



Security Council

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Letter dated 9 June 2025 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti on 3 March 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 5 June 2025.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the interim report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to
Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#)



Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)

Summary

The reporting period (October 2024–February 2025) was marked by a further intensification of gang violence and human rights violations. With the absence of an effective government response, gangs continue to have free reign to conduct attacks with impunity and expand their territorial control.

Competing political ambitions and allegations of corruption within transitional governing bodies have hindered efforts to stabilize the country, with very little progress made towards the restoration of public security or the implementation of the road map for the organization of national elections. Political competition has also contaminated the core functioning of State institutions, including the Haitian National Police, where acute tensions at the leadership level have further hampered its operational capacity. The Police remains critically understaffed and underequipped, and Police personnel and facilities continue to be constant targets for gangs.

The political turmoil and disorganized State response to the security crisis have been exploited by the gangs, which have ramped up their coordinated attacks, particularly against some of the last free bastions of the capital, including the communes of Pétion-Ville and Kenscoff. The Panel is concerned not only by the geographical contagion of gang violence across the country but also by the increase in the brutality of that violence. Alongside murder, kidnapping and rape, gangs have perpetrated at least four massacres during the reporting period in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department, killing between 70 and more than 200 people in each case.

Due to the limited presence of the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security Support Mission, as well as new areas under attack, vigilantism has risen further, with an increase in the number of mob lynchings, also called Bwa Kale, and of organized self-defence groups. These groups often include local police officers, some of whom actively participate in human rights violations. Furthermore, there has been a worrying number of extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police during the reporting period, with suspected gang members often summarily executed.

Despite the arms embargo, trafficking networks are able to bring in new materiel on a regular basis, and gangs continue to acquire enough arms and ammunition to sustain their firepower on multiple fronts. During the reporting period, gangs have been able to procure increasing quantities of 12.7 x 99 mm rifles and ammunition (.50 calibre), reinforcing their lethal capacity and presenting an additional challenge for security forces. The Panel is concerned that, in addition to illicit transfers from regional civilian markets, national stockpiles constitute an important source of materiel for gangs, with diversions from Haitian and Dominican Republic stockpiles confirmed during the reporting period. Self-defence groups and civilians looking to protect themselves also fuel the illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition in the country as they procure weapons from the illegal market.

In addition to arms trafficking, the turmoil in the country continues to provide a favourable environment for criminals to conduct a range of transnational activities, including the trade in elvers (baby eels). A number of Haitian actors are involved in the overexploitation and exportation of these eels, which, in addition to being highly lucrative, lacks regulation and offers significant opportunity for smuggling and money-laundering. The substantial economic gains that this trade affords to gangs and

criminal networks have created a complex web of financial flows that further contribute to the destabilization of the country.

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* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. On 18 October 2024, the Security Council adopted resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), in which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti consisting of an arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Currently, the sanctions list includes the names of seven individuals.¹
2. The Security Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 21 of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), and further decided that that mandate should also apply with respect to the measures imposed under resolutions [2700 \(2023\)](#) and [2752 \(2024\)](#).
3. The present interim report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#) and covers investigations conducted up to 17 February 2025.

B. Methodology

4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel's working methods are in full conformity with the best practices, as recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see [S/2024/704](#), annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources, given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.
5. Following the publication of several of the Panel's reports, the Panel and the Chair of the Committee received information volunteered by and about a range of actors cited in the reports. The Panel reviewed the documents and shared them with the Committee along with the Panel's own observations.
6. Since October 2024, the Panel has conducted fact-finding missions in Haiti (Port-au-Prince) and the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo, Dajabón, Pedernales) and is grateful for the support that it received from the respective national authorities, as well as from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United Nations country teams and non-governmental actors on the ground. The Panel's ability to conduct some field inquiries has been affected by the security situation in Haiti, which has again severely deteriorated since mid-October 2024. The Panel hopes to travel to Haiti as soon as the situation allows.
7. During its visit to Haiti in October 2024, the Panel met with representatives of Haitian State institutions, including the Transitional Presidential Council, and of the former Government, the Haitian National Police, the General Customs Administration, the Haitian Armed Forces, financial institutions and anti-corruption units, as well as politicians and private sector actors, civil society organizations, individuals living in gang-controlled areas and other victims of gang-related violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. The Panel also met with representatives

¹ See <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries>.

of BINUH, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and United Nations humanitarian agencies, and diplomats from various missions, as well as the Commander of the Multinational Security Support Mission. The Panel visited two internally displaced persons sites.

8. The Panel has sent a range of requests for information to Member States. It would like to thank those Member States that have responded to its requests and further emphasize the critical importance of such information in supporting its work.

C. Implementation of the sanctions regime

9. During its visit to Haiti, the Panel made considerable efforts to raise awareness of the Haitian authorities about the provisions of the sanctions regime, as well as to monitor the degree to which the regime is being applied. On the basis of those engagements, the Panel observed that there was a general lack of awareness of the sanctions regime, as well as some reluctance to implement it among certain Haitian authorities. In addition, on the basis of what officials from relevant government institutions told the Panel, the asset freeze and travel ban are not being effectively enforced in Haiti. The Panel has been informed that, following the inclusion of Prophane Victor (HTi.006) on the sanctions list, two Haitian banks had frozen a total of three of his accounts, of which one had been active and two inactive, containing a cumulative amount of less than \$300. The Panel is of the view that, by the time that the accounts were frozen, Prophane Victor might have already moved and/or transferred ownership of his assets. It should be noted that Prophane Victor was arrested by the Haitian authorities on 12 January 2025 for collusion with gangs of the Artibonite Department.

10. The Panel also offered its support to BINUH in implementing paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#), in which BINUH was encouraged to support the authorities in raising awareness about the arms embargo.

11. In November 2024, the Panel wrote to those Member States in which Haitian nationals are most likely to have assets and/or to which they are most likely to travel, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the United States of America, to enquire about the potential identification and subsequent freezing of assets belonging to sanctioned individuals. While Haiti and the United States have yet to reply, the Dominican authorities responded that, after research, they had not been able to identify any bank accounts, fixed assets or commercial entities registered in the names of any of the seven individuals currently under United Nations sanctions. The Dominican authorities also confirmed that they had not registered the entry of any of the sanctioned individuals into their territory since their respective designations.

Arms embargo

12. In Haiti, most of the officials met by the Panel who work in institutions expected to enforce the arms embargo are still unaware of its precise provisions. Enforcement of the arms embargo remains very limited due to a lack of resources within customs and other law enforcement agencies. In addition, the lack of access of such agencies to most ports of entry and exit by air, sea and land prevents effective implementation of the embargo (see the Panel's most recent final report, [S/2024/704](#)). No seizures of arms or related materiel at ports of entry have been officially reported since the submission of that report in August 2024.

13. During its visits to the region, the Panel discussed the efforts made by national authorities to implement the arms embargo, as well as the challenges that they faced. The Panel also sent official communications to Haiti, the United States and the

Dominican Republic to obtain more information about the enforcement of the embargo provisions. The Panel received information from the Dominican Republic.

D. Evolution of the political and security situation

14. Despite the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council being completed by the Transitional Presidential Council in December 2024 and ongoing regional consultations by the Steering Committee of the National Conference, the reporting period saw very limited progress towards the implementation of the road map for the organization of national elections and the constitutional referendum or the security of the country.

15. Public confidence in the transition has been considerably eroded by internal strife within the transitional governing structures. Disagreements between the then Prime Minister, Garry Conille, and the Transitional Presidential Council, including over the division of tasks and the question of the three members of the Transitional Presidential Council accused of corruption, culminated in the replacement of Mr. Conille by Alix Didier Fils-Aimé on 12 November 2024.

16. Competing political ambitions not only severely jeopardize the stabilization of the country through the inertia that they create, they also contaminate the core functioning of institutions by instrumentalizing divisions. For instance, since December 2024, competing political interests have reinforced tensions inside the leadership of the Haitian National Police, which further hamper the capacity of the Police to tackle gang violence.²

17. In this context, gangs have been exploiting the political turmoil and the disorganized State response to the security crisis by conducting coordinated attacks that have led to the expansion of their control into new areas, as well as the closure of the international airport and other main ports of entry and the destruction of key medical facilities (see sections II and III). Gangs have put additional pressure on the authorities by calling for the dismissal of the Transitional Presidential Council and continuing to attack key institutions, including the National Palace. Recent attacks against some of the last gang-free areas of Port-au-Prince have been backed by actors trying to foment further unrest and destabilize the situation for their own political advantage.

18. The sanctioned individual Jimmy Chérizier (HTi.001), the most vocal leader in the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, has increasingly been using a political narrative to justify the violence perpetrated by gangs and has even launched the *Viv Ansanm* political party. While the strategy is aimed at securing legitimacy and further consolidating power, gangs have limited political agendas beyond pursuing amnesty for their crimes and economic gains. *Viv Ansanm* remains a violent criminal organization that commits atrocious human rights violations on a daily basis (see section III). While engaging with gang leaders is regarded by some as a necessary evil to tackle armed violence, finding the right approach remains problematic for the authorities, as dialogue with violent criminal actors brings with it high risks of political recognition and the promotion of impunity.

19. With the weak capacity of the Haitian National Police, the need to rebuild the Haitian Armed Forces and the limited on-the-ground engagement of the Multinational Security Support Mission, despite the arrival of additional officers and materiel, gangs will continue to have the upper hand unless stronger international support is provided. On 21 October 2024, in a letter to the Secretary-General, the President of the Transitional Presidential Council requested the transformation of the Mission into

² Interviews with confidential sources, 2025.

a United Nations peacekeeping operation. At the request of the Security Council (S/2024/868), the Secretary General has launched an assessment mission to provide options for the possible future role that the United Nations can play.

II. Gang dynamics

20. Gangs have become increasingly aggressive during the reporting period, perpetrating massacres in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department. *Viv Ansanm* has ramped up its coordinated attacks, particularly against the last free bastions of the capital, such as Pétion-Ville and Kenscoff communes, with a very limited response by the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security Support Mission.

21. While the expansion of territorial control brings gangs additional sources of revenue and bargaining power, these attacks are also backed by individuals trying to destabilize the political transition for their own political goals.

A. Expansion of gang territory and limited security response

22. The new wave of coordinated attacks by *Viv Ansanm*, launched in mid-October 2024,³ and the subsequent takeover of the Solino neighbourhood (Port-au-Prince commune) in late October 2024 (see S/2023/674 and S/2024/704), spread gang violence to other areas of Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes.

23. For instance, the territorial control of *Viv Ansanm* over Solino enabled gangs including Delmas 6 (led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias “Barbeque”), Les Argentins (led by Kempes Sanon, alias “Kempes”) and Simon Pelé (led by Djouma Albert, alias “Djouma”) to take control of part of the airport road,⁴ in Delmas commune, in late October 2024. Since then, they have been carrying out attacks in the area, including looting and setting fire to warehouses belonging to private companies. Their goal is to access middle-class neighbourhoods, such as nearby Haut Delmas, in order to bring in more income from criminal activities.⁵ On 25 February 2025, Delmas 6 and Les Argentins launched a new attack against the Delmas 30 district to get closer to Haut Delmas. They killed several residents, including two Haitian Armed Forces officers, and wounded many more⁶ (see section III.B).

24. Haut Delmas and the Pétion-Ville and Kenscoff communes are some of the last remaining areas of the capital not under gang control, hosting numerous businesses, banks and residences. By targeting these areas, gangs seek to expand their territory to increase revenue from kidnappings and the extortion of commercial entities. Since late January 2025, as part of a larger strategy to take control of Pétion-Ville – where the offices of BINUH, United Nations agencies and diplomatic representations, and hotels are located – gangs have targeted the nearby mountainous Kenscoff commune (see section II.B).

25. Kenscoff commune remains an important source of agricultural produce in Haiti and holds strategic significance as a critical alternative route linking the West Department and the south-east, bypassing the gang-controlled National Road 2. By

³ The new wave of attacks was launched just after Guy Philippe (see S/2024/253 and S/2024/704) led demonstrations on 17 October 2024 – the date marking the 218th anniversary of the death of revolutionary leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines – to invite the population to arm themselves and overthrow the current system.

⁴ The area extending from Carrefour Aéroport to the entrance of the Simon Pelé neighbourhood, which is about 1 km from the international airport.

⁵ Interviews with gang analyst, February 2025.

⁶ Ibid.

cutting off another critical passage for people, goods and humanitarian aid, gangs continue to asphyxiate Port-au-Prince. By land, they maintain their grip over the main roads linking the capital to other departments. By sea, they exert considerable influence over the capital's bay from southern Gressier to northern Arcahaie communes,⁷ including to traffic drugs.⁸ By air, shootings at commercial aeroplanes by 400 Mawozo (led by sanctioned individual Joseph Wilson, alias "Lanmo San Jou" – HTi 004) and Chyen Mechan (led by Claudy Célestin, alias "Chyen Mechan") in November 2024 led to the closure of the country's main international airport for the second time that year.

26. Against the backdrop of extreme gang violence, the Government and the Multinational Security Support Mission have failed to respond effectively. Since October 2024, at least four massacres have resulted in more than 500 killings (see section III.B), and neither the Haitian National Police nor any authority intervened to prevent them. For instance, in Kenscoff commune, despite early warnings to public authorities before the attack, the Police did not deploy until hours after the massacre had begun, on 27 January 2025 (see section II.B).

27. Simultaneous attacks in multiple communes of the West (including Arcahaie, Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Ganthier, Gressier, Kenscoff, Montrouis, Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince and Tabarre) and Artibonite Departments (notably Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite) have presented a significant challenge for security forces' responses, in terms of both strategic planning and the coordination of operations.⁹ For instance, while Kenscoff has been the epicentre of much of the violence, gangs have also continued to target the National Palace, and on 13 February 2025, they set fire to the General Hospital in downtown Port-au-Prince (see annex 3.4).¹⁰ On the same day, in retaliation for the authorities banning its carnival, 400 Mawozo killed 21 people in Croix-des-Bouquets whom the gang accused of having links with the Haitian National Police. The reprisals by 400 Mawozo continued, with gang members setting fire to homes and executing residents of Tabarre commune on 24 February 2025¹¹ (see section III.B.). Against this backdrop, gangs continue to expand both their criminal activities and territorial control with impunity.

B. Attacks by *Viv Ansanm* to gain control of the remaining gang-free areas of Port-au-Prince

28. On 18 November 2024, some *Viv Ansanm* gangs (Grand Ravine, 5 Second, Les Argentins, La Saline, Delmas 6, Krache Dife and Kraze Baryè) attempted to invade Pétion-Ville commune. However, they were intercepted by the Haitian National Police, supported by residents, who killed about 90 gang members (including two 13-year-old children). Mutilated and burned corpses littered the streets in a scene of carnage. Hours before the attack, Jimmy Chérizier, alias "Barbeque", had vowed to target hotels in Pétion-Ville hosting Transitional Presidential Council members, describing them as oligarchs. He also called upon all Council members to resign,

⁷ Gangs such as 5 Second have maritime capabilities (see S/2023/674), including boats and jet skis, used for committing criminal activities at sea (e.g. kidnappings, drug and arms trafficking, and supporting allied gangs with weapons and men for attacks).

⁸ The Panel has already reported several cases of drug trafficking and is continuing its investigations.

⁹ Interviews with political analyst and confidential sources, February 2025.

¹⁰ Interview with government officer working with anti-gang operations, February 2025.

¹¹ Interview with gang analyst, February 2025.

asserting that *Viv Ansanm* would use all its resources to remove Council members from power.¹²

29. Other attempts to penetrate Pétion-Ville – through southern neighbourhoods (Cargo, Pernier and Vivy Mitchell), in late 2024, and northern neighbourhoods (Tara and Maccacco), in early January 2025 – were thwarted by the police and local self-defence groups. In this connection, on 27 January 2025, gangs from *Viv Ansanm* (Grand Ravine, 5 Second and Ti Bwa) launched a major assault against the mountainous communities of nearby Kenscoff and Carrefour in an attempt to further encircle Pétion-Ville commune.

30. According to residents, at the time of drafting, gang members were spread across over 40 hotspots in the Kenscoff area and had established temporary bases in Clemenceau, Carrefour Bête and Bois d’Avril (Grand Ravine, Ti Bwa and 5 Second gangs), as well as in Furcy (400 Mawozo and Kraze Baryè gangs). In several areas, homes have been ransacked and burned, and residents and livestock killed. Witnesses reported that the assaults had been planned for a long time. Gang members started infiltrating Kenscoff through nearby areas. According to local residents, within a few days, their numbers had risen from just a few dozen to a “thousand” individuals, although the precise number is difficult to establish.¹³

31. Despite several early-warning alerts, the Haitian National Police deployed only five hours after the attacks began, when 24 residents were already dead and approximately 70 residences had been burned down.¹⁴ As of mid-February 2025, while specialized units of the Police and the Multinational Security Support Mission remain stationed in some localities, many communal sections were inaccessible due to unpaved mountain roads. Security forces lack helicopters, all-terrain vehicles, motorbikes and drones. A community security initiative involving residents has attempted to bolster the security response, in coordination with the Police.¹⁵

32. According to government sources and individuals with knowledge of gang operations, a number of political and security figures are backing the attacks, in an attempt to secure power using gangs.¹⁶ Backers are also behind the efforts of *Viv Ansanm* to mask the criminal coalition with an opportunistic political agenda. For the gangs, these alliances are aimed at securing their future and allowing them to continue their activities with impunity. For the politicians, it is a way to win electoral support in many of the gang-entrenched areas in preparation for any future election.¹⁷ Moreover, sources mentioned the possibility of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance taking power by force with the backing of political and security actors. This may explain the repeated attacks against the National Palace, as previously reported by the Panel (see [S/2024/704](#)).

33. At the time of drafting, the situation remained very tense. Should the Government not be able to prevent the fall of Kenscoff, it would represent a significant victory for *Viv Ansanm* in their advance towards Pétion-Ville, which remains under threat on multiple fronts. In mid-February 2025, Kraze Baryè attacked the eastern outskirts of the commune (Métivier, Doko, Meyotte, Route des Frères and the vicinities of the National Police School),¹⁸ while Grand Ravine spread terror in

¹² Videos on file with the Panel, November 2024.

¹³ Interviews with residents, February 2025.

¹⁴ Confidential source, February 2025.

¹⁵ Interviews with residents, February 2025.

¹⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, February 2025.

¹⁷ Interviews with gang analyst, political analyst and individual working on gang-related issues, February 2025.

¹⁸ United Nations police report, February 2025.

the heights of Carrefour-Feuilles, a strategic area that would enable them to extend their influence towards Pétion-Ville.¹⁹

III. Acts that violate international human rights law or constitute human rights abuses

A. General information on human rights violations²⁰

34. Widespread violations of human rights continue to occur in Haiti. In 2024, there were some 7,342 killings, comprising 6,281 men, 117 boys, 884 women and 60 girls. More than 3,660 of these homicides occurred between July and December 2024. Moreover, some 2,017 Haitian nationals were kidnapped, comprising 1,249 men, 44 boys, 687 women and 37 girls.²¹

35. In 2024, at least 423 people were killed in mob attacks known as Bwa Kale (see [S/2023/674](#)). Many of these attacks were also perpetrated by self-defence groups, reflecting a dire situation in which communities are taking justice into their own hands.²²

B. Indiscriminate gang attacks against the population²³

36. On 3 October 2024, sanctioned individual Luckson Elan (HTi.007), leader of the Gran Grif gang, launched assaults on Pont-Sondé in Saint Marc commune (Artibonite Department), resulting in the deaths of about 100 individuals and in injuries to 16.²⁴ At least five rape cases, including one of a minor, were recorded.²⁵ The massacre forced over 6,000 people to flee their homes (see annex 4).

37. The attack against Pont-Sondé triggered violence between gang members, self-defence groups and unorganized members of the community. On 11 December 2024, Gran Grif killed 70 people in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite, after a self-defence group lynched 39 individuals accused of collusion with the gang, on 9 and 10 December 2024 (see annex 6).²⁶

38. Between 11 and 19 November 2024, *Viv Ansanm* gangs attacked several locations in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, such as Pernier, Nazon and Vivy Mitchell, in an attempt to invade Delmas and Pétion-Ville. In response, local residents and self-defence groups set up barricades and lynched alleged gang members. The violence led to at least 220 deaths, injuries to 92 people²⁷ and the displacement of

¹⁹ Interview with gang analyst, February 2025.

²⁰ See also annex 3 on other human rights violations.

²¹ United Nations police data. On 7 January 2025, United Nations agencies reported that, since January 2024, gang violence in Haiti had resulted in some 5,601 deaths, 2,212 injuries and 1,494 kidnappings. See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1158781>. Differences in reported figures are due to varying methodologies employed by different agencies. The Panel uses data provided by the police and corrections unit of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH).

²² United Nations police data. According to the Human Rights Section of BINUH, in 2024, at least 596 people (516 men, 62 women and 18 children) were lynched. See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_-_october-december_2024_-_en.pdf.

²³ See also section II on gang dynamics.

²⁴ Human Rights Section of BINUH. See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_-_october-december_2024_-_en.pdf and <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/pont-sonde-massacre-marks-surge-gran-grifs-deadly-campaign-artibonite-acled-insight>.

²⁵ Interviews with confidential source and with two human rights defenders, October 2024.

²⁶ BINUH, "Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti", October–December 2024.

²⁷ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s202528-enarruzh>.

nearly 41,000 residents. In November 2024 alone, gang violence in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas forced more than 40,000 individuals to flee (see annex 5).

39. Between 6 and 11 December 2024, Wharf Jérémie gang leader Monel Felix (alias “Micanor”) orchestrated a massacre in the Wharf Jérémie area of Cité-Soleil commune, where at least 207 people (134 men and 73 women, most of whom elderly) were killed (see annex 1).²⁸ The attack was justified by allegations that the victims had placed a curse on Micanor’s son.²⁹

40. Between 26 and 29 January 2025 and up to the time of drafting, *Viv Ansanm*³⁰ launched multiple attacks in Kenscoff (West Department), south of Port-au-Prince, aiming to seize control of the area and secure access to the south-east part of the country. While it is difficult to obtain an exhaustive account of the massacre, figures for the number of people killed ranged between 90 and 150 at the time of drafting.³¹ The violence resulted in the destruction of more than 100 households and the displacement of 3,139 people (see annex 7).

41. On 24 February 2025, at least 22 people, including eight women and three boys, were killed by the 400 Mawozo gang in the Tabarre 27 neighbourhood, in Tabarre commune.³²

42. On 25 February 2025, in the Delmas 30 neighbourhood of Delmas commune, at least 23 people were shot dead by the Delmas 6 and Les Argentins gangs. Among the victims were two off-duty Haitian Armed Forces soldiers.³³

C. Record number of internally displaced persons

43. The escalating violence in 2024 led to the displacement of about 1,041,000 individuals, more than three times the 315,000 reported in 2023.³⁴ In January 2025, the United Nations Children’s Fund reported a nearly 50 per cent increase in the number of displaced children in Haiti since September 2024, with over one in eight children displaced and accounting for more than half of all displaced people.³⁵

44. Several Member States continue to deport Haitian nationals, further increasing the number of internally displaced persons inside Haiti (see annex 8). Many deportees lack the resources to return to their communities of origin, while the vast majority

²⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-flash-report-23-december-2024-207-people-executed-wharf-jeremie-gang-port-au-prince>.

²⁹ See <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/united-nations-investigation-report-wharf-j%C3%A9r%C3%A9mie>; and Panel’s interviews with confidential sources, November 2024.

³⁰ According to a news report, Krisla’s gang, operating from Ti Bwa, carried out the attacks. See <https://ayibopost.com/kenscoff-under-attack-heartbreaking-accounts-from-witnesses-who-lived-through-the-horror/>. According to a human rights organization, Frantzy Valmé, alias “Didi”, along with Andressaint Deno, Pierre Fils Orvil, Lucner Deno, Monteclair and Fito, participated in the attacks. See www.fjkl.org.ht/rapports/massacre-de-kenscoff-la-fondasyon-je-klere-fjkl-denonce-la-desinvolture-et-le-cynisme-du-conseil-presidentiel-de-transition-cpt. Interview with human rights activist, January 2025.

³¹ Interview with confidential source, February 2025; confidential report, February 2025; and Fondasyon Je Klere report, February 2025. See www.fjkl.org.ht/rapports/massacre-de-kenscoff-la-fondasyon-je-klere-fjkl-denonce-la-desinvolture-et-le-cynisme-du-conseil-presidentiel-de-transition-cpt.

³² Interview with gang analyst, February 2025.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-displacement-triples-surpassing-one-million-humanitarian-crisis-worsens>.

³⁵ See www.unicef.org/press-releases/almost-one-eight-children-internally-displaced-haiti-armed-violence-continues-unicef.

cannot go back due to widespread insecurity. In many cases, their home communities have already been displaced, leaving them nowhere to return to.

45. The multidimensional crisis of Haiti continues to force people to flee, making them vulnerable to smugglers. The Panel continues its investigation into migrant smuggling, focusing on emerging routes and key actors.³⁶

D. Indiscriminate use of deadly force and extrajudicial executions by the Haitian National Police

46. Since its first report (S/2023/674), the Panel has indicated several human rights violations committed by members of the Haitian National Police. During the reporting period, over 556 individuals were killed during Police operations, comprising 490 men, 57 women and 9 children. In addition, 215 individuals were injured, including 152 men, 48 women and 15 children.³⁷ About 40 per cent of those reported killed or injured during operations were not related to gangs.³⁸ These constitute clear examples of the indiscriminate use of deadly force by the Police.

47. The Panel is concerned about the growing collaboration between some Haitian National Police officers and self-defence groups. While the State advocates legitimate cooperation between law enforcement and the population (see annex 9), it cannot delegate its exclusive use of force to self-defence groups. In many cases, the support – or at least the acquiescence – of the Police has contributed to serious human rights violations.³⁹

48. An example of this collusion occurred on 18 November 2024, when police thwarted an attack by *Viv Ansanm* aimed at infiltrating Pétion-Ville. During the fight, self-defence groups and a mob lynched between 70 and 90 suspected gang members, including two boys.⁴⁰ This happened in plain view of some Police officers.⁴¹

49. On 11 November 2024, Police officers and members of a self-defence group intercepted a Doctors without Borders ambulance in Port-au-Prince. They made threats to rape and kill humanitarian personnel and tear-gassed them, among other humiliations, and eventually executed two of the patients that were in the ambulance. Moreover, in the following days, there were more aggressions by Police officers against Doctors without Borders personnel.⁴² As a result, Doctors without Borders suspended its activities for almost a month.⁴³

50. Another area of serious concern is the rising number of extrajudicial killings by the Police. During 2024, specialized police units were responsible for 281 summary executions (251 men, 22 women and 8 children).⁴⁴

³⁶ See also annex 8.

³⁷ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_-_october-december_2024_-_en.pdf.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1158781>. Interviews with two human rights defenders, January and February 2025.

⁴⁰ See S/2025/28; https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_-_october-december_2024_-_en.pdf; and interview with a human rights analyst, February 2025.

⁴¹ Confidential source, December 2024.

⁴² See www.msf.org/haiti-msf-outraged-attack-ambulance-and-execution-patients.

⁴³ See www.msf.fr/communiqués-presse/haiti-msf-contrainte-de-suspendre-ses-activites-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-suite-a-des-violences-et.

⁴⁴ See http://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_-_october-december_2024_-_en.pdf.

51. On 12 November 2024, a young man was executed by members of the Police in Port-au-Prince after being stopped and asked to provide his national identification card, which he was unable to do.⁴⁵

52. On 7 February 2025, six farmers from the commune of Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite, including a 15-year-old boy, were arrested and later executed by Police officers.⁴⁶

53. From 1 October to 31 December 2024, the General Inspectorate of the Police initiated 32 investigations involving 40 officers, of whom only 4 were allegedly implicated in human rights abuses. During that period, 9 investigations were closed, 25 administrative actions were taken, and only 1 case was sent for legal prosecution.⁴⁷

54. Separately, between October and December 2024, Jean Ernest Muscadin, the Public Prosecutor of Miragoâne, committed six extrajudicial executions of alleged gang members. Since 2022, Muscadin has committed at least 42 executions.⁴⁸

IV. Arms trafficking

55. Arms and ammunition remain in high demand among gangs but also civilians in Haiti, including wealthy individuals seeking to protect themselves and their property, as well as private security companies and self-defence groups, all of which contributes to fuelling arms trafficking.

56. The Panel has previously reported on several trafficking cases and violations of the arms embargo originating in the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Dominican Republic and will share the results of its ongoing investigations with the Committee in due course. Owing to their very limited access and resources (see section V), Haitian authorities have not reported any seizures of arms or ammunition at ports of entry during the reporting period.

57. The Panel is particularly concerned about diversions from national stockpiles in Haiti and in the region which continue to feed armed violence in Haiti.

A. Materiel used by gangs

58. Gangs have managed to further expand their territorial control and to engage in clashes with the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security Support Mission and self-defence groups on multiple fronts (see section II), which indicates that, for the time being, the arms embargo is not having any significant impact on their capacity.

59. While most of the materiel seized by the Haitian National Police in 2024⁴⁹ included handguns (155), rifles (77) and shotguns (15), more and more gangs have managed to acquire additional .50 calibre rifles and ammunition, which represent an increase in their capacity and an additional challenge for security forces (see [S/2024/704](#), annex 24).

⁴⁵ See <https://lefacteurhaiti.com/port-au-prince-sans-carte-didentification-nationale-il-a-ete-execute-par-la-police/>.

⁴⁶ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/253342/six-agriculteurs-arretes-et-executes-par-des-policiers-a-petite-riviere-de-lartibonite-denoncent-leurs-proches>.

⁴⁷ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_-_october-december_2024_-_en.pdf.

⁴⁸ Ibid. See also [S/2024/253](#); and interview with a human rights defender, January 2025.

⁴⁹ Data include seizures operated between January and November 2024. Seizures also include 24 craft weapons. Haitian National Police/United Nations police data, 2025.

60. It is of particular interest to note that the Haitian National Police also seized a privately made firearm built with an 80 per cent receiver⁵⁰ in Cité Soleil commune on 26 December 2024.⁵¹ Privately made firearms from industrially produced components are also called “ghost guns”, as the absence of any serial number renders them very difficult to trace (see [S/2023/674](#), para. 102 and annex 29). The firearm seized was an AR-15-pattern rifle built with an 80 per cent receiver produced in the United States. The Panel documented similar firearms in previous reports (see [S/2023/674](#)). Seizures of ghost guns across the Caribbean have increased significantly over the past few years, indicating a worrying trend.⁵² However, it is very difficult to estimate the volume of these weapons circulating illicitly in Haiti due to the lack of identification capacity in law enforcement agencies.

B. Diversions from national stockpiles

1. Diversions from Haitian National Police stockpiles

61. As previously reported by the Panel, Haitian National Police stockpiles continue to be a source of illicit arms and ammunition. It is urgent to enhance the capacity of the Police and the Haitian Armed Forces with regard to weapons and ammunition management. In addition to materiel procured by the Police, the very weak management and accountability regarding arms and ammunition seized by its different units result in likely diversions (see [S/2024/704](#) and [S/2023/674](#), annex 33).

62. Arms and ammunition trafficking is a lucrative business (see [S/2024/704](#)), and members of the Haitian National Police are regularly arrested for trafficking materiel to gangs and other illicit end users (see [S/2023/674](#) and [S/2024/704](#)). According to the Panel’s investigations, due to the lack of control over the distribution of ammunition and its use during operations, corrupt Police officers are able to save unused ammunition that they then sell on. Several Police officers have also been buying ammunition at the border with the Dominican Republic, using their official status to avoid scrutiny.⁵³

63. For instance, on 31 October 2024, an officer from the Counter-Ambush Team (based at the Presidential Palace) was arrested while transporting 2,695 rounds of ammunition, mostly of 7.62 x 39mm calibre, to be delivered to a member of Krache Dife gang. The origin of the ammunition remains unclear at this stage, and the investigations of the Panel continue. This is not the first time that this officer would have been selling ammunition to gangs, and he is also suspected of working with other corrupt officers.⁵⁴

64. On 8 November 2024, a police officer from the temporary anti-gang unit was arrested near Champs de Mars (in downtown Port-au-Prince), an area prone to gang activities, in possession of 2,400 rounds of ammunition, including 1,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45mm calibre and 1,400 of 7.62 x 39mm calibre. This ammunition was traced back to the Haitian National Police central armoury, where the officer’s female

⁵⁰ The receiver is the lower part of a firearm that generally provides housing to the hammer, the bolt or breechblock and the firing mechanism. In the United States of America, it is the main regulated part of a firearm. Eighty per cent receivers are unfinished receivers that require additional work to be completed privately. Unserialized (as opposed to fully manufactured receivers), they represent a challenge for any tracing effort.

⁵¹ See, for example, the official Haitian National Police Facebook page, 27 December 2025.

⁵² See Yulia Yarina and Nicolas Florquin, “Dangerous devices: privately made firearms in the Caribbean”, Small Arms Survey, June 2024.

⁵³ Interviews with senior police officers, January 2025.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

partner worked as a secretary and was stealing from the stock.⁵⁵ According to information provided to the Panel, the ammunition was destined for one of the main gang leaders of the *Viv Ansanm* coalition.⁵⁶

2. Diversion from Dominican stockpiles

65. Several security sources in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti indicated that corrupt Dominican security agents were involved in selling arms and ammunition to Haitian end users.⁵⁷ For instance, in July 2024, 5,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45mm ammunition were seized by the Haitian National Police in Mirebalais, in the Centre Department of Haiti, after the rider of a motorcycle was shot by a self-defence group⁵⁸ while transporting the illicit cargo. According to the Haitian authorities, the ammunition had crossed over from the Dominican Republic.

66. The company that produced the ammunition, Fiocchi Munizioni (Italy), confirmed to the Panel that the ammunition had been produced in 2022 and was part of a batch of 500,000 5.56 x 45mm ammunition delivered to the National Police of the Dominican Republic in 2022. The Panel subsequently contacted the Dominican authorities to request information about that diversion and violation of the arms embargo. The authorities responded to the Panel and shared additional details during the Panel's visit in January 2025. The Panel appreciates the prompt and positive cooperation of Italy and the Dominican Republic during its investigation.

67. Following the seizure in Haiti, the Government of the Dominican Republic launched an official investigation, and the Dominican National Police conducted an inventory of its armoury in October 2024.⁵⁹ This shed light on the diversion of 908,001 items, mostly ammunition, from the Police stockpile, including more than 489,000 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, 230,000 of 5.56 x 45 mm and 26,000 of 7.62 x 39 mm, and 93,000 12-gauge shells. While it is difficult to estimate the amount of materiel that reached Haiti, some Dominican security experts explained to the Panel that, given that the market for 5.56 x 45mm and 7.62 x 39mm ammunition in the Dominican Republic was quite limited, it was likely that most of that materiel had reached Haiti, as those were the two main calibres used by gangs.⁶⁰

68. During its mission to Haiti in October 2024, the Panel obtained information about additional trafficking cases from the Dominican Republic and is currently investigating those transfers.

C. Weapons and ammunition management of the Multinational Security Support Mission

69. In paragraph 14 of its resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council called upon the Multinational Security Support Mission to implement weapons and ammunition management processes and oversight mechanisms for their weapons and ammunition and to report any diversion of weapons and ammunition, including through loss and theft, to the Panel of Experts. The Mission has not reported anything to the Panel to date.

⁵⁵ Interview with senior police officer, December 2024. See also official Haitian National Police Facebook page, 9 November 2024.

⁵⁶ Interview with a confidential source, January 2025.

⁵⁷ Interviews with border security officers, Haiti and Dominican Republic, 2024 and 2025.

⁵⁸ Interview with Mirebalais local authorities, August 2024.

⁵⁹ Information provided by the Dominican authorities, November 2024.

⁶⁰ Interviews with security officials, Dominican Republic, 2025.

D. Imports by diplomatic missions

70. The significant levels of armed violence in Haiti have led diplomatic missions to put more robust measures in place to protect their facilities and staff, including importing firearms. Various Member States argue that diplomatic missions are exempt from seeking approval from sanctions committees before importing arms and ammunition to ensure their security.

71. In addition, the majority of diplomatic representations in Haiti rely on private security companies, mostly Haitians, to provide security to their premises and personnel.⁶¹ In some cases, it is stipulated in the contracts that part of the fee paid to the private security companies is to be used to purchase firearms, ammunition and protective equipment to implement the contract. The end users and owners of the materiel are therefore not the personnel of the diplomatic representations but the private security companies working for their protection. In several of its reports, the Panel has raised concerns about the lack of oversight by Haitian authorities over the numerous private security companies in the country and their stockpiles.

72. Finally, the Panel is also concerned that some honorary consuls in Haiti often abuse their positions for private gain, including through bypassing import controls.⁶²

V. Illicit financial flows

A. Trade in elvers⁶³ and illicit financial flows

73. The Panel investigated the extent to which gangs and criminal networks engage in activities that destabilize Haiti through the illicit exploitation of or trade in natural resources. Preliminary findings show that these actors collaborate in the exploitation of and trade in the American eel (*Anguilla rostrata*) in Haiti by dominating the supply chain. The trade is targeted at elvers, a highly fungible resource that hatches in the Sargasso Sea (North Atlantic Ocean) and spreads along the coastlines of the Caribbean region and beyond (see annexes 10.A and 10.B).

1. The global demand for elvers

74. Elvers are in high demand on the global market, and this raises their value across the supply chain.⁶⁴ In Haiti, it is estimated that over 52,000 families spread across 1,535 km of the country's coastline are involved in artisanal fishing, including of elvers, mainly with handcrafted baskets.⁶⁵ According to the information provided to the Sargasso Sea Commission by Haiti in 2019, the country had an export capacity of 800 metric tons per year.⁶⁶ The prices increase steeply from upstream to downstream during the fishing season, making it a very lucrative resource (see annex 11). Although, in 2020, the Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural

⁶¹ Interviews with a representative of a private security company and with diplomats based in Haiti, October 2024.

⁶² Confidential sources, 2024 and 2025.

⁶³ "Elvers" are young eels (also known as baby eels, juvenile eels or glass eels), especially those undergoing mass migration upriver from the sea. See <https://eeldepot.com/elver/>.

⁶⁴ Interview with two middlemen involved in elvers trade, February 2025. See also www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/1009801.

⁶⁵ See www.sargassoseacommission.org/storage/documents/final_Haiti__American_eel_report_FS_updates.pdf.

⁶⁶ According to two customs officials, these were the latest formal statistics published. See also www.sargassoseacommission.org/storage/documents/Presentation_American_Eel_Anguilla_rostrata.pdf and <https://haitiantimes.com/2024/12/31/haitian-authorities-seize-boat-suspected/>.

Development of Haiti set the country's export quota at 6,400 kg,⁶⁷ the process lacks enforcement mechanisms due to the loosely regulated eel sector⁶⁸ (see annex 12).

75. The absence of regulatory structures at the national level and the fact that Haiti is not a State Party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora⁶⁹ create an environment that facilitates illegal activities, such as the extortion of traders by gangs, as well as contraband and money-laundering. The Convention, which is legally binding, depends on the enactment of national laws by States Parties for it to be in force.⁷⁰ In 2024, the intersessional working group on eels of the Animals Committee of the Convention determined that "Haiti and the Dominican Republic have become key exporters of glass eels of the American eel in recent years, and it would be helpful to understand more on their harvest and export".⁷¹ However, the Dominican Republic is a State Party to the Convention.

Misgovernance of the elvers sector

76. Increased fishing of the eel has resulted in the dwindling of its population. As such, the American eel is included as an endangered species on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,⁷² which is a voluntary instrument. However, Haiti, as a non-signatory to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, is not bound by its regulations, making the country susceptible to various risks. The Panel found that eel fishing within territories controlled by gangs directly benefits these groups. In areas where gangs do not exert direct control over the coastlines along which fishing activities occur, they erect checkpoints along the roads, targeting middlemen for extortion as they transport elvers to exporters.⁷³ For instance, when the 400 Mawozo gang blocked National Road 8 on 7 July 2024, in the Croix-des-Bouquets area, two middlemen transporting three oxygenated boxes of elvers heading to the Port-au-Prince were intercepted and had to pay \$900 to the gang at the checkpoint.⁷⁴

77. The economic benefit drawn by gangs and criminal networks in the exploitation of and trade in elvers of Haiti has created a complex web of exploitation and financial flows. For instance, in December 2024, a boat suspected of trafficking elvers was impounded in Fort Liberté, North-East Department, with export documents showing some countries in the region as destinations of elvers.⁷⁵ Actors in the elvers sector profit by monopolizing the supply chain from fishing to export. They have set up their own licensing system, which they tightly control and use to deny others the opportunity to enter the export market, making it an exclusive activity of only a few individuals (see annex 13).

⁶⁷ See <https://www.juno7.ht/haiti-exploitation-danguilles-de-riviere-le-marndr-ne-recoit-plus-de-dossiers/>.

⁶⁸ Interview with four confidential sources aware of the elvers sector operations in Haiti, February 2025.

⁶⁹ See <https://cites.org/eng/legislation>.

⁷⁰ Interview with an investigative journalist and two political analysts. See also <https://fcnhaiti.com/exportation-illegale-des-anguilles-lanaepa-attire-lattention-des-autorites-sur-la-contrebande-dans-la-filiere-peche/>.

⁷¹ See <https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-AC33-40.pdf>.

⁷² See www.iucnredlist.org/species/191108/129638652.

⁷³ Interview with two fishermen, one in Leogane and another in Carrefour, Port-au-Prince, February 2025.

⁷⁴ Interview with confidential source, February 2025. See also www.facebook.com/permalink.php/?story_fbid=488511340343151&id=100075528683717&locale=uk_UA&_rdr.

⁷⁵ Interview with confidential sources investigating the case, February 2025. See also <https://haitiantimes.com/2024/12/31/haitian-authorities-seize-boat-suspected/>.

B. Illicit financial flows in the public sector

78. Some public officials continue to abuse their positions to divert public funds for personal gain. This affects the Government's ability to deliver basic necessities such as health and education to those in need. As previously reported by the Panel (see [S/2023/704](#)), collusion in diverting public funds and the influencing of public officials to act in ways that lead to loss of public funds remain a major source of illicit financial flow activities in several governance structures. The Panel is aware of a dozen cases of this nature that have been investigated in the last 10 years and highlights some recent cases below as an illustration.

1. The case of the three members of the Transitional Presidential Council

79. Three members of the Transitional Presidential Council face allegations of soliciting a bribe from the then director of the National Credit Bank (a government-owned entity). In July 2024, the director wrote to the then Prime Minister to notify him of the alleged action by the three individuals to solicit a bribe for the renewal of his position. In the letter, the director stated that the three had demanded a total of 100,000,000 Haitian gourdes, the equivalent of \$750,000⁷⁶ (see annex 14). The country's anti-corruption unit investigated the matter and, in December 2024, recommended criminal charges against the three for alleged abuse of office, bribery and corruption. Consequently, the investigating judge of the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince summoned the individuals in question, but they failed to comply with the summons.⁷⁷ The three members appealed the Court's summons decision and, on 19 February 2025, the Appeals Court ruled that the Court of First Instance did not have the power to summon them due to their presidential status.⁷⁸ The three Council officials continue to serve in their positions.

2. Other cases of embezzlement of public funds

80. In November 2024, the Criminal Court of Hinche (Centre Department) sentenced an inspector at the Directorate General of Taxes to four years in prison for embezzlement of public funds, following investigations by the country's anti-corruption unit.⁷⁹

81. In a similar move to combat the diversion of public funds, the anti-corruption unit conducted investigations into the diversion of funds meant for the national school feeding programme by the former coordinator, leading to her arrest.⁸⁰ Furthermore, in February 2025, the Haitian National Police also arrested the former Director General of the National Insurance Office for embezzling public funds.⁸¹

82. Despite the anti-corruption unit's continued investigation of high-profile cases, there have been only two successful prosecutions of this type in 20 years. Interested

⁷⁶ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/250652/cpt-bnc-ulcc-case-advisors-gilles-and-vertilaire-state-they-will-not-resign>.

⁷⁷ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/un_sg_report_on_haiti_-_13_january_2025.pdf.

⁷⁸ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/253481/ulccbnc-annulation-des-mandats-de-comparution-des-conseillers-presidentiels>.

⁷⁹ See <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2025/220125-un-security-council-briefing-haiti.html>.

⁸⁰ See <https://x.com/lereliefhaiti/status/1888417110428447033?s=48&t=3kFgrKDPT9ScorQ5dwAnew>.

⁸¹ Interview with confidential sources investigating the case. See also <https://www.lefloridien.com/haiti-corruption-arrestation-directeur-ona-jemley-marc-jean-baptiste/>.

parties seen to be influential often jeopardize prosecutions by threatening prosecutors and judges if they do not act in their favour.⁸²

C. Attacks on the National Port Authority port and extortion by gangs

83. Since the Panel's previous final report (S/2024/704), intermittent attacks by gangs against the country's main port located in Port-au-Prince area, the National Port Authority port,⁸³ have continued (see annex 15). This has disrupted activities of the port, leading to loss of revenue for the Government and disrupting the supply of much-needed commodities, not least food, to Haitians.

84. When the National Port Authority port cannot operate due to insecurity, the Government loses tax revenue through illicit trade, including in contraband, which thrives along the land borders with the Dominican Republic (see S/2024/704) to meet the acute demand in-country. In addition, the Government loses import duty revenue when activities cease at the port. According to a senior customs official handling revenue collection, when the port is operational, the General Customs Administration collects at least 500 million Haitian gourdes (equivalent to \$3,800,358.47)⁸⁴ per day from the goods imported through the Caribbean Port Services terminal located at the port.⁸⁵

85. The Wharf Jérémie and La Saline gangs, which control adjacent areas, continue to extort trucks along the routes leading to and from the National Port Authority port. After a month-long closure,⁸⁶ operations resumed in November 2024. However, in January 2025, the two gangs each raised their extortion amount per container leaving the port from between \$200 and \$300 to between \$500 and \$1,000.⁸⁷

86. In early January 2025, the Wharf Jérémie gang leader, Micanor, threatened to invade and ransack the port if his demands were not met, leading to the closure of the port.⁸⁸ The port reopened on 15 January 2025 after negotiations with the gang.⁸⁹ The Panel is concerned about Micanor's increasing hold on the port activities.

⁸² Interview with a financial analyst, a government adviser and two anti-corruption officials, Port-au-Prince, 14 October 2024.

⁸³ The National Port Authority is the government authority that manages all seaports of Haiti. See www.facebook.com/AutoritePortuaireNationaleHaiti/.

⁸⁴ See <https://htg.fr/currencyrate.today/convert/amount-500000000-to-usd.html> (as at 4 October 2024).

⁸⁵ Interview with a customs official and two shipping analysts, 8 December 2024. See also <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/250667/les-attaques-contre-le-port-de-port-au-prince-privent-letat-de-ses-recettes>.

⁸⁶ Interview with two customs officials and a port agent. See also, <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/250667/les-attaques-contre-le-port-de-port-au-prince-privent-letat-de-ses-recettes>.

⁸⁷ Interview with two cargo truck operators and a customs official, January 2025.

⁸⁸ Interview with a confidential source and an analyst. See also <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252410/gang-leader-micanor-shuts-down-port-of-port-au-prince>.

⁸⁹ Interview with two confidential sources, January 2025. See also, <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/252522/reprise-des-activites-au-cps-confirme-jocelyn-villier>.

Annexes

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Annex 1: Mass killings in Wharf Jérémie from 6 to 11 December 2024

At least 207 people – mostly elderly – were executed between 6-11 December in Wharf Jérémie, a neighborhood of Cité Soleil commune, by the gang of the same name that controls the area, at the orders of its leader, Monel Felix (alias “Micanor”). The Panel had previously reported on aspects of Micanor’s criminal activities (see S/2024/704).

This annex is based on interviews with eyewitnesses of the events as well as with direct relatives of the victims, gang analysts, representatives of civil society organizations, UN staff and a BINUH/OHCHR flash report on the attack⁹⁰.

Timeline of the massacre

Wharf Jérémie, a neighbourhood of Cité Soleil commune, in Port-au-Prince, has been controlled by the Wharf Jérémie gang led by Micanor – see Annex 4 of S/2024/704) for the past 20 years. Micanor has a long track record of human rights violations. Like most Haitian gang leaders, Micanor is a devoted practitioner of voodoo and is himself a voodoo priest. He exploits people’s spiritual beliefs to consolidate his position and uses voodoo to build his gang’s strength and instil fear in the community⁹¹. Micanor ordered the massacre following the illness of his newborn son in early December 2024, which he directly attributed to voodoo curses by community members, particularly elders. As a result, he ordered the execution of at least 207 people (134 men and 73 women) between 6 and 11 December⁹².

Event of 6 December

According to eyewitnesses, on the evening of 6 December 2024, members of the Wharf Jérémie gang forcibly dragged elderly people (over 60 years-old) from their homes. They were told that they were going to be judged and punished by Micanor for the condition of his son. About 127 individuals (90 men and 37 women) were taken and executed in the Nan Mangué area of Wharf Jérémie neighborhood, located along the coastline. Most of the people were asked to lie down and then were executed with firearms and blunt weapons. Their bodies were later piled up and burnt. In some cases, victims were beheaded, and their heads were thrown into the sea⁹³.

Several inhabitants were forced to witness the execution as a way to instilling terror. Those who witnessed were ordered not to cry as it would be seen as challenging Micanor’s orders, and they would then be executed⁹⁴. According to an eyewitness, members of the Wharf Jérémie gang were forced to bring their own relatives to Micanor and to kill them. Some gang members that had asked him to spare the lives of their relatives were threatened with execution and others were taken to a prison led by Micanor⁹⁵. The three eyewitnesses interviewed by the Panel respectively lost a father, an aunt and uncle, and a grand-father that night. Along with many inhabitants, the eyewitnesses left Wharf Jérémie after the massacre.

Events between 7 and 11 December

The following day, on 7 December 2024, 50 residents (30 men and 20 women, mostly youth) who were attending a voodoo ceremony before smuggling themselves out of the country, were seized by members of the Wharf Jérémie gang, alongside the voodoo priest and six members of his family (four women and two men). They were brought to Micanor and other gang members to be interrogated and were later executed on the dawn of 8 December 2024. Their bodies were also either burnt or mutilated and thrown into the sea.⁹⁶

Enraged by the leak of the massacre’s news on 8 December 2024, Micanor confiscated residents’ phones to identify those responsible for sharing the information with the press and issued a 24-hour ultimatum for the families of the victims to

⁹⁰ BINUH and OHCHR, “Flash report: 207 people executed by the Wharf Jérémie gang (Port-au-Prince)”, December 23, 2024, available at http://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/flash_report_20241223_wharf_jeremie_fr.pdf, December 2024.

⁹¹ See S/2023/674

⁹² Interview with gang analyst and two human rights defenders, December 2024. OHCHR and BINUH report, December 2024.

⁹³ Interview with confidential source, December 2024

⁹⁴ Interview with confidential source, December 2024

⁹⁵ Interview with confidential source, December 2024


⁹⁶ Interview with a gang analyst and BINUH and OHCHR, “Flash report: 207 people executed by the Wharf Jérémie gang (Port-au-Prince)”, December 23, 2024, available at http://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/flash_report_20241223_wharf_jeremie_fr.pdf, December 2024.

leave Wharf Jérémie or face further violence⁹⁷. He also restricted movements in and out of Wharf Jérémie neighborhood and abducted 60 people whom he threatened to kill if his son died⁹⁸. His son reportedly died from his illness on the same day.

On 10 December 2024, additional three men and two women, relatives of the victims, were killed while trying to escape the neighborhood. Additional 8 men and 5 women were killed, while accused of communicating with journalists⁹⁹.

The next day, on 11 December, five women were killed when they were caught filming a video to denounce the massacre. However, Micanor released the 60 people abducted on 8 December 2024. The same day, a video was broadcasted on social media in which Micanor can be seen leading a pro-gang demonstration in Wharf Jérémie, seeking to divert attention from the massacre and portraying himself as the protector of the community. According to sources, Micanor forced inhabitants to join the demonstration in a show of support for the gang, using slogans like "Viva Wa Micanor!", and Micanor offered money and food kits to buy their silence¹⁰⁰.

Map: Sites of the incidents in Wharf Jeremie



Source: OHCHR and BINUH Flash Report, December 2024. [United Nations investigation report on Wharf Jérémie | BINUH](#), Map data: Esri, Maxar, Earthstar Geographics, and the GIS User Community

The boundaries and names shown, and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁹⁷ BINUH, "Flash report: 207 people executed by the Wharf Jérémie gang (Port-au-Prince)", December 23, 2024, available at http://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/flash_report_20241223_wharf_jeremie_fr.pdf, December 2024, and interview with confidential source, December 2024

⁹⁸ Idem.

⁹⁹ Idem.

¹⁰⁰ See <https://x.com/ameriqueinfo7/status/1866510692041347374?s=48&t=3kFgrKDPT9ScorQ5dwAnew>

Reactions in Haiti

On 9 December 2024, the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) strongly condemned the massacre, stating that those responsible for these crimes, as well as their accomplices, will be identified and brought to justice. However, no police response was deployed into the area.

Given the density of the population in Cité Soleil as well as the tight control and the significant arsenal of gangs of the area, security operations are extremely challenging.

Background information about Micanor and the Wharf Jérémie gang

Micanor is in his late 40s and has been the leader of the Wharf Jérémie gang for about 20 years. The gang is part of the G9 coalition (see report S/2023/674) and Micanor is a close ally of Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque” - HTi.001). The gang controls the coastal neighborhood of Wharf Jérémie in the La Saline area of Port-au-Prince, and is primarily involved in robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks, and extortion, as well as racketeering, forcing businesses to pay taxes in exchange for “protection”. Micanor’s territory surrounds the main seaport, the *Autorité Portuaire Nationale* (APN) from which he derives most of his revenue.

With around 300 heavily armed members, the gang withdrew from the *Viv Ansanm* alliance in May 2024, primarily due to Micanor’s refusal to cede control of the La Saline area to the La Saline gang as well as to 5 Second and Grand Ravine. These gangs have been engaged in an ongoing battle with the Wharf Jérémie gang to secure control over the area of La Saline, so that they can increase their revenues from hijacking trucks and racketeering against businesses operating within the port zone. In addition, the La Saline area has for a long time been coveted by the 5 Second gang (which supported the La Saline gang in its fight against Wharf Jérémie) as it seeks to control the bay coast of Port-au-Prince to facilitate its drug trafficking activities (see S/2024/704). In 2024, clashes in La Saline and Wharf Jérémie have resulted in at least 331 people being killed and 227 others injured¹⁰¹.

Micanor has a long track record of human rights violations. His ruthless leadership, including by punishing residents and gang members in case of non-compliance with his decisions, has instilled a climate of fear in the locality¹⁰². As a voodoo priest, religion has been a strong pillar of his leadership and a tool to instill terror. The mass killings of early December 2024 are not without precedent. In May 2008, he executed seven voodoo priestesses during a ceremony on the pretext of strengthening his mystical powers. And in 2012, he killed 12 elderly voodoo priestesses on charges of witchcraft¹⁰³. The Panel contends that Micanor’s activities pose a major threat to the safety, peace and security of the people of Haiti.

¹⁰¹ BINUH and OHCHR Flash Report, December 2024.



¹⁰² Interview with gang analyst, and two human rights defenders December 2024.


¹⁰³ Interview with gang analyst and BINUH and OHCHR Flash Report, December 2024.

TPC communiqué condamning the massacre at Wharf Jérémie



HNP warrant notice against Micanor

| | |
|---|--------|
|  POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE | |
| AVIS DE RECHERCHE | |
|  | |
| NOM : | FELIX |
| PRENOM : | MONEL |
| ALIAS : | MIKANÒ |
| CHEF DE GANG : WHARF JEREMIE | |
| INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES : ASSASSINAT, DETENTION ILLÉGALE D'ARME À FEU, VOL À MAIN ARMÉE, DÉTOURNEMENT DE CAMIONS DE MARCHANDISES, ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS, ETC. | |
| <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">En cas d'identification ou de localisation Prière d'appeler aux numéros suivants : 3838-1111 & 31060573</div> | |

Annex 2: Attacks against Kenscoff commune by *Viv Ansanm*

HNP and MSS in operation in the commune of Kenscoff

Photos shared with the Panel, February 2025



On 17 February 2025, 5 Second gang seized two HNP armored vehicles, in Kenscoff

Still from video shared on social media, February 2025



Annex 3: Other human rights violations

The Panel has undertaken a holistic investigation approach into human rights violations in Haiti. While gangs are the primary perpetrators, the Panel recognizes the complicity of some public officials, politicians, and economic figures in either supporting these groups or weakening state institutions that could combat them. The Panel is committed to investigating all parties involved.

Haiti continues in a downward spiral of violence.¹⁰⁴ Gang violence is escalating not only in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area but also in the wider western and Artibonite departments, where gangs' growing power is a major concern. Besides the specific violations documented in this report – indiscriminate gang attacks against the population, internally displaced persons, and HNP's indiscriminate use of deadly force and extra judicial executions– the Panel is particularly concerned about the following additional areas:

1. Recruitment of children

Gangs continue to actively recruit children and use them in their operations. About 50 percent of gang members are children, while the total number of children recruited by these groups has increased by 70 percent over the past year.¹⁰⁵

On 14 October 2024, Joseph Wilson (alias “Lanmo San Jou” – HTi 004) leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, distributed money to scores of children in the Croix-des-Bouquets commune, allegedly to support them in the new school year.¹⁰⁶

2. Unaccompanied migrant children (children in street situations)

During the Panel's mission to the border town of Dajabon, Dominican Republic, the Panel encountered a group of Haitian children (15 boys and 7 girls) in street situation.¹⁰⁷ The Panel witness their appalling living conditions and was also informed, by several organizations, of the rising number of Haitian minors surviving by begging, performing odd jobs, prostituting themselves, or engaging in criminal acts. Many of these children have been abandoned by their families who were deported while others live in Haiti and cross the border into the Dominican Republic to work there. The high number of Haitian deportees, during the reporting period, which, on some occasions, include pregnant women and minors,¹⁰⁸ increase the risks for minors to be left behind alone. Unaccompanied children are also at risk of becoming victims of trafficking in persons (Annex 3.1.)

3. Sexual and gender-based violence

Cases of sexual violence are rampant, as recorded by various organizations.¹⁰⁹ Survivors have minimal access to healthcare

¹⁰⁴ On 12 December 2024, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights expressed its deep concern over the rise in violence by armed gangs in Haiti, urging the State to prioritize public safety as a fundamental condition for achieving stable democratic governance. See https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2024/316.asp

¹⁰⁵ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157401>

¹⁰⁶ United Nations police data. October 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Panel visit to Dajabon. Confidential sources. January 2025.

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2024/10/06/migracion-detiene-y-deporta-menores-de-edad-haitianos/2872271>

¹⁰⁹ Precise figures on sexual violence are difficult to obtain due to widespread underreporting, different services provided and inconsistent data collection methodologies across different organizations. Some reporting data are the following: According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), in 2024, they assisted 4,463 survivors of sexual violence, compared to 3,207 in 2023 and 1,775 in 2022. Most of the assaults were committed by gangs, see <https://www.msf.fr/actualites/haiti-a-port-au-prince-l-insuffisante-prise-en-charge-des-victimes-de-violences-sexuelles>; According to United Nations police data, there were 1,102 reported victims of rapes and sexual violence in 2024; Between January and November 2024, a total of 5,857 gender-based violence incidents were reported to the Gender Based Violence Area of Responsibility Protection Sub-Cluster, see <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-le-genre-vbg-janvier-novembre-2024>, and from January to October 2024, the Sub-Cluster reported over 5400 cases of GBV (<https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-le-genre-vbg-de-janvier-octobre-2024>); the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti Report of the Secretary General reported that between August and October 2024, armed individuals committed 102 acts of sexual violence against 123 survivors, including 49 minors, see <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s202528-enarruzh>; UNICEF provided services and support related to sexual and gender-based violence to over 25,000 people, see <https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/number-children-haiti-recruited-by-armed-groups-soars-70-per-cent>.

services and an almost complete absence of justice.¹¹⁰ During the reporting period, the Panel was informed of cases of girls experiencing gender-based violence and rape in IDP' sites.¹¹¹ In 2024, UNICEF reported a 1000% increase in sexual violence against children compared to 2023.¹¹²

During its mission to the Dominican Republic, the Panel gathered testimonies from survivors of sexual abuse perpetrated by gang members in Haiti. Among them, one adult from the LGBTIQ+ community and two minors. All cases happened between September and December 2024 in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince.¹¹³

4. Food insecurity

During this reporting period, high levels of acute food insecurity persist. From August 2024 to February 2025, it is projected that 48% of the population, approximately 4.8 million people, will face high levels of acute food insecurity, classified as IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). This includes 6,000 individuals in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), experiencing famine and the collapse of their livelihoods (Annex 3.2).

5. Haiti's education system in crisis

Gang violence has severely disrupted Haiti's education system, affecting institutions from elementary schools to universities.¹¹⁴ In October 2024, gang violence forced the closure of nearly 3,000 schools in the West and Artibonite departments, mainly affecting public and national schools for low-income children. Many schools were repurposed as shelters for displaced people fleeing gang-controlled areas.¹¹⁵

According to UNICEF, as of October 2024 over 1000 schools remain closed due to violence or being used as shelters for displaced families, impacting more than 400,000 children. The situation is worsened by a teacher shortage, with nearly 30% of the staff having left the country or relocated.¹¹⁶

The rising number of IDPs is also affecting the education system, as many schools are being used as IDP shelters, while those in safer areas are becoming overcrowded due to the influx of displaced students.¹¹⁷

In January 2025, hundreds of students in Jérémie, Grand'Anse department, missed classes due to a teachers' strike demanding better working conditions, salary adjustments, and payment of overdue wages.¹¹⁸

Many University Faculties are in downtown Port-au-Prince, close to the General Hospital, an area controlled and constantly attacked by gangs. For instance, on 7 February 2025, the library of the Faculty of Law and Economic Sciences at the State University of Haiti was no longer operational due to gang attacks. Some books were removed, while others were stolen and sold on the streets.¹¹⁹

On 11 February 2025, in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, a 22-year-old student was killed by a stray bullet at the Center for Diplomatic and International Studies (CEDI) and another one was also injured by a stray bullet at the Saint-Louis de Gonzague Institution.¹²⁰

6. Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance

In 2024, there were 769 incidents of humanitarian obstructions recorded by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the vast majority due to security operations and ongoing gang hostilities (Annex 3.3).

¹¹⁰ See <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/haiti>

¹¹¹ Confidential sources. October 2024.

¹¹² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haitis-children-under-siege-staggering-rise-child-abuse-and-recruitment-armed-groups>

¹¹³ Confidential sources. January 2025.

¹¹⁴ See <https://ayibopost.com/lueh-confrontee-a-la-crise-du-depart-de-ses-professeurs/> Interview with a humanitarian actor. January 2025.

¹¹⁵ See <https://ayibopost.com/ouest-et-artibonite-3000-ecoles-fermees-a-cause-des-gangs/>

¹¹⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-9-october-2024>

¹¹⁷ See <https://ayibopost.com/des-ecoles-de-provinces-debordees-par-lafflux-deleves-de-p-au-p/>

¹¹⁸ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/252532/jeremie-des-enseignants-en-greve-des-ecoliers-reclament-leur-retour-en-salle-de-classe>

¹¹⁹ See <https://x.com/nouvelliste/status/1887883090950856891?s=48&t=3kFgrKDPT9SeorQ5dwAnew>

¹²⁰ See <https://x.com/PrimatureHT/status/1889470003193225509/photo/1>

Probably one of the worst incidents concerning the obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance is the aggression on 11 November 2024 and subsequent days,¹²¹ by police officers and self-defense members against a MSF ambulance, patients and medical personnel in Port-au-Prince.¹²²

7. Violations of the right to health

Haiti's healthcare system has been significantly impacted by gang violence, as the majority of medical facilities¹²³ are situated in areas controlled by gangs, forcing them to halt their operations.

Haiti's main hospital, the University Hospital, has remained non-operational since the end of February 2024 due to gang violence. On 24 December 2024, during an attempt to partially reopen the facility, gangs launched an attack, killing two journalists and a police officer, while injuring at least seven other reporters. Following the incident, the health minister was removed from office. Johnson André (alias "Izo", HTi.002), leader of the 5 Segond gang, stated that he had not authorized the reopening.¹²⁴ On 13 February 2025, a new attack by the 5 Segond gang set fire to one of the buildings of the hospital which contained the archives, radiology department, operating room, and surgical ward (Annex 3.4).

On 16 December 2024, gangs looted Bernard Mevs Hospital located in Port-au-Prince, and set its essential infrastructure on fire. According to medical sources, the perpetrators removed all valuable items following the destruction of the hospital.¹²⁵

8. Attacks against freedom of speech

Haitian reporters endure intimidation and attacks from criminal groups in Port-au-Prince, endangering their security and restricting media freedom. As of January 2025, Haiti was included at the Global Impunity Index due to the lack of accountability for the murders of journalist.¹²⁶

On 24 December 2024, the 5 Segond gang attacked during the ceremony of the partial reopening of the State University Hospital of Haiti, killing two journalists and one police officer, and injuring two police officers and seven journalists.¹²⁷

9. Deficiencies of prison system

Haitian prisons remain in critical condition due to over population, food shortages, lack of clean water, and inadequate medical care. In 2024, there were 186 reported deaths—29 more than in 2023. Approximately 33% of these deaths were linked to anemia and malnutrition.¹²⁸

Haiti's prison system holds a population of 7,463 inmates. A staggering 82.59% of the population, or 6,164 individuals, are in pretrial detention, while only 1,299 have been convicted. The occupancy rate continues to be as high as 302.14%, leaving each inmate with an average of just 0.33 m² of space. Within this population, there are 425 women, 226 boys, and 15 girls.¹²⁹

In a recent report on the Haitian prison system, the Haitian Ombudsperson described the current conditions as creating a criminal environment that further criminalizes inmates and called for a new management system.¹³⁰

¹²¹ For a list of the subsequent attacks at hands of police officers see <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/crisis-haiti-what-know>

¹²² See section on HNP's indiscriminate use of deadly force and extra judicial executions (III.D)

¹²³ Medical facilities include not only the main hospitals such as the University Hospital but also, pharmacies, mobile clinics, laboratories, facilities for medical test, mobile clinics, etc.

¹²⁴ Interview with a UN staff, February 2025.

¹²⁵ Interview with a human rights defender, January 2025.

¹²⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-israel-most-likely-let-journalists-murders-go-unpunished-cpj-2024-impunity-index-shows-enarhe>

¹²⁷ See supra.

¹²⁸ United Nations police data January 2025

¹²⁹ United Nations police data, as of 12 February 2025.

¹³⁰ Office de Protection du Citoyen, Etat des lieux, des Centres de détention et des Commissariats dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, décembre 2024. On file with the Panel.

10. Deviation of public funds and its impact on human rights¹³¹

States have a responsibility to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. When they fail to do so, through action or inaction, they violate those rights. Misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds, worsens poverty and inequality, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable and marginalizing members of society, and it constitutes a breach of the State's international human rights obligations.

While the diversion of public funds may not always directly constitute a human rights violation, it becomes one when those funds are earmarked for essential services like healthcare, sanitation, education, and food.

Two recent cases highlight this issue. The first one concerning the right to food of children while the second one relates to the right to social security of elderly people.

On 31 January 2025, the former coordinator of the National School Canteen Program (PNCS) was arrested for allegedly embezzling over 250 million gourdes.¹³² The investigation revealed that nearly 90% of registered food suppliers were fictitious, indicating widespread corruption within the program and a direct violation of children's right to food.

On 7 February 2025, the former director of the National Old Age Insurance Office (ONA) was arrested for fraudulent loans and embezzlement disguised as mortgage loans.¹³³ This scandal further erodes trust in the ONA, particularly given the existing issues with delayed pension payments, and demonstrates a violation of the right to social security for elderly citizens.

¹³¹ For more information see Section V.B

¹³² Confidential report, 2025.

¹³³ Confidential report, 2025.

Annex 3.1: Panel's visit to the Dominican side of the Haiti-Dominican Republic border at Dajabon.



Photographs taken by the Panel of Experts during a visit to Dajabon, Dominican Republic. January 2025.

Annex 3.2: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for August 2024 - February 2025 and Projection for March - June 2025

Current: Acute Food Insecurity Situation August 2024 - February 2025

**Map Key: Acute Food Insecurity**

Mapped Phase represents highest severity affecting at least 20% of the population

- 1-Minimal
- 2-Stressed
- 3-Crisis
- 4-Emergency
- 5-Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Areas not analyzed

Map Symbols

- Urban Settlement Classification
- IDPs/Other Settlement Classification
- HouseHold Group Settlement Classification
- Refugees Classification
- Risk of Famine

Area receives significant humanitarian food assistance(accounted for in Phase Classification)

- At least 25% of households meet 25-50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance


Projected: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March - June 2025



Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). "Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation August 2024 – June 2025." Available at: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1157971/?iso3=HTI> Visited February 2025

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 3.3. Overview of humanitarian access constraints from 1 January to 31 December 2024.



Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-aperçu-des-contraintes-d'accès-humanitaire-du-1er-janvier-au-31-decembre-2024> visited January 2025.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 3.4: Attacks by the 5 Second gang on the Hospital of the State University of Haiti (General Hospital).

- 1) 24 December 2024.

Photographs of corpses and wounded individuals

Pictures taken from the following social media sources:

<https://x.com/GazetteHaiti/status/1871611864775618576?s=19>

https://www.facebook.com/telepepofisyel/photos/plusieurs-journalistes-se-trouvent-actuellement-en-danger-%C3%A0-lh%C3%B4pital-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-o%C3%B9-/919249037012110/?_rdr

<https://x.com/passioninfoplus/status/1871612606076576073?s=48&t=3kFgrKDPT9SeorQ5dwAnew>


All web pages visited in December 2024.

- 2) 13 February 2025, a section of the General Hospital is set on fire by the 5 Second gang.




Still taken from a video available at: <https://www.facebook.com/Chaine52/videos/le-plus-grand-centre-hospitalier-de-port-au-prince-en-flammesun-incendie-sest-d%C3%A9clench%C3%A9-le-13-f%C3%A9vrier-2025-1718360708728636/>. Visited February 2025.

Annex 4: Displacement following Gran Grif gang attacks in Pont Sondé (03 to 09 October 2024)



"International Organization for Migration (IOM), Oct 10 2024. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 49.1 — Updates on displacement following attacks in Saint Marc (03 to 09 October 2024). IOM, Haiti." November 2024. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-491-updates-displacement-following-attacks-saint-marc-03-09?close=true> visited November 2024.


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 5: IDPs following *Viv Ansanm* gangs' attacks in several areas of Port-au-Prince, (11 to 20 November 2024)

"International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 22 2024. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 52.2 — Origin and host locations of IDPs (11 - 20 November 2024). IOM, Haiti." Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/maps/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-522-origin-and-host-locations-idps-11-20-november-2024> Visited November 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Annex 6: IDPs following Gran Grif gang attacks in Petite rivière de l'Artibonite, (10 December 2024)



"International Organization for Migration (IOM), Dec 12 2024. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 54 — Displacement following armed attacks in the municipality of Petite rivière de l'Artibonite (11 - 12 December 2024). IOM, Haiti." Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-54-displacement-following-armed-attacks-municipality-petite> Visited February 2025

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 7: IDPs following *Viv Ansanm* gangs' attacks in Kenscoff (West department), (28 January to 9 February 2025)




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Feb 10 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 55.1 — Updates on displacement following armed attacks in the municipality of Kenscoff (28 January - 09 February 2025). IOM, Haiti” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-551-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-municipality?close=true> Visited February 2025

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 8: Migration, Deportees/Returnees, Refugees and IDPs


IOM Haitian IDPs 2024

According to the IOM, at the end of 2024 there were 1,041,229 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Haiti, representing about 9% of the population. In the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, 65% of IDPs reside in official sites, while in other provinces, 99% live outside of official sites. Children (both boys and girls) comprise 53% of the IDP population, and women (adults and minors) make up 55%.¹³⁴



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-fiche-dinformations-cles-sur-la-situation-de-deplacement-round-9-decembre-2024?close=true> visited January 2025.


¹³⁴ <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-fiche-dinformations-cles-sur-la-situation-de-deplacement-round-9-decembre-2024?close=true>



Source: IOM. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Haiti 2024. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/haiti> visited January 2025. Map data @2025 Google, INEGI

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


IOM Haitian deportees 2024



Source: OIM. Forced returns to Haïti 2024. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/node/23491> Visited January 2025.


UNHCR

Haitian refugees and asylum seekers from 2024



UNHCR Refugee Data Finder. Data as of December 2024. Available at: <https://bitly.cx/0pxXk> visited January 2025.

Haitians crossing the Darien, 2022 to 2024.




UNHCR. Haiti: A multi-dimensional crisis leading to continued displacement. October 2024 Available at: <https://dataviz.unhcr.org/product-gallery/2024/10/haiti-a-multi-dimensional-crisis-leading-to-continued-displacement> visited January 2025. Map source @ Mapbox, @ OpenStreetMap

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

U.S. Customs and Border Protection data show a total of 220,798 Haitians encountered in 2024.



U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field Operations Encounters by Area of Responsibility and Component Available at: <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters> visited February 2025.

This table summarizes some of the incidents involving Haitian migrants in 2024 and early 2025. The incidents highlight the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to intercept vessels carrying migrants in the Caribbean and near Florida. Available at: https://search.usa.gov/search?affiliate=uscg_news&query=haiti+2024 visited February 2025.

| Date | Incident Summary | Number of Haitians Involved |
|---------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| 3 February 2024 | Interdiction of a smuggling operation near Fort Pierce Inlet, Florida. | 33 |
| 27 September 2 2024 | Interdiction of a Haitian vessel 60 miles south of Turks and Caicos Islands. | 182 |
| 12 October 2024 | Interdiction of a Haitian sailboat south of Turks and Caicos Islands. | 181 |
| 10 February 2025 | Repatriation of 132 Haitians to Cap-Haitien, Haiti, after interception near Marathon, Florida. | 132 |

The total Haitian nationals interdicted in FY2024 was 857¹³⁵

¹³⁵ <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4062016/coast-guard-repatriates-132-aliens-to-haiti/>

GARR

According to the Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés (GARR), an Haitian NGO, there were a total of 581,127 returnees to Haiti during 2024 mainly from the Dominican Republic.



“Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés, Rapport Mensuel: Rapatriements, Retours spontanés, Refoulements.” Available at: <https://x.com/GARRHaiti/status/1885421694468116627/photo/1> visited February 2025.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The General Directorate of Migration of the Dominican Republic reported that in 2024, it repatriated 276,215 foreigners of whom the majority were Haitians. These repatriations were carried out quarterly as follows: 48,344 between January and March, 62,446 from April to June, 71,414 between July and September, and 94,223 from October to December.¹³⁶



As of January 2025, about 31, 204 Haitian nationals had been expelled.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ See <https://migracion.gob.do/dgm-repatría-mas-de-276215-extranjeros-en-condición-migratoria-irregular-en-el-pais/>

¹³⁷ <https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2025/02/02/dominicana-deporto-unos-31-mil-extranjeros-en-enero-mayoria-de-haiti/>

HONDURAS

According to National Institute of Migration of Honduras, in 2024 a total of 19,647 Haitian nationals entered the country.¹³⁸



¹³⁸ See <https://inm.gob.hn/migracion-irregular.html>

MEXICO

According to statistics from the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR), in 2024, 10,853 Haitian nationals applied for asylum in Mexico. 2,570 cases were resolved, of which 49% (1,265 individuals) were granted refugee status. Additionally, 41% (1,054 individuals) received Complementary Protection, which guarantees certain rights and international protection, although without official refugee recognition.¹³⁹

***SOLICITANTES X NACIONALIDAD 2022, 2023 Y 2024 (PERSONAS)

| TOP10 | NACIONALIDAD | 2022 PERSONAS | TOP10 | NACIONALIDAD | 2023 PERSONAS | TOP 10 | NACIONALIDAD | 2024 PERSONAS |
|-------|--------------|------------------|-------|--------------|------------------|--------|--------------|------------------|
| 3- | HAITI | 17,199 | 1- | HAITI | 44,110 | 3- | HAITI | 10,853 |

TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2024.

| PAIS | RESUELTOS: Positivo, P.C, Negativo. | POSITIVOS | TASA DE POSITIVOS |
|-------|---|-----------|-------------------|
| HAITI | 2,570 | 1,265 | 49% |

TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2024.

| PAIS | RESUELTOS: Positivo, P.C, Negativo. | PC | TASA DE P.C. |
|-------|---|-------|--------------|
| HAITI | 2,570 | 1,054 | 41% |

TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2024.

| PAIS | RESUELTOS: Positivo, P.C, Negativo. | POSITIVO + P.C. | TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C. |
|-------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|
| HAITI | 2,570 | 2,319 | 90% |

¹³⁹ See <https://www.gob.mx/comar/articulos/la-comar-en-numeros-387226?idiom=es>

TURKS AND CAICOS

In 2024, Turks and Caicos authorities intensified security operations to address the increasing number of migrant vessels attempting to reach the islands. On 5 January 2024 a vessel carrying over 200 undocumented Haitian migrants was stopped near West Caicos.¹⁴⁰ On 11 March 2024, another vessel carrying 140 Haitian migrants (121 men and 19 women) was interdicted in nearby waters of Turks and Caicos.¹⁴¹

Between 16 and 18 August 2024, a total of 217 Haitian migrants were intercepted in four separate operations while attempting to disembark Turks and Caicos.¹⁴²

As of 8 October 2024, more than 1,100 Haitian nationals had been intercepted by Turks and Caicos authorities.¹⁴³

On 16 October 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard repatriated 169 people to Haiti after intercepting an overloaded makeshift vessel south of the Turks and Caicos Islands.¹⁴⁴

BAHAMAS

Each entry in this table summarizes incidents involving Haitian nationals, as reported in press releases from the Bahamas Department of Immigration. A total of 1,067 Haitian nationals were involved in these incidents throughout 2024 and early 2025, with most being repatriated from New Providence, Inagua, and Matthew Town as part of ongoing enforcement operations.¹⁴⁵

| Date | Number of Haitian Nationals | Description |
|-------------|-----------------------------|---|
| 28 Jan 2025 | 4 | Six individuals apprehended during control operations |
| 3 Jan 2025 | 3 | Three Haitians were prosecuted |
| 20 Dec 2024 | 5 | Five Haitian nationals prosecuted |
| 5 Nov 2024 | 10 | Ten Haitians prosecuted in court |
| 4 Sep 2024 | 1 | Haitian and American prosecuted |
| 17 May 2024 | 124 | 124 Haitians repatriated |
| 21 Mar 2024 | 264 | 264 individuals repatriated from Matthew Town |
| 17 Apr 2024 | 259 | 259 Haitians repatriated from New Providence |
| 8 Mar 2024 | 134 | 134 individuals repatriated |
| 1 Feb 2024 | 245 | Two repatriations executed from Inagua |
| 13 Jan 2024 | 18 | 18 Haitians detained in Matthew Town |
| Total | 1067 | |

¹⁴⁰ See: <https://thewatch-journal.com/2024/03/04/teamwork-deters-illegal-immigration-near-turks-and-caicos-islands/>

¹⁴¹ See: <https://magneticmediatv.com/2024/03/rbdf-intercepts-migrants-in-turks-and-caicos-islands-2>

¹⁴² See <https://www.tcipolice.tc/royal-bahamas-defence-force-patrol-vessel-intercepts-haitian-migrant-vessel-near-turks-and-caicos-island/>

¹⁴³ See: <https://tcweeklynews.com/local-authorities-captured-fleeing-haitians-to-date-in-p14480-155.htm#:~:text=Delana%20Isles%E2%80%A2,to%20be%20of%20Haitian%20descent>

¹⁴⁴ See <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3935373/coast-guard-repatriates-169-migrants-to-haiti/>

¹⁴⁵ See <https://www.immigration.gov.bs/?s=haiti>.

JAMAICA

On 6 October 2024 a group of 35 Haitian migrants was detained after arriving on a beach in the Portland district of Jamaica.¹⁴⁶ Additionally, on 23 October 2024, Jamaican returned to Haiti a group of 17 Haitian migrants who had been living in the country for about a year.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/detienen-35-migrantes-haitianos-arribaron-205748252.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly9jaGF0Z3B0LmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAGQoSKMp0n4c6pXDExiaWgi9sguXxgQf_Ix0tDPmjoFQScY3XppkdiN05LL5VSeK9krPGm8kKLVi8kueZj2jsDbXZQTviiEjQW2HkIQs1aDmiwfr7NbzNQtoQoZJNxK4AEi3C5dqU8yAxWCtKe07GdA7dBTaRhMmP_Omp8FSm7H

¹⁴⁷ See <https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/2024/10/23/17-haitians-reportedly-jamaica-year-returned-home/>

Annex 9: Haitian Government's call to the population to help the Police. 12 December 2024.



NOTE DE PRESSE

UN PLAN D'ACTION FERME POUR LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA JUSTICE : Le PREMIER MINISTRE TRACE la VOIE




Port-au-Prince, le jeudi 12 décembre 2024.-

Lors d'un point de presse tenu ce jour à la Résidence officielle, le Premier ministre, Monsieur **Alix Didier Fils-Aimé**, également président du Conseil supérieur de la Police nationale d'Haïti, a dévoilé une série de mesures fortes pour lutter contre l'insécurité et apporter un soutien concret aux entrepreneurs victimes d'actes de banditisme et de criminalité perpétrés par des groupes armés.

Reconnaissant la gravité de la crise sécuritaire, le Premier ministre a, d'entrée de jeu, présenté ses profondes sympathies aux familles des victimes des récents massacres, notamment à **Wharf-Jérémie, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite**, et dans d'autres localités de la région métropolitaine, avant de rendre publiques ses instructions claires et sans équivoque adressées au ministre de la Justice et de la Sécurité publique, **Me Patrick Pélissier**, afin de poursuivre et sanctionner sévèrement les auteurs de ces crimes odieux.

Des mesures concrètes pour renforcer la sécurité

Dans sa volonté d'agir rapidement et efficacement, le Premier ministre a annoncé les actions suivantes :

- **Doublement immédiat des frais de la carte prépayée des policiers, en reconnaissance de leur engagement sur le terrain**
- **Augmentation de 50% des indemnités des employés civils de la Police nationale d'Haïti, pour soutenir leur travail indispensable**
- **Renforcement technique et financier des forces de sécurité, incluant la Police nationale et les**

Forces armées d'Haïti, afin d'étendre leur capacité opérationnelle sur tout le territoire national

Appel à la mobilisation collective

Le chef du gouvernement a rappelé avec fermeté l'importance d'une collaboration étroite entre les forces de l'ordre et la population :

"La Police nationale, les Forces armées et le gouvernement doivent impérativement jouer leur rôle, mais cela exige aussi un accompagnement constant de la population pour venir à bout de l'insécurité", a-t-il martelé.

Assistance humanitaire et engagement pour l'avenir

Dans le cadre des mesures sociales, le Premier ministre s'engage également à fournir une assistance humanitaire aux déplacés internes et aux rapatriés de la République Dominicaine et d'autres pays.

Réitérant sa détermination à rétablir la sécurité et la justice dans le pays, le Premier ministre a également rappelé l'importance de travailler sur des chantiers prioritaires tels que :

- **La relance économique**
- **La réforme constitutionnelle**
- **Et l'organisation des prochaines élections dans un climat de sérénité et de transparence.**

"Nous sommes fermement engagés à rétablir l'État de droit et à offrir au peuple haïtien la sécurité et la stabilité qu'il mérite," a-t-il conclu.

FIN

www.primature.gouv.ht

Available at <https://x.com/PrimatureHT/status/1867351786367201490> visited January 2025.

Annex 10A: Photos of elvers (also known as “glass eels” or “zangi” in Creole) fished in the shores of Haiti.



Sources: <https://haiticlimat.org/ti-zangi-anguille-une-espece-vulnerable-prise-en-otage-en-haiti/> (visited on 5 February 2025).



Source: <https://www.juno7.ht/haiti-exploitation-danguilles-de-riviere-le-marndr-ne-recoit-plus-de-dossiers/> (Visited on 5 February 2025).

Annex 10B: The spawning

Upon spawning, the American eels spread from the Sargasso Sea, and since the distance to Hispaniola Island (Haiti and Dominican Republic) is much shorter than those migrating to the European continent, the former tend to be younger and smaller by the time they are caught (as glass eels). That explains why those caught elsewhere later are much bigger, having grown as they swim away.¹⁴⁸ In this context and due to their smaller size, 1kg of elvers in Haiti and in Cuba contains about 10,000 elvers, while in the Dominican Republic, the USA and Canada, where they are a bit bigger, 1kg contains 7,000 of them.¹⁴⁹ Elvers can survive by feeding on their umbilical cord for some days, while older ones need frequent feeding (often on fish flakes). Haitian traders therefore undergo lesser feeding costs for captured elvers.¹⁵⁰

For the breeding zone (Sargasso Sea) and the spread of American glass eels with the water currents from their spawning area in the Sargasso Sea, see for instance https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Panmictic-distribution-of-American-eel-and-their-migration-routes-from-their-spawning_fig1_370443366 (Visited on 10 February 2025).

¹⁴⁸ <https://www.kmae-journal.org/articles/kmae/pdf/1998/02/kmae199834908.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with officials of CODOPESCA in the Dominican Republic. January 2025.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with two traders of elvers in Haiti. February 2025.

Annex 11: The pricing

Whereas the retail price upstream (at the source) for live elvers is between USD 0.49 and USD 2.45 per kilogram within the fishing shorelines of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas,¹⁵¹ this price increases sharply to between USD 4,500 and 5,000 per kilo at the point of export.¹⁵² Although the annual volume of elvers from Haiti is difficult to quantify owing to the informal nature of the sector, sources indicated that the country's export capacity could be about 800 tons per year.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Interview with two fishermen, one in Leogane and another in Carrefour, Port-au-Prince. February 2025. Also see: <https://www.selinawamucii.com/insights/prices/haiti/live-eels/>.

¹⁵² Four confidential sources with the inside knowledge of the prices set by ANAEPa, 2025.

¹⁵³ A customs official aware of eel exports in Port-au-Prince. Also see, <https://www.selinawamucii.com/marketplace/dashboard/price-reports/36/90?category%5Bid%5D=36&category%5Bname%5D=Live%20Eels&country%5Bid%5D=90&country%5Bname%5D=Haiti/>.

Annex 12: Trends in the elvers sector in Haiti

Eel fishing in Haiti has expanded gradually in the country since 2013. The American eel is caught in the juvenile stage (as glass eel) between September to April and is practically done from dusk until dawn. Most fishermen flood the shorelines during this season because elvers are usually plenty and fetch more than ordinary fish. Three fishermen based in Leogane and one in Delmas area of Port-au-Prince metropolitan explained how, during the fishing season some gang leaders compel fishermen to contribute a quarter of their daily catch to them as a show of allegiance so as to be allowed to fish in areas controlled by those gangs. The task does not require too many expensive materials, as it is carried out with handcrafted baskets whose skeleton is made with bamboo or iron and covered with mosquito nets.¹⁵⁴ The middlemen, who source them from fishermen determine the downstream prices for *zangi* because they are the ones who undertake the tasks of packaging them in oxygenated tanks before transporting and delivering them to licensed exporters. At that point they sell 1kg of *zangi* \$1000 – 2500 USD per kg, depending on the season and availability.¹⁵⁵

A former minister observed that Haiti could seize the opportunity to regularize the eel trade so that the country combats illicit trafficking, among other things, in order to reduce insecurity.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with a *zangi* trading middleman based in Croix-des-Bouquets area, 10 February 2025; a customs revenue official based in Port-au-Prince (6 February 2025) and a former *zangi* fisherman based in Delmas (4 February 2025). Also see,

¹⁵⁶ Interview with a confidential source. Also see, <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/252777/jean-vilmont-hilaire-alerte-sur-le-commerce-danguilles-et-appelle-a-une-regulation-strict>.

Annex 13: Competing associations involved in elvers supply chain

- I. **ANAPRA** (L'Association Nationale d'Exploitation et de Protection Aquatique). It is an entity that reportedly works to maintain the balance between human consumption and the sustainability of aquatic populations. The idea came from a group of entrepreneurs claiming to be concerned about the major issues in the Haitian marine ecosystem and the fishing industry in general, but which were neglected by decision-makers.¹⁵⁷

Below: is a letter dated 12 August 2019 by the founding members, introducing ANAPRA and its objectives.



Three of the five officials of ANAPRA mentioned in the letter above are part of the 21 traders holding export licenses.¹⁵⁸

The Panel is looking into allegations of irregularities in the issuance of export licenses.

¹⁵⁷ <https://anaprahaiti.org/>.

¹⁵⁸ Names provided during interviews with two confidential sources aware of the *zangi* export sector in Haiti. Date: 8 February 2025. Also see, <https://lequotidiendhaiti.com/?p=10927>; <https://haitiantimes.com/2024/12/31/haitian-authorities-seize-boat-suspected/>

- II. ANAEPA: L'Association Nationale d'Exploitation et de Protection Aquatique (ANAEPA)** whose cofounder and president is Kathia Verdier, Ministre des Haïtiens vivant à l'étranger- MHVE (Minister of Haitians Living Abroad).¹⁵⁹ Verdier also owns a number of companies including ANKA Distributions, KV Fruits de Mer, and KV Nature.¹⁶⁰

In a statement issued on 16 November 2024, ANAEPA claimed to be the only authentic entity recognized by the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR). ANAEPA subsequently filed a complaint against rival entities for their involvement in smuggling of aquatic resources on 18 October 2024, at the Croix-des-Bouquets prosecutor's office against certain personalities and companies involved in the illegal trade in aquatic resources. ANAEPA claimed to be the only authentic association.¹⁶¹

- III. ANAFAH: L'Association Nationale des Fournisseurs d'Anguilles de rivière d'Haïti** (The National Association of River Eel Suppliers of Haiti) is an association of eels fishermen who operate at the upstream point of the supply chain. They earn the least income compared to middlemen and exporters. ANAFAH members are very vocal about what they see as injustice in the supply chain especially regarding the issuance of export licenses, which they see as a way of monopolizing the eel trade in the country. According to the association, "The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) issues export licenses in return for benefits."¹⁶²

Below: An excerpt of a video in which the head ANAFAH denounces corruption in Haiti's eelers sector on 3 July 2024.

Video available at: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=490973033464498> (Visited on 12 February 2025).



Despite Haiti not being a member of CITES, in February 2024, the country deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS).¹⁶³ The Agreement is an international tool adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) members in June 2022. Among other things, it prohibits support for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and bans support for fishing overfished stocks and ends subsidies for fishing on the unregulated high seas.¹⁶⁴ As at the time of drafting, the Agreement was yet to get the ratification of two-thirds of member states for it to enter into force.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/HaitianAmericans/posts/je-kathia-verdier-was-officially-inaugurated-as-haitis-new-minister-of-haitians-/1148293820631527/>.

¹⁶⁰ <https://haitiantimes.com/2024/11/19/haitis-new-cabinet-fils-aime/>.

¹⁶¹ <https://www.mjmedia509.com/haiti-environnement-lassociation-nationale-dexploitation-et-protection-aquatique-porte-plainte/>.

¹⁶² Interview with two members of ANAFAH, a middleman and a customs official aware of *zangi* trade. 5th and 6th February 2025. Also see, <https://haitistandard.com/commerce-des-anguilles-le-parti-pris-du-ministere-de-lagriculture-denonce-par-lanafarh/>.

¹⁶³ https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/fish_21feb24_e.htm.

¹⁶⁴ https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/wtmin22w22.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ <https://oneoceanhub.org/what-next-for-the-wto-fisheries-subsidies-agreement/>.

Annex 14: A letter dated 24 July 2024, from the President of the BNC to the-then Prime Minister notifying him of the alleged action by three CPT members soliciting a bribe for his renewal of his contract.

Port-au-Prince , le 24 juillet 2024

**Son Excellence Gary CONILLE
Premier Ministre de la République
En ses bureaux**

Objet: renforcement de sécurité

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Je tiens à vous informer que j'ai été approché par des Conseillers présidentiels, Messieurs Gérald Gilles, Smith Augustin et Emmanuel Vertilaire, qui ont exigé un paiement de 100 millions de gourdes pour conserver mon poste de Président de la Banque Nationale de Crédit.

Cette demande, que je perçois comme une forme de corruption, menace non seulement mon intégrité professionnelle mais pose également un risque sécuritaire grave pour ma famille et moi-même. Devenu cible de ces individus, nous sommes exposés à des menaces d'attaques potentielles.

Face à cette urgence, je sollicite une intervention rapide de votre part afin de renforcer notre sécurité et de permettre la continuation de mes fonctions dans un environnement sécurisé et sans pression indue.

Dans l'espoir que vous allez traiter cette situation avec la plus grande attention, je reste à votre disposition pour fournir toutes informations utiles et nécessaires.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Excellence, l'expression de ma haute considération.


**Raoul Pascal PIERRE-LOUIS
Président du Conseil de la BNC**

n.b. cette lettre remplace celle arrivée hier ayant pour accusé réception le No. 03495

Below is a public statement posted on social media by the ULCC Director General on the public release of the executive summary of the investigations on the three TPC members, on 02 October 2024.

This social media statement followed a press statement inviting the media to the public release of a summary of the report of ULCC investigations, which recommended the three for prosecution.¹⁶⁶ This was to remind the public that its actions were in line with the need for all public institutions to uphold the rule of law, to demonstrate that no one is above the law.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with two finance analysts and legal expert. December 2024. Also see: <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/250618/ulcc-recommends-legal-proceedings-against-cpt-members-smith-augustin-emmanuel-vertilaire-and-louis-gerald-gilles-for-passive-corruption>



Annex 15: Gang attacks at APN Port

Between late September and early October 2024, gangs severely disrupted maritime operations by shooting at cargo ships docking at the *Autorité Portuaire Nationale* (APN), the main port of the country located in Port-au-Prince area, from abandoned buildings.

By impeding the ships to dock, the 5 Segond gang, led by Johnson André (alias « Izo » – HTi.002) and La Saline gang, led by Bout Janjan, aimed at weakening revenues of the Wharf Jérémie gang, led by Monel Felix (alias “Micanor”), notably by the hijacking of trucks operating in the port¹⁶⁷. These gangs have sporadically been fighting for the control of La Saline (see S/2024/704). Additionally, gangs also attacked crew members, port workers, and small boats transporting civilians between the capital and other areas¹⁶⁸. The attacks led to the closure of the port between late September and November 2024.

Early January 2025, after additional feuds over access to the entries of the port for extortion, gangs and private actors negotiated and brokered a deal on revenue sharing. Gangs have since been sharing proceeds from extortion of truck drivers operating in the surroundings of the APN port. They also reached an understanding not to attack the APN port which is a major source of their revenue. Since then, the port has resumed parts of its operations¹⁶⁹. The Panel notes that the situation at the APN port remains fragile and this consistently affects the supply of food and other basic commodities.

¹⁶⁷ In southern Cité Soleil commune, Wharf Jérémie gang is entrenched in the seaside neighborhood surrounding the APN and has hijacked vehicles using the port to force them to pay taxes for “security”. La Saline gang, on the other hand, controls a larger swathe of territory further inland, and has been supported by 5 Segond to fight Wharf Jérémie, for the control of La Saline area.

¹⁶⁸ BINUH Quarterly Report (July to September 2024). Interview with senior Coast Guard officer and gang analyst, October 2024.

¹⁶⁹ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025.