



安全理事会

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2025 年 2 月 21 日至 6 月 20 日期间安全理事会第 1701(2006) 号决议的执行情况

秘书长的报告

一. 引言

1. 本报告全面评估了自 2025 年 3 月 12 日上一份报告(S/2025/153)发布以来安全理事会第 1701(2006)号决议的执行情况，并重点介绍了持续取得的进展以及普遍关注的领域。尽管停止敌对行动十分脆弱，但仍在继续，各方重申致力于全面执行第 1701(2006)号决议，但违反决议的情况依然存在。
2. 在以色列国防军根据 2024 年 11 月 27 日《停止敌对行动协定》撤出黎巴嫩领土方面没有取得任何进展。以色列国防军仍然驻扎在在蓝线北侧的五个阵地和两个所谓的缓冲区(S/2025/153，第 1 段)。联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队(联黎部队)探测或观察到从蓝线北侧向蓝线南侧发射的几个射弹轨迹，在联黎部队行动区多次查出违规武器，交由黎巴嫩武装部队进行处理，而以色列国防军多次袭击黎巴嫩境内的目标。
3. 在本报告所述期间，由约瑟夫·奥恩总统领导、纳瓦夫·萨拉姆总理新组建的黎巴嫩政府也做出协调一致的努力，巩固并扩大在黎巴嫩全境的国家权力。新政府根据部长级宣言采取了步骤，以扩大国家权力，包括在安全、经济和司法部门以及通过举行市政选举在地方一级扩大权力。在此期间，黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南持续部署并加强力量，在联黎部队的支持下，在拆除违规的非国家军事设施和收缴违规武器方面取得了进展。黎巴嫩领导人表示，他们承诺在全国范围内，包括在巴勒斯坦难民营内，执行国家对武器的垄断权。

* 由于技术原因于 2025 年 7 月 29 日重发。




二. 第 1701(2006)号决议执行情况

A. 停止敌对行动

4. 在本报告所述期间，联黎部队的雷达探测到220枚从蓝线南侧向北发射的射弹轨迹，以及1枚从蓝线北侧向南发射的射弹轨迹。联黎部队雷达还探测到7个射弹轨迹，而维持和平人员观察到8个从北向南发射的未越过蓝线的射弹轨迹。每道轨迹可代表多个射弹。几乎所有记录在案的都是火箭、迫击炮和炮弹轨迹。联黎部队的雷达无法探测某些类型的射弹，如空对地导弹、坦克炮弹、便携式反坦克弹或轻武器发射的射弹。联黎部队发现以色列国防军在蓝线北侧进行了67次空袭。此外，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军 118 次炮击蓝线北侧地区，22次从南向北开火。

图一


2025 年 2 月 21 日至 6 月 20 日联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队探测到的射弹轨迹



来源：联黎部队。

图二

2025 年 2 月 21 日至 6 月 20 日联黎部队观察到的每周空袭事件



来源：联黎部队。

5. 在本报告所述期间，以色列国防军不断袭击真主党据称在利塔尼河以南和以北的目标，包括比卡东部以及贝鲁特南郊、奈拜提耶、西顿和提尔等人口稠密地区附近，造成人员伤亡和民用设施损坏。自 2024 年 11 月 27 日以来，至少有 79 名黎巴嫩平民在以色列的军事行动中丧生，其中包括 15 名妇女和 10 名儿童，但没有以色列人伤亡的报告。以色列北部仍有数千名以色列人流离失所。
6. 自停止敌对行动生效以来，最严重的交火发生在 3 月份。3 月 22 日，联黎部队探测到从利塔尼河以北的卡法提布尼特发射的三个射弹轨迹，弹着点在蓝线北侧。以色列国防军宣布，三枚射弹“从黎巴嫩越境进入以色列，并在梅图拉被拦截”。同日晚些时候，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军在联黎部队行动区进行了 12 次空袭，包括对提尔中部(西区)的一次空袭。以色列国防军称，他们袭击了“数十个火箭发射器和真主党恐怖分子在黎巴嫩的一个指挥中心”。
7. 3 月 28 日，联黎部队观察到从阿德希特阿尔库赛尔发射的五个射弹轨迹和从阿尔坎塔拉(均为东区)向蓝线南侧发射的三个射弹轨迹。以色列国防军随后声称，“从黎巴嫩发射了两枚射弹：一枚被拦截，另一枚落入黎巴嫩境内”。同日晚些时候，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军在联黎部队行动区进行了 14 次空袭，并间接向阿诺恩、卡尔基拉、希亚姆和泰巴(均为东区)开火。以色列国防军随后对贝鲁特南郊进行了自 11 月 27 日以来的第一次袭击，称他们的目标是“真主党用于储存无人机的设施”。以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡 3 月 28 日宣称，“我们将继续强力执行停火。我们将袭击黎巴嫩境内任何地方，打击对以色列国的任何威胁”。
8. 4 月 1 日对贝鲁特南郊发动袭击后，以色列国防军称，其打击目标是“一名真主党恐怖分子，此人最近指挥了哈马斯特工活动，并协助他们策划对以色列平民的重大且迫在眉睫的恐怖袭击”。4 月 27 日，以色列国防军再次袭击了贝鲁特南郊，声称他们的目标是“一个储存有真主党精确制导弹的恐怖主义设施站点”。同日，内塔尼亚胡先生和以色列国防部长以色列·卡茨发表了以下联合声明：“以色列不会允许真主党变强，也不会允许其构成任何威胁——不论在黎巴嫩的任何地方”。
9. 6 月 5 日，在对贝鲁特南郊进行多次空袭后，卡茨先生表示：“本雅明·内塔尼亚胡总理和我已指示以色列国防军摧毁恐怖组织真主党用来制造和储存无人机的建筑物”。6 月 6 日，黎巴嫩武装部队称，“以色列敌方发出威胁后，我方立即与停止敌对行动监测机制展开协调，以阻止袭击发生。巡逻队还前往一些地点进行检查，尽管敌人拒绝了这一提议[……]”，“以色列敌方持续违反协定并拒绝与停止敌对行动监测机制合作，只会削弱委员会和军队的作用，并可能导致军事机构冻结与停止敌对行动监测机制在现场检查方面的合作”。
10. 联黎部队观察到以色列国防军在利塔尼河以南进行了几次无人机袭击，包括 3 月 5 日在纳古拉、4 月 3 日在宾特朱拜勒-亚伦公路和 6 月 20 日在提尔-阿巴西耶公路对车辆以及 5 月 27 日在亚特(均为西区)对一辆摩托车进行的无人机袭击。从 4 月开始，联黎部队观察到蓝线附近的预制建筑遭到袭击，包括 4 月 3 日和 6 日在纳古拉以及 5 月 23 日在沙马(均为西区)发生的袭击事件。以色列国防军

声称此次空袭针对的是“真主党的军事设施”，而黎巴嫩官员称，这些预制建筑只是临时用于安置市政服务机构，以待民用设施重建。联黎部队还听到或探测到 28 次爆炸声，这与媒体关于预制建筑或车辆遭到袭击的报道一致。

11. 以色列常驻联合国代表在 5 月 29 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2025/337)中报告，“真主党在利塔尼河的南北两侧又实施了 250 起违反行为。违反行为包括黎巴嫩南部真主党特工和高级成员展开军事活动、向以色列领土发射无人机和无人机等；保持地面和地下军事设施，如火箭发射器、隧道竖井和武器储存设施”。他还指出，“尽管有令人鼓舞的迹象表明，黎巴嫩政府和黎巴嫩武装部队试图履行停火谅解规定的义务，但到目前为止，他们做出的努力有限[……]”，“黎巴嫩当局在及时有效处理黎巴嫩全境的各种违反行为方面面临重大挑战。因此，在许多情况下，以色列不得不对迫在眉睫的军事威胁采取行动”。

12. 以色列国防军船只数次越过以色列国防军单方面设置的浮标线，并向黎巴嫩渔船开火。

B. 尊重蓝线的情况

13. 截至 6 月 20 日，以色列国防军仍驻扎在蓝线北侧的五个阵地和两个所谓的缓冲区。联黎部队至少 98 次观察到以色列国防军人员出现在蓝线北侧的这些阵地之外，包括阿拉伯卢韦扎、加贾尔和马克巴(东区)以及阿伊塔沙阿布、拉布内赫、马鲁瓦欣、鲁迈什和拉米亚(西区)等地区，这些人员经常从事挖掘工程或安装铁丝网。内塔尼亚胡先生于 2 月 23 日表示，以色列国防军将在指定地点驻扎，“直到黎巴嫩军队和黎巴嫩政府履行协定规定的所有义务”。3 月 11 日，奥恩先生呼吁停止敌对行动机制负责人向以色列施压，要求其“执行协定，撤出五个山丘[阵地]，并归还黎巴嫩囚犯”。

14. 联黎部队还三次观察到以色列国防军向经过这些阵地附近的车辆开火，并八次听到枪声。3 月 9 日，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军在基拉村附近的以军阵地附近向包括儿童在内的人员开枪，打死一名休班的黎巴嫩武装部队士兵，打伤另外三人，包括一名妇女和另一名休班的黎巴嫩武装部队士兵。受伤的黎巴嫩武装部队士兵随后被以色列国防军逮捕(见下文第 63 段)。3 月 22 日，联黎部队观察到一名以色列国防军士兵在基拉村东北向一辆黎巴嫩武装部队车辆开火。随后，车上的黎巴嫩武装部队士兵进行了还击。同日晚些时候，联黎部队观察到一名以色列国防军士兵乘坐一辆民用车辆向一名黎巴嫩士兵开枪，该名士兵当时正乘坐一辆民用车辆抵达位于贝特雅胡恩-宾特朱拜勒公路上的黎巴嫩武装部队阵地。另外，5 月 18 日，黎巴嫩武装部队证实，以色列国防军“在贝特雅胡恩-宾特朱拜勒检查站袭击了一辆黎巴嫩武装部队的车辆”，造成一名士兵受伤。

15. 3 月 7 日，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军移动了位于胡拉村(东区)蓝线附近的谢赫·阿巴德墓地/拉夫·阿希遗址围栏，此举阻断了从北侧进入的通道，同时为从南侧前来的数十名访客提供了便利。黎巴嫩武装部队称，“以色列定居者进入黎巴嫩领土是敌人持续违反国际法、[……]第 1701(2006)号决议和停火协定的一个方面”。以色列国防军随后通报联黎部队，称已采取行动阻止以色列平民

进入该区域。6月17日及20日，在阿拉伯卢韦扎东北，联黎部队观察到6个自称是获得授权的以色列平民工人的人员，修理了盖杰尔市的一台水泵。以色列国防军通知联黎部队，称其对这一活动一无所知。

16. 以色列国防军继续占领蓝线北侧的盖杰尔北部和毗邻地区，这违反了第1701(2006)号决议。黎巴嫩政府欢迎联黎部队2011年的提议，即推动以色列国防军撤出被占领地区，但以色列政府尚未作出回应。

17. 在本报告所述期间，联黎部队发现2 318次侵犯黎巴嫩领空行为，飞越总时间为4 294小时31分钟。在违反事件中，无人机占88%，战斗机占8%，直升机和不明飞行器占4%。空中违反次数最多的一天是3月28日，为36次。

C. 黎巴嫩武装部队部署情况

18. 3月13日，黎巴嫩内阁授权分三个阶段增派4 500名士兵，以加强黎巴嫩武装部队在黎巴嫩南部的部署。第一批1 500名人员的征召工作已于4月开始。1 500名黎巴嫩武装部队新兵已于1月开始训练(S/2025/153，第51段)，其中1 341人于5月完成训练，部署在利塔尼河以南。截至6月20日，7 522名黎巴嫩武装部队人员被部署到利塔尼河以南的116个阵地。

19. 黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河沿线设立了5个检查站和17个观察点，并封锁了8个河岸渡口。联黎部队和黎巴嫩武装部队在5月和6月期间在利塔尼河沿岸密切协调开展了若干行动，以防止违规武器流入。

20. 黎巴嫩武装部队开展了许多行动，以便利当地民众返回南部。在本报告所述期间，5名黎巴嫩武装部队人员被打死，6人受伤(见上文第14段和下文第39段)。以色列国防军方面没有伤亡报告。

21. 联黎部队与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调开展的行动占比从12%增加到23%。联黎部队依照特派团新的行动主导办法对黎巴嫩武装部队的支持大大增加(见下文第53段)。该办法提升了与黎巴嫩武装部队的互操作性。黎巴嫩武装部队联络处于3月在纳古拉重新开放。

22. 联黎部队海上特遣队向黎巴嫩武装部队海军提供了项目培训，同时黎巴嫩武装部队海军部队继续并入海上特遣队，以加强专门知识和互操作性。

23. 黎巴嫩武装部队和联黎部队还继续在战略对话进程框架内进行互动。本报告附件三提供了关于通过黎巴嫩军事技术委员会等途径支持黎巴嫩武装部队的更多详情。

D. 解除黎巴嫩境内所有武装团体的武装，包括在利塔尼河以南部署的违规人员、资产和武器


24. 4月14日，奥恩总统称：“军队正在利塔尼河以南履行职责，拆除地道并没收武器，真主党没有提出异议”。6月5日，萨拉姆总理表示，“国家继续根据《塔伊夫协定》履行职责，通过自己的部队将国家权力扩展到全国各地，并确

保所有武器处于国家的独家控制之下”，军队“拆除了利塔尼河以南的 500 多个军事站点和武器储藏处”。

25. 联黎部队蓝线和利塔尼河之间地区发现 150 起违规持有武器事件，包括从联黎部队行动区发射的火箭弹(见上文第 4 段)。在发现的 113 个武器弹药库中，黎巴嫩武装部队清除了 90 个。武器储藏处储藏有火箭发射平台和火箭、反坦克和杀伤人员地雷、迫击炮弹和小口径弹药等。另外，联黎部队清除了以色列国防军的两个武器储藏处。此外，联黎部队观察到猎人携带狩猎武器 30 次。

图三

2025 年 2 月 21 日至 6 月 20 日联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队发现、黎巴嫩武装部队清除的违规武器储藏处



来源：联黎部队。

26. 联黎部队查出了 37 处相关地点，并与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调，查访了其中 16 处。在拉布塔拉汀附近(东区)发现了一枚 122 毫米火箭，在塔卢沙(东区)附近发现了一枚 107 毫米和一枚 122 毫米火箭的残骸。联黎部队发现了 67 条地道或地下建筑。黎巴嫩武装部队还继续独立开展行动，搜寻和清除违规武器。

27. 2 月 23 日，真主党秘书长纳伊姆·卡西姆在贝鲁特举行的哈桑·纳斯鲁拉葬礼上宣称，“我们采取的最重要步骤是让国家在抵抗运动阻止敌人入侵并挫败其目标后承担起责任”。3 月 29 日，他说，“如果以色列继续攻击黎巴嫩，而黎巴嫩在国家层面不采取行动加以制止，真主党最终将采取其他手段”。

28. 奥恩总统于 4 月 14 日表示，“关于武器垄断问题的对话将在总统和真主党双边进行”。5 月 11 日，他说：“已做出只有国家才能拥有武器的决定[……]解决办法在于进行对话，甚至是与巴勒斯坦权力机构进行对话”。6 月 19 日，奥恩先生说，“正在进行沟通，以便在黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦两条战线实现武器专属管制原则”，并且“一旦以色列-伊朗冲突不断升级造成的区域不稳定局势平息下来，相关努力将进一步加强”。

29. 4月18日，卡西姆先生说，真主党“不会允许任何人解除抵抗力量的武装”。他进一步表示，“以色列撤军并停止侵略是开启国防战略讨论的重要前提步骤。防务战略关乎如何建立黎巴嫩的力量，如何加强军队，如何从抵抗力量及其武器中受益。该战略无关解除武装裁军，而是关乎就全面国防政策的外交、经济和军事层面进行讨论。”

30. 4月25日，议会议长纳比·贝里表示：“我们不会交出真主党的武器。武器是我们的王牌，如果不充分执行停火协定，不启动对话，我们不会放弃武器。我们需要做的是黎巴嫩已经完成的两件事：在南部部署军队和‘某党’撤出该地区”。

31. 以色列国防军声称对据称位于利塔尼河南北两侧属于真主党的武器储藏处、生产地点和储存设施进行了多次打击。4月9日，以色列国防军称，“真主党一直试图在[贝鲁特]南郊肖伊法特居民区中心地带重建一个地下武器生产基地”。以色列国防军4月23日声称，自2024年11月27日以来，“对黎巴嫩全境构成威胁的140多名[真主党]恐怖分子已被消灭”。4月4日及5月7日，以色列国防军声称，在西顿附近的空袭中击毙了哈马斯武装分子。此外，以色列国防军声称，4月22日在阿利区击毙了伊斯兰团的一名好战分子。

32. 3月发生火箭发射事件(见上文第6至7段)后，黎巴嫩武装部队于3月22日宣布，在奈拜提耶的卡尔蒂布尼特镇和阿诺恩镇之间的利塔尼河以北地区“发现了三个原始火箭发射平台”，并于3月28日“找到了利塔尼河以北奈拜提耶地区卡卡伊亚特吉斯尔的火箭发射场，并已展开调查”。4月16日，黎巴嫩武装部队宣布逮捕了几名黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦嫌疑人。4月20日，黎巴嫩武装部队在答复“关于准备发动新的火箭弹袭击的情报”时称，他们在西顿的一次突袭中缴获了导弹和发射台，并逮捕了若干人。由奥恩总统于5月2日主持的高级国防委员会警告“哈马斯不要利用黎巴嫩领土实施任何损害黎巴嫩国家安全的行为”。黎巴嫩武装部队随后宣布逮捕涉嫌参与3月22日和28日火箭发射的与哈马斯有关联的几名巴勒斯坦人。5月4日至6日，在西顿的艾因希勒沃营地和提尔的埃尔布斯营地等地，哈马斯将三名嫌疑人移交给黎巴嫩武装部队。

33. 在巴勒斯坦国总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯5月21日访问贝鲁特期间，阿巴斯总统和奥恩总统发表了一项联合声明，重申他们共同致力于“黎巴嫩国家拥有武器的专属权原则”。他们宣布成立黎巴嫩-巴勒斯坦联合委员会。5月23日，萨拉姆先生发出指示，要求“根据具体时间表建立一个明确的执行机制”。

34. 巴勒斯坦难民营安全局势进一步恶化。3月18日，的黎波里附近巴达维难民营的居民与邻近的瓦迪纳赫莱地区居民发生冲突，黎巴嫩武装部队随即部署介入。在巴达维难民营持续发生动乱后，黎巴嫩武装部队关闭了几个官方和非官方营地入口。5月18日至20日，敌对犯罪集团之间的激烈冲突迫使联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处(近东救济工程处)暂时停止在贝鲁特南部夏蒂拉难民营的活动。由于武装行为者继续存在，近东救济工程处在艾因希勒沃的四所学校仍然无法进入。

E. 武器禁运和边境管制

35. 2月21日至22日，以色列国防军宣称对据称真主党用于从阿拉伯叙利亚共和国向黎巴嫩转运武器和装备的路线实施了打击。2月26日及28日，以色列国防军声称其打击了黎巴嫩东北部的真主党武装人员，这些人员据称参与了从阿拉伯叙利亚共和国向黎巴嫩采购和转运装备，“以支持真主党持续重建军事能力”。以色列国防军声称，在4月20日对奈拜提耶的袭击中击毙了一名真主党指挥官，此人“与伊朗特工合作，协助向黎巴嫩转运武器和资金，包括通过贝鲁特国际机场进行转运”。黎巴嫩武装部队为打击武器弹药贩运至少开展了37次行动，主要是在比卡东部。

36. 伊朗伊斯兰共和国常驻联合国代表在4月21日的信(S/2025/242)中回应了“2月20日以色列政权驻联合国代表的信(S/2025/107)”。该信毫无根据、毫无道理地提到伊朗，谎称伊朗向真主党转让武器和资金。伊朗伊斯兰共和国再次断然拒绝这一毫无根据的指控”。

37. 3月27日，黎巴嫩和叙利亚国防部临时官员在沙特阿拉伯王国吉达表示，他们将“就标界这一战略问题采取后续行动，设立了专门的联合委员会并启动协调机制，以应对安全威胁，特别是边界沿线的安全威胁”。在此之前，黎巴嫩部族与叙利亚临时当局安全部队于3月16日至17日在黎巴嫩与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国边界附近发生武装冲突，造成至少7人死亡，52人受伤。

38. 4月14日，萨拉姆总理首次正式访问阿拉伯叙利亚共和国，以“揭开两国关系史上新的一页”。萨拉姆先生说，与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国临时总统艾艾哈迈德·沙拉的讨论重点是“控制边界和过境点，防止走私，并最终划定陆地和海上边界”。

F. 地雷和集束炸弹

39. 3月19日，联黎部队一名维和人员在兹布钦(西区)附近徒步巡逻时被地雷炸成重伤。4月14日，在联黎部队-黎巴嫩武装部队联合视察期间，一枚爆炸装置在兹布钦西南的一条隧道内引爆，造成一名黎巴嫩武装部队士兵死亡，另有4人受伤。4月20日，黎巴嫩武装部队称，该部队在奈拜提耶的布赖卡运送弹药时发生爆炸，造成3名士兵死亡，数名平民受伤。黎巴嫩武装部队宣布，在利塔尼河南北两侧分别实施了50次和42次引爆未爆弹药的行动。

40. 联黎部队答复了84份涉及疑似未爆弹药的报告和2份涉及疑似简易爆炸装置的报告。联黎部队在纳古拉以北排雷面积达1651平方米。此外，还完成了13项爆炸物危险清除任务，包括清除联合国阵地周围的爆炸物、清除路障和进行道路检查。联黎部队为70名军事和文职人员举办了6期爆炸物危险宣传讲习班，并为排雷组举办了14期培训班。

三. 扩展国家权力与维持制度稳定

41. 2月26日，萨拉姆总理领导的“拯救与改革”政府获得128名议员中95票的支持，赢得了议会的信任投票。政府在部长级声明中明确承诺致力于构建“一个有战争与和平决定权的国家”，“制定涵盖军事、外交和经济层面的国家安全战略”，以及“重建因以色列侵略而被摧毁的设施”。此外，政府特别强调“其全面、不折不扣执行联合国安理会第1701号决议的承诺”，并致力于履行“国家垄断武器持有权的法定职责”。

42. 奥恩总统和萨拉姆总理都表示，黎巴嫩不会卷入伊朗伊斯兰共和国与以色列的冲突。6月16日，萨拉姆先生说：“必须防止黎巴嫩以任何方式受到持续的地区战争的拖累或牵连。6月20日，奥恩先生和黎巴嫩前总统米歇尔·苏莱曼讨论了“必须使黎巴嫩远离伊朗与以色列之间的战事”。

43. 在3月6日的第一次会议上，内阁批准了2025年国家预算。3月13日，内阁批准了国家安全机构领导层任命，包括任命鲁道夫·海卡尔准将担任黎巴嫩武装部队新任司令，以及国内安全部队、国家安全和公共安全局的新任局长。内阁于5月29日批准了对陆军人员的补充补助金。

44. 3月27日，内阁任命卡里姆·苏艾德为中央银行新行长。3月28日，内阁批准了填补高级司法委员会长期空缺职位的任命，并于5月2日批准了关于司法独立的法律草案，并将其提交议会。

45. 关于对2020年8月4日贝鲁特港爆炸事件的调查，3月10日，国家检察官推翻了2023年1月禁止司法和安全部门配合塔里克·比塔尔法官调查工作的决定。此举有助于比塔尔法官讯问案件嫌疑人和被告。

46. 5月，政府在黎巴嫩全国1065个城市举行了曾经三次推迟的市政和市长选举。黎巴嫩国家安全部队采取了防范措施，为选举顺利进行提供保障，并且为蓝线附近39个受冲突影响的市镇设立了替代投票点。女性在选举产生的市政委员会中的代表性虽然仍然很低，但翻了一番，达到10%。

47. 内阁向议会提交了关于银行业重组的法律草案。4月24日，议会通过了银行保密法修正案，允许倒查十年银行记录。国际货币基金组织(基金组织)于3月和6月访问了贝鲁特，讨论了黎巴嫩提出的货币基金组织新方案的要求。5月，内阁重组了发展与重建委员会，这是未来重建工作不可或缺的一部分。

48. 黎巴嫩继续面临与冲突有关的人道主义需求。截至5月31日，至少有82000人流离失所，其中51%是妇女。以色列国防军继续驻扎在蓝线北侧，再加上持续的军事冲突活动、未爆弹药的存在以及对民用设施的广泛破坏，阻碍了难民返乡。人道主义伙伴继续支持受冲突影响的社区在安全形势和资金紧张的情况下满足基本的食物、住所、水、保护和保健需求。世界银行2025年3月7日发布的《黎巴嫩损失与需求快速评估》报告显示，重建与恢复所需资金预估达110亿美元。

49. 截至 3 月 31 日截止日期，呼吁追加 3.714 亿美元资金的黎巴嫩紧急呼吁延期计划的资金到位率为 26%。截至同一日期，为黎巴嫩应急计划发出的 2025 年呼吁获得了 18% 的资金，在所请求提供的 27.4 亿美元中有 4.828 亿美元到账，其中 2025 年迄今收到 2.518 亿美元，2024 年结转 2.311 亿美元。近东救济工程处预计从 2025 年 7 月起将出现现金流缺口，危及黎巴嫩境内 222 000 名巴勒斯坦难民持续获得基本服务。

50. 截至 5 月 31 日，联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)在黎巴嫩登记了 727 430 名难民和寻求庇护者，其中包括在黎巴嫩的大约 140 万叙利亚难民中的 716 050 人，以及 11 380 名其他国籍的难民和寻求庇护者。截至 6 月 15 日，至少有 177 430 名叙利亚人从黎巴嫩返回阿拉伯叙利亚共和国，其中包括在难民署登记的 119 873 名难民。截至 6 月 17 日，记录了 141 起通过突击搜查、检查站拦截和海上遣返行动进行驱逐的事件，涉及至少 7 047 名叙利亚人。据报告，北方省新增约 40 000 名叙利亚难民，贝卡省则新增 78 625 人。6 月 16 日，内阁批准了叙利亚难民从黎巴嫩返乡的原则框架。

四. 联合国的活动情况

A. 联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队的部署和调整

51. 截至 6 月 20 日，联黎部队由来自 47 个派遣国的 10 372 名军事人员组成，其中有 827 名女性(7.97%)。此外，联黎部队有 777 名文职人员，包括 237 名国际人员和 540 名本国人员，其中有 252 名女性(32.43%)。联黎部队海上特遣队有 5 艘船只和 699 名军事人员，其中包括 66 名女性(9.44%)。联合国停战监督组织的 44 名军事观察员，包括 34 名男性和 10 名女性(23%)任职于黎巴嫩观察员小组，在行动上接受联黎部队的指挥与控制。最高级别的女军官为中校，最高级别的女文职人员为 D-2 级。

52. 联黎部队平均每月进行 4 356 次业务活动。在这些活动中，有 784 项(18%)涉及混合性别小组。联黎部队还平均每月进行 45 次空中巡逻。

53. 根据联黎部队的适应计划，并作为适应新形势的一部分，联黎部队的行动重点是协助黎巴嫩武装部队部署到南利塔尼区，提供安全环境，并防止违反第 1701(2006)号决议的行为发生。为全面恢复业务活动，包括支持国家权力扩展和便利流离失所人群返乡，联黎部队拆除了 100 多个路障，清除了未爆弹药，重新开放和评估了次干道道路，重新建立了通往蓝线的通道。黎巴嫩武装部队还与联黎部队密切协调，拆除了以色列国防军 4 月在拉布内赫附近和 5 月在迈尔凯巴附近多次设置的路障。联黎部队继续就新技术的使用问题进行监测和报告，同时就部队保护问题与各方接触。

54. 自 4 月末以来，联黎部队行动自由受到限制的事件有所增加，当地民众多次拦截巡逻队，并错误声称：联黎部队人员必须由黎巴嫩武装部队陪同方可行动。这些事件往往由行为者拍摄，在社交媒体上传播。5 月 16 日在朱迈杰梅赫(西区)发生了一起特别令人担忧的事件，其间，当联黎部队维和人员从愤怒人群撤离

时，一名孤立枪手向其射击约 20 发子弹，维和人员进行了还击。联黎部队还经历了涉及以色列国防军的事件，包括 5 月 13 日武器指向和直接射击沙巴阿(东区)的一个联合国据点，一颗子弹击中了一个联合国据点的防御工事。联黎部队继续在五个以色列国防军阵地和蓝线北侧的所谓缓冲区周围遭遇路障，无法正常进入联合国五个阵地和整个蓝线(见附件一)。联黎部队发表了更多的声明、接受采访并进行面对面和在线媒体访问，以澄清其任务和活动，并反击错误信息和虚假信息。

55. 为支持海上拦截行动，联黎部队海上特遣队拦停了 2 476 艘船只。黎巴嫩武装部队检查并放行了联黎部队移交的所有 406 艘船只。联黎部队陪同黎巴嫩武装部队海军进行了 36 次船只检查。

56. 根据安全理事会第 2436(2018)号决议，联黎部队于 6 月 17 日评估 22 个下属军事单位和 3 艘船只的后勤、训练和战备状态，所有待改进事项均已整改完毕。联黎部队继续利用全面规划和绩效评估系统，评估特派团的姿态、足迹和行动的调整情况，以确保执行任务。联黎部队还利用“以行动促维和+”监测框架中的指标，以加强基于数据的分析和报告工作。

B. 安全和安保

57. 负责北利塔尼河和南利塔尼河的指定官员继续进行协调，以确保联合国在黎巴嫩的所有人员的安全。从 3 月 1 日起，联合国国际文职人员的家属获准返回北利塔尼河指定区域。3 月 25 日解除了对南利塔尼河非方案关键类文职人员的限制(见 S/2024/817，第 73 段)。南利塔尼河行动区仍然实施行动限制，文职人员若需前往提尔及提尔-纳古拉沿海公路以外区域，必须提前 48 小时报备并使用装甲车辆通行。

58. 军事冲突活动以及未爆弹药和其他战争残留物继续对人员安全保障构成威胁。3 月 22 日，以色列国防军袭击了提尔中部，爆炸点 1 000 米范围内驻有 14 名本国人员和 49 名联合国国际文职人员。自 6 月 13 日以来，在以色列与伊朗伊斯兰共和国互相展开敌对行动的背景下，联黎部队冒着碎片坠落的危险，沿蓝线沿线人员躲避了 55 次(见附件一)。作为安全防范措施，联黎部队从 6 月 13 日起减少了独立业务活动和蓝线附近的活动。

59. 联黎部队对直接影响联黎部队人员或资产的违反第 1701(2006)号决议的行为展开了一项技术调查。五项技术调查已经完成，并向各方通报了调查结果。

C. 行为和纪律

60. 联黎部队记录了 12 项关于可能不令人满意的行为的指控，其中包括一项性骚扰指控。联黎部队或联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员办事处均未收到任何性虐待和性剥削指控报告。为 72 名文职人员和 2 546 名军事人员(188 名女性和 2 430 名男性)提供了关于联合国行为标准的培训。

D. 对袭击维和人员行为追责

61. 联黎部队继续监督黎巴嫩军事法庭对涉嫌针对维和人员策划或实施重大袭击的个人的诉讼程序。关于 2022 年 12 月 14 日在阿吉比耶附近对联黎部队发动致命袭击一案(见 S/2023/184)的下一轮审判定于 2025 年 9 月 17 日举行。与 2018 年 8 月 4 日迈季代勒尊(西区)事件有关的刑事诉讼没有任何进展(见 S/2018/1029)。对 2021 年 12 月 22 日在沙克拉、2022 年 1 月 4 日在宾特朱拜勒和 2022 年 1 月 25 日在拉米耶对联黎部队维和人员的侵犯行为的调查仍在继续(见 S/2022/214)。2 月 14 日,联黎部队车队在贝鲁特拉菲克·哈里里国际机场外遭到袭击,造成前部队副指挥官和另一名维和人员受伤(见 S/2025/153, 第 56 段),相关调查正在进行中。对 6 月 10 日在德尔卡努纳赫尔发生的事件已经展开调查(见附件一),拘留了一名嫌疑人,并将其移交军事检察官。

五. 联络协调与可持续解决方案的推进

62. 联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员雅尼娜·亨尼斯-普拉斯哈特与黎巴嫩和以色列以及该地区的有关当局和行为体进行了斡旋,以支持停止敌对行动,并倡导各方采取具体步骤,争取通过谈判达成解决办法,推进第 1701(2006)号决议长期搁置的规定。她继续敦促各方通过公开和非公开渠道,利用《停止敌对行动协定》提供的政治势头,为全面执行安全理事会第 1701(2006)号决议开辟新的政治途径。

63. 联黎部队继续与各方接触,促进旨在协助以色列国防军撤出蓝线北侧地区的安全安排。联黎部队于 3 月 11 日主办了该机制的第六次会议,随后协助促成以色列国防军 2024 年扣押的 4 名人员返回黎巴嫩。3 月 9 日以色列国防军在基拉逮捕的黎巴嫩武装部队士兵(见上文第 14 段)于 3 月 13 日被遣返。

64. 联黎部队继续利用联络和协调机制来缓解沿蓝线的紧张局势。为保障黎巴嫩武装部队的行动安全,联黎部队与以色列国防军累计进行了 1 390 次接触,协助黎军完成包括相关地点核查、路障清除及流离失所民众返乡等多项部署与行动。联黎部队向以色列国防军发出 24 项停止射击请求,其中 5 项代表黎巴嫩武装部队,19 项代表联黎部队。作为补充,黎巴嫩问题特别协调员利用外交手段支持缓和局势降级措施。

65. 为支持平民保护工作,联黎部队与双方保持联络,并为 314 次平民和人道主义行动提供便利。负责监督人道主义通报系统的人道主义准入工作组继续进行协调,协助进入黎巴嫩各地难以到达的地区。2 月底,以色列国防军通知人道主义事务协调厅(人道协调厅),宣布将不再为利塔尼河以北区域的人道主义行动主动提供保障。人道协调厅继续通过联黎部队向蓝线周围三公里范围内的人员发出数量有限的人道主义通知。

66. 3 月,联黎部队开始修复和重建在敌对行动期间受损的约 40 个蓝线桶(见 S/2025/153, 第 68 段和附件一)。联黎部队的排雷队清除了一个被摧毁的蓝线桶。

67. 以色列同意 2008 年提出的在特拉维夫设立联黎部队联络处的提议,然而,该提议仍有待落实。

68. 我在2007年10月30日关于第1701(2006)号决议执行情况的报告(S/2007/641, 附件)中提出沙巴阿农场地区临时划界方案, 阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和以色列都还未做出回应。

六. 意见

69. 蓝线两侧的平民苦不堪言, 无法承受再次陷入冲突的风险。在实现《停止敌对行动协定》所载承诺方面取得了显著进展。虽然自停止敌对行动生效以来, 军事冲突活动的强度大大降低, 但局势仍然脆弱。当前, 蓝线两侧尚未形成有利于民众全面返乡与重建的安全环境。为此, 我呼吁各方确保保护平民, 加快政治努力的步伐, 为恢复对话创造空间, 以全面执行第1701(2006)号决议, 并最终实现黎巴嫩和以色列之间的永久停火。我呼吁所有有关行为体避免采取可能破坏全面停止敌对行动的单方面或挑衅性行动。无论一方实际上或被认为未履行第1701(2006)号决议规定的义务, 均不构成另一方背弃自身义务的正当理由。我敦促双方利用联黎部队已建立的联络和协调渠道, 并在停止敌对行动机制下加强安排, 以解决争端或威胁, 防止事态升级。该机制定期举行会议有助于加强沟通并促进共同解决问题。除针对即时行动-战术性问题的军方会谈外, 我敦促各方在战略政治层面也保持此类接触。此外, 我欢迎黎巴嫩领导人竭力避免该国遭受伊朗伊斯兰共和国和以色列之间敌对行动的影响。

70. 我欢迎以色列政府将被以色列拘押的五名黎巴嫩公民送回黎巴嫩, 并呼吁释放其余被关押的黎巴嫩人。

71. 双方都承诺充分尊重蓝线。然而, 以色列国防军继续驻扎在蓝线北侧, 并继续使用武力, 这不仅威胁到蓝线沿线的稳定, 而且破坏了黎巴嫩当局扩大国家权力的努力。这种做法可能助长某种舆论风向, 进而使黎巴嫩实现国家武器垄断权承诺所需的内部政治讨论更趋复杂化。

72. 以色列国防军在蓝线以北的驻扎, 既是对黎巴嫩主权和领土完整的侵犯, 也违反了第1701(2006)号决议。我再次谴责以色列方面对黎巴嫩主权的一切侵权行为, 并重申要求以色列政府立即停止在黎巴嫩领空的一切越界飞行。我敦促以色列当局履行第1701(2006)号决议规定的义务, 从蓝线以北所有地区撤军, 包括从盖杰尔北部及蓝线以北毗邻区域撤离。我再次重申联黎部队根据第1701(2006)号决议规定做出的提议: 愿为加强蓝线两侧社区互信的安全安排提供支持。

73. 黎巴嫩当局作出以下承诺令人鼓舞: 将所有武器纳入国家管控, 确保国家能在全境行使完整主权和治权, 并承诺举行对话以制定国家安全战略。我注意到黎巴嫩武装部队在蓝线与利塔尼河之间强化部署方面取得进展, 包括拆除违规设施、收缴违反第1701(2006)号决议的非法武器及相关物资。黎巴嫩武装部队为确保利塔尼河以南地区, 包括应对三月份火箭弹袭击事件所涉区域, 清除非法武器的行动表明, 黎巴嫩政府有履行第1701(2006)号决议义务的必要决心。我注意到阿巴斯总统与奥恩总统就黎巴嫩国家武器垄断权达成的协议, 该协议适用范围包括巴勒斯坦难民营内部。黎巴嫩武装部队必须继续采取必要行动, 确保国家武器垄断权覆盖黎巴嫩全境。我对迄今提供的慷慨支持表示赞赏, 呼吁

捐助者按照黎巴嫩武装部队对充分执行第 1701(2006)号决议的承诺，增加物质和财政支持。

74. 我欢迎联黎部队继续执行适应计划，包括采取新的工作方式。事实证明，以灵活机动的方式全面恢复整个行动区域的巡逻与监测，是确保行动效能的关键所在。我再次呼吁各方支持联黎部队的不断发展，包括通过部署和使用新技术来加强任务执行能力。

75. 联黎部队的行动自由对于充分执行第 1701(2006)号决议至关重要。自 4 月底以来，影响联黎部队行动自由的事件有所增加，这令人极为关切。我欢迎黎巴嫩主管部门最近发表公开声明，表示支持联黎部队并谴责对维和人员的袭击行为。至关重要的是，国家主管部门应继续发表此类声明，以反驳关于联黎部队部署的错误信息和虚假信息，并确保维和人员的安全。必须追究袭击联黎部队的行为者的责任。联黎部队还应继续加强联黎部队战略传播战略，以增进对授权职能的了解。

76. 以色列国防军向联黎部队人员和驻地或其附近开枪同样不可接受。我再次呼吁双方遵守包括国际人道法在内的国际法规定的义务，保障联合国人员的安全、行动自由以及联合国驻地和财产在任何时候都不受侵犯。

77. 我祝贺萨拉姆总理组建政府，并举行市政选举，以扩大国家在地方的权力。在明年议会选举之前，我呼吁政府和议会优先进行改革，加强包容性选举进程，以进一步提高妇女的政治代表性，并提升残疾人的无障碍环境。

78. 虽然政府和议会为实施经济、金融和司法改革而采取的步骤令人鼓舞，但需要加快进度，包括制定关于银行部门重组的立法，以获得货币基金组织的援助，恢复捐助者和储户的信心，并帮助黎巴嫩重新走上可持续复苏的道路，让社区恢复生活。取得更大进展对于释放急需的重建资金同样至关重要。同时，为人道主义援助和恢复工作增配资源也至关重要。

79. 我希望，阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的事态发展将对黎巴嫩产生积极影响，包括创造必要条件，促成叙利亚难民可持续、安全、有尊严和自愿返乡。我呼吁国际社会与叙利亚临时当局合作，共同创造有利于难民返乡的条件。在此过程中，始终如一地落实法律和程序保障措施，包括“不推回”原则，仍然至关重要。巴勒斯坦难民营已经经历了严重的困境和动荡，随着解除武装计划的推出，这些难民营可能面临更大的压力。因此，近东救济工程处能够继续向黎巴嫩境内的巴勒斯坦难民提供支助比以往任何时候都更加重要。

80. 我衷心感谢所有向联黎部队和黎巴嫩观察员小组提供军事人员和装备的国家。我感谢黎巴嫩问题特别协调员雅尼娜·亨尼斯-普拉斯哈特，感谢即将离任的联黎部队特派团团长兼部队指挥官阿罗尔多·拉萨罗·萨恩斯中将——他在整个非常具有挑战性的时期展现奉献精神和领导能力。我还要感谢部队派遣国——其部队对支持各方履行《停止敌对行动协定》和第 1701(2006)号决议所规定义务仍发挥着关键作用，同时感谢联合国国家工作队所有成员继续致力于促进黎巴嫩的稳定。

Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 February to 20 June 2025

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. In line with UNIFIL's adaptation plan, UNIFIL moved away from a "patrol sketch" (maps of planned patrol routes) oriented approach to a more "operation-led" *modus operandi* in March. Dedicated operations often spanned several days with different mission components working towards a joint end. "Patrol sketches" were at times used to facilitate the coordination of activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces but were not used to limit the freedom of movement of the Mission. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted a monthly average of 4,356 operational activities, including 45 air operations. The percentage of UNIFIL's operational activities conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces increased from 12 to 23 per cent, for an overall average of 16.8 per cent.
3. UNIFIL continued to update a list of locations of interest initiated after the return to the cessation of hostilities. As at 20 June, UNIFIL has identified 37 locations of interest and in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces inspected 16 of these.
4. While UNIFIL's freedom of movement was in general respected, UNIFIL experienced some incidents in which violence or weapons were used to intimidate UNIFIL peacekeepers, incidents resulting in damage to UNIFIL equipment or injuries to peacekeepers, and incidents resulting in UNIFIL cancelling their activity or using alternatives routes. Incidents of particular note occurred on 16 May in Jumayjmeh and on 10 June in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr. In addition to the incidents listed below, UNIFIL experienced minor incidents during which items such as stones or bottles were thrown at UNIFIL property or personnel without causing damage or injuries. There were also incidents during which patrols have been stopped, surrounded or pursued by individuals in civilian clothes. Incidents were often filmed by those hindering UNIFIL, with videos circulated on social media. Each of the incidents listed below has been raised by the Mission with the Lebanese Armed Forces.
5. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents involving the Israel Defense Forces, interfering with operations or putting peacekeepers or UN staff members at risk. Incidents of note took place near Rumaysh on 29 March, near Kfar Shuba on 13 May, near Yarun on 19 May and near Kfar Kila on 16 June. UNIFIL has protested each of the incidents to the Israel Defense Forces.
6. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents interfering with its operations that cannot be ascribed to any of the parties.




Figure 4. Denial of freedom of movement of UNIFIL 21 February – 20 June 2025.
 Source: UNIFIL.

Denial of freedom of movement and aggressive behaviour by Lebanese actors

7. On 11 March, individuals in civilian clothes ripped off the antenna of a UNIFIL vehicle passing through Bayt Lif (Sector West). The Mayor of Bayt Lif was contacted, however, as at 20 June, the antenna has not been returned.
8. On 19 March an individual in civilian clothes drove up next to a UNIFIL patrol in Ayn Baal (Sector West) and damaged the left side mirrors of two UNIFIL vehicles with a club. The peacekeepers stopped to verify the damage and resumed the patrol movement shortly thereafter.
9. On 21 March, a group of 10 to 12 individuals in civilian clothes approached a UNIFIL patrol in Yarun (Sector West) and removed the UN flag from one vehicle while making unfriendly gestures. The UNIFIL patrol used an alternative route to continue. The Mayor of Yarun later informed UNIFIL that the incident was the act of unknown individuals.
10. On 21 March, two individuals in civilian clothes on a scooter approached a UNIFIL patrol near Burj al-Shamali (Sector West) and removed the flag from a vehicle. The patrol continued its movement.
11. On 24 March, four individuals in civilian clothes on two motorcycles removed the UN flag from a moving UNIFIL vehicle near Mays al Jabal (Sector West). The mayor of Mays al-Jabal referred to the incident as “childish behaviour” but was not able to identify the perpetrators.
12. On 24 March, an individual threw a rock at a UNIFIL logistic convoy southeast of Ghanduriyah (Sector East), breaking the windshield of one vehicle.
13. On 25 March, an individual in civilian clothes on a scooter blocked a Lebanese Armed Forces during a patrol in close coordination with UNIFIL, west of Frun (Sector West). The combined patrol used an alternative route to continue its movement.
14. On 27 March, an individual in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol near Abbasiva (Sector West) and displayed a pistol before firing one shot into the air. The patrol cancelled its activity.

15. On 12 April, two individuals on a scooter threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol passing Jibal al-Butum (Sector West), breaking a vehicle windscreen. The patrol continued its movement.
16. On 25 April, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by a vehicle southwest of Tayr Dibbah (Sector West), prompting the patrol to turn around and use a secondary road. Two individuals in civilian clothes on motorbikes blocked the patrol again and it turned around for a second time. The two motorcycles subsequently followed the patrol for approximately 10 minutes with the incident filmed and shared on social media. The mayor of Tayr Dibbah stated that members of the community got scared as UNIFIL entered a private road, and that he has called on residents to refrain from aggression against UNIFIL patrols.
17. On 29 April, eight individuals on four scooters ripped the flag off a UNIFIL patrol vehicle northwest of Hariss (Sector West). The patrol continued its movement.
18. On 30 April, eight individuals in civilian clothes attempted to damage the rearview mirror and antennas on a UNIFIL vehicle in Siddiqin (Sector West) and further threatened to set it on fire. Peacekeepers used tear gas to disperse the crowd and then left the area. The peacekeepers returned to the area later the same day without further incident.
19. On 30 April, four individuals in civilian clothes climbed on top of UNIFIL patrol vehicles, in Khiyam (Sector East) and threw stones. A vehicle and a number of motorcycles followed the patrol as it was leaving. One UNIFIL vehicle sustained minor damage but the patrol continued its activity. The Lebanese Armed Forces later informed UNIFIL that the four individuals, involved in the incident, had been arrested.
20. On 30 April, ten individuals on scooters and in a vehicle pursued a UNIFIL patrol passing through Yatar (Sector West). A boulder on the road obstructed further movement while four scooters and a vehicle prevented the patrol from turning around. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter and the UNIFIL patrol continued. The mayor of Yatar informed UNIFIL that the individual who had spoken to the patrol was a member of the municipal police and (incorrectly) asserted that UNIFIL needed to be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces.
21. On 1 May, two individuals in civilian clothes stopped a motorcycle in front of a UNIFIL patrol, northeast of Tibnin (Sector West) with one of the individuals dismounting and stating that the area was private, and that the patrol could not continue. The patrol turned around and was followed by the motorcycle while using an alternative route.
22. On 2 May, eight individuals in civilian clothes on five motorcycles threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol near Suwannan (Sector East), damaging two of the vehicles. The same individuals also stole two jerrycans and one car hook. The UNIFIL patrol turned around and cancelled its activity. The Mayor of Suwannan later apologised and informed UNIFIL that the actions by the group did not reflect the sentiments of the community in regard to UNIFIL.
23. On 2 May, an individual in civilian clothes on a motorbike struck the side of a UNIFIL vehicle in Qabrikha (Sector East), causing minor damage. The patrol continued its activity.
24. On 9 May, a crowd of around 100 people surrounded and struck the vehicle of a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Batouliyah (Sector West) breaking a side mirror. The patrol continued its movement. Local authorities in Batouliyah later denied that the incident had taken place.

25. On 11 May, a UNIFIL patrol stopped northwest of Yatar (Sector West) as their vehicle was overheating. Where one individual stopped to assist the peacekeepers, a second man stated that he was a policeman and that the patrol was not allowed and used his vehicle to prevent further movements. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the patrol continued.

26. On 12 May, an individual in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Shab'a (Sector East) and stated that the road was closed. The UNIFIL patrol turned around and continued its movement using an alternative route. A video circulated on social media platforms, in which a man can be heard telling the patrol to "go back quickly". The Mayor of Shab'a later referred to the incident as "disgraceful" and not representative of the residents of Shab'a.

27. On 12 May, an individual in civilian clothes used a vehicle to block a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Ash Sh'aytiyah (Sector West) and stated that it was not welcome in the area without the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the UNIFIL patrol continued its movement. The Mayor of Ash Sh'aytiyah later informed UNIFIL that it would be good if the Mission was always accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

28. On 14 May, UNIFIL was stopped by a group of individuals in civilian clothes, while conducting a foot patrol in Shab'a. When the patrol tried to explain that it was carrying out an approved activity, the individuals started scuffling with the peacekeepers. UNIFIL adopted a defensive posture and contacted local leaders and the Lebanese Armed Forces. One UNIFIL vehicle was slightly damaged. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the patrol returned to its position. The mayor of Shab'a informed UNIFIL that he had spoken to the Lebanese Armed Forces, who had identified and spoken to the perpetrators to avoid further incidents.

29. On 16 May, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped in Jumayjmeh, near Khirbet Selm (Sector East), by an angry crowd of approximately 20 individuals. Peacekeepers were threatened with metal bars and axes and told they had no right to patrol the area as it was private property and that UNIFIL should be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The crowd grew to around 50 people and the Lebanese Armed Forces, who had promptly arrived, struggled to calm them down. Peacekeepers resorted to non-lethal force, including tear gas and warning shots fired into the air, to enable a safe withdrawal. As they were leaving, an isolated shooter fired approximately 20 shots, with impacts approximately one metre behind an armored vehicle. The patrol returned fire. There were no injuries, although two UNIFIL vehicles sustained damage, with several tires punctured and a radio stolen. The latter was later recovered by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The incident was recorded and widely circulated on social media platforms. A "statement" was also issued by "residents of Jumayjmeh", stating that UNIFIL had entered private property without being accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces, and that "several injuries were reported as a result of the tear gas".

30. On 19 May, five individuals in civilian clothes threw iron bars at a UNIFIL patrol east of Dayr Qanoun an-Nahr (Sector West), causing minor damage to the UNIFIL vehicles.

31. On 20 May, an individual in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL engineering reconnaissance mission in Aynata (Sector West), presenting himself as a police officer. He stated that UNIFIL could not continue its movement and was not allowed to take pictures. The Lebanese Armed Forces promptly arrived, and the peacekeepers continued their activity. The mayor of Aynata said that the local residents had seen the peacekeepers taking pictures and acting suspiciously, which was not tolerated in the village.

32. On 20 May, approximately 25 agitated individuals in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol, east of Shaqra (Sector East), prompting the patrol to turn around and return to its position.
33. On 25 May, two individuals in civilian clothes on a moped threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol passing Yarun, while recording the patrol and making unfriendly gestures. There was minor damage to the UNIFIL vehicle.
34. On 26 May, an individual in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL vehicle south of Aytit (Sector West), broke the side mirror and pulled off the UN flag while demanding the patrol to turn around. The patrol continued its movement.
35. On 28 May, ten individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol near Frun (Sector East) with two vehicles. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived some 40 minutes later, whereafter the UNIFIL patrol continued. The Mayor of Frun later told UNIFIL that the patrol had entered private property and that he remained at UNIFIL's disposal to address similar situations if they would occur.
36. On 28 May, 12 individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol undertaken in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, west of Yatar (Sector West) by placing two tractors across the road. The patrol used an alternative route with three vehicles following the patrol as they left the area. The incident was filmed and circulated on social media. The mayor of Yatar later informed UNIFIL that the individuals were part of the municipal police.
37. On 28 May, two individuals in civilian clothes moved alongside a UNIFIL patrol southwest of At Tiri (Sector West), one individual gesturing to turn around, while the second filmed. The UNIFIL patrol took an alternative route to continue its movement. The two motorcycles followed for a short distance.
38. On 29 May, an individual on a scooter approached a UNIFIL patrol in Ayn Baal and broke the left mirrors of two UNIFIL patrol vehicles. The UNIFIL patrol continued its planned activity.
39. On 30 May, an individual threw a glass bottle at a UNIFIL patrol vehicle northwest of Bint Jubayl (Sector West), causing minor damage. Later the same day, at the same location, an individual threw rocks at the patrol, again causing minor damage to the vehicle.
40. On 30 May, an individual in civilian clothes driving a vehicle stopped a UNIFIL patrol, west of Srifa (Sector West). Twenty additional individuals subsequently arrived at the location. Upon UNIFIL's request, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and accompanied the patrol out of the area.
41. On 3 June, two individuals in civilian clothes on a scooter stopped a UNIFIL patrol, southwest of Siddiqin and stated that it could not continue without the Lebanese Armed Forces. Ten minutes later, 20 other individuals arrived. When UNIFIL returned, having waited for the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, they were stopped again, and it was decided to use an alternative road. Media mischaracterized the incident as "a major clash". The former mayor Siddiqin attributed the incident to "unsupervised youths".
42. On 3 June, 20 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol in Srifa. The Lebanese Armed Forces was informed and when they arrived the patrol continued.
43. On 5 June, four agitated individuals in civilian clothes in two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol near in Sribbin (Sector West). Subsequently, 12 other individuals in civilian clothes joined the group. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location, whereafter the patrol continued its movement.

44. On 7 June, an agitated group of about 20 individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol near Srifa, climbing onto the vehicles and putting Hizbullah flags on them. The scene was filmed and shared on social media. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter and the UNIFIL patrol continued.

45. On 10 June, 20 individuals in civilian clothes carrying iron bars stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Dayr Qanun al-Nahr (Sector West). The patrol moved to a nearby location and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. A second UNIFIL patrol, which was responding to the first patrol's call for assistance, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, was then stopped in the same area by 10 individuals in civilian clothes. The group subsequently increased to about 100 people throwing stones and attempting to place Hizbullah flags on the vehicles. The peacekeepers used tear gas to disperse the crowd and returned to their UN position. The Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were also involved in a physical altercation with some of the individuals while the peacekeepers were leaving. The former mayor later condemned the incident but stressed that UNIFIL patrols should be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces to prevent future incidents. UNIFIL has been informed by the Lebanese authorities that an investigation has been initiated into the incident with one suspect detained and referred to the military prosecutor while efforts to identify additional suspects continue.

46. On 10 June, six individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Tayr Falsay (Sector West) and asked it not to proceed without the Lebanese Armed Forces. When the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived the UNIFIL patrol continued its movement. The former mayor of Tayr Falsay later contacted UNIFIL to express his dismay at UNIFIL patrols repeatedly entering the village without the Lebanese Armed Forces.

47. On 10 June, an individual in civilian clothes on a scooter, holding what appeared to be a hand grenade, stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Burj al-Shamali. The patrol used an alternative route to continue and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces.

48. On 10 June, north-east of Bidyas (Sector West), a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by three civilian cars and a group of 10 individuals. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces, which then intervened to resolve the situation. The UNIFIL patrol had to return to its United Nations position.

49. On 11 June, four individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Srifa, demanding it be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the patrol continued. The mayor of Srifa later informed UNIFIL that the incidents in the municipality on 3, 7 and 11 June were all the result of "childish acts" by youth. The mayor also said that he had reached out to all community members to call on them to refrain from stopping UNIFIL patrols.

50. On 11 June, approximately 40 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Bayt Lif and threw stones at the patrol, damaging the patrol vehicles. The patrol cancelled its activity. The mayor of Bayt Lif condemned the incident but said that the UNIFIL patrol had passed by the village shortly after an Israeli drone strike had hit the village, which had the residents feeling very anxious and nervous.

51. On 12 June, six individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Toura (Sector West) and stated that the patrol could not continue without the Lebanese Armed Forces. The patrol moved to a nearby location and, once the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, continued its movement. The mayor of Toura informed UNIFIL that locals had seen the patrol moving in a narrow street, stopped them and asked them to proceed to the main road. The mayor advised that patrols

should be conducted on main roads and that the municipal police should be informed in advance of UNIFIL's movements.

52. On 20 June, a UNIFIL convoy was denied freedom of movement on three consecutive occasions in the vicinity of As Surayî, north of Marjayoun (outside of the UNIFIL area of operations). Subsequently, the convoy withdrew and returned to Naqoura. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

Denial of freedom of movement and aggressive behaviour involving the Israel Defense Forces

53. UNIFIL continued to encounter other roadblocks particularly around the five Israel Defense Forces positions and two so-called buffer zones north of the Blue Line, complicating access to UN position 1-31, southwest of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West), observation point HIN near Marwahin (Sector West), UN position 8-33, northeast of Hula (Sector East), UN position 9-63, south of Udaysah (Sector East), and UN position 9-64 south of Kfar Kila (Sector East). UNIFIL has protested these access restrictions. The Israel Defense Forces has stated that it takes "significant measures to allow UNIFIL to operate freely and without and disturbance" while maintaining its operations and that "the Israel Defense Forces does not implement restrictions on the movement of any UNIFIL vehicles to observation post-HIN."

54. At the end of May, UNIFIL encountered new roadblocks in the vicinity of Israel Defense Forces' positions north of the Blue Line, in particular in Sector East. Following a number of incidents, as detailed below, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL on 3 June that it would not interfere with UNIFIL removing 13 of the roadblocks.

55. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents involving the Israel Defense Forces, interfering with operations or putting peacekeepers or UN staff members at risk. UNIFIL has protested each of the incidents with the Israel Defense Forces.

56. On 23 February, the Israel Defense Forces opened fire on a vehicle driven by an off-duty UNHCR national staff member near Hula (Sector East). The staff member and his wife sought refuge in a nearby ditch. UNIFIL coordinated with the parties to facilitate their rescue.

57. On 13 March, the Israel Defense Forces placed a polygon steel target in front of the observation slot of the southwest guard tower at a UN position southwest of Alma al-Sha'b, obstructing UNIFIL's view.

58. On 29 March, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed a laser at a UNIFIL patrol south of Alma al Sh'ab (Sector West). The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they do not acknowledge that the incident occurred.

59. Also, on 29 March, an Israel Defense Forces soldier south of the Blue Line fired shots in the direction of a UNIFIL patrol near Rumaysh (Sector West), using an automatic weapon. The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that these were warning shots, as part of an escalation of force procedure, towards an unidentified individual in the area and that Israel Defense Forces were aware of the presence of UNIFIL personnel and fired the warning shots with the utmost caution.

60. On 30 March, a laser was pointed at a UNIFIL patrol near Udaysah (Sector East) from an Israel Defense Forces tank. The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that the actions were not intended to cause harm or intimidate UNIFIL, and that it had emphasised the importance to its personnel to not aim lasers or fire warning shots towards UNIFIL.

61. On 1 April, an Israel Defense Forces soldier fired five shots in the air and three shots in the direction of a UNIFIL patrol near Udaysah (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that the area where the incident took place has a history of infiltration attempts, and that “the action taken by Israel Defense Forces was not intended to cause harm or intimidate UNIFIL forces”.
62. On 2 April, a stationary Israel Defense Forces tank aimed its turret at a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Hula (Sector East).
63. Overnight on 1 to 2 April, an Israel Defense Forces tank blocked a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Naqurah (Sector West). After about an hour, the tank was moved, and the patrol continued. The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that they had blocked the road while marking a mine field.
64. On 10 April, a group of 11 Israel Defense Forces soldiers clearing vegetation, stopped a UNIFIL patrol south of Alma al-Sha'b. The patrol managed to proceed shortly thereafter. The Israel Defense Forces has informed UNIFIL that they had “engaged in a respectful conversation and allowed them [the UNIFIL patrol] to proceed on their way, without interruption”.
65. On 28 April, an Israel Defense Forces tank located at one of its positions north of the Blue Line pointed the turret at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.
66. On 6 May UNIFIL issued a “stop-firing” request after five trajectories were detected and UNIFIL observed several points of impact near a UN position southeast of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West).
67. On 7 May, an Israel Defense Forces tank located south of the Blue Line, south of Alma al-Sha'b used its laser rangefinders on UNIFIL vehicles and turned their turrets toward the patrol. The UNIFIL patrol withdrew to a safe location and continued to monitor the situation. While withdrawing, the patrol was followed by a drone.
68. On 13 May, Israel Defense Forces personnel at the positions north of the Blue Line near Marun al-Ra's pointed a laser at a UNIFIL patrol vehicle's camera system.
69. On 13 May, the Israel Defense Forces fired two shots towards a UN position southeast of Kfar Shuba (Sector East), with one point of impact on a defensive barrier of the shelter. Peacekeepers took shelter and issued a “stop-firing” request. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that the action “was not intended to cause harm or intimidate UNIFIL forces” and that the Israel Defense Forces Command had “drawn lessons from the incident”.
70. On 17 May, Israel Defense Forces personnel north of the Blue Line pointed lasers at UNIFIL personnel southeast of Marun al-Ra's.
71. On 19 May Israel Defense Forces personnel located north of the Blue Line pointed lasers at UNIFIL personnel, southeast of Marun al-Ra's. The laser from a tank appeared to scan the UNIFIL vehicles and camera system.
72. On 29 May, the Israel Defense Forces fired approximately 30 small arms rounds about 50 metres in front of a combined UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces patrol, southwest of Yarun. Following up on the incident, the Israel Defense Forces stated that the UNIFIL forces “positioned themselves in the direction from which the Israel Defense Forces were securing themselves”.
73. On 30 May, the Israel Defense Forces aimed the turret of a tank, toward UNIFIL peacekeepers who were removing a roadblock near Markaba (Sector East). Simultaneously, at least ten Israel Defense Forces soldiers took up firing positions in the peacekeepers' direction. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently stated that removing the roadblock required “approval”.

74. On 31 May, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed his weapon toward a UN position, southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.

75. On 4 June, one UNIFIL Maritime Task Force vessel was illuminated by what seemed to be an Israel Defense Forces drone radar on at least four occasions.

76. On 6 June, the barrel of an IDF tank was pointed towards UNIFIL troops and illuminated them with a laser, in the vicinity of Aytarun (Sector West).

77. On 7 June, after Israel Defense Forces soldiers installed a roadblock in the vicinity of observation point MAR, southeast of Markaba, Israel Defense Forces troops inside the Israel Defense Forces position pointed a laser at UNIFIL troops.

78. On 8 June, as a UNIFIL patrol attempted to remove an Israel Defense Forces roadblock southwest of Markaba (Sector East), an Israel Defense Forces tank drew up less than 20 meters away and pointed its turret towards the peacekeepers. UNIFIL cancelled its activity.

79. On 16 June, UNIFIL reported warning shots fired near a UNIFIL patrol, southwest of Kfar Kila (Sector East). UNIFIL observed two 120 mm shells originating from an Israel Defense Forces Merkava tank, located south of the Blue Line, impacting approximately 600 meters from their location. No injuries or damage were reported. The LAF were informed.

80. On 19 June, a UNIFIL patrol in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces west of Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West), where it was interrupted by an Israel Defense Forces drone equipped with a loudspeaker, warning the patrol to leave the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces decided to relocate to a safe area and canceled the activity.

Incidents not attributed to any party

81. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents interfering with its operations that cannot be ascribed to any of the parties.

82. On 19 March, a UNIFIL soldier was severely injured in a landmine explosion during a foot patrol near Zibqin (Sector West). The injured peacekeeper was subsequently medically evacuated from Lebanon.

83. On 15 May, UNIFIL peacekeepers discovered minor damage to a UN position, southwest of Shab'a, likely caused by the shock wave from indirect artillery fire originating south of the Blue Line.

84. UNIFIL peacekeepers experienced temporary electronic interference while operating near Alma al-Sha'b on 24 May, At Tiri on 5 May and 18 June, Yarun on 13 and 14 May, as well as Ayn Ibil and Marun al Ra's on 16 May. UNIFIL also experienced manipulation of a maritime vessel's automatic identification system device while at sea on 13, 14 and 15 June.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) states that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

2. In identical letters dated 29 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2025/337](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that, “Hezbollah persists in its efforts to transfer money through Lebanon’s border crossings, including via Beirut International Airport, and to smuggle arms across the Syria-Lebanon border, in direct violation of the arms embargo [...]”. The Permanent Representative further conveyed that [these actions] “underscore the strategic objective of Iran and Hezbollah to rearm and re-establish Hezbollah’s military presence across Lebanon, spanning areas north and south of the Litani River”. The Permanent Representative further stated: “The Security Council must also adopt measures to deter Iran from continuing its transfer of weapons and financial support to Hezbollah [...] it is imperative that Member States take action to prevent the flow of funds to Hezbollah through their territories.”

3. Following allegations reported in the media about Hizbullah weapons smuggling at the port of Beirut, President Aoun and Minister of Public Works and Transport Fayez Rasamny on 11 April conducted an inspection of the port. Two days earlier, Minister Rasamny, in a press conference at the port, stated: “Security at the port is under close surveillance and we reject any media discourse that casts doubt on this matter.”

4. As detailed in paragraph 55 of this report, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,476 vessels.

5. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#). It urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, and all State security institutions, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection, and naval capacity.

2. In identical letters dated 9 January 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/36](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that, "The Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)], so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)." Subsequently, on 29 February 2024, Lebanon's then-caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati stated that to implement resolution 1701, the Army would need allied countries to help with everything from "fuel to equipment to means of transportation to the barracks and even to weapons – everything the Army needs."

3. In a presidential statement adopted on 16 January 2025 ([S/PRST/2025/1](#)), the United Nations Security Council called for further international assistance to strengthen State institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces.

4. The Announcement of a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements and Toward the Implementation of UNSCR 1701, which was circulated to the United Nations Security Council by the United Kingdom in its capacity as President of the Security Council ([S/2024/870](#)), noted the intention of the United States and France to work with the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon and the wider international community to support enhanced Lebanese Armed Forces deployment to southern Lebanon and to strengthen the capabilities of the Army.

5. During the reporting period, regional and global leaders have continued to champion a surge in support aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out its critical tasks. The Lebanese authorities have made several calls for increased international support to be channeled to the Army.

6. Support to the Lebanese Army has been a central theme of President Aoun's official visits in the region. In his visit to Riyadh on 3 March, a joint statement released by President Aoun and the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud emphasized the need to support and empower the Lebanese Armed Forces towards asserting the authority of the State across Lebanon. Following his visit to Doha, on 16 April President Aoun and his Qatari counterpart Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani released a joint communiqué which stated, "Both sides emphasized the national role of the Lebanese

Army, the importance of supporting it, and the need to implement Resolution 1701 in all its provisions.” The imperative to support the Lebanese Armed Forces was also cited during a 19 May press conference between President Aoun and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi during the former’s official visit to Cairo. Jordan’s support to the Lebanese Armed Forces was acknowledged according to a readout from His Majesty’s office during a meeting on 10 June between President Aoun and King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein.

7. Several commitments were announced by Member States in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the reporting period. On 18 June, a signing ceremony was held to mark Germany’s commitment to provide €17.85 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The grant will be used to procure essential equipment, uniforms and material for the Army. On 16 April, during the above-mentioned trip by President Aoun to Doha, the Emir of the State of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, announced a \$60 million grant to supplement the salaries of Lebanese Army personnel, as well as a commitment to provide military vehicles. In the reporting period, the Government of the Netherlands pledged an additional amount of €7.5 million for support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, to fund infrastructure, equipment, border control efforts, and mine action.

8. Several Member States provided equipment or other forms of in-kind support to bolster the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United States delivered additional assets and tactical support, including to advance explosive ordnance disposal, as well as infrastructural support. France and Italy provided equipment, logistics assistance, training-based capacity development, and livelihood and sustainment support, with Türkiye also providing equipment. Assistance from the United Kingdom and France was used to enhance training centres and related infrastructure. The United Kingdom also continued its support to the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area of border management. Canadian support was directed towards the provision of uniforms and procurement of equipment, while both Canada and Türkiye, alongside other donors, bolstered capacity building and training initiatives. France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and the United States channeled assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide direct support to local communities in southern Lebanon.

9. With a view to bolstering the coordination of international support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was signed on 14 May between the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), the United Nations Development Programme in Lebanon, and Lebanon’s Ministry of National Defense. The memorandum of understanding formalizes the “LAF Livelihood Ecosystem” project managed by the United Nations Development Programme to address the sustenance needs of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel and their families, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. With the support of France, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces signed a separate memorandum of understanding, on 10 June for the provision of non-lethal material support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

10. As part of international resource mobilization efforts to support enhanced Lebanese Armed Forces deployment in southern Lebanon, the Military Technical Committee convened for a two-day meeting in Beirut and Naqurah on 20 and 21 March, respectively, and in Berlin on 10 and 11 June to take stock of existing support streams and identify remaining gaps. Both UNSCOL and UNIFIL participated as observers, with the latter hosting the Committee at its base in Naqurah on 21 March. A rise in candidacies for membership in the Military Technical Committee points to growing multilateral interest in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, with the membership of Cyprus confirmed by the Committee during its Berlin meeting in June.

Since the inception of the Military Technical Committee in March 2024, \$384 million has been mobilized.

11. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces continued during the reporting period. Donor funding totaling approximately \$25 million, including pledges, from Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and Spain, was channeled through the above-mentioned LAF Livelihood Ecosystem [see annex III, para. 9] in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Separately, under a broader United Nations country team strategy of support to the security sector, seven United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are supporting the implementation of 18 projects in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. The United Nations also provided direct assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces to promote and mainstream inclusive gender policies.

12. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
