



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
11 June 2025

Original: English

---

### Letter dated 10 June 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Security Council, in its resolution [2742 \(2024\)](#), requested that I present a review of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) at least one month before the expiration of its mandate on 14 July 2025. The Mission, established pursuant to paragraph 1 of Council resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), supports the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, as set out in the Stockholm Agreement ([S/2018/1134](#), annex).

Since my previous review, submitted on 11 June 2024 ([S/2024/460](#)), UNMHA has continued to pursue the priorities set forth therein, namely: (a) incrementally intensifying its monitoring of the ports and the governorate-wide ceasefire; (b) enhancing communication and liaison channels between the parties; (c) re-establishing avenues for de-escalation; and (d) prioritizing entry points for confidence-building and mine action, while supporting the parties in the implementation of the Agreement.

#### Military and political dynamics

The military situation along the confrontation lines in Hudaydah Governorate between the forces of the Government of Yemen and the Houthis (who call themselves Ansar Allah) remained relatively stable, while the underlying conflict dynamics continued to shift. There were worrying spikes in hostilities between the parties across the front line between October and November 2024. These occurred against a backdrop of heightened rhetoric from political and military leaders calling for a return to full-scale conflict.

The Houthis have, since November 2023, sought to sustain their military actions against merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea while escalating their attacks against Israel. The Houthis' frequent use of sites across Hudaydah Governorate to plan and launch those attacks has undeniably affected the security context in Hudaydah. Air strikes have been conducted in response, primarily by the United States of America and Israel, and in some cases by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, against ports and other targets during 2024 and into 2025, demonstrating that Hudaydah has been directly involved in and vulnerable to events in the wider Middle East.

The Government of Yemen and the Houthis continued efforts to consolidate their authority in areas of the Governorate under their respective control, including service delivery, the distribution of humanitarian aid and high-profile visits by



political and military officials. The Houthis intensified efforts to instrumentalize air strikes on Hudaydah to mobilize the population. Such actions included regular Friday rallies, ostensibly in support of Gaza, in all Houthi-controlled districts of Hudaydah, and long-term efforts to enlist greater numbers of children and youth in what are termed “summer camps” throughout Hudaydah Governorate, in which attendees reportedly received political, religious and military training. In May 2025, a new Prime Minister was appointed to lead the Government of Yemen. Among his anticipated priorities is a continuation of efforts to consolidate Government authority across areas under its control.

The conflict between the parties in Hudaydah extended to the media, in which both sides used bellicose rhetoric towards the end of 2024 to project strength and assert readiness for major ground offensives. Since October 2024, the Houthis have been preparing for what they see as an inevitable offensive by the Government of Yemen to retake Hudaydah and launch a subsequent assault northward against Sana’a. Government-aligned media emphasized calls by military and political leaders for the recapture of the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’s Isa while questioning the validity of the Stockholm Agreement. While those efforts waned in December 2024, the focus on Hudaydah and reports of a possible ground offensive regained prominence in Yemeni media following renewed United States air strikes on Houthi-controlled areas in March 2025. The political landscape in Government-controlled areas of Hudaydah remained characterized by competing interests among various anti-Houthi groups.

### **Redeployment Coordination Committee and its de-escalation mechanisms**

The Mission continued to pursue all possible opportunities with both parties to revitalize the Redeployment Coordination Committee as a joint de-escalation mechanism, as mandated by the Hudaydah Agreement. During the reporting period, UNMHA held 7 meetings with the delegation of the Government of Yemen to the Redeployment Coordination Committee and 10 with the Houthi delegation. Since January 2025, UNMHA has met on a monthly basis with the Houthi delegation. Over the reporting period, UNMHA saw stronger cooperation with both parties in the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement and the exploration of all possible avenues for collaboration between the parties for de-escalating tensions.

Discussions in Redeployment Coordination Committee meetings with both parties centred on a number of issues, including: the resumption of the joint mechanism; the opening of roads and civilian crossing points on the front line in Hudaydah; cooperation on mine action across the front line; community engagement; the implementation of quick-impact projects; and patrolling. The Mission’s efforts to secure safe and reliable land movement across the front line in Hudaydah continued to face challenges due to disagreement between the parties on the issue of selecting road openings.

The strengthened relationship fostered in the latter half of 2024 between UNMHA and the Government delegation led to renewed support for the Mission to conduct assessment visits to the front line in southern Hudaydah and for the Mission’s community engagement efforts. Such engagement contributed to an overall improved perception of UNMHA, as Government officials differentiated between criticism of the Stockholm Agreement itself and criticism of UNMHA. It also resulted in approval for the opening of an UNMHA presence in Khawkhah district, in Government-controlled territory. That step had been agreed upon during a meeting with the Government delegation in October 2024. It addresses the long-standing grievance held by the Government concerning the lack of an UNMHA presence in those areas of the Governorate under its control.


With the Houthi representatives to the Redeployment Coordination Committee, UNMHA continued to advocate for expanding patrols to the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, as well as the front line. While the number of UNMHA patrols to the ports did increase in 2024, they were conducted in an extremely restrictive environment. Citing logistical and coordination challenges, the Houthis have not met the Mission's requests for greater access and more frequent patrolling. UNMHA frequently engaged with the Houthi de facto minister for foreign affairs and emphasized the need to uphold the Stockholm Agreement and refrain from any actions that risked a return to full-scale conflict in Hudaydah. The leadership of UNMHA used these interactions to also press the Houthis for the immediate and unconditional release of personnel of the United Nations, international and national non-governmental organizations, civil society and diplomatic missions whom they had arbitrarily detained.

On a positive note, since late 2024, there has been a nascent and explicit indication of interest from both sides in holding a joint technical-level meeting on areas of shared interest outside the formal structure of the Redeployment Coordination Committee. This is being actively pursued by the Mission in its engagements with all interlocutors.

### **Monitoring the ceasefire and maintaining the civilian nature of the ports**

Despite the challenging political and security situation in Yemen, UNMHA continued to implement its core mandate. In a sign of continued commitment to monitoring activities, both the Government and Houthi delegations to the Redeployment Coordination Committee maintained regular reporting of ceasefire violations to UNMHA. From 1 June 2024 to 31 May 2025, the parties reported a total of 38,413 ceasefire violations, with an average of 106 violations per day (see figure). Despite a small increase in the total number and daily average compared with the previous period, the overall trend indicated that incidents tended to be limited in scale and limited to where they occurred, with a steady tempo in the level of fighting in Hudaydah Governorate.

Reported Houthi anticipation of a potential ground offensive by Government-aligned forces to retake Hudaydah was assessed to have driven a consistent increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded from June 2024, with a peak in November 2024, which saw the highest monthly tally of incidents during 2024. However, after that period, the number of ceasefire violations declined steadily, as did, more recently, the strident public and political rhetoric in the media about an imminent offensive. Ceasefire violations were predominantly the result of small-arms fire, occasionally supported by heavier-calibre weapons. The construction of fortifications, mainly by Government forces, and infiltration attempts attributed to the Houthis tended to occur in tandem, highlighting the defensive posture of Government forces as compared to the more offensive posture of the Houthis. The daily clashes along the front line in Hudaydah continued to affect civilians, usually because of artillery shelling or drone strikes.

**Number of reported ceasefire violations, by month, June 2024–May 2025**

The Mission undertook regular patrols to the port of Hudaydah twice a week and to the ports of Salif and Ra's Isa once a week, despite considerable hindrances imposed by the Houthis, including restricting patrols to a pre-approved date, time and route and preventing UNMHA military observers from freely gathering information during the patrols. Within this restricted environment, UNMHA did not directly observe military objects or manifestations at any of the ports during its patrols. Between 1 June 2024 and 31 May 2025, UNMHA conducted a total of 157 patrols, a 15 per cent increase compared with the previous 12-month period. That situation builds on progress achieved over the previous year in increasing the frequency of the routine patrols to the Red Sea ports. In addition to the routine patrols, five special patrols were conducted to the port of Hudaydah in July 2024, December 2024, January 2025 and May 2025, following air strikes conducted by Israel in response to the multiple and continued Houthi drone and missile attacks targeting Israel. The Mission conducted 28 special patrols in the southern districts of Hudaydah under Government control, including missions in response to reported ceasefire violation incidents and missions dispatched in conjunction with field visits for stakeholder engagement and the implementation of quick-impact projects.

The Mission's patrols observed the damage caused by multiple air strikes conducted by Israel and the United States on the ports of Hudaydah and Ra's Isa between 17 April and 16 May 2025, in response to a large number of missile and drone launches by the Houthis targeting Israel and vessels in the Red Sea in the preceding days. As a result of those air strikes, the port of Hudaydah is assessed as only partially operational, with damage to gantry cranes, fuel storage tanks, tugboats and berthing areas. The destruction of jetties and fuel storage infrastructure at Ra's Isa has precluded the docking of vessels at the time of reporting. The damage to port infrastructure has affected the flow of vital fuel, food, medicine and other basic goods through the ports. The full extent of the impact on wider imports of humanitarian and commercial goods is currently being assessed.

During the period under review, UNMHA encountered a total of 43 restrictions on freedom of movement affecting its patrols. These included 30 restrictions related to access to the Red Sea ports in Houthi-controlled areas and an additional 13 restrictions related to planned patrols to the southern districts under the control of the Government of Yemen. Starting on 9 December 2024, UNMHA experienced an

extended period of movement restrictions on its routine patrols to the ports. The Houthi authorities attributed the denial of access to security concerns following air strikes. The restrictions were eventually lifted following leadership engagement with the Houthi delegation to the Redeployment Coordination Committee and the de facto ministry of foreign affairs in Sana'a, allowing patrols to resume on 13 January 2025. Regular UNMHA patrols have been unable to visit the ports of Salif and Ra's Isa since 28 April and the port of Hudaydah since 7 May, with the Houthis citing security reasons for the cancellations, apart from one special patrol on 13 May and a joint patrol with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on 25 May, both to the port of Hudaydah. This interval marked the longest continuous period reported by UNMHA without routine patrols to the ports.

### **Coordination with Stockholm Agreement stakeholders**

Central to the Mission's activities has been close coordination with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and with the United Nations country team. In this regard, UNMHA continued its mandated role of coordinating mine action efforts within Hudaydah Governorate, while supporting the Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator with technical advice, where appropriate, in its efforts to restructure national mine action interventions. Hudaydah Governorate continued to be the area in Yemen most significantly affected by explosive remnants of war, a situation exacerbated by the lack of funding for mine action interventions in Yemen. UNMHA sought to strengthen existing coordination with local mine action authorities, international non-governmental demining organizations and the United Nations country team. Those efforts included close cooperation with mine action coordination centres in Hudaydah, Sana'a and Aden to reduce the impact of explosive remnants of war on civilians. UNMHA also deployed a mine action specialist to the south of Hudaydah Governorate to support localized responses to mine action in areas under Government control. In addition, UNMHA continued to improve its comprehensive database for recording all incidents involving explosive remnants of war in Hudaydah Governorate. The Mission published a monthly fact sheet covering mine action-related data and activities in the Governorate.

A key area for collaboration with stakeholders in the Hudaydah Agreement was the implementation of quick-impact projects, which helped to enhance local stakeholders' understanding and support for the Mission's mandate. The Mission's quick-impact projects were focused primarily on income-generating opportunities and support for health facilities in Government-controlled districts. Regrettably, no quick-impact projects were delivered in Houthi-controlled districts due to reticence on the part of the Houthi delegation to the Redeployment Coordination Committee. A core principle of quick-impact project design has been that they should promote the women and peace and security agenda and the youth and peace and security agenda in Hudaydah. That principle has also formed an integral part of the Mission's engagement with leaders. Outreach has been focused both on women leaders at the grass-roots level and on those in senior political positions, on both sides of the front line where possible. UNMHA worked closely with a group of women community leaders from Hudaydah to inform its community outreach and the implementation of quick-impact projects. In addition, UNMHA hosted a side event at the feminist summit held in Aden in December 2024, which was invaluable in generating discussion on how to ensure that the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement is inclusive and takes the concerns of women and girls into account. In April 2025, UNMHA initiated an impact assessment of completed projects to distil lessons learned and good practices.

## Observations

Ensuring that the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa remain open and fully operational is critical in order to prevent further deterioration of an already dire humanitarian situation across Yemen. The damage caused by the air strikes conducted on the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa in April and May 2025 has affected the flow of vital fuel, food, medicine and other basic goods to the Yemeni population through those ports. According to the World Food Programme, approximately 4.87 million tons of food and 3.04 million tons of fuel imports – which are essential for humanitarian operations – were offloaded at the ports in 2024. The port of Hudaydah alone facilitates around 70 per cent of the commercial imports of Yemen and 80 per cent of humanitarian assistance. Protecting civilian infrastructure is not only a legal obligation under international humanitarian law, but a fundamental prerequisite for creating the conditions necessary for sustainable peace and the long-term recovery and resilience of Yemen.

The constructive trajectory in the relationship between UNMHA and the Government, and the latter's renewed commitment to the Mission's activities, were a positive trend during the reporting period. The Government has emphasized the important role that UNMHA can play in monitoring, documenting and reporting ceasefire violations. It has indicated that UNMHA can also serve a positive role in reopening critical access roads across the front line in Hudaydah. Government officials welcomed the establishment of a physical UNMHA presence in Khawkhah as a positive step. Once completed, the new premises will enhance the Mission's operational reach in conflict-affected districts.

In territories controlled by the Houthis, despite the deteriorating security environment, UNMHA maintained regular interaction with its interlocutors in Hudaydah and Sana'a. Maintaining such dialogue was critical in promoting de-escalation and ensuring cooperation towards the implementation of the Mission's core mandated tasks.

Enhanced dialogue with both parties through the Redeployment Coordination Committee created additional space for confidence-building, as demonstrated by the Houthi delegation becoming more proactive in calling for meetings of the Committee. However, the daily breaches of the Governorate-wide ceasefire underline the potential for rapid military escalation and the need for UNMHA to patrol the front line. The maintenance of the daily reporting of ceasefire violations by both parties indicates their willingness to continue engaging through the mechanisms established under the Stockholm Agreement, despite the precarious situation in Hudaydah. This must continue, and both parties should act on the Mission's calls to re-establish a joint Redeployment Coordination Committee, including both parties.

The rapidly evolving context in Hudaydah underscored the importance of coordination with all stakeholders in the Stockholm Agreement. UNMHA has sought to facilitate a collective effort to provide greater stability in the Governorate. I am grateful for the support expressed by regional actors and the diplomatic community in Abu Dhabi, Amman and Riyadh for the Mission's mandate and activities. Regular coordination with the Office of my Special Envoy for Yemen and the United Nations country team in Yemen strengthened the unity of purpose behind the Mission's mandate. Quick-impact projects were essential in creating avenues for cooperation with local authorities and UNMHA, as well as improving access to communities living in conflict-affected districts. UNMHA continues to actively look for new partnerships to those ends. The evolving context within Hudaydah and across Yemen, not to mention the wider region and the world, could create opportunities for further efficiencies and structural coherence and coordination across our missions in Yemen. These opportunities will be identified and considered with a view to overcoming

financial and other challenges that directly affect our capacity to deliver on our mandates.

The increasing frequency of air strikes in Hudaydah Governorate heightened risks to the safety and security of United Nations and humanitarian personnel. UNMHA has been active in implementing security measures to ensure the safety and well-being of its staff. It has also regularly tested crisis management and mass casualty incident procedures.

I have repeatedly called for restraint and de-escalation in and around Yemen and the wider region. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and on Israel must cease immediately. All parties are to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law and to respect and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Air strikes against the ports in the Governorate could alter the military dynamics between the parties in the context of the Hudaydah Agreement, with increased media rhetoric regarding a possible ground offensive and a low-intensity but steady military mobilization in the Governorate.

I urge all parties to exercise the utmost restraint and to engage constructively with my Special Envoy to reach a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict.

Lastly, I reiterate my demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all personnel, including that of the United Nations, who continue to be arbitrarily detained by the Houthis, some for several years.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* António **Guterres**

---