



Security Council

Distr.: General
11 June 2025

Original: English

Letter dated 11 June 2025 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you in response to the joint letter dated 9 June 2025 from the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the “E3”) concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That letter, regrettably, reflects yet another instance of the E3 attempting to shift blame and deflect attention from their own persistent and well-documented failures to uphold their obligations, while levelling baseless and politically motivated accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, I wish to bring the following points to your attention and that of the members of the Security Council:

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects the allegations contained in the letter, which ignore the critical context and misrepresent the reality of the current status of the JCPOA, the circumstances surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, and the responsibilities of the parties to the agreement. The E3’s assertions are not only factually misleading but also legally unsound and politically biased.

2. As Iran has consistently emphasized, its remedial measures have not occurred in a vacuum, but rather in direct response to the United States’ unlawful withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, and the E3’s subsequent failure to fulfil their essential obligations under the agreement, most notably with regard to the promised economic normalization. These E3 breaches effectively nullified the reciprocal balance of the deal, prompting Iran’s responses in full accordance with its rights under the JCPOA. Iran began gradually reducing its commitments under the JCPOA in 2019, over a full year after the United States withdrawal, in full accordance with its explicit rights, which asserted that, should the United States and the European Union/E3 reintroduce sanctions, Iran “will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part”. Iran’s nuclear-related commitments were balanced with economic dividends, which totally diminished due to the United States withdrawal and reimposition of sanctions, along with the European Union/E3’s failure to uphold their commitments. Thus, Iran’s reversible remedial measures were legal and proportionate.

3. The E3’s letter selectively highlights and exaggerates aspects of the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports. Iran’s nuclear programme remains entirely peaceful, with all enrichment activities conducted under one of the



most rigorous verification and monitoring frameworks established by IAEA. It must be emphasized that, as long as nuclear activities remain under IAEA safeguards and supervision, there is no legitimate cause for concern. Importantly, there is no restriction on the level of enrichment itself; the critical limitation lies solely in preventing the diversion of nuclear material or activities towards non-peaceful purposes. As recently as 31 May 2025, the IAEA Director General asserted that “safeguarded enrichment activities are not forbidden in and of themselves”. Our position and action proved that, as a Non-Proliferation Treaty member, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not seeking to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and continues to abide by its comprehensive safeguards agreement obligations. Furthermore, the term “significant quantity”, used by IAEA, is neither technically nor legally a credible assessment regarding weaponization. According to the Agency’s 2024 safeguards implementation report, there were 240,530 significant quantities of nuclear material under safeguards. Claims that Iran possesses between 7 to 9 significant quantities (compare this number to 250,530) – while all such material remains under continuous IAEA monitoring – are both misleading and diversionary. It is important to emphasize that IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that it has found no evidence indicating any diversion of nuclear material towards non-peaceful purposes in Iran. Any attempt to suggest otherwise not only misrepresents the Agency’s findings but also undermines its independent and professional mandate.

4. The E3’s attempt to conflate JCPOA provisions with Iran’s obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement is disingenuous. Iran has consistently cooperated with the Agency and has engaged constructively, including under the March 2023 joint statement with IAEA. Iran remains fully committed to its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations and continues to implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement. The E3’s deliberate blurring of legal frameworks serves only to politicize the technical work of the Agency. In this framework, Iran’s remedial measures were neither in breach of the JCPOA, nor the Non-Proliferation Treaty and comprehensive safeguards agreement obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Those measures cannot justify the European Union/E3 and the United States’ decisions that totally hollowed out the JCPOA, and cannot form a basis for the European Union/E3 to launch the dispute resolution mechanism or refuse to fulfil their obligations.

5. The E3’s acquiescence to unlawful United States sanctions, and their inaction following the United States withdrawal, their refusal to implement their commitments on Transition Day, the re-imposition of lifted sanctions, and their introduction of new unlawful restrictive measures all constitute clear and continuing violations of both the JCPOA and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Having failed to honour their own commitments, the E3 have no legal or moral standing to invoke the dispute resolution mechanism, let alone threaten the use of the snapback provision. Such a move would be procedurally invalid, substantively flawed and politically irresponsible. A party in material breach of an agreement cannot invoke its benefits – a principle well established in international law.

6. The claim that the E3 recused and exhausted the dispute resolution mechanism process in 2020 is simply false. Furthermore, the E3’s threat to “trigger the snapback mechanism” in the absence of “a satisfying deal” runs counter to the purpose of the mechanism. The dispute resolution mechanism is designed to safeguard the deal, and not to be abused against another participant to accept a separate deal to the satisfaction of a group of participants, which themselves are in breach of the JCPOA.

7. The insinuation that Iranian officials have advocated for nuclear weapons or altered the country’s defensive doctrine is utterly baseless and reflects a deliberate

attempt to manufacture a crisis. Iran's nuclear policy is unequivocally peaceful, rooted in both legal commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a deeply held religious and strategic defensive doctrine prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. This policy has been consistently reaffirmed by the highest authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

8. The Islamic Republic of Iran remains committed to finding a negotiated solution that addresses concerns, both pertaining to the nuclear matters and the sanctions that have unjustly targeted the well-being of the Iranian people. In this spirit, Iran has seriously engaged in diplomatic talks with the European Union/E3 as well as the United States in recent months. Iran resumed talks with the E3 on the sidelines of the seventy-ninth session of the General Assembly in 2024, even before entering into indirect talks with the United States. It is with utmost regret that the E3 has responded to Iran's goodwill and seriousness in the negotiations not only with a threat to trigger snapback, but also by raising unrealistic demands which go far beyond the JCPOA terms and scope. In real terms, the E3 is trying to leverage a JCPOA-embedded mechanism to extract new concessions from Iran. That totally runs against the minimum required goodwill for a diplomatic process. As Iran continues discussions with the United States and, in parallel, with the E3, any attempt or threat of snapback, which in itself is null and void, is a flagrant disregard for Iran's goodwill and will have serious negative ramifications.

9. If the E3 are truly interested in a diplomatic resolution, they must abandon the unrealistic approach and respect the sovereign rights of States under international law. The true threat to international peace and security lies not in Iran's peaceful nuclear activities, but in the continued resort to illegal and unilateral coercive actions in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the erosion of multilateralism and rule of law, and the instrumentalization of international organizations, in particular IAEA, for a narrow political agenda. The E3's threats to invoke the snapback mechanism as political leverage, despite their own non-performance, flagrantly contradict the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* and would seriously undermine the authority and credibility of the Security Council.

10. Iran firmly warns that any attempt to reinstate the terminated provisions of the previous Security Council resolutions would be a legally baseless and politically reckless act, with profoundly destabilizing consequences for regional and international peace and security. The E3, having failed to uphold their own JCPOA obligations, have no legal standing to invoke this mechanism. An attempt to abuse the dispute resolution mechanism and the mechanisms embedded in Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) not only erodes the credibility of the Security Council but will also seriously undermine the non-proliferation regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran has made it clear on all occasions, including through formal communications to E3 officials, that in case the mechanism to reinstate the terminated Security Council resolutions is triggered, Iran would consider proportionate responses, including starting the process of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in accordance with article X of the Treaty. In such a scenario, the responsibility for the consequences of such a shift will rest squarely with those who seek to misuse international mechanisms for narrow political ends. The Security Council must prevent this dangerous course of action and uphold the integrity of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

11. As the Security Council approaches the Termination Day of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all efforts must align with the resolution and it is imperative that this august body reaffirm its unwavering commitment to the principles of sovereign equality, good faith in treaty implementation, and the protection of the integrity of both resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the Charter. In this context, Iran calls on the Secretary-General and all Security Council members to reject the E3's selective and

legally unsound narrative and their misuse of these instruments. Iran further urges the E3 to reconsider their counterproductive policy of pressure and confrontation and to instead embrace meaningful dialogue aimed at restoring trust.

12. A sustainable diplomatic solution can only be achieved through mutual respect, strict adherence to international law, and negotiation in good faith. In recent months, and upon expression of readiness by the United States, Iran has engaged in several rounds of indirect negotiations with the United States under which Iran took a realistic, constructive and workable approach.

13. The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to finding a negotiated solution that provides enough assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, and at the same time recognizes and respects Iran's sovereign rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and international law, while removing unjust sanctions against the Iranian nation in a verifiable and enduring manner. From our perspective, an agreement to that end is within reach and could be achieved rapidly, if there is genuine political will.

I kindly request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Amir Saeid **Iravani**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
