



Security Council

Distr.: General
15 December 2025

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Twentieth report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides an update on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) since my nineteenth report (S/2025/397) of 19 June 2025. The current report provides an overview of the letters I have received from Member States on the implementation of the resolution, a summary of the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and an update on the restrictive measures concerning nuclear-related transfers and activities contained in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution.

2. In my previous report, I noted the diplomatic efforts of relevant Member States, including Joint Comprehensive of Action participants and the United States of America, to achieve a negotiated solution on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These talks were suspended following the military escalation between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran from 13 to 24 June 2025 and the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities by the United States of America on 21 June 2025.

3. In August and September 2025, diplomatic efforts involving Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action participants resumed and intensified, including within the Security Council. While these engagements did not succeed in identifying a way forward satisfactory to all parties involved, it is encouraging that all parties continued to reiterate their readiness to find a diplomatic solution.

4. In July and August 2025, I received letters from China, France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the stated intention of the E3 to invoke the snapback mechanism under resolution 2231 (2015).¹ In a letter dated 21 July (A/79/974-S/2025/479), the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the E3 lacked legal standing to invoke the mechanism, as they themselves had not upheld “key commitments” under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In a letter dated 28 August (A/79/1002-S/2025/541), the Islamic Republic of Iran further underscored

¹ China, S/2025/520 (19 August); France, Germany and United Kingdom, S/2025/513 (12 August 2025); Islamic Republic of Iran, A/79/974-S/2025/479 (21 July 2025) and A/79/1002-S/2025/541 (28 August 2025); and Russian Federation, A/79/989-S/2025/511 (11 August 2025).



that the triggering of the dispute resolution mechanism by the E3 in 2020 had been “neither recognized by all participants nor fully exhausted”.

5. In a letter dated 11 August ([A/79/989-S/2025/511](#)), the Russian Federation stated that there had never been a decision by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Commission “to activate the dispute resolution mechanism” and “no consensus reached by the participants regarding the attempt by Germany, France and the United Kingdom to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism”. The Russian Federation also stated that the E3 had “failed to abide by their obligations, as required under the JCPOA and Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” and that triggering the snapback mechanism “despite their own non-performance would contradict the fundamental principles of international law”. In a letter dated 19 August ([S/2025/520](#)), China stated that it firmly opposed the triggering of the snapback mechanism, as this action would “not help to build confidence or bridge differences among relevant parties” but would “undermine the diplomatic efforts for an early resumption of negotiations”.

6. In a letter dated 12 August ([S/2025/513](#)), France, Germany and the United Kingdom asserted that the snapback mechanism could be triggered by the E3 “because the relevant conditions under paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” had been met and that the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran constituted a “non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA”. The E3 further recalled “the use of the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism, which was activated by the E3 on 14 January 2020, as confirmed by the JCPOA Coordinator in a statement on the same date”.

7. In a letter dated 28 August 2025 ([S/2025/538](#)), France, Germany and the United Kingdom notified the Security Council that the E3 believed the Islamic Republic of Iran to be in “significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA” and thereby invoked the snapback mechanism, in accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

8. By 27 September 2025, at the end of the 30-day period initiated by the E3 letter and provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council had not adopted any resolution to continue in effect the terminations of sanctions as provided in the resolution.

9. Following the submission of the letter dated 28 August by the E3, I received additional letters from China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation disputing the validity of the E3 action and addressing subsequent developments in the Security Council.² In a joint letter dated 2 September ([A/79/1004-S/2025/546](#)), China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation stated that the “action by the Foreign Ministers of the E3 clearly contravenes the resolution and therefore, it is by default legally and procedurally flawed”. China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation further stated that the Council “cannot proceed on the basis of the communication submitted by the E3 and should consider it null and void”. Furthermore, they urged the members of the Security Council to “reject the claims” of the E3 “on allegedly invoking the ‘snapback’ mechanism and to reaffirm their commitment to the principles of international law and multilateral diplomacy”.

10. On 28 and 29 September 2025, I received letters from the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in reference to developments in the Security Council

² China, Islamic Republic of Iran and Russian Federation, [S/2025/546](#) (2 September); Islamic Republic of Iran, [A/80/406-S/2025/602](#) (27 September); and Russian Federation, [S/2025/544](#) (29 August) and [S/2025/601](#) (27 September).

and the actions taken by the Secretariat in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).³ In its letter dated 28 September ([S/2025/604](#)), the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its “categorical objection to the action taken today by the Secretariat [...] in ‘notifying Member States’ of the so-called re-application of terminated resolutions concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran”. In its letter dated 29 September ([S/2025/610](#)), the Russian Federation stated that there was “no basis [...] for the re-establishment of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#)”.

11. In a letter dated 18 October ([S/2025/660](#)), China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation affirmed that “in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all its provisions are terminated after 18 October 2025” and reiterated that “the full and timely conclusion of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) marks the end of the Security Council’s consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue”. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation also submitted individual letters to that effect.⁴

12. In a letter dated 20 November 2025 ([S/2025/759](#)), France, Germany and the United Kingdom stated that the snapback procedure had been “duly completed in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” and that resolutions [1696 \(2006\)](#), [1737 \(2006\)](#), [1747 \(2007\)](#), [1803 \(2008\)](#), [1835 \(2008\)](#) and [1929 \(2010\)](#) had been reinstated. The E3 further rejected claims by China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation that the snapback procedure was “null and void” and that resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) had expired on 18 October 2025. The E3 stated that those claims had no legal basis and “undermine the very authority of the Security Council, given the clear procedure laid out in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which was followed to the letter”. The E3 urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to “refrain from any escalatory action and to urgently return to full compliance with its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Security Council resolutions”. Lastly, the E3 stated that the decision did “not mean the end of diplomacy” with the Islamic Republic of Iran and that they continued “to be ready for diplomatic engagement and work towards reaching a comprehensive and lasting agreement”.

13. In a letter dated 1 December 2025 ([S/2025/783](#)), China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation reiterated their views that the “attempt by the E3 to trigger the so-called ‘snapback’” was “legally and procedurally flawed” and reaffirmed that “in accordance with operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all its provisions have been terminated after 18 October 2025”.

14. In its most recent report, dated 12 November 2025,⁵ IAEA reiterated that in February 2021 the Islamic Republic of Iran had stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments. The Agency had still been able to verify and monitor some of those commitments through safeguards activities implemented pursuant to the safeguards agreement with that country under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agency reported that, since February 2021, it had “verified that Iran, inter alia, had: enriched uranium above the enrichment level of 3.67 per cent U-235 stipulated in the JCPOA by enriching uranium up to 60 per cent U-235; exceeded the stockpile of enriched uranium of 202.8.kg provided for in the JCPOA by nearly 50 times; and exceeded the number and types of centrifuges installed, tested and operated as provided for in the JCPOA by a considerable margin”. The Agency also noted that, as at 18 October 2025, it had no information on the status of the low

³ Islamic Republic of Iran, [S/2025/604](#) (28 September 2025); and Russian Federation [S/2025/610](#) (29 September 2025) and [S/2025/654](#) (17 October 2025).

⁴ Islamic Republic of Iran, [A/80/495-S/2025/658](#) (17 October 2025) and [A/80/494-S/2025/659](#) (18 October 2025); and Russian Federation, [S/2025/656](#) (17 October 2025).

⁵ GOV/INF/2025/14.

and high enriched uranium stockpiles in the Islamic Republic of Iran and stated that a “commonly agreed framework with the support of countries concerned is necessary in order to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful”.

II. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

15. During the reporting period, no new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) were submitted for approval to the Security Council through the procurement channel. The Council received six new notifications during the reporting period pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

III. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

16. The Secretariat continued to support the work of the Security Council in the implementation of the resolution, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Secretariat also liaised with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on matters related to the procurement channel.

17. In accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council dated 29 May 2025 ([S/2025/2](#)), the mandate of the Permanent Representative of Slovenia as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) expired on 18 October 2025.
