



SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 33rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ABRASZEWSKI (Poland)

Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and  
Budgetary Questions: Mr. MSELLE

CONTENTS

AGENDA ITEM 111: PERSONNEL QUESTIONS (continued)

- (a) COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARIAT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
- (b) RESPECT FOR THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
- (c) OTHER PERSONNEL QUESTIONS

AGENDA ITEM 110: SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 111: PERSONNEL QUESTIONS (continued) (A/36/407 and Add.1, A/36/432 and Add.1 and 2; A/37/30 (annex I), A/37/143, A/37/378 and Add.1, A/37/469 and Add.1, A/37/528 and Add.1; A/C.5/37/5, A/C.5/37/6 and Corr.1, A/C.5/37/24, A/C.5/37/26, A/C.5/37/34)

- (a) COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARIAT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
- (b) RESPECT FOR THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
- (c) OTHER PERSONNEL QUESTIONS

1. Mr. OULD MAALOU (Mauritania) said that the effectiveness, dynamism and independence of a truly international Secretariat depended on the dedication, competence and integrity of those working in it and, above all, on strict respect on the part of Member States for Article 100, paragraph 2, of the Charter. His delegation noted with satisfaction the progress which had been made in the implementation of resolutions 33/143 and 35/210, in particular with regard to the use of modern personnel management techniques and the introduction of competitive examinations to improve recruitment. His delegation was gratified, in particular, by the fact that the target of filling 40 per cent of vacant posts with nationals of unrepresented or under-represented countries had been attained in the reporting period. Nevertheless, further progress must be made towards improving the geographical distribution of the Secretariat and the percentage of posts earmarked for nationals of unrepresented or under-represented countries should be increased. Recruitment methods were crucial in that regard and the use of competitive examinations could accelerate the process of promoting the equitable representation of all States. However, competitive examinations should be used in relation to part of a Member State's quota only, so as to avoid the risk that it would be represented in the Secretariat only in the junior grades.

2. He had serious doubts about the value of the competitive examinations as currently administered in view of the large number of successful candidates who had so far not been recruited and requested information on the reasons for that situation. Increasing the percentage of posts that could be filled by promoting General Service staff members to the Professional category, as suggested by the Secretary-General, might jeopardize the objective of equitable geographical distribution by reducing opportunities for the recruitment of external candidates from unrepresented or under-represented countries, very few of whose nationals were represented in the General Service category. However, his delegation could agree that, when a competitive examination was held in a given country, the nationals of that country serving in the General Service category who met the necessary requirements should be authorized to sit the examination.

(Mr. Ould Maaloum, Mauritania)

3. His delegation welcomed the agreement between the Joint Inspection Unit and the International Civil Service Commission with regard to a number of essential issues. As to those points on which JIU and ICSC still differed, they should be asked to work out objective technical solutions. Of course, contentious matters of a political nature should be negotiated by Member States so that the personnel policy reforms desired by Member States and the Secretariat alike could be speedily carried out.

4. He had reservations with regard to any increase in the age of retirement, since it would diminish opportunities to modernize the Secretariat and slow down the advancement of younger career staff.

5. Mr. KUDRYAVTSEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that long experience had shown that the efficiency of the Secretariat depended in large measure on the representativity of its staff. Only if staff members were recruited on the widest possible geographical basis, as required by the Charter, could the Secretariat properly represent the social, political and cultural variety of the modern world. The inadequate representation of a part of the Organization's membership had to be regarded as the result of biased and inimical personnel policies, especially as the situation had been long-standing. His delegation intended to insist on a radical improvement in the allocation of Secretariat posts, especially at influential levels of the Secretariat.

6. Almost two years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 35/210, many of the resolution's provisions remained unimplemented or had been applied only sporadically. One of the chief aims of the policy laid down in the resolution had been to encourage the wider recruitment of Professional staff from unrepresented and under-represented countries so as to bring those countries within their desirable ranges over a two-year period. The Secretary-General's report on the implementation of personnel policy reforms (A/C.5/37/5) indicated that approximately 43 per cent of the new staff members appointed to posts subject to geographical distribution between 1 July 1981 and 30 June 1982 had been nationals of unrepresented or under-represented countries. Resolution 35/210, however, had been adopted in December 1980. Between 1 January 1981 and 30 June 1982, the number of unrepresented countries had fallen from 20 to 17, the number of under-represented countries had diminished from 25 to 24, but the number of countries within their desirable ranges but below their mid-points had increased from 45 to 48. In total, therefore, there had been a reduction of just one in the number of countries inadequately represented in the Secretariat - from 90 to 89, over a period of one and a half years. If progress continued at that rate, it would take 130 years to eliminate the imbalances in the distribution of Secretariat posts. He wondered whether the Secretary-General really expected the process to take that long, or if some more heartening prognosis could be made.

7. Resolution 35/210 requested the Secretary-General to establish an active recruitment policy in order to raise the levels of personnel recruited from unrepresented and under-represented countries. There was no mention of such a policy in the Secretary-General's report. Presumably it was being held up for

(Mr. Kudryavtsev, USSR)

reasons of which his delegation was unaware. In any event, he could not but deplore the delay, while hoping, in the light of the remarks made by the Assistant Secretary-General for Personnel Services concerning her Office's preparation of a medium-term recruitment plan, that it would not be necessary to repeat his criticisms during the Committee's discussion of personnel questions in 1985.

8. The question of geographical distribution had been on the Committee's agenda for 20 years. Many resolutions on the subject had been adopted, but to little effect, and it was now surely more important to monitor compliance with the resolutions already adopted than to add to their number. He was amazed, for example, that document A/37/378/Add.1, paragraph 7, expressed disagreement with the JIU recommendation to apply specific targets of geographical distribution to individual Secretariat departments. How was equitable geographical distribution to be attained in the Secretariat as a whole if the principle was not observed in its main constituent parts? Yet when Soviet candidates were put forward for posts in certain departments, it was not uncommon for the departmental heads concerned to say - in the absence of any established criteria - that they were already employing "enough" Soviet staff. Some even felt that while the Secretariat might employ some staff from the socialist countries, there should be none in their departments. The situation was patently absurd, and patently discriminatory.

9. His delegation would not tolerate deliberate attempts to lower the levels at which Soviet staff were employed. Resolution 35/210 contained a specific provision (sect. I, para. 4) to protect the representation of Member States whose nationals served primarily on fixed-term contracts. He wondered why the Secretariat was having such difficulty in complying with that provision. Certainly it was not because the candidates put forward by the Soviet Union were inadequately qualified. It seemed that the executive officers in individual departments did not feel bound to observe General Assembly resolutions strictly. Indeed, it had been openly acknowledged that some departmental heads were opposed to moves to eradicate the under-representation of certain Member States. Resolution 35/210 had given the Office of Personnel Services specific authority to take a final decision on the selection of a candidate: he wondered whether that authority had been exercised over the past two years. The reports of the Secretary-General unfortunately skirted the issue.

10. Either the principle of equitable geographical distribution had to be applied in individual departments or the geographical imbalance of the Secretariat would persist. His delegation favoured a ban on the recruitment of candidates from over-represented countries to posts subject to geographical distribution until all countries had reached the mid-point of their desirable ranges.

11. Some delegations had even argued against the maintenance of a regional balance in individual departments, alleging that such a policy would deprive the Secretariat of "flexibility". Such flexibility was of benefit to only one group of States, which had been making use of it for decades. Some developing countries were even classed as over-represented because of the "flexibility" provided by the population reserve for their regions. If the reserve posts their nationals occupied were considered part of their geographical quotas, they would no longer be regarded as over-represented.

(Mr. Kudryavtsev, USSR)

12. On 30 June 1982 the Soviet Union had held nine posts fewer than the minimum of its desirable range, or 42 posts less than its mid-point. The number of Soviet nationals employed in posts subject to geographical distribution had, admittedly, gone up, but if it continued to increase at the same slow rate the Soviet Union would not reach its mid-point until some time in 1992. That was not to say that the Office of Personnel Services was not taking some steps to deal with the problem of adequate Soviet representation: there had been useful co-operation between the Office and the Soviet authorities. But most of the Soviet candidates interviewed and recommended by the Office were not accepted by the Secretariat. Their names were kept on file in the Office of Personnel Services for years, when their knowledge and experience could be being put to use for the benefit of international co-operation in the United Nations.

13. Like many other countries, the Soviet Union assigned staff to work in the Secretariat on fixed-term contracts, in the belief that with proper planning the practice should not hinder the attainment of its mid-point. He refuted attempts by an earlier speaker to dictate the contractual and other conditions under which Soviet staff should be employed. Fixed-term contracts had demonstrated their advantages over permanent contracts. Permanent contracts were often used by mediocre and poor staff members to shelter behind, since they afforded maximum protection against dismissal. The institution of permanent contracts led to the emergence of a closed, cosmopolitan caste of international civil servants who in many cases, had a very self-centred attitude towards employment in an international organization. Every member of the Committee who had witnessed the recent disturbances organized by the Staff Union had been able to see for himself that many members of the staff were coming to regard their jobs in the United Nations not as positions of high trust but as sinecures. The preponderance of permanent contracts clearly had an adverse effect on the efficiency of the Secretariat, in that fresh blood and experience were prevented from entering the Organization. It was also to blame for the unwarranted growth in the total number of staff, which could be avoided if permanent staff members were more versatile and able to perform different activities. As they were not, the Administration was constantly adding staff, and bringing in expensive outside experts and consultants, the majority of whom came from a small number of States. That was why his delegation favoured a greater proportion of fixed-term contracts in the United Nations, as was to be found in other organizations of the common system.

14. Turning to the second JIU report on the career concept (A/37/528), he commented that the report suffered from a cardinal defect: it was based on the incorrect notion that the international civil service should be composed basically of permanent staff making their careers in international organizations. He categorically opposed the idea of limiting the number of staff appointed from outside the Secretariat to middle-level and senior posts. A reduction in the number of posts open to external candidates would deprive the Organization of mature, highly-qualified staff members and would violate the principle of equitable geographical distribution, since the overwhelming majority of senior posts would then be taken by staff from over-represented countries serving on permanent contracts. He also opposed the Unit's second recommendation, concerning the

(Mr. Kudryavtsev, USSR)

introduction of written and oral tests at the P-3/P-4 levels, and the idea of stricter requirements for access to the P-5 grade. Until the consequences of introducing competitive examinations at the P-2 level had been evaluated, proposals to introduce examinations throughout the United Nations system would be premature.

15. His delegation recognized that competitive examinations could be used in selecting staff to fill P-1 and P-2 posts earmarked by the United Nations Secretariat for nationals of unrepresented and under-represented countries. It did not, however, agree with the Secretary-General's recent suggestion that no less than 50 per cent of the posts at those levels should be filled by internal promotion from the General Service and related categories, since the result would be an increase in the number of Professional staff from over-represented countries.

16. He found it hard to understand why internal candidates for promotion to posts at the P-1 and P-2 levels were not required to have had a university education, when for external candidates a university education was a prerequisite. The difference in the standards applied hardly seemed compatible with the requirements specified in the Charter. He was also strongly opposed to the proposed simplification in the written part of the competitive examination taken by General Service candidates (A/C.5/37/5, para. 33), especially when no such simplification was planned in the case of candidates from unrepresented and under-represented countries. ICSC should be commissioned to study the experience gained thus far in holding competitive examinations, and report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

17. He opposed any increase in the mandatory age of retirement and emphasized his disapproval of the practice of allowing representatives of the staff associations to attend meetings of the Fifth Committee. The offensive tone of the recent statement by one such representative, and the intolerable demands by the association concerned, only served to confirm the correctness of that attitude.

AGENDA ITEM 110: SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS (continued) (A/37/11; A/C.5/37/L.20/Rev.1, L.21 and L.23)

18. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, at the preceding meeting, the representative of Brazil had introduced draft resolution A/C.5/37/L.20/Rev.1 on behalf of the sponsors and the representative of Australia had introduced his delegation's draft resolution in document A/C.5/37/L.21. However, in a constructive gesture, the sponsors of the two draft resolutions had agreed that they should not be discussed at the current stage. Accordingly, only the draft decision in document A/C.5/37/L.23 was before the Committee for discussion.

19. Mr. KRISTIANSEN (Denmark), speaking on behalf of the 10 member countries of the European Economic Community, said that the delegations of those countries had reservations regarding the implications of draft decision A/C.5/37/L.23. In the general discussion of the item, the delegations concerned had emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Committee on

(Mr. Kristiansen, Denmark)

Contributions and the fact that only that Committee was responsible for making recommendations on the scale of assessments. They were aware that, in the course of informal discussions, an understanding had been reached on the limited redistribution among Member States of points in the scale of assessments. They had doubts, however, as to whether the redistribution in question would be in accordance with agreed criteria for the calculation of the scale of assessments. It would appear that the Committee on Contributions would be asked to reconvene at very short notice merely to formalize an agreement which, in the view of the EEC countries, would undermine the integrity and independence of the Committee. It was likely, moreover, that a sizeable number of the Committee's members would not be able to attend and that would raise doubts as to the validity and impartiality of its findings.

20. The delegations of the EEC countries reaffirmed their position that no decision should be taken on a new scale of assessments until the Committee on Contributions had completed the work which it had been requested to carry out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 36/231 A and that the existing scale should therefore remain in force until that time. They were increasingly concerned over the manner in which the scale of assessments had been dealt with in the Fifth Committee in recent years. In such circumstances, the position of the major contributors with regard to the need for strict budgetary control was especially apposite.

21. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said that he shared the doubts expressed by the representative of Denmark as to what the Committee on Contributions could be expected to achieve in a short period of time when no fewer than five of its members had made formal reservations with regard to the conclusions reached at its most recent regular session. His delegation favoured instructing the Committee on Contributions to draw up a new scale of assessments at its next regular session in 1983 in accordance with the criteria laid down in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. In the meantime, the existing scale should remain in force. In that connection, he drew attention to rule 160 of the rules of procedure, which stipulated that, once fixed by the General Assembly, the scale of assessments should not be subject to a general revision for at least three years. In any event, the decision which the Assembly took must not leave the Secretary-General in any uncertainty with respect to the financing of the budget for the next year.

22. His delegation therefore proposed that the draft decision in document A/C.5/37/L.23 should be amended to request the Committee on Contributions to re-examine the proposed scale contained in its report, submit a new recommendation by 30 May 1983, and maintain the existing scale in force until 31 December of that year.

23. Mr. MOLTENI (Argentina) said that what the representative of Spain was suggesting was not an amendment but rather a new proposal to maintain in force the existing scale of assessments. Accordingly, he asked the Chairman to rule whether it was in fact an amendment within the meaning of the rules of procedure.

24. The CHAIRMAN appealed to members not to enter into a protracted procedural debate. The Committee had been dealing with item 110 for some five weeks and it was essential to proceed in an orderly manner.
25. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said that his delegation's proposal, which would change part of draft decision A/C.5/37/L.23, was indeed an amendment within the meaning of the rules of procedure. Those same rules required that an amendment should be put to the vote before the proposal to which it related.
26. Mr. LAHLOU (Morocco) said that the aim of the sponsors of draft decision A/C.5/37/L.23 was to bridge the gap between opposing views and to find a solution which would be acceptable to all, or at least a large majority of, Member States. The Spanish proposal would radically alter the substance of the draft decision and was therefore a new proposal. As such, it could not be discussed before draft decision A/C.5/37/L.23.
27. Mr. TOMMO MONTHE (United Republic of Cameroon) said that, after the discussion in the Committee and the informal consultations which had been held, no one could be in doubt as to where members stood on the issue. He expressed gratitude to the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.5/37/L.20/Rev.1 and L.21 for their constructive attitude, which, it was to be hoped, would help the Committee to take the right decision. It would be pointless for the Committee to engage in a protracted discussion at the current meeting and he therefore announced his intention of moving the closure of the debate under rule 117 of the rules of procedure at the appropriate moment.
28. Mr. FONTAINE ORTIZ (Cuba) endorsed the comments of the representatives of Argentina and Morocco with regard to the Spanish proposal. The rules of procedure required that proposals should be considered separately in the order in which they had been submitted.
29. Mr. WANG Xuexian (China) shared the view that the Spanish proposal was not an amendment. He also agreed with the representative of the United Republic of Cameroon that all sides had made their views on the issue abundantly clear. It was time for the Fifth Committee to take a decision so that the Committee on Contributions would have sufficient time to re-examine its proposed scale of assessments.
30. Mr. HEMMINGS (Australia) said that it was time to take a decision on draft decision A/C.5/37/L.23 and, accordingly, he proposed the closure of debate under rule 117 of the rules of procedure.
31. Mr. de PINIES (Spain), speaking on a point of order, said that he objected to the description of the Spanish amendment as a new proposal. Rule 130 of the rules of procedure provided that when an amendment was moved to a proposal, the amendment should be voted on first, and that when there were two or more amendments, the Committee should first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal. It was clear that an amendment could modify the substance of a proposal; indeed, it frequently did so. His delegation thus requested that the Committee should vote first on the Spanish amendment and then on the draft decision in document A/C.5/37/L.23.



32. The CHAIRMAN said that several delegations felt that the Spanish amendment was actually a new proposal, since it would radically change the substance of the draft decision. Under rule 130 a motion was considered an amendment to a proposal if it merely added to, deleted from or revised part of the proposal. Two interpretations were possible: a technical interpretation and one concerned with the substance of the matter.

33. The Australian delegation had proposed that the debate should be closed. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to close the debate.

34. Miss CASTILLO (Dominican Republic) said that she was opposed to closure of the debate. The representative of Spain was correct in maintaining that his proposal was an amendment, not a new proposal.

35. The time allowed for in the draft decision was extremely short, and it was doubtful whether the Committee on Contributions could complete the necessary work so quickly. Her delegation therefore endorsed the Spanish amendment, in the interests of the Organization.

36. Mr. RALLIS (Greece) said that his delegation agreed that the Spanish proposal was an amendment.

37. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) inquired what would happen to his proposal if the debate was closed.

38. The CHAIRMAN said that the question put by the representative of Spain was valid, even if the timing was inappropriate. If the debate was closed, there would be no more speakers. The sponsors of the draft decision had stated that they viewed the Spanish proposal not as a mere amendment, but as constituting a new proposal.

39. Under rule 117 of the rules of procedure, permission to oppose the closure of a debate was to be accorded to two speakers. Since only one delegation had opposed closure of the debate, he declared the debate closed.

40. Mr. FORAN (Controller) said that if the General Assembly adopted the draft decision in document A/C.5/37/L.23, the Committee on Contributions would have to be convened during the current session. If it met for two days, with interpreting services, costs of \$32,400 would be incurred, although they could be absorbed if the meetings were accommodated as conference-servicing facilities became available. There would be an additional amount of \$23,900 for the travel and subsistence of members of the Committee, which could be met from existing resources.

41. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) wondered how the Controller could expect the Committee on Contributions to re-examine the proposed scale of assessments in the space of only two meetings. Unless the issues were all prejudged, they could hardly be settled in a mere two days.

42. Mr. HEMMINGS (Australia) said that five members of the Committee on Contributions were already in New York and would not incur travel and subsistence expenses. Accordingly, the amounts disbursed should be less than the estimates given.
43. Mr. FORAN (Controller) said he had assumed that the Committee on Contributions would hold four meetings in two days, rather than only two, when he had stated the financial implications. If that Committee met for a longer period, subsistence expenses of approximately \$3,000 per day would be incurred. The figures he had given took account of the fact that several members of the Committee were already in New York.
44. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said that the Spanish representative on the Committee on Contributions was in New York but would soon have to return to Spain; his travel costs would therefore have to be met if the Committee on Contributions was reconvened.
45. The CHAIRMAN said that Committee would vote on the draft decision in document A/C.5/37/L.23.
46. Mr. PEDERSEN (Canada), speaking in explanation of vote before the vote, said that his delegation supported the draft decision in the hope that it would resolve the financial problems of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it still preferred the recommendation made by the Committee on Contributions. Canada supported the reconvening of that Committee on the understanding that its members would not be bound by any prior understanding and would be free to consider the matter independently.
47. Mr. PAPENDORP (United States of America) said it was his understanding that the issue before the Committee was whether there was to be a vote on the Spanish amendment to the draft decision. The Chair had not ruled that the Spanish proposal had been rejected. The Committee should view the Spanish proposal as an amendment, vote thereon, and then vote on the draft decision.
48. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee was aware of the issue before it.
49. Mr. KRISTIANSEN (Denmark) said that the 10 States members of the European Economic Community would vote against the draft decision.
50. Mr. van HELLENBERG HUBAR (Netherlands) said that, under the rules of procedure, the proposer of a proposal was not permitted to explain his vote. Canada was a sponsor of the draft decision, so that his delegation interpreted the fact that the representative of Canada had been allowed to explain his vote as meaning that the Committee was about to vote on the Spanish amendment.
51. The CHAIRMAN said that the Canadian representative should not have explained his vote on the draft decision.

52. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said the Committee had not yet decided whether the Spanish proposal was an amendment or a new proposal. The Chair had not given its view. The Spanish proposal was still before the Committee, unless the Chair was prepared to rule otherwise.

53. The CHAIRMAN said that he was attempting to conduct the debate and apply the rules of procedure in an orderly manner. Spain had proposed an amendment, the nature of which had later been questioned by several delegations. He, as Chairman, was obliged to respect the feeling of the Committee, which was not prepared to view the Spanish proposal as a mere amendment to the draft decision. He had therefore suggested that the Committee should proceed to a vote on the draft decision.

54. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) said that there was no provision in the rules of procedure requiring the Chair to respect the "feeling" of the Committee. His delegation requested a recorded vote on whether the Committee viewed the Spanish proposal as an amendment within the meaning of rule 130 of the rules of procedure or as a new proposal.

55. The CHAIRMAN said that he was merely trying to expedite the Committee's proceedings. He suggested that the Committee should vote to determine whether the Spanish proposal was an amendment rather than a new proposal.

56. Mrs. DORSET (Trinidad and Tobago) said that once the Chair had ruled that voting had begun, chaos ensued if the proper procedure was not followed. If the Committee now reversed the procedure which the Chair had initiated, great confusion would ensue.

57. Her delegation did not think that the Committee should vote to determine whether the Spanish proposal was an amendment. The rules of procedure had to be observed, and the Committee should now vote on the draft decision itself.

58. The CHAIRMAN said that matters would be expedited if a vote concerning the Spanish proposal was taken first. Accordingly, there would be a recorded vote to decide whether the Spanish proposal could be considered an amendment to document A/C.5/37/L.23.

In favour: Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada,

Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia.

Abstaining: Algeria, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Congo, Cyprus, Upper Volta.

59. The Committee decided by 91 votes to 24, with 6 abstentions, that the Spanish proposal was not an amendment to draft decision A/C.5/37/L.23 within the meaning of rule 130 of the rules of procedure, but a new proposal.

60. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the draft decision in document A/C.5/37/L.23.

61. The draft decision was adopted by 90 votes to 18, with 17 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.