



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/43/411
17 June 1988

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-third session
Items 64, 66 and 73 of the
preliminary list*

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

**REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRD SPECIAL SESSION
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT**

COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Letter dated 17 June 1988 from the Permanent Representative of
Poland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement dated 14 June 1988 by the Government of the Polish People's Republic on the plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter and the attached statement to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items 64, 66 and 73 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Dr. Eugeniusz NOWORYTA
Ambassador

* A/43/50.

ANNEX

Statement concerning the plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe issued on 14 June 1988 by the Government of Poland

1. The Government of the Polish People's Republic has, with due attention, taken note of and carefully studied the views presented in the rejoinders of Governments and the pronouncements of their representatives, as well as during bilateral working contacts, concerning the plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe as contained in the memorandum of 17 July 1987 (see A/42/413, annex).

2. The Polish Government notes with satisfaction the emergence of a climate propitious for new undertakings in disarmament and confidence-building in Europe. This climate is particularly linked to the conclusion of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The implementation of this Treaty will be conducive to the further reduction of nuclear and conventional arsenals in Europe, which remains one of the main purposes of Poland's foreign policy.

3. The Government of the Polish People's Republic reiterates the validity of its proposals presented in the memorandum and covering the territories of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Polish People's Republic, together with their territorial waters and airspace. Moreover, taking into account developments in the international situation, particularly in disarmament and strengthening security, as well as the views exchanged hitherto on the substance of the memorandum, it desires to amplify the proposals contained therein in the following manner.

4. The Polish Government confirms its interest in the withdrawal and/or reduction, in the aforementioned zone, of mutually agreed types and quantities of nuclear weapons.

5. It emphasizes at this juncture that tactical nuclear weapons constitute the potentially most dangerous component of forces earmarked for offensive operations, particularly for a surprise attack, hence it is indispensable - in the interest of lasting peace - gradually to reduce and subsequently to eliminate them.

6. All types of nuclear weapons would be the subject of the agreed measures, assuming they are not the subject of other agreements. More specifically, these measures could cover, for example, missiles of up to 500-kilometre range, nuclear-capable aircraft, nuclear artillery and any type of nuclear charges.

7. The Government of the Polish People's Republic is in favour of initiating separate negotiations on reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual-capable means of delivery, and subsequently on eliminating such weapons.

8. Moreover, it believes it would be expedient, until disarmament measures are implemented, for the interested States to undertake an obligation not to increase the present level of nuclear armaments in Central Europe, not to compensate the weapons subject to reductions and not to introduce new types of such weapons.

9. Poland's proposal gradually to withdraw and/or reduce specific, mutually agreed types and quantities of conventional weapons is founded on the belief that the implementation of the agreed measures should be based on the principle of reciprocity and should lead to the removal of disproportions and asymmetries in given types of weapons, that is, to the attainment of such potentials as would ensure, in the opinion of the parties concerned, mutually acceptable military stability on a proportionally lower level.

10. An elimination of the possibility of undertaking offensive operations, including first and foremost the possibility of surprise attack by any party, would be an important element of such stability. These could be reached by substantially reducing offensive components of military potentials, while maintaining forces adequate for effective defence.

11. The Government of the Polish People's Republic envisages the transformation of military potentials into those of a strictly defensive nature as a set of measures having a political, doctrinal and technical character. These measures could comprise such essential elements as, for example, reducing military manpower and the quantity of weapons, changes in the armaments structure and their deployment, as well as other agreed undertakings.

12. In this context the possibility of removing asymmetries and disproportions could be considered, for example, by means of equivalent solutions under which the parties concerned would simultaneously decrease the quantities of various, mutually agreed types of weapons.

13. Of particular importance in removing the sources of instability and in mutual recognition of the strictly defensive nature of military potential would be the reduction of the quantities of weapons mutually recognized as offensive, in the first place those which could be used for surprise attack. In particular this concerns missiles, tactical strike aircraft, tanks and other armoured combat vehicles, armed helicopters and long-range artillery, including rocket artillery.

14. An exchange or publication of the lists of weapons considered to be particularly threatening might prove helpful when defining priorities and the scope of undertakings with regard to specific kinds and types of weapons.

15. The Government of the Polish People's Republic wishes at this juncture to reiterate its opinion, according to which the implementation of undertakings concerning the reduction of conventional armaments should be considered in the wide context of limiting the capacity to carry out offensive operations.

16. The withdrawal and/or reduction of weapons could lead to the establishment of a zone of dispersed armaments, in which a mutually agreed number of units of equivalent combat force, roughly comparable quantities of weapons and state of readiness would be deployed at an appropriate distance from the line of contact.

17. Within the framework of the zone of dispersed armaments, the most offensive components of armaments (units) would be withdrawn from the line of contact and put at a lower state of readiness or eliminated from the armed forces. This would substantially reduce the possibility of surprise attack.

18. The Government of the Polish People's Republic expresses its readiness to consider such methods and ways of reducing and dispersing armaments, which would lead to the substantial decrease of nominal weapon compositions, inter alia, by withdrawal of entire units with a comparable combat capability. The reduced armaments could be, for example, converted to peaceful purposes or temporarily placed in internationally controlled storage premises.

19. It is the view of the Government of the Polish People's Republic that the discussion and implementation of undertakings in the zone concerning conventional weapons are related to but need not be conditioned by the implementation of measures concerning nuclear weapons. This is also valid as to the manner, procedure and the time when negotiations on both topics might commence.

20. Such undertakings should be the subject of negotiations on reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments and on conventional stability in Europe, which could be pursued within the framework of the process initiated at Helsinki in 1975.

21. The Government of the Polish People's Republic reiterates its desire to undertake joint efforts that would ensure such an evolution of the nature of military doctrines and concepts that they could be reciprocally assessed as being strictly defensive.

22. A jointly undertaken review and comparison of both national and alliance military doctrines and concepts, an analysis of their nature and development trends would prove helpful. These efforts would concern both the political and technical-military aspects of the doctrines. It would be desirable to interpret mutually the terminology connected with doctrines and their practical reflection in the system of troop organization and training.

23. Joint efforts should permit the specification of ways and means that would lead to the required evolution of doctrines based on the principle of adequacy of defence. The States would then wield only such potential as would be indispensable for effective defence alone, would satisfy agreed requirements and would be mutually recognized as of a defensive nature.

24. The whole issue of doctrines could become the subject-matter at meetings of political representatives and of high-ranking military commanders; it might also be tackled within the framework of, or in connection with the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

25. The Government of the Polish People's Republic, while confirming the importance of reaching agreement on effective confidence- and security-building measures and the mechanisms for the strict verification of compliance with the undertaken commitments, feels that these could play a meaningful part in eliminating threats, preventing the possibility of a surprise attack and dissipating mutual distrust.

26. This purpose would be served, apart from the appropriate expansion of confidence-building measures already in use, by joint elaboration and acceptance of new parameters constraining the activities of ground forces by applying, inter alia, correspondingly further-reaching measures as the distance from the line of contact is decreased. Such constraints could be applied to the movements of force, to the size, number, duration and frequency of military exercises including, for example, the possibility of simultaneous exercises, and also to bans on large exercises.
27. Efforts could be undertaken to apply confidence-building measures to independent airforce and naval activities.
28. The confidence-building measures could also comprise exchanges of military information and procedures for the clarification of situations related to the military activity and arousing the concern of either party. This purpose would also be served by establishing a system of "hot lines" between the highest State authorities and military high commands and also through the extension of contacts among representatives of armed forces. Study visits and regular bilateral and multilateral working meetings would also be useful.
29. These undertakings should become the subject of negotiations within the framework of the follow-up to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.
30. For its part, the Polish Government reiterates its readiness to accept, on a reciprocal basis, far-reaching methods of control indispensable to verify the full implementation of the endeavours envisaged by the plan.
31. It is imperative that the control mechanism functions at all stages of implementation of the steps proposed. This mechanism would be based on means of control mutually deemed effective, applied permanently or on the ad hoc principle. The mechanism would, in particular, include observations and on-site inspections without the right of refusal.
32. The system of mutual control could encompass, inter alia, an exchange of indispensable information, including lists of the types and kinds of armaments being withdrawn and their dislocation, notification of the commencement, progress and completion of the various measures, and also the establishment of permanent observation posts on the borders of the zone, at large railway junctions, airfields and seaports through which the arms, equipment and specified military units would be transferred.
33. Weapons decommissioned from the armed forces would also be subject to control as would be compliance with levels attained as the outcome of the reduction and/or withdrawal process.
34. The establishment of an international consultative body with the possible inclusion of interested third parties might favour the effective implementation of control provisions. This body's mandate would, more particularly, concern observation and inspection activities and the investigation of controversial issues.

35. The Government of the Polish People's Republic, in its memorandum, which referred first of all to Central Europe, envisaged the possibility of parallel and staged negotiation of disarmament and stabilizing measures in the whole of Europe. The plan proposed here is a solution corresponding to the security requirements of Central Europe but remaining in a strict relationship with the situation, security requirements and solutions on an all-European scale.

36. It is recognized that the measures envisaged in the plan would be implemented in a manner not detrimental to the sense of security of any State.

37. In presenting this statement, the Government of the Polish People's Republic yet again stresses its readiness to co-operate in the further development of the proposals contained in the plan with all those interested Governments which are guided by a desire to strengthen security and peace in Europe.
