



# Security Council

Fifty-fifth Year

**4127**<sup>th</sup> Meeting

Friday, 14 April 2000, 10 a.m.

New York

*Provisional*

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<i>President:</i>	Mr. Axworthy . . . . .	(Canada)
<i>Members:</i>	Argentina . . . . .	Mr. Listre
	Bangladesh . . . . .	Mr. Ahmed
	China . . . . .	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	France . . . . .	Mr. Levitte
	Jamaica . . . . .	Miss Durrant
	Malaysia . . . . .	Mr. Kamal
	Mali . . . . .	Mr. Ouane
	Namibia . . . . .	Mr. Andjaba
	Netherlands . . . . .	Mr. van Walsum
	Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Granovsky
	Tunisia . . . . .	Mr. Jerandi
	Ukraine . . . . .	Mr. Kuchynsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . .	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America . . . . .	Mr. Holbrooke

## Agenda

### The situation concerning Rwanda

Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/1257).

*The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.*

### **Adoption of the agenda**

*The agenda was adopted.*

### **The situation concerning Rwanda**

#### **Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/1257)**

**The President:** I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Rwanda in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mutaboba (Rwanda) took a seat at the Council table.*

**The President:** In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, Chairman of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Carlsson to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1999/1257, which contains a letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I wish to express appreciation to the Secretary-General for having

commissioned the Independent Inquiry, with the approval of the Security Council.

In this connection, I should like to recall that in a statement issued on 16 December 1999, following the receipt of the report of the Independent Inquiry, the Secretary-General stated that he fully accepted its conclusions. In that statement, he also welcomed the emphasis which the Inquiry had put on the lessons to be learned from the tragedy and the Inquiry's careful and well-argued recommendations, which, he noted, were aimed at ensuring that the United Nations could and would act to prevent or halt any other such catastrophe in the future.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Carlsson. May I, on behalf of the Council, take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to Mr. Carlsson and to the other members of the Independent Inquiry, Professor Han and General Kupolati, for the manner in which they discharged the important responsibility entrusted to them.

I now give the floor to Mr. Carlsson.

**Mr. Carlsson:** I am grateful for the opportunity to present the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

I am pleased that the report is to be discussed in substance in the Security Council, one of the main bodies to which the recommendations were addressed. I commend Canada's initiative to convene this meeting.

It is now six years since the beginning of the genocide in Rwanda, six years since hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were brutally massacred by their own countrymen in only 100 horrific days. This was a genocide which took place before the eyes of the international community and before the eyes of the United Nations peacekeeping force. We, the international community, did not prevent, nor did we stop, the massacres once they had begun. Our failure to do so is the reason we are here today. We had a responsibility to act and failed to do so.

The question before the Security Council today is why, and what can be done to see to it that what happened in Rwanda in 1994 never happens again. The Independent Inquiry was set up at the initiative of the Secretary-General, with the acceptance of the Security

Council. I was joined by two colleagues, Mr. Han Sung-Joo of the Republic of Korea, and General Rufus Kopolati of Nigeria. We had two main tasks: to establish the facts related to the role of the United Nations during the genocide and to make recommendations for the future. We visited Rwanda and other countries in the Great Lakes region. We visited New York several times and conducted in-depth interviews with key United Nations officials. We visited France, Belgium and the United States. We spoke to a number of survivors of the genocide, the families of the 10 Belgian peacekeepers who were killed, members of the local staff of the United Nations in Rwanda at the time and other witnesses. They helped to provide us with the necessary, if painful, understanding of what happened.

My colleague and I presented our report to the Secretary-General on 15 December last year. In the report we identified what we considered were the failings of the United Nations before and during the genocide and formulated 14 recommendations for the future.

Today, I want to highlight the main conclusions of the Inquiry, but want to focus particularly on the forward-looking element of the report, its recommendations. This Council has the power to prevent some of the mistakes that were made in Rwanda from happening again. I hope today's discussion will help to mobilize will in this respect.

The Inquiry found that the overriding failure of the United Nations was the lack of resources and the lack of political will to act. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was often called an orphan operation, one that suffered from being created in the aftermath of Somalia. It was smaller and weaker than what was needed, and the mandate was based on an over-optimistic assessment of the peace process in Rwanda at the time. When the genocide started, the Mission was not working as a cohesive operation. As we wrote in our report, there was a lack of political leadership, a lack of military capacity, severe problems of command and control and a lack of coordination and discipline.

In the report, we tried to identify in each particular case where the responsibility lay within the United Nations system. The United Nations had a peacekeeping operation numbering 2,500 personnel in Rwanda when the genocide started. They should have been able to prevent or at least limit the genocide. In effect, however, despite the courageous efforts of some of the United Nations staff in Rwanda, the force disintegrated. There were certainly acts of bravery by those in UNAMIR who stayed in Rwanda. There are people in Rwanda and abroad who owe their

lives to the United Nations, but there were also those who were left behind when the United Nations left Rwanda. Some of these were massacred, others were at risk of being killed. The withdrawal of the bulk of the Mission left a lot of bitterness behind in Rwanda.

I should also say that our report also included criticisms of UNAMIR and some of the troops in Rwanda. It is important also to say that those countries which did not send troops or *matériel* to Rwanda, including my own country, also share responsibility for what happened. It is a terrible fact that UNAMIR was never able to get the troops that it needed, neither in quantity nor in capacity.

The Inquiry emphasized the need for the international community to be prepared to identify situations of genocide as such and to act accordingly. Political will is the key here. A lack of political will to act is perhaps the most dangerous obstacle to United Nations efforts to bring about and keep peace and undermines the authority and legitimacy of the United Nations itself. One of the aspects of the United Nations role during the genocide which has caused most bitterness in Rwanda is the fact that a few weeks after the start of the genocide, the Council decided to reduce the strength of UNAMIR to about one tenth of the original number. This decision, and the lack of will to react firmly to the actions of the extremists, put Rwandan civilians and the remaining United Nations personnel at risk. It was a decision taken despite clear evidence of the horrors which were taking place in Rwanda, in the face of evidence of a genocide.

A key recommendation of our report emphasized the need to improve the capacity of the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping. The members of this Inquiry are not the first to say this, and unfortunately, we are not likely to be the last. But I would like to ask the members of the Security Council to take this point seriously. The United Nations remains the only organization which can bring global legitimacy to peacekeeping. The reverse side of that coin is that failed peacekeeping efforts cause devastating damage to the credibility of this Organization. To the members of the Security Council I would say, give peacekeeping operations the mandates they need. See to it that the resources provided fit that mandate. Mobilize the political will to provide the troops that the United Nations needs at short notice and show the same determination to exercise responsibility for international law, peace and security, wherever the crisis and whatever the continent.

To the Secretary-General I would say, continue to focus on improving the Secretariat's capacity to plan and prepare peacekeeping operations. In recommending peacekeeping operations, tell the Security Council what the real needs on the ground are, how many troops, what mandate, how tough the task is. It is then the responsibility of this Council not to allow short-term budgetary or other financial considerations to overrule those needs. It must ensure that there is full coordination on the ground between different United Nations bodies involved and use the lessons learned from previous operations.

I hope that the panel that has been appointed to follow up on the Rwanda and Srebrenica reports will help in identifying these lessons. The real challenge will be to bring the lessons into the everyday planning for peacekeeping.

Finally, on this point, I would hope that all Member States will use the Millennium Summit and Assembly to create momentum to deal with the problems facing United Nations peacekeeping. Member States will have the chance to see the political imperatives of making peacekeeping work and to solve the problems which have plagued peacekeeping efforts for so long.

During the months leading up to the genocide, the United Nations, but also Member States and non-government actors, failed to really recognize the systematic horrors of what was being planned. There were warning signs, but these were not given the attention they needed. Much attention has been focused on the fate of the Dallaire cable, and it was discussed in detail in our report. I think the main lesson is the following: information of that magnitude, and clearly any information which relates to the threat to exterminate a population, should be shared with the Security Council as a whole and must lead to a firm reaction.

Efforts have been made over the past years to improve the United Nations capacity for early warning. The Inquiry believes those efforts must continue. A key aspect is improving cooperation between departments concerned in the Secretariat. Another relates to improving the flow of information to the Security Council. This also depends on members of the Council receiving briefings from those officials most qualified to do so, be it the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Information on the human rights situation is often a key indicator of warning signs. This was so in Rwanda.

Much has been said on the need to improve our capacity for prevention. Learning the lessons from Rwanda is a question of putting prevention into practice, of combining the will to act in time with the capacity to do so. Improving the protection of civilians is a key task for the United Nations. The Inquiry recommends that mandates of peacekeeping operations, where appropriate, explicitly include the protection of civilians. I very much welcome the work done within the Council on improving the protection of civilians, based on the report by the Secretary-General last year. I hope that this thematic emphasis will also add momentum when dealing with these issues in individual conflicts.

I would like to mention two lessons from Rwanda in this regard. First, there can be no neutrality in the face of the threat of genocide or massive violation of human rights. The United Nations and its peacekeepers must react. Secondly, it is important to recognize that the presence of a United Nations mission, whether or not its mandates include the protection of civilians, will create an expectation among the civilian population that they will be protected by the United Nations. This needs to be taken into account when planning operations, but also when discussing how mandates are implemented.

The mistakes that were made by the international community in Rwanda were grave. We must make a determined effort to see to it that the same thing never occurs again. Preventing genocide is a duty; it is also an effort which goes beyond what is normally understood by prevention. The Inquiry therefore recommended that the Secretary-General initiate a specific United Nations action plan to prevent genocide. The idea would be for each part of the United Nations system to examine what concrete steps it needs to take within its mandate to be better prepared to prevent genocide. Political analysts, peacekeepers and humanitarian officers should all be trained to recognize the warning signs. Headquarters should be prepared to pick up an early warning and to translate it into early action. The Inquiry's hope is that a United Nations action plan of this kind could provide concrete input to the World Conference against Racism next year.

Finally, I want to express the hope that this report will contribute to improving the relations between Rwanda and the United Nations. I also hope that the recommendations will be taken on board in future discussions on the role of the United Nations in conflict situations.

**The President:** I would like to thank Mr. Carlsson for his very comprehensive and very significant briefing.

**Mr. van Walsum** (Netherlands): First, allow me to express my delegation's appreciation both to the members of the Independent Inquiry — Mr. Carlsson, Mr. Han Sung-Joo and General Kupolati — for what is commonly called the Carlsson report, and to the Secretary-General for having taken the initiative to set up this Inquiry.

The objective of our contribution to this debate is to share with the Council a number of thoughts that have crossed our mind while reading the Carlsson report. Some of these thoughts may be relevant to what we are doing in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We do not expect to come up with answers during this meeting. An open Council meeting may be the appropriate forum for articulating questions; finding answers will require more time for careful study. We hope that all the questions that remain unanswered today will be addressed by the panel chaired by Mr. Brahimi, which has been asked to conduct to a major study on United Nations peace operations.

As we are reminded in the Rwanda report, there is also a Srebrenica report, and both are relevant to the present analysis. For obvious reasons, my delegation is acutely aware of this. But in the report before us, we are also reminded of the responsibility of the great majority of United Nations Member States, which were not prepared to send any troops or *matériel* at all to Rwanda. A similar observation could, of course, be made about Srebrenica. Accordingly, instead of criticizing anyone, we would like to begin by commending Ghana and Tunisia, which allowed their troops to remain in Rwanda throughout the terrible weeks of the genocide, despite the withdrawal of other contingents.

Next, we would like to make some observations on the issue of feasibility. The report poses what it terms the "natural question": why a force numbering 2,500 could not stop the actions of the militia and Rwandese Government Forces soldiers that began setting up roadblocks and killing politicians and Tutsi in the early hours after the plane crash which killed the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. The question becomes even more pertinent if we ask ourselves what could have been done if the 11 January cable of Brigadier General Dallaire had been handled properly. In a case of such urgency, simply replying that the proposed action would clearly go beyond the mandate entrusted to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) under resolution 872 (1993) does not, in our

view, constitute proper handling. It is true that Rwanda's membership of the Security Council complicated matters, but we feel that the other 14 Council members should have been informed without delay. Of course, the need to protect the informant required a high degree of confidentiality, but if that was the Secretariat's primary concern it might have been safer to inform 14 Permanent Representatives than President Habyarimana.

The point we wish to make is that feasibility depends on timing. Action which is feasible one day may not be feasible a month later. Once the window of opportunity has passed, the need to intervene will usually increase in inverse proportion to a dwindling political will to do so. It is not our intention to apportion blame, for almost all of us live in a glass house as far as action or inaction in the field of peacekeeping is concerned. Besides, as for timing, Dallaire's 11 January cable was by no means the first warning signal.

How had the international community reacted to the events of 9 March 1992, when a systematic slaughter of the Tutsis in Nyamata was aborted thanks to the Italian lay sister Tonia Locatelli, who succeeded in alerting the international media by radio but was then brutally murdered herself? The initial indignation caused by that event had soon died down because killings in Rwanda were seen as an age-old phenomenon, best viewed with a degree of even-handedness and not too much emotion. Tutsis were at risk in Government-controlled areas, and Hutu lives were in peril where the Rwandese Patriotic Front was in control. On 4 August 1993, the Arusha Peace Agreement was welcomed with a sense of relief because it gave the international community a peace process to support, as the perfect expression of its even-handedness.

This may explain why, one week later, hardly anyone paid any attention to the report of Mr. Waly Bacre Ndiaye, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. Mr. Ndiaye reported so many massacres of Tutsis that he asked himself whether the term "genocide" might be applicable. It is clear why a report of that nature was not immediately welcomed by an international community which had just placed its trust in the Arusha Peace Agreement. What is disconcerting, however, is that for so long afterwards — even after the genocide had begun — many protagonists continued to focus on the risk of jeopardizing the Arusha Peace Agreement, as though that accord were of a higher value than the thousands of people who were meanwhile being killed.

On 15 April 1994, after the Interim Government had taken office and already fled from Kigali, the President of the Security Council made a statement to the press which made no mention of the ongoing massacres but reaffirmed that the Arusha Peace Agreement was the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict. The Council therefore demanded that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to the negotiating table.

This statement was made at a time when, according to an estimate of Human Rights Watch, killers carried out the most devastating massacres of the genocide, in some cases slaying hundreds or even thousands of people in one or two days. Obviously, this unworldliness of the Council could not last. On 28 April, Ambassador Gambari of Nigeria complained that too much attention was being paid to the ceasefire negotiations and too little to the massacres. Two days later, on 30 April, the Council issued a presidential statement which admitted for the first time that killings of civilians had taken place especially in areas under the control of members or supporters of the Interim Government of Rwanda. Even in that statement, however, the word "genocide" did not appear.

We see a number of lessons to be learned from this part of the report. First, we should not treat a peace process as something of a higher order than the populations of the countries concerned. Secondly, we should not clutch at a peace process that has ceased to be relevant. A peace process may be dead, in which case it is the conflict that demands our attention. Thirdly, we should pay more attention to non-governmental organizations and, perhaps, somewhat less to countries with experience in the region. Most non-governmental organizations have a wealth of up-to-date information from the ground. On that basis, they tend to have a fresh approach and an open mind and are unlikely to mistake killers for victims. Fourthly, even-handedness is not a virtue when genocide is going on.

It is pointed out in the report that the credibility of the United Nations requires that troop contributors refrain from withdrawing unilaterally from a peace operation if that withdrawal may be expected to jeopardize the operation in question. It is understandable, but unfortunate, that a troop-contributing country which suffers heavy casualties will inevitably find itself under pressure from its parliament and its media to withdraw its contingent. The more this reflex can be counted on, the greater the likelihood that precisely such a contingent will be targeted by parties opposed to the peace operation. We have no solution for this problem, but it raises a discomfiting question as to the suitability of democratic countries for peace operations. We recall how,

in the case of Sierra Leone, Nigeria suddenly found it more difficult to play its leading role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) after it had restored democratic rule.

We have already referred to the complicating factor that, during the genocide, Rwanda was a member of the Security Council. The report recommends that further study be given to the possibility of suspending the participation of the representative of a State member of the Security Council in similar circumstances. We would not object to such a study, but we believe that it would be difficult to define the nature and scale of the occurrence that might justify such a suspension. Moreover, quite apart from the issue of Council membership, we are concerned about the general reluctance to acknowledge that, in the event of massive human rights abuses taking place in a given country — especially if they have given rise to armed rebellion — the Government of that country may be in the wrong. We believe that the unwillingness to condemn the Interim Government of Rwanda for the genocide it was directing was due not only to its Council membership.

As for the role of the individual members of the Interim Government, the report raises the question of whether their accountability was made sufficiently clear to them at the time. This question is of immediate "lessons-learned" relevance for the situation in Sierra Leone. Can we trust all the actors in that country to be fully aware that the amnesty provisions of the Lomé Accord do not apply to human rights abuses committed after the signing of that instrument and are not binding on non-parties, anyway?

Equally, in the context of lessons learned, we would like to point out that the report briefly touches on the origin of the problem in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which rightly finds itself at the very top of the Council's agenda. The outflow from the humanitarian protection zone under Operation Turquoise is described as the starting point of one of the most complicated and sensitive humanitarian emergencies of recent years: the huge exodus of Rwandan refugees into Zaire, whose camps were to become infiltrated by the Interahamwe and other forces behind the genocide.

In this connection, we would like to comment briefly on some of the recommendations contained in the report. We agree that the United Nations should acknowledge its part of the responsibility for not having done enough to

prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. We have noted with deep respect the statement made by the Belgian Prime Minister on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the beginning of the Rwanda genocide. Belgium, of course, is not alone in having failed. The whole international community should acknowledge its share of the responsibility. But the best way of doing so today is to show understanding for Rwanda's legitimate security concerns.

Similarly, my delegation fully subscribes to the recommendation that the international community should support efforts to rebuild Rwandan society after the genocide, paying particular attention to the need for reconstruction, reconciliation and respect for human rights.

We also agree that everything must be done to prevent future catastrophes of the type that took place in Srebrenica and in Rwanda. We support the proposals for enhancing early warning and early response capacity. It is at least equally important, however, that we be aware that with all the training of staff at Headquarters, in agencies and in programmes, and, not least, of personnel in field missions, we cannot rule out that people may once again expect a degree of protection from a United Nations peace operation that the latter cannot deliver.

We should not forget that this is what Srebrenica and Rwanda had in common. No matter how much we may increase the robustness of our mandates or how widely we may broadcast their strict limitations, we can never be sure that frightened civilians will not force their way into the compound of a United Nations peace operation and then expect protection beyond that operation's legal mandate or physical capacity. Such a situation could once more lead to a humanitarian tragedy. We would not like to give the impression that we have already found a way of making sure that something of the sort will never happen again.

The Rwanda report is at its most poignant where it describes the false expectations aroused by the United Nations presence, for instance among the people who had sought refuge at the Ecole Technique Officielle. The essence of the Srebrenica tragedy is of a similar nature. This may well be the most important problem to be studied by the Brahimi panel, for as long as it is not solved it jeopardizes the whole concept of peace operations. Hence, it must be solved. The inarticulate urge to do something is a notoriously bad motivating force, but the solution cannot be that we do not do what needs to be done.

**Mr. Kuchynski** (Ukraine): We listened with to Mr. Carlsson with great interest, and I would like to express my sincere appreciation to him and to the other participants in the Independent Inquiry for their great work done in the study and analysis of the tragic events that took place six years ago. The report, with its conclusions and recommendations, is indeed an outstanding contribution to the work of the Organization as a whole and of the Security Council in particular in the fulfilment of their primary task: maintaining and strengthening international peace and security.

We would also like to commend the delegation of Canada for bringing this issue to an open briefing. We hope that our in-depth analysis of the steps and actions taken by the United Nations, by individual Member States and officials and by participants in the events will be correctly interpreted and accepted by the international community. Honest and frank discussion of the failures, faults and mistakes of the Organization — a critical look at ourselves — could to a great extent rehabilitate and strengthen the credibility of the United Nations.

I would like to emphasize another important point. The report straightforwardly describes the events, gives specific names and refers to particular actions and decisions. We should certainly should give credit to the Secretary-General for appointing an independent inquiry. That required great courage and self-criticism on the part of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. Their readiness to assume their part of the responsibility and to take on heavy and fair criticism undoubtedly deserves respect.

It would not be erroneous to say that this report also makes a valuable contribution to enhancing the openness, transparency and democratization of the United Nations. The appointment of the Independent Inquiry and the subsequent release of its report also constituted a lesson and a warning to all of us — first and foremost to the Security Council. It proves that no steps and decisions — or the lack of these — can be concealed from succeeding generations.

For Ukraine, genocide is not just a term. We experienced difficult times in our own history: this century alone witnessed an unspeakable tragedy, when more than 7 million people were exterminated within two years by a well-planned famine. These events took place in the country once called the breadbasket of Europe. Today's meeting provides an opportunity for me to extend, on behalf of my country, deep condolences to the

people of Rwanda, who have gone through this deadly machine of genocide, a tragedy that deeply scarred the history of that country.

In both cases the international community was aware of the developments, but did nothing to prevent or ultimately to stop the tragedy. Therefore, I entirely share the view expressed by Mr. Carlsson that no consideration of a political, organizational or financial nature should prevent the international community, and the Security Council on its behalf, from taking decisive and uncompromising measures in the face of similar catastrophes.

It is not my intention to make a detailed analysis of the report. In the light of the remarks made by Mr. Carlsson and by the previous speaker, I will refrain from commenting on its specific conclusions and recommendations.

The major point, in our view, is that the report has become the subject of multifaceted and diverse work. Let us hope that this will bear fruit with regard to the work of the United Nations and its bodies, as well as to the commitment of individual Member States to their responsibilities stemming from the United Nations Charter.

We shall also refrain from remarks analysing the causes of events in Rwanda. Genocide is a tragedy of such immense scale that its causes and consequences have individual distinctions, and they are unlikely to be repeated with the same dynamics in other cases — and may God forbid such repetitions. However, the report and the work done in that direction are extremely important in our view. With its factual accuracy, it not only made us look at ourselves, but also made us see in that mirror all the shortcomings, mistakes and failures of the United Nations and the whole international community.

Before concluding, I wish to note that a few days ago we learned about the early retirement of Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire. Members may be aware of the reasons for the retirement of that 53-year old career officer. We would like to pay tribute to the courage of that man, regretting that his honest and dedicated stance did not receive an adequate response from New York, and that all his efforts to prevent the tragedy ended in failure.

**The President:** We appreciate the comments of the representative of Ukraine concerning the role played by General Dallaire. We will make sure that he knows fully of the sentiments he expressed.

I think it is appropriate, in the context of this discussion of the failure of the Security Council in Rwanda, that I announce on behalf of the Council that we have asked Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to lead, early next month, a Security Council mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mission is designed to accelerate full acceptance and implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and to support the relevant Security Council resolutions. I wish Ambassador Holbrooke and his mission every success in that very timely initiative.

**Mr. Holbrooke** (United States of America): I would like to thank you again, Mr. Minister, for coming back from Canada to chair this important meeting. I accept the mandate of the Security Council to lead this mission and am delighted that the membership of it is shaping up. I think it would be useful to note that a prior mission to Kosovo will be headed by Ambassador Chowdhury and that these two missions further the evolving role of the Security Council as an organization which, following on the historic work of Ambassador Andjaba's mission to East Timor last year, will take a more active role not only in adopting resolutions but in making sure they are implemented. So I welcome this assignment, Mr. President, and I believe that it is a mission that can be frankly said to give us the hope that we will avoid another meeting such as this one in the future, so it is very timely to announce it today.

Mr. Prime Minister, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your efforts in producing this historic report. Along with the Secretary-General's report on Srebrenica, which Ambassador van Walsum has already discussed, it is a remarkable document, a remarkable self-criticism. We have much to learn from these documents. That these reports were sponsored and generated by the United Nations itself is a testament to our collective commitment to work with the Secretary-General to reform the United Nations, to overcome and avoid the failures of the past and to do better in the future.

Fifty-five years ago the United Nations was created in the ashes of the Second World War to help prevent conflict and atrocities. It is the primary responsibility of this body, the Security Council, to stand against such horrible actions and take the lead in response. This is our core task. This is the one, ultimately, upon which the United Nations will be judged by the people of the world.

The report makes clear that in Rwanda, as in Bosnia and Somalia, the international system failed and that these



collective failures nearly brought the United Nations system down. It sparked an institutional and political crisis from which the United Nations system is trying to recover and which it will be severely tested in the "big four" of peacekeeping: East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

For its part, our nation accepts its own shortcomings in this terrible period. This has been expressed with openness and candour by President Clinton himself during his historic 1998 visit to Africa. In his visit to Kigali he said,

"The international community, together with the nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe havens for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past, but we can and must do everything in our power to help Rwanda build a future without fear and full of hope."

There is little I can add to President Clinton's statement. Like the Carlsson report and the Secretary General's report on Srebrenica, his words stand as an indictment of both the perpetrators and the bystanders. They are a call to action to prevent the recurrence of genocidal violence.

In the trip that my colleagues and I made in our national capacity to Africa and to Rwanda in December of last year, I visited a memorial, on a hillside outside of Kigali, to the victims of the genocide, accompanied by many of the survivors, still in a state of shock, five years later. Like the massacre sites of the Balkans or the factories of death of Nazi Germany or the killing fields of Cambodia, a visit to such a place of memory commands justice for the dead and hope for the living. The people stood in a field with wooden crosses and asked if the United Nations could help make it a permanent memorial. They told me that they estimated the cost would be \$300,000. I hope that some way can be found to accommodate this request so that we can recognize in a physical way on that hillside in Kigali the two fundamental imperatives we must focus on here in this Chamber: never forget, and never again.

What happened in Rwanda and Bosnia was not the spontaneous result of some sort of genetic predisposition for genocide or that dreadful phrase of journalists, "ancient

ethnic hatreds". Such judgements are an excuse for inaction. I repeat, such judgements are an excuse for inaction. I have written in my own book on Bosnia how appalled I was to hear these phrases coming from American officials in regard to Bosnia, and I commend you, Mr. Prime Minister, for being so direct and open about them in regard to this tragedy.

The atrocities in Rwanda were carried out by a small group of murderers intent on promoting hate to preserve power — just as was true in Bosnia. These were political acts, plain and simple. Those perpetrating them must be held responsible. For not acting against such violence when there were clear indications it would take place, so must we, the international community.

Again, we are grateful to Prime Minister Carlsson and his colleagues for their unsparing report. It is a historical document and, we hope, a blueprint for the future.

That future must now be our highest priority. The prevention of another round of violence, genocidal or otherwise, in Central Africa is a core element of the United States policy in the Great Lakes. It is one of the United Nations greatest current challenges.

The legacy of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a tragic reality that must be addressed and which will, Mr. President, be the focus of the mission you have announced today. We undertake your mandate with humility and hope, and I am delighted that so many members of the Security Council here represented will join in that mission. I know that you have decided that every country here should either go to Kosovo or the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the divisions are still being finalized, but I congratulate you on an excellent solution to that aspect of the problem, because Kosovo equally demands our attention.

In regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we must end the cycle of impunity. Our discussion today should galvanize support for United Nations sanctions against the Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe. We must also begin to plan and prepare for demobilization and reintegration of other armed groups in the Great Lakes region.

The United States supports the International war crimes Tribunal in Rwanda. We continue to press for reforms to make it more effective. We support Rwanda's

own domestic justice system, which is sometimes misunderstood by other people. We have allocated \$25 million for the Great Lakes Justice Initiative to help re-establish and strengthen the rule of law in that area.

It is undeniable that many of the Rwandan murderers remain at large within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and many of those wish to renew the genocide. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is unable to prevent the use of its territory by these armed groups. It is simply outside their physical, logistical and political capability. It is therefore time for all the States of the region to come together and find a common solution for the insurgencies of the groups that are not fully covered inside the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement. Angolan, Rwandan, Burundian and Sudanese groups operate with impunity in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The solution lies both within the countries of origin of these groups and within the country that is the often unwilling host.

We all know that something must be done. The full implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and a rededication to the institutions of justice offer the best hope for an end to the present crisis. We cannot say that the solution to Rwanda's problems lies exclusively in actions within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Neither can we say that Rwanda's problems should be solved without addressing the presence of the genocidal militia in a neighbouring State. Lusaka's full implementation, local and international justice, and democratization and institution-building in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the keys to preventing further conflict and genocide.

We share the previously expressed view of the representative of the Netherlands that the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations is inadequately staffed and inadequately structured to deal with the massive challenges that are posed by the African crises as well as by East Timor, Somalia and their other missions. However, we emphatically support the Secretary-General's peacekeeping commission. We look forward to its results and urge that it be ambitious in its goals.

Meanwhile, we must deal with ongoing crises. In the mission to Kinshasa that will begin on 2 May, the Security Council will assess the status of the progress being made, and we will urge the parties to do more. In the days ahead, how we act to help bring peace to the Congo will be the best tribute to the important report we are discussing today.

I wish also to thank the President for coming back to New York to chair this important and, I hope, potentially historic meeting.

**The President:** I thank the representative of the United States for the kind words he addressed to me.

**Mr. Ouane (Mali)** (*spoke in French*): I too wish to welcome Mr. Carlsson and thank him and the other members of the Independent Inquiry for the clear-sighted, courageous and informative report he submitted to us.

Let me recall that in this context the Organization of African Unity has also established an International Panel of Eminent Persons to analyse the Rwandan genocide and related events. Mali is proud to participate in that work through General Amadou Toumani Touré, former head of State of Mali.

The main conclusion we can draw from the analysis of the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is that the Organization and its Member States were not able to prevent or to halt the genocide in Rwanda. This conclusion is based on what the report deems to be an absence of capacity for analysis, which is the reason for the excessive and incomprehensible caution shown in the face of information regarding preparations for genocide. It also condemns the lack of political will to halt the genocide, which was partly the result of resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, which reduced the force level of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, and partly of the weakening of the mandate of that Mission.

These considerations were discussed at length in Mr. Carlsson's briefing today, and I will not repeat them. I would like to point out, however, that in addition to pointing out the failings of the Organization and its Member States, the report draws lessons from the tragedy of Rwanda and contains many proposals and recommendations. Today's meeting gives us a useful opportunity to engage in public and constructive reflection so that we can formulate guidelines to enable the United Nations to respond effectively to various types of conflict.

I should like in this respect to make a few brief comments.

My first comment relates to the capacity of the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping, in particular regarding the mobilization of resources, the strengthening

of the means of the Secretariat in the area of operations planning, logistical support to the contingents of developing countries, the definition of mandates and of rules of engagement, coordination and cooperation between peacekeeping operations and the non-governmental organizations that are active in the area of operations, and, finally, cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations.

We support the recommendations contained in the report, which were mentioned earlier by Mr. Carlsson.

My second comment relates to the decision-making process in the Council, in this case the question of the indispensable political will in the Council to give effect to resolutions and the fairness it must show in dealing with issues concerning Africa in particular compared to other conflict areas. Indeed, the political will to act, and in particular to prevent acts of genocide, such as in the case of Rwanda, or massive violations of human rights, such as in Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, should be clear and should not be subject to double standards. Attempts to advance national interests at the expense of international peace and security should cease.

My third comment relates to the system for gathering and dealing with information in crisis situations. It is imperative, we think, that the early warning capacity of the United Nations be enhanced, particularly its capacity to analyse information and react effectively to it. While we welcome the measures already taken at various levels of the Secretariat, we still must enhance the circulation of information among the United Nations agencies, in particular information relating to human rights.

Fourthly, with respect to efforts to rebuild society in Rwanda after the genocide, we believe that the international community must continue to give aid and assistance to Rwanda, devoting particular attention to efforts aimed at reconstruction and at bringing about reconciliation and respect for human rights, in order to realize the hopes that have begun to emerge.

Fifthly and lastly, with respect to the relationship between the Organization and Rwanda, we believe that the Organization should acknowledge its share of responsibility in the tragedy in Rwanda, and we welcome the resolve of the Secretary-General actively to seek a new beginning in the relationship between the United Nations and Rwanda.

**Sir Jeremy Greenstock** (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom is grateful to Canada for organizing this

open debate and for thus following up the discussion of the Carlsson report which the United Kingdom instigated among members of the Council in December.

We pay tribute to Prime Minister Carlsson and to his Korean and Nigerian colleagues on the Inquiry for the excellent job that they have done and to the Secretary-General for taking this initiative of commendable transparency.

It is important that our discussions should look to the future. We must all, Member States and the Secretariat, be prepared to learn from the report of the Independent Inquiry team, to discuss its recommendations in depth and to explore any other realistic ways to avoid such humanitarian catastrophes in future. The United Kingdom is very ready to do that.

We also need to look to the future of the people of Rwanda. What they need now is political commitment and practical support in their efforts to rebuild their country. The United Kingdom Government is committed to working in partnership with the Government and the people of Rwanda to build national unity and develop democratic processes in a society where trust was destroyed by genocide.

Rwanda also needs to restore the rule of law and address the devastating economic impact of the genocide. Given the background of 1994, and before that the legacy of decades of divisive and exclusionary rule, such a task will take time. The United Kingdom is committed to working in an open partnership with Rwanda to keep that process on track. For instance, we are now providing long-term development assistance to help Rwanda to meet international development targets, and I think that answers one of the points made by the Ambassador of Mali. For its part, Rwanda has made specific commitments in the areas of national unity, good governance, conflict resolution, poverty reduction and economic stability, commitments which it must fulfil.

The Carlsson report highlights a range of failures encompassing all those involved, and it puts forward a number of recommendations for the future. I will focus on those issues relating to the Security Council. Perhaps most damning is the apparent failure to face up to the reality on the ground when it really mattered. This failure became evident in two important aspects: first, the original mandate was based on the commitment of the parties to the Arusha Peace Accords but did not properly take account of the fragility of those Accords; second,

and most important, the Council failed to respond to the drastically changing situation on the ground.

It is apparent that there were real problems in the flow of information, including to the Security Council. Some of the causes were structural. But there also appears to have been a perception — probably justified — that the Security Council, and maybe the United Nations membership as a whole, did not have the political stomach for hearing and responding to the unadorned truth. This is fundamental. The Council needs accurate, timely and unfiltered information. At the same time, the Council and the United Nations membership as a whole must demonstrate the political will to act on that information, however unpalatable, to tackle complex humanitarian emergencies.

It is easy to underline the need for greater responsiveness and flexibility. In an organization of 188 equal States, that is not always so easy to deliver. But we as a Council have to be clear that no peacekeeping mandate is set in stone, that operational changes are part of the Council's business and that the underlying principles and responsibilities of the United Nations must not be ignored or set aside.

We know that for a peacekeeping mission to work, there must be a peace to keep. And it is right that any peacekeeping mission must be based on the commitment of all parties to a peace accord. But at the same time we have to recognize where fault lines remain — and in any long-term conflict such fault lines will be deep and extend to the population at large, not just to political and military players. This principle is bound to apply in most peacekeeping operations, not least those currently before us in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We must also be prepared to recognize and respond to signs of a major shift in the political or humanitarian situation. As the report makes clear, this means that any peacekeeping operation needs to have both a political analysis capacity and a human rights monitoring capacity. This underlines the importance, moreover, of the continuing efforts of the United Nations to strengthen its rapid reaction capability.

We must ensure that lessons learned from Rwanda inform future Council discussions. The Rwanda and Srebrenica reports are inextricably linked to wider issues of United Nations peacekeeping capability and humanitarian preventive action. These issues have implications for other United Nations bodies, not just the Security Council. This point is borne out by current discussions on conflict prevention, which are detailing the need for a

comprehensive approach going much wider than peacekeeping.

We therefore applaud the Secretary-General's intention to tackle these issues in a broad-ranging report on peace operations due to be issued this summer. Today's discussion must inform that process and lead to effective decisions by the Council which draw the right lessons from this appalling story.

**Mr. Listre** (Argentina) (spoke in Spanish): First of all, I would like once again to thank you, Mr. President, for coming to chair the Security Council debate here in New York. This bears witness to your and your country's dedication to and support for this organization and for humanitarian issues and conflict prevention, as well as the maintenance of international peace and security.

I would like to start by saying that we deeply appreciate the Secretary-General's decision to order an inquiry into the actions of the United Nations in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. As far as we are concerned, this is an exemplary gesture.

I would like to particularly pay tribute to you, Mr. President, for having taken the initiative of organizing an open debate on the report of the Independent Inquiry, which was chaired by Prime Minister Carlsson and included Minister Sung-Joo and General Kupolati. It is a comprehensive and objective report. Without doubt it will be a fundamental landmark for the Council's work, because without forgetting the past, it looks towards the future.

It is essential, I believe, that all of us, without exception — the Security Council, the other bodies of the Organization and the United Nations in general, as well as the international community as a whole — should think about our mistakes, our failings and our lack of resolve in Rwanda. We must do so with humility and with a deep sense of self-criticism. The United Nations did nothing, or at least not enough, to prevent or halt the genocide in Rwanda. We abandoned the Rwandese people at the time they needed us the most. Perhaps this was because we were not prepared from the military and political point of view, but perhaps also because we were not psychologically prepared to confront the events which developed in Rwanda six years ago.

I do not think it is helpful to begin to allocate blame, but we must take into consideration that following upon this bitter lesson, the peoples of the world will not forgive

us if in the future we fail to prevent or to rapidly and effectively respond to a genocide or to a massive violation of human rights.

The Rwandese tragedy inescapably leads us to think about three fundamental and interrelated issues: conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, and the strengthening of international standards of protection for human rights and humanitarian law.

As the Secretary-General pointed out in his report on the work of the Organization for 1999:

“The main short- and medium-term strategies for preventing non-violent conflicts from escalating into war, and preventing earlier wars from erupting again, are preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, and preventive disarmament.” (A/54/1, para. 36)

The United Nations of the twenty-first century must gradually become a source of preventive measures. Preventive diplomacy calls for an accurate assessment of events, economic resources and, most importantly, political will. We believe these factors were lacking in Rwanda in 1994.

As regards peacekeeping operations, there are four points that I consider essential.

First, peacekeeping operations must be endowed with a clear, realistic mandate commensurate with the established goals and backed by the necessary political, military and moral decisions.

Secondly, financial resources must be dependable and adequate. Voluntary funding can be a useful tool, but never a substitute for regular contributions.

Thirdly, there must be reasonable security guarantees for United Nations, associated and humanitarian personnel. In this regard, we would like to reiterate our call for the ratification of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel in peacekeeping operations, and we recall presidential statement S/PRST/2000/4, adopted on 9 February 2000 following the open debate held by the Security Council on this topic.

Fourth, in cases such as that of Rwanda, the mandate must include clear rules for the protection of civilians. When any deliberate attempt to carry out serious attacks on the civil population occurs, the United Nations cannot

remain indifferent — it has a moral imperative to act. Security Council resolutions 1270 (1999) and 1291 (2000), establishing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and extending the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), respectively, are a step in the right direction. They enable the Blue Helmets, in specific circumstances, to act under Chapter VII of the Charter to defend the civilian population. I think this is one of the lessons learned in Rwanda and Srebrenica. A false idea of impartiality must not be allowed to prevail when genocide or crimes against humanity are being committed. It is against this background, and within a broad interpretation of the idea of international peace and security, that we must understand the concept of human security, and the open debate proposed by Canada for 19 April on the protection of civilians in armed conflict is an initiative that we unequivocally support.

The need to strengthen standards for the protection of human rights and international humanitarian law is another element that must be studied, following the Carlsson report. It is clear that with certain limitations, there is already an adequate normative framework. The fact of the matter is, however, that there is a wide gap between the existence of these legal standards and their observance. This is why it is indispensable to establish appropriate national and international machinery to fight impunity. Justice is an essential component of a stable peace. The genocide in Rwanda and other crimes against humanity must not go unpunished. In this context, we support the work of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and we are convinced that the entry into force of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court will contribute to creating an awareness that impunity will not be tolerated.

The Argentine public learned yesterday, through the Buenos Aires newspaper *Clarín*, of the moving declarations of General Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. Referring to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, he said: “I know that God exists because I have shaken hands with the devil.” The events in Rwanda must move us all to deep reflection and analysis. As the Secretary-General has said in his report on the fall of Srebrenica,

“The United Nations global commitment to ending conflict does not preclude moral judgements, but makes them necessary.” (A/54/549, para. 506)

**The President:** I would like to thank the representative of Argentina for his very appreciative words on the role of General Dallaire.

**Mr. Granovsky** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): First of all, Mr. President, we would like to associate ourselves with the words of gratitude to you for having organized our discussion of the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the time of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

The Russian delegation has carefully studied the report, which reminds us of that terrible period when 800,000 entirely innocent people in Rwanda fell victim to an ethnic conflict that was rightly described by the international community as genocide. We are grateful to the authors of the report for their painstaking analysis of what could have been done by the international community to prevent that horrendous crime and of what, for a variety of reasons, was not done. Unfortunately, history does not know the conditional tense, and the clock cannot be turned back. Those who fell victim to genocide in Rwanda in 1994 cannot be resurrected from the dead, but we agree with the view that lessons must be drawn from the past to see to it that what happened in 1994 in Rwanda never happens again.

The Russian delegation believes that in preparing new peacekeeping operations, very careful account should be taken by the Security Council of the results of the analysis of actions by the United Nations in Rwanda during the time of the 1994 genocide. Unfortunately, the world is not perfect, and even the capacity of an authoritative body such as the Security Council of the United Nations is not unlimited, to say nothing of the capacity of individual countries represented on the Council. Nevertheless, Russia attaches great importance to a careful analysis of provisions for protecting civilians in areas where United Nations peacekeeping operations are being conducted. We must attempt, on the one hand, to ensure that peacekeepers provide maximum protection for innocent civilians and, on the other hand, to avoid creating illusions that are not backed up by the real capacities of United Nations personnel.

In the broader context, we again take note of the desirability of developing norms of international law, adapting them to new realities in order to produce a proper international legal interpretation of humanitarian crises and making it possible to respond to them properly. That was precisely the thrust of the President of Russia's proposal

that consideration be given to the legal aspects of the use of force in international relations in our globalizing world.

Concerning the current situation in Rwanda and in the Great Lakes region as a whole, of course we share the conclusions of the report regarding the need for the international community to assist the Rwandans in dealing with the effects of the genocide and in punishing the perpetrators. At the same time, we believe that the spinning wheel of violence, one rotation of which was the genocide in Rwanda, must be finally stopped. In other words, we call upon all forces involved in the conflicts in the Great Lakes region to lay down their arms and intensify the search for a political settlement to these conflicts, which could ultimately lead to a comprehensive settlement of the situation in the region within the context of an international conference on the Great Lakes region.

**Mr. Mohammad Kamal** (Malaysia): My delegation would like to express its appreciation to you, Mr. President, for convening this open briefing today on the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The formal consideration of this first-of-its-kind document is overdue. For too long, the Organization has shied away from acknowledging a serious flaw in judgement in its handling of the situation in Rwanda. The 1994 slaughter of the 800,000 people still reverberates today, and in order for us to exorcise this ghastly failure, we must muster the courage to accept and recognize, in all humility, our shortcomings. More importantly, we must learn from the tragedy and not allow a repetition of Rwanda in any part of the world.

In this regard, we would also like to express our appreciation to the former Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, for introducing a sobering, critical report that has catalogued in painful detail how the United Nations ignored abundant warnings of impending carnage and withdrew most of its peacekeeping force as the massacres began.

We also wish to commend Secretary-General Kofi Annan for his decision in commissioning the report and for his courage in making a public expression of his profound regret and acknowledgement of responsibility. Malaysia believes that it is for the good of the Organization that the truth be made known. We must restore the credibility of this Organization and, more importantly, contribute to the healing and reconciliation process of the Rwandan people.

Aside from its account of what actually happened, the report of the Independent Inquiry is also noteworthy for the timing of its release. Its issuance, on 16 December 1999, came on the heels of an equally critical internal report detailing how, in July 1995, the United Nations allowed the Bosnian Muslim safe area of Srebrenica to be overrun by Bosnian Serbs. Together, these inquiries have established an admirable new standard of candour at the United Nations. They could point the way towards more effective international action if similar situations were to arise in the future.

We can succeed only if we are honest with ourselves and have a clear idea of what has been wrong up to now. We must strive for a clear set of criteria and guidelines on how, in future, to better implement and coordinate the whole range of United Nations activities in the area of peace and security.

The report has clearly assigned responsibility for the limitations of the original mandate given to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) where it belongs. It is clear that an inadequate and flawed analysis underpinned the recommendations to the Council, which accepted the recommendation that the Mission be composed of fewer troops than the field mission had considered necessary. UNAMIR's mandate was cautious from its inception; it was to become equally cautious in its application on the ground. The mandate was applied in a manner which would preserve a neutral role for UNAMIR under a traditional peacekeeping mandate — one that was grossly inadequate to halt the genocide. This was the scope of the action that was perceived to have support in the Security Council. Despite a deteriorating security situation which should have prompted a more robust and preventive role for the United Nations, no steps were taken to adjust the mandate to the realities of the situation on the ground.

Council members must also share the responsibility — obviously, some more than others. There was no will to deploy a more substantial force or to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians at risk. It is clear from the report that an adequate number of properly trained, equipped and supported troops could have averted the horrific tragedy.

It has often been said that UNAMIR was an operation which was established in the shadow of Somalia. In particular, the tragic deaths of United Nations peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 had a deep effect on the attitude towards the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The experience of Somalia appears to have had a constraining

effect on the Secretariat, in particular with regard to the risks that could be assumed during peacekeeping operations and in respect of the interpretation of mandates. Nevertheless, while criticism can be levelled at the mistakes and limitations of the capacity of UNAMIR's troops, responsibility should also be shared by the great majority of United Nations Member States, which were not prepared to send any troops or *matériel* to Rwanda.

My delegation welcomes the commissioning, release and discussion of the report. It throws much light on the circumstances surrounding the tragedy that engulfed Rwanda, which is extremely useful to States Members of this Organization. However, many questions that should have been addressed by the Independent Inquiry were kept in abeyance. Such questions revolve around the identity of perpetrators and possible accomplices in the murderous attack that claimed the lives of the heads of State of Rwanda and of Burundi. That attack, as pointed out in many parts of the report, served as a catalyst for the Rwandan genocide. We note that the report is based on evidence collected from only one side in the conflict, that is, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and its collaborators. Similar interviews with other personalities in exile could have proved useful. Such exiles include members of the two successive transition Governments before the assassination of President Habyarimana, as well as members of the first RPF Government who had to flee the country.

We think it would perhaps have been useful for the Independent Inquiry to have included in its recommendations the setting up of a more comprehensive and detailed commission of inquiry on the Rwandan genocide. We believe that Rwandans mourn not only the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were massacred in 1994, but also other Hutus and Tutsis who were massacred before and after that period by extremists from all sides. Such an inquiry, while painful, would serve to bring this great tragedy to closure, thereby contributing to the necessary process of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups, which is important for the future peace and tranquillity of the region.

We note the Organization's admission, in the aftermath of the 1994 tragedy, that it had, indeed, learned some lessons from Rwanda. It had failed to respond to several warnings of the impending genocide. Six months before the massacre, for example, a report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva signalled what was to come, but the report never made it

to the desks of senior peacekeeping officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who might have acted on it. The failure of communication within the Secretariat and with the Security Council is less likely now. However, better internal communication is not the whole answer. The ability of the United Nations to respond to crises can be only as strong as the will of its leading members to provide the necessary resources. It is regrettable that the Council's failure to prevent the slaughter in Rwanda has led many to question its perceived selectivity when deciding to intervene in conflict situations.

The United Nations may not be able to meet all of the world's many humanitarian challenges. But this report from the Independent Inquiry, coming on the eve of the new millennium, should be a turning point for this Organization. The Organization must make a difference to populations at risk whenever necessary, wherever they happen to be. The shame of the Srebrenica massacre was that the United Nations had stationed a token peacekeeping force in the town, large enough for it to claim that it cared about the fate of Bosnian Muslims, but too small to actually help them. The shame of Rwanda, likewise, is that the United Nations did send a token force to the region but then stood by as the horror unfolded. We must learn from the lessons of this tragedy and come to terms with our acts of omission. In this regard, it is imperative that we give serious consideration to the 14 recommendations of the report, which, if adhered to, would ensure non-repetition of the tragic blunder made in respect of Rwanda. We must thank the authors of the report for speaking out without fear or favour.

**Mr. Jerandi** (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): I too wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the entire delegation of Canada for having organized this open briefing. I wish at the same time to thank Mr. Ingvar Carlsson for his useful statement on the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I commend the members of the Inquiry for their work, which led to a report of great importance and historic value.

We should like to pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his praiseworthy initiative to task the Inquiry with establishing the facts about the behaviour of the Organization with respect to the genocide in Rwanda so that the entire international community, the United Nations and Member States might draw the lessons needed to prevent such tragedies in the future.

Six years ago, the people of Rwanda suffered a tragedy that left a mark on its history: the massacre of 800,000 people. The international community, and in particular the United Nations, did not prevent that genocide and did not react in time to bring it to a halt. The report of the Independent Inquiry sheds light on this dark period of Rwanda's history and on the international community's failings during the tragedy. The report will inevitably enhance awareness and will be the basis of in-depth reflection on how to predict and prevent tragedies of this kind.

The Independent Inquiry has set out a series of conclusions and recommendations that deserve the full attention of States Members of the United Nations, of the Security Council and of the Secretariat. These will undoubtedly serve as a benchmark when future peacekeeping challenges arise.

Today's review in no way detracts from the valour, the courage and the sense of duty of the members of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), including Tunisian Blue Helmets, who on instructions from the Tunisian Government stood their ground during the terrible weeks of the genocide. The report of the Independent Inquiry refers to this, and commends it.

As the Independent Inquiry notes, some measures have been taken in recent years to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to respond to conflicts and to avoid some the mistakes made in Rwanda. But additional measures are needed to strengthen the capacity of the Organization to prevent future disasters. Political will and full support from the international community are indispensable if this undertaking is to succeed.

**Mr. Wang Yingfan** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): We thank the delegation of Canada for organizing today's meeting. Our thanks go also to Mr. Carlsson for introducing the report of the Independent Inquiry. The Inquiry has succeeded in summing up the experiences gained and lessons learned by the United Nations with respect to the massive killings in Rwanda. We convey our appreciation to the Inquiry for its conscientious and careful work.

The international community failed to prevent the tragedy that took place in Rwanda six years ago. The lessons to be drawn from that tragedy merit sober reflection. We believe that today's discussion will help us analyze the experiences and learn lessons with a view to



effectively improving United Nations peacekeeping operations and to increasing the capacity of the Security Council to react to and deal with similar crises in the future.

The Inquiry made many recommendations touching upon a variety of areas. They have a bearing on coordination and cooperation among various United Nations departments. The recommendations relate to such matters as reform of the United Nations, enhancement of the efficiency of the Security Council, strengthening of the political will of Member States, mobilization of adequate resources, and many other matters. These recommendations warrant attention and study by the relevant departments, and deserve comprehensive consideration in the context of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century.

We have noted that in recent years the United Nations has been making efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its peacekeeping operations. How to carry out effective peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Sierra Leone, and how to transform the priority attention we give to African issues into action in such a way that success will be achieved and mistakes reduced to the minimum: these are matters of increasing public concern. We believe that summarizing the lessons and experience gained from the Rwanda tragedy will be illuminating in that regard.

**Mr. Levitte** (France) (*spoke in French*): I too wish to welcome Mr. Carlsson and to thank him for the report before the Council today, which describes the horror of the genocide committed between April and July 1994:

“Rwandans killed Rwandans, brutally decimating the Tutsi population of the country, but also targetting moderate Hutus. Appalling atrocities were committed, by militia and the armed forces, but also by civilians against other civilians.

“The international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun”. (*S/1999/1257, annex, p. 3*)

The debate that you have organized, Mr. President, provides an opportunity for us to think about the lessons to be learned. More than ever before, we need to ensure that the United Nations will no longer remain inactive or powerless in the face of such tragedies.

But I wish first to welcome the initiative taken by the Secretary-General, who had the courage to task the Independent Inquiry with investigating the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide. We support that initiative. When the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hubert Védrine, received the Independent Inquiry last November, he said that France shared this determination to achieve transparency and effectiveness. In France, that determination was reflected in the 1998 establishment of a parliamentary fact-finding mission on Rwanda. Let us in turn have the courage together to look the truth in the face.

The United Nations seriously failed in its mission. The report of the Independent Inquiry provides a thorough analysis of the mistakes that led to the failure of the United Nations in Rwanda. The report highlights the shortcomings of decisions taken before the outbreak of genocide: the inadequate mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the lack of resources provided for the Mission, poor use of information, and an inability to adapt the mandate of the Mission to the requirements of the situation on the ground.

The report also highlights the serious mistakes that resulted in a “Failure to respond to the genocide” (*ibid.*, p. 35), a lack of determination to strengthen UNAMIR, inability to understand the real nature of events and to decide on what action should be taken.

Of course, as the investigators say, the situation in 1994 was particularly tense. The United Nations had deployed about 70,000 Blue Helmets throughout the world, and several missions were facing difficulties. These elements certainly affected decision-making. We should also pay tribute to the troops of UNAMIR, those of Belgium, and particularly of Ghana and Tunisia, who remained there on the ground and, as well as they could, protected the threatened civilians.

However, the overall picture is one of failure. The United Nations was not able to assist the Rwandans and, as the Inquiry stresses, all of us — Security Council members, the Secretariat, States Members of the Organization — bear the heavy responsibility for this.

Before the United Nations undertook its own inquiry into actions in Rwanda, the French National Assembly set up a parliamentary fact-finding mission on Rwanda. The mission, which was presided over by Mr. Quiles, throughout 1998 gathered testimony from many participants in and witnesses to the tragedy. All of this

information, in the spirit of transparency, was made public. This work made it possible to better understand several aspects of the Rwandan tragedy. Mr. Carlsson's Inquiry supplements those analyses.

From the report of the French Parliament, I note that France, before the events of 1994, had made an effort to avoid a military solution and to encourage the parties to share power in Rwanda. We need to place this tragedy in its historical context, which goes beyond the offensive by the Rwandese Patriotic Front in 1990, all the way back to events of 1959, the time of decolonization. The active support of France for the negotiations concluded in August 1993 in Arusha illustrated this policy. The accords reached were the framework in which lasting peace could have been established with mutual respect for all.

The parliamentary report also demonstrated that France, while aware of the risk of confrontation, underestimated the upsurge of extremism. Nevertheless, it tried to mobilize the international community, through the United Nations, to prevent a massacre. Mr. Carlsson's analysis shows that neither the other Member States present at the time nor the Secretariat used any better the information that, subsequently, was to prove crucial. This attitude goes a long way in explaining the inability of the United Nations to prevent the 1994 genocide. This tragedy still has one unclear area regarding elements that triggered the genocide, though this will no doubt be clarified one day.

In the face of the spring 1994 genocide and in the light of the delays and difficulties encountered in strengthening UNAMIR, France, in June, with the support of the troops of African countries, assisted the people who were under threat, and it did so in transparency and with the authorization of the Security Council. We are aware of the criticism, which we think unjustified, that Operation Turquoise elicited. But should we once again have stood by passively? The report submitted by Mr. Carlsson reflects some of this criticism, but it also says "many ... interlocutors have credited Operation Turquoise with saving a number of lives in a situation where few other initiatives were being taken" (ibid., p. 49). This is the point we wish to retain from that intervention.

Now we need to learn the lessons of this tragedy. Several comments could be made concerning the Great Lakes region, as well as the work of the Council and peacekeeping operations in general.

The Rwandan tragedy occurred in a particularly unstable environment. We recall in particular the massacres committed in Burundi in October of 1993 in an atmosphere of general passivity. Since 1994, this instability in the Great Lakes region has increased. After the failure to deal with the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations was not able to face up to subsequent crises.

In the months following 1994, the Council did not react in time to the problems caused by the presence of armed elements in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire.

In autumn of 1996, the Kivu crisis prompted the Council, at the urging, *inter alia*, of France, to authorize the dispatch of a multinational humanitarian force. Canada announced that it was prepared to head that operation. France said that it was willing to participate. The disagreement in the Council finally meant that the operation had to be abandoned. The international community once again remained inactive in the face of new massacres, the magnitude of which has not fully been measured.

As of August 1998, the Council was faced with a war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The information that reached us reported violence against civilian populations, particularly in the east of the country and attested to the seriousness of the situation. This time, will we be able to take the necessary action?

The events that occurred starting in 1994 are part of the context created by the Rwandan genocide. As we now consider Mr. Carlsson's report, we must draw conclusions for the work of the United Nations in the Great Lakes region.

Let us turn first to Rwanda. Mr. Carlsson's report calls upon the international community to help in reconstruction, reconciliation and observance of human rights. And we should add, to help in the matter of justice, which is essential to attain these goals. France supports this appeal. We participate in this effort together with our European Union partners. The Secretary-General has proposed to Rwanda a new partnership with the United Nations, and we hope that efforts on both sides will make it possible to make headway in this regard and that, in exchange for serious security guarantees, Rwanda will move towards peaceful democracy, allowing a return to regional stability. This is definitely a source of concern for the international community.

Indeed, United Nations action with respect to the Great Lakes region as a whole must be more sustained. The Council has authorized the deployment of the second phase of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). We must ensure that this operation receives the necessary means, in particular the necessary funding. Impartial action by Council members vis-à-vis each of the belligerents, with a view to inducing them to fulfil their commitments, is also essential to buttress the July 1999 Lusaka Agreement, all of whose elements must be implemented.

The next mission of the Council to the territory will be an opportunity to get all of our messages through. But it is the effective deployment of the second phase of MONUC that will attest to the will of the international community to contribute fully to bringing about peace in the country and in the Great Lakes region.

Here it might be useful to recall the situation in Burundi. The Council lent its support to the facilitation process led by President Mandela and to the efforts of the Burundian parties. This process is a difficult one. In order to strengthen it, the international community must, now that sanctions against the country have been lifted, assist it by speedily resuming economic assistance, which is so necessary to the people.

Beyond the Great Lakes region, we must consider ways of stepping up United Nations action in crisis situations.

The report of the Inquiry makes some recommendations in this respect: a plan of action against genocide, improved deployment capacities of the United Nations, protection of civilians, and so on. We welcome this trend, which is conducive to better circulation of information in the United Nations and to a greater capacity to react to events. The report that the Secretary-General requested from the panel chaired by Mr. Brahimi will make it possible to conduct a deeper analysis of this situation.

Turning now to the work of the Council, two points need to be made.

First, in the setting up of new operations, decisions of the Council must be better prepared. The information provided by the Secretariat needs to be supplemented, according to modalities to be defined, by other data — particularly historical data — so that we can better understand the situations at hand.

We must also improve the Council's follow-up of United Nations missions. Experience has shown that once missions have been deployed in the field, implementation of their mandate is not always followed up carefully enough by the Council. We need greater regularity in this area. This means that we need to refocus our work on crisis situations and United Nations operations. We should spend more time considering these situations and less time on the so-called thematic subjects.

Our goal should be to place the Council in a better position to assess the risks faced by missions in the field and to adapt their mandate and their means accordingly.

In the face of violence and the massacre of civilians, the decisions of the Council, and, beyond that, those of the troop contributors will always be particularly difficult. When the time comes to commit the United Nations, will we be sufficiently mindful of the lessons drawn by the Inquiry into events in 1994 in Rwanda? We certainly hope so; otherwise, we would be betraying the memory of the victims.

The attitude of the Council to the violence committed in East Timor last September is an encouraging sign. The deployment of the multinational Force led by Australia made it possible to stop the violence. The Council made that decision in a very short space of time.

But we can also think of other situations where the Council did not take the necessary decisions to put an end to massive violations of human rights. Can the Council, duly informed, remain divided and do nothing? We do not think so.

At the opening of the most recent session of the General Assembly last September, the Secretary-General appealed to the international community to consider how the United Nations could intervene quickly and more effectively in these situations. A debate was launched, which we need to continue in order to enable the Council fully to play the role entrusted to it by the Charter and to avert in future humanitarian tragedies such as the ones our world has witnessed in recent decades.

**Mr. Andjaba** (Namibia): Mr. President, I wish to thank you and your delegation for organizing this meeting. We commend the Secretary-General's decision to appoint an Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. I wish also to thank Prime Minister Carlsson and his team

for the extensive work that they have carried out in the fulfilment of their mandate.

We all witnessed the horrifying events of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Innocent Rwandese were brutally massacred by their neighbours and friends. Above all, these were fellow Rwandese.

The report clearly places on the international community the responsibility for the total lack of political will to prevent the human tragedy in Rwanda. The failure of the United Nations, and in particular of the Security Council, to respond to the tragedy was a terrible mistake, and we should now all work together for the good of humanity to ensure that never again shall we allow genocide to be repeated — anywhere.

The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is commendable. We fully support it and hope that all of the perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity will be brought to justice. Namibia will continue to cooperate with the Tribunal, and we call on other States to hand over to the Tribunal all those who have been indicted.

The observations and recommendations of the Inquiry are pertinent and need to be taken into account when dealing with conflict situations around the globe. I will therefore not dwell on all of them but highlight a few salient points.

First and foremost, it is important for the international community to focus its resources on addressing the root causes of conflict and to be proactive in preventing conflict from occurring in the first place.

Secondly, Member States need to exercise the necessary political will to adequately address conflicts in a timely manner, irrespective of where they occur.

Thirdly, we cannot overemphasize the need to equip each and every United Nations peacekeeping mission with an appropriate mandate and with adequate human and material resources. It is true that peacekeeping is costly, but peace does not come cheap. More often, when peacekeeping missions are considered, troop size and the costs involved are foremost in the minds of Member States.

This brings me to my fourth point, concerning adequate planning for each operation with the necessary technical and political input. This is vital for the success of any peacekeeping mission. Furthermore continuous

evaluation, monitoring and support are required and adjustments should be made to ensure that the mission is effectively dealing with the situation on the ground.

Fifthly, protection of civilians under threat should form part of peacekeeping mandates. The lessons learned from Rwanda clearly illustrate this point. I am therefore glad that next week we will take up the issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

We have noticed with regret that despite the Rwanda experience, some of the problematic measures pointed out in the report as having contributed to inaction in Rwanda in 1994 are still being applied today as the United Nations considers taking action on certain conflict situations.

The recommendation for the Secretary-General to develop a plan of action to prevent genocide is most welcome. We look forward to receiving the plan, and we have no doubt that it will greatly inform the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance scheduled for the year 2001.

We call on the international community to assist the Rwandese society in its reconstruction and development efforts. We support the Inquiry's call for assistance, paying particular attention to the need for reconstruction, genuine national reconciliation and respect for human rights.

Finally, I wish to pay special tribute to General Dallaire and commend the United Nations personnel within UNAMIR and in the programmes and agencies, who at that difficult time made tremendous efforts under extremely dangerous conditions and saved lives of many civilians, political leaders and United Nations staff, as stated in the report. These brave men and women deserve recognition for their efforts.

We have all failed the people of Rwanda. Let us learn from past mistakes and failures and exercise the necessary political will to make this world a better place for all human kind to live in.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Namibia for his words of appreciation to General Dallaire and the other United Nations personnel in the field who have made such great efforts.

**Mr. Ahmed** (Bangladesh): Mr. President, we join other members of the Council in expressing our sincere appreciation and gratitude to Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, whom we welcome in our midst, and his colleagues on the Rwandese Inquiry commission for presenting us with an extremely valuable report. The report is a historic document establishing accountability for the action of the world body and its different organs, of individual Member States, of the international community in general and of the Rwandans involved in the genocide, and it does so in an objective manner in full transparency.

We commend the Canadian presidency, and your leadership, for the initiative in having us face the realities and responsibilities in a formal meeting of the Security Council. We do agree that emphasis should be put on the lessons to be learned from the Rwanda tragedy. The Rwanda experience should be kept in mind in our decision-making process so that we do not commit such terrible mistakes in the future.

Mr. Carlsson's report makes an elaborate analysis of the events. It does not hesitate to assign responsibility. We all share it; we all have to learn lessons. Our sympathy and our realization of collective failure should be expressed in the sincerest and clearest terms.

Last December the Secretary-General acknowledged the failure in Rwanda and expressed his deep remorse on behalf of the United Nations. The United Nations was established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The explicit reference was to the two world wars. Civil wars were possibly considered a matter of the past and were hence not even envisaged. Yet, the unthinkable happened. Some 800,000 Rwandans were killed by their fellow countrymen, and the massacre was along the ethnic divide.

The evident conclusion is that what happened in Rwanda in 1994 should not have happened. It should not have happened in our century, particularly after the creation of the United Nations. The second conclusion drawn is that the genocide could have been prevented. The third conclusion is that it could not be prevented because the international system failed to do so and this failure was of colossal proportions, seen in terms of the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives in Rwanda.

The international community failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda, but it should not fail to do its part as regards the socio-economic development of Rwanda.

The best demonstration of our remorse, the best assurance of our realization of mistakes or failures would be to be able to act correctly in the future. That will be our best apology, that will be our best homage to the hundreds of thousands of fellow human beings massacred in Rwanda.

**Miss Durrant** (Jamaica): First of all, let me join previous speakers in thanking you for presiding over today's open briefing on the situation in Rwanda. My delegation wishes to commend Secretary-General Kofi Annan for his historic initiative in setting up an independent inquiry to investigate the actions of the United Nations during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. We also wish to express appreciation to Prime Minister Carlsson and the other members of the Commission for the thoroughness with which they discharged their mandate. Their analysis and conclusions in the report presented today by Mr. Carlsson are even more sobering as they point to one inescapable conclusion. The terrible events which occurred in Rwanda in 1994 were almost certainly preventable.

In this process of introspection, we are not seeking to attribute blame, but to understand the confluence of events and systemic deficiencies that allowed the genocide to take place unchecked, as we seek solutions which could prevent similar atrocities from occurring ever again.

As this debate is taking place in the Security Council, the focus must be on how this body can develop preventive measures that may be employed in the prevention of conflicts. The Security Council must assert its political will to strengthen its conflict prevention capabilities. We must become proactive and not wait until a great number of persons has died before we take action.

Understandably, many of the causes of conflict — social, economic, developmental and political — must be addressed by the international community as a whole. However, it remains the responsibility of this Council to prevent breaches of the peace. We cannot abdicate this responsibility. With crises such as those which occurred in Rwanda and in the Balkans, and which are occurring in many parts of Africa today, the credibility of the Security Council is constantly being questioned. We therefore support the recommendations of the Carlsson commission and will work with members of the Security Council as we seek to move beyond acceptance of recommendations to action. To do otherwise would mean

that 800,000 Rwandan men, women and children would certainly have died in vain.

The Carlsson report makes several facts clear. The slaughter of some 800,000 persons over a period of about 100 days, without the use of weapons of mass destruction, was certainly unprecedented in human history. The Tutsi population of Rwanda was savagely and brutally subjected to genocide. Many reasons have been proffered for the failure of the international community, the United Nations system and the Security Council in particular to act decisively to prevent one of the major tragedies of the twentieth century. This has been summarized as a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act or to act with enough assertiveness. Perhaps a major failure was the inability to recognize or acknowledge the tell-tale signs of impending catastrophe or to plan an effective response.

My delegation believes that extreme diligence must in future be exercised during the critical planning stages of peacekeeping missions. I therefore wish to address my remarks to one of the recommendations in the report which aims at improving the capacity of the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping operations.

From its inception, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was hindered by a poorly conceived mandate, the lack of the necessary resources to carry out that mandate and the lack of political will on the part of the Security Council to take critical decisions at a time when the forces on the ground could ill afford undue delays. We wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the peacekeepers and the humanitarian personnel who sought to serve the cause of peace, even while the international community turned a blind eye.

My delegation wishes to point out two critical factors which must be built into future missions. First, peacekeeping missions need to be designed with allowances for rapidly changing circumstances. At the very minimum, it must be possible to have reinforcements deployed quickly to augment forces when it becomes clear that the situation on the ground warrants a reassessment of the mission. The practice of deploying the minimum number of troops on the basis of either political or financial expediency takes no account of the many variables that troops may be presented with once in the field. We cannot continue to send troops without the necessary room to manoeuvre when faced with unforeseen circumstances.

Secondly, the mandates for peacekeeping operations must reflect the realities on the ground and must be

matched by the political will and the material means to implement those mandates. Mandates must also be formulated in close collaboration with all the parties involved in the conflict. While only the Security Council can legitimately authorize troop deployment and determine mandates, a mechanism must be designed to allow force commanders the necessary flexibility to determine their best course of action and be able to rapidly communicate their decisions to the Security Council. In this connection, we note the recommendations of the commission on the protection of civilians. This must be addressed in all future peacekeeping mandates.

Also, once troops are deployed, they must be under the command of one central authority. States should not unilaterally withdraw their contingents without reference to that central authority.

My delegation also endorses the commission's recommendation that the Secretary-General and the Member States use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Summit and Assembly to mobilize the political will to clearly address challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping. In this context, we look forward to the report of the Brahimi committee.

The Security Council, after the fact, took action to bring the perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide to justice by establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. But we must not stop there. The Security Council, the United Nations system and, indeed, the international community as a whole have a moral obligation to ensure that we do, in fact, have the will to prevent another genocide from ever occurring. Perhaps today marks the first step. Rwanda will continue to need the assistance of the international community as it seeks to rebuild the economic, social and political bases of its society and to seek national reconciliation.

Let us not fail them a second time.

**The President:** I shall now make a statement in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada.

Isaiah Berlin, the very well-known philosopher, once expressed the view that the primary duty of politics was to avoid "extremes of suffering". This sage counsel has too often gone woefully unheeded, and nowhere more so than in the case of Rwanda. The genocide in that country all too brutally exposed the enduring, darker side of human nature and the reality of suspicion, destruction, hatred and unrestrained violence.

I doubt that anyone in this Chamber can look back at that time without remorse and without a great deal of sadness at the failure to help the people of Rwanda in their time of need. The unchecked brutality of the *génocidaires* made a mockery, once again, of the pledge “never again”.

For the United Nations, the Rwandan tragedy came close to extinguishing belief in our capacity to fulfil its founding purpose. The presence of United Nations peacekeepers on the ground created a perception among civilians that they would be secure from violence. That such confidence in the United Nations was ill-founded is a matter of great shame and disappointment to all who support the principles and ideals which underpin the Charter.

Still, that those soldiers in blue berets, whose cries for support were so studiously ignored, still managed to save tens of thousands, is a source of pride and inspiration.

*(spoke in French)*

One peacekeeper, the Canadian Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, announced his retirement this week. As he put it simply, “I am a casualty of Rwanda — an injured officer.” His moral integrity, vision, insight and leadership under unimaginable circumstances shine as an example.

*(spoke in English)*

I know that the words that have been so generously expressed by many around the table about his work, and that of all those who served in the field, will go a long way towards helping heal some of the scars of that experience.

The report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide graphically chronicles, as we heard this morning, the lapses, blunders and shortcomings. It also draws lessons to which we must pay close attention.

We owe a great deal of gratitude to Prime Minister Carlsson and his colleagues for their work. Like many members, I wish to commend Secretary-General Annan for making certain that we did not forget and for publicly acknowledging this Organization’s failure in the tragedy.

The Council must share in the responsibility for this tragedy. The best way to honour the victims now is through a firm commitment never to turn away from civilians

victimized by armed conflict, but instead to focus energy and attention to protect them, in both word and deed.

The Inquiry’s recommendations make clear what needs to be done. First, the culture of impunity must end. There is an undeniable, growing international consensus that those responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity should be held to account. The establishment by the Council of the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda moved this forward. The adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court is its clearest expression yet. Council members have a special responsibility to ensure that the Statute of the Court is ratified rapidly and to make sure it works effectively. This will be a major deterrent to future abuse. Let the message be unambiguous and clearly understood: violators will be pursued, prosecuted and punished.

The report of the Inquiry also makes it very clear that information flow must be improved. It leaves no doubt that the Council must enhance its ability to analyse and monitor volatile situations and that information-sharing within the United Nations system must be made better, especially between the Council and United Nations departments. To that end, we welcome the efforts by the United Nations Secretariat and by the United Nations humanitarian agencies to develop a framework for coordination with an emphasis on prevention and preparedness.

For its part, the Security Council needs to continue to broaden its range of interlocutors and sources of information. The more varied its channels, the greater the chance that it will hear the signals of looming dangers.

This Council has nothing to fear from allowing the voices of suffering and oppression to be heard early, often and openly. This does not undermine the Council’s legitimacy or its capacity to act. On the contrary, it serves to strengthen it.

Rapid and resolute response is also essential. Yet at a time when requests for troops to help protect civilians are growing, the capacity of the United Nations itself to manage complex missions is under great strain.

Enhancing United Nations standby arrangements, including a rapidly deployable mission headquarters capacity, is vital to reversing this trend. So is a coordinated, integrated approach to identify, mobilize and commit the necessary military — and, indeed, civilian —

resources. Yet efforts to implement these forward-looking approaches are, quite frankly, left to languish.

The Security Council is on the frontline with regard to this fundamental question. It is not enough just to authorize peace operations; it is time for the Council to become more actively engaged in making sure the capacity is there to carry out these missions quickly and effectively.

The Council also needs to ensure that United Nations operations are given adequate finances, the necessary resources, suitably robust mandates and clear rules of engagement to carry out the tasks assigned to them.

There are signs that the Council is taking this to heart. Missions in Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic and East Timor have the mandates and personnel commitments to adequately protect people and to address the realities on the ground. But the Council's response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo suggests that there is still room for improvement.

Together, these measures, if we follow through, will allow us to better resolve conflict, promote peace, enhance human security and help to prevent humanitarian disasters.

But if we are honest with ourselves, there is no certainty that the most severe abuses, such as those that occurred in Rwanda, will not happen again. Indeed, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Preventive efforts will not always succeed. The spiral into extremes of human suffering cannot always be constrained.

In these most exceptional situations, the protection of civilians requires strengthening our disposition to intervene with force if necessary. Let me be very clear. Military intervention is called for only in the most severe cases: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and massive and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law causing widespread suffering and loss of life. The test we have in mind is very difficult. The threshold is very high.

The goal of intervention is not to threaten the territorial integrity of the State, but to bring an end to widespread suffering. Indeed, outside intervention to protect people is conceivable only when those who control the State are unable or patently unwilling to fulfil this basic, fundamental trust.

In our view, any discussion about the use of force to alleviate extremes of suffering and the Council's role in

such action needs to address three considerations, the first of which is the justification for action. The cumulative weight of international human rights and humanitarian law, the global trend against impunity and the precedents set by the Council itself all justify action. There is a growing body of common law that is beginning to establish new humanitarian standards that must be recognized.

Secondly, we must look at the guidelines for action. Once the determination has been made that the violence, real or anticipated, meets the test, there are other factors with which to guide a decision to intervene or not to intervene, including whether time has finally run out on other peaceful means to resolve the threat; whether there is a danger that the threat, if left alone, jeopardizes regional or international security; and whether not being able to intervene everywhere means we must not intervene anywhere.

Thirdly, there must be a framework for action. This should be permissive enough to stop massive and systematic violations, but clearly balanced with strong safeguards to ensure that it is not misused. To this end, we need to be certain that the severity of the crisis is fully corroborated; that military force can and will contribute to ending widespread suffering and loss of life; that the level of force employed is appropriate to the circumstances; that the use of force is multilateral and widely supported; and that it is part of a longer-term strategy to build and sustain peace.

Many have suggested that this is a debate that the Council is not yet ready to engage in. However, it is a discussion we cannot and should not avoid having, and the sooner we have it, the better. The price of inaction has simply been too high — for the victims of the Rwandan genocide, for others subject to extreme abuse, for the security of people generally and for the credibility of this Organization.

Perhaps if we had grappled with this very difficult subject earlier and worked to arrive at some common agreement on it, we might have done more to avoid the Rwandan genocide or to stop it once it began. Second chances are rare, but we have one now. Perhaps the most important proposal contained in the report of the Inquiry is that for a system-wide action plan to prevent genocide, to which I would add all crimes against humanity and war crimes. As the representative of Jamaica said, the Millennium Assembly offers an opportunity to work towards this goal and, as the Secretary-General suggests,



to “reassert the centrality of international humanitarian and human rights law”. (A/54/2000, para. 211)

In that context, the legacy of the Rwandan genocide is not just tragic; it is also hopeful. In his very graphic and dramatic book, Philip Gourevitch tells of how a group of young, defenceless Hutu girls in a Catholic convent school refused to leave the side of their Tutsi friends, even though ordered to do so by the *génocidaires*. Given the choice of freedom from that kind of suffering, they chose to stay, and paid the ultimate price: their lives. The courage and sacrifice of those young women in that convent school should be a guide and inspiration to people around this table and everywhere, for we can do no less.

The development of a United Nations action plan to protect people from the most egregious forms of abuse and from the most serious violators will be too late for past victims but, hopefully, not too late for us and for future generations.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The next speaker is the representative of Rwanda, on whom I now call.

**Mr. Mutaboba** (Rwanda): Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor on a subject of great importance to my country and to the family of the United Nations as a whole. I thank Canada for convening this open debate on the Carlsson report today, almost four months to the day since the report was issued. My appreciation and congratulations also go to your distinguished predecessors, Sir, whose leadership of the Council led this body in its wise deliberations. We wish you all the best.

We wholeheartedly thank all members for their statements, and for their words of regret, sympathy and support for us and for those who perished — especially those who bravely died trying to save lives.

The Government and the people of Rwanda wish to thank His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan for commissioning such a courageous report on behalf of the Organization; we congratulate him. The United Nations, the world and Rwanda owe thanks and appreciation to former Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and his team, which was composed of Mr. Han Sung-Joo and Lieutenant General Rufus M. Kupilati, assisted by Ms. Elinor Hammar skjöld and Mr. Lee Shin-wha, for their painstaking and comprehensive work in compiling what is known today as

the Carlsson report. The report describes in fine detail what happened and what did not happen when it was or was not meant to happen during a specific period of time during Rwanda’s genocide while United Nations peacekeeping forces were on the ground in my country. Every word, every phrase, every paragraph contains details of what went wrong, when, how and — shyly — why.

This is the time for us not to dwell on the past but clearly to state what comes next and to maintain the momentum. The world and Rwanda are now waiting to hear from all members of the Security Council; we have already heard their statements, for which we thank them, but what comes next? As a committed and concerned Member of the United Nations, my country, Rwanda, wishes to hear from all members of the Council about the policies and measures that this body has taken or has the intention of taking to make sure that what tragically happened in Rwanda, as witnessed on the world’s television screens, never again occurs elsewhere on the globe. The report shows beyond any possible doubt that the world failed Rwanda. The Rwandese Government and the Rwandese people are grateful to those who have put their hands on their hearts and apologized on behalf of their peoples and their Governments for failing Rwanda. I know that this is not an easy thing to do; it is a courageous stand that is meant to reconcile us with the sad past. We wish also to reiterate our sincere thanks to those who assisted us in difficult times; those times are not yet gone.

Every Rwandese person — and indeed every friend of Rwanda — has been in one way or another a victim of what happened. Victims of genocide in Rwanda are cruelly suffering from physical, psychological and post-traumatic hardships. The Government of Rwanda is bleeding itself to contain their cries, but in vain given the overwhelming dimension of the problem and the scarce means it has at hand. The Carlsson report’s conclusions and recommendations are worth revisiting to make sure that nothing of this sort happens again. Moreover, recommendations 13 and 14 specifically appeal to all, as individual Member States, for belated action so that victims of genocide, including the bitterest, most desperate survivors, can feel the wind of change coming their way from the international community. A unique “mini-Marshall plan” is needed for Rwanda, as many members often rightly say in the corridors of this building, but on an individual basis. It is possible to shock the world again — but by doing something

dramatically positive at last. All members can do this as individual countries, and as countries of the world.

It is never too late to make things right or to mend fences. The Rwandese people whom the whole community failed had the right to life and lost their best gift from God. I believe they too have an ear to listen to what we are saying today; we pay tribute to them. The country and the survivors lost everything they worked for and lived for. I am here representing them all. They too have a right to justice, recovery, rehabilitation, reintegration and genuine reconciliation as part of a concerted compensation effort from individual members and from others, from the countries of Council members and from the rest of the membership of the Organization. We have concerns. The Carlsson report is the members' report. What they do with it is what matters to the world and to the victims. If the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese people can assist members to assist them better, let me reiterate our full support and cooperation where immediate action is of the essence.

The report clearly challenges the conscience of the international community and invokes the responsibilities of the parties to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Reluctance to acknowledge that genocide was going on in Rwanda was nothing but a manifestation of the unwillingness of the

powerful to live up to that responsibility. It is a fact that many of those who masterminded the genocide in Rwanda are at large to this day. As Rwanda struggles to rebuild itself, surely let the words of the Secretary-General, who is not with us today, be a basis for action:

“Of all my aims as Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply committed than that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter”. (*Press release SG/SM/7263, 16 December 1999*)

That should be a statement not only of the Secretary-General, but of the Security Council and of us all.

We hope that, in this way, General Dallaire and the survivors of the genocide will be given a chance to shake hands with God and with the other heroes: those amongst us who have made long-term partnerships with Rwanda to rebuild the country and to restore the badly torn fabric of Rwandese society.

**The President:** I now call on Mr. Carlsson.

**Mr. Carlsson:** I think that the statement just made by the representative of Rwanda should be the last statement in this debate.

**The President:** There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*