



# Security Council

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## Implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

### Nineteenth report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The provisions of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), by which the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, are set to expire on 18 October 2025. As of today, the objectives of the resolution and those of the Plan have yet to be fully realized. Since my previous report, the regional context surrounding the Plan has evolved. I am profoundly alarmed by the ongoing military escalation in the Middle East between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran following the recent Israeli attacks on the Islamic Republic of Iran, including on some nuclear installations, and the Iranian response. I condemn the tragic and unnecessary loss of lives and injuries to civilians and damage to homes and critical civilian infrastructure. I ask both sides to show maximum restraint and avoid at all costs a descent into deeper conflict and reiterate my call for an immediate de-escalation leading to a ceasefire. I strongly appeal to all to avoid any further internationalization of the conflict. Diplomacy remains the best and only way to address concerns regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and regional security issues.

2. In the light of the most recent developments, a diplomatic solution that addresses the outstanding challenges and divisions that have delayed the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) is more important than ever. In the past several months, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action participants have intensified diplomatic efforts in various formats to identify a way forward. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America have, to date, engaged in five rounds of bilateral talks, facilitated by Oman. All parties must now redouble their efforts to address outstanding issues and prevent further escalation. A diplomatic solution that ensures the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and promotes economic and trade cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international community remains the only pathway to peace and prosperity. I stand ready to support these diplomatic efforts in every possible way.

3. In a letter dated 17 March 2025 addressed to me ([A/79/823-S/2025/167](#)), the Permanent Representatives of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation shared the joint statement of their meeting held at the level of deputy foreign ministers on 14 March 2025 in Beijing. In the statement, they stressed the importance of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including its time frames, and called for relevant parties to refrain from any action that might escalate the situation. In another



letter addressed to me dated 17 March 2025 ([A/79/822-S/2025/168](#)), the Permanent Representative of China shared a five-point proposal for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, including a commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, a holistic approach to the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action “as the basis for new consensus” and “cooperation through dialogue and a step-by-step and reciprocal approach”.

4. In a letter dated 9 June 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2025/358](#)), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland referred to the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and on the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Applications of Safeguards with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, both published on 31 May 2025. They noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s “extensive violation of its JCPOA commitments” were laid out in the verification and monitoring report, while the country’s “multiple failures to implement its obligations” were outlined in the NPT Safeguards Agreement report. The Permanent Representatives stated that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which they described as “far in excess of the limits imposed by the JCPOA”, constituted a “clear threat to international peace and security”. The letter further provided an overview of the efforts made by those three Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action participants to return the Islamic Republic of Iran to compliance and the United States to the deal, including the triggering of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dispute resolution mechanism in 2020. The Permanent Representatives welcomed the negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States and emphasized the urgency of reaching a strong new deal. They concluded that France, Germany and the United Kingdom would pursue all diplomatic options to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but that, absent a “satisfying deal,” they would consider triggering the snapback mechanism to address “threats to international peace and security arising from Iran’s nuclear programme”.

5. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 11 June 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2025/374](#)), “categorically rejects the allegations” made in the letter from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. He re-emphasized that its “remedial measures” had occurred in “direct response to the United States’ unlawful withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, and the E3’s subsequent failure to fulfil their essential obligations under the agreement”. He stated that, as long as the nuclear activities remained under IAEA safeguards and supervision, there was no legitimate cause for concern. He reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not seeking to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and that the country’s nuclear policy was “unequivocally peaceful”. The Permanent Representative contested the claim that the E3 had “recursed and exhausted the dispute resolution mechanism process in 2020” and stated that the “E3’s threat to trigger the snapback mechanism” in the absence of a “satisfying deal” ran counter to the purpose of the mechanism. He further stated that, if the mechanism was triggered, the Islamic Republic of Iran would “consider proportionate responses, including starting the process of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty”. This notwithstanding, the Permanent Representative stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran remained committed to finding a negotiated solution that addressed concerns, both pertaining to the nuclear matters and the sanctions. The Permanent Representative concluded by noting that the Islamic Republic of Iran had, in this spirit, seriously engaged in diplomatic talks with the E3 and the United States and that an agreement to that end was within reach if there was genuine political will.

6. In a letter dated 12 June 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2025/377), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation reiterated that France, Germany and the United Kingdom were “trying to divert the attention of the Security Council from their numerous grave violations of the JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)” and that those Member States continued “to disregard the root causes of the current situation related to the JCPOA, provoked by the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Plan in 2018, as well as their own failure to comply with their obligations under the JCPOA”. He also stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran remained the most thoroughly and closely verified State under IAEA and that any attempts to create an impression of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran as being “a clear threat to international peace and security [were] doomed to failure”. The Permanent Representative also stated that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dispute resolution mechanism had never been launched, that the Joint Commission had not convened to consider the matter and that there was no legal or procedural basis for France, Germany and the United Kingdom to activate the snapback mechanism. The Permanent Representative reaffirmed the Russian Federation’s “unwavering commitment” to resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, expressed its support for all efforts aimed at “the diplomatic settlement of issues related to their implementation” and affirmed its readiness to continue its constructive engagement towards that end.

7. In its most recent report,<sup>1</sup> IAEA reiterated that its verification and monitoring activities related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action had “been seriously affected by the cessation of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments” under the Plan and that it had lost continuity of knowledge on many aspects of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, the Agency noted that it had been unable to verify the total stockpile of enriched uranium in the Islamic Republic of Iran since February 2021, but estimated that, as at 17 May 2025, the total stockpile was 9,247.6 kg (exceeding the limit of 202.8 kg set in the Plan), including 335.1 kg enriched to 20 per cent U-235 and 410.6 kg enriched to 60 per cent U-235. The Agency noted that the significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by the Islamic Republic of Iran was of serious concern.

8. The present report provides an assessment of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) since the issuance of my eighteenth report (S/2024/896) on 12 December 2024. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the remaining restrictive measures related to nuclear-related transfers and activities, contained in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution, which specifies the activities that require the approval of the Security Council, notification of the Council or notification of both the Council and the Joint Commission.

## II. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

9. Since 13 December 2024, no new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were submitted for approval to the Security Council through the procurement channel. The Council received eight new notifications in the reporting period pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for specific nuclear-related activities consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

<sup>1</sup> See the IAEA report dated 31 May 2025. Available at [www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf).

### **III. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)**

10. The Secretariat continued to support the work of the Security Council in the implementation of the resolution, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). On 29 May, the Permanent Representative of Slovenia was elected as Facilitator until 18 October 2025. The Secretariat provided induction briefings for incoming members of the Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Secretariat also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Secretariat participated in an event for outreach to Member States on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

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