



## 安全理事会

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## 2025 年 6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日期间安全理事会第 1701 (2006) 号决议执行情况

### 秘书长的报告

#### 一. 引言

1. 本报告全面评估了自 2025 年 7 月 11 日上次报告(S/2025/460)以来安全理事会第 1701 (2006)号决议的执行情况，并重点介绍了持续取得的进展以及普遍关注的领域。尽管各方重申致力于全面执行第 1701 (2006)号决议，但局势仍然脆弱，违反该决议的行为仍在继续。

2. 以色列国防军根据 2024 年 11 月 27 日《停止敌对行动协定》和安全理事会第 2790 (2025)号决议从黎巴嫩领土撤军的进程没有取得进展，以色列国防军在蓝线以北五个阵地保留驻军并维持两个“缓冲区”(见 S/2025/153，第 1 段)。以色列国防军还继续在蓝线附近以及黎巴嫩南部和东部进行打击。

3. 虽然联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队(联黎部队)继续在利塔尼河以南查获未经授权的武器，但本报告所述期间的一个显著特点是，黎巴嫩内阁责成黎巴嫩武装部队制定一项计划，建立国家对武器的专属控制权。在此背景下，黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南拆除非国家军事基础设施和缴获未经授权的武器方面取得了进一步进展，包括在联黎部队的支持下取得的进展。几个巴勒斯坦难民营中的武器也移交给了黎巴嫩武装部队。

#### 二. 第 1701(2006)号决议执行情况

##### A. 停止敌对行动


4. 6 月 27 日，联黎部队雷达探测到从蓝线南向蓝线北发射的 121 枚弹丸轨迹，以及从蓝线北向蓝线南发射的两枚弹丸轨迹，发射地点位于迈斯杰贝勒(东区)附



近。<sup>1</sup> 7月1日，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军防空系统在蓝线以北、Kila村(东区)东北方向进行拦截。联黎部队无法确定是什么促发了拦截。联黎部队观察或探测到14次空袭以及蓝线以南至以北方向超过30次轻武器射击。联黎部队还在行动区内听到或探测到40多次爆炸，与媒体报道的针对摩托车、车辆和工程设备的袭击相符。10月11日，以色列国防军称，他们在西顿区Musaylah(行动区外)打击了“真主党用于重建恐怖主义基础设施的工程机械”。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表在10月13日分别致安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/80/483-S/2025/637)中指出，袭击“造成1人死亡、7人受伤，数百辆工程车辆和施工设备被毁，遭袭商业设施遭受严重破坏”。在10月16日在奈拜提耶地区发生的袭击中，以色列国防军称“袭击了真主党及绿色无国界协会组织所属的恐怖主义基础设施”，这些设施“使真主党得以在民用伪装下进行重建活动”。

图一

2025年6月21日至10月20日期间联黎部队检测到的弹丸轨迹




资料来源：联黎部队。

5. 以色列国防军多次袭击所称的真主党目标，包括涉嫌参与重建真主党武器生产、储存设施及其他基础设施的个人，特别是在利塔尼河以南地区以及比卡、杰津和奈拜提耶地区。

<sup>1</sup> 每道轨迹可代表多个射弹。几乎所有记录在案的都是火箭、迫击炮和炮弹轨迹。联黎部队的雷达无法探测某些类型的射弹，如空对地导弹、坦克炮弹、便携式反坦克弹或轻武器发射的射弹。

图二

2025 年 6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日期间联黎部队观察到的每周空袭事件



资料来源：联黎部队。

6. 以色列国防军向南部几个村庄投放传单，警告不要与真主党合作。9 月 18 日，以色列国防军向布尔吉卡拉维亚和 Shahabiyah(均为西区)、迪宾和迈斯杰贝勒(均为东区)以及奈拜提耶地区提布尼特村的居民发出“紧急警告”。当天晚些时候，联黎部队探测到布尔吉卡拉维亚和提布尼特村附近发生空袭。维和人员听到的爆炸声与代尔西里安、迈斯杰贝勒和迪宾(均属东区)附近空袭报告相符。以色列国防军随后称，他们打击了真主党的“武器储存设施”。

7. 8 月 13 日，以色列国防军总参谋长埃亚尔·扎米尔表示，停止敌对行动生效以来，“已消灭了 240 多名恐怖分子，并实施了近 600 次空袭”。

8. 据联合国人权事务高级专员办事处核实，自 2024 年 11 月 27 日以来，以色列在黎巴嫩的军事行动已造成至少 109 名平民死亡，其中包括 21 名妇女和 16 名儿童，以色列没有人员伤亡的报告。黎巴嫩公共卫生部报告称，7 月 15 日以色列袭击比卡东部的“真主党军营”后，造成 12 人死亡，其中包括 7 名叙利亚人。该部报告称，9 月 19 日，以色列在提卜宁(西区)一家医院附近发动袭击，造成 1 人死亡、11 人受伤，9 月 21 日，宾特朱拜勒(西区)附近的袭击造成 5 人死亡，其中包括 3 名儿童。黎巴嫩领导层在多份声明中谴责宾特朱拜勒的袭击是“一场新的屠杀”。以色列国防军称其“消灭了一名在平民区活动的真主党恐怖分子”，对“平民伤亡”表示遗憾，并称该事件“正在调查中”。

9. 在本报告所述期间，8 名黎巴嫩武装部队人员被打死，多人受伤(见第 26 段)。以色列国防军方面没有伤亡报告。

10. 9月1日，以色列总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡和教育部长约阿夫·基什“欢迎北部约95%的学生开学……这得益于以色列对真主党造成的沉重打击和在当地的不懈执法”。9月21日，内塔尼亚胡先生说，“我们已使北部大多数居民得以返回家园。”

## B. 尊重蓝线的情况

11. 以色列国防军仍驻扎在蓝线北侧的五个阵地，并维持两个“缓冲区”。联黎部队多次观察到以色列国防军从这些阵地开火，并经常观察到以色列国防军人员在这些阵地外在蓝线以北进行建筑土方工程及其他活动。8月7日，联黎部队在亚伦(西区)以南观察到遥控武装无人地面车辆，以色列国防军后来声称为其所有。

12. 10月2日，联黎部队确认，亚伦附近的以色列国防军T型墙已越过蓝线以北，覆盖面积约4100平方米。联黎部队向双方通报了这一违规行为，并要求以色列国防军迁移该T形墙。

13. 以色列国防军称，它于6月26日在胡拉(东区)附近、7月9日在Jabal Blat和Labbunah附近以及8月30日在艾塔沙卜(均为西区)附近开展了“地面行动”，以“拆除用于恐怖活动的建筑物”。8月13日，以色列国防军称，其参谋长视察了“黎巴嫩南部”的一个未公开的以色列国防军阵地(见第7段)。9月11日，以色列国防军阿拉伯语发言人表示，他访问了“希亚姆附近的前线防御阵地”。黎巴嫩总理纳瓦夫·萨拉姆谴责这次“挑衅性视察”，称其“证实了以色列破坏南部稳定的决心”。

14. 7月11日，黎巴嫩总统约瑟夫·奥恩指出，以色列在蓝线以北的持续存在“阻碍了黎巴嫩军队的全面部署”。9月18日，黎巴嫩武装部队称，“以色列敌人继续……从陆海空持续侵犯黎巴嫩主权，并持续袭击边境村庄的居民……这些袭击和侵犯行为阻碍了军队在南部的部署……”。

15. 内塔尼亚胡先生8月25日称，“部长会议最近决定在2025年底前推动解除真主党武装，这一决定意义重大……如果黎巴嫩武装部队采取必要措施实施解除真主党武装，以色列将采取相应措施，包括配合美国主导的安全机制分阶段减少[以色列国防军]的存在。”

16. 以色列国防军继续占领蓝线北侧的盖杰尔北部和毗邻地区，这违反了第1701(2006)号决议。黎巴嫩政府欢迎联黎部队2011年的提议，即推动以色列国防军撤出被占领地区，但以色列政府尚未作出回应。7月8日，联黎部队维和人员观察到以色列国防军士兵从盖杰尔(东区)的以色列国防军阵地向一名牧羊人开枪。

17. 联黎部队发现3027次侵犯黎巴嫩领空行为，飞越总时长为3644小时35分钟。侵犯领空行为中无人机占96%，包括8月5日胡拉附近的一架光纤制导无人机，战斗机占3%，直升机和不明飞机占1%。

图三

2025 年 6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日期间联黎部队检测到的侵犯黎巴嫩领空事件



资料来源：联黎部队。

### C. 黎巴嫩武装部队部署情况

18. 根据内阁征召 4 500 名士兵的授权(见 S/2025/460，第 18 段)，黎巴嫩武装部队于 6 月 22 日在利塔尼河以南部署了 789 名新兵。另有 1 115 名新兵于 7 月 14 日开始进行基础训练。9 月 18 日，黎巴嫩武装部队通知联黎部队，已在利塔尼河以南部署了 694 名新兵，使利塔尼河以南地区部署的人员总数达到 8 985 人。

19. 在整个报告所述期间，包括在内阁责成制定一项建立国家对武器的专属控制权计划之前(见第 27-30 段)，黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河沿岸增加了巡逻，并设置了检查站，同时在利塔尼河以南执行工程任务和广泛巡逻。

20. 联黎部队海上特遣队与黎巴嫩武装部队海军进行了 33 次训练演习，与黎巴嫩武装部队空军进行了 9 次训练演习。黎巴嫩武装部队海军继续与海上特遣队密切合作，以提升专业能力和互操作性。

21. 9 月 12 日，黎巴嫩武装部队海军对一艘未经适当许可离开西顿的船只进行了“追逐和登船”行动。次日，黎巴嫩武装部队称“船上 22 人被捕”。

22. 有关包括联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员办事处(联黎协调办)和联黎部队的努力在内的国际社会为支持黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南加强部署所作努力的更多详细信息，见本报告附件三\*。

\* 根据现行流动性管理措施，附件仅以来件所用语言分发，未经正式编辑。

D. 解除黎巴嫩境内所有武装团体的武装，包括在利塔尼河以南部署的违规人员、资产和武器


23. 7月31日黎巴嫩建军节，奥恩先生表示，黎巴嫩军队“已成功将管辖权延伸至利塔尼河以南未被占领地区，收缴武器并销毁无法使用的武器……这一点得到了五方军事委员会[机制]的证实”。奥恩先生呼吁“所有政治力量……推动军队和安全部队在黎巴嫩全境实现武器的专属持有——必须是今天，而不是明天”。

24. 10月16日，在停止敌对行动监测机制第十一次会议(见第74段)后，美国中央司令部发表声明称，黎巴嫩武装部队“在过去一年中成功清除了近10 000枚火箭弹、近400枚导弹和超过205 000枚未爆弹药碎片”。

25. 联黎部队在其行动区117次发现了违规武器，包括75个无人看守的武器储藏处，内有火箭发射架和火箭弹、反坦克地雷和杀伤人员地雷、迫击炮弹和小口径弹药，此外还有6次发现携带步枪或手枪的个人和34次发现携带狩猎武器的猎人。黎巴嫩武装部队报告称，联黎部队移交给他们的武器储藏处中有96%已被清除。联黎部队还查出了42处相关地点，并与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调，检查了其中28处，但没有任何重大发现。联黎部队还重新核查了先前查出的当时无法检查的地点，包括需要技术专业知识才能进入的隧道。

图四

2025年6月21日至10月20日期间联黎部队查明并由黎巴嫩武装部队清除的武器库



资料来源：联黎部队。

26. 8月9日，黎巴嫩武装部队称，“一支部队在提尔扎布金谷地发现一个武器库，在摧毁其中的武器时，武器库内发生爆炸，导致6名士兵死亡，另有数人受伤”。8月28日，黎巴嫩武装部队称两名士兵在纳古拉(西区)“检查一架[以色列]无人机时”遇难，另有两人受伤。

27. 8月5日，萨拉姆先生称，内阁“今天决定责成黎巴嫩军队[至迟于8月31日]制定收缴武器的计划”。
28. 8月7日，内阁“批准了美国特使托马斯·巴拉克提出的关于延长和稳定《停止敌对行动协定》的提案的目标”，包括“逐步结束非国家武装团体在该国的存在”。9月5日，内阁澄清说，“执行该文件[提案]的任何进展仍取决于其他各方的承诺，首先是以色列的承诺”。
29. 在9月5日的同一次会议上，黎巴嫩武装部队向内阁提交了其建立国家对武器专属控制权的计划。内阁表示，“欢迎军队司令部制定的计划及其各阶段，该计划旨在确保执行关于完全通过本国军队扩大国家权力并将武器垄断在合法当局手中的决定”，并称“决定对该计划的细节及相关讨论保密，并要求军队司令部就此事项每月向部长会议提交报告”。9月16日，萨拉姆先生表示，“该计划的一些细节已被泄露……例如三个月内在利塔尼河以南地区完成武器全面收缴，同时在同期通过禁止武器使用或转移地点实现武器管控。”
30. 随后，9月29日，黎巴嫩武装部队通知联黎部队，已启动确保国家对利塔尼河以南地区武器实施专属控制权的计划第一阶段。在这方面，应黎巴嫩武装部队的请求，联黎部队成立了一支“武器管控工作队”，由作战、工程、爆炸物处理和医疗资产组成，可在短时间内部署。10月6日，黎巴嫩武装部队向内阁提交了第一份月度报告。
31. 为了抗议内阁的决定，真主党和阿迈勒运动所属部长于8月5日和7日以及9月5日三度退出内阁会议。自8月5日以来，真主党和阿迈勒运动的支持者在贝鲁特南郊以及黎巴嫩南部和东部发起了大体和平的抗议活动，包括频繁的车队游行、静坐示威及集会。9月25日，即哈桑·纳斯鲁拉遇刺一周年的两天前，数千名真主党支持者聚集在贝鲁特海滨，纳斯鲁拉和哈希姆·萨菲丁的影像(见 [S/2024/817](#)，第14段)被投射到地标性建筑拉乌什岩(鸽子岩)上，这违反了行政限制。
32. 8月6日，真主党表示将把内阁决定“视同不存在”，称其“明显违反《民族协议》”。真主党议会党团负责人穆罕默德·拉德于8月8日指出，“国家有能力行使权力，却无法对抗敌人”。
33. 真主党秘书长纳伊姆·卡西姆7月30日表示，真主党的“武器是黎巴嫩的力量源泉，我们准备讨论如何将它们纳入黎巴嫩国家力量之中”。8月15日，卡西姆先生警告不要将“军队拖入内乱”，并表示“真主党和阿迈勒运动同意推迟街头示威计划，前提是在无人愿见的对抗爆发前，仍有对话、谈判与修正的空间”。8月25日，他呼吁政府“将敌人逐出我们的土地，终结侵略，释放囚犯，开始重建。这才是路线图。只有这样，我们才能讨论防卫战略。9月27日，卡西姆先生称，“我们不会离开战场，我们不会放弃武器……我们不会接受解除武装。”他还说，“我们正在前进，正在恢复元气，随时准备抵御以色列敌人的任何进攻”。



34. 8 月 31 日，黎巴嫩议会议长纳比·贝里指出，有可能“在冷静、协商一致的对话的框架内讨论真主党的武器问题……，进而制定保护黎巴嫩、解放国土并维护国际公认边界的国家安全战略”。不过贝里先生指出，“在任何情况下，将这颗火球抛给黎巴嫩军队都是不可接受的。”

35. 6 月 26 日，德鲁兹派领导人、社会进步党前党魁瓦利德·琼卜拉特宣布，该党已于三周前向黎巴嫩武装部队移交了“轻型和中型武器”。

36. 以色列常驻联合国代表在 2025 年 6 月 25 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2025/416)中称，“记录在案的违反行为反映了伊朗和真主党的蓄意战略，即在黎巴嫩各地，包括利塔尼河以南地区，重新武装并重建其军事能力。这些违规行为包括重建和恢复军事基础设施以及改变现有设施(如集装箱、地下设施和隧道竖井)的用途。违规行为还包括储存和囤积武器，包括战略武器，如精密制导导弹、火箭弹和火箭发射器……真主党仍拥有数万枚火箭弹的军火库”。

37. 此外，以色列常驻联合国代表在 2025 年 10 月 6 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2025/621)中指出，“据观察，真主党特工人员一直在收集情报，修复军营、隧道和竖井，往往使用重型建筑设备。真主党继续发展其无人机武器库和生产能力，包括当地生产的用于攻击和侦察目的的无人机……鉴于黎巴嫩政府未能有效执行相关措施，以色列被迫单方面采取行动。”

38. 根据巴勒斯坦国总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯与奥恩先生 5 月 21 日达成的协议(见 S/2025/460，第 33 段)，巴勒斯坦难民营的解除武装工作于 8 月 21 日开始，从贝鲁特南郊的布尔吉巴拉吉内难民营向黎巴嫩武装部队移交了三批武器中的第一批。黎巴嫩武装部队确认于 8 月 28 日收到从提尔的 Burj Shemali、El Buss 和 Rashidieh 难民营移交的“各种类型的武器、炮弹和不同类型的弹药”。同日，黎巴嫩—巴勒斯坦对话委员会宣布，“利塔尼河以南巴勒斯坦难民营的武器移交工作已完成”，并特别说明“属于巴勒斯坦解放组织各派系的重型武器……已移交”。8 月 29 日，贝鲁特附近的圣埃利亚斯和夏蒂拉难民营完成了武器移交。萨拉姆总理称，已致电阿巴斯总统，“赞赏……在巴勒斯坦难民营向黎巴嫩军队移交重型武器方面取得的进展”。9 月 13 日，黎巴嫩武装部队称，分别从的黎波里巴达维难民营和西顿艾因希勒沃难民营接收了“武器、炮弹和军用弹药”。巴勒斯坦解放组织各派系所属武器已在黎巴嫩境内 12 个巴勒斯坦难民营中的 8 个移交黎巴嫩武装部队保管，没有发生任何相关暴力事件。关于哈马斯运动和巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织等巴勒斯坦解放组织以外派系的武器处置的协议尚未达成。

39. 此外，在布尔吉巴拉吉内、Burj Shemali、艾因希勒沃、埃尔布斯、拉什迭和夏蒂拉难民营，因个人或刑事纠纷引发的涉枪支和爆炸物的暴力事件持续发生。10 月 19 日夏蒂拉难民营外围发生的武装冲突，促使黎巴嫩武装部队介入干预。由于安全形势恶化，联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处(近东救济工程处)暂停了在几个难民营的服务。由于武装行为者继续存在，近东救济工程处在艾因希勒沃的四所学校仍然无法进入。



40. 7 月 8 日，以色列国防军称，已在黎巴嫩北部的黎波里巴达维难民营附近“消灭了一名哈马斯重要指挥官”。

41. 关于 6 月 24 日于某未公开地点开展的反恐行动，黎巴嫩武装部队称，逮捕了达伊沙“最著名的领导人之一”，并称“缴获了他所拥有的大量武器弹药以及……制造无人机的设备”。

## E. 武器禁运和边境管制

42. 以色列国防军 6 月 25 日称，它在黎巴嫩南部的一次袭击中“消灭”了“萨迪克货币兑换交易所负责人”，并指称“萨迪克货币兑换交易所是真主党的资金储存和转移机制，用于处理源自伊朗圣城部队的资金”。7 月 3 日，以色列国防军称，已在山区省哈尔德附近的一次袭击中“消灭”了一名恐怖分子，该恐怖分子“负责为伊朗圣城部队走私武器并对以色列平民和[以色列国防军]部队发动恐怖袭击”。7 月 11 日，以色列国防军称其在奈拜提耶区 Numayriyah 附近的袭击“消灭”了一名涉入“从伊朗到北部战区、犹地亚和撒马利亚一些地方的武器走私路线”的真主党特工人员。以色列国防军称，8 月 5 日对比卡东部地区的袭击“消灭”了一名据称指挥“叙利亚境内计划向戈兰高地发射火箭弹的恐怖组织小组”的真主党特工人员。以色列国防军 9 月 11 日称，在黎巴嫩南部“消灭”了“伊朗伊玛目侯赛因师中的一名恐怖分子”，并指称“该师由伊朗圣城部队指挥，与真主党在黎巴嫩境内协同行动，以以色列平民和军队为袭击目标”。

43. 以色列常驻联合国代表在 2025 年 10 月 6 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2025/621)中指出，“伊朗圣城部队在黎巴嫩领土上的实体存在，凸显了德黑兰在协助和监督这些活动中的直接作用”。伊朗伊斯兰共和国常驻联合国代表在 2025 年 10 月 20 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2025/663)中，“坚决且明确地驳斥[了][这些]虚假且毫无根据的指控”驳斥了这些指控。

44. 黎巴嫩武装部队至少开展了 58 次打击人口贩运行动，主要在黎巴嫩东部和东北部地区。

45. 9 月 1 日，黎巴嫩和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国同意成立两个双边委员会——司法合作委员会和边境管理委员会。9 月 15 日，在黎巴嫩总统与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国总统艾哈迈德·沙拉在 2025 年在多哈举行的阿拉伯-伊斯兰特别峰会期间会晤后，黎巴嫩总统发表声明，“强调必须进行协调以确保边境沿线的稳定”。10 月 10 日，阿拉伯叙利亚共和国外交部长阿萨德·希巴尼在贝鲁特会见了黎巴嫩官员，这是叙利亚新当局首次部长级访问。同日，叙利亚当局暂停阿萨德时代的黎巴嫩-叙利亚最高委员会，并通知黎巴嫩当局，今后两国间所有沟通均须通过官方外交渠道进行。

## F. 地雷和集束炸弹

46. 黎巴嫩武装部队宣布，在利塔尼河以南地区开展了至少 47 次行动，在利塔尼河以北地区开展了至少 20 次行动，以引爆未爆弹药。

47. 联黎部队对 670 起疑似未爆弹药报告做出了回应，并清理了纳古拉以北 1800 平方米的土地。此外，联黎部队还为 192 名军事和文职人员举办了 6 次爆炸物风险意识课程，并为多功能工程和爆炸物处理单位的国内验证举办了 15 次培训支持活动。联黎部队还对排雷地点进行了 32 次质量保证和质量控制访问，并进行了一次认证。

## 三. 扩展国家权力与维持制度稳定

48. 7 月 15 日和 16 日，议会重新恢复了对政府的信任，否决了自由爱国运动领导人纪伯伦·巴西勒提出的不信任动议。萨拉姆总理在向议员们发表的回应中指出，“将国家主权扩展到其所有领土、扩大国家权力、限制武器、将战争与和平的决定权掌握在自己手中，以及尊重国际决议，特别是第 1701 号决议……都是符合黎巴嫩共同利益的责任……”。9 月 16 日，萨拉姆先生称，“将国家权力延伸至全境的决定并非我国政府杜撰。该决定自 1989 年……即《塔伊夫协议》签署以来便已存在。如今我们正致力于落实和执行该决定……”。总理还说，“若无国家稳定、安保和安全，投资、重建和经济复苏将难以实现。”

49. 7 月 31 日，议会通过了解决银行危机法(这是国际货币基金组织(基金组织)援助计划的先决条件)以及司法机构组织法。不过，解决银行危机法的实施取决于尚未提交议会的配套财政缺口法的通过。9 月 6 日，奥恩总统将司法机构组织法退回议会，称“该法存在形式、重大和实质性错误”，且“违反国际原则、基础和标准”。

50. 7 月 11 日，内阁填补了司法和金融领域关键职位空缺，包括金融检察官及中央银行四名副行长。9 月 11 日，内阁任命了电力和电信业监管机构成员。9 月 22 日，内阁批准了 2026 年国家预算，截至 10 月 20 日该草案仍有待议会审查。继 9 月 22 日至 25 日进行国别访问后，基金组织于 9 月 26 日称，“当局在制定应对银行业严峻挑战的战略方面取得了进展……尽管相关立法仍需进一步完善……以完全符合国际标准”，并称“期待 2026 年政府预算将采取更雄心勃勃的方法”。

51. 法官塔里克·比塔尔在 2020 年 8 月 4 日贝鲁特港爆炸调查中继续审问嫌疑人 and 被告。内阁成员首次与遇难者家属一起纪念爆炸五周年。9 月 22 日，司法部长阿德尔·纳萨尔签署了一份引渡请求，要求引渡 9 月 5 日在保加利亚被捕的将硝酸铵运往贝鲁特港的涉案船舶承租人(见 S/2020/1110，第 46 段)。

52. 7 月 14 日，中央银行发布通告，禁止所有许可银行和金融机构与“无牌货币兑换机构、汇款公司、协会或实体(如真主党附属的卡尔德·哈桑协会)”开展业务往来。

53. 截至 10 月 15 日，至少有 64 417 人流离失所，其中 51% 是妇女。以色列国防军继续驻扎在蓝线北侧，再加上持续的军事冲突活动、未爆弹药的存在以及对民用设施的广泛破坏，持续阻碍难民返乡。人道主义伙伴继续支持受冲突影响的社区在安全形势和资金紧张的情况下满足基本需求。

54. 截至 6 月 30 日，为黎巴嫩应急计划发出的 2025 年呼吁获得了 25% 的资金，在所请求提供的 26.35 亿美元中有 6.55 亿美元到账，其中 2025 年迄今已收到 4.32 亿美元，2024 年结转 2.23 亿美元。2025 年黎巴嫩应急计划呼吁首次专门关注返回阿拉伯叙利亚共和国问题。此外，近东救济工程处预计将出现现金流缺口，危及 2025 年后黎巴嫩境内 222 000 名巴勒斯坦难民持续获得基本服务的前景。

55. 6 月 25 日，世界银行批准了一项 2.5 亿美元贷款协议，有待议会批准。资金将通过黎巴嫩紧急援助项目发放，用于在发展和重建委员会(见 S/2025/460，第 47 段)的主持下，“支持最紧迫的受损关键公共基础设施和生命线服务的修复和重建，以及受冲突影响地区的可持续废墟管理”。总理办公室已开始制定全面计划，以统一、协调和优先安排恢复和重建工作。

56. 截至 9 月 30 日，联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)在黎巴嫩登记了 647 038 名难民和寻求庇护者，其中包括在黎巴嫩的大约 140 万叙利亚难民中的 636 051 人，以及 10 987 名其他国籍的难民和寻求庇护者。自 2024 年 12 月 8 日以来，已有 105 300 名叙利亚人逃往黎巴嫩，主要定居在北部和东部省份。截至 10 月 20 日，记录了 102 起通过突击搜查、检查站拦截和海上遣返行动进行驱逐的事件，涉及至少 4 091 名叙利亚人。

57. 7 月 1 日，在安全总局发布通告，免除返回叙利亚的叙利亚难民和来自阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的巴勒斯坦难民的出境费、逾期滞留罚款及再入境禁令后，难民署启动了自愿返回计划。截至 9 月 30 日，难民署驻黎巴嫩机构为 17 291 名叙利亚人回返提供了支持，另有 118 764 人表达了回返意向。2025 年，至少有 294 912 名叙利亚难民返回阿拉伯叙利亚共和国后被从难民署的数据库中删除。

## 四. 联合国的驻留情况

### A. 联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队部队部署和调整

58. 截至 10 月 20 日，联黎部队由来自 48 个派遣国的 10 290 名军事人员组成，其中有 816 名女性(7.93%)。此外，联黎部队有 742 名文职人员，包括 227 名国际人员和 515 名本国人员，其中有 238 名女性(32.08%)。海上特遣队有 5 艘船只和 626 名军事人员，其中包括 55 名女性(8.79%)。联合国停战监督组织的 50 名军事观察员(包括 40 名男性和 10 名女性(20%))任职于黎巴嫩观察员小组，在行动上接受联黎部队的指挥与控制。最高级别的女军官为中校，最高级别的女文职人员为 D-1 级。

59. 为应对联合国所有维和行动面临的财政挑战，联黎部队已实施应急计划，将在 2025/26 财政年度削减 15% 的支出。联黎部队将减少其军事和文职部分，同

时维持核心授权活动以及非可自行决定的支出，包括与维和人员安全保障有关的支出。

60. 自 2024 年 11 月 27 日以来，联黎部队首次达到全面行动节奏，平均每月开展 6 848 项行动，8 月份达到峰值 7 864 项。24%的活动是与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调进行的，13.7%的活动涉及混合性别团队。联黎部队平均每月进行 73 次空中活动。

61. 根据其调整计划，联黎部队的行动重点是协助黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南地区建立国家对武器的专属控制权上(见第 27 至 30 段)。联黎部队还提高了在蓝线沿线的可见度和存在，并确定了因路障、被毁的道路、地雷和未爆炸装置而仍无法进入的地区。应黎巴嫩武装部队的请求，联黎部队开展了几次行动，目的是在收获季节为当地居民提供安全保障。联黎部队还继续就运用新技术进行监测报告及部队保护事宜与各方进行接触。为此，联黎部队向蓝线沿线的阵地部署了反无人机资产。

62. 联黎部队的行动自由继续受到限制，并遭遇以色列国防军和当地行为体等实施的侵略行为(见附件一)。10 月 11 日，以色列国防军在 Kila 村附近的联合国阵地附近投掷手榴弹，造成一名维和人员轻伤。以色列国防军五个阵地和蓝线以北两个“缓冲区”周围的道路封锁继续阻碍联黎部队进入蓝线。联黎部队维和人员两次不得不使用催泪瓦斯驱散限制其行动的当地行为者人群。

63. 海上特遣队向 2 498 艘船只发出信号，以支持海上封锁行动。黎巴嫩武装部队检查并放行了联黎部队移交的所有 494 艘船只。联黎部队陪同黎巴嫩武装部队海军进行了 29 次船只检查。

64. 根据安全理事会第 2436 (2018)号决议，联黎部队于 10 月 13 日完成了对 19 个下属军事单位和 2 艘船舶的后勤、训练及战备状态评估，所有查明的待改进事项均已整改完毕。

## B. 安全防护

65. 黎巴嫩全境仍在实行行动限制。除提尔及提尔-纳古拉沿海公路沿线外，文职人员在联黎部队行动区的行动都需要使用装甲车并提前 48 小时通知。

66. 军事冲突活动以及未爆弹药和其他战争残留物继续对人员安全保障构成威胁。6 月 21 日至 25 日，在以色列与伊朗伊斯兰共和国开展敌对行动的背景下，由于有碎片坠落的危险，蓝线沿线联黎部队人员多次进入避弹所(见 S/2025/460, 第 58 段)。

67. 联黎部队对直接影响联黎部队人员或资产的违反第 1701(2006)号决议的行为展开了 2 项技术调查。一项技术调查已经完成，并向各方通报了调查结果。

## C. 行为和纪律

68. 联黎部队记录了4项可能的不当行为指控。联黎部队或联黎协调办均未报告性虐待和性剥削指控。联黎部队为来自10个部队派遣国的37名特遣队国家调查官员举办了一次讲习班。为1名文职人员和1 254名军事人员(74名女性和1 181名男性)提供了关于联合国行为标准的培训。

## D. 对袭击维和人员行为追责

69. 联黎部队继续监督黎巴嫩军事法庭对涉嫌针对维和人员策划或实施重大袭击的个人的诉讼程序。7月28日,就2022年12月14日阿吉比耶附近对联黎部队致命袭击一案(见 [S/2023/184](#))举行了快速听讯,七名被告中有六人被定罪。一名被告被(缺席)判处死刑,两名被告被判处监禁并处罚金,三名被告被处以罚金,一名被告被无罪释放。8月13日,检方就无罪判决及五名被告的量刑提出上诉。第一次上诉听讯将在完成程序通知后安排。

70. 与2018年8月4日迈季代勒尊(西区)事件有关的刑事诉讼没有任何进展(见 [S/2018/1029](#))。对2021年12月22日在沙克拉、2022年1月4日在宾特朱拜勒、2022年1月25日在拉米耶以及2月14日在拉菲克·哈里里国际机场附近对联黎部队维和人员的侵犯行为的调查仍在继续(见 [S/2022/214](#) 和 [S/2025/460](#))。

71. 在对6月10日在 Dayr Qanun al-Nahr 粗暴剥夺联黎部队巡逻队行动自由和一名维和人员遭到身体攻击的事件进行调查后(见 [S/2025/460](#), 附件一),一名嫌疑人被拘留,并移交军事检察官作进一步调查。目前正在努力认定和逮捕其他嫌疑人。

72. 最高军事法庭定于11月6日开庭审理2011年7月26日在西顿和2011年12月9日在 Burj Shemali(提尔)袭击联黎部队维和人员案件中提出的上诉。

## 五. 联络与推进可持续解决方案方面的进展

73. 联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员与黎巴嫩和以色列以及该地区及其他地区的相关当局和行为体进行了斡旋,以促进建立信任措施,巩固停止敌对行动。特别协调员还主张各方采取具体步骤,通过谈判达成解决方案,以推进长期搁置的第1701(2006)号决议相关条款。

74. 联黎部队继续与各方接触,促进旨在协助以色列国防军撤出蓝线北侧地区的安全安排。联黎部队于6月25日、8月12日、9月7日和21日以及10月15日主办了停止敌对行动监测机制会议。9月份的会议由美国特使摩根·奥尔塔古斯主持,联合国特别协调员出席了9月和10月的会议。讨论的重点是以色列国防军从蓝线以北地区撤出以及黎巴嫩武装部队执行其确保国家对武器的专属控制权的计划。联黎部队特派团团长兼部队指挥官还寻求双方支持修复受损的蓝线标记桶。



75. 联黎部队继续利用联络和协调机制来缓解蓝线沿线的紧张局势。为协调行动，联黎部队与以色列国防军进行了 5 001 次互动。联黎部队向以色列国防军发出 38 项停止射击请求，其中 1 项代表黎巴嫩武装部队。

76. 8 月 21 日，联黎部队协助双方和红十字国际联合会通过纳古拉/罗什哈尼克拉关卡遣返了一名在黎巴嫩被拘留的以色列公民。为支持平民保护工作，联黎部队与双方保持联络，并为 1 793 次平民和人道主义行动提供便利。

77. 8 月，联黎部队最终完成了对所有 272 个蓝线标记的评估，得出的结论是 200 个完好无损，60 个被损坏或毁坏，12 个无法接触到。此后，联黎部队报告称，以色列国防军又损坏了另外几个标记。联黎部队修复了冲突期间受损的三个标记(见 S/2025/460，第 66 段)。

78. 我在 2007 年 10 月 30 日关于第 1701(2006)号决议执行情况的报告(S/2007/641，附件)中提出沙巴阿农场地区的临时界定，阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和以色列都尚未作出回应。

## 六. 意见

79. 我注意到近几个月在全面执行第 1701(2006)号决议方面取得的进展。然而，仍有许多工作要做。我们决不能让这些来之不易的成果付诸东流。我欢迎为巩固停止敌对行动所做的外交努力。我敦促各方利用停止敌对行动监测机制下的强化安排、联黎部队已建立的联络和协调渠道以及我的黎巴嫩问题特别协调员的斡旋，解决任何争端或威胁。

80. 为了在脆弱的停止敌对行动基础上更进一步，我呼吁各方确保保护平民，创造对话空间，以全面执行第 1701(2006)号决议，并最终实现黎巴嫩与以色列之间的永久停火，从而为蓝线两侧社区带来应有的持久安全与稳定。我再次呼吁所有行为体不采取可能危及停止敌对行动的单边或挑衅行动。无论一方实际上还是被认为未履行第 1701(2006)号决议规定的义务，均不构成另一方背弃自身义务的正当理由。

81. 以色列国防军在蓝线以北的驻留以及对黎巴嫩的持续军事打击侵犯了黎巴嫩的主权和领土完整，也违反了第 1701(2006)号决议。这些行为破坏了黎巴嫩当局为实现国家对武器的专属控制权所作的努力，也阻碍了居民返回家园。我再次谴责所有以色列侵犯黎巴嫩主权的行爲，并再次促请以色列政府停止一切飞越黎巴嫩领土的行为。我敦促以色列当局履行第 1701(2006)号决议规定的义务，从蓝线以北所有地区撤军，包括从盖杰尔北部及蓝线以北毗邻区域撤军。我再次重申联黎部队的提议：愿为加强蓝线两侧社区互信的安全安排提供支持。

82. 必须将所有武器置于国家控制之下，并确保国家能够对其领土充分行使主权和权威。我欢迎黎巴嫩当局为履行承诺所采取的步骤，包括内阁决定责成黎巴嫩武装部队就此制定详细计划。

83. 我还注意到在黎巴嫩国家对巴勒斯坦难民营武器实施垄断方面取得的进展。然而，除这些努力外，还必须同时做出补充努力，以打破黎巴嫩和以色列之间在第 1701(2006)号决议关键条款上的政治僵局，并回应黎巴嫩社会各阶层对安全及社会经济问题的正当关切。联合国仍然全力致力于在这方面提供支持。
84. 我对迄今获得的慷慨支持表示感谢，并呼吁捐助方根据其全面执行第 1701(2006)号决议的承诺，以及黎巴嫩武装部队所面临挑战的严重性，加强对黎巴嫩武装部队有针对性的物资和资金支持。
85. 继安全理事会第 2790(2025)号决议决定最后一次延长联黎部队的任务期限后，联黎部队将在剩余任务期限内加紧努力，支持黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南加强部署，并帮助确保利塔尼河与蓝线之间的地区除黎巴嫩政府或联黎部队的武装人员、资产或武器之外，没有任何其他武装人员、资产或武器。此外，联黎部队将继续支持各方努力实现蓝线两侧社区的可持续安全与稳定，包括巩固停止敌对行动监测机制和为该机制提供支持以及恢复蓝线的完整性。
86. 根据第 2790(2025)号决议，目前正在准备应请求探讨联黎部队撤出后未来执行第 1701(2006)号决议的各种备选办法。
87. 联黎部队的行动自由对于充分执行第 1701(2006)号决议至关重要。影响联黎部队行动自由的事件令人严重关切，必须停止。我欣见黎巴嫩当局的公开声明，其中表示支持联黎部队并谴责对维和人员的袭击行为。必须追究对联黎部队袭击的实施者的责任。
88. 以色列国防军向联黎部队人员和房地或其附近开火的行为不可接受，黎巴嫩有关人员的侵略行为同样不可接受。我重申，双方必须确保保护平民，遵守包括国际人道法在内的国际法规定的义务，保障联合国人员的安全、行动自由以及联合国驻地财产不受侵犯。
89. 我注意到 2022 年 12 月阿吉比耶袭击事件的审判已经结束，该事件造成一名维和人员死亡、三人受伤。联合国继续呼吁对所有袭击维和人员事件追究责任。
90. 鉴于议会选举定于 2026 年 5 月前举行，我呼吁黎巴嫩政府和议会优先推进改革，确保选举及时、包容和具有参与性，包括进一步提高妇女的政治代表性，并改进残疾人的无障碍环境。我期待黎巴嫩当局提供必要的财政资源，并协助及时进行技术和行政准备，以确保选举的完整性和透明度。
91. 黎巴嫩政府和议会为实施经济、金融和司法改革采取了渐进步骤，我注意到，包括在按照国际标准通过立法方面取得的进展对于获取基金组织的援助、增强捐助方和存款人的信心以及帮助黎巴嫩重新走上可持续恢复和重建的道路至关重要。同时，为人道主义援助和恢复工作增配资源也至关重要。
92. 我鼓励黎巴嫩与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国继续开展双边合作，以维护两国的稳定和共同边界的安全。难民署启动黎巴嫩境内叙利亚难民自愿遣返计划，是推动叙利亚难民逐步、可持续自愿回返的积极举措。



93. 巴勒斯坦难民营已经经历了相当大的困难和动荡。捐助方对近东救济工程处的持续支持对于保障为黎巴嫩境内巴勒斯坦难民提供基本服务并维护难民营的稳定仍然至关重要。

94. 我注意到，由于影响维和行动的流动性危机导致支出减少 15%，这将对特派团执行任务的能力产生重大影响。我敦促各方在特派团适应这些制约条件时予以合作，并重申联合国将继续致力于支持各方全面执行第 1701(2006)号决议。我还强调所有会员国足额、及时缴纳维和预算摊款的重要性。


95. 我衷心感谢所有向联黎部队和黎巴嫩观察员小组提供军事人员和装备的国家。我感谢联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员雅尼娜·亨尼斯-普拉斯哈特和联黎部队特派团团长兼部队指挥官迪奥达托·阿巴尼亚拉少将。我还要感谢部队派遣国——其部队对支持各方履行《停止敌对行动协定》和第 1701(2006)号决议所规定义务仍发挥着关键作用，同时感谢联合国国家工作队所有成员继续致力于促进黎巴嫩的稳定。

## 附件一

## **Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 June to 20 October 2025**

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. In line with UNIFIL's adaptation plan, UNIFIL continued its operation-oriented approach. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted a monthly average of 7,864 operational activities, including 73 air operations. The percentage of UNIFIL's operational activities conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces was maintained at 24 per cent.
3. While UNIFIL's freedom of movement was in general respected, the Mission experienced several incidents in which violence or weapons were used to intimidate peacekeepers, which resulted in injuries to peacekeepers or damage to UNIFIL assets, or interfered with operations. Incidents of note occurred near Kfar Shuba on 3 and 20 July when the Israel Defense Forces opened fire across the Blue Line near a UN position, forcing peacekeepers to take security measures. Several concerning incidents also occurred in conjunction with UNIFIL's operations to remove roadblocks near observation point Marwahin (Sector West), in September, with the Israel Defense Forces dropping grenades near UNIFIL personnel and pointing their weapons at peacekeepers. Two serious incidents also took place near Marun al-Ra's (Sector East) on 2 October when the Israel Defense Forces dropped grenades near peacekeepers who had been providing security for local residents. On 11 October, a peacekeeper was slightly injured after a grenade was dropped near a UN position near Kfar Kila (Sector East). UNIFIL protested each of these incidents to the Israel Defense Forces.
4. UNIFIL also continued to encounter roadblocks around the five Israel Defense Forces positions and the two "buffer zones" north of the Blue Line. While UNIFIL reestablished access to UN position 8-33, northeast of Hula (Sector East) in June, and observation point Marwahin on 10 September, the Israel Defense Forces presence continues to restrict access to UN Position 1-31, southwest of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West), UN position 9-63, south of Udaysah (Sector East), and UN position 9-64 south of Kfar Kila.
5. UNIFIL also experienced incidents involving local actors in which violence was used to intimidate UNIFIL peacekeepers, UNIFIL equipment was sometimes damaged, or the peacekeepers had to use alternative routes. In addition to the incidents listed below, UNIFIL experienced minor incidents during which items such as stones or bottles were thrown at UNIFIL property or personnel without causing damage or injuries. Each of the incidents has been raised by the Mission with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Figure V  
Incidents of restrictions of freedom of movement of and aggressive behaviour against UNIFIL



Source: UNIFIL.

#### Restrictions of the freedom of movement or aggressive behaviour involving the Israel Defense Forces

6. On 3 July, the Israel Defense Forces fired hundreds of small arms bursts from south of the Blue Line towards Kfar Shuba (Sector East). A few impacts were observed on the bunker wall of a nearby UNIFIL position, likely caused by ricochets from bullets that struck rocks outside the perimeter of the position, approximately 25 meters from the bunker.

7. On 19 July, Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line pointed their weapons at a UNIFIL patrol that was operating in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces southeast of Qatmoun (Sector West).

8. On 20 July, the Israel Defense Forces opened heavy machine gun fire from south of the Blue Line, southeast of Kfar Shuba, prompting peacekeepers to take security measures. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel or damage to equipment.

9. On 24 July, the Israel Defense Forces pointed the barrel of a tank and a laser towards a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Marun al-Ra's.

10. On 8 August, two Israel Defense Forces soldiers using megaphones urged a UNIFIL patrol operating in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces northeast of Kfar Kila to "leave the area" or they would open fire. The UNIFIL patrol continued its activity as planned.

11. On 23 August, the Israel Defense Forces directed a high caliber weapon system, mounted on a bunker, towards Observer Group Lebanon personnel at observer point MAR, southeast of Markaba (Sector East).

12. On 25 August, the Israel Defense Forces aimed the turret of an automatic weapon system, equipped with a machine gun, towards UNIFIL peacekeepers in Hula.

13. On 25 August, an Israel Defense Forces drone dropped a grenade near a group of people in Kfar Kila as a UNIFIL patrol was passing by about 50 meters away. There were no injuries.
14. On 28 August, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed their weapon towards a UNIFIL patrol operating in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces near Arab al-Wazzani (Sector East).
15. On 30 August, an Israel Defense Forces vehicle followed an Observer Group Lebanon patrol southwest of Markaba, with the vehicle's mounted machine gun continuously pointing at the peacekeepers.
16. On 31 August, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line aimed several long-range green laser beams towards UNIFIL peacekeepers southwest of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West), prompting the patrol to move to a secure location.
17. On 1 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a red laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Naqurah, prompting the patrol to move to a secure location.
18. On 2 September, an Israel Defense Forces tank, at one of the five Israel Defense Forces positions north of the Blue Line, pointed its turret gun towards a UNIFIL patrol east of Marwahin.
19. On 2 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.
20. On 2 September, Israel Defense Forces drones dropped four grenades close to UNIFIL peacekeepers working to clear roadblocks that were hindering access to observation point Marwahin near the Blue Line. One of the grenades impacted within 20 metres and three within approximately 100 metres of UNIFIL personnel and vehicles. The grenades did not cause any injuries or damage. The UNIFIL activity had been preceded by rigorous information exchange and coordination with the Israel Defense Forces.
21. On 4 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed green laser beams towards a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.
22. On 4 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a red laser beam towards a UNIFIL patrol near Naqurah.
23. On 6 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed multiple green laser beams at two UNIFIL patrol vehicles near Alma al-Sha'b, prompting the UNIFIL patrol to return to its base.
24. On 8 September, the Israel Defense Forces pointed a red laser beam at a UNIFIL foot patrol southwest of Naqurah.
25. On 8 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel pointed their weapons at UNIFIL peacekeepers removing roadblocks near observer point Marwahin, prompting the peacekeepers to take security measures.
26. On 10 September, the Israel Defense Forces pointed blue lasers towards a UNIFIL foot patrol southwest of Naqurah.
27. On 12 September, UNIFIL peacekeepers conducting a foot patrol inside a UN position, southwest of Naqurah heard a voice from an Israel Defense Forces position nearby ordering them to retreat and the sound of the loading of a weapon. The patrol

responded by saying “understood”, stopped for several minutes, and then continued its movement inside the UN position.

28. On 16 September the Israel Defense Forces fired approximately 450 rounds of machine gun fire from south to north of the Blue Line, impacting near a UN position southeast of Markaba, prompting peacekeepers to take security measures.

29. On 16 September, the Israel Defense Forces pointed green laser beams at UNIFIL personnel inside a UN position southwest of Naqurah.

30. On 18 September, the Israel Defense Forces told UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces personnel inspecting suspicious equipment southwest of Naqurah “to stop activities, or personnel will be the object of fire.” UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces stopped the activity and moved to a safe position.

31. On 20 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel pointed their rifles towards UNIFIL peacekeeper conducting a bunker alarm drill southwest of Naqurah. Following the incident, UNIFIL requested to speak with the Israel Defense Forces commander in the area, [response to be added].

32. On 23 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at the window of a UNIFIL patrol vehicle northeast of Sarda (Sector East).

33. On 25 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Ayn Arab (Sector East).

34. On 30 September, an Israel Defense Forces tank at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed its turret towards a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Markaba.

35. On 1 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Khiyam (Sector East).

36. On 1 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam towards a UN position near Ghajar (Sector East).

37. On 2 October, the Israel Defense Forces dropped a grenade about 30 meters away from UNIFIL peacekeepers in Marun al-Ra’s, who were providing security to local residents. About 20 minutes later, a second group of peacekeepers at the same location observed a second grenade exploding approximately 20 meters above their heads, creating a bright flash and white smoke. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel nor to the local residents who were present. UNIFIL had informed the Israel Defense Forces of its planned activity in advance. As the incident transpired, UNIFIL issued a formal “stop-firing” request to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL also subsequently raised the incident with the Israel Defense Forces in writing.

38. On 3 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed green laser beams at UNIFIL patrol vehicles northeast of Sarda.

39. On 8 October, two Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed their rifles for a few seconds at an Observer Group Lebanon patrol, northeast of Marwahin.

40. On 8 October, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed his weapon toward five UNIFIL peacekeepers who were preparing for the Liaison Branch to cross the Blue Line, southwest of Naqurah (Sector West).

41. On 9 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel in vehicles at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser toward a UN position southwest of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East).

42. On 11 October, an Israel Defense Forces drone dropped a grenade approximately forty meters outside the fence of a UN position in Kfar Kila. The resulting shrapnel projection caused light injury to one of the UNIFIL peacekeepers who was inside the position. UNIFIL has launched a technical investigation into the incident. UNIFIL has also written to the Israel Defense Forces protesting the incident. Following the incident, the Israel Defense Forces issued a statement saying that it had “operated to distance suspects, who attempted to reestablish a military structure belonging to the Hizbullah terrorist organization in the Kfar Kila area by means of a grenade.” The Israel Defense Forces acknowledged the communication from UNIFIL and stated that that it reviewed the incident and “reinforced safety distance procedures for strikes near UNIFIL positions.”

43. On 15 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed an infrared light towards a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Sarda.

44. On 16 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel directed a flashlight towards a Lebanese Armed Forces position, where UNIFIL was present, whereafter the Lebanese Armed Forces directed a flashlight toward the Israel Defense Forces. The Israel Defence Forces subsequently fired approximately 10 to 15 rounds near the Lebanese Armed Forces position. UNIFIL immediately issued a “stop fire” request, whereafter the engagement quickly ceased.

#### **Restrictions of the freedom of movement or aggressive behaviour involving Lebanese actors**

45. On 21 June, 50 individuals in civilian clothes blocked the path of a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Tibnin (Sector West) by placing vehicles across the road. After about an hour, the patrol was able to move to an adjacent area where the Lebanese Armed Forces was waiting, whereafter the patrol continued its activity. The incident was filmed and shared on social media. UNIFIL issued a public statement reiterating that freedom of movement is a core requirement for the implementation of its mandate.

46. On 28 June, five individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Brashit (Sector East) and stating that the patrol could not proceed without being accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The crowd subsequently grew to ten individuals, with one of the individuals joining the group claiming that the road was private property. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, following which the patrol left the area together with the Lebanese Armed Forces and continued its activity using an alternative road.

47. On 2 July, an individual in civilian clothes on a motorcycle gestured to a UNIFIL patrol near At Tiri (Sector West) to turn around. The patrol moved to a nearby location where it met up with the Lebanese Armed Forces which advised the peacekeepers to avoid At Tiri due to planned Ashura commemorations. The patrol then continued its activity using an alternative route.

48. On 4 July, three individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol west of Srifa (Sector West) stating that the patrol could not continue its movement. The patrol continued its activity using an alternative route.

49. On 9 July, a UNIFIL patrol near Jibal Al Butm (Sector West) encountered a low-hanging electric cable stretching between buildings, blocking the road. Several individuals explained that the road was not passable due to an airstrike with about 17 people gathering around the patrol, while a civilian vehicle blocked the road behind. After the Lebanese Armed Forces and the deputy mayor arrived, UNIFIL resumed its

activity using an alternative route. Later the same day, UNIFIL confirmed that there had been an airstrike in the area.

50. Also on 9 July, about 15 individuals blocked the road of another UNIFIL patrol near Jibal Al Butm, without explaining the reason. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the patrol continued its activity using an alternative route. The mayor of Jibal Al Butm later informed UNIFIL that the individuals involved were local youth, acting independently.

51. On 10 July, about 10 individuals in civilian clothes, with motorbikes, blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol near Aytiti (Sector West), while throwing stones and beating the patrol vehicles with their hands as well as placing car tires in front of the UNIFIL vehicles. After warnings via a loudspeaker, the patrol used two smoke grenades to disperse the crowd. Meanwhile, individuals continued to throw stones, hitting one of the peacekeepers, without causing injury. The patrol vehicles then pushed aside the motorbikes blocking the road and continued their movement. Following the incident, the mayor of Aytiti stressed that while he coordinates UNIFIL access to the village with the Lebanese Armed Forces “intrusions” on private property remain unacceptable to the community.

52. On 16 July, an individual in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol west of Ibil al-Saqi (Sector East). The patrol turned around and left the area.

53. On 20 July, five individuals in civilian clothes with three vehicles blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol north of Frun (Sector East). The peacekeepers used an alternative road to continue their activity. Following the incident, the mayor of Frun suggested to UNIFIL that the perpetrators may have been outsiders.

54. On 21 July, eight individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol west of Dayr Kifa (Sector West), stating the patrol could not be present without the Lebanese Armed Forces. After the peacekeepers explained the purpose of the patrol, their attitude became more positive and, after the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the UNIFIL patrol continued its activity. Following the incident, the mayor of Days Kifa explained that local youth had stopped the last three vehicles of the patrol as they had been separated from the rest of the patrol and were entering private property.

55. On 24 July, a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Hariss (Sector West) encountered large stones blocking the road, apparently as the result of a landslide. While taking another road, one of the patrol’s armored personnel carriers got stuck in the vegetation. Soon thereafter, five agitated individuals in civilian clothes arrived and started striking the vehicle with their hands. The group subsequently grew to 15 individuals. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the patrol resumed its activity. Following the incident the mayor of Hariss stated that the patrol was stopped as it entered a dead end. He advised that UNIFIL should coordinate its patrols with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

56. On 9 August, two individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Zibqin (Sector West), stating they were not allowed to be present without the Lebanese Armed Forces as they were entering an area of private property. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the patrol continued its movement. A few minutes later, another individual in civilian clothes blocked the road of the patrol, stating the patrol could not continue as it was entering private property. After the Lebanese Armed Forces returned to the area, the patrol continued its movement for a second time.

57. On 10 August, four individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol near an olive grove south of Bafliyah (Sector West), stating the patrol was about to enter private property. An additional 15 individuals with vehicles arrived within minutes,



with one of the individuals hitting one of the UNIFIL vehicles with a telescopic baton, breaking the rear-view mirror. The peacekeepers subsequently used tear gas to disperse the crowd, whereafter they continued their movement. Following the incident, the mayor of Bafliyah stated that the patrol had entered private property, and that the aggressive posture of the peacekeepers fueled tension.

58. On 10 August, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported that an individual in civilian clothes threw a stone toward a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Mays al-Jabal, lightly damaging the vehicle.

59. On 11 August, a group of about 30 individuals blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Al Malikiyah (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived after about 30 minutes, whereafter the patrol continued its movement. Following the incident the mayor of Al Malikiyah stated that local youths often act spontaneously when patrols are not accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

60. On 28 August, five individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at UNIFIL patrol vehicles, northwest of Ayn Ba'al (Sector West), causing minor damage to two of the patrol vehicles. The local mayor informed UNIFIL that the incident will be investigated.

61. On 9 September, 12 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL vehicle patrol north of Ash Sh'aytiyah (Sector West), shouting and throwing stones, while stating the patrol had to be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. After a short interruption, the patrol continued its movement.

62. On 14 September, five individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol passing south of Jibal Al Butm (Sector West), resulting in slight damage to one of the UN vehicles.

63. On 16 September, approximately 15 individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL vehicle patrol in Alahmadiya (Sector East) prompting the peacekeepers to leave the area and use an alternate route.

64. On 28 September, an individual in civilian clothes stopped an Observer Group Lebanon patrol northwest of Kafra (Sector West) and informed the patrol that to continue on the road posed a safety risk. The patrol turned around and proceeded on a different route.

65. On 1 October, four individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Naffakhaniyah (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces soon arrived, whereafter the patrol continued its movement. About an hour later, the same patrol was stopped for a second time by a group of nine individuals in civilian clothes. After a short stop, the patrol was able to continue its movement.

66. On 3 October, two individuals in civilian clothes on motorcycles stopped a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Alahamadiya (Sector East) and asked the patrol to leave the village. The patrol left the village and resumed its planned activity.

67. On 4 October, a group of individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL vehicle southwest of Tibnin, resulting in minor damage to the vehicle.

#### **Incidents not attributed to any party**

68. On 3 October, a UNIFIL vessel operating in the UNIFIL Area of Maritime Operation experienced electronic interference from an unknown source for approximately 30 minutes, affecting its global positioning and radar systems.

69. On 5 October, UNIFIL Maritime Task Force vessels experienced electronic interference from an unknown source for approximately 45 minutes, affecting

essential navigational and surveillance equipment, including the global positioning and automatic identification systems and radar assets.

70. On 9 October, a UNIFIL patrol near Alma al-Sha'b experienced electronic interference from an unknown source, including radio interference in an unspecified language.

71. On 14 October, a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Marun al-Ra's experienced electronic interference from an unknown source, temporarily disrupting their global positioning system.

## 附件二

### Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) states that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

2. In identical letters dated 25 June addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/416](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “attempts to reactivate smuggling routes along the Lebanese-Syrian border have also been observed [...] Hezbollah is making concerted efforts to restore its military capabilities through transfer of funds [...] Iran initially attempted to resume direct financial transfers to Hezbollah via direct flights to Lebanon and also through indirect flights via third countries .... Recently, Hezbollah has shifted to more sophisticated methods, primarily using the “hawala” system through money exchange offices in Lebanon, transferring hundreds of millions of dollars through this channel. Overall, an estimated one billion dollars has been transferred to Hezbollah since the ceasefire came into effect [...] Hezbollah’s aerial unit continues to produce thousands of UAVs under the guidance and funding of Iran”.

3. In response, in identical letters dated 10 July addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/458](#)), the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations rejected “the baseless and fabricated allegations levelled against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the [Israeli] letters dated 29 May and 25 June 2025”.

4. In identical letters dated 6 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/621](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “Hezbollah has intensified smuggling by land, air, and sea, including efforts to reestablish arms smuggling routes along the Lebanese-Syrian border using local smugglers, operatives, and reportedly tunnels [...] on August 19, Syrian forces intercepted a truck carrying Grad rockets from Syria into Lebanon via the Homs route, a known smuggling corridor running from southwest of Homs towards northeastern Beqaa. This recent illustrative case follows multiple thwarted attempts to smuggle anti-tank missiles, launchers, and RPGs across the border in areas like Al-Hermel and Al-Qusayr.

5. On 15 August, Hizbullah Secretary General Naim Qassem stated “thank you to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which supported us with money, weapons, resources and political and media positions. Iran stood by us, bore the burden with us, and offered martyrs”.

6. Separately, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced on 13 July that it had detained a suspected terrorist connected to “a cell affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia” in possession of “explosive devices [obtained] through illegal smuggling crossings”. On 19 August, the Syrian Ministry of Interior stated that “the Internal Security Forces in Homs seized a car loaded with Grad missiles that were being smuggled towards the Lebanese border”. On 11 September, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced the arrest of a “terrorist cell affiliated with the Hezbollah militia” operating in the western Damascus countryside, adding that heavy weapons including “rocket launchers, 19 Grad rockets, anti-tank missiles, individual weapons, and large

quantities of various ammunition were confiscated” and that “preliminary investigations revealed that cell members received training in camps inside Lebanese territory and were planning to carry out operations inside Syrian territory that would threaten the security and stability of citizens”. Hizbullah, in a statement dated 11 September, categorically refuted the allegations, stating that it had “no presence or activities in Syria” and was “fully keen on Syria’s stability and its people’s security”.

7. On 18 October, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “thwarted an attempt to smuggle weapons in the Mount Hermon area”, noting that “a number of suspects were arrested who attempted to smuggle weapons from Syrian territory to Lebanese territory ... the forces arrested the suspects and transferred them for investigation after they attempted to smuggle hand grenades, pistols, anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition”.

8. As detailed in paragraph 63 of this report, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,498 vessels.

9. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

## 附件三

## Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 11 of its resolution [2790 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council urged “the international community to intensify its support, including equipment, material and finance, to the LAF in order to ensure their effective and sustainable deployment south of the Litani River and to enhance their capacities to implement resolution [1701\(2006\)](#), ... [and requested] ... the Secretary-General to continue adapting UNIFIL’s activities, within its mandate, to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL”.

2. During the reporting period, President Aoun continued to advocate for increased support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. In his speech delivered during the General Debate of the Eightieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 23 September, the President stated, “Furthermore, there is the issue of providing the necessary means to our legal armed forces so that they may take on the task in defending and safekeeping our national integrity. We remain hopeful about the public initiatives to organize international conferences dedicated to that purpose.” According to readouts published by the presidency, many of the President’s engagements with dignitaries on the margins of the General Debate included discussions on prospective support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Such support was also a key theme of discussions between President Aoun and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Lammy during the latter’s official visit to Lebanon on 4 July. Moreover, following a meeting between Prime Minister Salam and French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on 24 July, a statement released by the French Presidency noted that the latter had committed to continuing “to contribute to strengthening the Lebanese army, which must ensure the state’s monopoly on weapons throughout the territory”. Later, in a 6 September statement welcoming the Lebanese Government’s endorsement of the Lebanese Armed Forces plan to assert exclusive state control over weapons, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that France “stands ready to organize two conferences in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and of recovery and reconstruction when conditions allow”. Lebanese Armed Forces Commander General Rodolph Haykal also made trips abroad to rally financial and technical support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, traveling to Jordan in July and Qatar in October, while receiving several delegations for discussions on financial support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and opportunities for technical assistance.

3. On 30 June, Qatar formally announced its provision of \$60 million in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (see [S/2025/460](#), annex III, para. 7). According to the statement released by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the announcement came “within the framework of the State of Qatar’s firm commitment to support the Republic of Lebanon, stand by the brotherly Lebanese people, and its firm belief in the importance and necessity of joint Arab action”. The European Union (EU), on 23 June, launched a €12.5 million project to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in “leading recovery efforts, enhancing security and helping communities in Southern Lebanon rebuild”. On 10 September, the United States announced the approval of a package for Lebanon with an estimated value of \$14.2 million, intended to “build the capability and capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle weapons caches and military infrastructure of non-state groups, including Hizballah”.

4. The Military Technical Committee for Lebanon convened in London on 15 and 16 September to review the evolving requirements of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the context of the ongoing implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement and the plan to establish exclusive state control over weapons. During the meeting, the admission of three new members – Qatar, the Republic of Korea and Türkiye – signified the growing interest among Member States in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL and UNSCOL attended the meeting as observers.

5. In coordination with the Committee, several Member States continued to provide critical support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Equipment, including that related to explosive ordnance disposal, was provided by Germany, the Netherlands, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom delivered training courses and, in several cases, contributed to the enhancement training infrastructure for the Lebanese Armed Forces. Sustainment support, intended to enhance the wellbeing of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel, was provided by France, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Spain and the United States. The Netherlands and Italy continued to provide support to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities, while, outside the remit of the Military Technical Committee, the European Union, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States provided equipment, training and infrastructure to support border control and management. With funding from France and the EU, and support from the United Nations Development Programme, the International Organization for Migration and partners, the Lebanese Armed Forces, on 30 September, inaugurated the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre at the Beirut Naval Base. Focusing on prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery at sea, the Centre will coordinate maritime emergencies, rescue operations, and strengthen cooperation among the Army, ministries and security agencies, with UNIFIL participation.

6. Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding signed on 10 June for the provision of non-lethal material support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (see [S/2025/460](#), annex III, para. 9), UNIFIL delivered 55,263 kilograms of food rations and 442,620 litres of fuel to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In a separate initiative, on 16 September, UNIFIL gifted 101 vehicles, including four-wheel drive vehicles, cargo trucks, water tankers, ambulances, and luggage transport vehicles, as well as other equipment to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

7. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces continued during the reporting period. Of \$38 million in donor funding, including pledges, received by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes from Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Spain, \$32.7 million was channeled through the “Livelihood Ecosystem” project (see [S/2025/460](#), annex III, para. 9) in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Under a broader United Nations strategy of support to the security sector, seven United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are supporting the implementation of 20 projects in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, including in support to operational readiness, CIMIC activities for trust building, upgrading the main logistics warehouse, introducing modern supply chain systems and renewable energy solutions, removal of rubble and unexploded ordnance, border control, maritime security, and capacity development in the areas of migrant protection, human rights, mediation, and women, peace and security. Funding totaling \$2.1 million from the European Union and the Netherlands was also directed to the Lebanese Mine Action Centre. The Lebanese Armed Forces also endorsed and promulgated an anti-sexual harassment and domestic violence policy, developed with support from the United Nations, and delivered related training to officers in border regions.