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**2000 Review Conference of the Parties  
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons**

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New York, 24 April-19 May 2000

**Letter dated 1 May 2000 from the representatives of France, the  
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United  
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United  
States of America addressed to the President of the 2000 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons**

We have the honour to attach herewith the text of a statement by the delegations of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see annex).

We should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex issued as a document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and circulated to the participants in the Conference.

*(Signed)* Hubert de **La Fortelle**  
Ambassador  
France

*(Signed)* **Sha Zukang**  
Ambassador  
The People's Republic of China

*(Signed)* Youri **Kapralov**  
Ambassador  
Russian Federation

*(Signed)* Ian **Soutar**  
Ambassador  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

*(Signed)* Norman **Wulf**  
Ambassador  
United States of America

## Annex

### **Statement by the delegations of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America**

1. The delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, on the occasion of the sixth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, formally reiterate the strong and continuing support of our countries for this Treaty, the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. We remain unequivocally committed to fulfilling all of our obligations under the Treaty.
2. We welcomed the decision on indefinite extension of the Treaty adopted in 1995 by its member States. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthening the review process of the Treaty and to the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We reaffirm our commitment to the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995. The principles established by those documents will make a continuing contribution to the review process, the Treaty remaining its fundamental guide.
3. The progress of the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been confirmed after the 1995 conference. We welcome the accession to the Treaty by Chile, Vanuatu, the United Arab Emirates, Comoros, Andorra, Angola, Djibouti, Oman and Brazil. Today, there are 187 member States. We reiterate the need for universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty at an early date. The nuclear explosions carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998 were a cause of deep international concern. We continue to call upon both countries to undertake the measures set out in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). Notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
4. We stress that compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all member States is essential to further the comprehensive goals of the Treaty.
5. We reiterate our unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
6. A programme of action was set out by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI. In pursuit of that programme, there have been highly significant multilateral, bilateral and unilateral developments since 1995.
7. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996. The five nuclear-weapon States all signed it that very day. Today, 155 States have signed it and 55 of them, including 28 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, including France and the United Kingdom in a joint ceremony on 6 April 1998. The recent ratification of the Treaty by the Russian Federation is welcome. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has been set up in Vienna

and is putting into place the international monitoring system of the Treaty. Important progress has been made so far in the setting up of the verification system. We remain committed to ensuring that, at entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the verification regime will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty. The first conference of States having ratified the Treaty to consider the issue of its entry into force was held at Vienna in October 1999. No efforts should be spared to make sure that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty and to secure its early entry into force. There should be no doubt as to the commitment of our five countries to that effect.

8. As one logical multilateral step in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, we reaffirm the necessity of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices negotiated in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. We urge the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work as soon as possible, which includes the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on such a treaty.

9. The contribution of the five nuclear-weapon States to systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally has been and will be highlighted by each of us nationally.

10. Emphasizing the essential importance of cooperation, demonstrating and advancing mutual trust among ourselves, and promoting greater international security and stability, we declare that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at any State.

11. Ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons and is welcome. Completion of ratification of START II by the United States remains a priority. We look forward to the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

12. We are committed to placing as soon as practicable fissile materials designated by each of us as no longer required for defence purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other relevant international verification. We have launched a number of significant initiatives to provide for the safe and effective management and disposition of such materials.

13. We welcome the creation of two new nuclear-weapon-free zones since 1995 as a significant contribution to the enhancement of regional and international peace and security: South-East Asia and Africa. The five nuclear-weapon States have signed and, in most cases, ratified all the relevant protocols to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba; internal processes are under way to secure the few lacking ratifications. The consultations with States parties to the Treaty of Bangkok have recently been accelerated, paving the way for our adherence to the Additional Protocol. We are looking forward to the successful and early conclusions of those consultations. We encourage the States in Central Asia to pursue successfully their

efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. We support and respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia.

14. We note that the actions of the nuclear-weapon States since 1995 on the relevant additional protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have increased the number of non-nuclear-weapon States eligible for legally binding negative security assurances to over 100. We reaffirm our commitment to Security Council resolution 984 (1995) adopted in April 1995 on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to operative paragraph 10 of resolution 984 (1995), the issues addressed in that resolution remain of continuing concern to the Security Council. We are ready to exchange views relating to the positive security assurances referred to in the resolution.

15. We consider the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency as one of the essential pillars of the non-proliferation regime. That system acts as a guarantee for stability and the preservation of world peace. We call upon all States Parties, which are required by article III of the Treaty and have not yet done so, to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements without delay.

16. The development and the implementation of the strengthened safeguards system of IAEA through new agreements is a significant achievement. We praise the remarkable work carried out by IAEA in this field and hope that the strengthened system soon spreads across all regions of the world. Here again, universality is the challenge we face. To date, Additional Protocols have been signed by more than 50 non-nuclear-weapon States; 9 of them have entered into force. We urge all non-nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to sign without delay the Additional Protocol with a view to its early implementation.

17. As regards States not members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of them has recently signed an Additional Protocol with IAEA. We encourage the three others to negotiate an Additional Protocol with IAEA.

18. All the five nuclear-weapon States signed an Additional Protocol with IAEA and shall seek to ratify their agreements as soon as possible.

19. We support the promotion of transparency in nuclear-related export controls within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Parties to the Treaty and we welcome the initiatives taken in order to carry out this objective.

20. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the relevant principles on safeguards. Pursuant to our obligation under article IV, we have provided our support for the technical cooperation programmes administered by IAEA, which has enabled many nations to make progress in the application of nuclear technologies in important fields such as agriculture, hydrology, medicine and environment.

21. We stress the importance of international cooperation in order to maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force and the first review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety as well as

the opening for signature of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. We call upon all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify those two Conventions.

22. We are determined to take a forward-looking approach to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty provides an indispensable framework for future efforts against nuclear proliferation and towards nuclear disarmament. We fully acknowledge our particular responsibility and key role in ensuring continued progress in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

23. The five nuclear-weapon States hope that a similarly genuine commitment to the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as a contribution to enhanced peace and security will be shown by all States members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and States outside the Treaty. We will continue to work together and with the non-nuclear-weapon States for the success of the review process.

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