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Draft report

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Addendum

Programme questions: proposed programme budget for 2026

(Item 3 (a))

Programme 2

Political affairs

1. At its 18th meeting, on 23 May 2025, the Committee considered programme 2, Political affairs, of the proposed programme plan for 2026 and programme performance in 2024 (A/80/6 (Sect. 3)).

Discussion

2. Delegations commended the work of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and reiterated their support for its vital contributions to international peace and security through political engagement, conflict prevention and resolution, electoral assistance and peacebuilding. Delegations also recognized the contributions of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the United Nations Office to the African Union and the Office of Counter-Terrorism in promoting global peace and security. Delegations expressed their appreciation for the programme plan and its alignment with General Assembly resolution 79/1, entitled “The Pact for the Future”.

3. It was emphasized that the Department should continue to support national strategies and focus on preventing the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of conflict. Support was expressed for the Peacebuilding Commission’s efforts to promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, with a view to maximizing efficiencies.



4. A delegation made reference to its efforts to address security issues and promote world peace through the Global Security Initiative, which was intended to uphold principles and pursue justice, address difficult issues, and promote synergy and cooperation, through openness, inclusiveness and pragmatic action. It was stated that the Initiative reflected progressive values and was aimed at contributing to lasting peace and universal security.

5. While some delegations welcomed the mainstreaming of gender perspectives throughout the programme plan, including efforts to operationalize the women and peace and security agenda as mandated in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), other delegations raised concerns regarding the conceptual clarity of and justification for the proposed climate and gender lens, and further clarification of its relevance to conflict prevention and resolution tools was requested. It was stated that any policy or programme containing references to gender ideology would not be supported.

6. The importance of results-based management was emphasized and the need for effectiveness, resource optimization and measurable impact across all subprogrammes was highlighted. It was noted that the quantity of activities did not reflect their impact and that activities should be better designed to achieve measurable results. The importance of ensuring the effective use of Member States' contributions was underscored. A call was made for greater specificity in reporting, particularly in relation to performance indicators and the impact of intensified efforts under the programme plan. It was emphasized that quantifiable data and clarity on changes in working methods would enhance the ability to evaluate the programme's effectiveness.

7. While matters relating to parts of the programme dealing with resources were not within the mandate of the Committee for Programme and Coordination, it was noted that special political missions represented a significant portion of the Department's resources, and concerns were raised that the programme plan did not include information on the work to be carried out by those missions. Clarification was requested from the Secretariat on the rationale for the non-inclusion of special political missions in the programme plan.

8. A delegation enquired about equitable geographical representation within the Department and requested further details on measures taken to improve the representation of developing countries, the outcomes achieved and future strategies. The Department's efforts to combat racism and racial discrimination were acknowledged, and clarification was sought on the measures implemented, the resulting outcomes and future plans.

9. Regarding subprogramme 1, Prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, efforts to strengthen Member States' capacities for identifying, preventing and addressing conflict situations and efforts to develop regional strategies and partnerships with Member States and special political missions were commended. The importance of strengthening the implementation of Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations was underscored, with a focus on preventive diplomacy and peaceful dispute resolution through mediation and facilitation.

10. The reference in paragraph 3.I.17 to the linkages between humanitarian, development, peace and the integration of the United Nations system and the mainstreaming of women and peace and security and youth-related efforts was recognized. A delegation welcomed the inclusion of climate in the programme plan and expressed the view that climate and its impact on conflict needed to be more fully articulated in future programme plans, including through localized climate conflict analysis. Clarification was sought on the Department's efforts to link its activities with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and on the measures taken, results achieved and future plans.

11. Regarding programme performance in 2024, clarification was sought on the connection between the Secretary-General's good offices, disinformation, the impact of new technologies and the role of non-State actors. Concerns were raised regarding the general nature of programme performance in 2024 reflected in paragraph 3.I.19 and table 3.I.2, which lacked detail. Clarification was requested on whether the reported intensification of efforts could be quantified or linked to changes in working methods in the light of the Pact for the Future.

12. Regarding subprogramme 2, Electoral assistance, several delegations expressed appreciation for the work of the Department, which was one of the most impactful forms of United Nations support for institutional development and stability. The progress made in areas such as training, support for women in parliaments and engagement with regional and subregional organizations was acknowledged. A delegation emphasized that continued support was expected both for regular electoral cycles and for the strategic plans of national electoral bodies. Another delegation welcomed the regional training initiatives for electoral officials but noted that the current assessment framework was focused on headcounts and participation metrics, which lacked the rigour needed to evaluate the actual impact on capacity development, and a more results-oriented approach was recommended.

13. Regarding subprogramme 3, Security Council affairs, its specialized research, analysis and advisory support were noted as valuable contributions to improving the Security Council's working methods that benefited both Council members and the broader United Nations system. Regarding the performance indicator on the number of active users of the Council website, clarification was sought on how that metric contributed to the subprogramme's objective of supporting the Council in maintaining international peace and security. It was stated that activities should be better designed to reflect their impact. Appreciation was expressed for the subprogramme's support in facilitating the functioning of the Council, including its work on sanctions, and its activities related to training, the dissemination of reference materials, website enhancements and stakeholder engagement were recognized. While the subprogramme's efforts to update expert rosters and nominate candidates within two weeks of mandate renewals were acknowledged, faster resolution of appointment delays was encouraged. Greater coordination within the United Nations system was recommended to ensure broader understanding and implementation of sanctions. Regarding paragraph 3.I.49, the Secretariat's efforts to improve induction courses for incoming Council members were welcomed, and it was stated that the imbalance between elected and non-elected members, manifested in disparities in institutional memory, geographical representation and working methods, undermined the Council's effectiveness and legitimacy. Increasing the number and duration of induction courses was encouraged.

14. Regarding subprogramme 4, Decolonization, the importance of addressing the legacy of colonialism was emphasized, as called for in General Assembly resolution [79/115](#), and the subprogramme was encouraged to support the Department of Global Communications in those efforts. Another delegation reiterated its support for the right to self-determination and the full application of Article 73 of the Charter. Concerns were raised that independence was overly emphasized as the default status option in the Fourth Committee's deliberations, and reference was made to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in which it was affirmed that Non-Self-Governing Territories might opt for free association, integration or other political statuses if freely chosen. It was suggested that the decolonization mandate might have been fulfilled and that resources could be redirected to more pressing global crises. The limited performance measures, such as the generation of expert lists, were cited as indicative of reduced demand.

15. Regarding subprogramme 5, Question of Palestine, the timely and productive efforts of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People in promoting engagement with both the public and Member States on the question of Palestine were commended, particularly in the light of the critical situation on the ground. The initiatives were also recognized as especially relevant in the context of the upcoming High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, scheduled for June 2025. The Committee's contribution to international dialogue and awareness of the event was welcomed. The use of assessed contributions for the subprogramme was not supported by a delegation, which stated that it was premature, presupposed the outcome of final status issues that could be resolved only through negotiations between the parties and thus was counterproductive to efforts to secure a lasting peace. The view was expressed that strategic communication support to the Palestinian Authority was inappropriate, and concerns were raised about United Nations initiatives that presented a one-sided narrative, potentially harming the Organization's reputation.

16. Regarding subprogramme 6, Peacebuilding Support Office, delegations reaffirmed their support for the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund, and the Office and its role in strengthening the peacebuilding architecture, addressing root causes of conflict and preventing violence. The long-term impact of peacebuilding was recognized as significant, and strong support was expressed for efforts to enhance the effectiveness, reach and relevance of peacebuilding activities. Clarification was sought on the main challenges facing the subprogramme in fully and effectively delivering its mandate.

17. Delegations expressed support for country- and region-owned peacebuilding efforts and recognized the subprogramme's support for nationally-led peacebuilding programmes through the Peacebuilding Fund, particularly in transition, subregional and cross-border contexts, and for empowering women and young people in conflict-affected areas.

18. Several delegations reaffirmed that voluntary contributions remained the primary source of funding for the Peacebuilding Fund. With the approved assessed funding in 2025, delegations stressed that concrete, impactful and cost-effective results must be demonstrated. Concern was expressed over the lack of detailed programmatic data and planning information in the proposed programme plan, and it was stated that a comprehensive workplan for the Fund should be included as a core component of the programme.

19. Regarding the strategy segment of the subprogramme, and specifically paragraph 3.I.82 (a), clarification was sought on how the Peacebuilding Commission could enhance support for locally led, inclusive national prevention approaches that upheld human rights and the rule of law. While the Commission's technical and substantive advice was acknowledged, it was recommended that it focus on country situations where it could add the most value. Regarding paragraph 3.I.82 (b), further information was sought on how the Peacebuilding Fund could prioritize activities to prevent conflict in the most critical contexts and how the Office could better utilize the Peacebuilding Impact Hub to articulate the effects of Fund projects on conflict prevention. It was emphasized that nationally led peacebuilding efforts should be based on the sovereign decisions of States and not be externally imposed.

20. Regarding the programme performance in 2024 and paragraph 3.I.84, the focus on strengthening national prevention approaches was seen as a unique and valuable role of the Peacebuilding Commission.

21. With reference to result 1, paragraph 3.I.86 and figure 3.I.XIII, several delegations welcomed the increased participation rate of women and youth in meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission. Further information was requested on the origin and calculation of targets for the performance measure and on how the subprogramme could continue improving those rates. In addition, the subprogramme was requested in future to assess the participation by women and youth in peacebuilding more broadly through their inclusion in Peacebuilding Fund projects.

22. Regarding result 2, the increased focus on mission transitions was supported, and the subprogramme was encouraged to improve performance and incorporate both qualitative and quantitative indicators to better capture the impact of its interventions.

23. Regarding result 3, the expansion of partnerships with international financial institutions was welcomed, including with the World Bank and other multilateral development banks and with regional and cross-regional institutions, as indicated in paragraph 3.I.90, and it was recommended that the Peacebuilding Commission further deepen collaboration with regional multilateral development banks. Information was sought on how the Commission could work more effectively with international financial institutions to secure diversified and catalytic funding beyond joint country analysis and strategic alignment.

24. Regarding the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the recognition of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in programme plans was reaffirmed, and the critical work of the Office in advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the two-State solution was emphasized, not only for the parties involved but also for broader international peace and security.

25. Regarding paragraph 3.II.13, in which the facilitation by the Office of the Special Coordinator of joint planning exercises for the reconstruction of Gaza involving the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union was highlighted, clarification was sought on whether the Office had had any interaction with the League of Arab States relating to the League's plan for the early recovery, reconstruction and development of Gaza, published in March 2025.

26. Concerns were expressed that all three planned results for 2026 faced significant obstacles. Regarding result 1, it was noted that progress was hindered by increased movement restrictions in Area C of the occupied West Bank and the expansion of settlements. Regarding result 2, it was observed that efforts towards achieving a unified Palestinian Government were impeded by a lack of political will among the relevant parties. Regarding result 3, it was noted that the broader political framework for resolving the conflict was severely complicated by the ongoing conflict in Gaza. With regard to paragraph 3.II.20, clarification was sought on the intention of the Office of the Special Coordinator to expand dialogue with the parties in 2026 and on the most promising avenues for dialogue at a time when the humanitarian situation was at its most critical.

27. Regarding the United Nations Office to the African Union, support was expressed for the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union and for strengthening the capacity of subregional organizations for ensuring peace and security in Africa. The link between climate and security cited in paragraphs 3.IV.20 and 3.IV.21 and figure 3.IV.I was noted with concern, and it was recalled that the 2024 joint communiqué of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council referred only to the negative consequences of climate change for food security and other social, humanitarian and economic challenges, which might in turn affect stability on the African continent, and did not include a direct link to peace and security.

28. Regarding the Office of Counter-Terrorism, delegations reaffirmed the importance of countering terrorism, and the alignment of the programme plan with the mandates was recognized. Regarding paragraph 3.V.2, it was recommended that the reference to General Assembly resolution [75/291](#) be updated to resolution [77/298](#), in which the eighth and most recent review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was reflected. Regarding paragraph 3.V.5 (b), it was emphasized that the response to technical assistance needs was contingent upon requests from the concerned Member States. Regarding paragraph 3.V.6 (d), it was emphasized that, while technical assistance remained demand driven, in line with resolution [77/298](#), the integration of international human rights norms and standards into relevant measures was a universal obligation of all Member States and not limited to those requesting assistance, which should have been reflected in the programme.

29. Regarding paragraph 3.V.9 on inter-agency coordination and liaison, a delegation noted the detailed information regarding the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and stated that it would have preferred a streamlined version of the paragraph focused on the coordination functions of the Office, and in that context, it was suggested that revision of the 2026 performance measure of result 1 was needed to incorporate a focus on engagement with Member States, without additional emphasis on partnerships with specific actors.

30. A concern was expressed about overlapping mandates between the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and reference was made to paragraph 41 of resolution [79/257](#), in which the need to resolve such duplication was highlighted. The view was expressed that the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime should be transferred to the Office of Counter-Terrorism, which should be elevated to a Department to centralize the leadership and coordination of United Nations counter-terrorism efforts. It was suggested that the programme plan placed undue emphasis on enhancing the role of civil society in counter-terrorism and that the core focus of the Office of Counter-Terrorism should be on providing technical assistance to Member States. Concerns were raised about paragraph 3.V.13 and the integration of human rights and gender equality into activities of the Office, and it was stated that such integration should not be expanded beyond what was necessary for technical assistance.

Conclusions and recommendations

31. The Committee recommended that the plenary or the relevant Main Committee or Main Committees of the General Assembly, in line with Assembly resolution [79/247](#), consider the programme plan for programme 2, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for 2026 under the agenda item entitled “Programme planning” at the eightieth session of the Assembly.