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Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Summary

The present report, submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to Council resolution 55/19, consolidates the findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity committed in the context of the protests that began on 16 September 2022. In the report, the Mission provides details of its deepened investigations into patterns of violations and crimes by State authorities and the evolution thereof in the aftermath of the protests, including impunity and responsibilities, and refers to the road map for accountability, justice, truth and reparations that it has prepared.

* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.



I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 55/19, in which the Council extended the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran for a further period of one year to allow it to complete its mandate, including by ensuring that the large amount of evidence of human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran relating to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children, was fully and effectively documented, verified, consolidated and preserved. The Mission interpreted this aspect of its mandate as, *inter alia*, aimed at supporting accountability efforts, including the pursuit of truth, equality, justice and reparations, for and by victims and their families.
2. The present report comprises consolidated findings from the Mission's two years of investigations, including additional information and evidence that established new facts and circumstances of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the context of the protests. To support accountability efforts for victims, the Mission has compiled an accompanying conference room paper containing a detailed analysis of its findings, including a road map for accountability, truth, equality, justice and other measures to ensure effective redress for victims and survivors, and transformative reparations to break the cycle of violence and discrimination.¹
3. In its resolutions S-35/1 and 55/19, the Council called upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully with the Mission, including by granting it unhindered access to the country and providing all information necessary to allow the fulfilment of its mandate. Since the start of the mandate, the Mission has sent 36 information requests to the Government. While acknowledging responses to five such requests, the Mission regrets that the rest have remained unanswered, and that in the responses received, the Government did not provide the underlying information requested. Requests for meetings to discuss substantive issues with the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva have not received a positive response. The Mission reviewed the information made available by the Government, including its response to the draft of the present report, and where relevant, has reflected the factual information contained herein. The Mission also reviewed the report of the State-appointed Special Committee to investigate the 2022 unrest, published in March 2024, met with its members on 3 March 2025, and received additional information.
4. The Mission expresses its gratitude to the victims, witnesses and members of civil society organizations who provided information, who came forward to share their experiences, despite the ever-increasing security risks for them and their families, including well-founded fears of reprisals for cooperating with the Mission.

II. Methodology and standard of proof

5. The Mission was guided by the methodologies and best practices of United Nations entities and bodies, ensuring a victim-centred approach and paying specific attention to the gender dimension of the violations and crimes documented. In all its activities, the Mission continued to ensure strict adherence to the principles of "do no harm", independence, impartiality, objectivity, transparency and integrity.²
6. In line with the general practice of United Nations investigative bodies, the Mission applied the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard of proof.³

¹ See the conference room paper of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 March 2025, available on the web page of Mission, at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index>.

² The Mission's terms of reference are available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index>.

³ For the Mission's detailed methodology, see the conference room paper on the detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 19 March 2024,

7. The Mission has collected and preserved over 38,000 evidence items to date. They include interviews with 287 victims and witnesses and others who provided information, information received from credible human rights organizations, forensics and other subject-matter experts, and hundreds of secondary sources to corroborate and contextualize the information gathered.⁴

III. Continuous persecution against women, girls and others supporting human rights

A. Pervasive persecution of women and girls defying the mandatory hijab laws

8. Two and a half years after the protests began in September 2022, women and girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to face systematic discrimination, in law and in practice, that permeates all aspects of their lives. This is particularly so with respect to the enforcement of the mandatory wearing of the hijab.

9. Despite pre-election assurances by the new President, Masoud Pezeshkian, that strict enforcement of mandatory hijab laws would be eased, State authorities continued to enact and impose new measures to suppress women's and girls' fundamental rights and continued to repress those expressing solidarity with the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement. The State is increasingly reliant on State-sponsored vigilantism in an apparent effort to enlist businesses and private individuals in monitoring compliance with the hijab laws, portraying it as a civic responsibility. State rhetoric has also shifted towards explaining the refusal of women and girls to wear the hijab as being the result of their purported lack of awareness or education.

1. Increased policing and criminal prosecution

10. On 13 April 2024, at the request of the Head of the Judiciary, the Police Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA) launched the so-called Noor plan, emphasizing that it would comprise the deployment of police officers nationwide to "confront women and girls" promoting "social anomalies by appearing without the hijab". In support of the plan, on 21 April 2024, the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Tehran, Hassan Hassanzadeh, announced the establishment and deployment of the so-called ambassadors of kindness to monitor compliance in public spaces, including markets, parks and on public transport. A credible human rights organization reported that in 2024, at least 618 women were arrested in the context of the Noor plan.

11. Pursuant to established patterns, the Mission investigated cases of women and girls who were subjected to physical violence during arrests and in detention by the "morality police" for alleged non-compliance. The Mission received reports that, although the Vozara facility in Tehran appears to no longer be serving as a detention facility for women and girls allegedly flouting the mandatory hijab laws, women who do so continue to be arrested and detained in police stations operated by the Public Morality Security Police.

12. State authorities, moreover, sought to reinforce the already existing discriminatory legal framework against women and girls regarding the mandatory hijab through the judiciary. During the second half of 2024, women were increasingly summoned to appear before criminal or revolutionary courts, including the Ershad judicial complex in Tehran. In some cases, they were sentenced, including to flogging, based on evidence referred to as "reports provided by security forces" or "pictures submitted by the police", reaffirming that women continue to be frequently monitored and reported on by the State apparatus for non-compliance with the mandatory hijab laws and policies. Most women were sentenced to a fine and, in at least in one case, a woman's bank account was closed.

updated on 8 July 2024, available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index>, paras. 30–43.

⁴ Ibid.

13. On 23 November 2024, Roshnak Alishah was flogged 14 times following sentencing by branch 1907 of the Ershad judicial complex for “disturbing public chastity”. Ms. Alishah had been arrested on 3 November 2024 in connection with a video she posted online which showed her, without the mandatory hijab, confronting a man on a motorcycle who had assaulted her. More recently, in March 2025, a prominent Iranian singer, Mehdi Yarrahi, was flogged 74 times as part of his sentence in connection with a song he wrote during the protests in which he criticized the mandatory wearing of the hijab. The Mission reiterates its previous findings that corporal punishment, such as flogging, constitutes State-sanctioned torture and amounts to a violation of the right to security of person.

2. The “hijab and chastity” law

14. On 1 December 2024, the Parliamentary Spokesperson announced that the so-called hijab and chastity law was set to come into force on 13 December 2024. On 14 December 2024, however, the Supreme National Security Council announced that the law had been suspended pending further review. The law is yet to be signed by the President or officially promulgated. According to information from the Government, discussions are ongoing domestically as to whether the enforcement mechanism for violations of the law should be penal or civil in nature.

15. The current draft, if adopted, would strengthen State control over women’s and girls’ bodily autonomy and infringe upon fundamental rights and freedoms. Women could face up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to the equivalent of \$12,000 for non-compliance. If their conduct is deemed to amount to “corruption on earth”, as defined in article 286 of the Islamic Penal Code, they may also face the death penalty.⁵ The law would further delegate enhanced enforcement powers to the security apparatus and to citizens and businesses in the Islamic Republic of Iran, while also increasing the use of technology and surveillance.

3. Escalating restrictions of women’s and girls’ access to fundamental rights

16. While the hijab and chastity law has not yet been officially adopted, measures to implement it have already begun to be taken, including within the broader context of the Noor plan. Such measures include the expansion of existing restrictions on women’s and girls’ access to social and economic rights and related services, including health, education, employment, banking and public transport. The Government has also continued closing down private businesses, including cafes, restaurants and commercial offices, for non-compliance with the mandatory hijab rules.

17. In November 2024, the head of the Women and Family Department of the Tehran Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice announced the opening of a so-called clinic targeting teenage girls who would undergo “scientific and psychological treatment” for removing the hijab.

4. Enhanced surveillance

18. The Mission previously documented the far-reaching use of technology by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to restrict freedom of expression. Specifically, it was used to monitor women’s and girls’ compliance with the mandatory hijab laws and acts of solidarity with the protests. In April 2024, in Tehran and in the south of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the State resorted to aerial drone surveillance to monitor hijab compliance in public spaces. A new facial recognition software was also reportedly installed in April 2024 at the entrance gate of the Amirkabir University of Technology in Tehran to monitor women students’ compliance with the mandatory hijab laws.

19. The practice of confiscating vehicles from women for alleged violations of the mandatory hijab laws also persisted, including through increased reliance on individuals empowered by the State to exercise elements of governmental authority to enforce compliance. For example, the Mission obtained a copy of the Nazer mobile application, which enables vetted individuals and the police across the Islamic Republic of Iran to report

⁵ According to the Government’s response, the reference to article 286 of the law pertains to establishing centres of corruption and prostitution and is of no relevance to the hijab.

instances of non-compliance by women and girls in private vehicles. In September 2024, the application was updated to allow for such monitoring of women in ambulances, public transport and taxis. The application is accessible through the official Police Command website. Users may add the location, date, time and the licence plate number of the vehicle in which the alleged mandatory hijab infraction occurred, which then flags the vehicle online, alerting the police. It then triggers a text message in real-time to the registered owner of the vehicle, warning the owner that she has been found to be in violation of the mandatory hijab laws and that the vehicle would be impounded for ignoring the warning.

5. Eradicating women's rights initiatives

20. The State also increased efforts to suppress the remaining independent women's initiatives and activism. Defenders of women's human rights were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for their activism, as illustrated in the case of 10 women and 1 man arrested in Gilan Province in September 2023 and sentenced to imprisonment for periods ranging from three to six years, amounting collectively to 60 years.

21. Golrokh Ebrahimi Iraee, a woman human rights defender, has remained in Evin prison for over 30 months, since her arrest in late September 2022. In April 2023, she was sentenced by branch 26 of the Tehran revolutionary court to seven years in prison and a ban on residing in Tehran, for her support for the protests. In June 2023, she announced that she would not seek a pardon because she believed that she had been arrested and detained solely for her activism.

22. Imprisoned women activists and human rights defenders continue to be charged and sentenced to additional penalties for pursuing activism while they are in prison. They include Narges Mohammadi, who was sentenced in October 2024 to an additional six months' imprisonment in Evin prison for protesting against Reza Rasaei's execution (see para. 33 below). Ms. Mohammadi was released on medical furlough on 4 December 2024 after her health had significantly deteriorated following the authorities' denial to allow her medical care on at least nine occasions between September and October 2024.

23. Likewise, Reza Khandan, the husband of the prominent human rights defender Nasrin Sotoudeh, was arrested on 13 December 2024 in Tehran and transferred to Evin prison to serve a three-year prison sentence, reduced on appeal, on national security charges, including "propaganda activities against the State", for producing and distributing pins bearing the slogan "No to mandatory hijab" in 2019.

B. Escalated repression against victims, their families and other groups supporting rights and equality

24. Victims, including those who published information on incidents of blinding sustained during protests, were tracked down by security officers and repeatedly harassed, intimidated and threatened in order to dissuade them from engaging in public activities relating to their own injuries or those sustained by others.

25. The family of Jina Mahsa Amini was prevented in September 2024, for a second time, from commemorating the death of their daughter. In January 2025, Ms. Amini's father was charged with "propaganda against the State" by the revolutionary court in Saqqez after protesting the death sentence of the activist Pakhshan Azizi (see para. 41 below).

26. As in 2023, during the second anniversary of the protests in 2024, security forces escalated repression against grieving families to silence and prevent them from gathering at gravesites, especially in peak protest locations and in minority-populated provinces. Family members were arrested during house raids, on their way to or while attending commemoration services, and some were beaten. Others were reported to have been held in unknown locations, in acts amounting to enforced disappearance. Families who publicly advocated for accountability for their loved ones were charged with "propaganda against the State" or "inciting riots" to silence and discredit their demands. Some were denied employment, dismissed from their positions or demoted, leaving families financially struggling and further isolated.

27. The Mission also found a pattern of persistent threats against and harassment, intimidation, arrests and criminal prosecution of those who expressed support for the protests. They include human rights defenders, journalists, teachers, lawyers, students, trade union leaders, musicians, artists and others.

28. The continuous enforcement of inherently discriminatory laws and policies, along with increased policing and criminal prosecution, reflect the State's ongoing persecutory conduct aimed at suppressing women's and girls' rights to equality. Persecutory acts extend to victims and their families who have been systematically intimidated to remain silent, and to those who have acted in solidarity, such as human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists, forcing many to leave the Islamic Republic of Iran (see sect. VIII below). Against this backdrop, the State intensified surveillance, restricted digital space even further and extended its repression beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran to silence those who continued to speak up both inside and outside the country (see sects. VII and IX below). Together, these actions demonstrate concerted State efforts to stifle dissent, perpetuating a climate of fear and systematic impunity that denies victims the rights to truth, justice, accountability and reparations (see sect. X below).

IV. Increased use of the death penalty in the aftermath of the protests

29. While the Government has not published comprehensive data in relation to sentencing and executions, credible human rights organizations recorded an escalation of executions in the aftermath of the protests, with between at least 938 and 973 persons recorded as having been executed in 2024. This is a notable three-fold increase from 2021, the year before the protests.

30. In the months preceding the second anniversary of the protests, in September 2024, executions spiked, with 93 individuals executed in August 2024 alone, twice as many as the 45 executions reported in the previous month of July 2024. While the majority of those executed were convicted of drug-related offences, this marked upward trend in executions spiking after the 2022 protests appears to indicate a nexus with the overall repression of dissent in this period. This is in line with the authorities' long-standing use of the death penalty and executions to instil fear and as a tool of political repression against dissenting voices, including protesters and minorities.

A. Executions and death sentences in the context of the protests

31. At the time of publication, the Government had executed 10 men in relation to the protests. On 6 August 2024, Reza (Gholamreza) Rasaei, a young Kurdish protester of Yarsani faith, was executed in secret, without his family or lawyer being given prior notice. His execution followed a trial marred by serious violations of the right to a fair trial, including a confession obtained under torture. He was sentenced for his alleged role in the murder of an official of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on 18 November 2022 during a protest in Sahneh, Kermanshah Province.

32. At least 11 men and 3 women remain at imminent risk of being sentenced to death or executed in the context of the protests. On 12 November 2024, branch 13 of the criminal court in Tehran convicted six young men to death in a group trial for "participation in murder and intentional assault" in connection with the death of a Basij forces agent, Arman Aliverdi, in the Ekbatan neighbourhood of Tehran. The death sentences were imposed amid credible reports of gross violations of the right to a fair trial, including extracting confessions under torture and forcing defendants to incriminate themselves, including on camera.

33. On 16 May 2024, the Mission requested information from the Government regarding the cases of the rapper, Toomaj Salehi, the activist, Mahmoud Mehrabi, and the protester, Mojahed Kourkouri, following the death sentences imposed on them. The Mission expressed its concerns regarding gross violations of the right to a fair trial and allegations of confessions obtained under torture used to convict the three men. In its response to the Mission, the High

Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran refuted the allegations of torture and asserted that the defendants had been granted access to a lawyer, without providing the underlying information used to convict them requested by the Mission.

34. The Mission welcomes the subsequent overturning of the death sentences of Toomaj Salehi and Mahmoud Mehrabi by the Supreme Court on 22 July and 8 October 2024, respectively. It notes with concern, however, that while Toomaj Salehi was released on 1 December 2024, Mahmoud Mehrabi remains in prison to date, two years after his arrest in 2023 for his activism for expressing views critical of the Government and supporting the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement.

35. Alarmingly, on 11 December 2024, following a retrial, the revolutionary court in Ahvaz reimposed the death sentence on Mojahed Kourkouri, even though the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Iran had overturned his sentence earlier that month.

B. Gender impact

36. The use of the death penalty against women activists and women human rights defenders also escalated, particularly following their convictions for national security offences, including in relation to their activism. This disturbing development, noticeable in the aftermath of the protests, is indicative of growing retaliatory tactics against women for their unabated defiance against the discriminatory laws and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

37. Between July and October 2024 alone, three women activists and human rights defenders, Sharifeh Mohammadi, Pakhshan Azizi and Varisheh Moradi, were sentenced to death on charges of “armed rebellion against the State” (*baghi*). Ms. Mohammadi was sentenced to death for her former membership in the Coordinating committee to aid the formation of labour unions, which the State linked to the Komala party, considered by the State to be a terrorist organization. Ms. Moradi was sentenced on charges of “armed rebellion” for membership of the East Kurdistan Free Women Society, which the Government linked to the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, also considered by the State to be a terrorist organization. Ms. Azizi was sentenced for her alleged membership of the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan and for her support for the families of those killed during the protests. The women were convicted amid reports of serious violations of the right to a fair trial and confessions obtained under torture.

38. On 8 January 2025, the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Iran upheld Ms. Azizi’s death sentence. On 13 February 2025, branch 2 of the revolutionary court in Rasht upheld Ms. Mohammadi’s death sentence, thereby placing her at immediate risk of execution. Ms. Moradi’s case is still pending review before the Supreme Court.

V. Consolidation of the Mission’s investigations

39. The Mission found it important to conduct investigations in additional geographical areas where the impact on victims had been particularly severe, such as minority-populated regions where emblematic incidents had taken place, and in Tehran, Mazandaran and Alborz Provinces. It also investigated patterns of conduct against particular groups, including children, ethnic and religious minorities and LGBTQ+ persons. It focused also on allegations of extrajudicial executions and what the State declared to have been suicides of protesters. In relation to the use of force, the Mission prioritized investigations into incidents in which the security forces had used military-grade and other lethal weapons and ammunition.

40. On the basis of new evidence, the Mission has to date investigated killings and injuries, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence in at least 17 provinces. This reinforced the already robust evidence gathered during the first mandate, forming the foundation of the Mission’s findings of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This section provides a summary of a sample of new emblematic incidents and patterns investigated by the Mission.

A. Use of force resulting in deaths and injuries

41. The Mission established that additional instances of unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force by security forces had resulted in killings and injuries of protesters and bystanders, including children, who engaged in conduct protected under international human rights law and did not pose an imminent threat of death or serious injury.⁶

42. The Mission has thus far amassed substantial evidence that reaffirms widespread patterns of systematic ocular injuries resulting in the blinding of protesters and bystanders in eight provinces. Victims who sustained such injuries were effectively “branded”, as they continue to live with the visible signs of their injuries and with multiple pellets lodged in their heads and bodies, on occasion so deep that doctors are unable to remove them. They still suffer from serious health complications and the risk of infection, in addition to acute, chronic or complex psychological trauma.

Karaj, Alborz Province

43. The Mission investigated a key protest on 3 November 2022 in Karaj, where at least three protesters were shot and injured with metal pellets. One protester was blinded as a result, while another, a woman, sustained injuries from the 160 pellets shot into her face and body. The third victim, a woman human rights defender who participated in several protests while wearing the hijab, was shot at and injured in the legs while attempting to run away from the site of the protest.

44. The Mission also conducted investigations into the case of Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini and Mohammad Mehdi Karami, two protesters who were executed on 7 January 2023. Their summary trial had been marred by gross violations of the right to a fair trial, including evidence obtained under torture used to convict them of the killing of Seyyed Ruhollah Ajamian, a Basij forces officer, at the protest site in Karaj.

45. The Mission collected additional information about the killing of that officer. State media reported that protesters threw stones at Mr. Ajamian and then kicked, beat and dragged him to the ground and stabbed him multiple times. Witness testimonies indicated that some protesters asked those beating him to stop and not drag him on the ground. While video footage showed him unconscious on the ground, no blood is visible on his clothes or body that would indicate the reported multiple stabbing to his torso that led to his death. Although it was clearly in the possession of the State, no other evidence that the court relied upon to convict and sentence Mr. Hosseini and Mr. Karami to death, including a forensic report referenced by the judiciary, was made public. Information requests that the Mission sent to the Government remained unfulfilled, preventing the Mission from assessing all the evidence in accordance with its methodology.

B. Arbitrary arrests and torture and ill-treatment in detention

46. New evidence reaffirmed patterns of widespread arrests and detention of women, children and men for their participation in or support for the protests. The Mission found that plain-clothed agents made many of these arrests before transferring victims to the custody of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence, in both official and unofficial detention facilities.

47. Victims, including children, were subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including beating, flogging and prolonged solitary confinement. Torture and ill-treatment were carried out in unofficial detention facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and

⁶ The Mission reaffirms its previous findings that, while members of the security forces were killed and injured and instances of violence by protesters were found, the large majority of protests were peaceful. See also the conference room paper of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 March 2025, available on the web page of Mission, at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index>.

the Ministry of Intelligence, and in security wards 2-A and 209 of Evin prison, which are controlled by the same entities.

48. The Mission identified a pattern of mock executions of detained protesters, including children, in the custody of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Criminal Investigation Unit (*Agahi*) of the Police Command and the Ministry of Intelligence, in acts amounting to torture. Plain-clothed agents wearing surgical masks to conceal their identities arrested protesters and transferred them in civilian vehicles to unofficial detention facilities. To extract confessions, security officers subjected victims to torture and ill-treatment. When victims refused to confess, some were forcibly taken out of their cells, transferred to another detention facility, including in one case, to an official prison, and placed on chairs with nooses around their necks. Two women were subjected to a mock execution at gunpoint, including by a firing squad.

49. The Mission also obtained new information in relation to detention conditions in Mahabad (West Azerbaijan) and Tabriz (East Azerbaijan) central prisons. Detainees in both facilities were held in overcrowded and unsanitary cells, with some forced to sleep on the floor or share a bed. In Tabriz central prison, authorities refused to transfer detainees to medical facilities, despite visible pellet injuries and signs of beatings.

C. Rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence

50. The Mission established additional cases of sexual violence against women, children and men protesters, including rape, gang rape, rape with an object, threats of rape and genital electrocution, including against female relatives, intrusive body searches and gender-specific verbal abuse. Such acts were perpetrated during detainees' transfers to, and in the custody of, the Criminal Investigation Unit (*Agahi*) of the Police Command, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence units and the Ministry of Intelligence.

51. A woman was arrested at a protest site in 2023, severely beaten, including with chains, subjected to two mock executions, raped in the custody of the *Agahi* and gang-raped by plain-clothed agents in an undisclosed location.

52. Moreover, security officers perpetrated sexual violence against a woman protester immediately after they shot and injured her at a protest site. The victim described how she was assaulted after a plain-clothed agent fired over 200 metal pellets into her body and genitalia at close range.

D. Protester deaths dismissed by the State as suicide

53. The Mission collected additional information and evidence in relation to at least six cases in which the Mission found indicia of extrajudicial executions of protesters, which were later dismissed by the State as suicide. They include the deaths of three children, Sarina Esmailzadeh, Nika Shakarami and Sarina Saedi, and three adults, Atefeh Na'ami, Saman Qader Beg and Aida Rostami.

54. The Mission acknowledges the significant challenges in investigating these cases to determine the actual cause or causes and circumstances of the deaths. Nevertheless, it expresses serious concern that the State response to these deaths is reminiscent of its handling of other incidents and the killings of individuals at or near protest sites and, as such, forms part of a systematic pattern to conceal the truth and evade potential responsibility for the deaths. This includes delayed or flawed investigations into the deaths, contradictory State narratives on the cause of death, withholding information such as medical and toxicology reports to attest for a "suicide" and cases where the Mission found indicia of physical violence perpetrated by State agents concomitant to or preceding the death. It also includes credible information from relatives contesting the official narratives on the cause or causes of the deaths, coupled with persistent threats and arrests, denial of commemorative services, criminal charges and sentencing (including to flogging) of family members for seeking justice for the death of their loved ones. Moreover, some of the victims were reported to have been monitored by security forces prior to their death owing to their role in supporting the

protests, suggesting that they may have been deliberately targeted. Together, these patterns are indicative of State responsibility for the violation of the right to life and denial of justice with respect to the deaths.

E. Ethnic and religious minorities

1. Use of force resulting in killings and injuries

(i) Sistan and Baluchestan

55. The Mission deepened its investigations into the “bloody Friday” protests, an emblematic protest where a credible human rights organization recorded the highest number of casualties (103) in a single day during the protests. The Mission carried out further investigations into other key protests in 2023, all of which took place near religious sites of profound value for the Baluchi minority.

“Bloody Friday” protests, 30 September 2022

56. The Mission previously found that the use of lethal force by the security forces on “bloody Friday” was generally unnecessary and, in some instances, disproportionate to the threat that some of the protesters allegedly posed to public order. It had also found that the tactics and weapons used in responding to what was a generally peaceful assembly were unlawful and likely to be the result of discriminatory policies.

57. Further investigations yielded additional evidence of the use of force resulting, inter alia, in the killing of a 7-year-old child and worshippers inside the Grand Mosalla. It is likely that the girl’s death was caused by a gas canister that struck her on the head, and is attributable to the security forces, who used tear gas canisters in close proximity – less than 100 meters – from the women’s section. The Mission was unable to determine whether worshippers inside the Grand Mosalla were individually targeted by security forces or whether the damage to the religious site was intentional. The Mission deems, however, that both the casualties inside and the structural damage were at the very least a foreseeable consequence of an intentional act, due to the nature of the military-grade weapons used near the site where worshippers, including children, were known to attend Friday prayers at noon.

(ii) Zahedan in the aftermath of “bloody Friday”

58. Throughout 2023, and in contrast to other parts of the country, protests in Zahedan continued regularly on Fridays after midday prayers, with security forces responding with the same level of violent repression.

59. On 29 September 2023, around 300 protesters, including some 100 boys, gathered near Makki mosque to commemorate the victims of the “bloody Friday” events in 2022. Protesters chanted and some threw stones at riot police who had been deployed earlier nearby. In response, security forces dressed in black and plain-clothed agents positioned near Makki mosque and in nearby streets fired with shotguns and machine guns and used tear gas, injuring many. The security forces then arrested protesters, including boys as young as 15 years old, en masse in front of Makki mosque.

60. On 20 October 2023, protesters gathered in front of Dar-al-Alum, a prominent Sunni madrasa near Makki mosque. The security forces used tear gas against the protesters, injuring them, and carried out mass arrests, including of children, some as young as 8 years old. The following day, the Dar-al-Alum school issued a statement condemning the arrests and injuries and noting that the security forces had entered the madrasa’s residential complex without presenting the staff with a warrant, searched residences inside and assaulted several teachers, arresting one.

(iii) Accountability

61. “Bloody Friday” in Zahedan was a rare incident in that the State took steps to investigate and hold accountable officials who were found to be responsible for unlawful killings. The Government acknowledged that the shooting by police forces had resulted in

“injury and loss of life” of worshippers and “passers-by” who did not play a role in the “unrest”.⁷

62. Nevertheless, the judicial process has been inadequate, not least due to a lack of transparency. Following the investigations, on 21 June 2023, the Zahedan military prosecutor, Hossein Ali Mir, confirmed that 15 low-ranking law enforcement personnel had been convicted and sentenced in connection with “bloody Friday” and that some had since lodged an appeal.

63. On 13 January 2025, the head of the Sistan and Baluchestan judiciary, Ali Movahedi-Rad, reportedly announced that the charge of murder had been dropped due to alleged difficulties in identifying the perpetrator or perpetrators. Some officers had then been sentenced to up to 10 years’ imprisonment and “blood money” payments. State media has not, to date, published additional information on these trials, including the names of the alleged perpetrators and the charges upon which they were sentenced to imprisonment. The lack of transparency on the part of the State in relation to this emblematic protest raises serious concerns as to whether State investigations were conducted in good faith and whether accountability measures were truly meaningful. The Mission’s investigations also confirmed that some victims and families were threatened so that they would remain silent and accept blood money.

64. The Mission obtained no information indicating that investigations were initiated in relation to the protests on 29 September or 20 October 2023.

65. The Mission acknowledges the security concerns in the border provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the history of armed movements in Sistan and Baluchestan, with at least two documented clashes during the reporting period alone between security forces and armed groups resulting in deaths of officials.

66. Nevertheless, the Mission emphasizes that, while it is plausible that armed elements might have been present on 30 September 2022, particularly in the evening, the protest was largely peaceful and driven by long-standing unaddressed grievances rooted in decades-long structural discrimination against minorities. This is also evidenced by the disproportionately high number of child victims in Zahedan in 2022 and again in 2023. Furthermore, evidence of injuries during the “bloody Friday” anniversary, including to children and near the Dar-al-Alum madrasa a year later, is indicative of the recurrent unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force by the security forces in Zahedan, including in the context of law enforcement operations in the close vicinity of Sunni mosques.

2. Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan Provinces

67. New evidence reaffirmed that security forces deployed military-grade weapons and military equipment in protests in Kurdish-populated provinces more frequently than in central regions and immediately after protests began, resulting in injuries and killings of protesters. Such weapons included firearms, automatic and semi-automatic assault rifles, including Winchester rifles and AK-47s, and military-grade weapons, including G3 and DShK heavy machine guns. The security forces equally resorted to using shotguns and firearms with ammunition containing metal pellets.

68. The Mission reaffirmed that in Saqqez city, Police Command special forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence units deployed military vehicles and shot and injured protesters with firearms on 17 September 2022, the day of Jina Mahsa Amini’s funeral.

69. Witness statements and death certificates obtained by the Mission showed additional instances of killings of protesters at or near protest sites in peak protest towns in Kurdish-populated provinces, including Bukan, Mahabad, Sanandaj and Javanrud. In some of these cases, victims were shot dead with firearms.

⁷ Islamic Republic of Iran, Special Committee Investigating the 2022 Unrests, “Summary of the report of the President-Elected Special Committee Investigating the 2022 Unrests”, March 2024, pp. 82–86.

3. East Azerbaijan Province

70. The Mission received credible information that a significant number of killings and injuries resulting from the use of lethal force also occurred in East Azerbaijan Province, where the Azerbaijani Turk minority primarily resides.

(i) *Discriminatory practices in the context of detention and sentencing in minority-populated regions*

71. Investigations reaffirmed large-scale arrests carried out in provinces with ethnic and religious minorities with victims, including children, predominantly held in unofficial detention facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence units and the Ministry of Intelligence. In East Azerbaijan Province, the Mission identified two additional unofficial detention facilities, both reportedly operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, where Azerbaijani Turk protesters were held.

72. To extract confessions, minorities were subjected to particularly egregious forms of torture, including waterboarding, sexual violence, suspension from the ceiling by the arms, forcible administration of unknown substances and solitary confinement for up to 18 days. In Sistan and Baluchestan, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officials forced detainees to clean the cells with their bare hands and prevented victims from sleeping at night. The security forces also mocked their ethnicity, cultural values and traditional attire, and used dehumanizing and degrading language against them, including calling them “mountain goats” and “animals”, reflecting deep-rooted structural discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities. New evidence also reaffirmed earlier established patterns demonstrating that members of ethnic minorities were charged at a higher rate with and convicted of national security offences by revolutionary courts, including for “gathering and colluding to commit crimes against security”, “disrupting public order” and “propaganda against the system”.

(ii) *Gender impact*

73. Women belonging to ethnic and religious minorities experienced distinct harms that were compounded by pre-existing discrimination and violence against them, both as women and as minorities. In one case, a woman belonging to one ethnic and religious minority group was arrested during a protest in September 2022 and detained by intelligence officers. During interrogations, intelligence officers mocked her physical appearance and ridiculed her cultural values, telling her: “You [minority group], it will be better for us if you all die; your entire generation should be destroyed. As a woman belonging to [the minority group], how do you even dare to stand against the State?”.

F. LGBTQ+ persons

74. The Mission continued to investigate the treatment of LGBTQ+ persons during the protests. The Islamic Republic of Iran remains one of the few countries that imposes the death penalty for consensual same-sex relationships, while the criminalization of LGBTQ+ persons has long been considered discriminatory by United Nations human rights mechanisms. The criminalization is further exacerbated by discriminatory public statements by officials at the highest levels against LGBTQ+ persons that have been perpetuated over decades.

75. Against this backdrop, LGBTQ+ persons actively took to the streets to support the protests, in solidarity with those demanding gender equality more broadly, and to spotlight their grievances.

76. In the context of the protests, LGBTQ+ persons were disproportionately affected by virtue of their real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity. In detention, LGBTQ+ persons were subjected to dehumanizing insults, threats and treatment amounting to torture. To extract confessions, victims were also threatened with being outed to their families or communities. LGBTQ+ persons were also prosecuted for various national security offences and threatened in the context of interrogations with prosecution for same-sex relations.

77. Pre-existing discriminatory laws and policies created a permissive environment for gross human rights violations to be committed against LGBTQ+ persons. The evidence suggests that the State's actions constituted an intentional campaign to target and suppress LGBTQ+ persons through systematic violence and discrimination in the context of the protests. On this basis, the Mission finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that LGBTQ+ persons were specifically targeted in acts amounting to gender persecution. This targeting was based on their real or perceived sexual orientation and gender identity, intersecting with their activism and political beliefs.

VI. Children

78. During the reporting period, the Mission deepened its investigation into the situation of children in the context of the protests as a key feature of the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement. With students, both girls and boys, long at the forefront of protest movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran, State authorities resorted to particularly violent measures to punish children and young people for their pivotal role in the September 2022 protests. These included the use of lethal force that resulted in killings and maiming of children, mass arrests and detention, and disappearance, torture and sexual violence against child victims, some as young as 7 years old.

79. Under the Islamic Penal Code, the age of criminal responsibility is linked to the "age of maturity", which is 9 years old for girls and 15 years old for boys (art. 147). This renders children particularly vulnerable to violations in detention and to harsh penalties, including for national security offences for protected conduct. The very low age of criminal responsibility for children is, in and of itself, a clear violation of the rights of the child, under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party. The lower age of criminal responsibility for girls, compared to boys, has an adverse impact on girls, further exacerbating discrimination against them on the grounds of gender and age.

A. Killings and injuries of children

80. The Mission previously found and has reaffirmed as credible that between 57 to 68 children were killed in the context of the protests.

81. In resorting to unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police, killed and maimed child protesters and bystanders, predominantly boys, including some as young as 7 years old.

82. The Mission found that children were killed by the security forces as a result of being shot with live ammunition or metal pellets at close range. For example, a 16-year-old boy, Kumar Daroftadeh, from Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan, was shot while on his way to watch a football match on 30 October 2022. He was shot with pellets at close range by plain-clothed agents, having been targeted for his alleged leading role in the protests. According to credible information, the second shot – the fatal one – was fired after he had already fallen to the ground and was begging the agent not to shoot him again.

83. Children were also killed as a result of injuries consistent with severe beatings and blunt force trauma, resulting from multiple blows with batons to children's heads by security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

B. Arbitrary arrests

84. Children were routinely arrested for their participation in the protests and they were beaten, including with batons, punched, kicked and slapped by the security forces holding them. Children were then blindfolded, handcuffed and taken to unofficial facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Basij forces and the police.

85. Children provided harrowing accounts of their experiences during transfers to detention facilities. They included being thrown into ambulances and stomped on and being

placed in the trunk or on the floor of unmarked civilian cars and transported to detention facilities operated by various security agencies.

C. Detention, torture, sexual violence and enforced disappearance

86. In detention, children were routinely held alongside adults in both official and unofficial facilities, often for weeks at a time, without being informed of the reasons or grounds for their arrest or detention and without access to a lawyer, in some cases amounting to enforced disappearance.

87. New evidence reaffirmed the widespread scale of torture and ill-treatment used against arrested and detained girls and boys in the context of the protests. Particularly concerning were patterns of psychological torture, including mock executions, threats of killings, rape and harm directed at family members, aimed at instilling terror and fear. In this context, the Mission also established a pattern of solitary confinement of children for up to nine days in unofficial facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence units, the Ministry of Intelligence and the Basij forces. Judges dismissed child defendants' reports of torture, refused to challenge the validity of confessions reportedly obtained under torture and failed at trial to address visible marks of beatings on children's bodies.

D. Trial and sentencing of children

88. The Mission established a pattern whereby judicial and detaining authorities routinely circumvented mandated juvenile courts for proceedings involving minors, instead trying children for their participation in the protests before revolutionary courts, including for national security offences.

89. Children were not afforded any form of leniency or sentence mitigation on the basis of their status. Court documents showed that girls and boys as young as 12 years old were charged with national security offences for protected conduct, including participating in protests and writing slogans. In one case, in late 2022, a girl was arrested for simply writing slogans in East Azerbaijan Province. She was charged and convicted of "propaganda against the State" by a revolutionary court and sentenced to one year in prison.

90. According to other credible information, in some cases, children were not provided with a lawyer, even from the list of lawyers approved by the judiciary. Even when children were assigned a lawyer, it was common for the lawyers to advise the children to accept the charges against them and admit guilt, apparently on the understanding that doing so might lead to their release or a commutation of sentence, despite the lasting impact of a criminal conviction on their record.

E. Impact

91. The treatment of children in the context of the protests has had a particularly deleterious effect on them, with many still suffering from physical disability, trauma, depression and other physical and psychological consequences. Experts who spoke with the Mission expressed concern about child victims' limited access to support services, often driven by fear and other barriers, risking enduring and lasting emotional, social, physical and psychological repercussions, with many of them suffering from suicidal ideation. In one case, the parents of a child who had sustained injuries from being shot at with live ammunition during a protest said that they had been left with no other choice but to tie their son up with a rope every evening to prevent him from committing suicide.

VII. Digital space

92. The digital space has been a critical forum in the Islamic Republic of Iran, enabling people to communicate, organize, express their views and seek truth and justice. In response,

the State has leveraged digital tools to silence dissent, with technology amplifying and extending State control to restrict freedom of expression and association and to control narratives.

93. Having imposed Internet shutdowns during the protests and developed its own national Internet network, the State continues to restrict the use of mobile applications and engages in widespread surveillance. These tools are not only used to curtail freedom of opinion and expression, but also to monitor and target individuals, including activists and journalists, and to intimidate, stifle dissent and silence critical views. Repression thus extends beyond physical spaces, affecting online platforms where many people seek to express themselves freely, thus effectively silencing victims and human rights defenders.

94. Following the protests, the Government the Islamic Republic of Iran intensified cyber surveillance and control. In February 2024, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace banned virtual private networks and required users to access foreign platforms through State-approved domestic proxies, enabling potential government surveillance. Citizens were also forced to use local applications for essential services, such as banking or education, while a credible report found that some, including the Bale platform, monitored user activity.

95. Further restrictions included a law adopted in November 2023 mandating real-time online activity tracking to analyse social behaviour and prevent “harm”, raising concerns regarding the right to privacy. A development plan on judicial transformation and excellence, adopted in May 2024, granted the Government access to citizens’ private data, including banking and SIM card records. In September 2024, authorities deactivated SIM cards belonging to several journalists, activists and human rights defenders, restricting their access to banking and essential services. To regain access, the victims were summoned for interrogation by security agencies, including the Cyberpolice and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence units.

VIII. Displacement

96. Persecutory acts have created a pattern of displacement, preventing victims from living safely in the location of their choice in the Islamic Republic of Iran or from voluntarily returning to their homes from abroad.

A. Internal exile

97. Such punitive measures include sentences of internal exile, which in practice result in forcibly relocating victims to serve a prison sentence, or to reside in exile in economically disadvantaged parts of the country, separating them from their families and communities. In the context of the protests, activists, human rights defenders, victims and witnesses of protest-related violence have been sentenced to imprisonment in internal exile by revolutionary courts, or to reside in exile in remote areas for up to 21 years. Once exiled, individuals are prohibited from attending gatherings and from using the telephone and the Internet and are placed under surveillance by the security forces.

98. The Mission finds that, by resorting to internal exile, the State has intentionally displaced individuals, based on their dissenting political opinions, to a location previously designated by the Ministry of Intelligence within the country, against their will in a manner that is forced in nature. That is in violation of the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from one’s home or place of residence, among other rights.

B. Inability to remain

99. The Mission interviewed numerous victims, witnesses and family members who had fled abroad since 2022. In all the cases investigated, victims were forced to flee owing to threats of violence and coercion, caused by fears of arbitrary arrests, detention, sexual violence, criminal prosecution and sentencing, including the death penalty. For example, the

additional deployment in West Azerbaijan Province of security forces between October and November 2022 amplified fears of violence and arrests, compelling many to leave.

100. Such threats and coercion, combined with the implementation or threat thereof of ongoing discriminatory laws and policies engendered an environment of palpable fear and duress, which left many with no choice but to leave the Islamic Republic of Iran. Their departure occurred in the context of a coercive environment, in which victims did not have the ability to freely consent to leave, thus rendering their decision to leave forced in nature.

C. Inability to return

101. Victims consistently reported facing immense difficulties in deciding to leave and their preference to remain with their families and communities and to advocate for their rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Their decision to leave the Islamic Republic of Iran was not made lightly, as they knew that they were unlikely to be able to return.

102. Many of them continue to face consequences of the violations and crimes they endured during the protests. Victims who suffered physical injuries, in particular blinding, continue to bear visible scars. This also inhibits their ability to return, due to a well-founded fear of persecution, which may occur precisely due to their “branding” or bearing visible physical marks of their support for the protests. Torture and rape survivors continue to bear the physical and psychological consequences of the harm suffered in detention, as they attempt to navigate a new life abroad outside their communities and most often without their families.

IX. Transnational repression

103. Even those who have fled the Islamic Republic of Iran and engage in activism from abroad remain vulnerable to threats, intimidation and harassment online and offline, as State authorities have extended their repression beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To control the flow of information surrounding the protests, Iranian journalists reporting from abroad, and human rights defenders and victims who spoke up, were particularly targeted. Not only were these claims credible, but they also had significant consequences for the families of those who were targeted, with some being detained, interrogated or subjected to other forms of retaliation, including loss of employment. This extraterritorial threat against people located on the territory of another State resulted in human rights violations, including of freedom of expression, the right to privacy, the right to life and the right to be free from torture, in addition to the palpable fear caused by repeated threats, including by proxy when directed against family members inside the Islamic Republic of Iran.

104. Following the designation by the Iranian authorities in 2022 of four Persian-speaking media outlets – BBC Persian, Iran International, Radio Zamaneh and Radio Farda – as terrorist organizations, Iranian officials, including senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, threatened journalists who had engaged in media activity against the Islamic Republic of Iran with “consequences”. These increased threats against journalists and activists abroad further escalated to attempted murders or kidnapping of several journalists affiliated with Iran International, including in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Europe and countries neighbouring the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since 2022, at least 15 instances of attempted murder or kidnapping have been documented in the United Kingdom, reportedly leading to increased security measures and the temporary closure of media offices.

105. Likewise, victims abroad received threatening messages and/or calls on their personal phones from unknown individuals, due to their advocacy and activism in the context of the protests. Such threats were often gendered, accompanied by physical and online defamation campaigns. The nature of the threats, coupled with the persistent pressure on family members inside the Islamic Republic of Iran, indicated that these threats were part of coordinated action against individuals considered critical of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

106. The Mission established a consistent pattern of action by authorities, resorting to systematic repression by proxy on individuals through harassment, arrests and detention of family members who had remained in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Victims were thus forced to cut contact with relatives in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including by blocking some on social media, to ensure their safety. Victims abroad also described experiencing profound fear and anxiety.

X. Accountability

A. Impunity

107. The Mission's investigations yielded scarce verifiable information regarding accountability measures at the domestic level. The Mission was informed by the Special Committee to investigate the 2022 unrest that "621 judicial cases have been filed against law-enforcement officials ... of which 563 have culminated in judicial rulings", including the payment of 7.4 trillion rials (approximately \$9 million). However, the Special Committee did not provide a detailed breakdown of the number of criminal convictions or acquittals, administrative measures and compensation paid to victims, or details of the underlying human rights violations adjudicated. The Mission has also not received any of the supporting material to be able to fully verify the Special Committee's assertions. The Government has communicated to the Mission that, in 2025, the Ministry of the Interior promulgated a new directive establishing a permanent commission for redress and a protocol to compensate damages arising from security-related incidents, without providing further information regarding the scope of its mandate.

108. For the few victims who pursued legal action, the judicial authorities delayed or dismissed complaints, despite receiving medical reports attesting to the victims' injuries or video footage of the underlying incidents. When victims reported having been injured by plain-clothed agents, judges dismissed their complaints on the ground of difficulties in identifying the alleged perpetrator or perpetrators and pressured the victims and family members to accept blood money. Other cases, including that of Jina Mahsa Amini, have been stalled for more than two years without effective judicial proceedings. Families, victims and their lawyers have been and are relentlessly harassed, detained, prosecuted and otherwise punished for seeking accountability.

109. At least two official military personnel accused of killing two protesters were convicted of murder and sentenced to death through *qisas* (retribution) and some 15 low-ranking security officials were tried in the context of the "bloody Friday" incident. In the absence of publicly available information about the proceedings, such trials do not appear to represent an effective remedy for victims, nor do they effectively guarantee non-repetition.

110. It is thus imperative that comprehensive accountability measures continue to be pursued in the Islamic Republic of Iran and, in their absence, outside the country, in accordance with the expectations of many victims and survivors.

111. In November 2024, the Mission held consultations with victims and their families on their understanding of justice, truth and reparations, to ensure that its recommendations regarding accountability measures reflected victims' expectations, including those of women, children and minorities. Victims and survivors expressed their expectations for comprehensive accountability measures that include truth, justice, transformative reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence by the State. In its accompanying conference room paper, the Mission has prepared a road map for justice and accountability for the international community and other stakeholders in this collective endeavour, including proposals for prosecutions, domestic legal reforms and the establishment of a victims' fund.

B. Findings

112. During its second mandate, the Mission significantly strengthened its evidence underpinning the findings in its previous reports. The Mission thus reaffirms that the Iranian

authorities committed gross human rights violations in the context of the protests, many of which amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts. They were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, namely women, girls and others expressing support for human rights, including ethnic and religious minorities, and LGBTQ+ persons.

113. Additional investigations further reaffirmed the disproportionate impact of these crimes against humanity on children, who were among those at the forefront of the protests. Contrary to the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran to uphold the best interests of the child, authorities did not differentiate between child protesters and adults, subjecting children to harsh treatment in the streets, in detention and within judicial institutions. As a result, children suffered unfathomable harm, the impact of which may be transgenerational.

114. The Mission also found that ethnic and religious minorities, in particular Kurds and Baluchis, and LGBTQ+ persons, were victims of crimes against humanity and were affected as separate persecuted groups. As part of the targeted civilian population, the Mission found that the authorities acted with aggravated discriminatory intent against Kurdish and Baluchi minorities and LGBTQ+ persons for their participation and support for the protests. Considering the decades-long deep-rooted structural and institutional discrimination and marginalization of these groups, the State created a permissive environment for such criminal conduct.

115. While the protests have subsided, persecutory conduct has taken on more insidious forms such as death sentences and executions, arbitrary detention, including following grossly unfair trials, judicial and physical harassment, threats and intimidation. The Mission finds that persecutory conduct on the grounds of gender continues in the form of the ongoing repression of women and girls who defy the mandatory hijab laws, and protesters and their families and other groups advocating for accountability, including truth, justice and reparations. The escalating use of the death penalty, especially against women, to intimidate, silence and deter both women and the broader population from speaking out or taking to the streets again is alarming. Hundreds of protesters who now live with permanent disabilities, including blinding, or face ongoing psychological trauma for their advocacy for equality and rights under the banner of “Woman, Life, Freedom” remain victims of this persecution.

116. In parallel, and in lieu of addressing the legitimate grievances of the protesters, State authorities have continued to enforce and even extend the scope of discriminatory laws and policies against women and children, and those acting in solidarity with protesters, and to deny victims and survivors truth, justice or reparations. The State apparatus has remained fully mobilized to criminalize acts of defiance or dissent through arbitrary detentions, threats, harassment, increased surveillance and the tightening of civic space, both in the Islamic Republic of Iran and abroad through transnational repression. Such conduct indicates the continued persecutory intent of the authorities. Given the Mission’s earlier findings of crimes against humanity and the continuing nature of some of those crimes, exacerbated by systematic impunity, there is a real risk of recurrence of gross violations of the right to life and other crimes, as documented in the Mission’s reports.

C. Responsibility

117. In its reports and findings, the Mission detailed the role of different State entities in relation to the violations committed and their failure to take all reasonable measures necessary to prevent and punish violations. The Mission considers that this constitutes a breach of the State’s international obligations under international treaty and customary law.

118. The Mission further expanded its investigation into the roles, structures and responsibilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij forces, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Police Command, including its special forces, the morality police, the provincial governors and the judiciary. The findings in relation to the four related areas of investigation, namely the use of force, detention, the role of the judiciary and the mandatory hijab enforcement, are detailed in the Mission’s conference room paper. Regarding the judiciary, the Mission notes that in certain circumstances, judges incur

individual criminal responsibility for their acts. The cases investigated illustrate the instrumental role that some judges have played in the repression of the protests and in upholding and perpetuating a system of persecution. Judges have relied on torture-tainted evidence and issued death sentences in trials marred by flagrant violations of the right to a fair trial. The judiciary has contributed towards sustaining the policy of the State and the entrenchment of a system of institutionalized and structural discrimination based on gender.

119. In the light of their roles and authority within the entities listed above, the heads of those entities bear responsibility.

120. In the context of its preservation mandate, the Mission conducted a detailed mapping of the structures of State entities, selected information on which is included in the conference room paper. The Mission also collected and analysed material on the identities and responsibility of alleged perpetrators. This information is included in a confidential list to be handed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at the end of the Mission's mandate.⁸ The Mission notes that it is an investigative, not a judicial body. As such, any final determination of criminal responsibility should be made by judicial authorities following proceedings meeting fair trial standards and due process guarantees under international human rights law. Lastly, the Mission created profiles of entities, incidents and persons of interest. The Mission recommends that the investigation on the structures and the profiles continues, in particular in relation to collecting additional linkage evidence for the purposes of legal proceedings.

XI. Conclusions and recommendations

121. Human rights concerns in the Islamic Republic of Iran are extensive and complex and transcend both the temporal and material scope of the mandate entrusted to the Mission by the Human Rights Council.

122. The Mission reiterates its previous findings with respect to the commission of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the context of the protests, including ongoing persecutory conduct against women and girls and others supporting human rights in the context of the protests. Such conduct includes the use of the death penalty and executions, arbitrary arrests and cases of torture and ill-treatment, judicial and other forms of harassment of human rights defenders and related systemic impunity. These serious human rights concerns, coupled with the risk of recurrence of violence against those who continue to express dissent or challenge the State and its policies, make it essential for the Human Rights Council and the international community to continue to be robustly seized of the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

123. The Mission reiterates its recommendations from its previous reports, which regrettably have not been implemented to date. It further recommends that, upon completion of the Mission's mandate, the Human Rights Council consider mandating an independent body to follow-up on the Mission's work. Such a body could continue to investigate allegations of serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the Islamic Republic of Iran, both past and ongoing, the root causes of such violations and crimes, including structural and systemic discrimination against women, men and children, including on grounds of gender, ethnicity and/or religion and/or political beliefs. This independent body could continue the Mission's investigation into violations of the right to freedom of expression and association and of assembly, focusing on the harassment of human rights defenders, lawyers, artists, teachers and medical professionals. A focus on equal access to justice and public life should be maintained. Moreover, the body should be tasked with monitoring and following up on domestic and international accountability and with continuing the Mission's

⁸ See also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Who's Responsible? Attributing Individual Responsibility for Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in United Nations Commissions of Inquiry, Fact-Finding Missions and other Investigations* (New York and Geneva, 2018).

investigation into the responsibility of alleged perpetrators, both State entities and individuals, by documenting, verifying, consolidating and preserving evidence for legal proceedings. The body should have an explicit mandate to cooperate with judicial authorities that comply with international human rights standards and with other legal or quasi-judicial bodies engaged in the protection of victim's rights, in close consultation with victims, survivors, civil society, United Nations human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other relevant stakeholders.
