



Security Council

Distr.: General
21 November 2025

Original: English

Letter dated 20 November 2025 from the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The objective of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the E3) has not changed since 2003: to find a lasting diplomatic solution ensuring that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon. This objective has been the guiding principle of the E3's policy towards Iran and led to the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, based on the conviction that a durable and verifiable solution had been found to ensure Iran's nuclear programme was strictly used for peaceful purposes and abided by the international non-proliferation architecture.

Under the JCPOA, sanctions and other restrictive measures were temporarily lifted under the condition that Iran implements its commitments. Iran freely committed to the JCPOA in 2015.

However, the same JCPOA was undermined by Iran starting from 2019. Since then, Iran has exceeded all of the limits on its nuclear programme, as documented by numerous International Atomic Energy Agency reports. Faced with Iran's continued nuclear escalation, the E3 pursued comprehensive good-faith efforts to resolve the issue and avoid resorting to snapback. Following Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA from May 2019 onwards, the E3 triggered the Dispute Resolution Mechanism under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA on 14 January 2020, which the JCPOA Coordinator publicly and formally acknowledged on the same day. We also engaged in extensive talks with Iran over the past few years to find a diplomatic solution and even proposed a temporary and conditional extension of the snapback in July 2025 to allow additional time for diplomacy. Regrettably, Iran chose not to take up the offer. Against this backdrop, the E3 notified the Security Council of Iran's significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA on 28 August 2025, in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). On 28 September 2025, the snapback procedure was duly completed in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The E3 followed the procedural steps laid down in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to the letter. Triggering the snapback opened a 30-day process during which the Security Council had to decide whether to continue the termination of past resolutions provided for under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). On 19 September 2025, the Security Council rejected the resolution that would have maintained sanctions-lifting on Iran, with 9 votes against. This shows that a majority of Security Council members consider Iran's proliferating behaviour as a threat to international security that required sanctions to come back into force.



Consequently, Security Council resolutions [1696 \(2006\)](#), [1737 \(2006\)](#), [1747 \(2007\)](#), [1803 \(2008\)](#), [1835 \(2008\)](#) and [1929 \(2010\)](#) have been reinstated after the 30-day period following the notification had expired. As a result, the United Nations Secretariat has issued the notifications required to re-establish the United Nations sanctions regime to all States Members of the United Nations. The website and designation lists of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) are back online. As a result of the reinstatement of past resolutions, the architecture of the United Nations sanctions regime was also re-established. The E3 firmly reject the claims by Iran, Russia and China that the snapback procedure that was duly completed in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) in the light of Iran's years-long nuclear escalation and the E3's notification of the Security Council of Iran's significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA is "null and void" and that resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) expired on 18 October 2025. These claims have no legal basis and undermine the very authority of the Security Council, given the clear procedure laid out in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which was followed to the letter. Such attempts stand in contradiction with article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which "the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

The E3 emphasize that promoting a false narrative about the legality of snapback and the expiration of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) cannot alter the reality that the E3 triggered the snapback in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the completion of the snapback mechanism on 28 September 2025 has terminated paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) well before the "Termination Day" deadline set out in paragraph 8 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which is therefore no longer valid. Resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) did not expire on 18 October 2025, and the Security Council remains seized of the Iranian nuclear issue, for example through biannual [2231 \(2015\)](#) council meetings as per established practice.

The E3 condemn any attack on the United Nations Secretariat, which has acted in strict compliance with its mandate.

Iran's nuclear program is now constrained by the six reinstated Security Council resolutions. These resolutions are not new: they contain a set of sanctions and other restrictive measures that were previously imposed by the Security Council with unanimous P5 support and relate to Iran's proliferation activities. These include an obligation for Iran to suspend its enrichment-related, reprocessing-related and heavy water-related activities. These resolutions are legally binding for all States Members of the United Nations. The E3 are counting on the strict vigilance of all States to ensure the proper implementation of these measures. To that end, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and the related Panel of Experts must take up their work without any hindrance.

The E3 had no other choice but to activate snapback: this decision was a direct consequence of Iran's continuous non-performance of its JCPOA commitments and its rejection of two viable proposals put forward by the JCPOA Coordinator in 2022 and of the E3's most recent offer of a conditional snapback extension to allow for additional time to seek a diplomatic solution. Yet, this decision does not mean the end of diplomacy with Iran, and the E3 continue to be ready for diplomatic engagement and work towards reaching a comprehensive and lasting agreement. The E3 urge Iran to refrain from any escalatory action and to urgently return to full compliance with its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Security Council resolutions. The E3 will continue to work with all parties towards a new diplomatic solution to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon.

We would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jérôme Bonnafont**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

(Signed) **Ricklef Beutin**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations

(Signed) **James Kariuki**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
