

In 1980

Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.1 entitled 'Working paper introduced by the Chairman'
- CD/CW/WP.2 and Add. 1 and 2 entitled 'List of Documents' containing a list of Committee on Disarmament documents relevant to the work of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, circulated between July 1979 and July 1980
- CD/CW/WP.3 submitted by the United States of America entitled 'Issues to be defined by the Ad Hoc Chemical Weapons Working Group'
- CD/CW/WP.4 submitted by Sweden entitled 'Issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a Convention on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.5 submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled 'The impact of on-site inspections of current civilian production on the chemical industry'
- CD/CW/WP.6 submitted by France entitled 'Criteria for the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents'

In 1981

(i) Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.7 and Rev.1 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 1'
- CD/CW/WP.8 and Corr.1 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 2'
- CD/CW/WP.9 submitted by Canada entitled 'Verification and Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.10 and Corr.1 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the Group -- Part 3'
- CD/CW/WP.11 submitted by Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled 'Chemical Weapons: types of activity to be covered by a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.12 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 4'
- CD/CW/WP.13 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 5'

- CD/CW/WP.14 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 6'
- CD/CW/WP.15 submitted by Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland entitled 'Chemical weapons: definitions'
- CD/CW/WP.16 submitted by France entitled 'Declarations and destruction of materials and facilities'
- CD/CW/WP.17 submitted by France entitled 'Chemical weapons -- definitions, criteria'
- CD/CW/WP.18 submitted by Australia entitled 'Initial Comments on the Consolidated Outline suggested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.19 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/WP.20 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/WP.21 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/WP.22 and Corr.1 and Rev.1 entitled 'Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations'
- CD/CW/WP.23 submitted by Australia entitled 'Chemical Weapons Verification: Consultative Committee of Experts'
- CD/CW/WP.24 submitted by Australia entitled 'Chemical Weapons Convention: Assistance to Parties'
- CD/CW/WP.25 submitted by Australia entitled 'Chemical Weapons Verification: The Methyl-Phosphorous "Finger Print"'

(ii) Conference Room Papers

- CD/CW/CRP.5 and Rev.1 and 2 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman for particular technical issues to be addressed during CD's 1981 work on chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.6 entitled 'List of topics to be discussed with regard to the definitions and criteria of importance for a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.7 submitted by Belgium entitled 'Proposed definitions (revision of document CD/94)'
- CD/CW/CRP.8 submitted by France entitled 'Criteria for definition'

- CD/CW/CRP.9 entitled 'List of questions put to the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America at the meeting of 30 March 1981 with respect to the bilateral report CD/112, and outlines by the Chairman for the work of the Working Group'
- CD/CW/CRP.10 and Add.1 and 2 and Corr.1 and Rev.1 entitled 'Draft Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament'
- CD/CW/CRP.11 entitled 'Note by the Chairman'
- CD/CW/CRP.12 entitled 'Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations'
- CD/CW/CRP.13 and Corr.1 entitled 'Consolidated text of suggestions for elements I, I (bis) and Annex I of a Chemical Weapons Convention, received as at Friday, 26 June 1981'
- CD/CW/CRP.14 submitted by Australia entitled 'Delegation Amendments to CD/CW/WP.19 and CD/CW/WP.20, Subject to Revision'
- CD/CW/CRP.15 and Add.1 entitled 'Revised Suggestions by the Chairman for elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.16 and Add.1 entitled 'Compilation of suggested amendments to the draft Elements and Annexes proposed by the Chairman in documents CD/CW/WP.19 to 20'
- CD/CW/CRP.17/Rev.1, Add.1 and 2 and Rev. 2 and 3, and Corr.1 entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament'
- CD/CW/CRP.18 entitled 'Suggestion by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for recommendation by the Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament regarding decision on further work to be undertaken on methods for toxicity determinations for a Chemical Weapons Convention'

In 1982

(i) Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.26 submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled 'Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention' (also issued as CD/244)
- CD/CW/WP.27 and Rev.1 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman on the draft programme of work of the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for the first part of its 1982 session'
- CD/CW/WP.28 and Corr.1 submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled 'Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons' (also issued as CD/258)

- CD/CW/WP.29 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Questions related to the ban of binary chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.30 and Corr.1 entitled 'Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations'
- CD/CW/WP.31 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification' (also issued as CD/266)
- CD/CW/WP.32 submitted by the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia, entitled 'Technical Evaluation of "Recover" Techniques for CW Verification' (also issued as CD/271)
- CD/CW/WP.33, entitled 'Compilation of revised Elements and Comments thereto (CD/220), proposed new texts and alternative wordings as well as comments on new texts'
- CD/CW/WP.34, entitled 'The Chairman's closing statement' (first part of 1982 session)

(ii) Conference Room Papers

- CD/CW/CRP.19 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element I -- General Provision'
- CD/CW/CRP.20 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element II -- General definition of chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.21 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Conference Room Paper relating to Element II -- Use of the general purpose criterion for the determination of the scope of prohibition of chemicals'
- CD/CW/CRP.22 submitted by Poland, entitled 'Suggested alternative for Element II.2'
- CD/CW/CRP.23 entitled 'Note by the Chairman -- Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations -- Draft time-table'
- CD/CW/CRP.24 submitted by Argentina, Australia, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element I -- General Provision'
- CD/CW/CRP.25 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Text proposed for new Element III bis -- Prohibition of Stationing'

- CD/CW/CRP.26 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element IV -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.27 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Text proposed as a continuation to the wording for a new Element III (Bis) contained in CD/CW/CRP.25'
- CD/CW/CRP.28 submitted by Nigeria, entitled 'Text proposed in relation to Element IV.1.(b) -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.29 submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Conference Room Paper, -- Abolition and non-acquisition of a chemical warfare capability after destruction of chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.30 submitted by Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Proposals with respect to document CD/220, Element IV, comments 1 and 4, and Annex II, comments 1 and 3'
- CD/CW/CRP.31 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Precursors'
- CD/CW/CRP.32 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element IV -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.33 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element V -- Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion'
- CD/CW/CRP.34 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Annex III -- Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production'
- CD/CW/CRP.35 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element IX -- General provision on verification'
- CD/CW/CRP.36 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element XI -- National technical means of verification'
- CD/CW/CRP.37 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'New text proposed as a continuation to suggested alternative wording for Element II.2 contained in CD/CW/CRP.22'
- CD/CW/CRP.38 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Comments in relation to document CD/220, Annex I, paragraphs 3 and 4 -- Definition and Criteria'

- CD/CW/CRP.39 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Proposal for new subparagraph for Element IV -- To be inserted between (b) and (c) in document CD/220, page 14 -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.40 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element V -- Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion'
- CD/CW/CRP.41 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Annex III -- Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production -- Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3'
- CD/CW/CRP.42 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Annex IV -- Recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system'
- CD/CW/CRP.43 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element XI -- National technical means of verification'
- CD/CW/CRP.44 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Some observations concerning the definition of "precursors" for the purposes of the Convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.45 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element X'
- CD/CW/CRP.46 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Elements XII-XIII'
- CD/CW/CRP.47, entitled 'Draft Preamble as suggested by the Chairman'
- CD/CW/CRP.48 submitted by Czechoslovakia, entitled 'Alternative wording for Element XVII, paragraph 3'
- CD/CW/CRP.49 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Suggested text to be added at the end of existing Element XVI -- Duration and withdrawals'
- CD/CW/CRP.50 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Declaration of Stockpiles and Facilities'
- CD/CW/CRP.51 submitted by The Netherlands, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element XIV and paragraph 1 of Element XV'

- CD/CW/CRP.52 and Rev.1, Rev.2 entitled 'Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament'
- CD/CW/CRP.53 submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.54 submitted by The Netherlands, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3 of Element IX, paragraph 1 of Element XI, Element XII, Element XIII and text proposed for new Element XIII bis'
- CD/CW/CRP.55 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.56 submitted by China, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for the second paragraph of the draft preamble as suggested by the Chairman contained in CD/CW/CRP.47'
- CD/CW/CRP.57 submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Suggested wording for the report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament concerning consultations held during the first part of the 1982 session'
- CD/CW/CRP.58, entitled 'Summary by the Chairman of initial comments made with respect to the draft Preamble (CD/CW/CRP.47)'
- CD/CW/CRP.59 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons''

E. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons;  
Radiological Weapons

67. The item on the agenda entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" has been considered by the Committee since July 1979. The question of prohibiting radiological weapons has been mainly considered by an ad hoc working group of the Committee. A description of the work of that group is given in its latest report to the Committee, which was prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/284/Rev.1).

68. During the 1980 and 1981 sessions, Ambassador I. Komives (Hungary) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador H. Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany) was Chairman during the 1982 session. In the course of its 1980/1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 49 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria and Norway.

69. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION \*/

"Taking into consideration paragraph 76 of the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, which stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, the Committee on Disarmament considered the question of concluding a treaty on radiological weapons in its 1979 session. During this session, the USSR and the United States submitted their joint USSR/United States proposal on major elements of the treaty (CD/31 and CD/32). Other proposals were also submitted.

"Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 34/67 A entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", the Committee on Disarmament at its 69th Plenary Meeting held on 17 March 1980 adopted the decision reading, inter alia,

'The Committee on Disarmament decided to establish for the duration of its 1980 session an ad hoc working group of the Committee with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.'

"The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981 at its 105th Plenary Meeting on 12 February 1981 to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.

"During the 1980/1981 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Imre Kórnives (Hungary) held further discussions on the main elements of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons on the basis of the Chairman's Consolidated Text (CD/RW/WP.20) and other documents and proposals submitted with a view to elaborating the draft provisions for the treaty on radiological weapons (CD/133 and CD/228).

"The activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group during that period showed that, while further efforts were made to narrow down the existing difficulties, divergencies still existed, particularly on the scope of the prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses and the relationship of the proposed treaty with other international agreements and other measures in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

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\*/ A list of Documents, Working Papers and Conference Room Papers (1979-1982) submitted in connection with the question of radiological weapons is attached as Annex I to this report.



"In 1980 and 1981, several specific suggestions were put forward in the Working Group in connection with the scope of the treaty. It was stated that the work of the Committee on Disarmament should be oriented towards the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of use of radioactive material for hostile purposes.

"Some delegations argued that there existed a very real risk of mass destruction from dissemination of radioactive substances through attacks on nuclear facilities. Those delegations believed that the treaty on radiological weapons would form an appropriate legal framework for an undertaking not to attack nuclear facilities or to deliberately damage such facilities.

"Other delegations considered that an obligation to this effect would fall outside the framework of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. It was also felt that an attempt to deal in the same negotiations with the prohibition of radiological weapons and with the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities would complicate the negotiations and make elaboration of any agreement on either matter impracticable. They believed that the issues relating to nuclear facilities were already covered by the Geneva Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, and that any additional measures to protect nuclear facilities should be considered within the framework of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.

"Other delegations expressed the view that the existing international instruments on the subject were partial and ambiguous, and that the Committee on Disarmament was fully competent to consider the matter.

"Some delegations also expressed the view that as a compromise the idea of holding separate negotiations on this question should be reflected in the text of the treaty or in a separate statement.

"II. Present state of negotiations on elaboration of the Treaty prohibiting radiological weapons

"A. Organization of work and procedures

"In pursuance of the Committee's decision on subsidiary bodies, on 18 February 1982 (CD/243), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons was re-established on the basis of its former mandate. The Working Group held 12 meetings between 20 February and 2 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany). Mr. Guennady Efimov of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament served as Secretary of the Working Group.

"At their request, representatives of the following States, non-members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the Working Group during its 1982 session: Austria, Norway.

"In addition to the earlier resolutions the Working Group also took into account resolution 36/97 B of the General Assembly which contained an appeal to complete its negotiations in order to allow a treaty to be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament.

"Following consultations, the Chairman, on 9 March 1982, gave a comprehensive report (CD/RW/WP.25), advancing on a personal basis a certain number of suggestions as to the procedure to adopt, and as to possible compromises for the still unresolved problems.

"At the suggestion of the Chairman, on 15 March 1982 the Working Group agreed, as a procedural hypothesis and without prejudice to later decisions, to conduct separate meetings on the "traditional" \*/ radiological weapons subject matter, on the one hand, and on the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities on the other (CD/WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1).

"In this connection, some reservations were expressed. Some delegations maintained that such a procedural hypothesis should not be interpreted as signifying the commencement of negotiations on the subject of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Some delegations, while prepared to participate in the meetings, expressed doubts as to the competence of the Committee on Disarmament (or competence of the Working Group) to negotiate the question of protecting nuclear facilities from attack. Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter. Some other delegations made clear that the consideration of that question could, in their view, only be of an exploratory nature at this time. Some delegations believed that the two subjects on which negotiations were being conducted in accordance with the proposed procedure should be treated equally on a non-discriminatory basis with a view to incorporating them in the same legal instrument. Other delegations expressly reserved their position with respect to the number and form of the future legal instrument(s) on the subjects under consideration.

"B. 'Traditional' RW subject matter

"The Working Group on Radiological Weapons held three meetings devoted to consideration of the matters related to the "traditional" radiological weapons subject matter. While some new possible compromise formulations were advanced, the negotiations showed that differences still exist regarding, in particular, the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of prohibition, verification and compliance, peaceful uses, relationship of the treaty on radiological weapons with nuclear disarmament, and some aspects of the final clauses. Some delegations reminded the Working Group of their view that some draft articles might have to be revised, in view of their intention to have the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities included as an integral part of the Treaty.

"With regard to the formulation of a definition of radiological weapons and because of the objections by some delegations to the inclusion of an explicit clause excluding nuclear weapons from the treaty, attempts were made to develop a "positive definition" which would not include such a clause. Some specific suggestions were made in this respect (CD/RW/WP.26, 30, 31 and Add.1).

"Although no formulation was found to be entirely acceptable, from either the technical or legal point of view, the Working Group felt that efforts in this direction should be continued. While some delegations expressed their readiness to participate in those efforts, they still believed that the most effective way to define radiological weapons could be through maintaining an exclusion clause. Other delegations continued to believe that this would amount to a legitimization of nuclear weapons. Some delegations maintained their doubts as to the feasibility of including certain radioactive materials in the definition of radiological weapons.

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\*/ The Working Group agreed that for the purposes of this report the term "traditional" should be employed as a convenient reference to the scope of prohibition envisaged in the joint proposal contained in documents CD/31 and CD/32.

"In connection with the scope of prohibition some delegations maintained that the use of the term radiological warfare would depend on the scope of the future treaty. Other delegations felt that the concept of radiological warfare has no place in the framework of such a treaty.

"The view was also expressed that the treaty should not only address the prevention of the emergence of radiological weapons as a specific type of weapon, but also to the prohibition of the use of radiation from the decay of radioactive materials for hostile purposes.

"Some delegations maintained that the future treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons should contain an explicit commitment to urgently pursue negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this connection the text of an article for inclusion in the treaty was proposed by the Group of 21 \*/ (CD/RW/WP.36). Other delegations were of the view that this article was inappropriate for inclusion in a radiological weapons treaty.

"As regards peaceful uses, there was widespread recognition that the treaty should contain an appropriately balanced article which would include a provision relating to the strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of sources of radiation from radioactive decay and a provision stating that nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to international co-operation in this field; the Working Group, however, had not completed its consideration of the precise wording of these provisions.

"On the question of compliance and verification, some delegations were of the view that the procedures provided in the joint USSR/United States proposal correspond to the subject and scope of the treaty on prohibition of radiological weapons and should be fully maintained, including the provision for lodging complaints, in case of an alleged breach of the Treaty, with the United Nations Security Council.

"Some delegations disagreed with these views and held that the procedures for lodging complaints under the Treaty should not refer to the Security Council or other organs of the United Nations, since such procedures were, in any event, available under the United Nations Charter, and that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be the focal point for complaints and verification matters under the treaty. It was suggested that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be provided with broad investigatory powers so as to include, in the view of some delegations, provisions for on-site inspections. Some delegations advocated a two-tiered structure for the verification régime under the treaty, with a Consultative Committee of Experts as a fact-finding and evaluating body, and a General Assembly of States Parties as a political forum for consideration of alleged breaches of the treaty. It was agreed that the issues of compliance and verification under the treaty needed further consideration.

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\*/ Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Some delegations pointed out that the detailed elaboration of the provisions on verification and compliance would require the prior solution of the outstanding issues relating to the scope of prohibition.

With regard to the final clauses, the proposal was made for a more elaborate procedure to act upon proposed amendments (CD/RW/WP.20/Add.9/Rev.1); the general idea of this amendment was supported by some delegations. While some divergencies persisted as to the time intervals between entry into force and holding of a first and subsequent review conferences, the view was expressed that these differences could, perhaps, be overcome.

The view was widely held that the treaty should enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a lower number than 25 hitherto discussed and the number of 15 was advanced in this context, while some delegations reaffirmed their position that the treaty should enter into force upon its ratification by 25 governments, including the nuclear weapon States.

"C. Consideration of the question relating to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities

The Working Group also held three meetings devoted to consideration of some issues of relevance relating to the question of protecting nuclear facilities. During these meetings a number of delegations reiterated their reservation as stated in paragraph 16 above. One delegation did not take part in the meetings.

The discussion on the prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities followed the outline in the working paper CD/RW/WP.33 proposed by the Chairman and centered around the definition of facilities to be protected and the scope of a possible prohibition.

The Working Group heard technical explanations from some delegations as to the destructive effects that could result from attacks on nuclear power reactors exceeding a certain minimum thermal power, reprocessing plants and storage facilities of irradiated material and waste. It was pointed out that attacks on such facilities could possibly result in mass destruction, whereas in the case of certain other facilities, attacks on them would not result in mass destruction because of their low inventory of radioactive material or the lack of such inventory. A certain number of divergencies in relation to these issues appeared.

Some delegations proposed that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be as comprehensive as possible. Since the basic objective was, in their view, to prevent mass destruction, there could be no justification to differentiate between civilian and military facilities. They also believed that mass destruction would result from attacks on either kind of facilities. However, in their view, mass destruction was not the only criterion relevant to this issue. They argued that an important objective of the proposed instrument was to restore confidence among the countries regarding their peaceful nuclear programmes. This confidence had, in their opinion, been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities of a developing country. Therefore, they argued that the scope of the prohibition should include not only the larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities but also the smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter, in their view, would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries. In this connection, a specific proposal on the definition of facilities to be protected was put forward by one delegation (CD/RW/CRP.16).

"Some other delegations felt that it would create serious and possibly insuperable difficulties to grant protection to all nuclear facilities and that in this context it would be appropriate to introduce a threshold of minimum inventory of radioactivity (and of a minimum thermal power in the case of nuclear reactors) so as to eliminate from the protection facilities which, in case of attack, would not cause mass destruction. In this regard, it was particularly emphasized by these delegations that a prohibition of attacks on facilities, which would not result in any radiological damage, would provide a disincentive to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to the benefit of mankind. Some delegations held that the inclusion of military installations would entail very complex problems. A working paper on definition and scope of prohibition was put before the Working Group by one delegation (CD/RW/WP.34).

Some delegations noted however that this very working paper stated that "there may be good arguments that all facilities of the kind mentioned above should be protected by a radiological weapons convention be they civilian, military or dual purpose". A partial ban could, in their view, legitimize attacks on certain nuclear facilities resulting in mass destruction and thus contravene the main objective of the prohibition and increase the difficulties of compliance and verification. They also pointed out that the promotion of nuclear energy, at least in the developing countries was not being impeded by public opinion in these countries but by the restrictive policies of certain industrialized countries.

"On the other hand, it was pointed out that such a comprehensive ban could not be reasonably expected to be successfully negotiated or, alternatively, to receive the necessary number of ratifications to make it a viable and effective instrument of international law, and thus to remove the danger of mass destruction. The delegation, whose Working Paper had been quoted in the preceding paragraph, drew attention to the fact that the Paper in this context also contained the following statement: "The political difficulties of protecting military facilities in an international instrument are obvious, and such facilities therefore seem to have to be excluded from a convention".

"It was, however, stated by some delegations that such political difficulties as may be involved were not sufficient reason for a partial prohibition. In their view such an approach would leave open the possibility of legitimizing mass destruction in the conduct of warfare.

"Some other delegations believed many of the arguments advanced above were inaccurate and further had little to do with the issues at hand.

"The divergencies could not be settled in the course of the three meetings of the Working Group. Some delegations felt that the topic needed further clarification and discussion. They also felt that a detailed discussion on the remaining issues of the Chairman's provisional checklist (CD/RW/WP.33) would also require a solution of these basic differences of view on definition of facilities and scope of prohibition.

ANNEX I

LIST

of Documents, Working Papers and Conference Room Papers

I. Documents and Working Papers

1. CD/31 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
2. CD/32 United States of America: Agreed joint United States-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
3. CD/40 Hungary: Working paper on the draft preamble part of the Treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
4. CD/42 German Democratic Republic: Working paper on draft paragraph XI, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
5. CD/104  
(also as CD/RW/WP.1) Secretariat: Compilation of relevant documents on radiological weapons covering the period 1979-1980.
6. CD/133 Report to the Committee on Disarmament: Ad Hoc Working Group established with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. (1 August 1980)
7. CD/218 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons (14 August 1981)
8. CD/RW/WP.2/Rev.1 Chairman: Main elements in the negotiations of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.
9. CD/RW/WP.3 Canada: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
10. CD/RW/WP.4 Federal Republic of Germany: Proposed new Article V.

11. CD/RW/WP.5 Federal Republic of Germany: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
12. CD/RW/WP.6 Sweden: Proposals for Articles I, II, and III of a treaty prohibiting radiological warfare including the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
13. CD/RW/WP.7 Italy: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons (Document CD/31 and CD/32).
14. CD/RW/WP.8 France: Proposed amendments to the agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a Treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
15. CD/RW/WP.9 Pakistan: Revised Article V; new article after Article V.
16. CD/RW/WP.10 Yugoslavia: Proposal for an article of the treaty related to the definition of radiological weapons.
17. CD/RW/WP.11 Argentina: Observations of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.
18. CD/RW/WP.12 Venezuela: Proposals for amendments to the "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapon."
19. CD/RW/WP.14 Sweden: Proposal for a study on IAEA safeguards.
20. CD/RW/WP.15 Tabulation of proposals submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons (prepared by the Secretariat).
21. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.1/Rev.1 India: Proposals for amendments of Article I, II, III, V and VII of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons.
22. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.2 Indonesia: Statement delivered by the delegation of Indonesia at the fourth meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 13 March 1981.

23. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.2/Supp.1 Indonesia: Comment on the agreed joint USSR-United States CD/31-CD/32 especially paragraph 3, Article VIII concerning compliance and verification and on the French proposal contained in CD/RW/WP.8.
24. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.3 Yugoslavia: Proposal for amendments to Article II of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons.
25. CD/RW/WP.16/Rev.1 Report to the Committee on Disarmament.
26. CD/RW/WP.17 The Chairman's brief delivered at the First meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 20 February 1981.
27. CD/RW/WP.18 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on definition and scope of prohibition of a future treaty.
28. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.1 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on activities and obligations and peaceful uses.
29. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.2 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on relationship with other Disarmament measures and agreements and compliance and verification.
30. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.2/Supp.1 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative text for Annex.
31. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.3 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on Amendments, Duration and Withdrawal Review Conferences, Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary.
32. CD/RW/WP.19 Sweden: Memorandum on certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare.
33. CD/RW/WP.20 The Chairman's Working Paper containing consolidated text based on proposals submitted by the Chairman.
34. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.1 Sweden: Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
35. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.1/Supp.1 Morocco: Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
36. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.2 Japan: Proposed amendment to Article V of CD/RW/WP.20.
37. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.3 Federal Republic of Germany: Proposal for Article VII and Annex of the consolidated text by the Chairman.



38. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.4 Sweden: Proposal for Article VIII of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
39. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.5 Venezuela: Proposed amendment to Article IX of document CD/RW/WP.20.
40. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.6 Morocco: Proposed amendment to Article VII of document CD/RW/WP.20.
41. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.7 The Chairman's Working Paper on definition and scope of prohibition.
42. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.8 The Chairman's Working Paper on peaceful uses.
43. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.9/Rev.1 The Netherlands: Proposed Amendments to Articles VIII and X.
44. CD/RW/WP.21 The Chairman's Working Paper containing time-table for the work of the Working Group during the Second part of the CD 1981 session.
45. CD/RW/WP.22 Australia: Working Paper on scope and definition of the future Treaty on Radiological Weapons.
46. CD/RW/WP.23 Group of 21: Working Paper on certain elements of the Convention on the Prohibition.
47. CD/RW/WP.24 Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.
48. CD/RW/WP.24/Rev.1 Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.
49. CD/RW/WP.25 Chairman's Statement (9 March 1982).
50. CD/RW/WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1 Chairman's Amended Proposal for the organization of work during the opening session (adopted by the Working Group on 15 March 1982).
51. CD/RW/WP.26 Chairman's Working Paper: Positive formulations of an RW Definition (Synopsis).
52. CD/RW/WP.27\* Tentative Programme of Work (Submitted by the Chairman).
53. CD/RW/WP.28 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulation of the provision on scope of the Radiological Weapons Treaty.
54. CD/RW/WP.29 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulations of the provisions on peaceful uses.
55. CD/RW/WP.30 Yugoslavia: Definition of Radiological Weapons - Article II.

56. CD/RW/WP.31 Australia: Proposal on Definition and Scope of Prohibition (giving two alternative texts).
57. CD/RW/WP.32 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested mechanism of compliance and verification (following on Document CD/RW/WP.20).
58. CD/RW/WP.33 Chairman's Summary of suggested issues of initial relevance relating to protection of nuclear facilities for discussion during Working Group meetings on 26 March and 2 April 1982.
59. CD/RW/WP.34 Sweden: Memorandum of certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare (5 April 1982).
60. CD/RW/WP.35 Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament: submitted by the Chairman (Introduction) (Parts A and C).
61. CD/RW/WP.35/Add.1 Discussions on the provisions of the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons ("traditional" RW subject matter): submitted by the Chairman (Part B).
62. CD/RW/WP.36 Group of 21: Text proposed for an Article in the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons (14 April 1982).

" II. Conference Room Papers

1. CD/RW/CRP.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Netherlands, France, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, Canada and Italy.
2. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by Egypt, Pakistan, Italy and Australia.
3. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.2 Definition: Proposals by India.
4. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.3 Definition: Proposal by Yugoslavia.
5. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.4 Definition: Proposals by Venezuela and Argentina.
6. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.5 Definition: Proposal by Morocco.
7. CD/RW/CRP.2 Scope of Prohibition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands and Australia.
8. CD/RW/CRP.2/Add.1 Scope of Prohibition: Proposal by France.
9. CD/RW/CRP.3 Activities and Obligations: Proposals by USSR-United States, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Pakistan and India.

10. CD/RW/CRP.3/Add.1                    Activities and Obligations: Proposals by Australia and France.
11. CD/RW/CRP.4                        Peaceful Uses: Proposals by USSR-United States, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Pakistan.
12. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.1                Peaceful Uses: Proposal by France.
13. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.2                Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Pakistan.
14. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.3                Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Romania.
15. CD/RW/CRP.5                        Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposals by USSR-United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Canada and France.
16. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.1                Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Australia and France.
17. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.2                Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Pakistan.
18. CD/RW/CRP.6                        Compliance and Verification: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, France and Sweden.
19. CD/RW/CRP.6/Add.1                Compliance and Verification: Proposal by Pakistan.
20. CD/RW/CRP.7                        Annex: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
21. CD/RW/CRP.8                        Amendments: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
22. CD/RW/CRP.9                        Duration and Withdrawal: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
23. CD/RW/CRP.10                      Review Conferences: Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia and France.
24. CD/RW/CRP.10/Add.1               Review Conferences: Proposal by Morocco.
25. CD/RW/CRP.11                      Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary: Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia, France and Pakistan.
26. CD/RW/CRP.12                      Preamble: Proposals by Hungary, Sweden, Egypt and Belgium.
27. CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.1               Preamble: Proposal by Bulgaria.

28. CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.2 Preamble: Proposals by Sweden and Federal Republic of Germany.
29. CD/RW/CRP.13 Invitation to the International Atomic Energy Agency: Proposal by The Netherlands.
30. CD/RW/CRP.14 Scope on Prohibition: Proposal by The Netherlands.
31. CD/RW/CRP.15 Amendments to text of Draft Report.
32. CD/RW/CRP.16 Definition of facilities to be protected: Proposal by Pakistan.
33. CD/RW/CRP.17 Draft Consolidated Radiological Weapons Treaty" Provisions: Submitted by the Chairman.

70. Since 1979 several proposals have been made in connection with the general question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, in statements at plenary meetings and in official documents of the Committee. <sup>8/</sup>

71. During informal meetings held with the participation of qualified governmental experts from some Member States, many delegations underlined the importance of urgent action to prevent the appearance of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Statements were made concerning possible areas for the development of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. It was generally perceived as a real danger if the latest achievements of science would be used for the creation of such weapons. In this regard the following examples for possible areas for the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction were quoted: radiological means acting with the aid of radioactive materials; technical means of inflicting radiation injury based on the use of charged or neutral particles to affect biological targets; infrasonic means using acoustic radiation to affect biological targets; means using electromagnetic radiation to affect biological targets. The nuclear neutron weapon was also mentioned. Other delegations, however, pointed out that the areas mentioned did not concern weapons of mass destruction and that the nuclear neutron weapon could not be considered as being based on new scientific principles. It was pointed out that no new weapons had made their appearance so far.

72. The view was expressed that the rapid advance in weapons technology necessitated an urgent agreement or agreements on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Some delegations stressed the urgency of negotiating a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well as separate agreements prohibiting the emergence of specific new weapons of mass destruction, and drew attention to the draft international agreement submitted by the USSR in 1977 (CCD/511/Rev.1). It was also suggested that an ad hoc group of experts should be established to prepare a draft comprehensive agreement and to consider the question of concluding special agreements on individual types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Other delegations were of a different opinion. They stated that it was not appropriate to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on unidentified weapons systems, but that agreements should be negotiated on a case by case basis as necessary. They also considered that the Committee on Disarmament should give periodic attention to this question. In that connection, it was proposed that annual informal meetings with experts should be held to keep the matter under review.

73. Other proposals were made in 1980 and 1981 for the consideration of the question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It was suggested that a working group of the Committee might examine it more thoroughly and elaborate a definition of such weapons. Another alternative put forward was for the establishment by the General Assembly of the United Nations of a group of experts to review recent trends in scientific developments and recommend the most appropriate means to prevent the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction. The Committee felt that this question should be kept under continuing review.

74. During the first part of the 1982 session several delegations drew attention to resolution 36/89 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. It was pointed out by those delegations that the General Assembly called upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States to make declarations, identical in their substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such

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<sup>8/</sup> Documents CD/35, CD/118, CD/174 and CD/261.

weapons, as a first step towards concluding a comprehensive agreement on this subject. In the view of these delegations, the flexible approach adopted in the resolution offered new opportunities for progress in this field. Other delegations expressed reservations to this approach.

75. During the first part of the 1982 session, the Committee decided to continue to hold informal meetings, at which the participation of experts would be welcome, with a view to examining proposals and suggestions pertaining to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The informal meetings will be open to non-members and to their respective experts.

#### F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

76. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this item since February 1980, mainly in an ad hoc working group established subsequently to initiate negotiations on the subject.

77. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concluded its work at the end of the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee and submitted a report (CD/283) containing in an annex the Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is attached to this special report as Appendix I.

78. During the 1980 session, Ambassador O. Adeniji (Nigeria) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador A. García Robles (Mexico) was the Chairman during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. In the course of its 1980/1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 59 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

79. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

#### "I. INTRODUCTION

"At its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, the Committee decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the 1981 session. In its report on that session, the Working Group, bearing in mind that considerable work remained to be done in resolving several important and complex issues and that the Committee on Disarmament had been called upon to conclude negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, agreed to recommend to the Committee that the Working Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. The Committee on Disarmament adopted that recommendation at its 148th plenary meeting on 20 August 1981. In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 11 January 1982. At its 150th plenary meeting on 2 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament confirmed that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the first part of the 1982 session.

## "II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

"During the 1980 session, Ambassador Olu Adeniji (Nigeria) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico) was the Chairman during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. Mr. Guennady Efimov, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Working Group in 1980 and Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, did so in 1981 and 1982.

"In the course of its 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 59 meetings, 10 in 1980, 24 in 1981 and 25 in 1982.

"At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

"In addition to the official documents of the Committee on Disarmament circulated under the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", the following working papers were submitted by Member States in the course of the three sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Group:

- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CPD/WP.3 and Rev.1)
- Working paper on the outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Pakistan. (CD/CPD/WP.4)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.5)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles and guidelines", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CPD/WP.6)
- Working paper on the main principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.8)
- Working paper entitled "Draft section of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning the general guidelines for efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.9)
- Working paper on the principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Venezuela. (CD/CPD/WP.10).
- Working paper entitled "Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament and the concept of education for peace", submitted by Poland. (CD/CPC/WP.12)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.13 and Add.1)
- Working paper on forms and machinery, submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.15)
- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.17)
- Working paper on the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.18).

- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.19)
- Statement by the representative of the USSR on 3 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", submitted to the EMDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.20)
- Statement by the representative of the United States of America on 5 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted to the EMDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.21)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Objectives", submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.22)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing supplementary proposals on the measures, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.24)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing further proposals on the measures, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.25)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Pakistan. (CD/CPD/WP.26)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Measures", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.28)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.30)
- Working paper on the objectives of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.31)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CPD/WP.33)
- Working paper containing a text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CPD/WP.35)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CPD/WP.36 and Corr.1 and Adds. 1-5)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to nuclear weapons, submitted by Australia. (CD/CPD/WP.37)



- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to zones of peace, submitted by Australia. (CD/CPD/WP.38)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by France. (CD/CPD/WP.39)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.40)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Poland. (CD/CPD/WP.42)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Machinery and Procedure", submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Venezuela. (CD/CPD/WP.43)
- Working paper on the first stage of nuclear disarmament measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.44)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.45)
- Working paper containing amendments to the sections "Conventional weapons and armed forces" and "Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CPD/WP.46)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.47)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Poland. (CD/CPD/WP.48)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CPD/WP.49)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Mongolia. (CD/CPD/WP.50)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.51)
- Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CPD/WP.52)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CFD/WP.27, submitted by Nigeria, Poland and Venezuela. (CD/CFD/WP.55)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CFD/WP.55)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CFD/WP.56)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CFD/WP.57)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.58)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.59)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.60)
- Working paper containing an addition to the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CFD/WP.61)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and Procedures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CFD/WP.65)
- Draft text for the section on "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Yugoslavia. (CD/CFD/WP.64)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Measures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CFD/WP.67)
- Working paper on Verification, submitted by the United States of America. (CD/CFD/WP.69)
- Working paper on Verification, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CFD/WP.70)

In addition, the secretariat prepared the following documents:

- List of documents. (CD/CPD/WP.1)
- Compilation of documents submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in 1962 (EMDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1, EMDC/5, EMDC/13, EMDC/50 and Corr.1). (CD/CPD/WP.7 and Add.1)
- List of specific measures contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session and the 1979 and 1980 reports of the Disarmament Commission. (CD/CPD/WP.11)
- List of specific measures envisaged in the Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1962 (EMDC/2/Rev.1), and the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, submitted by the United States of America in 1962 (EMDC/50). (CD/CPD/WP.14)
- Tabulation of measures that are not explicitly included in the tabulations contained in documents CD/CPD/WP.11 and 14. (CD/CPD/WP.23)
- Results of the preliminary examination of chapters V ("Measures") and VI ("Stages of implementation") of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.27)
- Tabulation of the Principles contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.29)
- Tabulation of the Objectives contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.32)
- Tabulation of the provisions concerning Machinery and Procedure contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.34)
- Compilation of certain proposals concerning Machinery and Procedure listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. (CD/CPD/WP.41)
- Results of the examination of Stage-I measures contained in document CD/CPD/WP.27 and of written and oral proposals made in connection therewith. (CD/CPD/WP.54)

### " III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK

" In 1980, the Ad Hoc Working Group adopted an outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CD/CPD/WP.2/Rev.1) consisting of the following chapters: Introduction or Preamble; Objectives; Principles; Priorities; Measures; Stages of Implementation; and Machinery and Procedures. \*/ That outline constituted the basis for the consideration of the Programme in 1981 and 1982.

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\*/ A full account of the work carried out in 1980 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1980 report (CD/159, paragraph 60).

"In 1981, the Ad Hoc Working Group completed a preliminary examination of the substantive chapters of the Programme. It decided to defer the consideration of the Introduction or Preamble pending the elaboration of those chapters in view of the fact that the form and substance of the latter would determine its character and content. In the case of the chapters concerning measures and stages of implementation, which were considered in conjunction with each other, the Working Group was also able to have a second round of more detailed discussions on measures for a first stage. \*/

"In 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused on the task of elaborating the texts of the various substantive chapters of the Programme.

"With respect to the objectives of the Programme, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 8 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate the relevant chapter and designated Ambassador François de la Corce (France) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted to the Working Group a text that reflected different views on some points. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted that text (CD/CED/AF.66).

"At its 50th meeting on 11 February 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group established a contact group to elaborate the principles of the Programme and, at its 51st meeting on 15 February 1982, it designated Ambassador Gerhard Herder (German Democratic Republic) as its co-ordinator. As in the case of objectives, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on all questions of substance. In addition, differing views were held regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs in the chapter on principles. The contact group agreed that questions concerning the placement of those paragraphs should be decided at a later stage in the context of the whole Programme, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group (CD/CED/AF.65).

"With respect to priorities, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 8 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate that chapter of the Programme and designated Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted an agreed text which was adopted by the Working Group at its 55th meeting on 1 March 1982 (CD/CED/AF.62).

"With respect to measures and stages of implementation which, as previously, were considered in conjunction with each other, at its 54th meeting on 25 February 1982, the Working Group established a contact group to elaborate that part of the Programme and requested the Chairman to act as co-ordinator of the contact group. The contact group prepared a text that grouped measures in a first, an intermediate and a last stage, it being understood that this was without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. An informal drafting group was convened, with Mr. Tariq Altaf (Pakistan) as co-ordinator, with a view to reconciling the alternative formulations contained in

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\*/ A full account of the work carried out in 1981 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1981 report (CD/228, paragraph 127).

that text. The drafting group narrowed the areas of disagreement and, to the extent possible, unified and streamlined some of the alternative texts that were under discussion in the contact group. The text it elaborated was adopted by the contact group on 14 April 1982 with some changes. At its 53th meeting on 15 April 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group as orally amended at that meeting (CD/CPD/WP.71).

"The same contact group was also charged with the task of elaborating the chapter on machinery and procedures. It submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group a text reflecting differences of view on some points. At its 57th meeting on 8 April 1982, the Working Group adopted that text with some additions and amendments (CD/CPD/WP.68).

"At various stages of its consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused attention on the question of time frames and nature of the Programme. Divergent views were advanced since the initial stage as indicated in the Working Group's report covering its 1980 session (CD/139, paragraph 58 (13) and (15)). In 1982, these two matters were examined at meetings of the Working Group and of the contact group referred to in paragraphs 12 and 15 above. Concerning the question of time frames, it was generally agreed that the Programme should be implemented in the shortest possible time. Beyond that, different views continued to be maintained. On the one hand, it was again stressed that there should be a time frame for the implementation of each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole. It was felt that, otherwise, there would be no standard by which to judge whether progress was being made towards the full realization of the Programme. It was also argued that the acceptance of time frames would be a manifestation of political will to implement the measures contained in the Programme. It was further argued that the implementation of the Programme in an agreed time frame would generate the requisite confidence of the international community and have a positive influence on the climate of international relations by introducing an element of predictability in the process of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, it was recognized that only an indicative time frame should be set since in the course of the implementation of the Programme changing circumstances might call for readjustments. On the other hand, it continued to be argued that it would be inappropriate to set a time frame, whether indicative or not, for the implementation of the stages included in the Programme, because the setting of such time frames was not compatible with the conditions of a negotiation, a fortiori with the requirements of a series of interdependent negotiations. In this view, periodic reviews, envisaged as part of the machinery and procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, would give impetus for continued progress in the implementation of the Programme, provide a standard by which to assess such progress, permit its evaluation and the readjustment of the Programme, if necessary. Regarding the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, various views were advanced. One view was that the Programme should be embodied in a legally binding instrument. It was proposed that a solemn Declaration should accompany the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. A concrete proposal was made that the Declaration and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should then be signed by Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations, and finally noted by the Security Council in a resolution adopted under those provisions of the Charter that are designed to create obligations for States. Another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should not be embodied in a legally binding agreement since States cannot be bound to the success

of negotiations before such negotiations have begun. But it was considered that a strong political undertaking by States to implement the Programme, for example, in the form of a resolution adopted by consensus at the special session of the General Assembly, would create the necessary impetus for the completion of the implementation of the Programme at the earliest possible time. Still another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should represent an agreed set of measures aimed at halting the arms race and at disarmament and should serve as an incentive for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in the disarmament field. It was noted that under the United Nations Charter the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and that the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament may serve as a precedent for the adoption of the Programme. While no conclusions were reached on these two matters, it was recognized that the discussions had served to clarify the questions at issue and would thus facilitate the search for generally acceptable solutions.

"The view was generally held that the deliberations at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will contribute to the harmonization of the divergent positions reflected in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Some delegations also felt that their final position with regard to the formulations contained in the draft Programme could only be determined in the light of the content of the Programme as a whole. Other delegations felt that the progress made in the Working Group should have a bearing on the future work, and that their final position on the entire Programme would be determined in the light of the agreement reached on the specific provisions of the Programme, the time frames and a binding commitment to the implementation of the Programme.

#### "IV. CONCLUSION

"The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that is annexed to this report, <sup>9/</sup> with the recommendation that it be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session devoted to disarmament."

#### G. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

80. In March 1979, a proposal was made in the Committee on Disarmament concerning an additional protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies" (CD/9). Later in December 1981, the thirty-sixth regular session of the General Assembly adopted two resolutions requesting the Committee on Disarmament to consider certain aspects concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space (resolutions 36/97C and 36/99).

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<sup>9/</sup> See Appendix I of this special report.

81. During the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament, an appropriate item was inscribed on its agenda (item 7) and the Committee considered it both at plenary and informal meetings. There was widespread recognition of the need to ensure that any activity in outer space should be for peaceful purposes.

82. A proposal was made for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (CD/274), as the best means of solving the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. Another proposal was that the Committee should negotiate effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and that, in that context, it should consider as a matter of priority the question of prohibiting anti-satellite systems.

83. Several members suggested that an ad hoc working group be established by the Committee to start negotiations under this item. In that connection, a proposal was formally made concerning the terms of reference of a working group (CD/272). It was stated that a decision to set up an ad hoc working group on this question should be made in the light of the existing priorities before the Committee. The Committee intends to continue consideration of the proposals made during the second part of its 1982 session, as well as of any other suggestions on the further handling of this item.

H. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

84. During its 1979 session, the Committee had before it a working paper on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor which, although not considered under the items of the annual agenda, dealt with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in other areas (CD/13).

I. Consideration and Adoption of the Special Report of the Committee to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament

85. This special report is transmitted by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Yoshio Okawa

Japan

Chairman of the Committee





## DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

### I. Introduction or Preamble

(To be elaborated subsequently)

### II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to [prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war] [eliminate the danger of [war, in particular] nuclear war], to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:
  - to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
  - [- to consolidate and develop the positive results achieved so far, in particular in the sphere of the curbing of the arms race and of confidence-building measures and of détente;]
  - [ to [initiate [,] [or] resume] [provide for the initiation of] and [to] expedite] [at the initiation and expediting of] urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;
  - to open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.
2. [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the New International Economic Order is fully realized] [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme should be to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to avert the danger of war and to create conditions for a just and stable international peace and security and the full realization of the new international economic order]
3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:
  - to strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [ , bearing in mind that genuine security can be guaranteed only by the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons through disarmament] [ , bearing in mind that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control (paragraph 13 of the Final Document)];
  - to contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;

- [- to make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;]
- to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;
- [to [consolidate the foundations of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and] strengthen the development of co-operation between all States with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme] [to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme (based on paragraph 12 of the Final Document)];
- [to stimulate in all countries the contribution that public opinion could make to the cause of disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament].

### III. Principles

1. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]
2. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.
3. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.
4. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.
5. [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the

political will to reach agreements.] [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament.]

6. [It must be recognized that the political will of States is a decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament. States should therefore display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.]

7. [The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.]

8. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

9. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

10. [Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.]

11. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

12. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

13. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

14. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States [; in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals,] have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation. [All States are obliged to promote efforts in the sphere of disarmament. This applies first and foremost to the States possessing nuclear weapons and to other militarily significant States. The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced.]

15. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. [It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.]

16. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

17. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples [, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.].

18. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

19. The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be carried out without interruptions and proceed at a rapid pace, so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of weapons which are the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.

20. [The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the [fundamental principles enshrined in] [relevant provisions of]

the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

21. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage [, taking into account the existing situation regarding armaments of different kinds, and in particular the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.]. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. [In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

22. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

23. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

24. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

25. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

26. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. [The negotiations on the [balanced] reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.]

27. [States with the largest military arsenals have the primary responsibility for disarmament. They should immediately halt their arms race and take the lead in reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments. After they have substantially reduced their armaments, the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing armaments.]
28. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.
29. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. [All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective international verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]
30. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control [, proceeding from the fact that there is no type of weapon that could not be eliminated on a mutually agreed basis.].
31. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.
32. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal.
33. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

34. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.
35. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. [It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.]
36. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.
37. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.
38. [Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.]
39. [As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situation, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.]
40. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.
41. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

42. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

43. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

44. [Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.]

45. [In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

46. [Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.]

47. [In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

48. [Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, States hereby declare that they will respect the principles stated above [and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme in strict adherence to them] [in full implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament].]

#### IV. Priorities

1. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- nuclear weapons;
- other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and
- reduction of armed forces.

2. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.

3. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.



V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear Weapons \*/

(1. Nuclear test ban

[The conclusion of an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty on a nuclear test ban would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- (i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake [without further delay] multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear [weapons] tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system satisfactory to all parties concerned and provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.
- (ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should [immediately resume and intensify their negotiations [and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to] contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty].) \*\*/

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

[Substantial progress towards] the cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and [substantial progress towards] the achievement of nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the implementation of the Programme would constitute a major contribution to the rapid achievement of general and complete disarmament. [In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.]

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\*/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the division of the chapter "Nuclear weapons" into separate sub-sections.

\*\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

[Measures designed to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war should continue to be considered as a matter of urgent priority in the first stage.]

[Integrated] measures for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should include:

- (i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems:

Negotiations, during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to achieve an agreement or agreements, to bring about a halt to [qualitative improvement,] [research, development, production and testing] [research, development, testing and qualitative improvement] of nuclear weapons systems [and of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons], [in parallel with the measures to reduce nuclear weapons and as appropriate integrated with such measures].

These negotiations should [address] [achieve an agreement or agreements for the prohibition of]:

- (a) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles and on the complete destruction of their stockpiles,]
  - (b) [research,] development, [testing] and deployment[, including for replacement purposes] of all new types and new systems of nuclear weapons;
  - (c) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons systems];
  - (d) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems];
  - (e) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of intermediate and medium range missiles as well as tactical nuclear weapons];
  - (f) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-submarine warfare capabilities that could endanger the central strategic stability;]
  - (g) [conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.]
- (ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes:

Commencement of negotiations [with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States] [on an agreement,] [to halt the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with a cessation of production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes].

[Such an agreement could be negotiated in the following step by step manner:] [Such negotiations could address:]

- [(a) [Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, at a mutually agreed date, of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of their existing and proposed facilities for the production of [all] nuclear weapons, delivery systems of such weapons and for fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes to be submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.]
  - (b) Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspections, as part of [the agreement] [or agreements] to be negotiated, to establish the base on which [the agreement] [or agreements] prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.
  - (c) [Measures aimed at [eventually] bringing about the general and complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes along with [the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons] [measures to reduce nuclear weapons, and as appropriate integrated with such measures] involving the application of [international] [full fuel cycle] safeguards [under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency] to [all] nuclear facilities in all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes. Such international safeguards would be applied [as a first step to the civil nuclear programmes of all States] [to all States on a universal and non-discriminatory basis].]]
- [(a) The cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons which should cover the cessation of manufacture of means of delivery and fissionable materials for the purposes of weapons development;
  - (b) The gradual reduction of stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons;
  - (c) The complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

Parallel with the above, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.]

- [(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time:

Such measures would include at the appropriate time and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned the progressive and balanced reduction of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

- (a) as a starting point, the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of negotiations [already begun] [between the two States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals] on intermediate range nuclear forces and also on the process of strategic arms reduction:
- a continuation of the process aimed at agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic nuclear arms [belonging to these two States];
  - pursuit of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of [their] intermediate range nuclear forces based on the principle of equality within the framework of strategic arms control efforts;
- (b) (once [these reductions have reached an agreed stage] [the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties concerned have reached a dimension such as to justify the acceptance by the other nuclear-weapon States of the principle of a limitation or reduction of their own nuclear forces], initiation of further negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.) \*/

### 3. Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

Continuation of [negotiations on] [the process of] further limitation and reduction of strategic arms [between the USSR and the United States]:

[(a) Immediate ratification by the USSR and the United States of the SALT-II Agreement.]

(b) [The initiation, without delay, of further negotiations [on] [aimed at]] [measures for further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms] [the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments between the USSR and the United States leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitation on, strategic arms. [These negotiations should culminate, as soon as possible, in the first stage, in a treaty which should achieve:

- a reduction of at least 20 per cent in the numbers of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles in the arsenals of the USSR and the United States.
- comprehensive limitations on the qualitative improvement of strategic armaments, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic armaments.]]

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

4. [Intermediate range nuclear forces]

[The early conclusion of an agreement negotiated between the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to achieve on the basis of the principle of undiminished security, [inter alia,] a substantial reduction of [intermediate and] medium range and other nuclear weapon delivery systems and warheads deployed with respect to the European theatre.]

[As a starting point, the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations already begun on intermediate range nuclear forces and on strategic arms reduction:

Pursuit of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of their intermediate range nuclear forces based on the principle of equality within the framework of strategic arms control efforts.]

[The early conclusion of an agreement to limit and reduce medium range nuclear weapons in the region of Europe based on the principle of equality and equal security. The first step in this direction could be the agreed freeze on such weapons in Europe.]

5. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued and bearing in mind the devastating results which a nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, urgent measures should be negotiated to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, in the first stage [negotiations should address] [the following measures should be undertaken without delay]:

(a) [A binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, [that are committed to a non-nuclear status,] without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear weapon States, and, as a first step, the issuance by nuclear-weapon Powers of declarations of similar contents undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territories, with approval of such declarations by the Security Council.]

(b) [An undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.]

(c) [An international agreement prohibiting the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Measures to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, bearing in mind various proposals designed to secure these objectives and in accordance with paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Final Document, and thereby to ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered.]

(d) Measures to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas and periods of tension, by the establishment of hot lines and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict, especially a nuclear conflict including through [unauthorized] or accidental use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the respective

roles of nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified. [Measures should also be undertaken for the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack.]

6. [Nuclear non-proliferation] Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document

The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States [---(horizontal proliferation)---] and on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether [---(vertical proliferation)]. The international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation should include effective measures at the national level and through international agreements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures should include: [(a) measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mentioned above;] (b) [the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs] [universal adherence to and full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] [adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy]; (c) [unhindered access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries] [the full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis]; (d) [respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy]; (e) [agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis].

7. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPANAL and other relevant fora, and including ratification of Additional Protocol I by all States concerned.

(b) In Africa the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective. [The threat to nuclear non-proliferation in Africa and to the peace and security of the continent arises from the nuclear capability of South Africa. To assist the implementation of the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, therefore, all States should:

- (i) keep a constant watch on South Africa's nuclear capability;
- (ii) refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field which would assist the apartheid regime in manufacturing nuclear weapons.]

(c) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(d) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

(e) [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the European continent [at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone].]

(f) Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world should be promoted [at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone].

(g) Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

8. Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present

Conclusion of a treaty on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present; the renunciation by nuclear weapon States of further actions related to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States.]

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. [Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva on 17 June 1925.
2. [Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.
3. (a) [Renunciation of the manufacture and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons and also of the stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are none at present.]  
(b) Conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling [and use] of all chemical weapons and their destruction.
4. Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes].
5. Commencement of negotiations [, when appropriate,] with a view to an early conclusion of a [comprehensive] agreement or specific agreements on [the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of] such weapons [of mass destruction which may be identified], taking into account recent developments in science and technology. [As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.]

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

Agreements and other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis relating to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be achieved throughout the Programme, taking into account the right of all States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

[1. Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements of increasing their armed forces and conventional weapons as a first step towards the eventual limitation of armed forces and conventional weapons.]

1. The States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and accordingly by the end of the first stage [the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] [the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements] should negotiate to [significantly] reduce their conventional armaments and armed forces [by at least 25 per cent].



2. Other militarily significant States shall [negotiate to] undertake an agreed [smaller proportion of] reduction in the levels of their conventional weapons and armed forces.

[2. (a) In the course of the process of conventional disarmament emphasis should be placed on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments which are predominantly for offensive purposes, primarily tanks, airplanes, as well as airborne assault forces, amphibious forces and rapid deployment forces.]

3. A more stable and secure situation in Europe at a lower level of armed forces and armaments on the basis of approximate equality and parity should be achieved through negotiations by the end of the first stage. This will involve [besides the above-mentioned reductions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] mutual reductions in the armed forces and [conventional] armaments of [other] members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization leading to agreed lower levels of armed forces and armaments. This would be achieved through the on-going negotiations in Vienna [and/[or]] at a broader [European Conference on Security, Disarmament and Confidence Building Measures] [Conference on Military Détente and Disarmament] [Conference on Disarmament in Europe]. \*/ [Negotiations as appropriate on the development of effective security and confidence building measures and disarmament measures on the basis of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, taking into account all other aspects of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. To those ends, the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe should be decided in a concluding document of a CSCE follow-up meeting.]

[The above-mentioned measures of conventional weapons disarmament will involve:

(a) The demobilization of personnel and withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases;

(b) the destruction of agreed categories of conventional armaments and other military equipment especially weapons of great destructive capacity;

(c) measures for confidence building and security including restrictions on mobility of forces.]

4. [The above-mentioned measures should also include agreements for a reduction in the production of conventional weapons proportionate to the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons agreed upon.] [The above-mentioned agreements should include as appropriate measures for a gradual reduction of the production of conventional weapons.] [Reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces of States would facilitate an agreed reduction in the production of conventional weapons.]

5. During the first stage, consultations and conferences should also be held at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, among States for the consideration of various initiatives and proposals for confidence building and for the control, restraint or reduction of conventional armaments, particularly in regions of arms concentration, areas of tension, etc.

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\*/ The mentioning of the Vienna talks and the European Conference under the heading "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" is without prejudice to the content of the negotiations in those forums.

[In this context,] consultations should also be held among [major] arms suppliers and recipient countries with a view to the conclusion of agreements on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons on the basis in particular of the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

6. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects:

- (i) Signature and ratification by all States of the agreement adopted by the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
- (ii) Broadening of the prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
- (iii) [The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.]

7. [An agreement for the cessation of the development, production and deployment of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons.] [Agreements for the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments and the development of new means of warfare, in particular highly destructive conventional weapons.]

#### D. Military Expenditures

##### Reduction of military expenditures

1. [Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means for its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.]

2. [Upon the commencement of this Programme, [the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] [the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States] should agree to an immediate freeze in the current levels of their military budgets. [All other nuclear-weapon States are invited to follow this example.] [During the first stage, these States should reduce their military budgets in both absolute and percentage terms.]]

- [ - Achievement of greater transparency of military postures, i.e. the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures enabling their comparison as a step to their balanced reduction on a multilateral level;
- Establishment of registers within the framework of the United Nations for the recording of data necessary for transparency and comparability of military postures.]

3. [The nuclear-weapon States [,] [and] other militarily significant States [and other States] will make reductions during the first stage in their military expenditures [in proportion to] [taking into account] their reductions of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, reductions in the production of such weapons, reductions in their armed forces and dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc.] [Multilateral gradual and balanced reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, ensuring transparency and comparability of military postures through the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures.]

4. [Other States] [States] [may] [shall] also make reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements; [or] [and] reach agreement to freeze the levels of their military spending at certain levels.

[5. The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.

6. Agreements on reduction of military expenditures should be elaborated on the basis of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries and include, as an integral part, provisions for verification, satisfactory to all parties. All member States, particularly the most heavily armed States, should endeavour [, whenever feasible,] to make use of the reporting instrument, contained in document A/35/479, in reporting their military expenditures as a means to increase confidence between States by contributing to greater openness in military matters. In light of future experiences gained through a wider participation, the reporting system may be further refined.]

[The basis for implementing the above-mentioned measures will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means for its implementation acceptable to all of them, including the continuation of efforts, within the framework of the United Nations, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures.] \*/

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\*/ This text has been proposed as an alternative to paragraphs 5 and 6.

- [1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other military significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.
2. Upon the commencement of this Programme, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States should agree to an immediate freeze in the current levels of their defence expenditures. All other nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States are invited to follow this example.
3. During the first stage, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should start to negotiate agreements concerning reductions in their military expenditures leading to reductions of their nuclear, conventional and other weapons, their armed forces and their production of such weapons and to the dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc.
4. Other States may also make reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements; or reach agreement to freeze the levels of their military spending at certain levels.
5. The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.
6. Agreements on reduction of military expenditures should be elaborated on the basis of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries and also include provisions for verification, satisfactory to all Parties.
7. An international standardized reporting system has been devised and adopted by the United Nations thirty-fourth General Assembly as recommended in document A/35/479. On this basis all States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should endeavour to make use of the reporting instrument and report annually their military expenditures to the United Nations. In light of future experiences gained through a wider participation the reporting instrument may be further refined.]

E. Related Measures

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

(2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration and adoption] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [ , taking into account the emerging régime under the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference].) \*/

(3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Negotiations should be undertaken during the first stage on an international agreement [or agreements] prohibiting States from [developing, testing and] deploying weapons [of any kind] [including] [in particular] [anti-satellite weapons systems] in outer space.

[3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

(a) In order to preserve the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. In particular such negotiations should aim at preventing, by verifiable means, the development of anti-satellite weapons and anti-ballistic missile capabilities.

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

(b) Further negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aiming at the conclusion, in the first stage, of an agreement to ban anti-satellite weapons.

(c) Further negotiations to conclude an agreement to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA);

(d) An agreement by States concerned to provide advance information of the launching of space vehicles to permit inspection;

(e) Measures to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration of outer space.]] \*/

4. The establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document

(a) The Indian Ocean

[Concrete action should urgently be taken to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, and to the early establishment of the Zone of Peace as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and taking into account the decisions of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.] [In this connection, the Conference on the Indian Ocean should be convened not later than the first half of 1983.]

(b) South-East Asia

[Steps should be taken by interested States in this region to further elaborate the concept of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" with a view to concluding an agreement on its establishment.] [The establishment of a zone of peace and stability in South-East Asia.]

(c) [establishment of a zone of [stable] peace [and co-operation] in the Mediterranean.]

5. [[Promotion of] adherence to existing international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States which are not yet parties to those agreements.]

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

## OTHER MEASURES

### 1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

(a) All States [, especially the militarily significant States,] shall undertake confidence-building [and security] measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed upon, as a contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament:

(i) (a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) Measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack.

(ii) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

(iii) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

(b) States shall seek to reach agreement on [effective] confidence-building measures at a global and regional level, taking into account the specific needs and the situation of the region, [e.g.:

- publication and exchange of information on security-related measures including matters of arms [control] [limitation] and disarmament;

[- regular bilateral and/or regional consultations of governmental representatives on such security-related matters;]

[- provisions of scholarships in military schools for the military personnel of other States;]

[- exchange of military delegations and military attachés;]

- indication of normal military conduct and information on scope and extent of specific military activities like manoeuvres, specified movements etc. according to pre-established procedures;

- limitations of certain military activities and movements;

- establishment of procedures for the containment of conflicts, including the establishment of hot lines;]

- negotiations [as appropriate] on the development of [effective security and] confidence-building measures [in the military field] [contained in] [on the basis of] the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [and the achievement of agreement on new confidence-building and disarmament measures] [, taking into account all other aspects of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe]. To those ends, the convening of a conference on [military détente and] disarmament in Europe [should be decided in a concluding document of a CSCE follow-up meeting];

- [- the extension to the Mediterranean Sea area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory;]
- [- development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries.]

In adopting such confidence-building measures, States will bear in mind the study on the subject to be prepared by the United Nations Group of Intergovernmental Experts.

Such measures should include agreements providing for the advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres. [Such measures should include agreements for the advance notification of large [as well as small] scale military manoeuvres [and of manoeuvres containing amphibious and/or airborne troops].]

## 2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

In addition to measures aimed at the strengthening of international peace and security at lower levels of forces by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments, the following measures, which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension, should be undertaken during the first stage:

(a) Withdrawal of all foreign [occupation] [aggression] forces from the territories of other States in accordance with the relevant United Nations [Security Council] resolutions and observance of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.

(b) [An international agreement for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and elimination of the military presence [and rivalry] of foreign powers from various regions of the world] [including the sea areas in particular the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.]

(c) [Mutual limitation of the activities of navies of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Conclusion of an agreement to the effect that missile-equipped submarines of both sides should be withdrawn from their current extensive military patrol zones, that navigation by such submarines should be limited by mutually agreed lines. Negotiations with a view to the extension of confidence-building measures to the surface of the seas and oceans, especially to the regions that contain the busiest sea lanes so that the largest possible proportion of the world's oceans could become, in the very near future, a zone of peace.]

(d) [An undertaking not to enlarge existing or to establish new military alliances.]

(e) [The ending of the division of Europe into military-political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military activities.]

(f) [Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.]



3. Preventing the use of force in international relations

[[An international agreement or solemn understanding] [Legal undertakings] by all States, particularly the militarily significant States, to [strictly observe] [strengthen the observance of] the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law regarding respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, to conduct inter-State relations on the basis of sovereign equality and to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a treaty all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.]

4. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] \*/

(a) In order to [mobilize world public opinion] [promote public awareness] on [behalf of] disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted.

(b) Throughout the implementation of the Programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week. These actions should [constitute a large-scale programme to] further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular.

(c) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which war, in particular nuclear war, would lead. To that end, [an authoritative international committee should be set up which would] [it is imperative to] demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear [or conventional] catastrophe. [The holding of a

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\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

world disarmament campaign, the collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in this respect.] [All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.]

As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. [Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.]

#### DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT \*/

[1. Peace and development are indivisible. In order to ensure that the process of disarmament envisaged in the comprehensive programme makes an effective contribution to economic and social development, especially of the developing countries, and to the full realization of the [N]ew [I]nternational [E]conomic [O]rder:

[A close relationship exists between disarmament and development. Disarmament can and should make an effective contribution to economic and social development on a just and democratic basis and to the establishment of a new international economic order, inter alia by switching resources from military purposes to purposes of development, particularly of the developing countries.]

(i) [The militarily significant States shall undertake concrete measures at the national level to reallocate resources from military purposes to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries, and report to the United Nations and/or the international disarmament authority on the measures contemplated or undertaken.] [All States, especially the militarily significant States, shall create the necessary prerequisites, including preparations and, where appropriate, planning to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent economic and social needs, in particular, in the developing countries. They shall consider making the results of experiences in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the United Nations General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems.]

(ii) [A significant part of the savings from the reduction of military expenditures particularly by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States shall be provided as an additional flow of resources for

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\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

the economic and social development of the developing countries. Immediately after the adoption of the comprehensive programme, a separate account for the transfer of savings resulting from disarmament should be set up under the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme.] [Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear-weapon States. The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. A special committee should be set up for the allocation of such funds.]

In the elaboration of measures under subparagraphs (i) and (ii) above, adequate consideration will be given to the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

[2. Concrete measures shall be undertaken by all States to strengthen international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, taking into account the provisions of all relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, in particular to ensure the success of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to be convened in principle by 1983, as decided upon in General Assembly resolution 34/63 of 29 November 1979, as well as other promotional activities in this field in the United Nations system including those within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.]

#### DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY<sup>\*/</sup>

[Disarmament represents a material guarantee of international security and must play a decisive role in preventing war and affording genuine security to peoples. Genuine security can be guaranteed only through arms limitation, reduction and elimination — through disarmament.]

1. All States shall [undertake a solemn commitment to] support [all] measures for strengthening [the structure, authority and operation of] the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security. In this context, the conclusions of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security should be borne in mind.

2. All States shall undertake to utilize all appropriate means envisaged in the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

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<sup>\*/</sup> This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

Intermediate stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear Weapons

(1. Nuclear test ban

[The conclusion of an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty on a nuclear test ban would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake [without further delay] multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear [weapons] tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system satisfactory to all parties concerned and provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.

(ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should [immediately resume and intensify their negotiations [and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to] contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty].)\*/

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

(i) (a) ([Continuation of negotiations, if necessary, to conclude an agreement or agreements to bring about a halt to [qualitative improvement] [research, development, production and testing] [research, development, testing and qualitative improvement] of nuclear weapons systems and of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. [in parallel with the measures to reduce nuclear weapons and as appropriate integrated with such measures] [as well as on gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons leading to their complete destruction].]) \*/

(b) effective implementation of the agreement or agreements concluded [to ensure the complete and universal halt to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems.]

(ii) (a) ([steps to halt the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery:]) \*/

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) [Conclusion of negotiations on an agreement to bring about the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as [on an agreement to halt] the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapon purposes in accordance with the process outlined in the first stage;]

[Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspection, as part of the agreement or agreements to be negotiated, to establish the base on which agreement or agreements prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.]

- (iii) Further reduction, through an international agreement or agreements, of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including:
- (a) [a further reduction by 50 per cent in the strategic, tactical and other nuclear weapons and delivery systems of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States;]
  - (b) an agreed [proportionate] reduction in the nuclear weapons and delivery systems of [other] nuclear-weapon-States;
  - (c) [destruction of the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons reduced or dismantled by the nuclear-weapon States and transfer of surplus weapons-grade materials to peaceful purposes.]

[At the end of the intermediate stage, the nuclear-weapon States will register and serialize the nuclear weapons remaining with them and register the remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons.]

- [(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time:
- (a) (once [these reductions have reached an agreed stage] [the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties concerned have reached a dimension such as to justify the acceptance by the other nuclear-weapon States of the principle of a limitation or reduction of their own nuclear forces], initiation of further negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.) \*/
  - (b) effective and verifiable destruction of particular nuclear weapons components.]
- ((iv) Conclusion and implementation of an international [agreement] [or agreements], including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all the Parties by the end of the intermediate stage, providing for:

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (a) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States;
- (b) the dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons;
- (c) the transfer of all fissionable [and fusionable] materials remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon or any other States to peaceful purposes.) \*/

3. Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

Continuation of [negotiations on] [the process of] further limitation and reduction of strategic arms [between the USSR and the United States].

4. [Nuclear non-proliferation] [Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]

Universal application of the international consensus to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons developed jointly by the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States during the first stage.

[Adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.]

[The full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis.]

5. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

- (i) Measures to further strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zones which are established and those which may be established during the first stage;
- (ii) Creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. Universal adherence to and strict compliance with the international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling [and use] of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

2. Universal adherence to and strict compliance with the treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes].

3. (a) [Adoption of] [Universal adherence to and strict compliance with] [any specific] [an international comprehensive agreement] or [agreements] [on the prevention of the emergence of new types and new systems of weapons-of mass destruction] [on weapons of mass destruction which may have been identified].

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) Further efforts with a view to identifying and prohibiting [other] new weapons of mass destruction.

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

1. Negotiations on and conclusion of a multilateral agreement or agreements providing for:

(a) Further reductions [of fifty per cent] in the armed forces and conventional weapons of [the two major] [militarily significant States] [the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements] during the intermediate stage.

(b) Further [proportionate] reductions of the conventional weapons and the armed forces of other militarily significant States during the intermediate stage.

(c) [Consistent with reductions made by the above-mentioned States a freeze of the conventional weapons and armed forces of other States at agreed levels during the intermediate stage.]

(d) [Proportionate] reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons of all other States during the intermediate stage.

(e) [Proportionate] reductions by the above-mentioned States of their production of conventional armaments during the intermediate stage.

2. Based on the results of the consultations held during the first stage, negotiations on and conclusion of appropriate agreements between arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons [to a level designed to ensure the limitations and relative balance agreed upon under paragraph 1 above].

3. [Negotiation of measures aimed at] [Conclusion of a multilateral agreement on] the cessation of the qualitative development of [all] [highly destructive] types and systems of conventional weapons [in parallel with the above agreements on the reductions of conventional weapons and armed forces, and as appropriate integrated with such measures].

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. Throughout the intermediate stage, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States will make further reductions in their military expenditures [proportionate to] [taking into account] [or leading to] the reduction in their armaments, armed forces, production of armaments and [any] dismantling of military facilities.

2. [In the course of] [throughout] the intermediate stage, [the] other States [will] [may] make reductions in their military expenditures [proportionate to] [taking into account] [or leading to] the reductions in their armaments, armed forces, production of armaments and [any] dismantling of military facilities.

[3. [The above-mentioned States] should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.]

4. All States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should continue to submit annually a fully itemized report on their respective military expenditures to the United Nations and/or the appropriate international authority.]

[The implementation, throughout the Programme, of the measures with regard to military expenditures should take place on the basis to be agreed upon by all participating states during the first stage.] \*/

5. [Human and material] resources released as a consequence of the reduction of military budgets should be reallocated for economic and social development especially [for the benefit] of the developing countries.

([Multilateral gradual and balanced reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, ensuring transparency and comparability of military postures through the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures.]) \*\*/

#### E. Related Measures

1. (Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration and adoption] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account the emerging régime under the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference].) \*\*/

2. ((a) Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Negotiations should be undertaken during the intermediate stage on an international agreement [or agreements] prohibiting States from [developing, testing and] deploying weapons [of any kind], [including] [in particular] [anti-satellite weapons systems] in outer space.) \*\*/

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\*/ This text has been proposed as an alternative to paragraphs 3 and 4.

\*\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.



- (b) [Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:
- (i) an agreement by States concerned to provide advance information of the launching of space vehicles to permit inspection;]
  - (ii) measures to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration [and use] of outer space;
  - (iii) [an international agreement by States to place all activities for the peaceful exploration [and use] of outer space under international supervision;]
  - (iv) [further attention to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.]

3. Further steps to establish and strengthen zones of peace and prevent military competition [on the seas]: establishment of zones of peace in [other] appropriate regions of the world.

4. Further steps to prevent military competition [on the high seas and international air space].

5. [[Promotion of] adherence to international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States concluded during the first stage.]

#### OTHER MEASURES

##### 1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

All States shall endeavour to further elaborate and extend confidence-building measures, especially in regions of arms concentration and where international tensions and disputes exist.

##### 2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

([An international agreement for dismantling of all foreign military bases and elimination of all foreign military presence from all the regions of the world by the end of the intermediate stage.]) \*/

##### 3. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] \*\*/

Continuation of the programmes by governments, governmental and non-governmental international organizations to [mobilize world public opinion in favour of] [promote public awareness of] general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

\*\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT \*/

[[1. [All States concerned, especially the militarily significant States, shall submit periodically full and detailed reports to the United Nations on the measures undertaken by them to reallocate from military purposes to economic and social purposes, especially for the benefit of the developing countries;] [All States, especially the militarily significant States, shall consider making the results of experiences and preparations in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the United Nations General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems.]

2. An International Disarmament Fund for Development shall be established under the aegis of the United Nations to which contributions shall be made principally by the most heavily armed States [in proportion to their military expenditures as a means of generating sizeable additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries];]

[Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear weapon States. The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. These funds should be distributed by the special committee to be established during the first stage.]

3. [States shall undertake to support full and unhindered international co-operation in all fields of scientific research to promote economic and social development particularly in the developing countries and, in this context, to engage in free exchange of scientific and technological information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel and to provide full access to technology.]

4. [A substantial part of the savings resulting from the various disarmament measures envisaged in this stage of the Programme shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development as an additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries.]]

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY \*\*/

1. [States shall conclude appropriate agreements with the United Nations to provide United Nations peace-keeping forces in accordance with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.]

2. Commencement of negotiations by States with the United Nations with a view to concluding agreements to [place their internal security forces as required, at the completion of general and complete disarmament, at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping] [provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force].

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\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

\*\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

Last stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons

(Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

Conclusion and implementation of an international [agreement] [or agreements], including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all the Parties by the end of the last stage, providing for:

(a) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States;

(b) the dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons;

(c) the transfer of all fissionable [and fusionable] materials remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon or any other States to peaceful purposes.) \*/

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

(Efforts should continue with a view to identifying and prohibiting [other] weapons of mass destruction.) \*/

C. Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces

1. Negotiations on and conclusion of an agreement or agreements on the elimination of conventional armaments and armed forces, including: the disbanding of armed forces, the destruction of all armaments by all States, the cessation of military production and the dismantling of production facilities, the abolition of military establishments, recruitment and conscription, planning and training and the prohibition of appropriation of funds for military purposes.

2. In the course of these negotiations, agreement should be reached on the level of a strictly limited number of personnel, equipped with light firearms, and the necessary support facilities, for the maintenance of internal order, which would include policing of borders and safeguarding the personal security of citizens. The level of such personnel and facilities should also provide for compliance by States with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. By the end of the last stage, all States shall cease all military expenditures and prohibit appropriation of funds for military purposes. Appropriations, as

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\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

expressly agreed upon, shall be permitted for the maintenance of internal security forces [within their own territories] and in order to meet obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

2. [All States shall submit detailed reports annually throughout the last stage regarding the progressive reductions made in their military expenditures and plans for further cuts leading at the end of the stage to complete cessation of military expenditure.]

#### E. Related Measures

[States would undertake to report to the appropriate international authority any scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance. The international authority would make appropriate recommendations after examination and study of such reports and developments.]

#### OTHER MEASURES

##### (1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

All States shall endeavour to further elaborate and extend confidence-building measures especially in regions where international tensions and disputes may exist.

##### 2. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] \*/

Continuation of the programmes by governments, governmental and non-governmental international organizations to [mobilize world public opinion in favour of] [promote public awareness of] general and complete disarmament under effective international control.) \*\*/

#### DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT\*\*\*/

[[A substantial part of] the further savings resulting from the achievement of general and complete disarmament, at the end of the Comprehensive Programme, shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development.]

#### DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY\*\*\*\*/

Conclusion of agreements by States with the United Nations to [place their internal security forces as required, at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping] [provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force].

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\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

\*\*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

\*\*\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

\*\*\*\*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

## VI. Machinery and procedures

1. In order to assure the most effective implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, two kinds of bodies will continue to be required in the field of disarmament — deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.
2. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. (Further provisions regarding the special role of the United Nations on the various aspects of the process of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be elaborated subsequently, including the relationship between disarmament and development and its practical consequences.)
3. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures.
4. The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to deal only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. (Further possible provisions regarding the manner in which the First Committee should annually consider the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament may be elaborated subsequently.)
5. The Disarmament Commission shall continue to function as a subsidiary deliberative body of the General Assembly. The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. (Further provisions regarding the specific responsibilities of the Disarmament Commission in relation to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its procedures are to be elaborated subsequently.)
6. The Committee on Disarmament shall continue to be the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. (Further provisions relating to the Committee on Disarmament are to be elaborated subsequently.)
7. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.
8. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.
9. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it in the most effective manner, [the performance of the] disarmament Secretariat of the United Nations shall be [strengthened and developed in the light of the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392)] [improved further]. (Further provisions on this aspect are to be elaborated subsequently.)
10. (This chapter on Machinery and Procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should include provisions concerning the mobilization of public opinion to be elaborated taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 15, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 and 129 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the fact that, pursuant to resolution 36/92 C, the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, is to take decisions with respect to the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign.)

11. [As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. (Further provisions regarding studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations and on the possible role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are to be elaborated subsequently.)]

[As part of the process of facilitating and preparing the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken, whenever their result can be expected to have a positive influence on the course and outcome of negotiations. Studies should be envisaged especially in order to identify priority areas for arms control and disarmament measures, where negotiations seem necessary in view of a present or imminent destabilization of the relation of forces, and such fields where negotiations seem opportune in view of the existing political and security situation. Moreover, studies can also be undertaken to consider the contents and scope of collateral and other measures.

Decisions to prepare studies should be taken in conjunction with the periodic review of the Programme's implementation. They should be endorsed by the General Assembly, so as to provide the necessary link with other activities in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The studies should be pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, either by the Secretary-General, if necessary with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis or by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Further procedures, such as the delegation of specific studies or parts of them to other bodies, may be envisaged should the need arise.

The studies to be undertaken within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be concluded in time so as to permit the review to take its results into account and base its further recommendations for negotiations on these findings. Whenever feasible, studies should contain concrete proposals and suggestions for negotiations to be held or other steps to be taken.]

12. (Provisions regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies are to be elaborated subsequently.)

13. [In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened [every five years at the end of each stage of the Programme] to review its implementation. The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme's implementation shall be held in [June/July 1987]. Such special sessions of the General Assembly shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the re-adjustments that need to be made and to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in Stages II, III and IV of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology. [United Nations studies could make an important contribution to the task of elaborating the specific measures to be negotiated in the second and subsequent stage.]]

[Conferences for the review of the operation of agreements play a substantial role in maintaining the viability and efficiency of fulfilment of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Taking account of useful experience in that respect, it is advisable to provide for a possibility of periodic review of the progress of implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament may be convened, as required.]

[The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is based on a phased step-by-step approach. Negotiations on disarmament and arms control measures which are specified in the Programme will be carried out in a sequence of phases. Each phase is to comprise negotiations on various interrelated measures which, taking into account the prevailing international political and security situation, aim at going one step further in lowering the level of armaments and military forces, while providing for the undiminished security of all States during that stage. Collateral and other measures, in particular confidence-building measures, will, during that stage, strengthen and consolidate the results achieved during the previous stages and, at the same time, prepare the ground for the successful outcome of negotiations during the next phase by further building and enhancing confidence among States. Studies will be undertaken in order to facilitate recommendations for which disarmament and collateral measures should be included in the next phase.

The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be periodically reviewed until general and complete disarmament under international control will have been achieved. The first review could take place at the conclusion of the Second Disarmament Decade.

The review should be undertaken in an appropriate existing form of the United Nations with the participation of all Member States. The recommendations emerging from the review are to be taken by consensus. They should take into account progress reached in implementing the measures agreed upon previously, the state of negotiations in progress, and external events.

The objectives of these reviews will be to consider the implementation of measures agreed upon in previous phases and, where necessary, propose ways and means to ensure or enhance their strict observance, to decide on the question of when a current phase can be declared as concluded and if the following one can begin as well as to consider the measures which might most appropriately be pursued thereafter. The date of the next review will also be examined.]

14. In addition to the periodic reviews [to be carried out at the end of each stage] of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be a continuous review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included in the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of United Nations Disarmament Secretariat, should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

15. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme. [, including verification of agreed measures]. In this connection, the proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, inter alia,

be taken into account. (Further relevant provisions related to this question may be elaborated subsequently.) [The establishment under United Nations auspices of an international organization charged, inter alia, with the following tasks with respect to existing and future arms control and disarmament agreements:

- implementation
- verification including fact finding
- organization of review -- and amendment conferences
- provision of information.] [The creation of an international satellite monitoring agency would make an important contribution to the verification of the implementation of disarmament agreements. The negotiations should be pursued with a view to the conclusion of an agreement for the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency.]

([Verification is one cornerstone for progress in disarmament and arms control. Because arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interest of the States involved, such measures must be effectively verifiable. They should also make the situation with respect to the remaining armaments more transparent and contribute to the strengthening of confidence between the States concerned. Without means of strict international and national verification, as appropriate, a sufficient degree of confidence of States in the observance of agreements cannot develop.]

Effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of the undiminished security of States during the disarmament process. States should therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular arms control and disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without exaggerating any difficulties involved in their implementation.

Negotiations on specific disarmament and arms control measures should therefore encompass the inclusion of appropriate verification arrangements, and States should accept appropriate provisions for adequate verification. Where the scope of agreements and their verification have reciprocal influence on each other, questions concerning verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. During treaty negotiations, progress on verification measures can have a positive effect on the negotiation of other elements of the treaty.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or, where appropriate, through the United Nations system in the verification process. A combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Suitable procedures, including on-site inspection, must therefore be envisaged.]) \*/

([Agreements on arms limitation and disarmament should provide for adequate reliable monitoring of their implementation so as to ensure compliance with the agreements by all parties. The forms and conditions of monitoring depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement. Questions relating to

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\*/ This text is provisionally included in the chapter on "Machinery and procedures" with the understanding that its placement requires further consideration.



monitoring should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.

Accumulated experience shows that national technical means form a reliable basis for monitoring compliance with agreements. Where necessary, different methods of verification and other monitoring procedures, including international ones, should be combined on a voluntary basis. The strengthening of confidence would assist the application of additional monitoring measures.

A most important pre-condition for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of Governments; references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement on measures for halting the arms race.]] \*/

([Adequate and effective verification is a key prerequisite to any progress towards arms control and disarmament. Acceptance of this principle, and application of it to specific steps undertaken towards disarmament will therefore facilitate over-all progress towards general and complete disarmament. The role of verification in the comprehensive programme of disarmament is threefold: as a principle upon which progress towards disarmament is based, as a part of the specific measures to be undertaken by States; and as an objective to be carried out by means of the over-all machinery and procedures called for in a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interests of the States involved and the advantages accruing to any State party to an arms control and disarmament agreement comes from the fulfillment by the parties to such an agreement of the obligations and responsibilities contained therein. Thus, States must be confident that such obligations and responsibilities are being adhered to, and verification is the means by which such assurance is gained. Without effective verification, the confidence of States that agreements are being observed cannot sufficiently develop. In addition, since any agreement must be designed in such a way to ensure the security of the States party to it, and as it is through adequate verification measures that States can develop confidence that the agreement is being complied with, it therefore follows that effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of undiminished security of States during the disarmament process.

The principle of effective verification must, in practice, be reflected by the inclusion of necessary and appropriate verification measures and arrangements in specific disarmament and arms control agreements. Negotiations must therefore include consideration of effective measures of verification, which will form a part of the agreement or agreements to be negotiated. Such verification measures should encompass, as appropriate, both national and international means, and include provisions, as necessary, for on-site inspection. Through the inclusion of appropriate measures of verification a sound basis will be established for the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements.

In the negotiation of specific arms control and disarmament agreements, where the scope of agreement and verification measures have reciprocal influence, questions of scope and verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. And as verification measures are a vital part of any arms control and disarmament agreement, progress in the development of verification measures during the course of negotiation can have a positive effect on the negotiations of other elements of the agreements. The form, conditions, and modalities of verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope, and nature of the agreements.

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Measures designed to ensure effective verification of compliance with agreements will, as noted, contribute to the increased confidence of States. Such measures should, in addition, also make the situation with respect to the remaining armaments more transparent. States should therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular arms control and disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without exaggerating difficulties involved in their implementation.

A combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Suitable procedures, including on-site inspection, must therefore be envisaged.

The multilateral aspects of disarmament negotiations have become more significant, and experience has increasingly demonstrated the need for closer attention to the development by parties to agreements of appropriate machinery and procedures to ensure verification of compliance with multilateral agreements. Therefore, the possibility of establishing requirements and criteria of an institutional and procedural nature with broad application for effective machinery to ensure implementation of individual multilateral disarmament agreements, in particular their verification, should be considered. In this context, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should provide for examination of the various possibilities available in this regard. In the consideration of various possibilities, the experience accumulated by already functioning agencies, as they provide working prototypes from which an effective organization could be developed, should be of benefit.

The review processes for agreements already in effect vary widely, and many, as appropriate, rely to some extent on national evaluations. Many States may not, however, possess a national capability to effectively make national evaluations of compliance with agreements to which they may be a party. The consideration outlined above may serve to promote an improved verification process by providing for an evaluation of the implementation of agreements and a report to the involved parties at periodic review conferences.]) \*/

([Verification forms an important part of measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, is inseparably linked with such measures, and must stem from a precise and clear agreement on them. Consequently, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should contain basic provisions on verification, proceeding thereby from the principles enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. These principles should find their concrete application in the elaboration of measures for verifying compliance with each specific agreement on arms limitation and disarmament to be concluded and implemented at the different stages of the CPD and within indicative time-frames. Due consideration should be given in this regard to the experience gained until now with the elaboration and implementation of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

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Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties.. Thus, in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. In enhancing confidence in the observance of disarmament agreements, appropriate verification measures would contribute to attracting other States to adhere to them and promote the general disarmament process.

At the same time, a certain minimum of confidence is necessary as a basis for devising an effective verification system. Thus, normal relations between States based on détente and recognition of mutual interest are very conducive to the elaboration of reliable verification procedures, whereas a policy aggravating international tension and accelerating the arms race is not likely to promote agreement on far reaching verification measures. Verification is likely to be most successful in an atmosphere of co-operation.

The settlement of verification issues depends on whether or not the various parties have the political will to conclude the relevant disarmament agreements. It is universally recognized that strong political will is a prerequisite to reaching agreement on any significant or meaningful measure in the field of disarmament. Once such political will has been built up, it will not be difficult and certainly not beyond human ingenuity, to devise controls appropriate to any requirement in the field of disarmament, no matter how complex it may be.

Strong political will combined with a degree of mutual trust has to exist in respect of any measure in the field of disarmament, before a practical, least-onerous and fair system of verification can be devised and effectively implemented.

Disarmament negotiations should not be involved in an abstract verification discussion, diverting their attention from substantive disarmament problems. Arguments concerning complexities in regard to verification or controls should not become a camouflage for the lack of political will and a a priori refusal to trust others. With regard to disarmament measures of the highest priority, such as a comprehensive ban on the testing of all nuclear weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons, it is clearly the lack of political will, rather than the complexities involved in verification, which is holding up the conclusion of negotiations in this area.

In general, one may proceed from the assumption that a State becomes a party to a disarmament agreement in order to abide strictly by the obligations it has assumed under it, and therefore verification should not be built upon the principle of total distrust by States of one another, and should not take the form of global suspiciousness.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. To proceed the other way round would involve disarmament negotiations in endless debates on detailed and highly technical aspects of verification and lead to an actual postponement, if not prevention, of disarmament agreements.

Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures of verification which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

Verification measures should be an important link in the chain of the other measures ensuring confidence in the observance of a given disarmament treaty by all parties. Thus, they constitute an integral part of the broader system for ensuring compliance with such an agreement. The main function of this system is to give the parties to those agreements assurance of their observance by other parties, and through the employment of certain forms of co-operation to facilitate the resolution of questions in dispute. Therefore, where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

It is universally recognized that a system of controls, guaranteeing 100 per cent verification, is not possible, nor can a completely fool-proof system of verification be designed. The whole complex of available and possible verification methods, ranging from national control to certain forms of international verification, provides a high degree of assurance that violations of disarmament agreements could be detected. It is most doubtful that a militarily important violation could be concealed.

Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.

Against this essential general background, it is clear that it would be wrong to make a fetish of verification. It would be equally wrong to devise or establish a machinery of controls in the absence of genuine measures of arms limitation or disarmament. To do that, would be like putting the cart before the horse. There can be no merit, either, in sterile and abstract discussions of the complexities of verification issues, kinds of verification régimes, or in stressing the need for some kind of an international verification organization, without reference to any concrete measure of real disarmament or serious arms limitation.]) \*/

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List and Text of Documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/1	Letter dated 17 January <sup>1979</sup> 1979 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session
CD/2	Letter dated 16 January 1979 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71L of 14 December 1978
CD/3	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Message of greeting from Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/4	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed
CD/5	Italy: Working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations
CD/6	The Netherlands: Some procedural suggestions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons
CD/7	The Netherlands: On the use of short-period initial motion data for discrimination purposes
CD/8	Rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/9	Italy: Additional Protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space: memorandum
CD/10	Pakistan: Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/11	Group of 21: Working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction
CD/12	Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/13	Poland: Working paper on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor
CD/14	Letter dated 20 April 1979 from the Ambassador (Political Affairs) of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Articles 30 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/15	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts (14-16 March 1979)
CD/16	Letter dated 20 April 1979 from the Head of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Article 30 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/17	Letter dated 28 March 1979 from the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political and Security Council Affairs addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa
CD/18	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Seventh Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/19	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (second part of the 1979 session)
CD/20	Hungary: Letter dated 19 June 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979

✓ Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

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Document No.	Title
CD/21	Poland: Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction: working paper
CD/22	Mongolia: Letter dated 20 June 1979, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, transmitting the Declaration by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, published in Ulan-Bator on the occasion of the signature of the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)
CD/23	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Working paper on draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States
CD/24	Letter dated 21 June 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Charge d'Affaires <u>ad interim</u> of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/25	Pakistan: Working paper on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/26	Compilation of material on chemical weapons from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament working papers and statements, 1972-1979 (prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee on Disarmament)
CD/27	The United States of America: Working paper on a proposal for a CD recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly concerning the security of non-nuclear weapon States against nuclear attack
CD/28	Letter dated 27 June 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USA and USSR to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and the joint United States-Soviet Communiqué

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Document No.	Title
CD/29	Letter dated 2 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting additional documents relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic offensive arms
CD/30	Letter dated 2 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the Decision adopted by the Committee on 15 February 1979 concerning the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Seismological Experts
CD/31	Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting a document entitled "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
CD/32	Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America transmitting a document entitled "Agreed joint US-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
CD/33	Italy: Letter dated 6 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a letter from the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic to the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CD/34	Letter dated 9 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Article 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/35	Letter dated 10 July 1979 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament on the negotiations on the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons



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Document No.	Title
CD/36/Rev.1	Group of 21: Working paper on cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
CD/37	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on some aspects of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons: experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany
CD/38	Letter dated 10 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/39	Letter dated 16 July 1979 from the Ambassador (Political Affairs) of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents - an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data
CD/40	Hungary: Working paper on the draft preambular part of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons
CD/41	The Netherlands: Working paper containing questions relevant to a convention prohibiting chemical weapons
CD/42	German Democratic Republic: Working paper on draft paragraph XI, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons
CD/43	Letter dated 25 July 1979 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the second report of the <u>ad hoc</u> group

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Document No.	Title
CD/45/Add.1	Second Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (Appendices)
CD/44	Poland: Outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction: working paper
CD/45	Sweden: Working paper on international seismological datacenter demonstration facilities in Sweden
CD/46	Sweden: Draft CD decision for a continued mandate to the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Seismic Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/47	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to Consider, and Negotiate On, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use Or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons - Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/48	Letter dated 7 August 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/49	The Netherlands: Chemical weapons - Answers to questionnaire contained in CD/41
CD/50	Statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979
CD/51	Results of the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament - Working paper submitted by a group of socialist States**/
CD/52	France, Italy and the Netherlands: Chemical weapons - Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to prohibition of chemical weapons
CD/53 CD/53/Corr.1	Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly
CD/54	Statement by Mr. Jamsheed Marker, Leader of Pakistan delegation to the Committee on Disarmament - 14.8.79

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\*\*/ Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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Document No.	Title
CD/L.1	Draft Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/L.2/Rev.1	Revised Working Paper on the Provisional Agenda and the Programme of Work
CD/L.3/Rev.1	<u>Ad Hoc Working Group to Consider, and Negotiate On, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons - Revised Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament</u>
CD/L.4	Draft Report of the Committee on Disarmament
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CD/NGC.1	List of communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

Document No.	Title
CD/8/Rev.1	Rules of procedure of the <sup>1980</sup> Committee on Disarmament
CD/55	Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session
CD/56	Italy: Working paper on control and limitation of international arms transfers
CD/57	Romania's position on disarmament
CD/58	German Democratic Republic: Letter dated 12 February 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/59	Australia: Chemical weapons: proposal for informal meetings with experts
CD/60	Poland's policy on détente and disarmament
CD/61	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the ninth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events
CD/62	Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (adopted at the 61st plenary meeting held on 19 February 1980)
CD/62/Add.1	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (adopted at the 67th plenary meeting held on 11 March 1980)
CD/63	Bulgaria: The position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on détente and disarmament at the present stage
CD/64	Group of 21: Statement of the Group of 21 on the Establishment of Working Groups on Items on the Annual Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980
CD/65	Finland: Letter dated 21 February 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland concerning the participation of Finland in the work of the Committee on chemical weapons during the 1980 session

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Document No.	Title
CD/66	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Note Verbale dated 25 February 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam concerning Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/67	Poland: Resolution of the Eighth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party
CD/68	Poland: Chemical weapons - a possible procedural approach to the tasks facing the Committee on Disarmament: working paper
CD/69	Denmark: Letter dated 3 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Denmark concerning paragraphs 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/70	Spain: Letter dated 3 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva in connexion with paragraph 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/71	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Extracts from the address delivered by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at the meeting of electors in the Bauman electoral district, Moscow, on 22 February 1980
CD/72	Statement of the Group of 21 on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CD/73	Federal Republic of Germany: Working Paper - Workshop on the demonstration of procedures to obtain seismic data at individual stations under different conditions
CD/74	Austria: Letter dated 13 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning paragraphs 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/75	Finland: Letter dated 12 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva submitting a working document containing the views of the Finnish Government concerning the item "Effective International Arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

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Document No.	Title
CD/76	Democratic Kampuchea: Letter dated 13 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure.
CD/77	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 7/Rev. 1)
CD/78	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 8/Rev. 1)
CD/79	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 9/Rev. 1)
CD/80	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 10/Rev. 1)
CD/81	Finland: Letter dated 18 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning the participation of Finland in the Committee's work on chemical weapons during the 1980 Session
CD/82	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Letter dated 18 March 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Memorandum on the use of chemicals by the United States of America in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea"
CD/83	Group of Socialist States: Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 25 March 1980 by a Group of Socialist States

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Document No.	Title
CD/84	The Netherlands: Working Document - Draft Initial Work Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons
CD/85	Democratic Kampuchea: Letter dated 26 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament and transmitting two documents entitled "Statement of 5 February 1980 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea on the intensification by Hanoi of the use of chemical weapons and other activities to exterminate the Kampuchean people" and "The use of chemical weapons by the Vietnamese aggressors in Kampuchea; Report issued by the Ministry of Information of Democratic Kampuchea on 25 February 1980"
CD/86	Letter dated 24 March 1980 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, prepared pursuant to General Assembly Decision 32/422 of 11 December 1979
CD/87	People's Republic of Kampuchea: Telegram dated 8 April 1980 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/88	Egypt: Letter dated 11 April 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative and Head of the Delegation of Egypt to the Committee on Disarmament in connexion with CD/71 of 4 March 1980
CD/89	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Telegram dated 13 April 1980 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a "Declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan issued on 11 April 1980"
CD/90	Australia and Canada: The Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes

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Document No.	Title
CD/91	Democratic Kampuchea: Letter dated 10 April 1980 and received on 15 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the Permanent Representative's communication of 13 March 1980 (CD/76)
CD/92	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the tasks of the Second Disarmament Decade
CD/93	Belgium: Prohibition of nuclear tests: proposal for an informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts members of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/94	Belgium: Proposed definition of a chemical warfare agent and chemical munitions
CD/95	Australia: An illustrative list of subjects might be examined by the Committee on Disarmament in considering Agenda Item 1 "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/96	Poland: Ad Hoc working group on CW - Initial Work Programme: Working Document
CD/97	Sweden: Working Paper on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare Capability
CD/98	Poland: Letter dated 9 June 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Representation of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva enclosing the declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw on 15 May 1980
CD/99	Canada: Letter dated 10 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva forwarding a document entitled "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals"
CD/100	Mongolia: Letter dated 10 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, enclosing the text of a statement dated 20 May 1980 by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic in support of the Declaration adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at Warsaw on 14 and 15 May 1980



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Document No.	Title
CD/101	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament for the Second Part of its 1980 Session (Adopted at the 84th plenary meeting on 17 June 1980)
CD/102	China: Letter dated 19 June 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Acting Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper on the "Chinese Delegation's Proposals on the main contents of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons"
CD/103	Finland: Letter dated 24 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Identification of degradation products of potential organophosphorus warfare agents"
CD/104	Compilation of relevant documents on radiological weapons covering the period 1979 - 1980 (Prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee on Disarmament)
CD/105	France: Elements of a reply by the French delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/41)
CD/106	France: Working Paper - Control of the non-manufacture and non-possession of agents and weapons of chemical warfare
CD/107	German Democratic Republic: Letter dated 27 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a letter of Mr. Oskar Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic
CD/108	Mongolia: Letter dated 27 June 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Leader of the Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/109	German Democratic Republic: Working Paper - Proposal on behalf of a group of socialist countries concerning urgent steps for the practical implementation of "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed" (CD/4)

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Document No.	Title
CD/110	Yugoslavia: Working Paper on Medical Protection Against Nerve Gas Poisoning (Present Situation and Future Possibilities)
CD/111	Yugoslavia: Working Paper on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA)
CD/112	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/United States of America: Letter dated 7 July 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/113	Canada: Organization and Control of Verification Within a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/114	Australia: Reply at this stage submitted by the Australian Delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament in Document CD/41
CD/115	Switzerland: Letter dated 2 July 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure and referring to the decision taken by the Committee at its 86th Plenary Meeting
CD/116	Group of 21: Working Paper on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament
CD/117	Canada: Definitions and Scope in a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/118	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft decision of the Committee on Disarmament on the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> group of experts to prepare a draft comprehensive agreement and to consider the question of concluding special agreements on individual new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction
CD/119	Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts: Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Tenth Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events
CD/120	Pakistan: Working Paper - Possible draft resolution for adoption by UN Security Council as an interim measure on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

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Document No.	Title
CD/121	Poland: Some of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a CW convention: working paper
CD/122	Morocco: Proposed definition of chemical weapons
CD/123	Mongolia: Working document - Interrelationship between the future convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925
CD/124	Indonesia: Some Views of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
CD/125	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Report to the Committee on Disarmament.
CD/126/Rev.1	Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/127	Canada: Letter dated 29 July 1980 from the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva, forwarding a document entitled "A quantitative working paper on the compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals"
CD/128	A Group of Socialist Countries: Proposal for the main elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/129	Mexico: Working paper containing draft amendments to section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, entitled "Participation by States not members of the Committee"
CD/130	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/United States of America: Letter dated 30 July 1980 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America transmitting a document entitled "Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament"
CD/131/Rev.1	Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons: Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/132	Pakistan: Working Paper - Views of the Government of Pakistan submitted in response to the circulation of document CD/89

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Document No.	Title
CD/133	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group established with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons: Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/134	Group of 21: Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusion of the Annual Session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980
CD/135	Results of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament: Statement by the group of Socialist States
CD/136	Statement by Ambassador Yu Peiwen of the People's Republic of China at the Plenary Meeting of the Committee on Disarmament held on 7 August 1980
CD/137	Statement made by the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Yu Peiwen, at the 73rd Plenary Meeting of the Committee on 27 March 1980
CD/138	Declaration by the delegation of Mexico on the question of the Committee's documents relating to participation by States not members of the Committee
CD/139	Report to the United Nations General Assembly

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Document No.	Title
CD/124/Rev.:	Revision of CD/124 on the <sup>1981</sup> Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical Warfare Agent
CD/140	Letter dated 2 February 1981 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session
CD/141	Considerations on the Organization of Work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session
CD/142	Working Paper : Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons (4 annexes)
CD/143	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/144	Agenda and programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/145	Letter dated 5 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/146	Letter dated 10 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/147	Letter dated 12 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure

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Document No.	Title
CD/148	Letter dated 19 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/149	Letter dated 8 January 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/150	Progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the eleventh session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events
CD/151	Decision adopted by the Committee on <u>ad hoc</u> working groups at its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981
CD/152	Letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the People's Republic of China and Pakistan, handed over 12 February 1981
CD/153	Working Paper : Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/154	Letter dated 12 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/155	Working Paper : Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament "Objectives"
CD/156	Letter dated 19 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/157	Letter dated 20 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981

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Document No.	Title
CD/158	Letter dated 26 February 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt transmitting the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the occasion of its ratification of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 26 February 1981
CD/159	Letter dated 24 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/160	Letter dated 2 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting part of the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entitled "To Strengthen Peace, Deepen Détente and Curb the Arms Race"
CD/161	Working Paper : Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/162*	Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests
CD/163	Letter dated 2 March 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/164	Letter dated 18 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland, transmitting a working document entitled, "Creation of Chemical Weapons Control Capacity - present phase and goals of the Finnish project"

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Document No.	Title
CD/165	Letter dated 19 March 1981 from the Representative of Venezuela addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the address given by His Holiness Pope John Paul II at Hiroshima on 23 February 1981
CD/166	Letter dated 23 March 1981 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the memorandum "Peace, Disarmament and International Security Guarantees" submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. Gromyko, to the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly
CD/167	Verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities
CD/168	Working Paper : Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents
CD/169	Working Paper : Dismantling of Production Facilities/Means of Production for Chemical Weapons
CD/170	Letter dated 26 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of India transmitting extracts from the section entitled "Review of the international situation" contained in the New Delhi declaration issued at the conclusion of the Ministerial Conference of Non-aligned countries held in New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981
CD/171	Tabulation of proposals on nuclear disarmament since the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
CD/172	Working Paper on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament
CD/173	Disposal of Chemical Agents
CD/174	Working Paper : Proposal for informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of qualified governmental experts on the prohibition of development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons



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Document No.	Title
CD/175	Letter dated 1 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/176	Letter dated 7 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, Ta Nea.
CD/177	United Kingdom Working Paper on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/178	Letter dated 15 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister-Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland addressing an invitation of the Finnish Government
CD/179 + Add.1	The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons
CD/180	Statement by the Group of 21 on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/181	Statement by the Group of 21 on item 1 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled: "Nuclear test ban"
CD/182	Statement of a Group of Socialist Countries on the results of the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/183	A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification Produced by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs and the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Ottawa
CD/184	Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament Transmitting Resolutions Adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 June 1981

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Document No.	Title
CD/185	Letter dated 9 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th Plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/186	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament for the second part of its 1981 session (Adopted at the 129th plenary meeting on 16 June 1981)
CD/187	Statement by the Group of 21 on the Israeli air attack against a nuclear facility on 7 June 1981
CD/188	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/189	Letter dated 22 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia transmitting an Extract from the Report of the General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, President of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, Mongolian People's Republic Comrade Yu.Tsedenbal to the XVIII Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
CD/190	Letter dated 22 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Austria concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 113th Plenary meeting on 10 March 1981
CD/191	Letter dated 30 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the Appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World
CD/192	Statement of the Group of 21 (Item 1: Nuclear Test Ban)
CD/193	Considerations on the further proceeding of the Committee on Disarmament concerning item 2 of its agenda
CD/194	Statement of a Group of socialist countries concerning a nuclear test ban
CD/195	Working Paper: Incapacitating Agents (Some aspects of definition, classification and toxicological characteristics)

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Document No.	Title
CD/196	Letter dated 13 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland transmitting a document entitled "Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents"
CD/197	Working Paper: Suggestions for Elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/198	Working Paper: Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/199	Working Paper: Definition and Characteristics of the Toxins
CD/200	Increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/201	Letter dated 28 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia enclosing the text of "The Appeal of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to Parliaments of all Asian and Pacific Countries"
CD/202	Letter dated 29 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the United States Representative to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Announcement made on 16 July 1981, by the President of the United States of America Concerning the Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Co-operation Policy of the United States of America
CD/203	Consultation and Co-operation, Verification Measures and Complaints Procedure in the framework of the Convention on the complete and effective Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of all Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
CD/204	Working Paper: Establishment of subsidiary organs
CD/205 CD/CPD/WP.52	Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/206	Working Paper: Views on Disarmament and its related Questions
CD/207	Working Paper: On the Question of Security Assurances
CD/208 CD/CPD/WP.55	Working Paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

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Document No.	Title
CD/209	Working Paper on the question of verification in the field of disarmament
CD/210	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Twelfth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/211	Letter dated 12 August 1981 from the Representative of Cuba to the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting part of the Statement made on 26 July 1981 by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, Chairman of the Councils of State and of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba
CD/212	Some viewpoints on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
CD/213	Some viewpoints on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament
CD/214	Working Paper on the Elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/215 & Corr.1	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to Continue to Negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/216	Letter dated 14 August 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a Statement by Tass dated 13 August 1981
CD/217 & Corr.1	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/218	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/219	Statement of a group of socialist countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons
CD/220	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/221	Some observations of the Chinese delegation on the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981 (18 August 1981)
CD/222 & Corr.1	Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusions of the Annual Session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981
CD/223	Working Paper on the Chapter entitled "Measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"
CD/224	Statement by a group of socialist countries on the results of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/225	Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba made on 19 August 1981
CD/226	Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic
CD/227	The Chinese delegation's denial to the Soviet allegation regarding China's position on the question of the neutron bomb
CD/228 & Corr.1	Report to the United Nations General Assembly

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- CD/229  
CD/CPD/WP.56      Group of 21: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
- CD/230  
CD/CPD/WP.57      Group of 21: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
- CD/231      Letter dated 1 February 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session
- CD/232  
CD/CPD/WP.58      Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
- CD/233  
CD/CPD/WP.59      Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
- CD/234      Message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament
- CD/235      Romania: Messages from the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and to Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, concerning the Geneva negotiations on the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range missiles
- CD/236      Romania: Appeal of the Romanian Parliament to the Parliaments, the Governments and the peoples of the European countries, the United States of America and Canada
- CD/237      Romania: Appeal by the people of Romania, to the peoples and forward-looking democratic forces of the world, for disarmament and peace, security, independence and progress
- CD/238      Letter dated 3 February 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Representative of Venezuela, transmitting the result of the study carried out in October 1981 by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, at the request of His Holiness John Paul II, entitled "Statement on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons"

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Document No.	Title
CD/239 CD/CPD/WP.60	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/240	Letter dated 10 February 1982 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, containing excerpts from the report on the reception by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, of Representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament
CD/241.	Document of a group of socialist countries: Considerations relating to the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament in the course of its 1982 session
CD/242	Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (Adopted at the 156th Plenary meeting held on 18 February 1982)
CD/243	Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on <u>ad hoc</u> working groups at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982
CD/244 CD/CW/WP.26	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/245	Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Czechoslovakia: Working paper on the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"
CD/246	Letter dated 2 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/247	Letter dated 18 November 1981 from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/248	Letter dated 20 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/249	Letter dated 18 December 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure

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Document No.	Title
CD/250	Letter dated 15 January 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/251	Letter dated 30 January 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/252	Letter dated 2 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/253	Letter dated 23 February 1982 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a TASS statement of 19 February 1982
CD/254	Letter dated 28 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/255 CD/CPD/WP.63	Group of 21: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and Procedures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/256	German Democratic Republic and Hungarian People's Republic: Working paper - non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present
CD/257	Sweden: An international system for the Detection of Airborne Radioactivity from Nuclear Explosions
CD/258 and Corr.1 CD/CW/WP.28 and Corr.1	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Working paper - Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons
CD/259	German Democratic Republic: Working paper - Draft mandates for <u>ad hoc</u> working groups on a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
CD/260	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Thirteenth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-Operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/261	Hungary: Working paper - Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons



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Document No.	Title
CD/262	Romania: Working paper - Scientists and Disarmament
CD/263	Finland: Working paper on the Relation of Verification to Scope of a Ban on Chemical Warfare Agents
CD/264	United States of America: The United States Programme to Deter Chemical Warfare
CD/265	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on Principles and Rules for Verifying Compliance with a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/266 CD/CW/WP.31	Yugoslavia: Working paper - Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification
CD/267	Letter dated 18 March 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a statement issued by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
CD/268	Letter dated 25 March 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting part of the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR
CD/269	Letter dated 26 March 1982 from the Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a decision, taken by the Federal German Government on 17 March, on the present state of the INF negotiations and Secretary-General Brezhnev's proposals
CD/270	Letter dated 31 March 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands transmitting a document entitled "Indonesia and the Netherlands - Working Document - Destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java. Indonesia"
CD/271 CD/CW/WP.32	United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia: Technical Evaluation of "Recover" Techniques for CW Verification
CD/272	Mongolian People's Republic: Working paper on the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

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Document No.	Title
CD/273	Letter dated 2 April 1982 from the Head of the Delegation of India addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a note of the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in response to General Assembly resolution 36/81 A and B pertaining to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
CD/274	Letter dated 6 April 1982 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly
CD/275	Letter dated 5 April 1982 from the Deputy Representative of Canada to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament forwarding a document entitled "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals - Second Edition"
CD/276	Note Verbale dated 29 March 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Tunisia addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/277	Sweden: Working paper - The concept "precursor" and a suggestion for definition for the purpose of a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/278*	China: Working paper on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
CD/279	Sweden: Working paper - Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons
CD/280	Statement of the Group of 21 on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
CD/281/Rev.1	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament
CD/282	Working paper containing the text of the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the prevention of nuclear war, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the invitation extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981
CD/283	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

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Document No.	Title
CD/284/Rev.1	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group on Radiological Weapons to the Committee on <u>Disarmament</u> in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament
CD/285	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
CD/286	Statement made by Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group and the draft Comprehensive Programme annexed thereto
CD/287	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Proposal for the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group under Item 1 of the agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/288	Statement made by Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group
CD/289	Statement made by Ambassador Henning Wegener, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group
CD/290	Statement made by Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Security Assurances, on the occasion of the submission of the Special Report of the Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/291	Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/292	Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament



SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO  
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Corrigendum

1. In page 19 replace the end of the first paragraph, which reads "and as referred to in paragraph 2 above", by "and as referred to in the second paragraph under Section 'I. Introduction' above".
2. In page 19 replace the last part of the fourth paragraph, which reads "as contained in paragraph 9 above, were reaffirmed in the Ad Hoc Working Group by various delegations", by "as contained in the sixth paragraph under Section 'II. Substantive Negotiations During 1979, 1980 and 1981 Sessions' above, were reaffirmed in the Ad Hoc Working Group by various delegations".
3. In pages 23 and 24 delete the asterisks after "(11) CD/125" and "(23) CD/278".
4. In page 25 delete the asterisk after "(10) CD/SA/WP.3/Rev. 1".
5. In page 42 delete the asterisk after "Document CD/265".
6. In page 59 delete the asterisk after "52. CD/RW/WP.27".
7. In Appendix II to the Special Report, pages 19 and 30, delete the asterisks after "CD/162" and "CD/278".



SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE  
SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Corrigendum

Delete the text contained in page 23.





SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE  
SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Corrigendum

Delete the words "and text" in the title of Appendix II, page 1.



TABULATION OF PROPOSALS CONCERNING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT  
MADE BETWEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
AND THE CONVENING OF THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF  
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Prepared by the Secretariat

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the 116th plenary meeting on 19 March 1981, the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, in his statement concerning the further activities of the Committee on agenda items 1 and 2 relating to nuclear disarmament questions, requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted since the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, to be complemented subsequently by a similar tabulation of nuclear disarmament proposals submitted between the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the holding of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.
2. In accordance with the first part of that request, the Secretariat, on 31 March 1981 prepared the first tabulation (CD/171), covering the period since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The present tabulation, covering the period between 1945 and 1978, has been prepared in accordance with the second part of the Chairman's request and includes proposals submitted to: (a) the General Assembly; (b) the Atomic Energy Commission; (c) the Disarmament Commission; (d) the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament; (e) the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee; (f) the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; and (g) the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Also included are the recommendations contained in the resolutions of the General Assembly transmitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; other relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly; and other relevant proposals: (i) proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests (1958); (ii) proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack and for the preparation of a report thereon to Governments (1958); (iii) proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests (1958-1962); (iv) proposals submitted at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (1968).
3. Like the first tabulation, the present one includes references to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons because, although that question constitutes a separate item on the Committee's agenda, in many cases it has direct relevance to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

II. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY \*/

Third session, 1948

4. Draft resolution on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, submitted by the USSR on 17 November 1948 (A/723)

The draft resolution recommended that, as a first step in the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the permanent members of the Security Council reduce by one-third, during one year, all land, naval and air forces; that atomic weapons be prohibited as weapons of aggression but not of defence; and that an international control body be established within the framework of the Security Council for the supervision of and control over the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as those for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Ninth Session, 1955

5. Proposal submitted by the USSR in December 1955 (A/C.1/L.140)

The proposal, submitted as an amendment to a draft resolution subsequently adopted as General Assembly resolution 913 (X), setting up the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, called on nuclear-weapon States to continue their efforts towards reaching agreement on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

Eleventh Session, 1957

6. Memorandum submitted by the United States on 12 January 1957 (A/C.1/783)

It was proposed, inter alia, that after a cut-off on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, nuclear test explosions should be limited and ultimately prohibited, and that arrangements should be worked out for advance notice and registration and limited international observation of such tests.

7. Draft resolution on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, submitted by the USSR on 14 January 1957 (A/C.1/L.160)

The draft resolution called upon States conducting atomic and hydrogen weapons tests to discontinue them forthwith.

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\*/ Documents that contained proposals, including draft resolutions, that were subsequently adopted as or reflected in General Assembly resolutions are not included in this section. Also, documents that were submitted to more than one organ are included only under one organ, generally under the organ to which the contents of the documents more directly related.

8. Memorandum on partial measures in the field of disarmament, submitted by the USSR on 20 September 1957 (A/C.1/793)

The memorandum proposed, inter alia, reduction of armed forces, reduction of armaments and military budgets, prohibition of atomic weapons and discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing, prohibition of the transfer of these weapons to other States and the establishment of aerial photography zones in Europe and the Far East.

9. Draft resolution submitted by Japan on 23 September 1957 (A/C.1/L.174)

By the draft resolution the General Assembly would call upon the States concerned to suspend all nuclear-weapon test explosions, once they had agreed in principle on the need for a verification system.

10. Draft resolution introduced by India on 1 November 1957 (A/C.1/L.176 and Rev.1,2,4)

By the proposal, a commission of experts would supervise and ensure the effectiveness of a suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

#### Twelfth Session, 1958

11. Draft resolution introduced by the USSR on 9 October 1958 (A/C.1/L.203)

By the proposal the General Assembly would call upon all States carrying out nuclear weapon tests to stop such tests immediately and enter into negotiations to conclude an appropriate agreement.

12. Draft resolution introduced by Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, the United Arab Republic and Yemen on 15 October 1958 (A/C.1/L.204, Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2)

By the proposal, the General Assembly would, inter alia, call for the immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing until agreement was reached by the States concerned on control arrangements, and would request the parties to the tripartite Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to report to the General Assembly on the agreement reached.

#### Thirteenth Session, 1959

13. Declaration on general and complete disarmament submitted by the USSR on 19 September 1959 (A/4219)

The declaration contained the text of a three-stage programme which provided for: first stage - reduction of armed forces and armaments to agreed levels; second stage - completion of the disbandment of the armed forces and elimination of foreign military bases; third stage - destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles, as well as air force equipment; prohibition of the production, possession and storage of means of chemical and bacteriological warfare and their destruction. An international control organ would be established to verify the implementation of the disarmament measures. At the end of the disarmament process, States would retain only strictly limited and agreed contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms.

The USSR also submitted a plan for partial measures, proposing the establishment of a control and inspection zone in Europe; establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe; abolition of foreign military bases; and conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Member States of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty.

Fifteenth Session, 1961

14. Agreed statement of principles, submitted jointly by the USSR and the United States on 20 September 1961 (A/4879)

As a result of an exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations, the USSR and the United States agreed on and recommended a number of principles as a basis for future disarmament negotiations, as follows: (a) the final goal would be general and complete disarmament; (b) the programme would ensure that States would have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments and forces as necessary to maintain internal order and a United Nations peace force; (c) there would be provision for the disbanding of armed forces, the elimination of military institutions, the discontinuance of military expenditures, etc. (d) the disarmament programme should be implemented by stages; (e) all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that no State or group of States could at any time gain military advantage; (f) international control; (g) measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace should be agreed; and (h) all States should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date.

By its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the joint USSR/USA statement of agreed principles and recommended that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based on those principles

15. Memorandum on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament, submitted by the USSR on 26 September 1961 (A/4892)

The memorandum contained proposals on freezing military budgets, prohibition of nuclear weapons; prohibition of war propaganda; non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and decrease of danger of surprise attack.

Nineteenth Session, 1964

16. Programme for peace and international co-operation (chapter VII) adopted at the second non-aligned summit conference, Cairo, 5-10 October 1964 (A/5763)

The programme suggested various measures of disarmament including: general and complete disarmament; peaceful use of atomic energy; prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests; establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons; abolition of all nuclear weapons; convening of a world disarmament conference.



Twentieth Session, 1965

17. Draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted by the USSR on 24 September 1965 (A/5976)

The draft treaty would prohibit nuclear Powers from transferring nuclear weapons directly or indirectly into the ownership or disposal of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons or from granting the aforesaid States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons; prohibit such Powers from giving nuclear weapons and control over them and over their location to units or to individual members of the armed forces of States not possessing nuclear weapons; and require States not possessing nuclear weapons to undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare to manufacture nuclear weapons either independently or jointly with other States.

Thirtieth Session, 1975

18. Memorandum on the problem of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, and establishment of lasting peace, submitted by Romania on 30 October 1975 (A/C.1/1066)

Romania called for a number of measures including cessation of the arms race through the immediate freezing and reduction of military budgets, with the highest priority overall being assigned to nuclear disarmament. It provided for undertakings to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons; banning introduction of new nuclear weapons into the territory of other States; cessation of development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and delivery means, and reduction and liquidation of stockpiles and a total ban; creation of nuclear-free zones; certain partial measures of disarmament and disengagement including withdrawal of foreign based troops, and the dismantling of foreign bases; conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; enhancing the United Nations role and convening a special session of the Assembly on disarmament; banning war propaganda; and the wider informing of the public on the arms race and its consequences.

Thirty-First Session, 1976

19. Political declaration (chapter XVII), adopted at the fifth non-aligned summit conference, Colombo, 16-19 August 1976, submitted by Sri Lanka on 8 September 1976 (A/31/197)

The Declaration stressed the conviction of the Conference that universal peace and security could be assured only by general and complete disarmament in particular, nuclear disarmament, under effective international control and that essential measures to that end should include the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests pending the conclusion of a test ban treaty, renunciation of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of arsenals of all such weapons. The Conference declared that the arms race was inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order. It reiterated the urgent need for convening of a World Disarmament Conference, and recommended in the meantime, the holding of a Special Session of the General Assembly.

20. Memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament, submitted by the USSR on 28 September 1976 (A/31/232)

The memorandum contained proposals which were considered as the main areas for co-ordinated action: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; (c) consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; (d) prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; (e) prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction; (f) reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments; (g) creation of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions; (h) reduction of military budgets; and negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament, particularly in a universal forum such as a world disarmament conference.

Thirty-second Session, 1977

21. Draft resolution on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war, submitted by the USSR in November 1977 (A/32/242, annex 11)

The draft resolution specified a variety of measures to be taken by all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for the purpose of reducing, as far as possible, the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. The proposal urged that those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so should conclude agreements with other nuclear-weapon States concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and that those nuclear-weapon States which had concluded such agreements with each other should improve and develop such measures. It also called for negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from certain areas of the world's oceans and on other possible measures to limit the nuclear arms race in those areas.

III. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION \*/

22. Proposal for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority submitted by the United States on 14 June 1946 (AEC/1/1)

An International Atomic Development Authority would be created and entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy and with power to control, inspect and license all atomic activities. Once a system of control was effectively operating, further production of atomic weapons would cease and existing stocks of atomic weapons would be destroyed. The Authority would be in possession of full information as to the production of atomic energy.

23. Draft international convention to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction submitted by the USSR on 19 June 1946 (AEC/2/2)

The draft convention provided for obligations: (a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever; (b) to prohibit the production and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy; (c) to destroy within three months of its entry into force all stocks of atomic weapons. Penalties for violation were to be provided by domestic legislation and the conversion should be followed by other measures to control observance of it. The need and possibilities of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes were stressed.

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\*/ The General Assembly by resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, established an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was dissolved on 11 January 1952, by Assembly Resolution 502 (VI).

IV. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION \*/

24. Draft plan of work submitted by the United States on 14 March 1952 (DC/3)

Under the draft plan, the Commission would, inter alia, examine such specific questions as: plans for the progressive and continuing disclosures of all armed forces, including atomic armaments; effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy; elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; methods of verification, in particular through international inspection, to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of information disclosed; the establishment of an international control organ or organs; the elaboration of effective safeguards; procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

25. Draft plan of work submitted by the USSR on 19 March 1952 (DC/4/Rev.1)

The plan put emphasis on: (a) prohibition of atomic weapons - prohibition and control would be put into effect simultaneously; reduction by the permanent members of the Security Council of the armaments and armed forces by one-third within a year; and information on armaments and armed forces - including atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories; (b) prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons; (c) a draft convention on prohibition of atomic weapons and use of those existing only for civilian purposes; and (d) establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council.

26. Draft plan of work submitted by France on 26 March 1952 (DC/5)

The plan contained the following items: disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic; regulation of all armaments and armed forces including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme. The questions of disclosure and regulation were to be studied concurrently in the first stage of the Commission's work.

27. Programme of work adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 28 March 1952 (DC/6)

Consideration of nuclear disarmament-related issues was envisaged under the following headings listed on the programme:

- A. Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments and of all armed forces.

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\*/ The General Assembly, by its resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, established the Disarmament Commission which was directed to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, for the elimination of all mass destruction weapons and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy.

- B. Regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including:
1. Elimination of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy
  2. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction
  3. Limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and armed forces.

C. Procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

28. Proposal concerning essential principles for a disarmament programme, submitted by the United States on 24 April 1952 (DC/C.1/1)

The proposal set out essential principles of a disarmament programme including the goal and how it would be achieved through international agreements which would provide for safeguards to ensure compliance.

29. Tripartite working paper setting forth proposals for fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (DC/10)

The proposal suggested that there should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. A ceiling between 1 million and 1.5 million was suggested for the Soviet Union, the United States and China, while a ceiling between 700,000 and 800,000 was suggested for the United Kingdom and France. The proposal called for agreed maximum ceilings for all other States having substantial armed forces and envisaged reduction in armed forces.

The proposal was supplemented with a new tripartite paper submitted on 12 August 1952 (DC/12).

30. "Letter dated 8 April 1954 from the Permanent Representative of India to the Secretary-General enclosing extracts from statement made by the Prime Minister of India in the House of the People on 2 April 1954 on the subject of the hydrogen bomb" (DC/44)

In his statement, Prime Minister Nehru of India, among other things, proposed that pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the following measures should be taken:

- (a) "standstill" agreement on nuclear-weapon tests;
- (b) full publicity by the nuclear-weapon States and by the United Nations on the destructive power and known and probable effects of nuclear weapons;
- (c) immediate and continuing consideration, within the Disarmament Commission, of the "standstill" proposal on nuclear-weapon tests, pending decisions on prohibitions and control;
- (d) active involvement by States and peoples, in particular those not directly involved with nuclear-weapon production, in a world-wide public opinion campaign against such weapons.

31. "Communication dated 19 April 1954 to the Secretary-General from the Permanent Observer of Japan to the United Nations transmitting a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan dated 17 April 1954 enclosing a resolution passed by the House of Councillors on 5 April 1954" (DC/50)

By the resolution, entitled "Resolution on international control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons", the House of Councillors decided to request the United Nations to take immediately appropriate measures to realize the establishment of an effective international control of atomic energy, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the prevention of damages by experiments of atomic weapons, and to achieve the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

32. Draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 14 May 1954 (DC/SC.1/1)

By the operative paragraphs, the Disarmament Commission would, *inter alia*, declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of mass destruction weapons and direct the Security Council to take immediate measures towards an international agreement guaranteeing the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of that prohibition.

33. Working paper on methods of implementing and enforcing disarmament programmes - the establishment of international control organs with appropriate rights, powers and functions, submitted by the United States on 25 May 1954 (DC/SC.1/5)

The proposal called for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority and detailed its organization, responsibilities and financing and relationships to other United Nations organs and to individual States.

34. Statement by the Government of the USSR on the speech delivered by United States President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953, submitted by the USSR on 8 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/8)

In its statement, the USSR, *inter alia*, accepted a proposal contained in United States President Eisenhower's speech that the two countries hold talks on atomic weapons. The USSR suggested that those talks should examine the USSR's proposal for an agreement by which signatories to it would assume a solemn and unconditional obligation not to employ atomic, hydrogen or other mass destruction weapons.

35. Proposal submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/9)

The proposal consisted of a text entitled "Basic provisions of a draft international convention for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, for a substantial reduction in armaments and armed forces, and for the establishment of international control over the observance of the convention".

36. Memorandum submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/10)

The memorandum contained a proposal for immediate acceptance of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except for defence. The draft treaty should include: the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons of mass destruction of every type; major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; establishment of a control organ. The treaty should be approved by a

World Disarmament Conference. The treaty would detail phases through which the disarmament programme should be carried out: first phase - over-all military manpower and military expenditure should be limited to 31 December 1953 levels; second phase - one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear and other prohibited weapons should cease; third phase - the second half of the agreed reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons should be carried out.

37. Draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 25 February 1955 (DC/SC.1/12/Rev.1)

By the draft resolution, the Security Council or the General Assembly would, among other things, propose to all nuclear-weapon States to destroy completely their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and use atomic materials solely for peaceful purposes.

38. Draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/14)

By the draft resolution, the sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission would submit to the General Assembly for consideration a proposal to convene in 1955 a world conference on the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, to be attended by States Members as well as non-members of the United Nations.

39. Draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/15/Rev.1)

The draft resolution outlined the provisions which should be provided for in a disarmament treaty including: (a) total prohibition of use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and conversion of existing stocks to peaceful purposes; (b) major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; (c) a control organ to guarantee compliance. The disarmament programme would be carried out as follows: first phase - over-all military manpower and expenditure should be limited to agreed levels; second phase - one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it, the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons should cease; third phase - second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it, the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear and all other prohibited weapons should be carried out.

40. "Declaration of the Delegations of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States", submitted on 11 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/16)

The Declaration contained the views of the sponsors on the USSR draft resolution contained in DC/SC.1/12/Rev.1, above. They observed, *inter alia*, that the draft resolution did not provide for a halt to the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and for the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

41. Draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 19 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/19/Rev.1)

By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit for confirmation by the Security Council a draft international convention or treaty providing for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other mass destruction weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States, a substantial reduction in armaments and implementation of those decisions on the basis of the joint French/United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/10; see above).

42. Memorandum on the reduction of armed forces, submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 29 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/20)

France and the United Kingdom stated that they were prepared to reduce their armed forces to a ceiling of 650,000 provided that those of the other three permanent members of the Security Council would be fixed at a figure of between 1 million and 1.5 million, other States would have considerably lower ceilings, and no State would be entitled to increase its armed forces except in special cases.

In another memorandum of 19 April 1955 (DC/SC.1/24) it was agreed that the reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments should be better co-ordinated with the abolition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, amendments to the draft resolution of 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/15/Rev.1, above) were proposed.

43. Proposal on nuclear disarmament, submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States on 18 April 1955 (DC/SC.1/23)

The proposal provided, in general, for the destruction and prohibition of use and manufacture of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and for the conversion to peaceful uses of all stocks of fissile materials possessed by States. The proposal considered that these measures should be fitted in with reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in such a way that no country's security would be endangered in the process.

44. Joint draft resolution on the principles of control, submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States on 21 April 1955 (DC/SC.1/25)

The draft provided, among other things, for the establishment of an international control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments and the prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons.

45. Proposal concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons submitted by the USSR on 10 May 1955 (DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2)

The proposal called for a declaration by the General Assembly in which was included a comprehensive and detailed two-stage disarmament programme. In the first stage the permanent members of the Security Council would reduce their armed forces and armaments by 50 per cent of the difference between the specific ceilings proposed by France and the United Kingdom. Simultaneously the draft envisaged as one of the first measures, discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests, prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, and elimination of some of the military bases in the territories of other States. During the second stage, the second half of the reductions would be carried out. When 75 per cent of the total reduction had been completed a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would come into force. These weapons would be destroyed simultaneously with the last 25 per cent of the reduction of armed forces. The States should reduce their armaments and armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

Concerning control, it was anticipated, in the first stage, creation of an international control organ which would be allowed to install control posts on a basis of reciprocity, at major ports, at railway junctions, on main highways and at airfields in the territories of all States concerned. The functions of the control organ would be extended in the second stage and would include inspection on a permanent basis.



46. Memorandum of the United States, submitted on 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/28)

The memorandum contained a statement on disarmament by the President of the United States on 21 July 1955 at the Geneva meetings of the Heads of Government of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. In his statement, the President of the United States, among other things stated his Government's readiness to enter into a sound and reliable agreement to reduce armaments. In this connection, he stressed the view that priority attention in disarmament efforts should be paid to the subject of an adequate inspection and reporting system. He therefore suggested a study of the subject to include a step-by-step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

47. "Proposal submitted by Mr. N.A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the meeting of the Heads of Government for the four great Powers held on 21 July 1955" submitted to the Disarmament Commission by the USSR on 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/29/Rev.1)

The proposal was in the nature of a draft decision by the four Heads of Governments on questions relating to the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons. By the proposal, the four leaders would, inter alia, agree that complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall enter into force when conventional armaments and armed forces had been reduced to the extent of 75 per cent of the agreed reductions, and that pending the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the four States would assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons against any country.

48. Memorandum of the United Kingdom, submitted on 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/30)

The memorandum contained a proposal by the United Kingdom at the Geneva meetings of the Heads of Government of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, on 21 July 1955. The United Kingdom proposed that consideration be given to the establishment of a system of joint inspection of the forces confronting each other in Europe. The United Kingdom thought that the project would provide an opportunity for the practical test on a limited scale of international inspection of forces and would provide valuable experience and lessons for use over a wider field in the future.

49. Proposal concerning aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints, submitted by the United States on 30 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/31)

Under the proposed plan, the United States and the Soviet Union were to exchange information about the strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, as well as a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations, with their positions. Verification of information was to be accompanied by ground observers as well as unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance.

50. Working paper containing proposals concerning the structure of an international disarmament organization, submitted by France on 2 September 1955 (DC/SC.1/32)

The proposed organization would include a Control Administration section to ensure compliance with disarmament agreements.

51. Working paper containing proposals concerning the powers of the Control Administration, submitted by France on 2 September 1955 (DC/SC.1/33)

Elaborated on the functions of the Control Administration provided for in DC/SC.1/32, above. Functions were envisaged largely in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces.

52. Memorandum concerning the control organ, submitted by the United Kingdom on 13 September 1955 (DC/SC.1/34)

The work of the control organ would mainly be in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces but would also include the adequate attention being paid to developments relating to nuclear installations and reactors.

53. Working paper containing a proposal concerning the objects which should be subject to control, submitted by France on 6 October 1955 (DC/SC.1/35)

Amended parts of document DC/SC.1/33, above, with the amended version providing for an expanded role for the proposed Control Administration in the nuclear field.

54. "Memorandum supplementing outline plan for the implementation of the 21 July 1955 presidential proposal at Geneva regarding disarmament", submitted by the United States on 7 October 1955 (DC/SC.1/36)

Elaborated on DC/SC.1/28, above, on the subject of an inspection and control system in a disarmament programme.

55. Working paper containing a proposed synthesis submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 19 March 1956 (DC/SC.1/38)

This was a revised edition of the plan of 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/10, above). The new plan provided for: significant conventional reduction to be carried out in the first stage; limitation of nuclear tests at the beginning of the second stage and total prohibition at the beginning of the third; prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons - the cut-off at the beginning of the third stage - and the link between the achievement of political settlements and the achievement of disarmament.

56. Proposal for an agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, submitted by the USSR on 27 March 1956 (DC/SC.1/41)

The proposal contained three different partial disarmament approaches:  
(a) limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the specific levels of 1 million to 1.5 million men for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom, within two years, with an international control organ to be established and to be in position to carry out inspections before reductions commenced; (b) a European zone of limitation and inspection of armaments; (c) discontinuance of tests of thermonuclear weapons, independently of disarmament; (d) banning of atomic weapons on German soil; and (e) a 15 per cent reduction of military budgets.

57. "Draft working paper for the first phase of a comprehensive agreement for disarmament", submitted by the United States on 3 April 1956 (DC/SC.1/42)

Among the objectives of the first phase would be: decrease the nuclear threat over the world; provide against surprise attack; prevent a future arms race of either a conventional or nuclear nature. In implementing those objectives specific measures would, among others, provide for all signatory States possessing

nuclear weapons to begin to make agreed regular reciprocal and equitable transfers of their fissionable materials to exclusively peaceful uses; the testing of nuclear weapons to be limited and monitored in an agreed manner under the control of an Armaments Regulations Council.

58. "Working paper on control", submitted by France and United Kingdom on 3 May 1956 (DC/SC.1/44)

The proposed international disarmament organization would, in stage II of a disarmament programme, control, among other military-related activities and facilities, nuclear test explosions. In stage III, and for as long as the treaty on a disarmament programme remained in effect, control would also extend to establishments that produced nuclear materials, establishments that used nuclear materials and stocks of nuclear material of weapons grade not made up into weapons.

59. "Declaration", submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States on 4 May 1956 (DC/SC.1/46)

In the Declaration the four delegations reaffirmed their determination to seek agreement on a disarmament programme which should take effect without delay and should include measures, under effective international control, to end competition in armed forces and armaments of all kinds.

60. "Draft declaration", submitted by the USSR on 3 July 1956 (DC/88)

By the draft declaration, Member States of the United Nations would, inter alia, assume a solemn obligation to refrain in their international relations from the use or threat of use of force and the use of atomic or hydrogen weapons.

61. Draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 3 July 1956 (DC/87)

By the draft resolution, the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission would continue to search for agreement guided by certain principles including: proceeding by stages, with each dependent on satisfactory completion of the previous stage; effective international control; and, under safeguards, cessation of build-up of nuclear weapons. The production of fissionable materials would be devoted to peaceful uses. Amendments to the draft were subsequently submitted by Australia on 10 July 1956 (DC/90) and by the four original sponsors plus Australia on 10 July 1956 (DC/91).

62. Draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia on 10 July 1956 (DC/92)

The draft resolution urged the members of the Sub-Committee to reach agreement on general disarmament; to seek an early agreement on and implementation of such initial disarmament measures as were feasible, more particularly, a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces as well as of military expenditure; the cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons.

63. "Note verbale dated 25 July 1956 from the representative of India to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/98)

The note verbale contained a memorandum setting out proposals of the Government of India for consideration by the Disarmament Commission. The proposals included the following related to nuclear weapons: (1) cessation of all explosions of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons; (2) prohibition of the further use of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; (3) prohibition of the transfer of fissionable materials from civilian to military stocks; (4) an agreement by those States most

advanced in the production of weapons of mass destruction to dismantle in public a limited number of atomic and hydrogen bombs and to make available for peaceful purposes the fissionable material contained in these weapons.

64. "Letter dated 18 March 1957 from the representative of Japan to the Secretary-General transmitting a resolution of the House of Councillors of Japan on the prohibition of atom and hydrogen bombs, together with a letter from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan" (DC/109)

In his letter, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in addition to transmitting the resolution adopted by the House of Councillors of Japan on 15 March 1957, also reproduced the texts of two earlier resolutions adopted by the House of Councillors on 5 April 1954 and 9 February 1956, both of which called for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The 15 March 1957 resolution also called for such prohibition and inter alia called upon the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to suspend all atomic and hydrogen bomb tests. (See also DC/50, above).

65. "Proposal on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons", submitted by the USSR on 18 March 1957 (DC/SC.1/49)

The proposal, among other things, provided for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes. It also provided for the establishment of an effective international control organ to ensure compliance with the provisions of agreed measures.

66. "Note verbale dated 9 April 1957 from the Ambassador of Japan in London to the Secretary-General" (DC/SC.1/51)

The note verbale contained proposals by the Government of Japan towards prohibiting nuclear test explosions. The proposals provided, inter alia, for the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation or a Nuclear Test Explosion Control Committee which could be newly established, to study whether it was possible to detect all nuclear test explosions and should it conclude that such detection was possible, all nuclear test explosions would be prohibited upon the recommendation of the General Assembly or Security Council. Should the Committee conclude that such detection was impossible by means of existing detection systems and methods, a new international detection machinery shall be set up by the Committee, methods of detection shall be improved and strengthened and steps shall be taken to make such detection possible.

67. "Note verbale dated 24 June 1957 from the Ambassador of Yugoslavia in London to the Secretary-General" (DC/SC.1/52/Add.1)

The note verbale contained a "Declaration" dated 18 June 1957, of the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia calling for an end to the tests of nuclear weapons and for their prohibition.

It suggested, as a minimum, an agreement to suspend such tests temporarily for a given period, to be supplemented by declarations by the States concerned not to conduct further tests, even after the expiry of the agreed period, unless another State should resume tests.

68. "Letter dated 26 April from the Chargé d'Affaires of Norway in London to the Secretary-General" (DC/SC.1/54)

Enclosed with the letter was a memorandum by the Government of Norway concerning the proposal for a system for registering nuclear test explosions.

69. Proposals on the implementation of partial disarmament measures, submitted by the USSR on 30 April 1957 (DC/SC.1/55)

The proposals envisaged: acceptance of the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and China to 2.5 million men and of France and the United Kingdom to 750,000 men each, as a first step towards further reductions in the armed forces respectively to 1 - 1.5 million men and 650,000 men; reduction of the military budgets during the first period by 15 per cent; creation of an appropriate international control organ under the Security Council; establishment of control posts on the territory of States; renouncement of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons; discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; liquidation of foreign bases; aerial inspection within certain areas in Europe and the Far East; ending of war propaganda.

70. "Memorandum on nuclear test explosions", submitted by the United Kingdom on 6 May 1957 (DC/SC.1/56)

The memorandum contained proposals on the registration, limitation and cessation of nuclear explosions.

71. "Memorandum on radio-active fall-out", submitted by the United States on 8 May 1957 (DC/SC.1/57)

The memorandum contained the text of a speech on radio-active fall-out delivered on 26 April 1957 by the Commissioner of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

72. "Joint statement on the temporary suspension of nuclear test explosions", submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and the United States on 2 July 1957 (DC/SC.1/59)

The statement, *inter alia*, noted USSR's acceptance of the principle of setting up inspection posts with appropriate scientific facilities for the purposes of control and detection of nuclear testing. The statement pointed out that such acceptance brought within the realm of possibility a temporary suspension of nuclear testing as part of an agreement for a first step in disarmament. The temporary agreement, the statement emphasized, would be subject to precise agreement on its duration and timing, on the installation and location of the necessary controls, including inspection posts, and on its relationship to other provisions of a first stage disarmament agreement.

73. "Proposal on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests", submitted by the USSR on 14 June 1957 (DC/SC.1/60)

The proposal, *inter alia*, suggested the establishment, on the basis of reciprocity, of control posts in the territory of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States and in the Pacific Ocean area for the purpose of supervising the fulfilment by States of their obligation to cease atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

74. "Working paper on systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack", submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and the United States on 2 August 1957 (DC/SC.1/62/Rev.1)

According to the paper, upon the entry into force of a first-stage disarmament agreement, the parties concerned would co-operate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection in order to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack. The paper then described in detail what would be envisaged.

75. Working paper containing proposals for partial measures of disarmament, submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 29 August 1957 (DC/SC.1/66)

The working paper contained proposals on limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; military expenditures; non-use of nuclear weapons except in self defence; control of fissionable material; nuclear weapons testing, control of objects entering outer space, and safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack. Part of the proposal, which was intended as a package proposal, would be the setting-up of an international control organization.

76. "Note verbale dated 29 August 1961 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement by the Government of the United States of America concerning the Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/189) \*/

The statement, *inter alia*, reviewed the United States Government's position on a nuclear test ban in general and on the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests, in particular. The statement stressed the importance and value of international inspection and control to ensure compliance with any agreement to discontinue nuclear-weapon tests and it appealed to the USSR to reconsider its position favouring national rather than international means of control.

77. "Letter dated 12 September 1961 from the Permanent Representatives of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, India, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General" (DC/190)

The letter contained a statement \*\*/ on disarmament agreed by Commonwealth Prime Ministers on 17 March 1961. In their statement, the Commonwealth leaders, *inter alia*, said the aim must be to achieve total world-wide disarmament, subject to effective inspection and control. They stated that the elimination of nuclear and conventional armaments must be so phased that at no stage would any country or group of countries obtain a significant military advantage. They stressed that every effort should be made to secure agreement for the permanent banning of nuclear-weapon tests by all nations and for arrangements to verify observance of such an agreement. They saw an agreement banning nuclear tests as urgent since otherwise additional countries might become nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, they held, an agreement on nuclear tests, apart from its direct advantages, would provide an additional impetus for agreement on other disarmament measures.

78. "Letter dated 13 November 1961 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the General Assembly, transmitting the text of a note concerning the resumption of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests delivered by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of the USSR" (DC/193)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

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\*/ Circulated also as an annex to document A/4853.

\*\*/. The text of the statement was also circulated as an annex to General Assembly document A/4863.

79. "Letter dated 13 November 1961 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the General Assembly, transmitting the text of a note concerning the resumption of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests delivered by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of the USSR" (DC/194)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

80. "Letter dated 14 December 1961 from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting the verbatim records and documents of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests for the period 28 November to 7 December 1961" (DC/195 and Add.1)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

81. "Letter dated 19 February 1962 from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting the verbatim records and documents of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests for the period 8 December 1961 to 29 January 1962" (DC/195 and Add.2)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

82. "Letter dated 19 December 1961 from the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a joint report on the situation in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1649 (XVI)" (DC/196)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

83. "Letter dated 20 February 1962 from the representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a supplementary joint report on the situation in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests" (DC/196/Add.1)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

84. "Letter dated 20 December 1961 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a statement dated 13 December 1961 by the Soviet Government on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", (DC/197)

In its statement, the Government of the USSR, among other things, regretted that its proposal presented on 28 November 1961 at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests <sup>\*/</sup>, had not met with the approval of Western nuclear-weapon States. It reaffirmed the proposal and saw it as creating every

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<sup>\*/</sup> GEN/DNT/122. See also "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

possibility for a speedy agreement on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The proposal, among other things, provided for a ban on nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, with the exercise of mutual control through national means of detection. In relation to underground tests, the proposal provided that a moratorium on such tests be established pending an agreement on a system for controlling underground explosions as part of an international system for controlling the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. In its statement the USSR stressed that it would be forced, because of continued testing by Western States, to conduct nuclear-weapon tests in order to ensure its defence but that at the same time it would continue to make every effort to achieve an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.

85. "Letter dated 2 January 1962 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a communication from the Soviet Government on the situation with regard to the question of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/198)

The communication of the Government of the USSR consisted of a detailed review of its position and an assessment, from its viewpoint, of developments at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests. In the communication, the Government of the USSR once more reaffirmed its position and proposals on the issue (see also document DC/197, above).

86. "Letter from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a report on the inquiry conducted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI)". submitted on 2 April 1962 (DC/201 and Add.1 to 3 and DC/204 and Add.1)

General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI) of 4 December 1961, requested the Secretary-General to make an inquiry into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country. In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General on 2 January 1962, requested Member States to give their views with regard to the aforementioned conditions. Those views were reproduced as addenda to the Secretary-General's report as results of his inquiry, in accordance with Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI).

87. "Letter dated 3 April 1962 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement by the Soviet Government on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/202)

In his statement, the Government of the USSR, among other things, asserted that Western nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, had not only continued but had in fact intensified their nuclear-weapon tests. The USSR, the statement continued, wanted a ban on such tests and as such was prepared to continue discussions at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and also within the framework of an agreement on general and complete disarmament in the course of deliberations in the ENDC.



88. "Letter dated 28 April 1965 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/213 and Add.1 and 2)

Addendum 1 of the letter consisted of the text of a "draft treaty proposed by the USSR on general and complete disarmament under strict international control" \*/ and addendum 2 consisted of a memorandum \*\*/ by the USSR on measures for the reduction of international tension and limitation of the arms race. Among the disarmament obligations provided for in the draft treaty were the prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. An international disarmament organization to implement control over disarmament was also provided for in the draft treaty.

89. "Letter dated 29 April 1965 from the representative of the United States of America to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/214 and Add.1)

The letter included a "Memorandum of the United States of America on measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt and turn down the arms race, and reduce international tension". The memorandum set forth the positions the United States took at the ENDC during 1964. These positions were derived largely from proposals contained in a message to the Committee from United States President Johnson on 21 January 1964. The full text of the message was also included in the memorandum, as were statements by various United States officials elaborating on certain of its aspects. Also included in the memorandum was an amended text of the document previously submitted to the ENDC on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30, see above) by the United States entitled "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world".

90. "Letter dated 3 May 1965 from the representative of Yugoslavia to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/216)

The letter included a "Memorandum of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on necessary immediate measures in the field of disarmament".

The measures proposed by Yugoslavia for immediate implementation included the following: (a) the obligation not to use nuclear weapons; (b) the banning of all nuclear-weapon tests without exception; (c) the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, with an agreement to begin solving the problem of denuclearization of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Yugoslavia considered, inter alia, that the problems of control, as far as the aforementioned proposals were concerned, should not constitute an insurmountable difficulty.

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\*/ Revised text of the draft treaty originally submitted to the ENDC on 15 March 1962, incorporating additions and amendments issued since that date.

\*\*/ General Assembly document A/5827 of 7 December 1964.

91. Draft resolution submitted by the United States on 1 June 1965 (DC/200/Rev.1)

By the draft resolution, the Disarmament Commission, inter alia, would urge the ENDC, inter alia, to resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban treaty; conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizeable, agreed quantities of such material; explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.

92. Resolution adopted at the 102nd meeting of the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 (DC/225)

By the operative part of the resolution, the Disarmament Commission, inter alia, reaffirmed the General Assembly's call upon all States to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and recommended that the ENDC should, among other things, consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the Partial Test Ban Treaty to cover underground nuclear-weapon tests.

V. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (TNCD)

93. "A plan for general and comprehensive disarmament in a free and peaceful world" submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States on 16 March 1960 (TNCD/3)

The proposal called for a three-stage plan. In the first stage, it provided for the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization for carrying out studies and furnishing data designed to facilitate enforcement, as well as for initial arms reductions. Second-stage measures included a ban on placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space; an agreement to stop production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; measures to prevent surprise attacks, including the establishment of an effective verification system; and further reductions in armed forces. In the final stage, maximum reductions were to be carried out, and an international law enforcement capability to preserve world peace was to be established. The ultimate goal was general and complete disarmament, with inspection and control under the international disarmament organization, particularly the prohibition of production of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

94. "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and USSR on 8 April 1960 (TNCD/4)

According to the document, general and complete disarmament included, among other things, the disbanding of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, prohibition of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles, and establishment of an international control organ. The process would proceed by stages with a fixed time-table.

95. Proposal concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, submitted by Canada, France, Italy, United Kingdom and United States on 26 April 1960 (TNCD/5)

Among other things, the document declared that the disarmament process and any agreement finally reached must fulfil certain conditions, inter alia, the following: (a) disarmament must be carried out by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible although no fixed time-table could be laid down in advance for the process as a whole; (b) nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced so that no country or group of countries would obtain, at any stage, a significant military advantage and so that equal security for all would be maintained.

The proposal concluded that the final goal of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to the levels required by each State for its own internal security and fulfilment of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the elimination of all weapons surplus to those required for these purposes. The programme must also provide for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the final elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

96. "Basic clauses on a treaty on general and complete disarmament", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on 7 June 1960 (TNCD/6/Rev.1)

The basic provisions of the draft treaty were: in the first stage (18 months) all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be destroyed and their manufacture prohibited, all foreign military bases would be eliminated and all troops would be

withdrawn from foreign territories, all rockets launched for peaceful purposes would be subject to inspection, and dissemination of nuclear weapons would be prohibited. In the second stage, there would be a complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, and reduction of armed forces to fixed levels. The third stage would complete the process of general and complete disarmament. An international control organization would verify the implementation of the provisions of the treaty by stages and without hindrance. Measures for preserving peace and security would be carried out under the United Nations Charter with the Security Council having contingents of militia at its disposal.

97. "Programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control" submitted by the United States on 27 June 1960 (TNCD/7)

The paper outlined the goal and the controlling principles by which general and complete disarmament could be achieved and briefly described a three-stage programme. The first stage would include prohibition of placing in orbit vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction; taking measures to guard against surprise attack; initial reductions in armed forces and armaments; and cessation of production of fissionable material. The second stage would include further reduction of armed forces; reduction of all weapons including atomic; and creation of an international peace force within the United Nations. The third stage would complete force reductions to levels required for maintaining internal order and for the international peace force. An international disarmament organization would verify that each stage was initiated simultaneously and upon completion of the necessary preparatory studies.

The proposal was further elaborated by a declaration on 25 September 1961 (A/4891) and also issued as ENDC/6 on 19 March 1962.

VI. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

1962 Session

98. "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", a draft submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 19 June 1962 (ENDC/2)

The draft treaty set forth measures which would lead within a short time to elimination of the military machinery of States. The disarmament process would take place in three stages within a fixed, short period of time (five years). The reduction of armed forces and armaments would proceed to agreed levels parallel to the reduction in the production of conventional armaments. The total elimination of all foreign military bases would take place in the first stage. The complete elimination of vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of such vehicles as well as the obligation not to transfer control of nuclear weapons or information on their production to non-nuclear States was also envisaged in the first stage. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes and the discontinuance of their production would take place during the second stage. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons would be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed. At the third stage, all armed forces would be fully disbanded and the elimination of the military machinery of States would be completed. The draft provided for strict international control over what was being reduced, destroyed or converted to peaceful uses, as well as over the cessation of arms production. Contingents without nuclear weapons would be made available to the Security Council, under article 43 of the Charter. An international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations Charter would establish procedures for the settlement of international disputes.

The draft treaty was later amended and revised as follows: 16 July 1962 (ENDC/2/Add.1), 22 September 1962 (A/C.1/867 or ENDC/2/Rev.1) and 4 February 1964 (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

99. "Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 21 March 1962 (ENDC/9)

The draft treaty was originally submitted to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, as documents GEN/DNT/110 dated 18 April 1961, and addenda 1 to 3 thereto, and was also issued earlier as document A/4772 and addendum 1 thereto. See also "Proposals submitted to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

100. "Statement by the Soviet Government, dated 27 November 1961, in connection with the resumption of negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and text of a draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 22 March 1962 (ENDC/11)

The draft agreement was issued earlier as document GEN/DNT/122, on 11 December 1961. See DC/197 (Proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission), above.

101. "Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of 26 September 1961, on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 24 March 1962 (ENDC/14)

The memorandum contained proposals for (a) freezing of the military budgets of States, (b) renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, (c) prohibition of war propaganda, (d) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, (e) withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, (f) measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, (g) establishment of nuclear-free zones, and (h) steps to decrease the danger of surprise attack. Also issued as document A/4892, above.

102. "Letter, dated 27 March 1962, from the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, transmitting a Memorandum from the Government of the German Democratic Republic", submitted by Czechoslovakia on 27 March 1962 (ENDC/16)

The memorandum contained a proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe, including the region of northern Europe.

103. "Joint Memorandum", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic, on 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28)

The joint memorandum expressed deep concern about the lack of agreement on banning nuclear weapon tests and proposed the establishment of an International Commission, a verification system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis.

104. "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted by the United States on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30)

The plan outlined a disarmament process which would take place in three stages. Beginning with a freeze, disarmament was to be gradual as confidence developed; ultimately, the military establishment would be eliminated. The first two stages were to be of three years each, and the third would be completed within an agreed period of time, as promptly as possible. Armed forces and all major armaments, nuclear as well as conventional, would be gradually reduced. The draft provided in the first stage for the nuclear-weapon States to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons; not to transfer control of nuclear weapons or information on their production to non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to transfer, for peaceful uses, agreed quantities of such material. The number of nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons would be reduced by an agreed percentage during the second stage and their production would halt and nuclear weapons would be reduced in the light of the steps taken in stages I and II. The plan envisaged a system of inspection and control to verify the disarmament process and, in addition, to verify remaining quantities of armaments and forces. It also proposed measures to keep and reinforce peace during and after the disarmament process. A United Nations peace observation corps and peace force would be established. The question of whether the peace force should be equipped with nuclear weapons was to be left open for future decision. The international disarmament organization would be placed within the framework of the United Nations and its administrator would consult with the Secretary-General, providing that the decisions would be taken by the organization's control council. Parties would refrain from use of force of any type contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and would settle disputes in accordance with Charter procedures. The draft treaty was later amended as follows: 6 August 1962 (ENDC/30/Add.1); 8 August 1962 (ENDC/30/Add.2); 10 December 1962 (ENDC/69); 14 August 1963 (ENDC/30/Add.3 and ENDC/109).

105. "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58)

The draft treaty set forth provisions, inter alia, regarding the obligation to discontinue nuclear weapon testing; the establishment of the International Scientific Commission including its functions, role, organization of the verification system and on-site inspection; and the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

106. "Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space, and Underwater", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/59)

The draft treaty was a contribution towards the realization of what eventually became the partial test ban treaty.

107. "Working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication", submitted by the United States on 12 December 1962 (ENDC/70)

The paper proposed various measures to prevent accidental war, in particular a nuclear war, including, among others, advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres, setting up observation posts, exchange of military missions, communications on military emergencies.

#### 1963 Session

108. "Declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons", a draft proposal submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 12 February 1963 (ENDC/75)

The draft set forth several measures as a step towards more extensive disarmament measures. It urged the dismantling of bases in foreign territory for nuclear submarines; the withdrawal from foreign ports of aircraft carriers having nuclear weapons on board; the dismantling of strategic nuclear weapon systems in foreign territory; and the withdrawal of strategic nuclear bombers from foreign bases.

109. "Memorandum of position concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 1 April 1963 (ENDC/78)

The memorandum proposed arrangements for on-site inspections and for automatic seismic stations on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

110. "Outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons", submitted by Mexico on 21 June 1963 (ENDC/98)

The draft treaty set forth provisions for prohibition of the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. It called for peaceful use of outer space and of the celestial bodies.

111. "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States on 30 July 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1)

The document contained the agreed text of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater (Partial Test-Ban Treaty);

1964 Session

112. "Measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension", submitted by the USSR on 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123)

The memorandum contained proposals on withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, reductions of armed forces, reduction of military budgets, non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear non-proliferation, measures to prevent surprise attack, elimination of bomber aircraft, and prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

113. "Working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cut-off", submitted by the United States on 25 June 1964 (ENDC/134)

The proposal outlined the requirements for inspection of nuclear power under a cut-off of fissionable material production for use in weapons. IAEA safeguards were envisaged.

114. "Working Document on Nuclear Delivery Vehicles", submitted by Nigeria on 14 July 1964 (ENDC/136)

It was proposed that an agreed quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles should be set at the initial stage, with the goal of a total elimination of all such systems at the end of the disarmament process.

115. "Memoranda containing a brief résumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 14 September 1964 (ENDC/144)

The paper contained memoranda which reflected views, positions, suggestions and proposals of each delegation on disarmament issues, particularly the question of nuclear disarmament.

1965 Session

116. "Draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons", submitted by the United States on 17 August 1955 (ENDC/152)

The draft treaty was a contribution towards the realization of what eventually became the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The draft was subsequently amended on 21 March 1966 (ENDC/152/Add.1) and on 24 August 1967 (ENDC/192).



117. "Draft of unilateral non-acquisition declaration", submitted by Italy on 14 September 1965 (ENDC/157)

The draft set the form for a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States, with a view to facilitating international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear arsenals, leading to general and complete disarmament.

118. "Joint memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 15 September 1965 (ENDC/159 <sup>\*</sup>/)

The joint memorandum reiterated an appeal to the States concerned to suspend forthwith nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and called for the discontinuance of underground tests and the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

#### 1966 Session

119. "Letter, dated 24 September 1965, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/5976)", submitted by the USSR on 27 January 1966 (ENDC/164)

The letter contained a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, proposed by the USSR. The draft was subsequently amended on 24 August 1967 (ENDC/193).

120. "Working paper on transfer of fissionable material obtained by the destruction of nuclear weapons", submitted by the United States on 8 March 1966 (ENDC/172)

The paper suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union should each agree to transfer to peaceful uses highly enriched uranium and plutonium obtained from nuclear weapons destroyed for that purpose. The materials obtained through the destruction process would be transferred under IAEA safeguards and the weapons themselves would be disassembled under appropriate observation arrangements.

121. "Working paper on an inspection method for verifying the status of shutdown plutonium production reactors", submitted by the United States on 14 April 1966 (ENDC/174)

The paper set forth technical aspects of one possible method of determining that reactors for the production of plutonium that had been shut down in compliance with an arms control or disarmament agreement had remained so between visits of inspectors.

This paper was reinforced by a description of a monitoring system for the shut down of nuclear reactors, submitted by the United States on 11 August 1966 (ENDC/176).

122. "Joint Memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 17 August 1966 (ENDC/177)

The joint memorandum urged the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and offered various ideas and suggestions with a view to facilitating an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests.

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<sup>\*</sup>/ See also ENDC/177, below.

123. "Joint Memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 19 August 1966 (ENDC/178)

The joint memorandum presented five principles in connection with the negotiation of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also contained some elaborations of the sponsors' views and positions on each of the five principles as the basis for negotiating such a treaty.

124. "Memorandum concerning an approach to the realization of United Nations resolutions on banning of nuclear weapons, denuclearization of Africa and a world conference on disarmament", submitted by Ethiopia on 22 August 1966 (ENDC/180)

The memorandum presented views on nuclear disarmament and called for an international agreement for the security of denuclearized regions which were ready for collective security under the principles and auspices of the United Nations. It proposed seven criteria as a basis for negotiating such an agreement, particularly the question of the denuclearization of Africa.

125. "Working paper on determination of the location of seismic events", submitted by the United States on 23 August 1966 (ENDC/182)

The paper presented technical aspects of the determination of the location of seismic events as references for the verification systems of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

#### 1967 Session

126. "Memorandum on the control of an underground test-ban treaty", submitted by Sweden on 19 July 1967 (ENDC/191)

The memorandum presented a scientific background in connection with the problems of an underground test-ban control. It described the Swedish investigations on the question of how to use seismological methods of identification to distinguish underground explosions from earthquakes for the purpose of verifying an underground test-ban treaty.

127. "Working Paper: Proposal concerning the transfer of fissile material", submitted by Italy on 30 November 1967 (ENDC/205)

The paper contained a proposal from the speech delivered at the Conference of the ENDC on 1 August by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

#### 1968 Session

128. "Draft resolution of the Security Council on security assurances", submitted by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on 7 March 1968 (ENDC/222)

The draft resolution dealt with certain assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was later considered at the Security Council and was adopted as Security Council resolution S/RES/255(1968) on 19 June 1968.

129. "Report to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission", submitted by the Co-Chairmen of the ENDC, the USSR and the United States on 14 March 1968 (ENDC/225)

The report contained, inter alia, the final text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as various views, additions and amendments proposed by delegations during the course of deliberations, particularly those of the non-aligned countries, were incorporated. The General Assembly, on 12 June 1968, adopted resolution 2373 (XXII) in which it commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; requested the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date; and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

130. "Memorandum by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament", submitted by the USSR on 16 July 1968 (ENDC/227)

In view of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the memorandum contained proposals on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, stopping manufacture and destroying stockpiles of nuclear weapons, limitation and reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons, limitations on nuclear-weapon-laden bomber flights and navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines, ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests, prohibition of use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, elimination of foreign military bases, measures for regional disarmament, and peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor.

131. "Working paper on the comprehensive test-ban treaty", submitted by the United Kingdom on 20 August 1968 (ENDC/232)

The paper presented proposals regarding the problem of on-site inspection in connection with the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In particular, it called for the establishment of an international committee with the mandate to carry out on-site inspection.

132. "Working paper on underground nuclear explosions", submitted by Italy on 23 August 1968 (ENDC/234)

The paper suggested that the regulation of underground explosions for peaceful purposes should temporarily be separated from that of underground nuclear explosions for military purposes. It proposed certain provisional measures concerning the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, pending an over-all agreement for the cessation of all experiments for military purposes.

The paper was later amended with additions contained in document ENDC/250.

#### 1969 Session

133. "Draft treaty on prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 18 March 1969 (ENDC/240)

The draft treaty was the initial text proposed by the Soviet Union. It was later amended and revised, paving the way to the USSR-USA joint draft Treaty on Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof; contained in document CCD/269, below.

134. "Establishment of nuclear-free zones: Working document" submitted by Mexico on 24 March 1969 (ENDC/241)

The paper described the development of the proposals for nuclear-free zones in Africa and Latin America. It also gave a summarized analysis of the Treaty of Tlatelolco including the nature of its additional protocols. In its final part, it suggested certain conclusions bearing relevant significance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions in the future.

135. "Working paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests" submitted by Sweden on 1 April 1969 (ENDC/242)

The paper contained a draft treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, including the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The draft treaty was later amended in CCD/348 on 2 September 1971.

136. "Working paper on the comprehensive test-ban treaty" submitted by Nigeria on 15 May 1969 (ENDC/246)

Supplementing working paper ENDC/232 submitted by the United Kingdom (see above) concerning the question of on-site inspection for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, this paper recommended that the proposed international committee in charge of such on-site inspection should be composed, exclusively, of non-aligned countries that had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and possessed the technological know-how to cope with the implications of such inspections.

137. "Draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor" submitted by the United States on 22 May 1969 (ENDC/249)

The draft treaty was the initial text proposed by the United States. It was later amended and revised, paving the way to the USSR-USA joint draft treaty on the sea-bed, as contained in document CCD/269, below.

138. "Revised working paper on requests to Governments for information about exchange of seismological data" submitted by Canada on 18 August 1969 (ENDC/251/Rev.1)

The paper contained a draft request of the United Nations Secretary-General to the governments of individual States concerning the provision of certain information in the context of the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data which would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

VII. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1969 Session

139. "Draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof" jointly submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on 30 October 1969 (CCD/269/Rev.1)

The joint draft was subsequently revised and amended during the course of deliberations, as contained in documents CCD/269/Rev.2 on 23 April 1970 and CCD/269/Rev.3 on 1 September 1970.

1970 Session

140. "Working paper on verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty" submitted by the United Kingdom on 28 July 1970 (CCD/296)

The paper described technical aspects of developments in seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions.

141. "Working paper on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.2)" submitted by Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia on 30 July 1970 (CCD/297)

The paper contained amendments to the USSR-United States joint draft text of a Sea-bed treaty (CCD/269/Rev.2).

142. "Working paper introducing seismic data from Rulison" submitted by the United States on 4 August 1970 (CCD/298)

The paper introduced a technical report which presented a comprehensive resume of seismic data from RULISON, including travel times and amplitudes of the principal phases and the associated body- and surface-wave magnitudes.

143. "Working paper on seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Canada on 10 August 1970 (CCD/305)

The paper described technical aspects of seismology with the view to contributing to a verification system for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

1971 Session

144. "Working paper concerning seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions" submitted by the Netherlands on 18 March 1971 (CCD/323)

The paper set forth a summary of existing data in two figures regarding seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions.

145. "Working paper on the seismological detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Canada on 29 June 1971 (CCD/327 and Add.1)

The paper outlined the results of a scientific study of Eurasian earthquakes and underground explosions made using seismic records from the currently deployed Eurasian standard seismograph stations.

146. "Working paper on seismological verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests" submitted by Sweden on 29 June 1971 (CCD/329)

The paper summarized six scientific reports made from 1960 to 1971 as well as some unreported results of efforts at the Research Institute of National Defence in Sweden with a view to contributing to the solution of remaining problems with seismological verification of a ban on underground test explosions of nuclear weapons.

147. "Working paper containing remarks of Dr. Stephan Lukasik, Director of the US Advanced Research Projects Agency, regarding research on seismic detection, location and identification of earthquakes and explosions, presented at Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971" submitted by the United States on 30 June 1971 (CCD/330)

The paper reviewed the status of the research directed towards improving detection capability and location accuracy, the development of discrimination criteria, and the installation of appropriate instrumentation to provide the necessary seismic data to support the discrimination research. The research programme was further elaborated in document CCD/330.

148. "Working paper on the problem of underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Italy on 1 July 1971 (CCD/331)

The paper underlined the importance of the establishment of an effective international seismological data exchange system with a view to detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests, and made a number of suggestions in this regard.

149. "Working paper on possible progress towards the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" submitted by Canada on 22 July 1971 (CCD/336)

The paper recommended certain transitoral or confidence-building measures, pending the achievement of a total test ban, so as to reduce underground testing.

150. "Working paper suggesting some provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests" submitted by Pakistan on 12 August 1971 (CCD/340)

The paper suggested separate provisions to be applied to nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in connection with the conducting of peaceful nuclear explosions. It was proposed that non-nuclear-weapon States must not conduct any kind of nuclear explosions whatsoever including peaceful nuclear explosions, but that they might obtain the benefit of peaceful explosions conducted for them or on their behalf by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the provisions of an international agreement to be negotiated. It also proposed that the definition of a nuclear-weapon State should be that of a State which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

151. "Working paper on some basic facts relating to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol II" submitted by Mexico on 19 August 1971 (CCD/342)

The paper presented some basic facts and elements contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its Additional Protocol II which had direct relevance to the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, as well as certain implications to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

152. "Working paper containing remarks of Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro, the Japan Meteorological Agency, concerning the usefulness of the employment of Ocean-bottom seismographs and a universally acceptable means of determining the magnitude of seismic events, presented at the Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971" submitted by Japan on 24 August 1971 (CCD/345)

The paper reviewed technical aspects of the employment of ocean-bottom seismographs and means of determining the magnitude of seismic events as well as their contribution to the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions.

153. "Working paper on the seismicity of the USA, the USSR and China" submitted by the Netherlands on 7 September 1971 (CCD/349)

The paper presented a study based on a computer analysis of the epicenters of events in the years 1961-1970 inclusive, as provided by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. It set forth a comprehensive set of earthquake data for the whole world during that period.

154. "Joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty" submitted by Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia on 30 September 1971 (CCD/354)

The memorandum urged early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty in light of the intensified efforts devoted to examining the technical aspects of a verification system.

#### 1972 Session

155. "Working paper on seismic yields of underground explosions - estimating yields of underground explosions from amplitudes of seismic signals" submitted by the United Kingdom on 25 April 1972 (CCD/363/Rev.1)

The paper discussed the technical aspects of the relationship between the seismic magnitude scales and explosion yields. It also demonstrated some of the difficulties in arriving at a consistent relationship, and hence in relating the detection and identification threshold, expressed as magnitudes, of a given recording system to explosion yields.

156. "Working paper on measures to improve tripartite co-operation among Canada, Japan and Sweden in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means" submitted by Canada, Japan and Sweden, on 20 July 1972 (CCD/376)

The paper described agreement of measures to improve tripartite co-operation in order to strengthen exchanges, not only of seismological data but also of over-all scientific information in the field of seismic discrimination.

157. "Working paper on an experiment in international co-operation: short-period seismological discrimination of shallow earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Canada and Sweden on 27 July 1972 (CCD/330)

The paper examined experiments conducted by Canada and Sweden regarding the power of seismological discriminants which depended only on short-period seismic observations as well as its implications for further studies.

158. "Working paper on seismic data handling and analysis for a comprehensive test ban" submitted by the United Kingdom on 22 August 1972 (CCD/336)

The paper described the technical aspects of handling seismic data by using computer systems at recording stations, as experienced by the United Kingdom, for a comprehensive test ban.

159. "A review of current progress and problems in seismic verification", submitted by the United States on 24 August 1972 (CCD/338)

The paper elaborated upon document CCD/330, above, which reported on ongoing United States research into seismic verification of an underground test ban. The present paper reviewed the progress towards attaining the research objective outlined in document CCD/330 and discussed certain residual problems preventing seismic verification down to low magnitudes. It also outlined some directions that were then being pursued in seismic instrumentation, seismic systems and deployments to assist in the solution of these problems.

#### 1973 Session

160. "Letter dated 20 February 1973 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament", submitted by Mexico (CCD/394)

The letter reproduced the text of General Assembly document A/C.1/1026 containing a letter from the Chairman of the delegation of Mexico to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly addressed to the Secretary-General. That letter had requested the circulation, as Assembly documents, of the texts of the three bilateral USSR/United States instruments referred to as the SALT I accords, signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972.

161. Memorandum submitted to the CCD on 14 March 1973 by Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia (CCD/396)

The memorandum considered, inter alia, that there was no justification for the stagnation of the Committee's work and the current absence of effective negotiations, especially on the priority items of a comprehensive test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons. It considered further that the current phase of the Committee's negotiations should concentrate on "the most important questions related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and not on less pressing matters".

162. "Working paper with points to be considered by experts on the verification of ban on underground nuclear explosions", submitted by Sweden on 24 April 1973 (CCD/397)

Suggested a number of points for consideration by experts on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions. Among the points listed were the following:



- (1) methods and present capabilities for verification;
- (2) verification aspects of proposed treaty structures; and
- (3) technical and organizational matters to be settled in connection with a ban on underground nuclear explosions.

163. "Working paper presenting the ways in which verification has been dealt with in various arms control and disarmament treaties and proposals", submitted by Sweden on 24 April 1973 (CCD/398)

The working paper updated an earlier paper on the same subject, also by Sweden (CCD/287, see above).

164. "Working paper on problems in determining the body wave magnitude", submitted by Japan on 24 April 1973 (CCD/399)

The paper constituted a contribution to the on-going technical discussion of possible uses of seismic technology in the verification of a CTB. (See also documents CCD/306, 327, 363 and 380, above).

165. "Working paper on a review of the United Kingdom seismological research and development programme", submitted by the United Kingdom on 20 June 1973 (CCD/401)

The paper reviewed the United Kingdom's seismological research and development programme and explained the underlying themes which determined the emphasis of that programme. The paper was submitted in connection with the consideration of the seismological aspects of a CTB.

166. "Working paper on the estimation of depth of seismic events", submitted by the United Kingdom on 20 June 1973 (CCD/402)

The paper examined the technical question of the estimation of seismic events within the context of the question of the monitoring of a CTB. In this connection, it describes two examples of the use of a spiking filter technique for the estimation of the depth of seismic events and considered that the technique's principal contribution to the seismological issues of a CTB was to increase the confidence with which doubtful seismic events were categorized.

167. "A program of research related to problems in seismic verification", submitted by the United States of America on 5 July 1973 (CCD/404)

The paper provided a detailed treatment of certain problems in seismic verification dealt with in an earlier paper, also by the United States (CCD/388, see above), indicated current ideas on approaching those problems and outlined the programme of research being undertaken by the United States to help solve those problems.

168. "Working paper reviewing Swedish scientific work on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions", submitted by Sweden on 10 July 1973 (CCD/405)

The paper was submitted as a contribution to the CCD's informal meetings of experts on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions. In general, it reviewed recent Swedish scientific work in this field. The main portion of the paper consisted of brief discussions on some of the subject matters listed in document CCD/397 (see above), also submitted by Sweden.

169. "The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means", submitted by Canada on 10 July 1973 (CCD/406)

Reviewed the recent scientific research and developments aimed at clarifying the technical factors involved in the consideration of the seismological verification of a CTB.

170. "Comments on CCD/399, concerning magnitude determinations", submitted by the United States of America on 10 July 1973 (CCD/407)

The paper contained reactions to certain points raised in document CCD/399, submitted by Japan (see above).

171. "Working paper on comparison between earthquakes and underground explosions observed at the Matsushiro Seismological Observatory", submitted by Japan on 10 July 1973 (CCD/408)

Pointed out certain preliminary investigations on the nature of seismic waves from underground explosions and earthquakes recorded by the Matsushiro Seismological Observatory of the Japan Meteorological Agency.

172. "Some observations on detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions - prospects of international co-operation", submitted by Italy on 10 July 1973 (CCD/409)

Considered that expanded research and international collaboration could contribute to reducing, if not eliminating, uncertainties relating to the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. Saw the problem as having two basically inseparable aspects: (1) Discrimination of events, especially those of low magnitude, and (2) Refinement of recording techniques with a view to obtaining for any given event a generally recognized value.

173. "Letter dated 16 July 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Norway on seismic research at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NOSAR)" (CCD/411)

The working paper presented the following two facets of the research undertaken at the data centre for the Norwegian Seismic Array (NOSAR): (1) Research into methods for detecting small seismic events; and (2) Seismic verification research.

174. "Working paper containing a compilation of statements made on the stagnation of the Committee's work, the absence of effective negotiations, and other related matters, at the formal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament held from 20 February to 16 August 1973 (535th to 622nd meetings)", submitted by Mexico on 23 August 1973 (CCD/415)

An illustrative compilation, prepared by the delegation of Mexico, of views expressed at the CCD's 1973 session on the question of the absence of effective negotiations in the Committee, especially on the priority issues of a CTB and a chemical weapons ban (see also CCE/396, above).

175. "Some observations on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear test explosions", submitted by the Netherlands on 23 August 1973 (CCD/416)

The paper, among other things, held that recent research and studies on the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions appeared increasingly to lead to common findings. In its conclusions, the paper: (1) felt that obligatory on-site inspections would not enhance the identification possibilities significantly; (2) indicated that realistic possibilities of evading an underground test ban seemed to exist for test yields of up to about 10 kilotons, and (3) stated that an intensified international exchange of those seismic data used for the identification of events was needed on a routine basis.

176. "Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States" submitted by Pakistan on 11 July 1974 (CCD/428)

The document contained the text of a resolution adopted at the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 21 to 25 June 1974. That resolution, among other things, called upon all nuclear-weapon States to give solemn assurances in the nature of an obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear-weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

177. "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests", jointly submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 16 July 1974 (CCD/431)

The document contained the text of the United States/USSR bilateral treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions together with the protocol to the treaty, signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974. The document also contained the text of the protocol to the 1972 United States/USSR treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, and a joint United States/USSR statement on environmental warfare. The ABM Protocol and the joint statement on environmental warfare were also signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974.

The threshold test ban treaty, among other things, prohibited the parties from carrying out any underground nuclear-weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons and provided for national technical means of verification, supplemented by the reciprocal exchange of relevant data, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

The ABM Protocol reduced the number of anti-ballistic missile sites allowed each side from two to one.

178. "Underground nuclear test activities in the United States and the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1973" submitted by Sweden on 1 August 1974. (CCD/430)

The purpose of the paper was to report on recent underground nuclear weapon tests in the United States and the Soviet Union and to discuss the estimated yields of those tests in relation to the threshold of 150 kilotons agreed upon in the threshold test ban treaty (see CCD/431, above). The paper explained that its data regarding the numbers of tests and their estimated yields came from official announcements of some of those tests and from detection by seismological means.

179. "Letter dated 6 August 1974 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD/439)

The letter requested that the contents of United Nations General Assembly document A/9293 of 8 November 1973 be reproduced as a CCD document. That document contained a joint USSR/United States letter of 6 November 1973 to the Secretary-General transmitting the texts of the Agreement between those two States on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Washington, D.C., on 22 June 1973, and requesting that those texts be circulated as an official General Assembly document.

180. "Working paper on a development in discriminating between seismic sources", submitted by the United Kingdom on 13 August 1974 (CCD/440)

The working paper reported on the progress made in research initiated by the United Kingdom on seismogram modelling and on improving methods of depth estimation, in a continuing scientific study of the possible use of seismological means for the technical verification of a CTB.

181. "Working paper on the identification of seismic events in the USSR using seismological data from observatories in Japan and Sweden", submitted jointly by Japan and Sweden on 13 August 1974 (CCD/441)

The paper presented results of a joint Japanese-Swedish study of multistation mb (Ms) discrimination, carried out within the framework of an agreement between the two countries on co-operation in the field of detection seismology (see CCD/376, above). The goal of the discrimination exercise was to identify whether a detected seismic event was an underground nuclear explosion or an earthquake. The ultimate objective of improved seismic detection and discrimination, within the context of the CCD's work, would be to assist in CTB verification.

182. "Working paper on the accuracy of locating seismic events", submitted by Japan on 13 August 1974 (CCD/442)

A technical paper dealing with the question of the accurate detection and discrimination of underground nuclear explosions. The contents of the paper were related to the continuing examination of the subject of using seismic means to verify a nuclear test ban agreement.

1975 session

183. "Joint Anglo-Soviet Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", submitted jointly by the USSR and the United Kingdom on 12 March 1975 (CCD/448)

Text of a joint Declaration signed in Moscow on 17 February 1975 by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the Declaration both sides, inter alia, stressed the need for nuclear non-proliferation and pledged efforts towards limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests with a view to their ultimate discontinuance.

184. "Steps to be taken within a Disarmament Programme", submitted by Romania on 13 March 1975 (CCD/449)

Among the measures proposed by the Twelfth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in November 1974 for inclusion in an international programme were the following: prohibition of the use of nuclear and mass destruction weapons; nuclear-weapon States should halt production of such weapons and destroy existing stockpiles of the weapons; nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established; negotiations for general disarmament and, in particular nuclear disarmament, should be conducted on a democratic basis with the participation of all States concerned.

185. Working paper containing views of a Japanese expert on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), submitted by Japan on 7 July 1975 (CCD/454)

Against the background of efforts within the CCD towards adopting a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, the paper sought to differentiate between such tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and examined the implications of the latter for nuclear disarmament efforts. The paper stressed the complexity of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, noting in this connection that while such explosions should not be used to mask nuclear weapons tests they should not be banned completely either so long as they possessed peaceful economic feasibilities.

186. "Letter dated 24 June 1975 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects", (CCD/455)

The letter indicated that the IAEA had continued its studies on peaceful nuclear explosions and enclosed with the letter were certain documents describing and summarizing that Agency's activities in that field.

187. "Working paper on arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs)", submitted by the United States on 10 July 1975 (CCD/456)

The paper, among other things, examined how peaceful nuclear explosions could be accommodated under a comprehensive test ban. It considered that further discussions on CTB verification could provide a better understanding of how such accommodation might be achieved.

188. "Working paper reporting the summary proceedings of an informal scientific conference held 14-19 April 1975 to promote Canadian-Japanese-Swedish co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means", submitted jointly by Canada, Japan and Sweden on 14 July 1975 (CCD/457).

The title of the working paper adequately reflected the nature of its contents which reported on an informal trilateral seismological conference which brought together scientists from three countries active in multilateral technical efforts to study the use of seismological means for CTB verification.

189. "Working paper on safeguards against the employment of multiple explosions to simulate earthquakes", submitted by the United Kingdom on 24 July 1975 (CCD/459)

The paper described research on how safeguards could be employed to prevent the technical simulation of earthquakes to mask a nuclear-weapon test and examined the implications of such research for the CTB.

190. "Strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States", submitted by Pakistan on 29 July 1975 (CCD/462)

Contained the text of a resolution adopted by the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, from 12 to 15 July 1975. The resolution, among other things, urged nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which were not protected by treaty guarantees from a nuclear-weapon State against nuclear threat or attack.

191. "Letter dated 6 August 1975 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD/464)

The letter requested the reproduction as a CCD document of the texts of two draft resolutions, with accompanying annexes, submitted by certain non-nuclear States to the first Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, proposing agreement on two additional protocols to the Treaty; those drafts were not adopted at the Review Conference. The leader of the delegation of Mexico considered the texts of the drafts as relevant for the CCD's discussions on CTB and on nuclear disarmament in general.

192. "Letter dated 18 August 1975 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the Study of the Question of Nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its Aspects to the Co-chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament", (CCD/467)

With that letter, the chairman of the ad hoc group of experts studying the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones transmitted the study to the CCD, under whose auspices the study had been carried out. In its comprehensive treatment of the question, the study examined such topics as: the historical background of military denuclearization by areas; the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones; responsibilities of States within the zone and of other States; verification and control; nuclear-weapon-free zones and international law; and peaceful nuclear energy.

193. Comments on the informal meetings of PNE experts by Ambassador H. Nisibori of Japan on 18 July 1975 (CCD/468/Rev.1)

In his observations, Ambassador Nisibori, among other things, stressed that the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) was complex. Each PNE project, he said, should be given careful international scrutiny in order to prevent its use to disguise nuclear-weapon testing. He thought that from the experts' statements on the subject, it was clear that indigenous PNEs by non-nuclear-weapon States was not feasible. He stressed that his observation was not an a priori political conclusion but the product of technical evidence as presented by the experts.

194. "Working paper containing a draft definition of the concept of a 'nuclear-weapon-free zone' and a draft definition of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of such zones", submitted by Mexico on 20 August 1975 (CCD/470)

The paper set out a definition of the term "nuclear-weapon-free zone" and outlined the obligations of nuclear-weapon States towards such zones. Those obligations, the paper stated, would be embodied in a binding international instrument.

195. Informal meetings on the question of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of the CTB, note being taken of operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX) - Comments made by Ambassador Mishra of India on 18 July 1975 (CCD/474)

Ambassador Mishra of India, inter alia, asserted that only by considering the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing would it be possible to arrive at satisfactory arrangements in regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, whether they were conducted by nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States outside the framework of the NPT.

#### 1976 session

196. "The test ban issue", submitted by Sweden on 26 March 1976 (CCD/481)

The paper described the background and current status of the test ban issue, outlined the political requirements and technical possibilities for monitoring nuclear explosions and described possible international co-operative measures for monitoring a CTB.

197. "Working paper on co-operative international measures to monitor a CTB", submitted by Sweden on 26 March 1976 (CCD/482)

The paper discussed possible international co-operative measures to facilitate the global monitoring of a CTB. In this context, it outlined a possible international system consisting of a network of selected seismological stations, a communications network and an international data centre. (See also CCD/481, above).

198. "Letter dated 8 April 1976 from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper on some new results in seismic discrimination" (CCD/484)

The paper, describing some new results of continuing technical research on seismic discrimination, was submitted in connection with the CCD's technical discussions, with the participation of experts, on the question of a CTB.

199. "Working paper on the United Kingdom's contribution to research on seismological problems relating to underground nuclear tests", submitted by the United Kingdom on 12 April 1976 (CCD/486)

A progress report on seismological research in the United Kingdom into the problems of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests. The paper was contributed in connection with the CCD's technical discussions on a CTB.

200. "Working paper on the processing and communication of seismic data to provide for national means of verifying a test ban", submitted by the United Kingdom on 12 April 1976 (CCD/487 and Corr.1)

The paper, inter alia, reported on technical experiments in the United Kingdom on the processing and communication of seismic data as well as on the communications links on which the United Kingdom based its national capacity to verify a test ban by seismological means alone.

201. "Working paper on the recording and processing of P waves to provide seismograms suitable for discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions", submitted by the United Kingdom on 12 April 1976 (CCD/488)

The paper dealt with the technical aspects of a CTB and in this connection explained why broad band seismograms should be more reliable for discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions than narrow band seismograms, and suggested how to obtain broad band seismograms from narrow band recordings on short seismograms.

202. "Working paper on the estimation of focal depth by pP and sP phases", submitted by Japan on 13 April 1976 (CCD/489)

A technical examination of the problem of focal depth determination, a relevant process in identifying underground nuclear explosions.

203. "The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means", submitted by Canada on 20 April 1976 (CCD/490)

A progress report on seismological research and development undertaken by Canadian scientists. The report, among other things, summarized developments at the Yellowknife seismological array and described the contribution that medium aperture arrays could make to future international co-operative CTB monitoring procedures. The paper also discussed the problem of evasive detonation which it referred to as probably the most significant obstacle to significantly reducing the threshold of seismological discrimination between earthquakes and underground explosions.

204. "Current status of research in seismic verification", submitted by the United States on 20 April 1976 (CCD/491)

The paper reviewed current research problems in seismic verification, the status of the data resources and systems being developed to address those problems and the progress made towards their evaluation and solution.



205. "Text of a statement by Mr. Fakley at an informal meeting of the CCD on Tuesday, 20 April 1976", submitted by the United Kingdom on 21 April 1976 (CCD/492)

In his statement, Mr. Fakley, inter alia, identified the issues of verification and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) as the two main difficulties standing in the way of the successful negotiation of a CTB. He elaborated on that view and concluded that as of then seismic means were not capable of providing adequate national technical means of verifying a CTB and that further examination of the role of PNEs in a CTB was required.

206. "Working paper containing statement by Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro at the informal meetings with participation of experts on a comprehensive test ban on 20 April 1976", submitted by Japan on 26 April 1976 (CCD/493)

The statement, among other things, gave a general explanation of seismological means of verification in an effort to clarify certain technical aspects of a CTB. In this connection, he suggested the undertaking of a test run of a seismological verification system as a way, inter alia, of demonstrating its operative capability.

207. "Text of statement of the Government of Japan on the occasion of the depositing of its instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 3 June 1976", submitted by Japan on 3 June 1976 (CCD/494)

In the statement, the Government of Japan, inter alia, reaffirmed its policy of foresaking nuclear armaments and called upon the nuclear-weapon States to abolish their nuclear weapons. It also urged nuclear-weapon States to take concrete steps towards the realization of a CTB and hoped that they would make further effective efforts to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

208. "Terms of reference for a group of scientific governmental experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events" submitted by Sweden on 24 June 1976 (CCD/495)

Under the terms of reference proposed by Sweden, the expert group, whose establishment Sweden had proposed on 22 April 1976, \*/ in carrying out the investigation would, inter alia, specify the characteristics of an international monitoring system and estimate its detection and identification capability.

(The CCD, on 22 July 1976, decided to establish the expert group under its auspices. \*\*/)

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\*/ See CCD/PV.704.

\*\*/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), para.66.

209. "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes" (CCD/496 and Corr.1)

The text of the bilateral United States/USSR Treaty and its accompanying protocol, signed on 28 May 1976, was submitted to the CCD jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union on 23 June 1976. Also included was the text of an Agreed Statement by both countries relative to the Treaty. The Treaty, inter alia, limited each side's individual peaceful nuclear explosions to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons and aggregate or group explosions occurring at the same time to a maximum yield of 1,500 kilotons. The Treaty also provided for national technical means of verification supplemented by the reciprocal exchange of relevant information and access to sites of explosions.

210. "Letter dated 20 July 1976 from Mr. Leif Blomqvist of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on Finnish capabilities of seismological detection of underground nuclear explosions" (CCD/509)

The paper represented a contribution by the Government of Finland to the CCD's technical discussions on a CTB, in particular the question of the possible use of seismological means to verify a CTB.

211. "First progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events" submitted on 6 August 1976 (CCD/513)

The report, among other things, indicated that the Group had agreed on the following provisional Table of Contents for its Final Report: 1. Summary; 2. Introduction; 3. Data and procedures to be used for detection and location of seismic events and for obtaining identification parameters; 4. Selection of seismographic stations for a global network; 5. Data exchange between selected stations and data centres; 6. Data centres for detection and location of seismic events and for reduction of identification parameters; 7. Estimated cost to establish and operate the specified monitoring system; 8. Estimated capability of the specified monitoring system; and 9. Proposal for experimental exercises. \*/

1977 session

212. "Draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted by the Soviet Union on 22 February 1977 (CCD/523)

The draft treaty provided, inter alia, for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests anywhere in all environments and for verification by national technical means combined with certain flexible procedures including the international exchange of seismic data and the possibility of on-site inspection. The draft treaty also stipulated that its provisions would not apply to underground peaceful nuclear explosions.

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\*/ The CCD, on 2 September 1976, took note of the report and approved, in principle, the proposed time schedule for the work of the Ad Hoc Group, subject to review in the light of its work.

213. "Working paper on location capability of a multi-array stations capability", submitted by Japan on 24 February 1977 (CCD/524)

A technical study related to possible seismological verification of a CTB.

214. "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments", submitted by Sweden on 1 March and 5 July 1977 (CCD/526 and Rev.1)

The draft treaty provided, in principle, for a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, but suggested possible transitional arrangements for the two major nuclear-weapon States and special arrangements for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions. Compliance with the treaty was based principally on co-operation in the international exchange of seismological data and verification was envisaged to include the assistance of a consultative committee and the possible involvement of the United Nations Security Council.

215. "Letter dated 20 July 1977 from the Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the views of the Government of New Zealand on a comprehensive test ban treaty" (CCD/536)

New Zealand identified as the three main areas of difficulty facing CTB negotiations, the problem of universal adherence to an agreement by all nuclear-weapon States, the problems of adequate verification and the question whether or not to permit peaceful nuclear explosions under a CTB. New Zealand proceeded to discuss each of those problems in detail and concluded, among other things, that the advantages of a CTB heavily outweighed the risks involved in each of those three problem areas.

216. "Working paper on focal depth resolvability of a multi-array stations system", submitted by Japan on 3 August 1977 (CCD/540)

A technical paper dealing with possible seismological verification of a CTB.

217. "Working paper containing a preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Mexico on 23 and 25 August 1977 (CCD/545 and Corr.1)

Under section III entitled "Components and Stages of the programme", the preliminary draft stated, *inter alia*, that efforts should urgently be intensified to reach agreement on a CTB, the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and further measures in the field of disarmament, in particular those aimed at achieving quantitative and qualitative strategic nuclear arms reductions with a view to their eventual elimination. Under sub-section B of Section III, the preliminary draft listed a number of measures the implementation of which required the political will of the two principal nuclear-weapon States. Among those measures were the following: a moratorium on the cessation of the testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapons; a ban on flight-testing of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the assignment of existing stocks to civilian uses; a freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons; a solution to the problem of the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

1978 session

218. "Working paper on the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Italy on 31 January 1978 (CCD/543)

The paper listed nuclear weapons as one of the main elements that should be included in a comprehensive programme for disarmament and suggested action on the following specific measures in the field of nuclear disarmament: (a) Conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB); (b) Limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems; (c) Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; (d) Strengthening of the non-proliferation régime; (e) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

219. "Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR on 21 February 1978 (CCD/552)

The paper regarded cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as one of the principal areas of disarmament efforts and urged appropriate action on the following specific measures in this respect: measures to avert the danger of nuclear war; complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; consolidation of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace.

220. "Working paper on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Romania on 21 February 1978 (CCD/553)

Under the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which was listed as one of the elements for a comprehensive disarmament programme, the working paper listed the following specific measures:

(a) solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

(b) solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States at any time and under any circumstances;

(c) prohibition of the deployment of new nuclear weapons on the territory of other States; total prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof;

(d) withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of other States;

(e) cessation of the development and testing of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery (including the comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons);

(f) cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; conversion of existing materials to peaceful purposes and transfer of a quota of such materials to be used by all States in the framework of broad international co-operation;

(g) setting up of nuclear weapon-free zones and zones of peace and co-operation in various regions of the world accompanied by effective guarantees by nuclear-weapon States to observe their status;

(h) reduction and complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery;

(i) complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

221. "Suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Nigeria on 24 February 1973 (CCD/555)

The paper listed nuclear disarmament as one of the elements for the comprehensive programme and stated in this connection that utmost priority should be given to the cessation of the nuclear arms race through the following specific measures:

(a) urgent conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;

(b) a ban on the further development and testing of means of delivery of nuclear weapons;

(c) measures to achieve significant qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems and the ultimate elimination of such weapons;

(d) establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions and complete prohibition of the introduction of nuclear weapons into areas where they did not already exist;

(e) cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and submission of all nuclear programmes of all countries to IAEA safeguards;

(f) promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all countries;

(g) encouragement of universal adherence to the NPT;

(h) complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

222. "Letter dated 9 March 1973 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events to the Co-chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the final report of the Ad Hoc group" (CCD/558 and Add.1)

The report, among other things, reviewed earlier studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events; discussed procedures for extracting and reporting data from individual stations in a global co-operative seismic network; dealt with the selection of seismograph stations for a global network; discussed the estimated capability of the specified global system; examined the question of data exchange between selected stations and data centres; considered the subject of international centres for the collection, processing and exchange of seismic data; examined the question of equipment and estimated costs of establishing and operating the specified system; and proposed the carrying out of an experimental exercise in order, inter alia, to test the over-all functioning of the proposed system.

223. "Draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, on 10 March 1978 (CCD/559)

By the draft Convention each State Party would undertake not to produce, stockpile, deploy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons. Verification would mainly be by national technical means although consultations and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations might also be envisaged in connection with the verification problem.

VIII. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR  
THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT <sup>2/</sup>

224. "Working document submitted by the non-aligned countries containing the draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation" (A/AC.187/55/Add.1 and Corr. 1-2). Submitted to the CCD by Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire (CCD/550 and Corr.1)

In their suggestions for a "Programme of Action" the sponsors of the document listed nuclear weapons at the top of their order of priorities for disarmament negotiations and proposed the following specific measures in this field:

- (a) Prohibition of the use and, as a first step, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against States which had no such weapons on their territories.
- (b) Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.
- (c) The reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their complete elimination.
- (d) The immediate conclusion of a treaty on the complete ban of nuclear-weapon tests.
- (e) The immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes.
- (f) Other urgent steps:
  - cessation of research and development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance;
  - freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems;
  - prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems.

The sponsors stated in the document that the two leading nuclear-weapon States bore a "particular" responsibility with regard to the realization of the above measures, while the other nuclear-weapon States, as well as other militarily significant States should contribute towards the attainment of those objectives. They also proposed the following additional measures in the field of nuclear disarmament:

- (1) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of arrangements among States of such regions. Respect by nuclear-weapon States of these zones and the statutes thereof by means of legally binding international instruments that included the obligation to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States included in such zones.

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<sup>2/</sup>This section includes relevant proposals for a programme of action that had been submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session and were subsequently also submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

- (ii) The status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be respected by all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and the major maritime users. In addition it would be desirable to create zones of peace in the region of the Mediterranean, among others.
- (iii) The formulation of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, pending their final elimination.

225. "Working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Programme of Action on disarmament", submitted by Pakistan (A/AC.187/92; CCD/556)

According to Pakistan, the General Assembly would adopt the following specific measures on nuclear disarmament in its Programme of Action:

Prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(1) An international agreement or another form of binding international instrument should be adopted, under which the nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers.

(2) Nuclear-weapon States should undertake, in a binding legal form, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which comprise nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace and not to introduce nuclear weapons in such zones.

(3) Following the adoption of the above measures, negotiations should be initiated among the nuclear-weapon States for an agreement on the total prohibition of the use or threat of use of all nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical, under any circumstances.

Reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and prohibition of their qualitative development

(1) The negotiations between the United States, USSR and the United Kingdom on a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests should be finalized as early as possible so as to enable the CCD to consider and adopt the treaty in the shortest possible time.

(2) The two major nuclear-weapon States should conclude the second agreement on strategic arms limitations to provide for meaningful reductions in their deployment of nuclear weapons and to halt the development and refinement of new kinds of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

(3) Those same States should conclude a third agreement to implement substantial reductions in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. This agreement should also prohibit all research into development and refinement of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

(4) An international agreement should be reached on measures to prevent the diversion of the results of scientific research and development (R and D) to war-like purposes.



(5) The two major nuclear-weapon States and their allies should initiate, within the negotiations for mutual force reductions in Europe, consideration of an agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in co-ordinated phases.

(6) Negotiations should be initiated among all the nuclear-weapon States for a general agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

#### Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

(1) Immediate steps should be taken to ensure that nuclear facilities not presently subject to IAEA safeguards were brought under international inspection and control.

(2) International safeguards should be applied by the IAEA to supplies of nuclear equipment, materials, technology and facilities on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

#### Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

(1) The nuclear-weapon States which had not ratified Protocols I and II of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America should do so without delay.

(2) All States and parties in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and the South Pacific should take steps to implement the objective of denuclearizing their respective regions.

(3) In the meantime, no action should be taken which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions.

(4) All States and parties in those regions should accept the application of IAEA safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.

(5) The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions.

#### Creation of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions

(1) The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should reach agreement on measures, such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves, in order to promote conditions of security within the Indian Ocean region.

(2) The great Powers should, for their part, agree at an early date to eliminate altogether their presence and rivalry from the region.

(3) Consultations regarding all aspects of the proposal to create a peace zone in the Indian Ocean should take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean with the participation of all the States concerned and lead to the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

(4) Efforts should be made to encourage the creation of zones of peace in other regions, such as the Mediterranean.

226. "Elements for inclusion in the programme of action of the United Nations Special Session on disarmament and in its documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations" submitted by Sweden (A/AC.187/95; CCD/554)

Sweden suggested that in its "Programme of Action" the General Assembly should, with regard to nuclear disarmament:

- make an appropriate reference to the draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban;
- consider as a general guideline for further action that the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon States, bore the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament;
- conclude that negotiations should urgently be undertaken on the following measures aiming at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States:
  - (a) Freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems;
  - (b) Cessation of the research and development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance;
  - (c) Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes;
  - (d) Balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems;
  - (e) Prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems.

The Assembly should also, according to Sweden:

- request the CCD to continue with the highest priority its work in the field of nuclear disarmament;
- underline the importance that the United Nations be kept fully informed on all ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament;
- expect substantial results in the area of nuclear disarmament to be reported to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

227. "Draft programme of action for the United Nations special session on disarmament", submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom (A/AC.187/96). Submitted to CCD by Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (CCD/549 and Corr.1)

Under section II of their draft programme entitled "Immediate measures of arms control and disarmament", the sponsors proposed that in the nuclear field, in which they said the nuclear-weapon States had a "particular" responsibility, the first goal should be the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation through the following specific measures:

- the halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions: especially by a second Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons;
- the earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests;
- further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA;
- the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all the States in the region and with effective co-operation from nuclear-weapon States.

The second goal, the sponsors suggested, was the provision of assurances, as appropriate, by nuclear-weapon States designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
TRANSMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT  
COMMITTEE (ENDC) BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Twentieth session of the General Assembly, 1965

228. Resolution 2032 (XX)

By its operative paragraphs, the resolution urged the suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests; called upon all countries to respect the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty; and requested the ENDC to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a CTB and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection, and to report to the General Assembly.

229. Resolution 2033 (XX)

By its preambular part, the resolution, inter alia, recognized that the denuclearization of Africa would be a practical step towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and of the objectives of the United Nations. By its operative paragraphs the resolution, inter alia, endorsed the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued in 1964 by the Heads of State and Government of African countries; called upon all States to respect and abide by the aforementioned declaration; called upon all States to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on the African continent; called upon States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, using or deploying nuclear weapons on the African continent and from acquiring such weapons or taking any action which would compel African States to take similar actions; urged States possessing nuclear weapons and capability not to transfer such weapons, scientific data or technological assistance to the national control of any State in any form which may be used to assist such States in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa; expressed the hope that African States would initiate studies, as they deemed appropriate, with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa and take the necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity to achieve that end; and requested the Secretary-General to extend to the Organization of African Unity such facilities and assistance as may be requested in order to achieve the aims of the present resolution.

Twenty-first session of the General Assembly, 1966

230. Resolution 2153A (XXI)

By operative paragraph A, the General Assembly requested the ENDC to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon States should give an assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that had been made or may be made for the solution of the problem.

231. Resolution 2162A (XXI)

The resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.

(In accordance with this resolution the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, prepared a report entitled "Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons", <sup>\*/</sup> which the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly's twenty-second session.)

232. Resolution 2162C (XXI)

By operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly requested the ENDC to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests.

233. Resolution 2163 (XXI)

The General Assembly, among other things, recalled the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and annexed to the report of the ENDC, <sup>\*\*/</sup> and in particular the concrete suggestions contained therein;

Recognized the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests; and in the operative paragraphs of the resolution: urged all States which had not done so to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty;

Called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

Expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data; and

Requested the ENDC to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

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<sup>\*/</sup> Document A/6853 (Sales No. E.68.IX.1)

<sup>\*\*/</sup> Document ENDC/17, see above.

234. Resolution 2169 (XXI)

The General Assembly, inter alia, believed that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament and contribute to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament; believed further that the widest possible attendance at a conference for the purpose of signing such a convention was of vital importance for the effective and universal observance of its provisions; and in the operative paragraph of the resolution, requested that a future world disarmament conference give serious consideration to the question of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

Twenty-second session of the General Assembly, 1967

235. Resolution 2286 (XXII)

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed with satisfaction the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, called upon all States to give full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoyed universal observance, referred to the contemplated signatures of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty and invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty.

The recommendations for the signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II were also reflected in the following resolutions: 2456 B (XXII); 2666 (XXV); 2830 (XXVI); 2935 (XXVII); 3079 (XXVIII); 3258 (XXIX); 3262 (XXIX); 3467 (XXX); 3473 (XXX); 31/67 and 32/76.

236. Resolution 2289 (XXII)

By operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly expressed its conviction that it was essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention on the subject. By operative paragraph 2 it urged all States to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the question proposed by the USSR<sup>2/</sup> and such other proposals as may be made on the subject and to undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the ENDC, or directly between States.

237. Resolution 2343 (XXII)

By its operative paragraphs the resolution urged all States which have not yet done so to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear-weapon tests in all environments; expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data; and requested the ENDC to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests.

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<sup>2/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second session, Annexes agenda item 96, document A/5834.

Twenty-third session of the General Assembly, 1968

238. Resolution 2455 (XXIII)

Substance of the operative paragraphs similar to that of General Assembly resolution 2343 (XXII), above.

239. Resolution 2456D (XXIII)

The resolution noted the recommendation contained in resolution D of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States; \*/ considered that, pursuant to the agreement reached in July 1968 by the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of both offensive and strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems, such discussions could lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and relaxation of tensions and urged the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter at an early date into the aforementioned discussions.

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\*/ See "Proposals submitted at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States", below.

X. RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
TRANSMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)  
BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, 1969

240. Resolution 2602 A (XXIV)

By the operative paragraph of the resolution the General Assembly appealed to the Governments of the USSR and the United States to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

241. Resolution 2604 (XXIV)

The contents of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 were the same as those of resolution 2343 (XXII), above. Operative paragraph 3 requested the CCD to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account the proposals already made in the Committee as to the contents of such a treaty, as well as the views expressed on the subject at the General Assembly's twenty-fourth session, and to submit a special report to the Assembly on the results of the Committee's deliberations.

Twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, 1970

242. Resolution 2627 (XXV)

Paragraph 5 of the resolution which was entitled "Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations", stated the following:

"On the threshold of the Disarmament Decade, we welcome the important international agreements which have already been achieved in the limitation of armaments, especially nuclear arms. Conscious of the long and difficult search for ways to halt and reverse the arms race and of the grave threat to international peace posed by the continuing development of sophisticated weapons, we look forward to the early conclusion of further agreements of this kind and to moving forward from arms limitation to a reduction of armaments and disarmament everywhere, particularly in the nuclear field, with the participation of all nuclear Powers. We call upon all Governments to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal - general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

243. Resolution 2661 A (XXV)

The General Assembly, among other things, believed that the possibilities for rapid success in bilateral USSR/United States negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems would increase if steps were taken by the nuclear-weapon States to halt the development of new nuclear weapons and urged the Governments of the nuclear-weapon States to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing and deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems. The recommendations were subsequently also reflected in General Assembly resolutions 2932 B (XXVII), 3184 A (XXVIII), 3484 C (XXX), 31/189A and 32/87G.



244. Resolution 2661 B (XXV)

The General Assembly, by the resolution, noted that all States had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; said it was aware of the development of new techniques for uranium enrichment; considered that these new techniques may contribute to the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; considered also that material produced by these new techniques may be diverted for weapons purposes unless subject to effective safeguards; noted that the IAEA was engaged in the study of safeguards under the NPT; and in operative paragraphs requested the IAEA to pay attention also to the safeguards required with respect to new techniques for uranium enrichment.

245. Resolution 2661 C (XXV)

By operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly urged the CCD to make more intensive efforts to bring about a faster pace towards the achievement of disarmament measures and by operative paragraph 3 recommended to the Committee to take into account in its further work and its negotiations General Assembly document A/8191 and Corr.1 as well as other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future.

Document A/8191 contained a "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" proposed jointly by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Under Section III of the document entitled "Elements and phrases of the programme", sub-section B dealing with "Other measures of disarmament", called for persistent scrutiny and negotiation to be given to the following specific measures of nuclear disarmament:

- (i) A moratorium or, cessation of testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear-weapon systems;
- (ii) The cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to civilian uses;
- (iii) A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons;
- (iv) The conclusion of regional agreements for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (v) A solution of the problem concerning the prohibition of the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons.

246. Resolution 2663 A (XXV)

By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly urged Governments to consider and, wherever possible, to implement methods of improving their capability to contribute high-quality seismic data with assured international availability, taking into account the suggestions contained in the documents annexed to the report of the CCD,\*/ and invited those Governments in a position to do so to consider lending their assistance in the improvement of world-wide international availability of seismic data for the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. By operative paragraph 3 the Assembly invited Members of the CCD to co-operate in further study of this issue.

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\*/ A/8059.

247. Resolution 2663 B (XXV)

By operative paragraph 3 the General Assembly requested the CCD to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the proposals already made in the Committee as well as the views expressed at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session a special report on the results of its deliberations.

248. Resolution 2734 (XXV)

Paragraph 20 of the resolution which was entitled "Declaration on the strengthening of international security", urged all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to make urgent and concerted efforts within the framework of the Disarmament Decade and through other means for the cessation and reversal of the nuclear and conventional arms race at an early date, the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as ensure that the benefits of the technology of the peaceful use of nuclear energy shall be available to all States, to the maximum extent possible without discrimination.

Twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, 1971

249. Resolution 2825 A (XXVI)

By operative paragraph 2 the General Assembly requested the IAEA to include in its annual report to the Assembly full information on the progress of its work on the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT, including safeguards on nuclear material in uranium enrichment plants using both existing and new techniques.

250. Resolution 2828 A (XXVI)

By the preambular part, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its conviction that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB. By the operative paragraph, the Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its condemnation of all nuclear-weapon tests and urged nuclear-weapon States to halt all nuclear-weapon tests at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 5 August 1973.

251. Resolution 2828 B (XXVI)

By the preambular paragraphs the General Assembly, among other things, took into account that underground nuclear and thermonuclear tests may not only create serious health hazards but may also cause as yet undetermined injury to humans and animals of the region where such tests were conducted and recognized that sufficient nuclear, thermonuclear and other lethal weapons of mass destruction already existed in the arsenals of certain States to decimate the world's population and possibly render the earth uninhabitable. By the operative paragraphs the Assembly appealed to the nuclear States to desist from carrying out further nuclear and thermonuclear tests, whether underground, under water or in the earth's atmosphere; urged all the nuclear States to reach agreement without delay on the cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests; and reassured the peoples of the world that the United Nations will continue to oppose nuclear and thermonuclear tests of any kind and requested the nuclear States not to deploy such weapons of mass destruction.

252. Resolution 2828 C (XXVI)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, stressed anew the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all States; urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty; called upon all Governments that had been conducting nuclear weapon tests, particularly those of parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests, pending the early entry into force of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments by all States; urged Governments to take all possible measures to develop further, and to use more effectively, existing capabilities for the seismological identification of underground nuclear tests, in order to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban; requested the CCD to continue as a matter of highest priority its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the suggestions already made in the Committee, as well as the views expressed at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly; requested particularly Governments that had been carrying out nuclear tests to take an active and constructive part in developing in the CCD, or in any successor body, specific proposals for an underground test ban treaty; and expressed the hope that these efforts would enable all States to sign, in the near future, a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

253. Resolution 2831 (XXVI)

By operative paragraph 6, the General Assembly called upon all States to intensify their efforts during the Disarmament Decade with a view to promoting negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and for nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

254. Resolution 2832 (XXVI)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, solemnly declared the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, as a zone of peace for all time; called upon the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.

Called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations was unaffected;

(c) Appropriate arrangements were made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, 1972

255. Resolution 2934 A (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, in part I of the resolution, inter alia, stressed anew the urgency of halting all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific or anywhere else in the world; and urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty.

In part II of the resolution, the Assembly declared that a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests was an important element in the consolidation of the progress towards disarmament and arms control made thus far and that it would greatly facilitate future progress in these fields; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments; and called upon the CCD to give urgent consideration to the question of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the views already expressed in the Committee, the opinions stated at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and, above all, the pressing need for the early conclusion of such a treaty.

256. Resolution 2934 B (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly stressed again the urgency of halting all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all States; urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and meanwhile to refrain from testing in environments covered by that Treaty; called upon all Governments conducting underground nuclear weapon tests, particularly those States parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures that would suspend or reduce such testing, pending the early entry into force of a ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments; urged Governments that had been carrying out nuclear weapon tests to take an active and constructive part in presenting and developing in the CCD, or in any other appropriate body, specific proposals for a comprehensive test ban; requested the CCD to give first priority to its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking full account of views of experts and of technical developments bearing on the verification of such a treaty; urged Governments to take all appropriate measures further to develop existing capabilities for detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests through seismological and other technical means, and to increase international co-operation in the elaboration of relevant techniques and evaluation of seismographic data, in order to facilitate an underground nuclear weapon test ban; and called upon Governments to seek as a matter of urgency a halt to all nuclear-weapon testing, and to endeavour to achieve at the earliest possible date a comprehensive test ban and to obtain universal adherence to such a ban.

257. Resolution 2934 C (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs the General Assembly reiterated once again its condemnation of all nuclear-weapon tests; reaffirmed its conviction that there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB; urged once more the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to halt all nuclear-weapon tests at the earliest possible date, and in any case not later than 5 August 1973, either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria.

258. Resolution 2936 (XXVII)

By preambular paragraph 10 the General Assembly expressed its belief that renunciation of the use or threat of force and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be fully observed as a law of international life. By operative paragraphs the Assembly solemnly declared, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations their renunciation of the use or threat of use of force in all its forms and manifestations in international relations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; and recommended that the Security Council should take, as soon as possible, appropriate measures for the full implementation of the present declaration of the General Assembly.

259. Resolution 2992 (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, among other things, called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to support the concept that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace; and decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to study the implications of the proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken in furtherance of the objectives of the resolution, having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, 1973

260. Resolution 3078 A (XXVIII)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly once again condemned all nuclear-weapon tests; reiterated its conviction that there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB; and once more urged nuclear-weapon States to halt without delay all nuclear-weapon tests either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria.

261. Resolution 3078 B (XXVIII)

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly emphasized its deep concern at the continuance of nuclear-weapon tests both in the atmosphere and underground, and at the lack of progress towards a CTB agreement; called anew upon all nuclear-weapon States to seek, as a matter of urgency, the end of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments; insisted that the nuclear-weapon States that had been conducting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere should discontinue

such tests forthwith; urged States which had not yet done so to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty without further delay; urged CCD Member States, in particular nuclear-weapon Members and parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty immediately to start negotiations for elaborating a treaty designed to achieve the objective of a comprehensive test ban; requested the CCD to continue, as a matter of the highest priority, its deliberations on a CTB treaty, taking into account suggestions already made in the Committee and views expressed at the twenty-eighth and at previous sessions of the General Assembly, and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a special report on the question, including the areas of agreement on the achievement of a draft treaty; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session an item entitled "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban" in place of the item entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" which appeared on the agenda of the twenty-eighth session.

262. Resolution 3080 (XXVIII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged all States to accept the principles and objectives contained in Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", (see above), as a constructive contribution to the strengthening of regional and international security; requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by him, a factual statement, based on available material, of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry and to submit the statement to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean if possible by 31 March 1974.

Twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, 1974

263. Resolution 3257 (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, condemned all nuclear weapon tests in whatever environment they may be conducted; reaffirmed its deep concern at the continuance of such testing, both in the atmosphere and underground, and at the lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement; called upon all States not yet parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith; emphasized once more the urgency of concluding a comprehensive test ban agreement; reminded the nuclear-weapon States of their special responsibility to initiate proposals to this end; called upon all States to refrain from the testing of nuclear weapons, in any environment, pending conclusion of such an agreement; and requested the CCD to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the progress achieved.

264. Resolution 3259 A (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to give tangible support to the establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; called upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing and strengthening their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean as an essential first

step towards the relaxation of tension and the promotion of peace and security in the area; requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter, as soon as possible, into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean; invited all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions; thanked the Secretary-General for his efforts in the preparation of the factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean. \*/

265. Resolution 3261 C (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the USSR and the United States to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their strategic arms limitation talks, and stressed once again the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament; and invited the Governments of the two States to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the results of their negotiations.

266. Resolution 3261 D (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, appealed to all States, in particular, nuclear-weapon States, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; requested the IAEA to continue its studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects; called upon the CCD, in submitting its report to the General Assembly's thirtieth session on the elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, to include a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and, in so doing, to take account of the views of the IAEA as requested above; expressed the hope that the NPT Review Conference, to be held in Geneva in May 1975, would also give consideration to the role of peaceful nuclear explosions as provided for in that Treaty; invited, in this connection, the USSR and the United States to provide the Review Conference with information concerning such steps as they had taken since the entry into force of the Treaty, or intended to take, for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which was envisaged in article V of the Treaty.

267. Resolution 3261 E (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly reaffirmed its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone; reiterated its call upon all States to respect and abide by the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity; reiterated further its call upon all States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on the African continent; requested the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of the aims and objectives of the present resolution.

The recommendations were subsequently further elaborated and reflected in General Assembly resolutions 3471 (XXX), 31/69 and 32/81.

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\*/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9629 and Add.1), annex.

268. Resolution 3261 F (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, among other things, decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects; requested that the study be carried out by an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD; called upon interested Governments and international organizations concerned to extend such assistance as may be required from them for the carrying out of the study; requested the CCD to transmit the study in a special report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

(See also document CCD/476, above.)

269. Resolution 3261 G (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly declared its firm support for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States and recommended to Member States to consider in all appropriate forums, without loss of time, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

270. Resolution 3263 (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; considered that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region, it was indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons; called upon the parties concerned in the area to accede to the NPT; expressed the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of the present resolution; requested the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the resolution, in particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, and to report to the Security Council at an early date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

271. Resolution 3265 A (XXIX)

By the resolution, the General Assembly, among other things, recognized that conditions and procedures for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones differed from region to region; recognized further that, in appropriate regions and by agreement among the States concerned, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could promote the cause of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and considered therefore, that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent.

272. Resolution 3265 B (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note of the affirmation by the States of the South Asia region not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples; endorsed, in principle,



the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; invited the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to initiate, without delay, necessary consultations with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone and urged them, in the interim, to refrain from any action contrary to the achievement of these objectives; expressed the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of the resolution; requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations envisaged above, and to render such assistance as may be required for the purpose.

Thirtieth session of the General Assembly, 1975

273. Resolution 3466 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, condemned all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted; deplored the continued lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement; emphasized the urgency of reaching agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to halt all nuclear-weapon tests through an agreed suspension subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement; emphasized in this regard the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States belonging to international agreements in which they had declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race; called upon all States not yet parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith; urged the CCD to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on the progress achieved.

274. Resolution 3468 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, noted that an agreement in principle on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean had emerged among the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean; requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to continue their consultations on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, with particular attention to the following six points: (a) Purpose of the conference; (b) Date and duration; (c) Venue; (d) Provisional agenda; (e) Participation; (f) Level of participation; requested the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work and consultations in accordance with its mandate and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session a report on its work, including the results of the consultations referred to above; invited all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions.

275. Resolution 3472 A (XXX)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note of the special report of the CCD containing the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects; invited all Governments, the IAEA and other international organizations concerned to transmit to the Secretary-General before 30 June 1976 such views, observations and suggestions on the special report as they may deem appropriate; requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report based on information received and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

276. Resolution 3472 B (XXX)

By the operative paragraph, the General Assembly solemnly adopted the following declaration:

I. Definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

1. A "nuclear-weapon-free zone" shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined:

(b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

II. Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein

2. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, all nuclear-weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the following obligations:

(a) To respect in all its parts and statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;

(b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;

(c) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone.

III. Scope of the definitions

5. The above definitions in no way impair the resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones nor the rights emanating for the Member States from such resolutions.

277. Resolution 3474 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed the opinion that the Member States with which the Secretary-General had consulted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXX) (above) should exert efforts towards the realization of the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; urged all parties directly concerned to adhere to the NPT as a means of promoting this objective; recommended that the Member States referred to above, pending the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should: (a) Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing,

acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of such weapons in their territory or the territory under their control, by any third party; (b) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards; recommended to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote this objective. The recommendations were subsequently also reflected in General Assembly resolutions 31/71 and 32/82.

278. Resolution 3476 A (XXX)

By the operative paragraph, the General Assembly decided to give due consideration to any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia, after it had been developed and matured among the interested States within the region concerned.

279. Resolution 3476 B (XXX)

By preambular paragraph 2, the General Assembly noted the report of the Secretary-General \*/ and by the operative paragraphs it, inter alia, urged the States of South Asia to continue their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, as recommended in Assembly resolution 3265 B (XXIX) (see above); further urged those States to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The recommendations were subsequently also reflected in General Assembly resolutions 31/73 and 32/83.

280. Resolution 3477 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly endorsed the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific; invited the countries concerned to carry forward consultations about ways and means of realizing this objective; expressed the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, co-operate fully in achieving the objectives of the present resolution; and requested the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the States of the region in giving effect to the purpose of the present resolution.

281. Resolution 3478 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note of the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests submitted to the Assembly by the USSR, the text of which was annexed to the present resolution; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations, not later than 31 March 1976, with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and invited twenty-five to thirty non-nuclear-weapon States, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations, and to inform the Assembly, at its thirty-first session, of the results of the negotiations; requested the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be necessary for the negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

282. Resolution 3484 A (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, appealed once again to all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; invited the USSR and the United States to provide information on such consultations as they may have entered into or may intend to enter into for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in article V of the NPT, to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session through the Secretary-General; requested the CCD to keep under review, in its consideration of an elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the possibility that such explosions could be misused to circumvent any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons; stressed the need to ensure, particularly in the context of a comprehensive test ban, that any testing or application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes did not contribute to the testing or refinement of the nuclear-weapon arsenals of nuclear-weapon States or to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability by other States; and called upon all Member States to support and assist in the fulfilment of these tasks.

Thirty-first session of the General Assembly, 1976

283. Resolution 31/66

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, condemned all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted; declared its profound concern that substantive negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban agreement had not yet begun and re-emphasized the urgency of concluding a comprehensive and effective agreement; called once again upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons by agreement, subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement; emphasized in this regard the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States belonging to international agreements in which they had declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race; called upon all States not yet parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith; urged the CCD to continue to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the progress achieved.

284. Resolution 31/68

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, deplored the meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and the detrimental effects on world peace and economy of the continuing unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race; called again upon all States, as well as the organs concerned with disarmament issues, to place at the centre of their preoccupations the adoption of effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, and for the reduction of military expenditures and to make sustained efforts with a view to achieving progress toward general and complete disarmament.

285. Resolution 31/70

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to the security of members of such zones, to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the goals of general and complete disarmament; drew the attention of Governments to the comprehensive study and the views, observations and suggestions on that study contained in the report of the Secretary-General; \*/ expressed the hope that the comprehensive study and the views, observations and suggestions on that study would enhance further efforts of Governments concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones and will be of assistance to States interested in the establishment of such zones; and commended the comprehensive study and the report of the Secretary-General to the Governments concerned, to interested international organizations and to the CCD for further consideration and for the adoption of measures that they may deem appropriate within their respective fields of competence.

286. Resolution 31/75

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urgently called for determined efforts by all nuclear-weapon States: (a) To bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race; (b) To undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament; (c) To find an early solution to the difficulties in reaching agreement to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time as a step towards the realization of these objectives; emphasized the particular responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon States in this regard; stressed the urgency of international co-operative efforts in appropriate forums to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; recognized that States accepting effective non-proliferation restraints had a right to full access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and underlined the importance of all efforts to increase the availability of energy, particularly for the needs of the developing countries of the world; requested the IAEA to accord high priority to its programme of work in these areas.

287. Resolution 31/88

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Ad Hoc Committee and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to continue their consultations with a view to formulating a programme of action leading to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean; invited once again all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions.

288. Resolution 31/89

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, again called upon all nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3478 (XXX), to proceed as soon as possible with negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests with the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States; requested the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be necessary for the negotiations and to transmit to the group referred to in paragraph 1 above all documents relating to the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session of the item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

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\*/ A/31/189 and Add.1 and 2. See also CCD/467, above.

289. Resolution 31/92

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter-alia, invited the States which participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to implement fully and urgently all the provisions of the Final Act, including those relating to the Mediterranean, and to consider favourably the conversion of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation in the interests of international peace and security.

290. Resolution 31/189 C

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly requested the nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards a complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to consider undertaking, without prejudice to their obligations arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon Powers; and decided to review at its thirty-second session the progress made on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

291. Resolution 31/189 D

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly recognized that States accepting effective non-proliferation restraints had a right to enjoy fully the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and underlined the importance of increased efforts in this field, particularly for the needs of the developing areas of the world; requested the IAEA to give special attention to its programme of work in the non-proliferation area, including its efforts in facilitating peaceful nuclear co-operation and increasing assistance to the developing areas of the world within an effective and comprehensive safeguards system; further requested the IAEA to continue its studies on the questions of multinational fuel cycle centres and or an international régime for plutonium storage as effective means to promote the interests of the non-proliferation régime; and called upon the IAEA to give careful consideration to all relevant suggestions presented to it aiming at strengthening the safeguards régime.

Thirty-second session of the General Assembly, 1977

292. Resolution 32/50

By the preambular paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its conviction that the objectives of the full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be promoted by the establishment of universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By the operative paragraphs, the Assembly, among other things, declared that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be under agreed and appropriate safeguards applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

293. Resolution 32/78

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing had continued unabated in spite of repeated Assembly resolutions calling for a halt to testing in all environments; noted with satisfaction that negotiations had begun among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to the drafting of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban; declared that the conclusion of such an agreement and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the May-June 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; urged the three nuclear-weapon States concerned to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion as soon as possible and transmit the results to the CCD by the beginning of its spring 1978 session for full consideration; requested the CCD to take up the agreed text resulting from the trilateral negotiations, with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the May-June 1978 special session on disarmament.

294. Resolution 32/86

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, declared that as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean be convened in New York at a suitable date, which other States not falling within this category, but which have participated or have expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, could attend, and requested the Ad Hoc Committee to make the necessary preparations for the meeting.

295. Resolution 32/87 A

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, invited all States that had not yet done so in particular those possessing nuclear or other mass destruction weapons, to ratify or accede to the Sea-Bed Treaty; affirmed its strong interest in avoiding an arms race in nuclear or any other mass destruction weapons on the sea-bed, the ocean floor or the sub-soil thereof; requested the CCD, in consultation with the States parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty and taking into account the proposals made during the Sea-Bed Treaty Review Conference and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with the consideration of further disarmament measures to prevent an arms race in the sea-bed.

296. Resolution 32/87 B

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly reaffirmed the provisions of its resolution 31/189 C (see above); urged the nuclear-weapon States to give serious consideration to extending the undertaking proposed by the Assembly in its resolution 31/189 C and to take expeditious action in all relevant forums to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; and recommended that all possible efforts be made at the May-June 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to evolve binding and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, taking into account resolution 31/189 C.

297. Resolution 32/87 F

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urgently called for determined efforts by all nuclear-weapon States: (a) to bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race; (b) to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament; (c) to find an early solution to the remaining problems in reaching

agreement to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons. The Assembly also emphasized, in this connection, the particular responsibility of those nuclear-weapon States that had already accepted international obligations, namely in article VI of the NPT, with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests, and noted as encouraging recent efforts underway towards those ends. Among other things, the Assembly underlined the importance of determined efforts, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; urged States that had not yet adhered to the NPT, in the first instance, to do so at an early date or, at a minimum, to accept other arrangements involving the application of safeguards to their complete nuclear fuel cycle that would provide assurances to the international community against the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons while guaranteeing to the States concerned unhindered and non-discriminatory access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy; solemnly affirmed that: (a) States should not convert civil nuclear materials or facilities to the production of nuclear weapons; (b) all States had the right to develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective and non-discriminatory safeguards against nuclear-weapon proliferation.

298. Resolution 32/154

By operative paragraph 6 the General Assembly urged effective measures to put an end to the arms race and to promote disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the creation of zones of peace and co-operation, the withdrawal of foreign military bases and the achievement of tangible progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this regard. By operative paragraph 7 the Assembly expressed the hope that further positive results would be achieved at the meeting at Belgrade of States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe concerning the full implementation of the Final Act of the Conference, bearing in mind the close interrelation of the security of Europe to the security of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and all other regions of the world, and supported the conversion of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation.



XI. OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

First Session (1946)

299. Resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946

By the resolution, the General Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission composed of members of the Security Council and Canada, whenever it was not a member of the Council, "to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters". Specifically, the Commission should make proposals:

(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;

(c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

300. Resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946

The resolution, inter alia, provided for a general reduction of armaments, with the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes as the primary objective. It proposed the establishment within the framework of the Security Council, of an international system of control and inspection to control the reduction of armaments and to control the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

Third Session (1948)

301. Resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948

By operative paragraph one, the General Assembly approved the findings of the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the establishment of an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.

The Assembly in this connection requested the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission (the five permanent members of the Security Council and Canada) to hold discussions with a view to determining if a basis existed for ensuring the exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy and the elimination of atomic weapons.

Sixth Session

302. Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments created in 1947 by the Security Council and established the Disarmament Commission which was directed to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties for the regulation,

limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy. In listing the principles to guide the Commission in its work, the General Assembly stated, inter alia, that in a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic.

Ninth Session (1954)

303. Resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged further efforts to reach comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing, inter alia, for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and mass destruction weapons of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes; and for the establishment of effective international control, so that the whole disarmament programme would be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered.

Tenth Session (1955)

304. Resolution 914 (X) of 16 December 1955

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the continuation of efforts by the States concerned to reach a comprehensive disarmament programme and as initial steps to give priority to early agreement on and implementation of proposals relating to control and inspection.

Twelfth Session (1957)

305. Resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957

The General Assembly, among other things, urged: the immediate suspension of nuclear-weapon tests with prompt installation of effective international control; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and exclusive peaceful use of such materials under effective international control; the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a programme of transfer, on an equitable and reciprocal basis and under international supervision, of stocks of fissionable material from weapons uses to non-weapons uses; the reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate, safeguarded arrangements; the progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attacks, the joint study of an inspection system to ensure that the sending of objects into outer space shall be solely for peaceful purposes.

Fourteenth Session (1959)

306. Resolution 1402 A and B (XIV) of 21 November 1959

The General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its appreciation to the participants\*/ in the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests for their

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\*/ The USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States.

efforts towards reaching an agreement on the question including an appropriate international control system. The Assembly urged those States to continue their voluntary discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests during their negotiations and appealed to other States to desist from conducting such tests.

Fifteenth Session (1960)

307. Resolution 1576 (XV) of 20 December 1960

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, called for a permanent agreement to prevent nuclear-weapons proliferation; called upon nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of such an agreement, to desist temporarily and voluntarily from transferring nuclear weapons or information that could be used to produce such weapons, to States that did not yet have them; called upon non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain, temporarily and voluntarily, from manufacturing or acquiring by any other means, nuclear weapons.

Sixteenth Session (1961/2)

308. Resolution 1648 (XVI) of 6 November 1961

The General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its deep concern and profound regret that nuclear-weapon test explosions had resumed; urged the States concerned to refrain from such further testing pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements on the subject; called upon the States concerned to undertake urgently and expeditiously to conclude such agreements.

309. Resolution 1649 (XVI) of 8 November 1961

The General Assembly, inter alia, considered that negotiations on a treaty on the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests should proceed on the following basis: the treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms; international control machinery should be organized so as to be representative of all parties to the treaty and should be staffed and operated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness, avoiding self-inspection, under procedures which would ensure that its facilities would be used exclusively for purposes of effective control; the day-to-day executive and administrative operations of the control system should not be susceptible to obstruction by the exercise of a veto, and administrative responsibility should be concentrated in the hands of a single Administrator acting impartially and functioning under the supervision of a commission composed of representatives of parties to the treaty.

310. Resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon member States: to refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form; to refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons; to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone.

311. Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, declared that:

(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, was contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;

(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war would be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;

(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. Also by the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes and to report on the results of such consultation to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

312. Resolution 1664 (XVI) of 4 December 1961

By the resolution, the General Assembly, among other things, taking note of the suggestions that an inquiry be made into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country; requested the Secretary-General to make such an inquiry as soon as possible and to submit a report on its results to the Disarmament Commission not later than 1 April 1962; requested the Disarmament Commission to take further measures as appeared to be warranted in the light of that report; called upon the nuclear Powers to extend their fullest co-operation and assistance with regard to the implementation of the present resolution.

313. Resolution 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961

The General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.

Seventeenth Session (1962)

314. Resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November 1962

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, asked that all nuclear-weapon tests cease by 1 January 1963; took the memorandum jointly submitted to the ENDC on 16 April 1962 by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, \*/ as a basis for negotiations towards a ban on nuclear-weapon testing; and recommended that should it not be possible to reach agreement by 1 January 1963 to cease all nuclear-weapon tests, the States concerned should conclude immediately an agreement prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by a provisional agreement suspending underground nuclear-weapon tests.

315. Resolution 1762 B (XVII) of 6 November 1962

The General Assembly, inter alia, called upon the ENDC to endeavour to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban treaty under effective international verification; requested the participants in the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests to agree on a date in the near future for the resumption of their negotiations with a view to realizing an agreement prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests.

316. Resolution 1801 (XVII) of 14 December 1962

The General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to obtain the views of member States on the possibility of convening a special conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

Eighteenth Session (1963)

317. Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of 17 October 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the expressions by the USSR and the United States of their intention not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction; and solemnly called upon all States: (a) to refrain from placing such weapons in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies or in outer space; (b) to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities.

318. Resolution 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its satisfaction that agreement had been reached on a partial test ban treaty and on the establishment of a direct communication link between Moscow and Washington and noted that the parties to the partial test ban treaty had emphasized the need for additional initial disarmament steps.

319. Resolution 1909 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, requested the ENDC to study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

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\*/ ENDC/28, see above.

320. Resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States to become parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and requested the ENDC to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble of that Treaty.

321. Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, noted with satisfaction the declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America; \*/ expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would initiate studies concerning the measures that should be agreed upon with a view to achieving the aims of the said declaration; trusted that after a satisfactory agreement had been reached, all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would co-operate for the effective realization of the peaceful aims inspiring the present resolution; and requested the Secretary-General to extend to the States of Latin America, such technical facilities as they might require to achieve the aims of the resolution.

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\*/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes,  
Document A/5415/Rev.1.

XII. OTHER RELEVANT PROPOSALS

- (i) Proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests (1 July to 21 August 1958, Palais des Nations, Geneva) /

322. In communiqué number 30 of the Conference, issued following the last day of the Conference, on 21 August 1958, the following was stated, among other things:

"In the course of the work of the Conference there was an exchange of opinions on the question of the various methods of detecting nuclear explosions. The Conference came to the conclusion that the methods of detecting nuclear explosions available at the present time, viz. the method of collecting samples of radioactive debris, the method of recording seismic, acoustic and hydro-acoustic waves, and the radio signal method, together with the use of on-site inspection of unidentified events which might be suspected of being nuclear explosions, make it possible, within certain specific limits, to detect and identify nuclear explosions, and it recommends the use of these methods in a control system. The Conference noted that the combined use of the various methods considerably facilitates detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

The Conference of Experts noted that the effectiveness of the methods considered will increase in course of time with improvement of measuring techniques and with study of the characteristics of natural phenomena which cause interference when explosions are detected.

The Conference has adopted an agreed conclusion regarding the technical equipment of the control system necessary for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

The Conference of Experts reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up, with certain capabilities and limitations, a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It was established in this connection that a network of control posts which were equipped with all the necessary apparatus appropriate to the various methods of detection of nuclear explosions should be disposed on continents and on islands, as well as on a few ships in oceans.

The Experts came to the conclusion that the control system should be under the direction of an international control organ which would ensure the co-ordination of the activities of the control system and the functioning of the system in such a way that it would satisfy the necessary technical requirements.

On the 21st of August 1958 the Conference of Experts adopted a final report for consideration by governments." \*\*/

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\*/ See also General Assembly document A/3897 and Corr.1.

\*\*/ Document EXP/NUC/28.

323. The following working papers were submitted at the Conference:

Technical factors which the Western Delegation considers relevant to a discussion of monitoring a nuclear test suspension (submitted on 1 July 1958; document EXP/NUC/1)

Agenda submitted by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation and adopted by the Conference during its 3rd meeting on 4 July 1958 (document EXP/NUC/2 and EXP/NUC/2/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion on the possibility of using the air wave registration method to detect nuclear explosions (Presented by Mr. Sadovski of the USSR Delegation on 7 July; document EXP/NUC/3)

Summary of acoustic detection (Working paper presented by the Western Delegation on 7 July; document EXP/NUC/4)

Proposed revised draft of a conclusion as to the suitability of the method of registering air waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (Presented by the Western Delegation on 8 July; document EXP/NUC/5)

Proposed draft of a conclusion as to the suitability of the method of registering acoustic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (Presented by the USSR Delegation on 9 July; document EXP/NUC/6)

Conclusions as to the applicability of the method of registering acoustic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (submitted on 10 July; document EXP/NUC/7 and revised on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/7/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion on the suitability of the method for observing radioactive contamination in the atmosphere for the control purposes (Presented by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation on 10 July; document EXP/NUC/8)

Proposed conclusion as to the suitability of the method of identifying radioactive debris from nuclear explosions (Presented by Dr. Fisk of the Western Delegation on 10 July; document EXP/NUC/9)

Proposed conclusion as to the applicability of using radioactive debris for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by the Western Delegation on 11 July; document EXP/NUC/10)

Proposed conclusion as to the applicability of using radioactive debris for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation on 12 July; document EXP/NUC/11)

Examples of pinpointing in various points of the USSR some explosions caused by the United States (submitted on 12 July; document EXP/NUC/12)

Revised draft conclusion on the applicability of the use of radioactive debris to detect and identify nuclear explosions (Presented by the Western Delegation on 14 July; documents EXP/NUC/13, EXP/NUC/13/Corr.1 and EXP/NUC/13/Corr.1/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion about the application of a method of registering seismic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (Presented by Academician N.N. Semenov of the USSR Delegation on 17 July; document EXP/NUC/14)



Draft conclusion on the applicability of the method of the use of radioactive debris to detect and identify nuclear explosions (Presented by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation on 21 July; document EXP/NUC/15)

Conclusions on the applicability of the electromagnetic technique to the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by Dr. Fisk of the Western Delegation on 21 July; document EXP/NUC/16)

Conclusions on the applicability of the electromagnetic technique to the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by Mr. Leipunski of the Delegation of the USSR on 22 July; document EXP/NUC/17)

Conclusions as to the applicability of the method of using radioactive debris for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions (submitted on 23 July; document EXP/NUC/18 and subsequently revised documents EXP/NUC/18/Rev.1, EXP/NUC/18/Rev.1/Corr.1 and on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/18/Rev.2)

Conclusions as to the applicability of the method of registering seismic waves for detecting nuclear explosions (submitted on 24 July; document EXP/NUC/19 and subsequently revised documents EXP/NUC/19/Rev.1 and on 19 August; EXP/NUC/19/Rev.2)

Conclusions on the applicability of registration of radio signals for the detection of nuclear explosions (submitted on 25 July; document EXP/NUC/20 and revised on 19 August EXP/NUC/20/Rev.1)

Conclusions on the detection of nuclear explosions carried out at high altitude (More than 30 to 50 km above the earth) (submitted on 28 July; document EXP/NUC/21 and Corr.1 and revised on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/21/Rev.1)

Draft conclusions with reference to technical equipment of control posts (Presented by Mr. Sadovski of the USSR Delegation on 31 July; document EXP/NUC/22)

Conclusions on the question of the technical equipment of the control system for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (submitted on 6 August; document EXP/NUC/23 and Corr.1 and revised on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/23/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion on a network of control posts (Presented by the USSR Delegation on 11 August; document EXP/NUC/24)

Draft conclusion on the organization and functions of a system for checking the implementation of an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests (Presented by the USSR Delegation on 11 August; document EXP/NUC/25)

Draft conclusions on a system of control (submitted on 11 August; document EXP/NUC/26)

Conclusions on a control system for detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests (submitted on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/27)

Report of the conference of experts to study the methods of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests (submitted on 20 August; document EXP/NUC/28)

- (ii) Proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack and for the preparation of a report thereon to Governments (held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 10 November to 18 December 1958)

324. The report of the Conference, \*/ among other things, stated the following:

"In the course of the meetings, the participants in the Conference stated their positions, their points of view, and exchanged their opinions on the problem discussed. The meetings have been helpful in clarifying for each side the views of the other side."

325. During the course of these meetings various documents were submitted as follows:

Proposed Plan of Work submitted by the Western experts. 11 November 1958 (see Annex 1 to the Report of the Conference)

Draft Agenda: proposal submitted by the Delegations of the USSR, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. 11 November 1958 (See Annex 2 of ibid.)

Proposed Plan of Work submitted by the Western experts. 17 November 1958 (See Annex 3 of ibid.)

Draft recommendation regarding the undertaking by States of an obligation not to carry out flights of their aircraft with atomic and hydrogen weapons over the territories of other States and over open seas: Proposal submitted by the Delegation of the USSR. 17 November 1958 (See Annex 4 of ibid.)

Explanatory document of the first point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: a survey of the relevant technical aspects of possible instruments of surprise attack as a prerequisite for examining means of detection and systems of inspection and control. 18 November 1958. (See Annex 5 of ibid.)

Explanatory document of the second point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: a survey of techniques which would be effective in the observation and inspection of the instruments of surprise attack. 19 November 1958 (See Annex 6 of ibid.)

Explanatory document of the third point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: an illustrative outline of possible systems for observation and inspection of long-range aircraft. 24 November 1958. (See Annex 7 of ibid.)

Declaration by the Soviet Government on measures for preventing surprise attack: submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 28 November 1958 (See Annex 8 of ibid.)

Proposal regarding the establishment of ground control posts, the taking of aerial photographs and the putting into operation simultaneously of a number of disarmament measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack: submitted by the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 28 November 1958 (See Annex 9 of ibid.)

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\*/ Document GEN/SA/15 and Annexes 1 to 15. See also General Assembly document A/4078.

Participants were: Albania, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

Second explanatory document of the third point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: a paper illustrating a possible system for observation and inspection of ballistic missiles. 3 December 1958 (See Annex 10 of ibid.)

Third explanatory document of the third point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: an illustrative outline of a possible system for observation and inspection of ground forces. 5 December 1958 (See Annex 11 of ibid.)

Proposal regarding the tasks and functions of ground control posts and aerial inspection: submitted by the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR, 12 December 1958 (See Annex 12 of ibid.)

An explanatory statement regarding certain factors involved in the planning of an integrated observation and inspection system for reducing the possibility of surprise attack: submitted by the Western experts in explanation of Section IV of their proposed plan of work. 17 December 1958 (See Annex 13 of ibid.)

Statement on behalf of the Western experts by Mr. William C. Foster.  
18 December 1958 (See Annex 14 of ibid.)

Statement regarding the position of the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Conference for the prevention of surprise attacks: speech made by Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov.  
18 December 1958 (See Annex 15 of ibid.)

(iii) Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests (held at Geneva from 31 October 1958 to 29 January 1962) \*/

The following were the proposals submitted at the trilateral Conference composed of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States:

326. "Draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" submitted jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States on 18 April 1961 (GEN/DNT/110. See also A/4772 and Add.1, DC/134 and Add.1 and 2 and DC/135)

By the draft treaty each of the parties would, inter alia, undertake to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear-weapon tests at any place under its jurisdiction or control and refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of nuclear-weapon test explosions anywhere. To ensure compliance with the treaty's provisions, the parties would agree to establish a Control Organization.

327. "The United States Aide-Memoire concerning the Geneva test ban negotiations", delivered to the USSR on 17 June 1961 (A/4787, DC/136 and DC/137)

328. "The United States note of 15 July concerning the Geneva test ban negotiations", delivered to the USSR on 15 July 1961 (A/4819 and DC/138)

329. "Note verbale dated 29 August 1961 from the Chairmen of the Disarmament Commission to the Secretary-General transmitting a statement by the United States Government on the Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (A/4853 and DC/139)

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\*/ Includes only those proposals or documents submitted also to the General Assembly or to the Disarmament Commission.

330. Letter dated 15 November 1961 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/4967 and DC/193)

The letter contained a Note from the United Kingdom Government to the USSR proposing resumption of the Geneva Conference on 28 November 1961.

331. Letter dated 13 November 1961 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/4969 and DC/194)

The letter contained a Note from the United States Government to the USSR proposing resumption of the Geneva Conference on 28 November 1961.

332. "Letter from the Acting Secretary-General, dated 14 December 1961, to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission forwarding an interim report to the Disarmament Commission on the progress of the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/195 and Add.1)

The interim report consisted of the verbatim records and documents of the Conference from its resumption on 28 November through 7 December 1961. One of the documents included in that interim report was a "Draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapon tests" submitted at the Conference on 28 November, by the USSR (see also GEN/DNT/122).

By that draft, the States parties would undertake not to conduct tests of any kind of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water and would use their national means for the purpose of exercising mutual supervision of compliance with the undertaking prohibiting tests.

333. "Letter from the Acting Secretary-General, dated 19 February 1962, to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission forwarding the verbatim records and documents subsequent to 7 December 1961 of the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/195/Add.2)

One of the documents included was a report of the United Kingdom and the United States submitted jointly to the Disarmament Commission \*/ on the deliberations at the Geneva Conference (see also GEN/DNT/PV.348 of 19 December 1961).

In their joint report, the United Kingdom and the United States, inter alia, stressed their view that the USSR draft treaty of 28 November 1961 on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapon tests (see GEN/DNT/122 and DC/195 and Add.1, above), amounted to an uncontrolled agreement and a repudiation of previous USSR agreements for international inspection and control of nuclear-weapon tests. The United Kingdom and the United States saw the new USSR position as a step backwards in the discussions of the Conference.

In their supplementary joint report, \*\*/ the United Kingdom and the United States, inter alia, expressed the hope that the USSR would reconsider its opposition to an

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\*/ DC/196, see above under "Proposals submitted at the Disarmament Commission"

\*\*/ DC/196/Add.1, see ibid.

internationally controlled test ban agreement. They, furthermore, reaffirmed their desire to re-establish a common basis for negotiations either at the ENDC, through diplomatic channels, or through members of their delegations present at Geneva for test ban negotiations, and pledged to redouble their efforts to reach an adequately controlled agreement on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

334. "Statement of the Soviet Government on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted at the 352nd meeting of the Geneva Conference on 26 January 1962 (GEN/DNT/PV.352 and GEN/DNT/127. See also DC/195/Add.2)

In the statement the USSR, inter alia, indicated its readiness to continue the Geneva Conference and reaffirmed its position that the final solution to the question of discontinuing nuclear-weapon tests could be found only in the conditions of the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Once nuclear weapons were prohibited and existing stockpiles eliminated, there would no longer be the incentive to conduct nuclear tests.

(iv) Proposals submitted at the Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States (held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968) \*/

335. The Conference \*\*/ adopted several resolutions and a Declaration which embodied the principal conclusions regarding the problems debated at the Conference. The text of the Declaration read in part as follows:

"... Guided by the conviction that peace and security, like development in the world, are indivisible and recognizing the universal responsibilities and obligations in this regard, the Conference addressed itself to the problems of universal peace and, in particular, the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, cessation of the nuclear arms race, general and complete disarmament and harnessing of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, and has agreed on the following:

1. The participants of the Conference noted that there was a general acceptance of the fact that the future of mankind cannot be secure without the complete elimination of the use or threat of use of force in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. The Conference agreed that peace and progress could not be safeguarded for any nation unless the security of all nations is assured. The Conference stresses the necessity of further steps for an early solution of the question of security assurances in the nuclear era.
2. The participants consider as their sacred duty to appeal to all countries of the world to observe the United Nations Charter and the generally accepted norms of international law governing relations among States.
3. The Conference considers that an immediate cessation of the arms race and the acceleration of the process of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under effective international control are indispensable for the safeguarding of world peace and security, independence and economic progress of all countries.

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\*/ Document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2.

Participants included 92 non-nuclear-weapon States and four nuclear-weapon States: France, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

\*\*/ The Conference was convened pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI).

The Conference recommends that, pending the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, steps be undertaken urgently with a view to reaching agreements on various collateral measures.

4. In this context, the Conference has noted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was commended by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII). The Conference considers that the Treaty should be followed up by measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.

5. The Conference considers that nuclear-weapon-free zones, established under appropriate conditions, constitute an effective contribution to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the promotion of disarmament. It notes with satisfaction the progress already achieved with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America."

TABULATION OF PROPOSALS CONCERNING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MADE BETWEEN  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONVENING OF THE  
FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Prepared by the Secretariat

1. On page 2 replace the subtitle reading "Ninth Session, 1955" by "Tenth Session, 1955".
2. On page 3 add before paragraph 8 the following subtitle "Twelfth Session, 1957".
3. On the same page replace subtitles reading "Twelfth Session, 1958" and "Thirteenth Session, 1959" by the following: "Thirteenth Session, 1958" and "Fourteenth Session, 1959" respectively.
4. On page 4, replace the subtitle reading: "Fifteenth Session, 1961" by "Sixteenth Session, 1961".





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Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the  
development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons  
and on their destruction

Proposal of the USSR

Chemical weapons are a barbaric means of destruction. Such weapons have already taken tens of thousands of lives and have maimed millions of people. At present, the threat of massive use of much more horrible types of chemical weapons is looming over mankind.

The world's peoples are demanding that this should be prevented and that the very possibility of the use of chemical weapons should be ruled out by prohibiting their production and destroying accumulated stockpiles.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of this. True to the humane purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the USSR has never used chemical weapons anywhere and has never transferred them to anyone.

Motivated by the desire to achieve a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union is submitting to the States Members of the United Nations for their consideration the following basic provisions of a convention on the subject.

I. SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION

General provisions

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons and undertakes to destroy or divert to permitted purposes the accumulated stocks of such weapons and to destroy or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

Definition of chemical weapons

For the purposes of the Convention "chemical weapons" means:

(a) Super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal and harmful chemicals, and their precursors, except those intended for non-hostile purposes or for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes;

(b) Munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of the chemicals released as a result of the

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employment of such munitions or devices, including those with binary or multicomponent charges;

(c) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connexion with the employment of such munitions or devices.

#### Other definitions

For the purposes of the Convention:

1. The definitions of the terms "super-toxic lethal chemical", "other lethal chemical" and "harmful chemical" shall be based on specific criteria of toxicity (lethality and/or harmfulness) for each of these categories of chemicals (shall be specified in the Convention on the basis of the levels agreed upon in the Committee on Disarmament).

2. "Permitted purposes" means non-hostile purposes and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

3. "Non-hostile purposes" means industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes or purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons.

4. Such terms as "a chemical", "an incapacitant", "an irritant", "a precursor", "capacity" and "a facility" are also subject to definition in the Convention.

#### Prohibition of transfer

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes:

(a) Not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons;

(b) Not to transfer any super-toxic lethal chemicals, incapacitants or irritants, or their precursors to anyone, directly or indirectly, even for permitted purposes, except to another State Party;

(c) Not to assist anyone, or to encourage or induce anyone, directly or indirectly, to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.

#### Non-stationing

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to station chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, in the territories of other States and also undertakes to recall all its chemical weapons from the territories of foreign States if they were stationed there earlier (dates for the fulfilment of this obligation shall be specified in the Convention).

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Destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to destroy its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons or divert them to non-hostile purposes in quantities consistent with such purposes.
2. The destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons shall be begun by each State Party not later than 2 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after the State has become a Party to the Convention.

The first operations for destruction may, as a display of goodwill be carried out by each State Party possessing chemical weapons as early as the initial stage of the functioning of the Convention.

Elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons

1. Each State Party undertakes to eliminate or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.
2. Operations for eliminating or dismantling facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons shall be begun not later than 8 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after a State becomes a Party to the Convention.
3. Any State Party to the Convention shall have the right, for the purposes of destroying stocks of chemical weapons, to convert temporarily facilities previously used for the production of such weapons and also to carry out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a specialized facility or facilities built for such purposes.

Permitted activities

1. Each State Party to the Convention shall have the right to retain, produce, acquire or use for permitted purposes any toxic chemicals and their precursors, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes.
2. The aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes which are produced, diverted from stocks or otherwise acquired annually or are available shall at any time be minimal and shall not, in any case, exceed one metric ton for any State Party to the Convention.
3. Each State Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes shall concentrate such production at a single specialized facility, of appropriate capacity which shall be subject to special agreement.

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Protection of the population and the environment

In fulfilling its obligations connected with the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and the elimination of means of their production, each State Party shall take all necessary precautions for the protection of the population and the environment.

Promotion of development goals

The Convention shall facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for the economic and technical development of the Parties and for international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. The possibility of interference with areas of activity unrelated to the purposes of the Convention shall be precluded.

II. DECLARATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, to declare:

- Whether or not it possesses chemical weapons and capacities for their production;
- The magnitude of its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and capacities for their production;
- The volume of transfers to anyone of chemical weapons, of technological equipment for their production, and of relevant technical documentation which took place after 1 January 1946;
- Whether or not there exist in its territory stocks of chemical weapons, and in what quantities, or facilities for the production of chemical weapons, and with what capacities, which are under the control of, or have been left by, any other State, group of States, organization or private person.

2. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, declare that it has ceased all activities relating to the production of chemical weapons or the transfer to anyone of such weapons, of technological equipment for their production and of relevant technical documentation.

3. Each State Party undertakes to declare, not later than 6 months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, its plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons, and to declare, not later than one year before the commencement of the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for producing chemical weapons, its plans for their destruction and dismantling, stating the location of the facilities.

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4. Each State Party which carries out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a facility (facilities) temporarily converted for such purposes or at a specialized facility shall declare the location of the said facility (facilities) within the time period provided for in the plan for the destruction of the said stocks.

5. Each State Party which carries out the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specialized facility shall declare its location before the date of the commencement of the facility's operation.

6. Each State Party shall undertake:

(a) To submit periodic notifications concerning the implementation of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the available stocks of chemical weapons and of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. Where such operations are carried out earlier than provided for in the plan, the State Party shall submit appropriate notification;

(b) To submit appropriate notifications three months before the initiation of the implementation of each stage of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and of each stage of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons; the location of the facility to be destroyed or dismantled shall be stated in the appropriate notification;

(c) To submit, not later than 30 days after the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and after the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons, appropriate statements to that effect.

7. Each State Party shall undertake to submit annual declarations concerning the following substances produced, diverted from stocks acquired or used:

- Super-toxic lethal, other lethal and harmful chemicals for purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons;
- Super-toxic lethal chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons;
- Other lethal and harmful chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and irritants for purposes of law enforcement.

8. States Parties shall proceed from the assumption that chemicals and precursors produced, acquired, retained and used for permitted purposes, when they represent a special danger from the viewpoint of their possible diversion to purposes connected with the use of chemical weapons, must be included in appropriate lists. Each State Party shall undertake to present annually information on the chemicals and precursors of chemicals included in those lists.

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9. Each State Party shall undertake to submit notifications concerning each of its transfers to any other State Party, where not prohibited by the Convention, of super-toxic lethal chemicals, incapacitants and irritants and of other chemicals which could be used as components for chemical weapons with binary or multicomponent charges.

10. The above-mentioned declarations, plans, notifications and statements shall be submitted to the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention. Their contents and the procedure for drawing up the required lists are to be defined in the Convention.

### III. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION

#### General provisions on verification

1. States Parties to the Convention shall base their activities relating to the verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention on a combination of national and international measures.

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take any internal measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity under its jurisdiction or control that is in violation of the provisions of the Convention.

3. To monitor the fulfilment of obligations provided for in the Convention, any State Party may establish a Committee of National Verification (a national verification organization) which is vested with the necessary juridical rights and whose composition, functions and methods of work shall be determined by the State Party to the Convention in accordance with its constitutional norms.

4. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by other States Parties, any State Party shall have the right to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Any State Party which possesses national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place at the disposal of other Parties information which it has obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the Convention.

5. Each State Party shall undertake not to impede, through the use of deliberate concealment measures or in any other manner, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties.

6. International measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, and through consultations and co-operation between States Parties, as well as through the services of the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention.

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### Consultation and co-operation

1. The States Parties undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of the Convention or in connexion with the application of its provisions.
2. The States Parties shall exchange, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, information which they consider necessary to provide assurance of fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Convention.
3. Consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter. Such procedures may include the use of the services of appropriate international organizations in addition to those of the Consultative Committee.
4. In the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention, the States Parties shall agree in due form to prevent any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States Parties.

### Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention

1. For the purpose of carrying out broader international consultation and co-operation, exchanging information and promoting verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of the Convention, the States Parties shall establish a Consultative Committee within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force. Any State Party shall have the right to appoint its representative to the Committee.
2. The Consultative Committee shall be convened as necessary and also at the request of any State Party to the Convention within 30 days after the request is received.
3. Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Consultative Committee, its possible subsidiary bodies, their functions, rights, duties and methods of work, its role in on-site inspections, forms of co-operation with national verification organizations and other matters are to be elaborated.

### Fact-finding procedure relating to compliance with the Convention. On-site inspections

1. Each State Party shall have the right to request, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, from another Party which is suspected of violating the Convention information on the actual state of affairs. The State to which the request is sent shall provide the requesting State Party with information in connexion with the request.

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2. Each State Party may, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, send to another State Party which is suspected of violating the Convention a request for an on-site inspection. Such request may be sent after the possibilities of fact-finding within the framework of paragraph 1 of this section have been exhausted and shall contain all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the request.

Requests may, in particular, be sent in connexion with notifications concerning the destruction of accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and concerning the destruction and dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. The State Party to which such a request is sent may treat the request favourably or decide otherwise. It shall inform the requesting State Party in good time about its decision, and if it is not prepared to agree to an inspection, it shall give appropriate and sufficiently convincing explanations.

3. Within the period of destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the stocks of chemical weapons, a possibility of carrying out systematic international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the destruction of stocks at a converted or specialized facility (facilities) shall be provided for.

4. The Convention shall provide for the possibility of carrying out international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specified facility.

Procedure for lodging complaints with the United Nations  
Security Council. Provision of assistance

1. Any State Party which has reason to believe that any other State Party has acted or may be acting in violation of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. Such complaint shall include all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the complaint.

2. Each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation.

3. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to provide assistance or support assistance being provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which requests it if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed or is possibly being exposed to danger as a result of the violation by another State Party of obligations assumed under this Convention.

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Relationship with the Geneva Protocol of 1925

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting, or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

IV. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

Provision shall be made for a procedure for the signing of the Convention, its ratification and entry into force, arrangements relating to a depositary, as procedure for the accession of States to the Convention and withdrawal from it, machinery for amendments to the Convention, dates for holding conferences to review its implementation and the status of such conferences.

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COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/295  
23 July 1982

Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 22 JULY 1982 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF  
INDIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA TRANSMITTING THE  
DRAFT OF A CONVENTION SUBMITTED BY INDIA AT THE SECOND SPECIAL  
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

I am transmitting herewith for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament under item 2 of its Agenda, the enclosed Draft of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was submitted by India at the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.

2. I would request that the Draft Convention and this letter be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament for the information and consideration of its members.

(Signed) A.P. Venkateswaran  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
India to the United Nations

DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION  
OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article II

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article III

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by 25 Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IV

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_ date of \_\_\_\_\_  
One thousand nine hundred and \_\_\_\_\_.



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Considerations of the Grand National Assembly, of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, presented to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament

Romania appreciates that States have presented during the special session a series of important proposals to be examined with the greatest attention as they constitute the basis for the working out of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Romania considers that in this spirit it is necessary to urgently start negotiations and to agree on the following measures:

1. All efforts by Governments and responsible factors should be consistently aimed at the attainment of our fundamental objective - the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of effective steps towards disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament.

2. To attain this objective, it is necessary to stop the production of nuclear weapons and to start the gradual reduction of the existing stockpiles till their complete liquidation, and to ban for ever all nuclear weapons, as well as the other weapons of mass destruction.

Of outstanding importance would be the undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States of the firm commitment not to be the first to use such weapons.

It is necessary to intensify the efforts for the conclusion in the shortest possible time, of agreements on:

- the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;
- the prohibition of the production and development of neutron weapons;
- the prevention of using new technological achievements to produce and develop new types or systems of weapons of mass destruction;
- the prohibition of the production and development of chemical weapons and the liquidation of the existing stockpiles of such weapons;
- the prohibition of radiological weapons;
- granting of security guarantees to all non-nuclear States; the undertaking of the firm commitment that no nuclear weapons and generally no other weapons or threat of force will be used against those States.

Romania welcomes the numerous proposals submitted so far on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, of the production of the atomic armaments. We are in favour of a substantial reduction by the two major Powers of their nuclear weapons, for example by 50 per cent in the first stage as a step towards the total elimination of the nuclear weapons.

Romania has welcomed the understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States to begin this month negotiations on strategic armaments.

The major interests of all peoples require that one should act in a spirit of high responsibility and that everything should be done to eliminate the nuclear armaments; they require that the Soviet Union and the United States - the two big States which possess most of the nuclear weapons - should each make every effort and act with goodwill for reaching agreement.

Undoubtedly, there are differences between the proposals submitted so far by the two sides. However, we are of the opinion that all proposals should be taken into consideration and that negotiations should be started for the conclusion of common agreement.

At the same time, we believe that all countries, all the peoples of the world have the duty to act directly, without waiting for the outcome of the negotiations between the two countries, to militate firmly and with determination for disarmament, and make their contribution to the fulfilment of mankind's aspiration towards putting an end to armaments and living in a world without wars.

3. In order to stop the arms race, we propose the freezing of military expenditures at the level of 1982 and their reduction by 10-15 per cent until 1985.

Thirty to fifty per cent of the funds thus saved should be used for supporting the efforts of the developing countries, and the rest for the creation of new jobs and the implementation of other economic and social measures in the countries operating such reductions. Romania considers that for the encouragement of efforts in this field, it would be particularly important for the General Assembly to adopt a declaration on the principles that should govern the activities of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

4. Proceeding from the particular importance which the adoption of effective measures of substantial reduction of conventional armaments would have for the ensurance of international peace and security, Romania pronounces itself for an agreement between the two blocs, and generally between the two sides, on a maximum ceiling for the main armaments - airplanes, tanks, battle ships, missiles, heavy guns and others.

5. Being aware of the very serious situation on the European continent, Romania firmly pronounces itself for the cessation of the deployment and development of medium-range missiles in Europe, the withdrawal and destruction of the existing ones, and the elimination from the continent of all nuclear weapons.

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Our country has welcomed the beginning of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva concerning the medium-range nuclear weapons, and it is hopeful that those negotiations will be concluded with concrete and positive results, in the direction of the reduction and elimination of the nuclear danger from Europe. In our opinion, since this problem is of direct interest to all European nations, all other States of the continent should participate, in one form or another, in the Geneva negotiations.

6. For the reduction and elimination of the danger of war from the European continent, it is necessary to reach an agreement on the convening of a conference on the confidence-building and disarmament in Europe.

It is necessary that, at the resumption of its proceedings, the Madrid meeting should be held in a constructive spirit and should be concluded, in the shortest possible time, with positive results, with decisions reaffirming the principles and commitments undertaken under the Final Act, contributing to their unitary implementation, convening a conference on confidence-building and disarmament, and ensuring the continuity of the process started in Helsinki. The organization of such a conference would meet the major interests and aspirations of the European peoples, and would stimulate the promotion of a steady process of détente and disarmament and the establishment of a climate of security and co-operation on the continent. Romania declares itself for the upbuilding of a united Europe, in which all States, irrespective of their social system, would co-operate fruitfully on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and every nation would be able to develop in freedom and independence, without any outside interference.

7. We attach great importance to the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world through agreements among the States in the respective areas, the nuclear Powers committing themselves not to use atomic weapons and force in general against the States participating in such zones.

By acting steadily towards this end, Romania carries out an active policy of development of wide relations with the other States in the Balkans, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. In this spirit, it declares itself for a Balkan meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, militates and acts for the transformation of the Balkans into a zone of friendship, co-operation, good-neighbourliness and peaceful coexistence, free from nuclear weapons. The achievement of such a zone in the Balkans - also related to other nuclear-free zones in Europe - would be a step towards a Europe without nuclear weapons and would have most positive effects on the European political climate as a whole.

8. Under the present international circumstances, of particular importance would be the adoption, with the participation of all States, of effective measures for increasing confidence among States.

Romania considers that it is of utmost importance for the strengthening of confidence and détente between States to agree on the withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national borders, to have every State undertake the firm commitment not to deploy troops on the territory of other States.

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In Romania's opinion, these measures should also be aimed at the following:

- reduction of the manifestations of bloc policy and of military activities of blocs, intensification of efforts to bring about their simultaneous dissolution;
- liquidation of foreign military bases on the territory of other States;
- renunciation of military manoeuvres and demonstrations, particularly of those with the participation of several States, near the national borders of other countries;
- steady implementation of the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;
- observance, in good faith, by all States, of the commitments undertaken by virtue of the existing agreements in the field of disarmament, as well as of the United Nations decisions concerning disarmament negotiations, particularly of those adopted by consensus.

The increase in confidence among States and the strengthening of international security require that the relations among all States be firmly based on the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equality of rights, non-interference in the internal affairs, complete renunciation of force and threat of force, and of armaments policy, the ensuring of the balance of military forces at an ever lower level through the gradual reduction of military expenditures and personnel, as well as of armaments, primarily of nuclear ones.

9. To create favourable conditions to disarmament, more determined actions should be taken without delay for the settlement of all conflicts between States exclusively by peaceful means, for the cessation of the present conflicts and their political solution through negotiations, for the prevention of any new military conflicts and confrontations.

In the opinion of the Romanian Government, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of international disputes are interdependent and they condition each other. The perpetuation of armed conflicts and of hotbeds of tension and war represents a serious obstacle in the way of disarmament. Life and events demonstrate that it is easy to start a conflict, to create tension in one or another part of the world, but it is much more difficult to stop and solve them. That is why everything should be done to prevent recourse to military means, to force, for the settlement of various issues arising among States. No matter how long negotiations would take, it is much better, in the interest of the countries concerned and of the cause of peace and détente, that the peaceful way, that of negotiations, should be chosen for the settlement of conflicts.

It is necessary that all States should commit themselves to solve all their international disputes by peaceful means, displaying moderation and self-restraint, and renouncing any form of recourse to force or to threat of force. Of great

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importance in this regard would be the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a declaration on the settlement of all disputes between States exclusively by peaceful means.

10. In order to prevent and settle the conflicts and disputes between States peacefully, and having in mind the numerous existing problems, Romania proposes the creation, within the United Nations, of a special body that should act for the organization of negotiations and for the solution of disputes between States in this way only.

The States which would not make use of this body, ignore its activity or disregard the fundamental requirement to settle all disputes only by peaceful means, thus defying the imperative of the complete elimination of all acts or threats of force from international life, would be considered aggressors.

11. The implementation of the set of measures aimed at the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament should be done in conditions of mutual confidence and equal security for all countries. Romania believes that it is necessary to ensure strict and effective control over the carrying out of the obligations undertaken by States, with a view to achieving real disarmament encouraging and assisting negotiations.

To this effect, Romania stands for setting up in the framework of the United Nations of an international body entrusted with the right of controlling and inspecting the implementation of adopted disarmament measures, and the Governments should lend it their full support.

Romania firmly declares itself in favour of the achievement of a balance based not on the increase in armaments, military forces and expenditures, but, on the contrary, on their continuous reduction. Therefore, we believe that the success of the efforts to this end requires the contribution in good faith of States, by providing the elements which are necessary to know and measure the military budgets and forces, as well as the armaments.

12. In order to strengthen peace, security and healthy co-operation among nations, Romania is of the view that it would be of an exceptional importance for all States to undertake their solemn commitment to renounce force and the threat of force, to respect the independence of all peoples, their inalienable right to decide freely upon their own destinies, without any interference from outside.

13. In Romania's opinion, an objective of such scope as general and complete disarmament can only be attained gradually, through partial measures within a process by stages.

That is why it is necessary that the General Assembly should - at this session - adopt the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The Programme should be as binding as possible, establish priorities and time-frames and include a set of measures to be negotiated both bilaterally and multilaterally, within a sustained disarmament process, which would be conceived in a long-term perspective, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament.

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The United Nations General Assembly should take note of the solemn commitment of all States to co-operate in a constructive spirit and in good faith for the translation into practice of that Programme.

We deem it necessary that actions should be taken for the observance and implementation by all States of the United Nations decisions and resolutions, for the improvement of this world forum, so that it should make a greater contribution to the settlement of international issues through negotiations, to the development of co-operation among all States, irrespective of their social system, and to the achievement of lasting peace in the world. The strict observance by every State of the United Nations decisions is in the interest of all nations, since those who today disregard or refuse to implement United Nations decisions and resolutions jeopardize their own independence, because tomorrow the same practices will turn against them.

14. Romania attaches great importance to the strengthening of the role of peoples, of world public opinion in the settlement of all issues relating to mankind's peace and progress, to the consolidation of their solidarity and collaboration in the promotion of the policy of détente, peace and national independence.

The great demonstrations in favour of peace and disarmament, which have taken place lately in many States, Romania included, and which assert themselves with a vigour and force unknown in the post-war period, clearly show that the action of peoples, of world public opinion in favour of disarmament and peace has developed as a new and progressive factor in contemporary international relations, which is of particular importance for the cessation of the arms race, for mankind's salvation from a nuclear catastrophe.

We would like to emphasize the particular role in the struggle for disarmament, peace and understanding, of the young generation, which represents the majority of the globe's population, makes the greatest sacrifices in case of armed conflicts and is vitally interested in peace, in order to ensure a peaceful and happy future.

Romania actively supports the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign under the aegis of the United Nations.

15. In the historic effort to put an end to the arms race and to achieve disarmament, particular responsibility and role devolve upon scientists who know best the destructive capacity of modern weapons and the catastrophic consequences of an atomic war.

Under the present circumstances, no scientist can remain indifferent to the fact that the latest achievements of modern science and technology are used for the production of ever more destructive weapons, that important material resources and a huge scientific potential are monopolized by the armaments policy. Under these circumstances, Romania considers that conditions should be created in order that the voice of scientists should be heard at the United Nations and in other international bodies, that they should participate directly in the debate of all problems relating to disarmament and peace.

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16. Starting from the need to do everything to ensure a climate of confidence, peace and co-operation among nations, Romania considers that it would be of particular importance to put an end to propaganda for armaments and war and to undertake wide actions of educating peoples in the spirit of the ideals of peace, against war and armaments. In this regard, Romania proposes to agree on the organization under United Nations auspices of a World Conference of the Mass Media - Radio, Television, Press - to examine and establish appropriate measures in this field.

17. In today's world, disarmament, like other major international problems of vital interest to the whole mankind, should be solved in a democratic manner, with the active participation of all States.

In this context, we declare ourselves for further increase in the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the achievement of disarmament.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has clearly confirmed that the United Nations represents the wide democratic framework in which the disarmament agreements should be achieved and implemented, with the participation of all States of the world. The present situation requires the further consolidation and democratization of the machinery for deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament, established at the first special session.

Romania supports the enlargement of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament and the access of other States to its proceedings, the strengthening of the role of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and of the United Nations Institute for Research on Disarmament, as well as other measures capable of contributing to an increase in the effectiveness of the United Nations bodies in the field of disarmament.

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**APPEAL OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
AT ITS SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT**

For disarmament, for a Europe without nuclear weapons,  
for a world of peace!

Concerned at the escalation of the arms race, which seriously endangers peace and the very existence of peoples, and at the growing threat to peace and security, we, the citizens and entire nation of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in these extremely grave international circumstances, solemnly appeal to the United Nations General Assembly, meeting in special session devoted to disarmament, to adopt concrete measures designed to initiate disarmament, and in the first place nuclear disarmament, and the reduction of military expenditures, so that the vast material and human resources released by halting and curtailing the arms race may be devoted to human progress and well-being and to the eradication of economic underdevelopment.

Like other European peoples, the Romanian people resolutely calls for an end to the deployment and development of new medium-range nuclear missiles, the withdrawal and destruction of the missiles in place and the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the continent.

The whole of mankind is at present confronted with a choice: the path of war or that of peace. Nothing could justify the pursuit of a policy of armaments and war.

The United Nations and the leaders of all States and Governments, whose representatives have assembled at the United Nations for the special session, bear a heavy responsibility to their peoples and to the future of human civilization for the release of mankind from the burden of armaments and the terrifying spectre of a nuclear war, for halting the race towards disaster and for safeguarding and consolidating peace.

In the name of human existence and the future of mankind, we appeal to the United Nations, all States and all peoples to overcome every hesitation and obstacle and to decide to halt the arms race and initiate disarmament, and in the first place, nuclear disarmament.

Let us start to disarm before the first nuclear bombs are dropped. Once the dropping of bombs begins, it will be too late.

The Romanian people, like all other peoples of the world, urges that prompt action be taken now, before it is too late, in order to safeguard the basic human right: the right to peace, life and freedom.

We resolutely demand that the voice of the peoples be heard and that their will to live in peace be respected.





YUGOSLAVIA  
WORKING PAPERSome aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention

During the negotiations held so far in the CCD and CD as well as in the working papers of some delegations it has been emphasized that verification is the basis for reaching an agreement in the elaboration of a convention on the ban of chemical weapons. Objective considerations of the verification procedure have indicated the complexity of this problem, both from its technical and political aspects. However, it can be concluded that there exists an agreement in principle on most of the technical issues of verification.

As is known, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons. Since the Protocol of 1925 does not specifically prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of CWA, this was taken by some major military powers as a justification for intensive research to obtain new types of chemical weapons. Other industrialized countries also have experience in research and development of CWA, of types and quantities of CWA's which are used for the purpose of technical and medical protection (the developing of protective equipment, detection, decontamination, medical treatment and other).

At the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and the group of experts held during 1980, 1981 and 1982, there was a harmonization of views regarding a series of very important issues such as: the scope of the future convention, definitions of chemical weapons and toxicity criteria, as well as on the need for States to declare their chemical weapon stocks and production units and agree to a fixed time-table for their destruction. However, the appearance of binary weapons has introduced new elements, even in cases when agreement had, in principle, been reached. Thus, for instance, the components of relatively low toxicity and non-toxic components (precursors) which are an integral part of binary weapons cannot be categorized according to the already adopted toxicity criteria of CWA. The fact that binary weapons contain "non-toxic" substances is of importance only to those who produce and possess such weapons and this primarily when it concerns their production, stockpiling and destruction. However, if one bears in mind the purpose of binary weapons, there

is then no difference from CWA which are today classified, in terms of toxicity, as supertoxic lethal chemicals. These data point to the indispensability of applying chemical, physical and biological methods of detection and identification for the purpose of verifying binary weapons in the course of production and stockpiling. The application of the cited methods is also very important when monitoring and proving the existence of activities linked with the verification of possible use of chemical weapons as well as for the monitoring of the destruction of CWA stocks in general. On the other hand, the combining of chemical, physical and biological methods creates the conditions for a credible verification of the existence or use of chemical weapons. The implementation of verification will be facilitated if agreement is reached with regard to the standardization of methods because results from several laboratories could then be compared and reproduced.

The verification of chemical weapons should, in our opinion, be implemented on the basis of a national and international procedure, where we consider that national verification does not preclude international verification but rather that they complement each other. In order to increase confidence among countries, it is possible that both national and international verification be based on an agreed, generally acceptable and unified identification system - methods that would be standardized for particular CWA categories. This, of course, does not preclude a separate national approach especially when a country has qualified personnel, equipment and organization in the gathering of samples, data processing and other. The standardizing of the methods of international verification can greatly facilitate the national verification system and chemical defense measures, in those countries as well which have no experience in developing their own verification methods. The standardizing of verification methods presupposes their periodical modification in accordance with scientific and technological progress. It is understandable that the introduction of new methods and procedures should be subject to agreement and acceptance on the part of an international organ created by the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In our view the arms reduction and disarmament agreements must be founded on reasonable confidence, as is the case with some existing agreements. If there is a decrease in confidence or if there is doubt concerning the violation of agreements, then only verification measures can restore confidence among States Parties to the agreements. This is particularly true for the countries which possess production facilities and stockpiles of chemical weapons because the arms race, which is usually motivated by acquiring arms advantage or is justified by the need to not lag behind in the creation of new weapons, is most often initiated by these countries.

Although it may appear at a glance that the term verification is clear and that it is understood what it encompasses, there have so far been different opinions and explanations, which is confirmed by a number of working papers devoted to this issue. Bearing in mind the specific characteristics that CWA possess, the proposed international verification procedures reflect either political or technical difficulties. On the basis of negotiations held and working papers tabled thus far, it seems, in our opinion, that three fundamental categories of international verification appear:

(a) comprehensive (absolute) verification

(b) essential (necessary) verification

(c) limited (insufficient) verification

(a) Comprehensive (absolute) verification presupposes the voluntary acceptance of international inspection and a maximum of openness regarding the obtaining and gathering of necessary data in all stages of the verification procedure. In such a case, the State on whose territory verification is made gives the necessary technical, professional and other assistance according to need and is ready to co-operate. The time-frame for carrying out this verification should not, in principle, be defined, and depends on its scope. This verification comprises: on-site inspection; sampling and determination of samples by using standardized chemical, physical or biological methods. These analyses can be performed in the laboratories of the country in which inspection is being carried out, samples can be sent to the so-called reference laboratories, with regard to which there is agreement on part of the signatory countries to the effect that trustworthy analysis can be performed there, or both possibilities can be used at the same time. Within the scope of this inspection there can also be a medical check-up with the taking of samples (blood, urine, etc.); - near-site inspection: sampling and determination of samples by using chemical, physical or biological methods. These samples could represent contaminated air, effluent water etc. at a distance from the production plant permitting reliable measurements.

(b) Essential (necessary) verification presupposes a mutually agreed acceptance of international inspection which is in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the Convention. It can be carried out periodically (once or several times in a year) or when the need arises. The State on whose territory the inspection is carried out should secure unhindered work for the international commission. The participation

of the country in which the inspection is being carried out in offering technical and professional assistance depends on its readiness for co-operation. In principle, the time needed to complete the verification should be defined but also depends on the scope of the verification. This verification comprises:

- On-site inspection: sampling and sending of samples to reference laboratories outside the country where the verification is being performed.
- Near-site inspection: sampling of contaminated air, effluent water, etc. at a distance from the production plant permitting reliable measurements. Samples are sent to reference laboratories outside the country in which inspection is carried out.
- On-site and near-site inspection should also include medical examinations of people, with the taking of samples (blood, urine and other), who are employed in the plants as well as of people living in the nearest vicinity.

(c) Limited verification does not include the international verification procedure. The results and data of national verification<sup>1/</sup> are mostly used for the purpose of controlling violations of the Convention which, for understandable reasons, have a limited validity and utility. Limited verification can also use other sources of information which indirectly indicate a possible violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Under certain conditions, this verification can also encompass off-site inspection.

In case of suspicion of use of chemical weapons it is possible to use the three mentioned forms of verification (a, b, and c). We would like to underline that regardless of which type of verification is in question, what is essential is that it be performed on time. Thus, for example, when there is a suspicion that persistent CWA are being used, the time needed for taking samples for chemical and physical-chemical determination cannot be longer than two to three weeks, (depending on meteorological conditions). For non-persistent CWA, this time is far shorter and amounts, under the most favourable meteorological conditions to a couple of days.

The classification of international verification in this working paper is considered conditional and we propose it as working material for the considering of different levels of international verification.

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<sup>1/</sup> The national verification system in this working paper is understood to comprise the use of personnel and resources linked to one's own territory and differs from national technical verification which encompasses the monitoring of foreign territory from satellites.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/299<sup>1/</sup>  
29 July 1982

Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 27 JULY 1982 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND, TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "SYSTEMATIC IDENTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS; IDENTIFICATION OF NON-PHOSPHORUS WARFARE AGENTS".

I have the honour to transmit to you a document entitled "Systematic Identification of Chemical Warfare Agents; Identification of Non-Phosphorus Warfare Agents". This study represents a further contribution of the Government of Finland to the work of the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons.

I would appreciate if the study would be circulated as an official CD document.

(Signed) Arto Kurittu  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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<sup>1/</sup> A limited distribution of this document in English has been made to the members of the Committee on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki.

GE.82-65194



# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/300

3 August 1982

Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 3 AUGUST 1982 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN CONNEXION WITH THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT.

I have the honour to draw your attention to the following paragraphs of the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which are of direct relevance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament:

1. In paragraph 55, the General Assembly notes that the exchange of views on the question of machinery "focused on the enhancement of the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. With that objective in mind, suggestions to expand the membership of the Committee in a limited and balanced manner, consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness, received wide support. Several suggestions were also made:

- "(a) That the Committee meet for a period of eight months or all year round;
- "(b) That a pledge be obtained from its members, in particular from the nuclear-weapon States, not to use the practice of consensus to obstruct the adjustment of the structure of the Committee, in particular the establishment, as appropriate, of new ad hoc working groups;
- "(c) That the Committee's name be changed to 'Standing Conference on Disarmament' in order to reflect properly its present status."

2. In paragraph 56, the General Assembly states that "in the views concerning aspects of secretariat support, general satisfaction was expressed with the work of the Centre for Disarmament and the need for strengthening the Centre including the strengthening of the support for the Committee on Disarmament, was recognized"

3. In paragraph 62, the General Assembly stresses "the need... to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body. In this regard the Committee on Disarmament is requested to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session on its consideration of an expansion of its membership; consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness".

4. In paragraph 63, the General Assembly refers back to the Committee on Disarmament the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. In addition, the General Assembly requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament at the Assembly's thirty-eighth session.

(Signed) Javier Perez de Cuellar  
Secretary-General

GE.82-65239





## EIGHTH

Memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat  
of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons

The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, is one of the most important international instruments in the field of arms control.

Its importance was formally recognized in the Final Document of the first special session, paragraph 72 of which declares that all States should adhere to the Protocol.

It should perhaps, however, be pointed out that the international community had taken the view that prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological agents, and the destruction of such agents, whose use in war is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol, constituted a significant contribution to the achievement of disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The negotiations on this question resulted in the conclusion in 1972 of a first agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxin weapons and on their destruction. The Committee on Disarmament is at present elaborating a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, taking into account paragraph 75 of the Final Document, which describes this as one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

After the 1972 treaty, and taking into account the ongoing negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament, it becomes apparent that the international community cannot ignore another aspect of the process of reinforcing the Geneva Protocol: deciding on arrangements for monitoring compliance with the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In its report to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament made reference to this point.

There is more than one reason why compliance with the Geneva Protocol needs to be ensured:

- (a) Every aspect of the undertaking begun in 1925 would then be completed, and the international régime concerning bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons would thus be consolidated;
- (b) Monitoring compliance with the prohibition of use in combat would meet a need that has been expressed on several occasions during the last few decades;
- (c) An agreement on this question would create confidence and have a beneficial effect on the climate of international relations.

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\*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.

Moreover, the monitoring of compliance with the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons can be effected only through an ad hoc instrument, in view of:

(a) The scope of the prohibition under the Geneva Protocol, which has customarily been regarded as being the broadest possible, including both bacteriological (biological) weapons and chemical weapons;

(b) The special procedures required for verification of compliance with the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The Committee on Disarmament, which is the only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, could be given the task of elaborating such an instrument, making whatever procedural arrangements it deemed appropriate, such as having the drafting done in its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in view of the interrelatedness of the problems for purely practical reasons.

The elements of such an instrument, which might be entitled "Protocol on the monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons", could be structured as follows:

#### I. Preamble

Establishing the link between this Protocol, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and the ongoing negotiations concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons;

Expressing the hope that States will agree among themselves, at the regional level, on measures stricter than those referred to in this Protocol.

#### II. Scope

Organization of the monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of the agents referred to in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons generally.

#### III. Activities and obligations

1. A firm commitment by States parties to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to compliance with the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons.
2. Such consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Such international procedures may involve the services of appropriate international organizations (e.g., WHO), as well as the services of the Advisory Committee established under this Protocol.

#### IV. Advisory Committee

1. An Advisory Committee shall be established as soon as this protocol enters into force. Its composition shall be as follows:

##### (a) Institutional arrangements

The Advisory Committee shall be composed of States parties to this Protocol, as well as States parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Convention on biological weapons.

It shall be presided over by the depositary of this Protocol.

It shall meet every four years to define and assess its methods of work and to discuss technical and budgetary questions.

It may meet at other times, if special circumstances so warrant.

##### (b) Permanent Committee

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, questions relating to its application shall be dealt with, between sessions of the Advisory Committee, by a Permanent Committee, which shall act on behalf of the Advisory Committee and subject to its approval.

The Permanent Committee shall have 10 members, appointed for a renewable four-year term by the depositary of this Protocol in consultation with the members of the Advisory Committee, taking into account the principle of equitable geographical distribution.

The chairmanship of the Permanent Committee shall rotate among its members, who must be nationals of States members of the Advisory Committee.

The members of the Permanent Committee may be assisted by experts.

A State member of the Advisory Committee which files a complaint or against which a complaint is filed shall be entitled, upon simply notifying the Chairman of the Permanent Committee, to designate a representative to sit on the Permanent Committee when the complaint is before it, if the membership of the Permanent Committee does not include a national of that member State.

The Permanent Committee shall have its seat in (New York) (Geneva).

##### (c) Technical Secretariat

The Advisory Committee and the Permanent Committee shall be assisted by a small Technical Secretariat, which shall be responsible for maintaining contacts with the members of the Advisory Committee and the Permanent Committee, for facilitating contacts between them and for assisting them in the performance of their duties.

The Technical Secretariat shall be responsible for, inter alia, designing and improving monitoring procedures (fact-finding and collection and impartial analysis of samples), in close consultation with the Advisory Committee, the Permanent Committee, national monitoring agencies and appropriate international organizations.

The Technical Secretariat shall be established as soon as this Protocol is opened for signature.

It shall be under the jurisdiction of the Advisory Committee and the Permanent Committee and shall report to them on its activities.

The depositary shall attend to the material organization of the Technical Secretariat.

The Technical Secretariat shall have its seat in (New York) (Geneva).

## 2. National monitoring agencies

The States members of the Advisory Committee shall endeavour to establish national monitoring agencies, with which the Advisory Committee and its organs shall maintain contact.

The national monitoring agencies shall assist the Advisory Committee and its organs in the performance of their duties.

## 3. Procedures

(a) A complaint may be brought before the Permanent Committee by one or more members of the Advisory Committee, by the depositary or by the Director of the Technical Secretariat if they have serious reasons to believe that the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical or bacteriological weapons has been violated.

The complaint must be set forth in detail and substantiated with evidence relating to the acts that are alleged.

(b) The Permanent Committee shall be convened by its Chairman immediately, or in any event not later than five days, after the complaint has been brought before it in accordance with paragraph 3 (a) above.

(c) The Committee shall first investigate whether a bilateral solution to the dispute is possible and shall offer it good offices for that purpose.

(d) If such a solution is not possible and the nature of the complaint so requires, the Permanent Committee may decide to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the area. The decision to dispatch a mission shall be regarded as being of a procedural nature. The State party against which the complaint has been made may itself request the Permanent Committee to dispatch a fact-finding mission to its territory. Where necessary, and after expeditiously consulting its members by any suitable procedure, the Chairman of the Permanent Committee may make all necessary arrangements for the dispatch of the mission, if possible within 48 hours of the event to which the complaint refers.

The Permanent Committee shall arrange for samples collected on the spot to be analysed by at least two laboratories selected, by agreement among its members, from a list of establishments proposed by the States members of the Advisory Committee.

(e) The Permanent Committee shall have the right to request, through its Chairman, to request States and international organizations to provide such information and assistance as it deems desirable to enable it to fulfil its task.

(f) If the State party in whose territory the events are alleged to have taken place refuses to admit the mission, it must furnish the Permanent Committee with appropriate explanations showing that the dispatch of such a mission to the area at that particular time would jeopardize its higher interests.

If the Permanent Committee is not satisfied with the explanations furnished by the State in question, it may, should it deem necessary, make a new request.

In case of a further refusal, it shall report the matter to the depositary, who shall in turn inform the competent United Nations bodies to which a complaint relating to the same events may have been brought.

(g) Whenever a State member of the Advisory Committee requests a determination of the facts in a specific case or the provision of an authoritative opinion, the Permanent Committee shall transmit to the depositary a summary of its findings or its authoritative opinion, in which all the views and information presented to it shall be set forth. The depositary shall circulate the summary to all States members of the Advisory Committee.

(h) The Advisory Committee and the Permanent Committee shall take all procedural decisions relating to the organization of their work by consensus where possible, or otherwise by a majority of the members present and voting. Substantive matters shall not be put to the vote. If the Advisory Committee and the Permanent Committee are unable to reach a unanimous decision with respect to determinations of facts or authoritative opinions which they have been requested to provide, they should render an account of the different views that have been taken.

## V. Final provisions

1. The Protocol would be open for signature by all States. Any State which had not signed the Protocol before its entry into force could accede to it at any time.
2. The Protocol would be subject to ratification by the signatory States. The instruments of ratification or accession would be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The Protocol would enter into force when instruments of ratification had been deposited by two Governments.
4. The Protocol would enter into force for States whose instruments of ratification or accession were deposited after its entry into force on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary would promptly inform all States which had signed or acceded to the Protocol of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force and the receipt of any other communication.

6. The Protocol would be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. The Protocol could provide for a review procedure so that, when the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons was concluded, the terms of the Protocol could be amended accordingly and use could be made of the Advisory Committee infrastructure to be established under the Convention, while ensuring that the special machinery for monitoring compliance with the prohibition covered by the Protocol was retained.

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LETTER DATED 25 JUNE 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GREECE  
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING  
RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

Upon instructions from my Government and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the participation of the States non members of the Committee, I have the honour to inform you that Greece wishes to participate, during the 1982 Session, in the work on all substantive items on the Committee's agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, in the working groups and in other subsidiary bodies which may be established for the consideration of those items.

I would be grateful if you would bring this request to the attention of the Members of the Committee on Disarmament so that the Committee may be in a position to take a decision at its earliest convenience.

(Signed) A. CHORAFAS  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of Greece  
to the United Nations





LETTER DATED 30 JULY 1982 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF IRELAND  
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING  
RULES 33 TO 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

Upon instructions from my Government and in accordance with the provisions of Rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the participation of the States not members of the Committee I have the honour to inform you that Ireland wishes to take part, during the second part of the 1982 Session, in the work on all substantive items on the Committee's agenda, in plenary and informal meetings, in the working groups, and in other subsidiary bodies which may be established for the consideration of those items.

I would be grateful if you could bring this request to the attention of the members of the Committee on Disarmament so that the Committee may be in a position to take a decision at its earliest convenience.

(signed)

Marian O'LEARY  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Ireland  
to the United Nations in Geneva.



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PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FOR THE  
SECOND PART OF ITS 1982 SESSION

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1982 session: 1/

- 3 - 6 August            Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work for the second part of the 1982 session, as well as of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies.
- 9 - 13 August            Chemical Weapons.
- 16 - 20 August           Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament.
- 23 - 27 August           Nuclear Test Ban.
- 30 August -  
1 September            Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
- 2 - 3 September        Effective International Arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- 6 - 7 September        New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons. 2/
- 8 - 9 September        Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
- 10 - 14 September      Consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies. Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Plenary meetings shall be scheduled on a weekly basis, keeping in mind the workload of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

In accordance with previous decisions of the Committee (CD/292 para. 17) informal meetings shall be held during the second part of the session on ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee's operations.

Meetings of the ad hoc working groups will be convened after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairman of the ad hoc working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the various groups.

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1/ The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons began its work on 20 July.

2/ Informal meetings of the Committee shall be held during this week under item 5 of the agenda "New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons", with a view to examine proposals and suggestions pertaining to this issue. Participation of experts will be welcome in these proceedings. The informal meetings will be open to States not members of the Committee and to their respective experts.

As decided by the Committee at its 167th Plenary meeting, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events shall meet from 9 to 20 August.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will hold consultations with delegations on technical questions from 2 to 6 August.

In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on the  
re-establishment of its ad hoc Working Group on the  
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

The Committee decides to re-establish the ad hoc working group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to submitting a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the second special session.



THE NETHERLANDS

Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of  
nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting  
materials downstream of chemical production plants

1.1. A NON-INTRUSIVE METHOD TO VERIFY A BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF NERVE AGENTS

One of the functions of an effective verification system with respect to a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons is to deter the production of chemical weapons, in particular the very dangerous nerve agents. To achieve adequate deterrence, procedures are necessary to ensure that a sufficient chance exists that clandestine production of nerve agents will be detected. On the other hand, one always strives for verification methods which are as non-intrusive as possible.


As a contribution to solve part of the problems involved, a highly sensitive method will be described to analyse waste water downstream of chemical production plants and to compare this with an upstream sample with the purpose of detecting the presence therein of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials. The analytical procedure may be carried out in every laboratory equipped with a gas chromatograph and the method is sufficiently sensitive to give a positive indication even after extensive water purification.

From the results it may be concluded that the reported procedure gives a practically unambiguous and simple yes or no answer to the question whether nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials are present or not. After a positive detection -- which would only make the plant suspected -- a visit to the plant could be made to reveal the identity of the product manufactured.


1.2. BASIS OF THE METHOD

The nerve agents are organophosphorus compounds and structurally related to pesticides. Generally both types of compounds may be prepared in similar production plants. However, an important structural difference between both types of compounds exists. The majority of the nerve agents is related to methylphosphonic acid (I),

whereas most of the commercially available organophosphorus pesticides have phosphoric acid (II) as their basic structure apart from a few pesticides based on I which generally have an experimental status<sup>(3-5)</sup>.




I



II

The Japanese delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament drew attention to the fact that the phosphorus-carbon bond is not cleaved under mild decomposing conditions. Besides gas chromatography in combination with a specific detection was mentioned as a suitable method to detect organophosphorus compounds at very low concentrations.<sup>(6)</sup>

A verification procedure, based on the above-mentioned considerations, is presented in this report. Samples from the Rhine and Meuse, both considered as heavily polluted rivers, were used as models for substantially diluted waste water downstream of chemical production plants. As such the procedure provides a rather non-intrusive inspection method. Ethyl S-2-di-isopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonotioate (VX).



was used as a representative of the nerve agents.

After a discussion of the investigations concerning the different aspects of the procedure in part 2 the ultimate procedure is described in part 3. Part 4 comprises some results obtained on application of the ultimate verification procedure on Rhine and Meuse river water samples. Some directions for future work conclude the report as part 5.



## 2. EVALUATION OF THE VERIFICATION PROCEDURE

2.1. Materials

Rhine river water samples were collected from the Lek at Bergambacht and analysed by the Dune Water Works of the Hague. The Meuse river was sampled at Keizerzveer and analysed by the Drinking Water Works of Rotterdam. The samples were stored in a refrigerating room. The chemical analyses of the water samples are listed in Table 1.

component	Rhine						Meuse
	12-12-'73	12-8-'74	20-11-'74	8-1-'75	25-8-'75	3-3-'76	23-2-'76
chloride (mg/l)	230	175	169	83	140	196	37
sulphate "	89	86	85	59	70	94	54
bicarbonate "	140	146	156	146	149	193	134
nitrate "	11.5	10.8	12.2	14.0	12.7	17.6	17.0
Kjeldahl nitrogen "	4.4	1.7	2.2	1.5	1.0	2.6	1.9
orthophosphate "	0.62	0.55	0.75	0.41	0.98	0.97	0.73
unfiltered "	1.95	1.27	1.70	1.10	1.61	1.92	1.4
total organic carbon "	6.2	7.8	5.9	8.0	5.5	8.2	6.9
silt "	64	10	19	46	33	23	26
cholinesterase inhibition in parathion eq. (µg/l)	0.17	0.25	0.24	0.04	0.08	0.13	-
pH	7.55	7.60	7.50	7.65	7.70	7.50	7.6
flow (m <sup>3</sup> /sec)	2572*	1648*	2870*	3497*	1964*	1329*	350**

\* Lobith.

\*\* Lith.
















For each experiment new glassware was used to preclude cross-contamination.

<sup>32</sup>P-labelled methylphosphonic acid (specific activity 1 mCi/g) and <sup>32</sup>P-labelled VX (specific activity 20 mCi/g) as well as the corresponding unlabelled compounds were synthesized in this laboratory. Diazomethane was prepared and used in diethyl ether solution (7).

2.2. Hydrolysis

As stated in Chapter 1 gas chromatography in combination with a specific phosphorus detection is a suitable technique for the tracing of nerve agents in water at very low concentrations. To make the gas chromatographic picture as simple as possible (section 2.6) a complete hydrolysis should be carried out after which most



Table 2 Hydrolytic half-life values of some compounds related to phosphorus-containing nerve agents and pesticides at pH 3				
compound	systematic or trivial name	hydrolysis temp. (°C)	t <sub>1/2</sub> (h)	ref.
1 	VX	130	0.24	-
2 	ethyl hydrogen methylphosphonate	130	10	-
3 	ethyl hydrogen methylthiophosphonate	130	9.8	-
4 	methylphosphonothioic acid	130	0.36	-
5 	Parathion	70	21	13
6 	Paraoxon	70	23 <sup>2</sup>	13
7 	diethyl hydrogen phosphate	130	82	-
8 	ethyl dihydrogen phosphate	130	1.42	-
9 	diethyl hydrogen phosphorothioate	130	61	-
10 	Disyston	70	62 <sup>2</sup>	13
11 	diethyl S-hydrogen phosphorodithioate	130	0.97	-
12 	monothiophosphoric acid	32.8	1.2	14
13 	DDVP	70	3.4 <sup>2</sup>	13
14 	dimethyl hydrogen phosphate	100	110	15
15 	methyl dihydrogen phosphate	100	0.23	9

hydrolysis of the intermediately formed alkyl hydrogen methylphosphonate (IV) and dialkyl hydrogen phosphate (VI) is the rate determining step. Therefore hydrolytic data on these compounds are included.

The rates of hydrolysis of phosphates and phosphonates are known to be pH-dependent. The hydrolysis of alkyl dihydrogen phosphates<sup>(9)</sup> generally shows a maximum rate at pH 4; the hydrolysis rates of dialkyl hydrogen phosphates<sup>(10)</sup> and phosphonates<sup>(11)</sup> rise progressively when lowering the pH-value. Thiophosphates<sup>(12)</sup> show a maximum rate at pH 3. As a compromise and for practical reasons a pH 3 was selected for all hydrolysis experiments: acidic solutions below pH 3 may affect the performances (e.g. the capacity) of the anion-exchange column in the second step of the procedure (section 2.3).

A temperature of 130°C was selected to obtain measurable rates of hydrolysis in a four-days period.

From Table 2 it may be concluded that nerve agents, pesticides and their decomposition products hydrolyse to I and II respectively in a reasonable period of time at pH 3 and 130°C. In the ultimate procedure the temperature was increased to 160°C to obtain a complete hydrolysis of organophosphorus esters in 24 hours.

### 2.3. Isolation and concentration

After the hydrolysis the water samples of the Rhine and the Meuse river are passed through glass-fibre papers to remove solid particles (silt) preceding the use of the anion-exchange column. In this way the resin could be reused by means of a regeneration process<sup>\*</sup> and a possible disturbance of the sample flow through the column was excluded. The adsorption of I onto the solid particles in the river samples is negligible as was determined by means of <sup>32</sup>P-labelled I. After filtration through the filter paper ng quantities of I were recovered quantitatively in the eluate.

A strong anion-exchange resin [type  $\phi-N(CH_3)_3^+$ ] is used to adsorb the methylphosphonate anion from the hydrolysed water samples. A simultaneous adsorption of other anions occurs e.g. chloride, sulphate and phosphate, which are generally present in excess when compared with the amount of compound I. The bicarbonate ion and other anions or weak acids are not adsorbed. A 2-3 fold excess in adsorption capacity of the anion-exchange column is used which is based on the average amount (3.5 meq.) of anions present in 0.5 litre of Rhine water in addition to the methylphosphonate ion and the added amount (about 3 meq.) of hydrochloric acid used to adjust the pH to 3. The first experiments were carried out with the commercially available anion-exchange resin

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<sup>\*</sup>/ According to BIO-RAD: (step 1)  $\text{resin-Cl}^{\ominus} + \text{NaOH} \rightarrow \text{resin-OH}^{\ominus}$ ; (step 2)  $\text{resin-OH}^{\ominus} + \text{formic acid} \rightarrow \text{resin-formate}^{\ominus}$ .

Amberlite IRA-400 in the chloride ( $\text{Cl}^-$ ) form. On a column packed with this resin a quantity of 0.1 meq. of the methylphosphonate anion proved to be adsorbed incompletely from one litre of the water sample. 50-60 per cent of the added amount of I was not retained on the column. A quantitative adsorption of I was obtained when the resin was converted into the formate ( $\text{HCOO}^-$ ) form. Afterwards a commercially available resin, type BIO-RAD AG 1-X8  $\text{HCOO}^-$  was used. By means of a breakthrough chromatogram using a 0.5 litre sample containing 815 mg of chloride or 1200 mg of sulphate and 225  $\mu\text{g}$  of  $^{32}\text{P}$ -labelled I it was found that during the isolation I moved as a narrow band on the column in front of the chloride and the sulphate ions. Compound I eluted from the column only when the anion-content in the water sample surpassed the anion-exchange capacity of the column.

After the passage of the water sample the resin is washed with methanol to remove the interstitial water together with some neutral and basic compounds present in the original water sample. It is important that the hydrochloric acid-methanol solution, which is then used to elute the methylphosphonate anion, is dry because the subsequent evaporation of this solution in the presence of water gives rise to considerable losses of compound I.

A recovery of compound I amounting to 75-100 per cent was found after evaporation as was checked by experiments with  $^{32}\text{P}$ -labelled I.

#### 2.4. Derivatization

Compound I itself cannot be gas chromatographed but has to be converted into a volatile derivative to achieve a sensitive gas chromatographic detection and separation. The compound was transformed into dimethyl methylphosphonate using diazomethane in diethyl ether solution<sup>(7)</sup>. The yield of the esterification was nearly quantitative (95 per cent) as determined by gas chromatography (Chapter 3). Other acids such as phosphoric acid and sulphuric acid are methylated simultaneously. These acids may be present in the ion-exchange column eluate coming from the original water sample and trapped on the resin together with compound I.

#### 2.5. Clean-up

This part of the complete verification procedure was introduced to obtain a proper gas chromatographic analysis of dimethyl methylphosphonate as outlined in section 2.6.

Ether as well as methanol are removed from the esterified sample (section 2.4) by means of boiling under reflux in a Vigreux column until a residual volume of 3-4 ml persists. This concentration step was checked by means of a number of experiments with mixtures containing 10 ml of benzene, 10 ml of ether, 1 ml of methanol and 3  $\mu\text{g}$  of dimethyl methylphosphonate. A recovery of 90-100 per cent of the phosphonate was found as determined by gas chromatographic analysis.

The procedure according to reference 16 using a small silica gel column removes the majority of trimethyl phosphate and dimethyl sulphate from the methylated sample solution. Details of the gas chromatographic interferences of dimethyl sulphate are given in section 4. The silica gel column is successively eluted with benzene, ethyl acetate, and methanol. It was found that the benzene fraction contains mainly dimethyl sulphate, the ethyl acetate fraction trimethyl phosphate and the first ml of the methanol fraction about 80 per cent of the added amount of dimethyl methylphosphonate.

### 2.6. Gas chromatographic analysis

For the separation of dimethyl methylphosphonate and trimethyl phosphate the performances (e.g. resolution and peak symmetry) of a number of different stationary phases such as SE-30, QF-1, FFAP, OV-225, DEGS and Triton X-305 were evaluated. Triton X-305 turned out to be the best.

The optimum column temperature was found to be 140-150°C. Due to an increased column bleeding at higher temperatures the column-life decreased considerably whereas an increase in detector noise and detector contamination occurred.

Besides the use of diazomethane for the esterification of methylphosphonic acid and phosphoric acid it is possible to use other diazoalkanes. The resolution of the resulting trialkyl phosphates and dialkyl methylphosphonates may be expressed by:

$$R_s = 2 \frac{t_r(\text{trialkyl phosphate}) - t_r(\text{dialkyl methylphosphonate})}{y(\text{trialkyl phosphate}) + y(\text{dialkyl methylphosphonate})} \quad (3)$$

where  $R_s$  stands for the resolution,  $t_r$  for the retention time and  $y$  for the peak width at the base. The results together with the retention time relative to dimethyl methylphosphonate are given in Table 3.

$(RO)_2P(O)CH_3$ R =	relative retention	$(RO)_3P(O)$ R =	relative retention	resolution
CH <sub>3</sub>	1.00	CH <sub>3</sub>	1.33	2.1
C <sub>2</sub> H <sub>5</sub>	1.29	C <sub>2</sub> H <sub>5</sub>	2.07	4.0
n.C <sub>3</sub> H <sub>7</sub>	2.57	n.C <sub>3</sub> H <sub>7</sub>	5.53	4.1
i.C <sub>3</sub> H <sub>7</sub>	1.09 <sup>**/</sup>	i.C <sub>3</sub> H <sub>7</sub>	1.58	2.8

<sup>\*/</sup> Retention time is 200 sec, column temperature 140°C, for further gas chromatographic conditions see Chapter 3.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> Tailing peak.

From the results given in Table 3 it might be concluded that it is advisable to prepare either the ethyl or the n.propyl esters instead of the methyl esters. Nevertheless the use of the methyl esters is to be preferred for the following reasons:

- (a) Dimethyl methylphosphonate is detected at least two times more sensitive than diethyl methylphosphonate and dipropyl methylphosphonate.
- (b) When using the ethyl esters or n. propyl esters the analysis time will be increased two or four times respectively in comparison with that needed for the methyl esters.
- (c) Methanol is used as a main component of the eluent system to desorb methylphosphonic acid from the anion-exchange column. In that case the use of diazomethane<sup>(17)</sup> is recommended.

Owing to its specificity for organophosphorus compounds the thermionic detector was the detector of choice. The mean lowest detectable amount of dimethyl methylphosphonate proved to be 0.23 ng (range 0.15-0.30 ng). The maximum injection volume was found to be 5  $\mu$ l. More solvent volume caused an extinction of the detector flame.

Dimethyl methylphosphonate can be identified by means of its retention index according to Kovàts<sup>(18)</sup>. The index amounts to 1427 when determined at 170°C on Triton X-305 as a stationary phase. Under these conditions trimethyl phosphate, which will be detected as well, has a retention index of 1483.

To prove unambiguously that the peak ascribed to dimethyl methylphosphonate is not due to the presence of a non-phosphorus compound in relatively high concentration, the thermionic detector was used in combination with a flame ionization detector. In case of a non-phosphorus compound the last mentioned detector will give a relatively high pressure.

### 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE VERIFICATION PROCEDURE

From the results outlined in the preceding Chapter the following method was selected to verify the presence of nerve agents or their decomposition products in waste water.

Hydrolysis: The hydrolysis is carried out in sealed 750 ml Carius tubes containing 500 ml water samples adjusted to pH 3 using 0.5 N hydrochloric acid. The tubes are heated in an oil-bath at 160°C during 24 hours.




Figure 1. Pear-shaped flask to concentrate the column eluate.



Isolation and concentration: After filtration through glass-fibre paper (Whatman, GF/A) the hydrolyzed sample is passed through an anion-exchange column (length 20 cm, i.d. 11 mm) packed with AG 1-X8 (formate form, BIO-RAD) at a flow rate of 1-2 ml/min. After the passage of the sample the exchange column is washed with 30 ml of methanol. Methylphosphonic acid and other acids adsorbed on the resin are eluted at a flow rate of 0.5-1 ml/min with 20 ml of acidified (with gaseous hydrochloric acid up to 3N) methanol. The eluate, collected in a pear-shaped flask (Fig. 1), is concentrated to a volume of less than 1 ml by evaporation in a water-bath maintained at 50°C, using a gentle stream of air.

Derivation: A solution of diazomethane, generated from N-methyl-N-nitroso-p-toluene-sulphonamide and potassium hydroxide<sup>(7)</sup>, in ether is added to the residue of the eluate until a yellow colour persists. The mixture is allowed to stand for 15-20 minutes. The excess of diazomethane is removed by means of a few droplets of acetic acid.

Clean-up procedure: After the addition of 10 ml of benzene the methylated solution is concentrated by boiling under reflux using a Vigreux column (length 19 cm, i.d. 11 mm) until a residual volume of 3-4 ml. To prevent bumping of the boiling liquid use is made of a device consisting of a glass bar bent in a U-form<sup>(7)</sup>. During boiling the pear-shaped part of the reaction flask (Fig. 1) is immersed in an oil-bath, which is gently heated from room temperature up to 160°C in the course of 45 minutes.

Silica gel, after pretreatment by heating for 48 hours at 135°C, is partially deactivated by shaking with 3 per cent (w/w) distilled water. After four hours the gel is ready for use. To a column (length 19 cm, i.d. 8 mm) plugged with glass wool 1 g of the silica gel is added, followed by 2 g of a hydrous sodium sulphate<sup>(16)</sup>. The column is prewashed with 10 ml of hexane. The sample solution is transferred to the silica gel column which is successively rinsed with 16 ml of benzene, 24 ml of ethyl acetate and 8 ml of methanol at a flow rate of 0.2-0.4 ml/min. The eluates of benzene, ethyl acetate and the initial 1 ml of methanol are collected separately. The methanol fraction is set aside for further use.

Gas chromatography: The gas chromatographic analyses are carried out on a Becker gas chromatograph, type 409, equipped with a thermionic detector (TID), type 712. The coiled glass column (length 2 m, i.d. 1.5 mm) is packed with Chromosorb W-AW/DMCS 80-100 mesh coated with Triton X-305 (25 per cent w/w) after sieving in the particle range from 149-177 µm. The column, injector and detector are maintained at 150, 200 and 200°C respectively. Gas flow rates are 40 ml/min for nitrogen, 65 ml/min for hydrogen and 250 ml/min for air. Because of the use of a splitter at the end of the column, [ratio (3:1)] only 20 ml of nitrogen per minute reached the TID detector. The remaining part is led to a flame ionization detector. Maximum sample volumes of 5 µl can be injected. Reference samples of comparable concentration are used for quantitative measurements.

#### 4. APPLICATION AND DISCUSSION

Once developed the complete verification procedure was checked by adding varying quantities (0.1 µg - 1 mg) of VX to 1 litre of demineralized water and Rhine river water.

Based on dimethyl methylphosphonate a mean recovery of  $73 \pm 11$  per cent was obtained in demineralized water. The clean-up part of the procedure was omitted in this case. Considerable concentrations of phosphoric acid (approximately 0.2 mg/litre) were found which were detected as trimethyl phosphate by gas chromatography. Phosphoric acid is probably released from the wall of the glassware during hydrolysis.

Samples obtained after the addition of a relatively high quantity (1 mg) of VX to 1 litre of Rhine river water were analysed similarly. A clean-up of the sample before the gas chromatographic analysis proved to be unnecessary because no interfering substances were present at that concentration level and the comparable amounts of dimethyl methylphosphonate and trimethyl phosphate could be sufficiently separated by gas chromatography. Based on dimethyl methylphosphonate a recovery of  $78 \pm 10\%$  (n=6) was obtained.

In the analytical procedure carried out with small quantities of VX (0.1-1 µg) added to 1 litre of Rhine river water the clean-up method had to be introduced because of interferences in the gas chromatographic analysis. First of all separation of small amounts of dimethyl methylphosphonate from a 1000 fold excess of trimethyl phosphate proved to be insufficient because of overlapping of the peaks. Moreover dimethyl sulphate interfered seriously in the detection of dimethyl methylphosphonate. Depending on the hydrogen flow the thermionic detector gave negative or positive peaks for dimethyl sulphate which influenced the response of dimethyl methylphosphonate, because of peak overlap. Dimethyl sulphate was identified by the combination of gas chromatography and mass spectrometry (type JEOL JMS-01-SG). It is most probably formed by methylation of sulphuric acid present in the Rhine river samples (concentration level of sulphate  $\approx 80$  mg/litre). The interferences of excess trimethyl phosphate and dimethyl sulphate could be overcome when using a clean-up of the methylated sample before the gas chromatographic analysis. In this way it proved to be possible to analyse concentrations of VX added to Rhine river water samples down to 250 ng/litre. Based on dimethyl methylphosphonate a recovery of 80-90 per cent was found in Rhine river samples taken 25 August 1975.

These recoveries were corrected for an amount of dimethyl methylphosphonate (0.7-0.8 µg/litre) detected in the same Rhine river samples to which no VX was added. The identity of this compound was approved by mass fragmentography on a Finnigan quadrupole gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer, type 3100-003D. The peak was scanned at three characteristic m/e values: 79, 94 and 109 which correspond with  $(\text{CH}_3\text{O})\text{P}(\text{O})\text{H}^+$ ,  $(\text{CH}_3\text{O})\text{P}(\text{O})\text{H}(\text{CH}_3)^+$  and  $(\text{CH}_3)_2\text{P}(\text{O})^+$ . The peak intensity ratio was 6:4.4:1 which

equals the result obtained with a reference sample of dimethyl methylphosphonate. Owing to the small amount the intensity of the molecular ion was too small for scanning.

Later on the same compound was detected in the Rhine river samples of 3 March 1976 (conc. 760 ng/litre) and in the Meuse river sample of 23 February 1976 (180 ng/litre). Obviously one or more emission sources in or at both rivers give rise to the presence of a compound containing a  $\text{PCH}_3$  group in the molecule. Literature gives no indication that such compounds occur in nature. It is known that a number of insecticides containing a P-C bond are commercially available e.g. Dyfonate (ethyl S-phenyl ethylphosphonodithioate). As a result of the described analytical procedure dimethyl ethylphosphonate will result. According to its retention index (1468) this compound will not interfere in the gas chromatographic analysis of dimethyl methylphosphonate (retention index 1427, see section 2.6). However, Mecarphon<sup>(5)</sup> to our knowledge the only commercially available pesticide containing a  $\text{PCH}_3$  group will give rise to dimethyl methylphosphonate on application of the analytical procedure and will thus interfere in the verification process.

As stated in section 2.6 the mean lowest amount of dimethyl methylphosphonate detectable by gas chromatography (section 2.6) is 0.23 ng of dimethyl methylphosphonate or 250 ng of VX per litre of water, being corrected for a mean recovery of 80 per cent and an original water sample volume of 0.5 litre, which was concentrated to a volume of 1 ml. This means that if a plant carries off at least 5 kg of VX or an equivalent quantity of its decomposition products or starting materials in 24 hours into a river with a flow of  $250 \text{ m}^3/\text{sec}$  it will be detected. A survey of advanced waste treatment technology has revealed that carbon adsorption processes would be capable of reducing a concentration of 1 mg/litre of phosphorus containing insecticides in a waste stream to less than 1  $\mu\text{g}/\text{litre}$ <sup>(4)</sup>. This concentration lies well above the detection limit of the procedure described.

As to the possible presence of  $\text{PCH}_3$ -containing compounds may also be due to a natural or industrial background a reference sample upstream of the chemical production plant has to be analysed in addition to a downstream sample.

##### 5. FUTURE WORK

Further research is needed to get acquainted with the natural or industrial occurrence of compounds which will deliver dimethyl methylphosphonate after application of the described procedure.

Experiments will be carried out to investigate the applicability of the procedure in case of binary nerve agent systems in which the nerve agent is formed by mixing two compounds during the delivery of the projectile to its target.

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