



Совет Безопасности

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**Письмо Группы экспертов по Южному Судану, учрежденной
резолюцией 2206 (2015) Совета Безопасности, от 25 ноября
2024 года на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности**

Члены Группы экспертов, которая была учреждена резолюцией 2206 (2015) Совета Безопасности и мандат которой был продлен во исполнение резолюции 2731 (2024) Совета Безопасности, имеют честь настоящим препроводить промежуточный доклад, представленный в соответствии с пунктом 18 резолюции 2731 (2024).

Доклад был представлен Комитету Совета Безопасности, учрежденному резолюцией 2206 (2015), 1 ноября 2024 года и рассмотрен Комитетом 14 ноября 2024 года.

Группа будет признательна за доведение настоящего письма и промежуточного доклада до сведения членов Совета Безопасности и их опубликование в качестве документа Совета.

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Промежуточный доклад Группы экспертов по Южному Судану, представленный во исполнение резолюции 2731 (2024)

Резюме

Южный Судан — одна из стран мира, где наиболее остро ощущается нехватка продовольствия. Почти три четверти населения нуждаются в продовольственной помощи, а в некоторых районах страны назревает голод. Из-за конфликта в Судане более 830 000 человек были вынуждены искать убежище в Южном Судане, а нефтяные доходы правительства сократились почти на 70 процентов.

Руководителям Южного Судана с трудом удается реагировать на эти усиливающиеся кризисы, а участники политического процесса в Джубе прежде всего поглощены соперничеством за власть, должности и контроль над сокращающимися государственными ресурсами. В настоящее время вследствие беспрецедентных наводнений затоплено от 7 до 12 процентов территории страны, что еще больше затрудняет оказание гуманитарной помощи.

13 сентября 2024 года руководители Южного Судана согласились продлить еще на два года переходный период, установленный в Обновленном соглашении об урегулировании конфликта в Республике Южный Судан (мирное соглашение) от 2018 года. Их консенсусное решение — это не только указание на то, что в Джубе сохраняются возможности для политического диалога, но и подтверждение того, что в ходе выполнения мирного соглашения было сделано слишком мало в плане содействия проведению свободных и справедливых выборов и подготовки к следующему этапу развития страны. В более широком смысле оно также указывает на то, что ощутимую выгоду от его завершения способна извлечь лишь малая часть силовых и политических элит, играющих центральную роль в мирном процессе.

В то время как перспективы проведения демократических выборов отодвигаются еще на два года, право осуществлять назначения практически на все должности в правительстве и секторе безопасности и распределять государственные ресурсы остается под надежным контролем элит в Джубе. Президент Южного Судана Салва Киир Маярдит, партия «Народно-освободительное движение Судана» (НОДС) и Народные силы обороны Южного Судана (НСОЮС), в частности, эффективно используют этот контроль для ослабления своих оппонентов, поощряя переход на свою сторону и постоянно проводя перестановки почти во всех государственных органах. У тех, кто не входит в эту систему, остается все меньше альтернатив присоединению к ней.

Например, в штате Центральная Экватория правительство успешно раскололо Фронт национального спасения, переманив на свою сторону ряд высокопоставленных руководителей. Однако в результате этого обострился конфликт с оставшимися членами группировки и участились грабительские нападения на гражданское население, поскольку многочисленные группировки теперь пытаются действовать независимо.

Региональное взаимодействие по-прежнему крайне важно для мирного процесса в Южном Судане, а реализуемая под руководством Кении инициатива «Тумаини» дает некоторую надежду на заключение мира с рядом оставшихся оппозиционных групп. При этом нынешние стороны, подписавшие мирное соглашение 2018 года, возражают против заключения дополнительных

соглашений или создания дополнительных учреждений из-за опасений того, что они лишь усложнят и без того непростой процесс осуществления.

На фоне региональной нестабильности испытываются на прочность границы страны, в результате чего на высоком уровне несколько раз потребовалось принимать политические меры. Множество вооруженных солдат Народных сил обороны Уганды были замечены на территории по меньшей мере трех штатов Южного Судана, в результате чего было нарушено оружейное эмбарго, а северную границу Южного Судана пересекли военнослужащие Сил быстрого реагирования Судана.

Для большинства населения, которое с трудом выживает в условиях тяжелой гуманитарной ситуации, по-прежнему неясно, смогут ли руководители Южного Судана использовать следующие два года для достижения того, что не удалось достичь за предыдущие шесть лет.

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I. Справочная информация

A. Мандат и поездки

1. В своей резолюции [2206 \(2015\)](#) Совет Безопасности ввел режим санкций в отношении физических лиц и организаций, способствующих конфликту в Южном Судане, и учредил комитет по санкциям (Комитет Совета Безопасности, учрежденный резолюцией [2206 \(2015\)](#) по Южному Судану). 1 июля 2015 года Комитет объявил о введении адресных санкций в отношении шести физических лиц. Приняв резолюцию [2428 \(2018\)](#), Совет ввел оружейное эмбарго в отношении территории Южного Судана и добавил в санкционный перечень двух физических лиц. 30 мая 2024 года Совет принял резолюцию [2731 \(2024\)](#), продлив действие режима санкций до 31 мая 2025 года.
2. В своей резолюции [2731 \(2024\)](#) Совет Безопасности продлил также мандат Группы экспертов по Южному Судану до 1 июля 2025 года, с тем чтобы она могла предоставлять информацию и аналитические выкладки в порядке оказания Комитету поддержки в его работе, в том числе в части возможного включения в санкционный перечень физических лиц и организаций, которые, как предполагается, участвуют в деятельности, о которой говорится в пункте 7 резолюции [2206 \(2015\)](#).
3. 10 сентября 2024 года Генеральный секретарь, действуя в координации с Комитетом, назначил пятерых членов Группы (см. [S/2024/676](#)).
4. Из-за задержек с назначением своих членов Группа не смогла посетить Южный Судан до подготовки настоящего доклада в октябре 2024 года.

B. Сотрудничество с международными организациями и другими заинтересованными сторонами

5. Хотя Группа действует независимо от учреждений и структур Организации Объединенных Наций, она хотела бы выразить признательность Миссии Организации Объединенных Наций в Южном Судане (МООНЮС) и сотрудникам других структур Организации Объединенных Наций, в том числе в Нью-Йорке.
6. Перед подготовкой настоящего доклада Группа попросила о проведении встреч с представителями правительства Южного Судана и ряда государств региона. На момент подготовки настоящего документа Группа не получила ответов на эти просьбы. Однако, используя свои обширные связи в Южном Судане и регионе, Группа смогла пообщаться с рядом нынешних и бывших членов правительства Южного Судана, высокопоставленными представителями Народных сил обороны Южного Судана (НСОЮС) и других органов безопасности, старшими представителями южносуданских оппозиционных групп, членами обновленной Переходной национальной законодательной ассамблеи, южносуданскими журналистами и членами организаций гражданского общества, сотрудниками компаний, работающих в Южном Судане, гражданскими лицами и представителями иностранных вооруженных групп, присутствующих в Южном Судане.
7. В пункте 17 резолюции [2731 \(2024\)](#) Совет Безопасности особо отметил важность проведения Группой консультаций с соответствующими государствами-членами, международными, региональными и субрегиональными организациями и МООНЮС. Группа смогла провести широкие консультации с органами и учреждениями Организации Объединенных Наций в Южном Судане и других местах. Она провела также консультации с представителями

большинства механизмов безопасности, установленных в соответствии с Обновленным соглашением об урегулировании конфликта в Республике Южный Судан (мирное соглашение), а также с представителями ряда многосторонних организаций, работающих в Южном Судане.

8. Группа направила правительству Южного Судана, государствам региона и другим физическим лицам и организациям 10 официальных писем, на которые она получила один ответ по существу в период до подготовки настоящего доклада. Ответы, полученные Группой позднее, содержатся в приложениях к настоящему докладу.

С. Методология

9. Настоящий доклад был подготовлен в октябре 2024 года на основе независимых исследований и расследований Группы. Она провела множество бесед, что позволило собрать массу достоверной информации из самых разных источников. Группа изучила документацию, предоставленную физическими лицами, коммерческими организациями, конфиденциальными источниками и правительством Южного Судана. Группа приложила сознательные усилия к тому, чтобы в ее докладе были отражены различные мнения о мирном процессе в Южном Судане, включая точки зрения многочисленных группировок, входящих в Обновленное переходное правительство национального единства, и остальных оппозиционных групп. Группа также учитывала результаты своей прошлой работы, включая предыдущие доклады Совету Безопасности и Комитету, причем как открытые, так и конфиденциальные.

10. Группа соблюдала нормы, которые Неофициальная рабочая группа Совета Безопасности по общим вопросам, касающимся санкций, рекомендовала в своем докладе, опубликованном в декабре 2006 года ([S/2006/997](#)). В целях соблюдения соответствующих требований, предъявляемых к доказательствам, Группа подтверждала достоверность содержащейся в настоящем докладе информации, обращаясь к нескольким независимым источникам.

11. Группа проводила исследования с максимально возможной транспарентностью, уделяя при необходимости первоочередное внимание конфиденциальности. Источники информации или документы квалифицируются как конфиденциальные только в том случае, если их раскрытие может поставить под угрозу безопасность источника.

II. Сложные гуманитарные проблемы

12. В Южном Судане сохраняется тяжелейшая гуманитарная ситуация. На протяжении многих лет усугубление проблем в области политики, экономики и безопасности сопровождалось серьезными внешними потрясениями, что вызвало комплексный и масштабный кризис.

А. Беспрецедентное наводнение

13. Руководители Южного Судана готовы объявить в стране чрезвычайное положение, поскольку из-за масштабных наводнений затоплено от 7 до 12 процентов территории страны и почти 30 процентов территории таких штатов, как

Юнити и Вараб¹. Ожидается, что в 2024 году от наводнений пострадают около 3,3 миллиона человек, проживающих более чем в половине округов страны². Паводковыми водами были затоплены или повреждены десятки тысяч акров сельскохозяйственных угодий, сотни школ и источников воды, а также десятки медицинских учреждений³. Один из жителей Джубы, недавно вернувшийся из поездки на родину своих предков в штате Джонглей, рассказал о том, что на том месте, где раньше был густой лес, образовался «океан»⁴.

14. В результате наводнения усугубились последствия других гуманитарных проблем. В настоящее время Южный Судан принимает более 830 000 человек, бежавших от конфликта в Судане, притом что в пределах его границ уже были перемещены 2,2 миллиона человек⁵. Многие люди прибыли в штаты, которые серьезно пострадали от наводнения. Более 8 миллионов человек, или около 70 процентов населения, нуждаются теперь в продовольственной помощи⁶, поскольку резко выросли цены на продовольственные и непродовольственные товары⁷. На значительной части территории страны сохраняется чрезвычайный уровень отсутствия продовольственной безопасности (уровень 4 по Комплексной классификации стадий продовольственной безопасности)⁸.

15. Кроме того, по состоянию на октябрь 2024 года около 75 процентов дорог в Южном Судане были перекрыты или иным образом пострадали от наводнений и других бедствий⁹. В этой ситуации значительно осложняется гуманитарное реагирование, а гуманитарные организации вынуждены полагаться на денежные переводы¹⁰, дорогостоящие воздушные поставки и менее эффективные

¹ Беседа с экспертом по геопространственным данным, октябрь 2024 года. См. также снимки наводнения в Южном Судане, сделанные с 5 по 9 октября 2024 года Центром спутниковой связи Организации Объединенных Наций, URL: https://unosat.org/static/unosat_filesystem/4002/UNOSAT_A3_Natural_Landscape_FL20220424SSD_05Oct_09Oct2024_SouthSudan_Week24.pdf.

² План готовности и реагирования на наводнения в Южном Судане в период с июня по декабрь 2024 года, подготовленный гуманитарными организациями в координации с правительством Южного Судана, URL: <https://fsccluster.org/sites/default/files/South%20Sudan%20Floods%20Preparedness%20and%20Response%2022%20June%202024.pdf>.

³ См. приложение 2.

⁴ Беседа с гражданским лицом из Южного Судана, октябрь 2024 года.

⁵ Международная организация по миграции и Управление Верховного комиссара Организации Объединенных Наций по делам беженцев, данные о перемещении населения из Судана в Южный Судан (дата последнего обращения: 22 октября 2024 года). URL: <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZTMwNTljNWYtYmVhYi00ZGI2LTgwYzAtN2UyNDZmZTRlNjBkIiwidCI6IjE1ODgyNjJkLTlzMltNDNiNC1iZDZlLWJjZTQ5YzhjNjE4NiIsImMiOiJh9&pageName=ReportSection95859b8850a76994e6fb&pageName=ReportSection4f5adec6c9d67015bc74>.

⁶ Famine Early Warning System Network, Food Assistance Outlook Brief, August 2024, URL: <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-08/FEWSNET-FAOB-August%202024.pdf>.

⁷ Reach, Joint Market Monitoring Initiative, September 2024, URL: https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH_SSD_Factsheet_JMMI_September-2024.pdf.

⁸ Famine Early Warning System Network, “Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remain widespread as flooding expands”, September 2024, URL: <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/september-2024>.

⁹ См., например, карту ограничений доступа, составленную Группой логистики Южного Судана, URL: www.logcluster.org/en/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024.

¹⁰ В рамках таких программ люди или общины получают наличные деньги, а не продукты питания или другие товары и услуги.

информационно-разъяснительные кампании¹¹. При этом услуги оказываются главным образом в тех районах, где у гуманитарных организаций уже имеется потенциал. Некоторые местные эксперты предупреждают, что в этой ситуации создаются отдельные безопасные зоны¹², из-за которых может усиливаться существующее неравенство и другие общины могут оставаться в маргинализированном положении¹³.

16. Ситуацию с наводнениями, вызвавшими перемещение людей и скота, осложняли серьезные межобщинные противоречия и вспышки насилия на местном уровне, в том числе в штатах Вараб, Джонглей, Центральная Экватория и Верхний Нил¹⁴. Эксперты предупреждают, что эти проблемы, возможно, не будут носить временный характер, поскольку в настоящее время не представляется возможным вернуться к прежнему образу жизни в некоторых районах, где посевные и урожайные циклы были полностью нарушены¹⁵.

В. Усугубление последствий в результате ограниченности мер планирования и защиты от наводнений

17. Последние наводнения — это вполне предсказуемое последствие изменения климата в регионе. Бассейн реки Нил в Южном Судане и водно-болотные угодья Судд связаны с тремя сходящимися в одной точке гидрологическими системами: западные притоки Нила, оттоки вод из озера Виктория и стоки с Эфиопского нагорья. В 2024 году в Восточной Африке увеличился объем осадков в годовом исчислении, а поймы рек Южного Судана уже были заполнены водой, что привело к наводнениям такой силы, которые редко случались в прошлом¹⁶.

18. При этом, по мнению ряда экспертов, масштабы и последствия наводнений в Южном Судане можно в целом объяснить тем, что правительство слабо к ним подготовилось и что уже многие годы не работает значительная часть инфраструктурных сооружений, предназначенных для предотвращения наводнений и смягчения их последствий¹⁷. Несколько экспертов, например, выразили обеспокоенность в связи с тем, что ограниченное число дамб вселяет «ложную

¹¹ Беседы с семью сотрудниками гуманитарных организаций и местными аналитиками, октябрь 2024 года.

¹² Беседа с местным экспертом по инфраструктуре, октябрь 2024 года. См. также приложение 3.

¹³ Беседы с местным экспертом по инфраструктуре и правительственным чиновником в штате Юнити, октябрь 2024 года.

¹⁴ По последним данным, в 80 процентах округов Южного Судана существует риск «значительной уязвимости» перед гендерным насилием, а во втором квартале 2024 года число сообщений о сексуальном насилии увеличилось на 168 процентов по сравнению с аналогичным периодом 2023 года. См. UNHCR Protection Cluster, “South Sudan: Protection Monitoring Spotlight, July to August 2024”, 25 September 2024, URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-protection-monitoring-spotlight-july-august-2024>; UNMISS, “Brief on violence affecting civilians, April to June 2024”, URL: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilian_s_april_-_june_2024_0.pdf; и Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, September 2024”, URL: www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024.

¹⁵ Беседы с гуманитарными работниками, климатологами и представителями местных общин, октябрь 2024 года.

¹⁶ Доклады о динамике метеорологических показателей в Южном Судане, имеющиеся в распоряжении Группы.

¹⁷ Беседы с 19 климатологами, правительственными чиновниками, сотрудниками гуманитарных организаций и представителями местных общин, октябрь 2024 года.

надежду» в некоторые общины, которые остаются в зонах возможного затопления в штатах Джонглей и Юнити¹⁸. В некоторых из таких мест построенные вручную дамбы были быстро переполнены водой, что привело к массовому перемещению населения¹⁹.

19. Кроме того, несмотря на критику со стороны экологов и технических экспертов, государственные должностные лица энергично проводят в жизнь крайне политизированный проект по выемке грунта, представляющий собой единичную попытку обеспечить доступ к притокам Нила в штате Юнити²⁰. Несколько местных экспертов сообщили Группе, что, по их мнению, на сегодняшний день этот проект дал слабый или «нулевой результат»²¹. Другие эксперты сообщили Группе, что из-за ряда проектов, связанных со строительством дорог и мостов по всей стране, был заблокирован или нарушен проход воды и что влиятельные подрядчики, занимающиеся строительством дорог, игнорируют технико-экономические обоснования в отношении проектирования дорог и устойчивости к наводнениям, что привело к разрушениям и перемещению населения²².

20. По причине отвлечения и расхищения ограниченных государственных ресурсов подрывается способность страны реагировать на наводнения и смягчать их последствия. Так, в сентябре 2022 года правительство выделило в общей сложности около 26,7 млн долл. США на реализацию национальной программы реагирования на наводнения²³, заключив с 25 южносуданскими компаниями²⁴ контракты на сумму около 20 млн долл. США на поставку товаров, включая сорго и противомоскитные сетки²⁵. Однако лишь малая часть этих ресурсов в конечном счете достигла жертв наводнения, а несколько тонн продовольственной помощи, как утверждается, было расхищено²⁶. Многие компании, заключившие контракты, почти или совсем не имели опыта в сфере логистического управления при реагировании на чрезвычайные ситуации, а нескольким поставщикам правительство так и не заплатило²⁷.

¹⁸ Беседы с сотрудниками гуманитарных организаций, местными аналитиками и экспертом по инфраструктуре, октябрь 2024 года.

¹⁹ Там же. Подтверждается докладами, полученными от местных наблюдателей в сентябре и октябре 2024 года, и фотографиями, изученными Группой.

²⁰ Беседы с экспертом по инфраструктуре и координатором по вопросам международного реагирования, октябрь 2024 года. См. также приложения 4 и 5.

²¹ Беседы с местным экологом и тремя местными аналитиками в штате Юнити, октябрь 2024 года.

²² Беседа с экспертом по инфраструктуре, участвующим в разработке технико-экономических обоснований для строительства дорог, октябрь 2024 года. Подтверждается сообщениями в социальных сетях, фотографиями и видеозаписями, сделанными представителями общин в штатах Западный Бахр-эль-Газаль, Северный Бахр-эль-Газаль и Лейк. См. также, например, Eye Radio, “ARC commits to resolving Wau road blockage after heavy rainfall”, 24 May 2024, URL: www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/. См. также S/2024/343.

²³ Eye Radio, “Govt allocates \$16.7m to flood-affected populations”, 10 September 2022, URL: www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/; и заявление Канцелярии президента от 30 ноября 2022 года.

²⁴ Eye Radio, “Govt allocates \$16.7m”.

²⁵ Number One Citizen, “Government procures food for vulnerable flood victims”, 2 November 2022. См. также www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/.

²⁶ Доклады международных наблюдателей от февраля 2023 года. См. также Sudans Post, “Ex-humanitarian minister Peter Mayen denies walking away with flood victims’ emergency funds”, 27 November 2022.

²⁷ Беседа с правительственным подрядчиком, октябрь 2022 года.

зарегистрировать политические партии и активизировать конституционные процессы»³⁴.

24. Когда в стране был продлен период для функционирования переходных механизмов управления, в сфере политики и безопасности усилились процессы фрагментации. Поскольку в переходный период структура власти отличалась высокой степенью централизации, главные участники мирного соглашения, в частности президент Южного Судана Салва Киир Маярдит, получили контроль практически над всеми должностями в политических учреждениях и органах безопасности страны, включая парламент и субнациональные учреждения. По мере затягивания переходного периода многие оппоненты либо ослабли, либо были вынуждены отколоться, с тем чтобы вступить в партии, занимающие доминирующие позиции в рамках системы. В партии президента «Народно-освободительное движение Судана» (НОДС) и НСОЮС считают, что эта ситуация создает благоприятные условия для того, чтобы ослабить политических и военных соперников, привлечь их на свою сторону и осуществить перестановки среди руководителей органов безопасности³⁵.

А. Дестабилизации ситуации в штате Центральная Экватория в результате фрагментации Фронта национального спасения

25. В Экваториальном регионе правительство по-прежнему прилагает успешные усилия к тому, чтобы старшие командиры и бойцы Фронта национального спасения (ФНС) оставляли своего лидера Томаса Чирилло. Эта ситуация привела к фрагментации и ослаблению ФНС, а также позволила правительству использовать новых союзников из числа перебежчиков в качестве марионеточных сил для борьбы с оставшимися членами ФНС. На этом примере видны те стратегии, которые эффективно использовались правительством в других частях страны, включая штаты Верхний Нил и Юнити³⁶. Однако, как и в других случаях, эта кампания также привела к тому, что ситуация с безопасностью на местах значительно ухудшилась.

26. По мере того как ФНС все чаще сталкивается с проблемами материально-технического и ресурсного обеспечения, правительству становится легче побуждать их командиров к дезертирству³⁷. Некоторые из них были прельщены обещанием получить оплачиваемую должность в полиции или НСОЮС, а некоторые перебежчики из ФНС уже вошли в состав подразделений НСОЮС, дислоцированных в округах Восточный Мундри и Моробо³⁸.

27. При этом утверждается, что значительная часть средств, выделенных на реализацию мирного соглашения, но перенаправленных в Министерство по делам кабинета министров, была использована для стимулирования дезертирства в рядах ФНС³⁹. Например, после вызова в парламент министр по делам кабинета

³⁴ The East African, “South Sudan delays polls to 2026, extends transitional government”, 14 September 2024.

³⁵ См. приложения 6 и 7.

³⁶ Другие яркие примеры этой стратегии можно найти в документах [S/2024/343](#), [S/2023/294](#), [S/2022/884](#) и [S/2022/359](#).

³⁷ См. приложение 8. Беседы с Томасом Чирилло, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года.

³⁸ Беседы с местными жителями и конфиденциальными источниками, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года.

³⁹ См. приложения 9–12. Беседы с четырьмя представителями гражданского общества и местными аналитиками, октябрь 2024 года. См. также Eye Radio, “Dr. Lomuro admits to diverting peace funds to special projects”, 7 June 2024; и Sudans Post, “Lomuro claims he was quoted ‘out of context’ on \$10 million peace funds”, 10 June 2024.

министров Мартин Элиа Ломуро подтвердил, что в апреле 2024 года для содействия «установлению мира» с командирами ФНС было произведено ненадлежащее снятие суммы в размере 1 050 000 долл. США⁴⁰.

28. Недавно двумя самыми известными перебежчиками стали Кеннеди Кений «Уорриор» Абду Лопионг, который теперь выступает в качестве марионетки и союзника НСОЮС, и Джон Латио Кений Лобуронг, который сейчас возглавляет собственную группу «Объединенные силы национального спасения» (ОСНС)⁴¹. Документы, изученные Группой, свидетельствуют о том, что переговоры с обеими перебежчиками велись на самом высоком правительственном уровне, в том числе в аппарате президента и Министерстве по делам кабинета министров⁴².

29. Правительство все активнее пытается использовать некоторых перебежчиков в качестве марионеточных сил для борьбы с оставшимися членами ФНС. В других случаях они нападали друг на друга. Так, хотя подразделения под командованием Кения «Уорриора», по сообщениям, действуют вне рамок официальных структур НСОЮС, им было поручено вести борьбу с отрядами ОСНС и ФНС в окрестностях Лайнии (штат Центральная Экватория)⁴³.

30. 9 октября 2024 года в Вондурубе (штат Центральная Экватория) были убиты по меньшей мере 24 человека, включая 19 гражданских лиц, и несколько человек получили ранения в результате боестолкновений между НСОЮС, которые вступили в союз с силами под командованием Кения «Уорриора», и подразделениями ОСНС под командованием Лобуронга⁴⁴. Эти боестолкновения вызвали осуждение со стороны местных общин, групп гражданского общества и правительства штата⁴⁵.

31. Кроме того, значительно возросло число похищений и вымогательств на территории штата Центральная Экватория, в том числе в округах Джуба, Моробо и Йей⁴⁶. Не имея достаточных ресурсов, многие отколовшиеся группировки нападают на мирных жителей и гуманитарных работников, вследствие чего в этом районе приостановились некоторые гуманитарные операции.

32. Члены Группы побеседовали с семьей гражданами, которые были похищены на срок до четырех дней и утверждали, что за их освобождение боевики ФНС требовали от их работодателей тысячи долларов⁴⁷. По словам этих же граждан, местные подразделения НСОЮС произвольно арестовывали и

⁴⁰ См. приложения 9–12. См. также Eye Radio, “Dr. Lomuro admits diverting peace fund”.

⁴¹ См. приложения 13–16.

⁴² Беседы с пятью представителями гражданского общества, октябрь 2024 года. См. также приложения 13–16.

⁴³ Беседы с представителями местных общин, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года. См. также приложение 16.

⁴⁴ Там же. Подтверждается докладами, полученными от полевых наблюдателей и контролеров и имеющимися в распоряжении Группы. См. также приложения 18 и 21–23. См. также UNMISS, “UNMISS alarmed by violent attacks in Juba County, calls for investigation and accountability”, 11 October 2024, URL: <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-alarmed-violent-attacks-juba-county-calls-investigation-and-accountability>.

⁴⁵ См. приложения 17–20.

⁴⁶ Доклады наблюдателей в штате Центральная Экватория, подготовленные в мае и сентябре 2024 года и имеющиеся в распоряжении Группы. Беседы с тремя представителями гражданского общества и гуманитарных организаций, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года. См. также UNMISS, “Brief on violence affecting civilians”.

⁴⁷ Беседы с семьей похищенными и представителем местной общины, октябрь 2024 года.

задерживали гражданских лиц, подозреваемых в симпатиях к ФНС, и требовали за их освобождение до 200 000 южносуданских фунтов (65 долл. США)⁴⁸.

33. Несмотря на потерю нескольких командиров, ФНС под руководством Томаса Чирилло выжил и пополнил свои ряды за счет похищений и вербовки⁴⁹, а несколько других местных вооруженных группировок встали под знамя ФНС⁵⁰.

34. В ответ правительство еще больше активизировало военные операции в этом районе, перебросив туда дополнительные подразделения, включавшие перебежчиков⁵¹. Несколько окружных комиссаров из числа гражданских лиц также были заменены новыми чиновниками с военным прошлым⁵², а в качестве дополнительной меры военные операции, проводимые НСОЮС на юге штата Центральная Экватория, были переданы под управление командира НСОЮС, недавно повышенного в должности и базировавшегося в Ейе⁵³. В то же время Группе сообщили, что кое-где в армии усиливается напряженность и ухудшается ситуация с командованием и управлением в результате того, что офицеры, покинувшие ФНС, получают деньги при зачислении в ряды НСОЮС, которые месяцами остаются без денежного довольствия⁵⁴.

В. Посредническая инициатива «Туманини», реализуемая под руководством Кении и при участии оппозиционных групп

35. Из-за фрагментации оппозиционных групп осложняются усилия по установлению мира, а изменчивая ситуация в сфере политики и безопасности теперь удерживается благодаря растущему числу соглашений и процессов, которые частично дублируются.

36. 9 мая 2024 года в Найроби под эгидой посредников состоялись переговоры на высоком уровне между правительством Южного Судана и некоторыми оппозиционными группами, которые не подписали мирное соглашение 2018 года. К

⁴⁸ Беседы с членами семей похищенных гражданских лиц и лидерами общин, октябрь 2024 года.

⁴⁹ См. приложения 24 и 25. Беседы с Томасом Чирилло и представителем гражданского общества, октябрь 2024 года; и UNMISS, “UNMISS gravely concerned by rising abductions in Greater Yei, calls for collective action”, 2 August 2024. См. также видеоматериал, выпущенный ФНС, URL: www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA; и Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, “Quarterly report on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1 July to 30 September 2024”, URL: <https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports/254-rjmec-quarterly-report-on-the-status-of-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-from-1st-july-to-30th-september-2024/file>.

⁵⁰ Беседы с представителями гражданского общества, октябрь 2024 года. Подтверждается независимыми общинными докладами, рассмотренными Группой с июня по сентябрь 2024 года, и докладами международных наблюдателей, имеющимися в распоряжении Группы.

⁵¹ Доклады международных наблюдателей, подготовленные в марте 2024 года и имеющиеся в распоряжении Группы. Беседы с тремя представителями гражданского общества и Томасом Чирилло, октябрь 2024 года.

⁵² Доклады местных наблюдателей, подготовленные в августе 2024 года и имеющиеся в распоряжении Группы. Беседы с местным аналитиком и представителем гражданского общества, октябрь 2024 года. См. также The Dawn, “Governor Wani urge newly appointed county commissioners to improve security”, 7 August 2024.

⁵³ Беседы с местным аналитиком и представителем гражданского общества, октябрь 2024 года.

⁵⁴ Беседы с тремя представителями гражданского общества, октябрь 2024 года. Подтверждается докладами местных наблюдателей, подготовленными в августе 2024 года и имеющимися в распоряжении Группы.

числу участников инициативы «Тумаини» (значит «надежда») относятся: Реальное НОДС (руководитель — Паган Амум), Объединенный фронт/армия Южного Судана (руководитель — Пол Малонг Аван (SSi.008), находящийся под санкциями) и Народное движение/армия Южного Судана (руководитель — Стивен Буай). Саймон Гатвеч (SSi.002), который находится под санкциями и входит в группировку «Китгванг» в составе Народно-освободительного движения/армии Судана (оппозиция) (НОДС/А (О)), также получил приглашение, но не смог приехать из Судана для участия в переговорах⁵⁵.

37. На переговорах также присутствовал Марио Локу Томас Джада, который за несколько месяцев до их проведения вышел из рядов ФНС и сформировал Совет революционного командования ФНС. Остальные члены Альянса оппозиционных движений Южного Судана отказались от участия, сославшись на проблемы с безопасностью в Кении и выразив недоверие к процессу. В августе 2024 года главный посредник инициативы «Тумаини» Лазаро Сумбейво отправился в Рим, предприняв безуспешную попытку убедить Томаса Чирилло присоединиться к переговорам⁵⁶.

38. 15 июля 2024 года участники инициативы «Тумаини» парафировали консенсусный документ, содержащий шесть «протоколов»⁵⁷. Однако на следующий день после этого события Народно-освободительное движение Судана (оппозиция) (НОДС (О)) отвергло этот документ и официально вышло из переговорного процесса⁵⁸.

39. Объясняя свой выход из переговоров, должностные лица НОДС (О) заявили, что инициатива отклонилась от своей намеченной цели — служить площадкой для посредничества. По их мнению, планы использовать инициативу для заключения отдельной договоренности, а не увязать ее с существующим мирным соглашением 2018 года, представляют собой «нарушение» мирного соглашения, «подрывающее» усилия по его выполнению⁵⁹.

40. Представители НОДС (О) возражали, например, против предложения о создании национального совета лидеров, который бы функционировал в качестве «внутреннего гаранта» с учетом возможности заключения соглашения в рамках инициативы «Тумаини»⁶⁰. По их мнению, такой орган, решения которого не подлежали бы утверждению существующим кабинетом министров или законодательным органом Южного Судана, явно посягнет на полномочия учреждений, обеспечивающих разделение властных полномочий и созданных в соответствии с мирным соглашением 2018 года. Они также возражали против того, чтобы новые комиссии по реформе и надзору в секторе безопасности дублировали функции существующих механизмов безопасности⁶¹.

41. В этих возражениях отражается давняя обеспокоенность НОДС (О) по поводу главенствующей роли мирного соглашения 2018 года, которое рассматривается его лидерами как основание для того, чтобы участвовать в работе

⁵⁵ Беседы с Саймоном Гатвечем (SSi.002), май и июнь 2024 года.

⁵⁶ Беседы с Томасом Чирилло, Саймоном Гатвечем (SSi.002) и членами посреднической группы, октябрь 2024 года.

⁵⁷ См. приложение 26.

⁵⁸ См. приложение 27.

⁵⁹ Там же.

⁶⁰ Беседы с членами правительственной делегации и другими политическими деятелями в Джубе, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года. См. приложение 27.

⁶¹ См. приложение 27.

правительства, получить ряд руководящих должностей в силах безопасности страны и интегрировать свои подразделения в состав единой национальной армии⁶².

42. Подобную обеспокоенность разделяли и другие видные политические деятели в Джубе. В докладе постоянного комитета высокого уровня, который следит за ходом выполнения мирного соглашения 2018 года и в состав которого входят министр по делам кабинета министров и генеральный секретарь НОДС Питер Лам Бут, также говорится о том, что ряд протоколов противоречат мирному соглашению и что правительственной делегации не следует допускать создания новых механизмов или учреждений⁶³.

43. Однако для оппозиционных партий, участвующих в инициативе «Тумаини», неспособность выполнить соглашение 2018 года и особенно провести реформы в сфере безопасности служит доказательством того, что необходимо создать новые и усиленные механизмы реализации⁶⁴. Официальный представитель одной из оппозиционных структур сообщил Группе, что без дополнительных механизмов инициатива рискует обернуться очередным невыполненным соглашением. Другой человек сказал членам группы следующее: «Я не подпишу документ «Консенсус Тумаини», если будут устранены механизмы надзора и реализации; я вновь уйду в заросли»⁶⁵. Пол Малонг (Ssi.008) подчеркнул, что разработка нового соглашения лишь в целях его увязки с провальным соглашением 2018 года только подорвет инициативу «Тумаини»⁶⁶.

44. После ряда консультаций был предложен компромисс, согласно которому невыполненные положения мирного соглашения 2018 года будут включены в разрабатываемый ныне график реализации инициативы «Тумаини»⁶⁷.

IV. Региональные вопросы

A. Региональная реакция на продление переходного периода

45. Государства и организации региона по-прежнему вносят важнейший вклад в решение проблем Южного Судана, о чем свидетельствует видная роль Кении в реализации инициативы «Тумаини». Решение о продлении переходного периода и переносе выборов еще на два года вызвало в регионе неоднозначную реакцию.

46. В заявлении Межправительственной организации по развитию (ИГАД) Исполнительный секретарь приветствовал «консенсусный характер» принятия решения и настоятельно призвал Переходное правительство национального единства приложить все усилия для окончательного выполнения оставшихся положений мирного соглашения, с тем чтобы обеспечить своевременное проведение выборов⁶⁸. В этом заявлении Исполнительный секретарь отметил, что выборы

⁶² Беседы с участниками инициативы «Тумаини», октябрь 2024 года.

⁶³ Там же. Доклад Постоянного комитета высокого уровня от 7 октября 2024 года, рассмотренный Группой.

⁶⁴ Беседы с участниками инициативы «Тумаини», октябрь 2024 года.

⁶⁵ Беседа с участником инициативы «Тумаини», октябрь 2024 года.

⁶⁶ Беседы с Полом Малонгом (Ssi.008), октябрь 2024 года.

⁶⁷ Беседы с участниками инициативы «Тумаини», октябрь 2024 года.

⁶⁸ IGAD, "IGAD Executive Secretary's Statement on the Extension of South Sudan's Transitional Period and Call for Renewed Efforts in Implementing the Revitalized Peace Agreement", 23 September 2024, URL: <https://igad.int/igad-executive-secretarys-statement-on-the-extension-of-south-sudans-transitional-period-and-call-for-renewed-efforts-in-implementing-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/>.

переносятся уже в четвертый раз и что поэтому сейчас необходимо срочно разработать конкретный план действий.

47. Председатель Комиссии Африканского союза выступил с аналогичным заявлением, приняв к сведению решение правительства о продлении переходного периода и призвав к конкретным шагам по всестороннему выполнению мирного соглашения⁶⁹.

48. В совместном заявлении Миссии Африканского союза в Южном Судане, ИГАД и МООНЮС отмечается, что переходный период необходимо продлить еще раз из-за «невыполнения важнейших контрольных показателей»⁷⁰.

В. Взаимодействие с государствами региона

49. Руководство Южного Судана, в частности президент, продолжает осуществлять программу регионального взаимодействия, в рамках которой особое внимание уделяется конфликту в Судане и отношениям Южного Судана с Угандой.

50. Как уже сообщалась Группой ранее, правительство Южного Судана продолжает участвовать в посреднических усилиях по урегулированию конфликта в Судане, в том числе путем проведения нескольких встреч между президентом и председателем Суверенного совета Судана Абделем Фаттахом аль-Бурханом. Два лидера обсудили совместный план действий по таким вопросам, как защита транзита нефти, экспортируемой Южным Суданом, урегулирование гуманитарного кризиса в Судане и обеспечение коллективной безопасности, включая борьбу с трансграничной преступностью⁷¹.

51. Из проведенных Группой бесед следует, что подразделения Сил быстрого реагирования сохраняют присутствие в ряде районов штата Западный Бахр-эль-Газаль и что нынешние отношения Джубы с Народно-освободительным движением Судана (Север)⁷², Суданскими вооруженными силами и Силами быстрого реагирования сохраняют значимость, особенно с учетом транзита южносуданской нефти⁷³.

52. 26 марта 2024 года Лоренс Корбанди (Южный Судан), который является близким соратником президента, был назначен Специальным посланником ИГАД по Судану, благодаря чему растет надежда на то, что Южный Судан сыграет заметную посредническую роль в урегулировании конфликта в Судане⁷⁴.

53. Руководство Южного Судана также продолжает взаимодействовать с Эфиопией, в том числе по вопросам строительства инфраструктуры, например

⁶⁹ African Union, “AUC Chairperson statement regarding the extended political transition in South Sudan”, 21 September 2024, URL: <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240921/chairperson-statement-regarding-extended-political-transition-south-sudan>.

⁷⁰ См. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/joint-press-release-aumiss-igad-and-unmiss-note-decision-to-extend-transitional-period-of>.

⁷¹ Заявления Канцелярии президента, имеющиеся в распоряжении Группы.

⁷² См. S/2023/922 и S/2024/343.

⁷³ Беседы с международными и местными наблюдателями, местными чиновниками, представителями иностранных вооруженных групп, присутствующих в Южном Судане, и гражданскими лицами, взаимодействующими с подразделениями СБР в Южном Судане, май и октябрь 2024 года.

⁷⁴ IGAD, “IGAD Executive Secretary Announces the Appointment of Hon. Lawrence Korbandy as Special Envoy for Sudan”, 26 March 2024, URL: <https://igad.int/igad-appoints-hon-lawrence-korbandy-as-special-envoy-for-sudan/>.

дорог, и прокладки альтернативного маршрута для транспортировки южносуданской нефти через территорию Эфиопии в Джибути⁷⁵.

V. Оружие

A. Присутствие Народных сил обороны Уганды на территории Южного Судана⁷⁶

54. Группа документально подтвердила, что по меньшей мере в трех районах Южного Судана активно проводятся военные операции Народных сил обороны Уганды (УПДФ). В каждом из этих районов по меньшей мере некоторые подразделения УПДФ были вооружены, имея при себе смертоносное военное имущество. В пункте 4 резолюции [2428 \(2018\)](#), которая была недавно продлена резолюцией [2731 \(2024\)](#), Совет Безопасности запрещает переправку смертоносного военного имущества на территорию Южного Судана⁷⁷. Таким образом, присутствие УПДФ в Южном Судане представляет собой нарушение оружейного эмбарго.

55. В двух штатах Экваториального региона, граничащих с Угандой, несколько подразделений было развернуто, судя по всему, из-за местных конфликтов, связанных с демаркацией границы.

56. Например, в августе 2024 года в округе Каджо-Каджи (штат Центральная Экватория) несколько вооруженных военнослужащих УПДФ временно задержали от 6 до 12 гражданских лиц; это произошло после того, как там вспыхнул местный очаг напряженности из-за проекта строительства дороги, подрядчики которого находились под защитой УПДФ. Угандийские военнослужащие якобы утверждали, что соответствующая территория относится к Уганде⁷⁸. В последующем заявлении местные власти Южного Судана перечислили более 100 деревень, которые расположены в округе Каджо-Каджи и в которые, по их словам, регулярно вторгаются угандийские силы⁷⁹.

57. Сообщалось также, что в июле 2024 года вооруженные военнослужащие УПДФ «в полном боевом [снаряжении]»⁸⁰ въехали «на больших грузовиках» в населенные пункты штата Восточная Экватория⁸¹. Местное население обвинило этих военнослужащих в том, что они осуществляют патрулирование, притесняют гражданских лиц и лишают их крова. Представители НСОЮС заявили, что

⁷⁵ См. Sudan Tribune, “Ethiopia, South Sudan agree to build alternate oil pipeline route”, 7 July 2024; and Eye Radio, “Ethiopia challenges South Sudan to road construction race”, 15 February 2024.

⁷⁶ См. приложения 39 и 40, где содержатся подробные и конструктивные ответы правительства Уганды на выводы, представленные в настоящем разделе.

⁷⁷ Группа документально зафиксировала несколько таких нарушений, в том числе в документах [S/2020/342](#), [S/2020/1141](#), [S/2019/897](#) и [S/2018/1049](#).

⁷⁸ Беседы с представителями местных органов власти и молодежи, проведенные наблюдателями и изученные Группой, август 2024 года. Подтверждается видеозаписью, полученной Группой. См. также приложение 28. См. также Eye Radio, “Uganda provokes another encroachment in Kajo-Keji”, 7 August 2024.

⁷⁹ См. приложение 29.

⁸⁰ Eye Radio, “UPDF rounds up Magwi villagers, threatens them to evacuate – official”, 20 August 2024.

⁸¹ Беседа с местным наблюдателем в штате Восточная Экватория, октябрь 2024 года. См. также Eye Radio, “Ugandan army reportedly encroaches into South Sudan’s Magwi”, 11 July 2024.

несколько их военнослужащих оказались под арестом УПДФ⁸². В ходе одного инцидента, произошедшего в июле в штате Восточная Экватория, угандийскими военнослужащими были убиты от 11 до 21 гражданина Южного Судана, которых затем обвинили в браконьерстве⁸³.

58. 28 сентября 2024 года командующий силами обороны НСОЮС Сантино Денг Уол (SSi.004) отправился в Уганду, чтобы встретиться со своим коллегой из УПДФ генералом Мухози Кайнеругабой⁸⁴. По информации пресс-релиза НСОЮС, стороны договорились о том, что «УПДФ прекращают дальнейшие посягательства на территории Южного Судана»⁸⁵.

59. В соответствии с режимом санкций, установленным в резолюции 2206 (2015) Совета Безопасности, с 1 июля 2015 года на Сантино Денга Уола (SSi.004) распространяется запрет на поездки. Поскольку просьб об изъятии на основании положений пункта 11 вышеуказанной резолюции не представлялось, его поездка нарушает вышеуказанный запрет.

60. Группа также документально подтвердила, что в июле и августе 2024 года — одновременно с тем, как в Экваториальном районе возникли очаги трансграничной напряженности, — в штате Западный Бахр-эль-Газаль присутствовали значительные контингенты УПДФ, которые были развернуты в рамках совместных операций с НСОЮС и Национальной службой безопасности Южного Судана⁸⁶.

61. В этом районе Группа получала свидетельства из целого ряда источников, некоторые из которых рассказали о том, что для развертывания угандийских подразделений и техники использовались самолеты и вертолеты⁸⁷. Эти сведения частично подтверждались фотографиями, изученными Группой. Ее члены установили, что в этом районе во время развертывания часто использовалось по меньшей мере одно зарегистрированное в Уганде воздушное судно (грузовой самолет Lockheed L-100 Hercules)⁸⁸.

62. По сообщениям, некоторые совместные операции угандийских и южносуданских сил безопасности были направлены против боевиков группировки «Армия сопротивления Бога», действовавших в приграничных районах Судана, Центральноафриканской Республики и Южного Судана⁸⁹.

63. После того, как на местах вышеуказанное развертывание было раскрытировано и были высказаны опасения по поводу втягивания подразделений в

⁸² Там же. См. также приложение 30; и Radio Tamazuj, “South Sudan tells Uganda to free detained soldiers”, 21 July 2024.

⁸³ Беседа с местным наблюдателем в штате Восточная Экватория, октябрь 2024 года. Подтверждается докладом международных наблюдателей, рассмотренным Группой, август 2024 года. См. также Eye Radio, “Ugandan wildlife rangers allegedly killed 21 S. Sudanese poachers”, 23 July 2024, и Number One Citizen, “Budi murder: Lobong, ministers to face MPs”, 30 July 2024.

⁸⁴ См. приложения 31 и 32.

⁸⁵ См. приложение 31.

⁸⁶ Беседы с тремя местными наблюдателями и сотрудником органов безопасности, октябрь 2024 года. См. также Sudans Post, “Lawmaker says Kiir’s office involved in Ugandan army encroachment”, 2 September 2024; и Radio Tamazuj, “Questions over presence of Ugandan soldiers in Raja”, 16 August 2024.

⁸⁷ Там же.

⁸⁸ См. приложение 33.

⁸⁹ Беседы с международными и местными наблюдателями и сотрудником органов безопасности в штате Западный Бахр-эль-Газаль, октябрь 2024 года. См. также сообщение УПДФ в социальных сетях, 20 августа 2024 года. URL: https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213.

конфликт с боевиками суданских Сил быстрого реагирования, которые также были замечены в этом районе, источники в органах безопасности Южного Судана указали на то, что Национальная служба безопасности отговорила УПДФ от установления более постоянного присутствия в этом районе⁹⁰.

В. Закупка военных автомобилей

64. 13 августа 2024 года частная компания, находящаяся за пределами Южного Судана, объявила о том, что она «заключила сделку на поставку автомобилей для армии Южного Судана» в целях удовлетворения ее «оперативных потребностей»⁹¹.

65. Однако 19 августа 2024 года официальный представитель НСОЮС опроверг это заявление⁹². НСОЮС подтвердили, что представители компании встречались с генеральным директором НСОЮС по закупкам лишь для общей оценки возможностей компании. В своем опровержении НСОЮС отметили, что «[они] все еще находятся под действием оружейного эмбарго», и предположили, что некоторые из предлагаемых к поставке автомобилей могут подпадать под оружейное эмбарго, которое было установлено резолюцией [2428 \(2018\)](#) Совета Безопасности и недавно продлено резолюцией [2731 \(2024\)](#). Ранее Группа уже сообщала, что в нарушение оружейного эмбарго были закуплены бронетранспортеры⁹³.

66. Хотя под действие оружейного эмбарго, установленного согласно пункту 4 резолюции [2428 \(2018\)](#) Совета Безопасности, подпадают «военные транспортные средства», в пункте 5 f) допускаются изъятия из этих мер при предварительном одобрении Комитетом. В пункте 2 резолюции [2683 \(2023\)](#) Совета, недавно подтвержденном пунктом 1 резолюции [2731 \(2024\)](#), также разрешается импорт «несмертоносного» военного имущества «исключительно в поддержку выполнения условий мирного соглашения» и без необходимости направления Комитету запроса или уведомления о предоставлении изъятий.

67. В своем конструктивном ответе на запрос Группы компания заявила, что она не обсуждала поставку каких-либо категорий автомобилей, подпадающих под действие оружейного эмбарго, и в любом случае «решила, что нам не следует проводить какие-либо дальнейшие обсуждения»⁹⁴.

С. Закупка оружия оппозиционными группами

68. Группа продолжает отслеживать усилия оппозиционных групп по закупке оружия в нарушение оружейного эмбарго. Такие усилия прилагали, в частности, Абрахам Чол Кич и Питер Биар Аджак (оба граждане Южного Судана), которые в марте 2024 года были обвинены в Соединенных Штатах во вступлении в сговор с целью приобрести оружие и в намерении спровоцировать переворот в Южном Судане⁹⁵. Предполагается, что эти два человека стремились приобрести ряд

⁹⁰ Беседы с двумя местными наблюдателями и сотрудником органов безопасности, октябрь 2024 года.

⁹¹ Публичные заявления компании, которые были позже пересмотрены или удалены и которые находятся в распоряжении Группы. Подтверждается также перепиской с компанией.

⁹² См. приложение 34.

⁹³ См. [S/2024/343](#), [S/2023/294](#) и [S/2022/359](#).

⁹⁴ Переписка Группы с компанией.

⁹⁵ См. [S/2024/343](#).

вооружений, включая переносные зенитные ракетные комплексы FIM-92 «Стингер»⁹⁶ и гранаты М-67⁹⁷, а также наводили справки о противотанковых системах FGM-148 Javelin. Согласно судебным документам⁹⁸, «обвиняемый неоднократно просил [...] получить ракетные системы «Стингер», чтобы выводить из строя южносуданские военные вертолеты. ... Кроме того, обвиняемый [заявил], что ему нужно противотанковое оружие для выведения из строя 13-15 танков, которые используются в Южном Судане». Эта информация показывает, что особую озабоченность вызывал бронетанковый и авиационный потенциал НСОЮС.

VI. Финансы и природные ресурсы

А. Продолжающиеся перебои с экспортом нефти

69. 25 сентября 2024 года министр финансов и планирования Южного Судана Мариал Донгрин Атер представил бюджет на 2024/25 финансовый год членам Переходной национальной законодательной ассамблеи Южного Судана⁹⁹. Министр отметил, что в феврале 2024 года произошел разрыв трубопровода, по которому в Порт-Судан (Судан) поставляется добываемая в стране сырая нефть сорта Dar Blend¹⁰⁰. В результате экспорт сырой нефти из Южного Судана сократился с примерно 150 000 до всего лишь 45 000 баррелей в сутки. Учитывая важность экспорта нефти для экономики страны, министр подчеркнул, что «продолжающиеся перебои с добычей и экспортом сырой нефти — это вопрос национальной безопасности»¹⁰¹.

70. 20 октября 2024 года делегация должностных лиц Южного Судана отправилась в Порт-Судан, чтобы встретиться с председателем Суверенного совета Судана Абделем Фаттахом аль-Бурханом и другими должностными лицами и обсудить усилия по ремонту трубопровода¹⁰². Суданские должностные лица сообщили прибывшей с визитом делегации Южного Судана, что была проведена необходимая подготовка к возобновлению экспорта южносуданской сырой нефти. Несколько экспертов подтвердили Группе, что ремонтно-технические работы, скорее всего, были завершены; при этом они отметили, что может потребоваться дополнительное время для полной промывки отремонтированного трубопровода и восстановления добычи в полном объеме на нефтяных месторождениях в штате Верхний Нил, где был распущен ряд субподрядчиков¹⁰³.

71. Однако более серьезное препятствие заключается в достижении политического соглашения о разделении доходов от возобновления экспорта нефти между сторонами конфликта в Судане¹⁰⁴. Из проведенных Группой бесед видно, что

⁹⁶ В частности, пять переносных зенитных ракетных комплексов.

⁹⁷ См. приложение 35.

⁹⁸ См. https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al_azdce-24-00394__0022.0.pdf.

⁹⁹ Выступление по бюджету на 2024/25 финансовый год, которое прозвучало 25 сентября 2024 года и текст которого имеется в распоряжении Группы. Бюджет был представлен с опозданием, поскольку 2024/25 финансовый год начался 1 июля 2024 года. По состоянию на октябрь 2024 года второе чтение бюджета еще не состоялось.

¹⁰⁰ См. S/2023/922 и S/2024/343.

¹⁰¹ Выступление по бюджету на 2024/25 финансовый год, которое прозвучало 25 сентября 2024 года и текст которого имеется в распоряжении Группы.

¹⁰² Заявление Канцелярии президента Южного Судана.

¹⁰³ Беседы с южносуданскими и суданскими должностными лицами и представителями нефтяной промышленности Южного Судана, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года. На момент составления настоящего доклада (октябрь 2024 года) экспорт не возобновился.

¹⁰⁴ См. S/2023/922.

Суданские вооруженные силы пытаются пересмотреть размер платы, которую Южный Судан должен платить за использование трубопровода и другой нефтяной инфраструктуры, а представители Сил быстрого реагирования также требуют свою долю в связи с возобновлением экспорта нефти¹⁰⁵.

72. На фоне продолжающихся перебоев с экспортом нефти из Южного Судана правительство вынуждено рассмотреть альтернативные маршруты экспорта, включая строительство нового трубопровода до Джибути¹⁰⁶. Кроме того, предприняты усилия по диверсификации доходной базы Южного Судана, причем золотодобыча, в частности, была обозначена в качестве приоритетной отрасли должностными лицами как из национальных, так и из местных органов власти¹⁰⁷.

В. Усиление соперничества за нефтяные доходы в Джубе

73. В условиях отсутствия возможности для экспорта нефти сорта Dar Blend усилилось соперничество за контроль над одним или двумя¹⁰⁸ грузами нефти сорта Nile Blend, которые правительство все еще может ежемесячно поставлять на рынок¹⁰⁹. Хотя для установления цены на нефтяные грузы используется официальный процесс торгов, сотрудники Канцелярии президента часто решают, какие компании в конечном счете получают груз¹¹⁰.

74. Доходы от грузов нефти сорта Nile Blend обычно направлялись на реализацию программы «Нефть для дорог», главным подрядчиком которой выступает компания, контролируемая одним из специальных посланников президента¹¹¹. Однако члены парламента и сотрудники ряда правительственных министерств Южного Судана настоятельно призвали приостановить эти платежи, направив их на выплату зарплат и покрытие других важнейших государственных расходов¹¹². Международные сырьевые трейдеры по-прежнему применяют порядок, при котором предоплата за будущие грузы сырой нефти осуществляется за несколько месяцев вперед¹¹³.

75. В то же время ряд южносуданских компаний получили контроль над грузами нефти и попытались их продать на рынке, а вырученные деньги оставить себе в качестве платы за предоставленные правительству товары и услуги¹¹⁴.

¹⁰⁵ Беседы с южносуданскими и суданскими должностными лицами и представителями нефтяной промышленности Южного Судана, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года. В бюджете Южного Судана на 2024/25 год предусматривается, что Судану будет выплачена сумма в размере около 52 млн долл. США.

¹⁰⁶ Беседы с правительственными чиновниками и представителями нефтяной отрасли, октябрь 2024 года. См. также Eye Radio, “Sudan makes preparations to export South Sudan crude oil”, 21 October 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Беседы с правительственными чиновниками и представителями гражданского общества. См. также Number One Citizen Daily, “Капоета gold rush: South Sudan’s silent trade that fuels inequality”, 7 September 2024.

¹⁰⁸ Груз сырой нефти составляет около 600 000 баррелей.

¹⁰⁹ Беседы с экспертами по нефтяной промышленности Южного Судана, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года.

¹¹⁰ Беседы с правительственными чиновниками и представителями частного сектора (подтверждено документами, изученными Группой), сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года.

¹¹¹ См. S/2024/343.

¹¹² Беседы с представителями частного сектора и гражданского общества, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года. См. также, например, Number One Citizen Daily, “MP proposes suspension of Oil for roads project fund”, 5 September 2024.

¹¹³ Беседы с экспертами по нефтяной промышленности Южного Судана, сентябрь и октябрь 2024 года.

¹¹⁴ Там же.

Хотя одна из таких компаний называет себя строительной, ею управляют два человека, которые ранее были связаны с компанией, содействовавшей импорту бронетранспортеров в Южный Судан¹¹⁵. Еще одной такой компанией руководит бывший исполнительный директор Канцелярии президента. Ни одна из этих компаний не фигурирует в списке утвержденных участников торгов для южно-суданской нефти, а один груз нефти, предоставленный второй из вышеупомянутых компаний, по этой причине был впоследствии отозван¹¹⁶.

76. В статье 4.8.1.10 мирного соглашения по Южному Судану и разделе 6.2 Закона об управлении нефтяными доходами предусматривается, что все платежи, связанные с нефтью, должны поступать на единый счет для нефтяных доходов и что покупателям не разрешается платить непосредственно частным компаниям за государственную нефть¹¹⁷.

77. Экономические последствия сокращения нефтяных доходов лишь частично отражены в бюджете Южного Судана на 2024/25 год¹¹⁸. В бюджете предполагается, что общие поступления правительства составят 2,6 трлн южносуданских фунтов, а общие расходы — 4,1 трлн южносуданских фунтов. Таким образом, если экспорт нефти не будет восстановлен в полном объеме, почти половина запланированных расходов так и не будет профинансирована. Более трети всего бюджета выделяется на выплату зарплат, включая погашение задолженности, причем около 70 процентов зарплат выплачивается в секторе безопасности. Кроме того, бюджет по-прежнему в значительной степени ориентирован на финансирование учреждений, где ведется работа по вопросам мирного процесса, а бюджет парламента почти в три раза превышает бюджет всего сектора здравоохранения¹¹⁹.

VII. Заключение

78. Руководители Южного Судана решают целый комплекс усиливающихся проблем. Одни из них вызваны собственными действиями, а другие — масштабными внешними потрясениями. Потребуется неослабная региональная и международная поддержка для обеспечения значимого прогресса в деле проведения реформ, необходимых как для восстановления доверия населения к своему правительству, так и для содействия усилиям по оказанию гуманитарной помощи и достижению устойчивого развития.

VIII. Рекомендации

79. Группа экспертов рекомендует Комитету Совета Безопасности, учрежденному резолюцией 2206 (2015) по Южному Судану, призвать правительство Южного Судана к следующему:

а) всячески содействовать оказанию гуманитарной помощи путем устранения бюрократических препятствий, предотвращения нападений на гуманитарных работников и их имущество и обеспечения беспрепятственного передвижения по всем регионам, в частности вдоль реки Нил;

¹¹⁵ См. S/2024/343 и приложение 36.

¹¹⁶ См. приложение 36.

¹¹⁷ См. также приложение 37.

¹¹⁸ Бюджет на 2024/25 финансовый год, представленный в парламенте 25 сентября 2024 года.

¹¹⁹ См. также приложение 38.

б) прилагать всяческие усилия для выделения всех необходимых ресурсов, чтобы завершить обучение и развертывание оставшихся необходимых объединенных сил, согласовать их командную структуру и предотвратить дальнейшее дезертирство в переходный период;

с) после возможного возобновления экспорта нефти сорта Dar Blend вновь регулярно публиковать маркетинговые доклады по нефти в соответствии с главой 9 Закона об управлении нефтяными доходами¹²⁰, а также другие бюджетные документы, включая ежеквартальные отчеты о расходах.

80. Группа экспертов рекомендует Комитету призвать правительство Уганды использовать процедуры предоставления изъятий, изложенные в резолюциях [2206 \(2015\)](#) и [2428 \(2018\)](#) Совета Безопасности и недавно продленные резолюцией [2731 \(2024\)](#), как при рассмотрении вопроса о поставке смертоносного военного имущества на территорию Южного Судана, так и при облегчении поездок для лиц, которые подпадают под действие ограничительных мер, установленных согласно этим резолюциям.

81. Группа экспертов рекомендует Комитету рассмотреть возможность разработки памятки по вопросам осуществления оружейного эмбарго, в которой содержалась бы дополнительная информация, в том числе в интересах правительства Южного Судана и потенциальных поставщиков, о термине «несмертоносное военное имущество» и формулировке «исключительно в поддержку выполнения условий мирного соглашения», особенно в отношении транспортных средств, используемых военными и полицейскими.

¹²⁰ См. приложение 37.

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Annex 1: List of abbreviations

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NASU	National Salvation United Forces
NSS	National Security Service
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

Annex 2: Partial data on flood-related impacts

The following is representative data of the impact of flooding. It does not capture the full extent of the impacts.

Reported displacement:¹²¹

- About 271,000 displaced by floods across South Sudan as of mid-October
- Jonglei – Tens of thousands reported displaced in Pochalla, Ayod, Twic East, Uror, Fangak in September
- Northern Bahr el Ghazal – almost 155,000 people impacted across four counties in September
- More than 6,000 flood-displaced households identified in Unity state in September
- In parts of Upper Nile, figures of flood and conflict displaced people revised to nearly 20,000 in September

Impact on schools:

- 127 schools reported damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024¹²²
- In Unity, 65 schools submerged due to floods, affecting 20,214 students¹²³

Impact on health facilities:

- 29 health facilities damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024¹²⁴
- 58 health facilities submerged in five counties, and nearly 90 others inaccessible¹²⁵

Impact on water points:

- 103 water points rendered unusable in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024¹²⁶

Impact on agriculture and farmlands:

- 53,100 farmers and cattle keepers lost crops and livestock in September¹²⁷
- In Mayendit County, Unity State, about 4,275 hectares of farmland submerged as of mid-September¹²⁸
- In Jur River in Western Bahr el Ghazal, more than 150,000 acres of farmland were destroyed¹²⁹

¹²¹ UN OCHA, South Sudan: Floods Snapshot (as of 18 October 2024), available from: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-floods-snapshot-18-october-2024> and UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 4 (As of 18 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-4-18-september-2024>

¹²⁴ UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

¹²⁵ WHO, Severe flooding compounds health crisis in South Sudan, 21 October 2024: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/severe-flooding-compounds-health-crisis-south-sudan>

¹²⁶ UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 3 (as of 12 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-3-12-september-2024>

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Annex 3: Images of flooding at Bentiu IDP camp and Rubkona airfield





Image depicts the airstrip in Rubkona, the UNMISS Internally Displaced Persons camp, and the UNMISS base, all in Unity State, surrounded by water. Image date 28 October 2024.

Source: Planet Labs PBC

Annex 4: Press statement on waterway dredging, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 8 June 2022




screening of the project sites there after develop TORs for the conduct of the ESIA and any relevant studies. Following the development of the TORs, a tender for the conduct of the ESIA will be advertised and Environmental Firms or Individual consultants will bid and those vetted and deemed qualified by the ministry will be awarded the contracts to conduct the assessments and studies. They will then submit their reports to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry for review and endorsement. If the report(s) concludes that the projects have no, minimal or severe environmental or social impacts, with recommended mitigation measures in place, then a letter of no Objection will be issued and the project will commence.


Therefore since the above process has not commenced, any dredging of the rivers is illegal.

On the resumption of the Jonglei Canal to drain the Sudd Wetland to mitigate floods, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry will not approve the resumption or completion of the Canal because of the Ecosystems services that Sudd provides to our nation, the region and the world.

Finally rest assured that such projects are not the remit of a single ministry and that's why as a cross-cutting ministry with the mandate of protecting and conserving our environment, no project with such a magnitude without the clearance of the ministry is to be implemented.




Annex 5: Image of waterways in Unity State




Source: Planet Labs PBC. Image date 28 October 2024

Partial river clearing operations were conducted downstream (north) on the Bahr el Ghazal River, which flows past Bentiu town in Unity State. However, the accumulation of vegetation upstream, near the low-lying bridge, has blocked water flow into the dredged sections of the river.

Annex 6: Republican orders reshuffling senior SSPDF command positions, October 2024







REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
The President

RSS/RO/J/13/2024

7th October 2024

**TRANSFER OF AN OFFICER FROM THE TIGER DIVISION OF THE
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) TO THE
GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS OF THE SSPDF.**

Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 27(1) of the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act, 2009, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF do hereby **Transfer Maj. Gen. Lual Wek Guem Maroldit from being the Commander of Tiger Division of the SSPDF to the General Head Quarters of the SSPDF.**

Signed under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba, this Seventh Day of the Month of October in the Year 2024.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to be 'K. Kiir', is written over a faint circular outline.

**Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President,
Commander -In- Chief of the SSPDF,
Republic of South Sudan,
Juba.**

SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCES FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL AND FINANCE

10th October, 2024,

FROM: A/CDF FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL & FINANCE
TO: ALL UNITS
RPT: DIRECTOR FOR OFFICERS AFFAIRS
RPT: GROUND FORCE COMMANDER

INFO: ALL A/CDFS
INFO: CMI
INFO: IG
INFO: D/CDF
INFO: CDF

REFERENCE TO THE REPUBLICAN ORDER NO, RSS/RO/J/13/2024 AND
RSS/RO/J/14/2024 FOR THE RESHUFFLING DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER OF TWO
OFFICERS WITHIN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLES DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) AS HERE
UNDER AND IT HAS COME INTO FORCE WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

1. MAJ. GEN LUAL WEK GUEM TRANSFER FROM TIGER DIVISION TO 1ST
INFANTRY DIVISION AS COMMANDER
2. MAJ. GEN "PSC" ABRAHAM GUM MAKUAC TRANSFER FROM 1ST
INFANTRY DIVISION TO TIGER DIVISION AS COMMANDER.

THEREFORE, THE TWO ABOVE MENTIONED SENIOR OFFICERS ARE DIRECTED TO
EXECUTED THIS ORDER ACCORDINGLY TO HANDOVER AND TAKEOVER
IMMEDIATELY.

I CONGRATULATES, THEM AND BEST WISH ON THEIR NEW RESPECTIVE
OBLIGATION:

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

FOR *[Signature]*

LT. GEN MALUAL MAJOK CIENGKUACH JOK
A/CDF FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL & FINANCE

CC: FILE

[Circular Stamp: OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCES FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL AND FINANCE, SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, Juba, Nuba. 10 OCT 2024]

[Handwritten: 10/10/2024, ALL UNITS]

Office of Assistant Chief of Defence Forces for Administration, Personnel and Finance
South Sudan People's Defence Forces, General Headquarters- Juba, Nuba

**Annex 7: Statement by former Director General of the Internal Security Bureau,
10 October 2024**

10th October, 2024

**Subject: Letter of Appreciation to H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President and C-In-C of SSPDF and all other Organized Forces,
Republic of South Sudan**

First and foremost, I would like to appreciate H.E. the President for the opportunity and the trust he bestowed upon me during my thirteen (13) years of service as the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB).

Your Excellency, it was an honour to serve under your Comradeship in one of the most sensitive and important institutions in the country. It was through your guidance and directives, that I was able to deliver and achieve some of the assigned tasks within the Service. I have cherished every moment of it.

Secondly, H.E. the President is a mentor and one of the role models who, without his unwavering support, I would not have succeeded in the Service during my tenure.

Despite my little disappointment following my recent appointment to the Gubernatorial position as Governor of Warrap State, its subsequent revocation and the ensuing rumours flying around, I want to assure the public that I am one of those cadres trained, tested, committed and loyal to the Revolution. I will never deviate from the line of the Revolution. One of the basic principles of the cadres of the Revolution is that a cadre is the first to attack and the last to withdraw. We are still at the phase of being attacked as a Revolution and therefore I will be the last to withdraw.

Lastly, allow me to reiterate to your top echelon, my sincere gratitude and steadfastness in supporting your able leadership.

Kind Regards,

 10/10/2024

Gen. Akol Koor Kuc,

Former DG of ISB and also Former Governor-Designate of Warrap State

Annex 8: Partial list of known defections from the National Salvation Front (NAS)

In May 2023, operational commander John Latio Kenyi Loburong defected from NAS to government.

In February 2024, Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong defected to government.

In May 2024, nine commissioned and non-commissioned NAS officers defected and joined the SSPDF in Yei.¹³⁰

In August 2024, forces under the command of former NAS zonal commander, Emmanuel Salah Juma, deployed under the command of the SSPDF to Dollo Payam in Central Equatoria.¹³¹

On 9 September, Asiki Samson, a former SPLA-IO and SSNMC commander who later joined NAS, split from NAS and offered to join the SSPDF in Morobo in southern Central Equatoria.¹³²

¹³⁰ Reports from field observers in Yei, obtained by the Panel. May 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, NAS officers denounce rebellion, 7 May 2024:

<https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/05/07/nas-officers-denounce-rebellion/>

¹³¹ Field report by international monitors, obtained by the Panel, August 2024. See also, South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 1,500 NAS soldiers join SSPDF in Kudra, Central Equatoria, 17 August 2024:


https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view_clip_email/779593/56/0

¹³² Reports from local observers, September 2024. Interview with Thomas Cirillo, October 2024.

See also, No. 1 Citizen, Morobo receives NAS defectors, 25 September 2024:

<https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/09/25/morobo-receives-nas-defectors/>

Annex 9: Parliamentary summons letter, 29 May 2024



For the purpose of this meeting, the following TNLA's specialized Committees and representatives of relevant institutions and Mechanisms shall be invited:

1. Public Accounts Committee (PAC), (four members)
2. Finance and Planning Committee (FPC), (Four members)
3. Governance Assurance, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (GAME), (four members)
4. National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC), (two Members)
5. National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), (two members)
6. Judicial Reform Committee (JRC), (two members)


The meeting shall take place on:

Date: Monday, 3rd June, 2024

Time: 3:00 Pm

Venue: TNLA's Blue Room

Best Regards



Rt. Hon Oyet Nathaniel Pierino
First Deputy Speaker
TNLA/RSS/Juba



Cc: Rt. Hon Speaker
Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Administration and Finance
Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Welfare
Cc: Clerk
Cc: Legal Advisor
Cc: NCRC, NCAC, JRC ✓
CC: TNLA's PAC, GAME, Finance and Planning.
Cc: File

Annex 10: Summary Report on the payment of \$10 million to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 6 June 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY First Deputy Speaker

Date: 6th June 2024

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE TNLA LEADERSHIP WITH THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CABINET AFFAIRS AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF SOUTH SUDAN ON THE PAYMENT OF USD 10,000,000 (SSP: 15,322,939,000) TO THE MINISTRY OF CABINET AFFAIRS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIORITY PROVISION OF THE R-ARCSS AND THE ROADMAP SPECIAL PROJECTS

INTRODUCTION

1. The TNLA received petition from the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms in late April 2024 regarding controversial payments of USD 10,000,000 allocated to NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc.
2. The TNLA made consultations with relevant institutions including the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Bank of South Sudan etc on the credibility of the petition and the report of payments.
3. The TNLA obtained a letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject: "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects".
4. The letter from the Ministry of Finance and Planning indicated that the fund in question was to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Special Projects of the Roadmap. Attached to the letter was a document of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs outlining allocations to the following beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms:



Page 1 of 5

Email: nla1stdeputyspeaker@gmail.com | Telephone: +211 (0) 920 085 551

S/No	Institutions	Total amount in USD	Total amount in SSP
1.	National Constitutional Amendment Committee	1,871,340	1,871,340,000
2.	Constitutional Making Process (10% the of budget)	3,583,887.73	3,583,887,725
3.	National Human Right Council	1,052,000	1,052,000,000
4.	Judicial Reform Committee	999,380	999,380,000
5.	2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears	1,000,000	1,000,000,000
6.	Popularization of the Agreement on the Roadmap (R-ARCSS)	945,871.57	945,871,575

AUTHORITY AND MANDATE

5. Pursuant to TCRSS, 2011 (as amended), Article 82 (1) (3), and the TNLA Conduct of Business Regulations, 2011 (Amended 2021), Regulations; 8(1)(c)(d), 133, 134 & 135, the TNLA leadership involving relevant Specialized Committees of Public Accounts (PAC), Finance and Economic Planning, Government Assurances, Monitoring and Evaluation (GAME) convened a meeting on 29th May 2024 and summoned the Ministers of Cabinet Affairs, Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan to clarify and resolved the matter of payments to the relevant institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanism; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. The representatives of these beneficiary Institutions and mechanisms were also invited.

FINDINGS

The outcome of the meeting of the First Summon which was attended by the Ministers of Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, representatives of the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC, and the Second Summon for the Minister of Cabinet affairs which was attended also by representatives of the aforementioned beneficiary institutions and the Minister of Cabinet Affairs were as follows:

- 1) **Confirmation** by the Ministry of Finance and Planning of the letter of the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
- 2) **Confirmation** by the Bank of South Sudan of receipt of the letter from the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to the Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects' SSP Account (General Secretariat) 00269122001036.
- 3) **Confirmation** that, on the 8th April 2024, an equivalent of SSP 15,322,939,000 was deposited in SSP Account No. 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939
- 4) **Confirmation that** on 16th April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-

Page 2 of 5



- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.2423
- 5) **Confirmation that** on 23rd April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.5358
 - 6) **Confirmation that** on 13th May 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 to transfer the amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No. 00269121269233
 - 7) **Confirmation that** from date 13th – 31st May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawals) occurred on the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs- Special Project Account totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83
 - 8) **Confirmation that** as of 31st May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account-00269121269233 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02, roughly equivalent to USD 5,627,281.95
 - 9) **The Minister of Cabinet Affairs stated that:**
 - a. An equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000 was paid to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Accounts on 8th April 2024.
 - b. The purpose of the fund was for the facilitation of the activities of NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. outlined in the document attached to the payment request Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject; "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
 - c. Payments (withdrawals) from the Account Number 00269122001036, done on dates 16th and 23rd April 2024 were made for the following additional projects that **were not** included in the attached documents in (b) above:
 - a) NAS peace implementation (USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.2423)
 - b) Phase II of Security Arrangement under the office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security, Hon. Tut Gatluak Manime (USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.5358)
 - c) The unspecified amount of payment for the **9BR** Special projects
 - d) The Minister of Cabinet Affairs denied knowledge of the several transactions (withdrawals) that occurred on the Account 00269121269233, between dates 13th - 31st May 2024, totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
 - d. The attached document to the payment request of 2nd April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet communicated to the Ministry of Finance.
 - e. Finally, the Minister confirmed the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Account No. 00269121269233 was SSP 8,879,850,921.02



- 10) **The TNLA observes** that, the fund in question meant to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Roadmap special projects was first deposited in the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-00269122001036 instead of the Ministry's Account 00269212279231 as per the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 2nd April 2024. However TNLA cannot fault the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs since currency was changed from USD to SSP.
- 11) **The TNLA also observes** that, two transactions (withdrawals) were carried out by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs on the fund, under the Account- 00269122001036 on date 16th April 2024 and 23rd April 2024.
- 12) **The TNLA further observes** that, the balance of the fund SSP 10,460,570,724.85 was then moved from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Account (General Secretariat)-00269122001036 to the Ministry's Account for Special Projects SSP Account 00269121269233. The fund was already less by at least SSP 4,862,368,276.
- 13) **The TNLA is concerned** of the following:
- Despite the fund amounting to **USD 10,000,000** in its equivalent in **SSP 15,322,939,000** was transferred to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Account on 8th April 2024 and was to be paid to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc, some of these institutions and mechanisms were either partially paid their money or not at all.
 - The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs introduced payments for additional projects namely; NAS, High Level Committee (Office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security) and the **9BR** Special Projects against the funds meant for NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC, Popularization of the R-ARCSS Roadmap and payment of 2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears and these payments were done in full and as a matter of priority.
 - The Payments in (b) above has deviated from the purpose for which the fund was requested and paid by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in their letter dated 2nd April 2024, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1 contravening the Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011
 - The attached document to the payment request of 2nd April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs communicated to the Ministry of Finance has total amount approximated USD 17,000,000 of which payments approximated USD 8,000,000 was expected from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. In light of this discrepancies of total amounts on documents not consistent with total amount of SSP: 15,322,939,000 requested and paid, therefore, the new claims of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs could not have been approved and authorized for payment by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
 - The changes claimed by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs on the attached document to the payment request of 2nd April 2024 which reduced payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. was done without the resolution of the Council of Ministers hence this was unilateral and personal discretion of the Minister of Cabinet Affairs.



- f) In light of the above transactions (withdrawals), there is prima facie case of misappropriation of funds SSP: 15,322,939,000 (USD 10,000,000, @ bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939)

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

In light of the above facts, the TNLA hereby directs the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs as follows:

1. To pay in full, all allocations due to the beneficiary institutions and peace implementation mechanisms as requested by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and paid by the Ministry of Finance.
2. To pay without further delay allocations due to the beneficiary institutions; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC etc.
3. Adhere to the principles of Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011 including ensuring no diversion/misappropriation of funds once approved and paid to the spending agencies by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
4. The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs has no authority to unilaterally divert funds meant for the aforementioned institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms as this contravenes Financial Regulations and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011
5. Decisions to allocate and pay funds to the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms was taken in the Council of Ministers meeting, the TNLA expects any change in the payment affecting the amount due the institutions and Mechanisms should be by a resolution of the Council of Ministers' meeting.
6. The Ministry of Finance and Planning to pay directly every spending agency through official Account rather than through a third party Institution. This shall ensure proper auditing and accountability by spending agencies as per the Constitution and the relevant laws.

Sign.....

Rt. Hon Oyot Nathaniel Pierne
First Deputy Speaker
TNLA/RSS/Juba



Annex 11: Talking points for Deputy Speaker of Parliament, 3 May 2024

03-May-2024

Talking Points

The Ministry of Finance and Planning has done an allocation of USD: 30,000,000.00 to some relevant institutions and Mechanisms as directed by them. The equivalent was allocated in SSP as of which the Ministry of Cabinet received an amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 in equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00

1. On the 02nd April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received Authorization Letter from the Ministry of Finance & Planning to Deposit the amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 to the SSP Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036.
2. On the 8th April 2024, an equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00 was deposited in SSP Account No: 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the Bank buying rate of SSP/USD: 1532.2939.
3. On 16th April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 1,050,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415.00 - (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank Official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.2423
4. On 23rd April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 2,000,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600.00- (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.5358
5. On 13th May 2024., the Bank of South Sudan received another Authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 to transfer the Amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No:00269121269233.
6. From date 13th - 31st May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawal) occurred at the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs – Special Project Account Totalling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
7. As of 31st May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs A/C No: 00269121269233 is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02

Kind Regards

Annex 12: Authorization of transfer of \$10 million toward 'Special Projects' under Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 2 April 2024

REF: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1.

Date: April 2, 2024

Hon. Governor,
Bank of South Sudan
RSS-Juba

Subject: Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from account number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects

Dear Hon. Governor,

Reference to the above mentioned subject, we write to authorize the Bank of South Sudan to transfer the sum of USD 10,000,000 (Only Ten Million United States Dollar) from account 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects account below. Being funds required to facilitate the implementation the priority provisions and special projects.

Account Name: Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects
Bank Name: Bank of South Sudan
Account Number: 00269212279231

Please accept the assurances of our highest regards.



Malual Tap Dieu
1st Undersecretary of Finance




Dhef Mayuol Tong
Director General of Accounts

Cc: Hon. Minister of Finance & Planning
Cc: Hon. Deputy Minister of Finance & Planning
Cc: Director of Expenditure
Cc: File.

Annex 13: John Latio Kenyi Loburong's defection, 14 May 2023



Chief of the SSPDF and all other Organized Forces, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Secretary General of High-Level Standing Committee for the implementation of the revitalized Agreement as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor.

5. Appoint Honourable Kawunda John Mogga as the NAS Chief negotiator and the Team Leader of the negotiations with the membership of the following:

- (i) Major General Pitiya Yoane Suma. CDR Amadi and Dollo Area Command.
- (ii) Brigadier General Kasbash John Darius-Secretary and CDR for Office Affairs and Dem Records.
- (iii) Brigadier General Bingo Apolo Valentino-Commissioner Wonduruba Payam.
- (iv) Brigadier General Alex Lomeling Martin. Coordinator and Finance Officer, Aru, Uganda.


6. Direct all NAS forces to allow unhindered and safe return of refugees from the neighbouring countries, and the internally displaced, to their areas of origin in order for them to engage in livelihood activities to alleviate hunger and poverty without any disturbance.

Issued under my hand and Seal of NAS today the 14th / 05 / 2024 in the NAS Headquarters.



Signed _____
General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Annex 14: Roadmap of negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and the Government of South Sudan



1. Introduction

General John Kenyi Latio, commonly known as Kenyi Lo-Burong, of NAS has taken a courageous decision opening talks directly with General Salva Kiir Mayardit, The President of the Republic of South Sudan. The decision came after several months of thought and consultation with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga in the United States of America, both of whom hail from the same constituency.

These thoughts and consultation focused on the untold suffering of the citizens in the war thorn areas specially and South Sudan in general. As a result General Kenyi Loburong and his brothers decided to have dialogue which triggered the government to send a delegation to meet with the delegation of General Kenyi Lo-burong, in Nairobi, Kenya. The objective is to understand the reasons which led to rebellion of General Kenyi Lo-Burong and his forces, their grievances and how to achieve genuine peace.

2. Background to the conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the National Salvation Front (NAS).

- 2.1 The current Government-NAS conflict has its roots as early as the 1960s. Everyone knows that the Any-anya-1 war was started by elders and leaders of Equatoria region and especially Poculum heroes like Aggrey Jaden and many others. Most of our elders and leaders joined the Any-anya-1 rebellion and continued struggling until the Addis Ababa agreement was signed of 1972. Thereafter, our people were side-lined and the movement was high jacked by Maulana Abel Allier and General Joseph Lagu Yanga and other Political Parties and Allies. As a result, most of the founders of the Any-anya-1 Movement found themselves out of the military and the government of the then Southern Sudan all together.
- 2.2 This political manipulation which occurred during the integration of the Any-anya-1 Forces was intended to marginalize those who fight and instead dominate the system by others with no compensation done to the war affected areas and to the fighters. A good number of the fighters were recruited as road laborers and forest guards and the heroes were not recognised up to now, especially a leader like Aggrey Jaden Wani.
- 2.3 It was thought that the Arab Policy of divide and rule applied on the leaders of the then Government of South Sudan. But, history repeated itself again as everyone knows that during the SPLA/M struggle, able Men, Women and Youth of the Pöjulu people and other Communities of Greater Equatoria joined only to be mistreated in the movement.



2.4 Our people stood firm by supporting the movement physically, politically and military making the SPLA/M strong enough and was able to control most of the areas till it gained independence of South Sudan. The Independence of South Sudan created hope the all our people will enjoy the fruits of the struggle. But to our surprise, the contrary became true and the situation became worse than during the Arab regime. The people of greater Equatoria, especially the Pöjulu who are known to be strong and brave politically and military, were purposely marginalized as follows:

- (i) Most of our leaders who were leading the movement were undeployed, side-lined demoted, targeted, manhandled and eliminated by the same SPLM/A system which they fought for and supported wholeheartedly. The intention was to reduce their strength, demoralize and frustrate them so that they do not participate in the governance of the independent South Sudan which they died for.
- (ii) Our brave men who were in the struggle were then not considered during the integration into the military and the government in the eve of the CPA-2005 simply because they were from certain ethnic background. Most of them were said be unfit, no unit and were stripped off their ranks just to demoralize them in order to abundant military. This was done in mile-55 by late General Salva Mathok-gendit and as a result most of them find their ways to their villages.
- (iii) Those who survived the process were intentionally deployed to the far end of South Sudan like Upper Nile, Unity and Bahr-el-Ghazal areas with their departure orders verbally stated as 'mission of no return'. Indeed, three quarters of them, if not all, died. Their orphans and widows are undergoing untold sufferings, left to be taken over by their colleagues.
- (iv) General Kenyi lo-Burong who was a roaring lion and great fighter controlling Central Equatorial, especially Greater Juba and most parts of Yei, remained unpromoted. Yet, even Former President Bashir knew him very well. Despite all of that, he did not give up and continued to sacrifice himself for the shake of the struggle of the people of South Sudan for independence.
- (v) General Kenyi lo-Burong was later promoted to the rank of 2nd Lt by General Abu John when he was the Governor of Equatoria. He felt unrecognised and discouraged and went to his village. Later, General Ladu Gore convinced him to return and promoted him to the rank of colonel and made him in charge of his forces in Luri. He was attacked in Luri and in his residence in Hai-Tarawa in Juba. Even then, he was captured and then



taken to prison in Yei where he spent years and again demoted to the rank of 1st Lt and deployed to Mogiri.

- (vi) Again, he was transferred and deployed to Police, where he was demoted to the rank of warrant officer. All these grievances forced him and those who went through the same treatment to demand justice, equality and freedom through the barrel of gun. So, when Dr. Riek Machar rebelled most of us joined his rebellion with the hope of getting their rights and liberating ourselves from the bad ideology of mischief, marginalization and domination by our fellow countrymen.
 - (vii) In SPLA-IO the same tactics of mischief, marginalization and domination by fellow South Sudanese was even worse. Killing, nepotism, tribalism and disregard of our military commanders by the entire leadership of the SPLM/A-IO was rampant. Logistics were only supplied to Upper Nile and hence Equatorians were left helpless struggling to arm ourselves. They carried assassinations attempts some of which succeeded and that angered us to have our own movement.
 - (viii) In view of the SPLM/A-IO treatment, General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to form his own movement, which he deliberating decided not to disclose its name or declare its commencement. When suddenly General Thomas Cirillo Swaka rebelled and declared his movement on 6th March, 2017, he immediately engaged General Kenyi Lo-Burong to be the military wing of his movement, the National Salvation Front (NAS). It was not until 28th July, 2017, when General Kenyi Lo-Burong, who had already decided to form his own movement, accepted and announced joining NAS as the military wing.
 - (ix) Unfortunate, General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, who joined us in the bush has a hidden agenda and was not sincere to General Kenyi Lo-Burong. We discovered that he has no sincere political agenda for the welfare of the people of South Sudan and our own concerns. He clearly displays tribalism, nepotism and no care for the issues of the movement.
- 2.5 Therefore, General Kenyi Lo-Burong has taken the decision for genuine and wholistic peace in South Sudan by engaging in direct peace talks with President Salva Kiir Mayardit who he respects as a true SPLM/A separatist leader. It has become clear that there is no future in tribalism, nepotism and marginalization of a people in their own country.
- (ii) General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to join our brothers in good heart for peace so that so we together can give a massive support to our President and our elder Dr. Martin



J. K. L.

Elia Lomuro in a move to open a new chapter of peace, reconciliation and development in our country instead of following leaders who are selfish and continue to cause destruction in the country.

- (ii) If general Thomas want to continue with war, he should form his own force but not using us as his tools to achieve his own selfish intension of wanting to gain big position in the government because we are tired of this game. In this regard we hope the government will negotiate with us in good faith so that we create a very strong alliance to defeat Dr. Riek Machar in the upcoming contested general election, in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit.

2.6 You have all witnessed the destruction of properties, loss of lives, displacement of people and the suffering of the civil population in the war affected areas. All these requires social services to be fixed in the country. What does this call for? That calls for honest and genuine peace and security so that the government can speed up the process of reconciliation and development. Hence, for genuine peace and security the NAS under the leadership of the General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand the following:

- (i) Cessation of hostilities, ceasefire, separation and demonization of forces in their areas of control.
- (ii) Integration of our forces into all the Security Sectors i.e., SSPDF, National Security and other Organized Forces. The NAS, under General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand for the confirmation of all ranks of its forces without compromise.
- (iii) The process of integration, disarmament, demotion and demobilization should be handled in a dignified manner to avoid internal dispute between different forces which will be integrated together as one national force.
- (iv) Most importantly, guarantee for the safety of our leadership and forces before, during and after the negotiation period in the town of negotiations to avoid the unnecessary danger.
- (v) Although the peace talks are direct between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and General Kenyi Lo-Burong, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomurō as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor on the side of the government and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga on the NAS side, we demand the Government of Uganda to be the over-all witness and guarantor as it is in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.



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- (i) Based on our experience, we demand that our forces be integrated, trained and deployed in areas under NAS control until the end of the election period so that we support the democratic elections to defend our interest as well as the interest of the government in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit to defeat the SPLM/A-IO leader Dr. Riek Machar Teny.
- (ii) SPLA-IO battalion under the command of General John Mabie Gar should be relocated from Morobo county, Panyuone Payam, because they are committing atrocities against the civilian population in those areas. They continue to loot civilian properties, murder, violently rape women and girls, and occupying civilian homes and social amenities causing displacement of inhabitants of the area to the refugees' camp, scaring returnees and inflicting more suffering to the civilians
- (iii) All deployed SSPDF forces in civilian populated areas and social amenities should be redeployed to their previous designated military garrisons to pave way for returnees and displace persons to come back and secondly for our forces to have free movement in the process of assembling such that they are able to prepare themselves early enough to participate in upcoming general election.
- (iv) The areas are as follows: In Yei County they are Morsak, kejiko, Ombasi, Goja and Tokori. In Lainya County they are Kon-kat, Rejongu, America Ansarat and Mongiling. In Morobo county they are Bura, Panyana, Udabi and other parts of Kaju-keji. Also, Mundari, Amadi, Maridi and parts of eastern Juba County.
- (v) Any confiscated property of those who rebelled and those who ran to the refugee's camp should be returned back to their owners without hindrance. This is a very vital step towards reconciliation and healing so that all will gain trust and believe in a meaningful agreement.
- (vi) Representation of NAS political Cadres in all levels of the government: National, State and County levels in order to work for federalism as a means of permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan.
- (vii) Destroyed and targeted business men with fear of losing their lives and freedom of movement should be compensated and those who currently reside outside the country whose licenses were confiscated be returned to them so that they start business afresh in secure environment without any interference.



J. K. L.

- (viii) Government should evacuate **Mundari** and **Dinka Bor** cattle herder in Central Equatorial and take them back to their place to allow quick return of the refugees and displaced persons who are purely farmer to start cultivation in a peaceful environment.
- (ix) We demand the Government to reconsider Wonduruba as a county of its own in order to avoid further political dispute between the citizens of Lainya County and the Bari Community. Rokon should also be given a county of its own so that no one is not kept hostage by others in the so call Juba County because they are all equal citizens of South Sudan. They also deserve the same right like any other citizen of South Sudan so that everybody enjoy equal rights.
- (x) For the duration of the peace talks, the leadership of the NAS should be given the responsibility for their logistics to avoid the challenges being encountered by the current process of cantonment, training and deployment of the R-ARCSS forces.
- (xi) Our fallen comrades who fought tirelessly during the two civil wars deserves to be recognized and honored by including their names in historical statutes, such as Schools, Roads and other monuments, structures and Institutions in consultations with the Pojulu Community leadership.
- (xii) We demand that the Government of South Sudan build a mausoleum in the name of Pojulu people. Further, we demand upgrading of the historic Loka Secondary School into a University and the promised Dr. Samson Kwaje memorial agriculture institute be constructed in a memory of Aggrey Jaden, Dr Samson Kwaje Lukare and my other fallen heroes in Pojulu land.
- (xiii) The President through the Ministry of Humanitarian Affair and SSRRC should bring more Non-governmental Organisations, National NGOs and other organizations to provide services and other life support assistance to the war affected areas including destroyed social amenities. The Government should grant special sponsorship and scholarship for the benefit of those whose education was interrupted by the conflict.
- (xiv) In this regard, the President, through Dr. Marin Elia Lomurö who is our only trustworthy elder, should believe that we shall remain loyal to him and support him for permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan and make sure he becomes more powerful.



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
- (xv) The NAS under the leadership of General Kenyi Lo-burong submit these demands for negotiations in good faith and in the spirit of peace. May God bless our President, our country the Republic of South Sudan and our people



General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)
Chairman and Commander-in-chief

Cc

- President Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and SG of the HLSC for R-ARCSS implementation.
- Honourable Kawunda John Mogga-NAS Chief Negotiator and Team Leader.
- File

Annex 15: Negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and President Salva Kiir, 19 May 2023

basis of the roadmap you sent him. As soon as you make the declaration, as per the copy attached to the roadmap, negotiation will commence.

Further, His Excellency the President has appointed Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, as the Mediator and Guarantor for the peace negotiations between him and you. In due course, a team will be set-up to assist Dr. Lomurö with the negotiation process.

To this end General Kenyi-Loburong, please accept the gratitude of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and of the entire Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for accepting peace and joining the R-TGoNU. We look forward to seeing you and your forces amidst our national security sector and government. Again, thank you for accepting peace and please accept the assurance of our highest consideration.

Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin
Minister for Presidential Affairs,
R-TGoNU, The Republic of South Sudan.

Cc:

- **Salva Kiir Mayardit**-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- **Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö**-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.
- **Bishop Elias Taban**, The Bishop of Presbyterian Church of South Sudan

Annex 16: Partial Integration List of Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong’s forces into the SSPDF, 2 February 2024




REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
The President

RSS/RD/J/33/2024 **2nd February 2024**

INTEGRATION OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF FORMER NAS SOLDIERS FROM LAINYA COUNTY OF CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE, INTO VARIOUS RANKS IN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE’S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF).

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act, 2009 (Amendment) Act, 2022, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF, do hereby integrate and Commission **Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of Former NAS Soldiers from Lainya County of Central Equatoria State, Into Various Ranks in the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF)** as hereunder:

S/NO	Rank	Name in Full
1.	Brigadier	Kenned Kenyi Abdu Lopiong
2.	Lt. Colonel	Peter Jima Oliver Loboton
3.	Lt. Colonel	Peter Lomoro Lotigo Kurispino
4.	Lt. Colonel	Kabash John Dario
5.	Major	Charles Wani Michael
6.	1 st Lieutenant	James Lusuku John Lokule
7.	1 st Lieutenant	Joseph Liwa Ely Duku

The President 

8.	1 st Lieutenant	Kenyl John Martin
9.	1 st Lieutenant	Moses Hakim Pasquale
10.	1 st Lieutenant	Charles Nicola Julu
11.	2 nd Lieutenant	Isaac Malish Confucius Luote
12.	2 nd Lieutenant	Cosmos Alakai Live Martin
13.	2 nd Lieutenant	Gatwech Guol Garang Long
14.	2 nd Lieutenant	Charles Lubanga Paskal Lowate
15.	2 nd Lieutenant	John Salimba Emmanuel
16.	2 nd Lieutenant	Angelo Lemi Bullen
17.	2 nd Lieutenant	James Kenyl Joseph
18.	2 nd Lieutenant	Kuch Abut Maker Madoldit
19.	2 nd Lieutenant	Atem Malong Atem Maluk
20.	R/SM	Peter Lubang Charles
21.	R/SM	Robert Bida Martin Wani
22.	R/SM	Both Nyang Deng Padiet
23.	R/SM	Dominic Bittenson Lawyer
24.	R/SM	Sallah Isaac Mick
25.	R/SM	Kenyl John Emmanuel
26.	R/SM	Stephen Wujugu Stanley
27.	R/SM	John Luka Samuel
28.	R/SM	Charles Lujang Mathew
29.	S/M	Morris Malesh Lora Sebit
30.	S/M	Peter Data Justin Davis


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The President

54.	Pvt	James Yap Diet Yuot
55.	Pvt	Justin Bidai Alex
56.	Pvt	David Loputu Lizira
57.	Pvt	David Lado Jacob
58.	Pvt	Samuel Lokudu Gore
59.	Pvt	Essien Oliver Taban
60.	Pvt	Lomoro Wilson Steven
61.	Pvt	Denis Bidai Steven
62.	Pvt	Emmanuel Lukudu James

Issued under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba,
this Second-Day of the Month of February in the Year 2024.


Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President,
Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF,
Republic of South Sudan,
Juba.

4
The President

Annex 17: Press statement by the Central Equatoria State Government, 10 October 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION



OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

For immediate ReleaseOctober 10, 2024

Press Statement on the Tragic Massacre of Youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq).

On October 09, 2024 the Government of Central Equatoria learnt with shock the horrific massacre of 10 youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam, and 9 others in Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) of Ganji Payam Juba County the victims lost their lives in an absurd act of violence and cowardice targeting innocent civilians on Wednesday night, preliminary reports indicate that the attack took place when armed individuals targeted the youth and shoot at them while others were hacked by machetes and murdered in cold blood.


The Government of Central Equatoria State expresses its deepest sorrow and condemnation over the horrific massacre, this heinous act which occurred is a grave violation of rights and a threat to peace and stability of the people of Central Equatoria and South Sudan as a whole and will not go unabated.

The state government, in collaboration with national authorities and security forces, will work together in conducting investigations to identify those responsible for this barbaric act and hence assure the public that swift and decisive action will be taken to ensure justice and peace will prevail accordingly.

The Central Equatoria State Government under the leadership of the Governor, HE. Gen. Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani, extends its deepest condolences to the families of the victims. Our thoughts and prayers are with the entire people of Wonduruba, Kulipapa (Ganji Payam) and the state at large as it grieves this profound loss, equally the state Government reaffirms its commitment to ensuring a peaceful and secure conditions for all its citizens warranting that violence in any form will not be tolerated.

May the souls of the deceased rest in eternal peace, and may we find strength and unity in this time of sorrow.

Hon. Gerald Francis,
Minister of Peacebuilding and Acting Minister of Information and Communication
Central Equatoria State/Juba



Ministries Road, West of State Secretariat – CES

Annex 18: Reaction from the Pujulu community in Juba, 14 October 2024



Date: 14-10-2024

Subject: Condemnation on the Killings of the Twenty-one (21) and Wounding of Four (4) Innocent Civilians in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Jebel Iraq at Ganyi Payam.

Pojulu Community is mourning the brutal murdering of over twenty-one (21) innocent Civilians and wounding of four (4) in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and road travelers at Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) Ganji Payam in Juba County, in Central Equatoria State and on the 9th of October 2024 immediately after the returned of Governor from Wonduruba.

During the visit of H. E. Governor Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani and accompanying delegations to Lainya and Wonduruba respectively, Governor has stressed a clear message for durable peace prospect to the citizens and assured them on the President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit efforts in engaging the holdout oppositions through Tumaini peace initiative currently taking place in Nairobi Kenya. Also, H.E. Governor echoed publically to the citizens of Lainya County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam on the general Amnesty declared by our President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit in 2017 in Yei which still holding up to now as way of restoring peace in the State.

H.E. Governor left Wonduruba on the 8th of October 2024 and immediately on the next day Wednesday on the 9th of October 2024 Government Forces, from the Ground Unit including Bridger Gen. Kennedy Kenyi Abdu popularly known as "Kenyi Warrior", clashed around Wonduruba Administrative Payam with the holdout rebels groups under John Kenyi Lotio popularly known as "Kenyi Loburong". In the fight Officers belonging to the ground forces at Jebel Iraq were killed in that joint operations. Casualties on the rebel side are unknow to us. As a result of receiving the sad news of their killed officers in those operations on the same date the 9th of October 2024 at 02:00 pm, Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa reacted massively by; arresting, torturing and massacring the motorists and travelers from Juba to Lainya and vice-versa killing eleven (11) travelers.

Page 1 of 2

Only four bodies of civilians were recovered through the efforts from Lainya County and Juba County Commissioners and four bodies were handed over to the grieved families but the rest were not found their where-about. Then at 04:00 pm the Ground Unit elements took seven motorcycles of those killed victims each bike carrying three armed officers backed by one Toyota Land Crusher pickup full with armed SSPDF officers moving to Wonduruba very fast via Lainya and the convoy was seen by the civilians in Lainya. Upon their arrivals to Wonduruba at night the same Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa carried out systematic house to house arrests, handcuffed and dragged those unarmed civilians to the road side and all were executed through shootings while others hacked by the machetes on the road side killing ten (10) civilians and wounded four (4) who are under treatment in Yei.

The entire Pojulu Community was outraged and saddened by such barbaric and illegitimate actions committed by the Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa. Totally and Heartily, Pojulu Community everywhere strongly expressed their greatest disappointments over the grossly execution of the unarmed civilians who were massacred in cold blood at Jebel Iraq in Juba County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam.

Therefore, we call our State and national governments to uphold to the constitution and take serious measures to bring the culprits to the book. On the other hand, Pojulu Community leaderships argue everyone to remain calm and not to take law into their own hands as we pursue justice to prevail through the State and National Government to investigate and bring all the culprits to face the law.


Also, Pojulu Community argues the State and national governments to provide security to allow the grieved families to search for the missing bodies in Jebel Iraq for decent burial. Finally, on the behalf of the Pojulu Community we would like to extend our deepest heartbroken sympathies and condolences to the families of those massacred innocent souls and their forcefully departure.

May Almighty God and Our Lord Jesus Christ consoles the entire Pojulu Community and South Sudanese for these un-wanted deaths.

Yours in grief


Mr. Lole Laila Lole
D/Chairman of Pojulu Community
Juba, South Sudan



Annex 19: Reaction from the Wonduruba Community Association in Juba, 12 October, 2024

Annex 20: Reaction from the Central Equatoria State Youth Union, 10 October, 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
YOUTH UNION
United Youth for Sustainable Development



CHAIRPERSON

Date: 10. 10. 2024

#PRESS RELEASE#

CONDEMNATION ON THE KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN JEBEL IRAQ AND WONDURUBA ADMINISTRATIVE AREA PAYAM

On behalf of **Central Equatoria State Youth** we want to express our profound condemnation of the recent acts of violence that have resulted in the tragic loss of innocent civilian lives killed by cowardice act of terror.

The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is a violation of fundamental Human rights and International Humanitarian Law. Such actions are not only morally reprehensible but also constitute war crimes against humanity under the Geneva Conventions.

The ongoing violence in our state has inflicted unimaginable suffering on countless families, leaving communities shattered and lives forever altered. There is absolutely no justification for attacks that deliberately target innocent individuals, and it is imperative that government should hold accountable those who perpetrate such heinous acts

The protection of civilian lives must be a priority for all parties involved in any conflict. As members of these state, we have a collective responsibility to advocate for peace and to ensure that the voices of the youth and innocent people are heard. We must call for an immediate investigation and the perpetrators must face the full force of law.

Therefore, we call upon our leaders in the state and representative of international community to take a firm stand against the killing of innocent civilians and to advocate for measures that protect human life and promote peace.

###END##



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Email: cesyouthunion@gmail.com
CES Youth Training Center - Hai Neem, Juba - South Sudan.

Annex 21: Photographs of victims of killings in Wondoruba, Central Equatoria State

Images widely circulated in South Sudan, and corroborated by representatives from civil society organizations and members of the local Pujulu community. Injuries indicate victims were tied and shot or hacked to death by blunt instruments, including possibly machetes¹³³



¹³³ Interview with a medical professional, October 2024

Annex 22: Press release by the National Salvation United Forces, 10 October 2024



**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
National Salvation United Forces; Hope General Headquarters
South Sudan**

Ref: nasu/osp/02/024

Date: 10/10/2024

For Immediate Press Release

In their continuing offensive against the National Salvation United Forces (NASU), which started September 5, 2024, the SSPDF and the allied Militia of Dr. Martin Elias Lomuro on October 7 pulled out from Mile 58 Juba Lainya road to attack our bases in Wonduruba and Lainya counties for the 4th time in row. On the same day they proceeded to open a base at Logoko, in Logwerle Boma close to our locations.

At around 4 pm while the Governor of Central Equatoria State was addressing the people in Wonduruba centre, the hungry SSPDF and their militia rolled out and attack us at our base. Our gallant forces fought back in defense and forced them to retreat to their base in Logoko leaving behind one dead and several others injured. Wednesday October 8, 2024 early morning they again attack us. This time our forces fought hitting hard, killing 7 at the spot, over ran their newly established base, and burn down 1 land cruiser vehicle which was rushing reinforcement to the besiege forces. Finally the force was defeated and the remnants flee to Wonduruba town in panic. Five of them died in hospital meaning a total 13 traitors have been eliminated while none was killed or injured on our side.

At around 10 pm, 3 motor bikes, a fighter tank, and truck arrived Wonduruba centre from Lainya town to collect those who are injured. They decided to launch a revenge attacks on innocent civilian who had gathered to mourn a dead family member. The mourners were rounded up and the youth were picked, some were collected from their rooms while sleeping tied up and were either shot or hacked by machetes. 10 innocent youth were killed in cold blood, with reasons that they are either related to General Kenyi Loburong or a member of his clan. If John Kenyi is a rebel, then his family members are all rebels as well?

This is what the Mathiang Anyoor fighters are encouraged to do by the clan government in J1 after defeat. Kenyi Warrior is implementing this strategy in

Wonduruba and Lainya counties because earlier he called our command and told us that he has been instructed by CDF, Dr Martin, Ambrose, and Gen Toy to clear us from these areas in 6 months. Why can't they face us instead of killing the innocent people who they claim to protect.

NASU leadership, urges the people of South Sudan to condemn this heinous crime perpetuated by the failed government in Juba. We call upon the Human right organizations, The Troika, peace monitors to investigate these atrocities done to the innocent people of wonduruba and to call for the release of those who are innocently being detained for simply being people from the area. The NASU forces remains committed to seeking for a durable peace for the well-being of all South Sudanese people.

Thank,


Maj Gen. Paul Gideon Subian
Spokesperson
NASU



Annex 23: NAS press release concerning defections, 13 October 2024



SOUTH SUDAN
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/ Army
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/12

13th October, 2024.

FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE

The Leadership of National Salvation Front (NAS) is very much appalled by the horrendous mass murder of innocent civilians in Wonduruba Payam, Juba County, Central Equatoria State, by the South Sudan Defense Force (SSPDF) allied militia, commanded by Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (aka Kenyi Warrior) and funded by Cabinet Minister Martin Elia Lomuro.

On 8th October, the SSPDF and militia under Brig. Kenyi Warrior massacred ten (10) innocent boys who were arrested while participating in a funeral occasion. This came as a revenge for the defeat of the SSPDF and their militia by forces under Gen. Kenyi John Loburon. The SSPDF out of frustration turned against the innocent civilians as a result executing ten (10) young boys in cold blood.


Following this outrageous massacre, the Leadership of NAS would like therefore to state the following;

- 01- NAS condemns in the strongest terms possible the mass murder and mafia-style cold blood execution of these innocent boys by the SSPDF and their allied militia under the command of Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (Kenyi Warrior).
- 02- NAS holds the commander of SSPDF in Lainya, the militia commander Brig. Kenyi Warrior, the militia funder Dr. Martin Elia and coordinator Mr. John Lomeling Kaunda (an American citizen) as aiders and accomplices of this heinous crime.
- 03- NAS cautions the people of South Sudan on complacency towards the existence of the illegal and unconstitutional tribal regime of Salva Kiir that relishes to loot, displace, rape and kill the people of South Sudan.

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

- 04- The Leadership of NAS appeals to the youth, especially those who are being targeted, to join the ranks of NAS and resist the brutality of the regime and its militia or else form vigilante groups to defend their villages from the marauding SSPDF and the murderous militia.
- 05- NAS calls on civil society and International Human Rights Organization to pursue the case against the murderers of these innocent people and their accomplices to ensure that the criminals are brought to justice
- 06- NAS Leadership appeals to Community members to reject the evil plans by the regime of Salva Kiir and its agents of planting seeds of hatred and disunity among the communities while they continue to rule over weak and divided communities. Community members and Leaders therefore, need to exercise maximum restraint as they work to contain this situation.
- 07- NAS Leadership stands in solidarity with the Pojulu community and the people of Wonduruba, sends its condolences to the families of those who have lost their dears ones and pray that the souls of these innocent boys' rest in Eternal peace.

Suba Samuel Manase
Spokesperson,
National Salvation Front, NAS



Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

Annex 24: Appointment of Commissioners to the NAS Federal Civil Authority, 7 September 2024



General Headquarters
Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 7 September 2024

Subject: Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority.

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(2) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

Constitutional Order No. 10/07/09//2024

- (1) Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority, as provided on the list of Compatriots below:

NAMES	PORTFOLIO
1. Mr. Felix Charles Ali Bilal	Commissioner for Federal Governance Affairs
2. Amb. Lado Gubek	Commissioner for International Relations
3. Amb. Daniel Lee	Commissioner for Information, Mass Communication and Cultural Affairs
4. Mr. Turjuman Ramadan	Commissioner for Legal Affairs and Human Rights
5. Mr. Bosco Otim Mario	Commissioner for Finance and Resource Mobilisation
6. Mr. Robert Samson Lugga	Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs
7. Dr Wani Lolik	Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
8. Mrs. Vera Mahdi	Commissioner for Health

NAS

NAMES	PORTFOLIO
9. Dr Lokuowe Gordon	Commissioner for Education, Social Welfare and Gender
10. Dr Peter Pitya	Commissioner for Infrastructure and Physical Planning

These appointments come into effect from 7th Day of September 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on these appointments in recognition of your diligence and commitments to work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.



Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief
National Salvation Front (NAS).

NAS

Annex 25: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority, 4 May 2024



General Headquarters
Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 14th May 2024.

Subject: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(1) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

Constitutional Order No. 07/14/05/2024

- (1) The appointment of Compatriot **Isaac Ajiba Ochang**, as the Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority.

This appointment comes into effect from 14th Day of May 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on this appointment in recognition of your diligence and commitment to the work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.

Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief
National Salvation Front (NAS).



NAS

facilitation required to ensure that the NIOC performs its functions and duties; and

- 6.1.14 The NIOC shall provide monthly reports to the NLC, the TNLA and the Tumaini Initiative on the progress in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

6.2 External Guarantors / Observers

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders agree to the formation of the High-Level Panel of Heads of State and Government which shall be composed of Heads of State and Government from the region, and Partners and Friends of South Sudan, whose core roles and responsibilities shall be:

- 6.2.1 To steward, monitor and oversee the implementation of all measures, processes, and activities specified in the Tumaini Consensus, in liaison with the National Leadership Council;

- 6.2.2 To receive and consider reports regarding implementation of the Tumaini Consensus from the Tumaini Initiative;

- 6.2.3 To organize, in coordination with the Tumaini Initiative, high-level visits to South Sudan to assess the progress of the implementation of this and other related protocols from the Tumaini Consensus;

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, P.J., N.B., G.L.D., PER, P.A.G., M.A.G.

- 6.2.4 To review briefs and reports and to engage with the East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union (AU), Troika, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Community of Sant'Egidio, and Friends of South Sudan, as well as other regional and international bodies and partners on the process of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.2.5 To advise and recommend actions to be taken for the proper and timely implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

- 6.2.6 To convene Quarterly meetings, or on a need basis, between the Tumaini Initiative and the National Leadership Council to appraise the progress of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

Handwritten signatures and initials: PER, SBR, P.J., N.B., G.L.D., M.A.G., P.A.G.

List of People to Initiate the Tumaini Consensus Protocols - 15 July 2024

Name	Representative Organization	Initial
Hon. Amh. Abino Mathon	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, Head of Delegation	A/A
Amel Ahmed	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman, Real-SPLM	PER
Gen. Paul Maling Awan	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan United Front/Army	F
Gen. Stephen Bury Nohang	South Sudan United National Alliance (SSUNA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan People's Movement / Army	SBR
Gen. Mario Loka Thomas Jada	National Salvation Front - Revolutionary Command Council, Chairman and C-in-C	PER
Dr. Pauline Riak	Academia	PER
Patrick Godi	Youth	P.A.G.
Bridget Ngonono	Women	N.B.
Geoffrey Lou Duke	Civil Society	G.L.D.
Bishop Moses Deng	Faith Based	PER
Sheikh Jaralebi Khamis	Faith Based	PER
Gov. Kael Aguer Kurl	People's Coalition for Civil Action	A/A
Lt. Gen. Lazaro Surebelpwo (Rtd)	Chief Mediator	PER
Amh. Dr. Mohamed Ali Geyo	Deputy Chief Mediator	PER
Amh. Ismail Waini	IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, Co-mediator	PER
Paolo Impagialzo	Community of Sant' Egidio, Co-mediator	P.J.
Dr. A. Korie Singdel	USK, State Department of Foreign Affairs, Principal Secretary	

Handwritten signatures and initials: G.L.D., P.J., PER, P.A.G., M.A.G.

Annex 26: Tumaini protocols, 15 July 2024

**HIGH LEVEL MEDIATION
"TUMAINI INITIATIVE"
FOR SOUTH SUDAN**

Tumaini Initiative



**TUMAINI CONSENSUS
FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN**

PROTOCOLS FOR INITIALING

Nairobi, 15 July 2024

Handwritten signatures and initials are present, including: G.D., S.B.R., P.S., N.B., P.A.G., and others. There are also some handwritten notes and a small stamp.

Preamble

WHEREAS H.E. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President of the Republic of South Sudan requested his brother, H.E. Dr. William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya to mediate between the Government and South Sudan Opposition Groups;

WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of Kenya accepted to facilitate the mediation of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan through the High-Level Mediation "Tumaini Initiative" for South Sudan that took place in Nairobi, Kenya;

AWARE that the Tumaini Consensus resolves the conflict between the Revitalized-Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU), South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) and other opposition groups, to achieve inclusive peace in the Republic of South Sudan, and that the ongoing, pending programs in Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and newly established programs in the Tumaini Consensus, shall provide the framework for peacebuilding and democratization in South Sudan;

RECALLING and RECOGNISING previous and current agreements, consensus and understandings to cease violence, pursue peaceful resolutions of conflicts, and the commitments to build a stable, peaceful, united and prosperous South Sudan;

MINDFUL of the devastation, distraction and disruption of lives and livelihoods, loss of lives and property, and other damages that have occurred as a result of past and current conflicts and the continued suffering of communities, families and individuals that still suffer the effects of the conflicts and natural calamities;

ACKNOWLEDGING the efforts, commitments, and progress made by the leadership, partners, friends and the people of South Sudan to

Handwritten signatures and initials are present, including: S.B.R., G.D., P.S., N.B., P.A.G., and others. There are also some handwritten notes and a small stamp.

achieve peace, build a better country and secure a future for the coming generations;

CONSCIOUS that much still remains to be done in order to heal the wounds of the past, ensure reconciliation, consolidate peace, restore stability, and put in place developmental programs, and strengthen systems of governance to ensure advancement and growth;

CONVINCED that consolidation of peace and effective pursuit of growth and advancement of South Sudan is only possible where the diversity of the people in and outside South Sudan, are recognized and brought together in an all-inclusive process of nation-building;

PERSUADED that the envisaged reforms, democratic transition, and changes towards a better South Sudan shall be achieved through a comprehensive and all-inclusive Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS;

MINDFUL of the importance of confidence and trust-building measures, implementation modalities, and other steps for guaranteeing commitment and realization of peace;

RECOGNIZING the importance of gender parity and empowerment in all spaces and committed to promote intergenerational considerations, the Parties commit to ensure representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

FURTHER COMMITTED to the Tumaini Initiative, resolution of the conflict, and the consolidation of durable peace in South Sudan; and

COGNIZANT that Federal system is a popular demand of the people of South Sudan and the constitution shall be drafted based on Federal arrangements and structures.

Handwritten signatures and initials are present, including: S.B.R., G.D., P.S., N.B., P.A.G., and others. There are also some handwritten notes and a small stamp.

Statement of Purpose

The Tumaini (Hope) Initiative acknowledges that the protracted political conflicts in South Sudan have compromised the wellbeing of the citizens of South Sudan. The future of current and coming generations is bleak if efforts to achieve and protect sustainable peace fail.

Recognizing that past agreements to end conflicts and sustain peace have not registered adequate success, the Tumaini Initiative now presents an opportunity to build consensus among the Parties and Stakeholders.

The aim of this consensus is to attain sustainable peace and democracy by implementing agreed interim programs. The roadmap to sustainable peace in the Republic of South Sudan comprises, *inter alia*, a Permanent Constitution making process with self-executing mechanisms, which addresses root causes of conflicts, and will provide the means for inclusive development and provision of services to all citizens in all corners of South Sudan.

This roadmap comprises several elements:

First Trust and Confidence Building measures are required among all Parties and Stakeholders. Some undertakings from previous agreements were not completed because not everyone kept the promise. This Framework presents strong mechanisms for building trust and confidence so as to implement agreed programs and collectively make a Permanent Constitution for South Sudan and secure sustainable peace.

Second the urgent need for enhanced civilian protection and support to humanitarian efforts. There are many citizens in need of relief assistance because of floods, droughts, and displacement by violent conflicts. All Parties and Stakeholders have a moral obligation and duty to mobilize resources to address the

Handwritten signatures and initials are present, including: S.B.R., G.D., P.S., N.B., P.A.G., and others. There are also some handwritten notes and a small stamp.

Fourth fostering ceasefire, undertaking security arrangements and reforms. The Parties and Stakeholders recognize that the integration of the various armed groups is key to addressing political instability.

Fifth implementing economic recovery programs and institutional reforms to manage public resources will be prioritized to realize the dividends of peace and development.

Sixth implementing programs for resolving community conflicts and land related disputes to achieve sustainable peace, security and stability.

Seventh national healing, truth, and reconciliation programs to be undertaken throughout the country to heal the wounds inflicted by the conflicts among our people in order to restore the broken social fabric.

Eighth the Permanent Constitution Making Process as part of this consensus will consider past and present challenges, provide a strong and inclusive foundation for stability, wellbeing of citizens, sustainable development and build a society founded on democratic values, rights and freedoms.

Ninth the Tumaini Initiative in coordination with the Parties, Stakeholders and development partners will convene a donor conference to mobilize technical and financial resources for peace building, post-conflict reconstruction of war affected areas from the region and the international community.

The Tumaini Initiative shall guarantee **PERMANENT PEACE, STABILITY, and SHARED PROSPERITY.**

1. General Principles

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders agree and commit to the following general principles that shall guide the interpretation and implementation of the commitments under the Tumaini Consensus:

- 1.1 Respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan and its people demonstrated through a people-centered and inclusive Permanent Constitution Making Process;
- 1.2 Enhanced civilian protection and secured access to emergency humanitarian and other assistance particularly to vulnerable population including displaced persons, returnees and refugees;
- 1.3 Commitment to a genuine national healing and reconciliation and the building of enduring trust and confidence in South Sudanese society founded on the principles of justice, equality, human dignity, and the advancement of societal welfare;
- 1.4 Strict adherence to constitutional guarantees for equitable representation of all South Sudanese in public institutions and particularly to achieve representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

1.5 Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement for the people of South Sudan, as shall be regulated by law;

1.6 Protection of press freedoms and widening of civic and political space in the country, as shall be regulated by law;

1.7 Strengthen commitment to sustaining cessation of hostilities and permanent ceasefire during the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and beyond:

1.8 Mutual commitment to the Tumaini Consensus, its principles, and structures, including agreement on its guarantors and measures to assure implementation, processes, and timelines;

1.9 Mutual respect and tolerance, respect for opinions, transparency, respect for the rule of law, accountability, the unfettered access to relevant information and commitment to building of consensus;

1.10 Enhance the decentralized system of government during the transitional period and expedite the process of constitution-making to realize the popular demand of the people of South Sudan to establish a federal system of government; and

1.11 Parliament shall enact enabling laws and amend existing laws to be in conformity with the Tumaini Consensus and Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 (as amended).

2. Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Support

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders reiterate their commitment to creating an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable communities, humanitarian workers and individuals in South Sudan.

The Parties and Stakeholders agree as follows to:

- 2.1 Commit to the facilitation and provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need of such assistance as a result of previous and current conflicts, natural disasters and other factors;
- 2.2 Strengthen the safeguard measures to returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their families, the reinstatement of their properties in accordance with their constitutional rights and applicable legislations, rules and regulations and full reintegration to their communities or residence of their choice;
- 2.3 Establish, continue and enhance Quick Impact Programs and service delivery targeting vulnerable groups affected by conflict and natural disasters including children, orphans, women, widows, persons with special needs, and war-wounded; and
- 2.4 Establish and allocate adequate resources to the Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) and appoint a credible management for the Fund to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

3. Protocol on Trust and Confidence-Building Measures

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders, as a gesture of their commitment to the Tumaini Initiative, create a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS that will lead to the adoption of a Permanent Constitution for the Republic of South Sudan, agree to the immediate implementation of the following measures after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus:

- 3.1 Release all the political detainees and prisoners of war (POWs) and dismiss all the cases and charges on persons accused as a result of politically motivated factors;
- 3.2 Expedite the repeal of Sections 54, 55 and 57 of the National Security Act 2014 so as to conform with the provisions of the Constitution, R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus before the commencement of the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 3.3 Refrain from arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions;
- 3.4 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee the freedom of movement of political leaders, in and outside South Sudan;
- 3.5 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of association and assembly of all persons in South Sudan, in conformity with the Constitution and the law;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

- 3.6 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of expression of all persons in South Sudan, including freedom of the media, and equal access for all to the State Media;
- 3.7 The Parties and Stakeholders or their representatives in the Tumaini Initiative, shall make a confidence-building visit to Juba, South Sudan to hold joint public forums, to publicize, and to commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.8 The Government leadership or their representatives, shall make a confidence-building visit to Nairobi, Kenya to support and commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.9 The Government shall protect property rights and guarantee security of property and assets of the Government, groups, and individuals in South Sudan, irrespective of their political affiliations;
- 3.10 The Tumaini Initiative to convene a National Leadership retreat inside South Sudan after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus for sensitization and confidence building; and
- 3.11 National Prayers for peace shall be organized and held by the religious leaders after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus in Juba, the States and the Administrative Areas.

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4. Protocol on Permanent Ceasefire, Security Arrangements and Reforms

THAT the Parties recommit to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) (2017), and commit to a permanent ceasefire agreement that shall be agreed in the Tumaini Consensus. The Parties commit to the reform and reorganization of the Security Sector in order to create unified professional national forces that include the Armed Opposition Groups.

THAT to achieve unification of forces, all the mechanisms below shall be reconstituted to ensure inclusion of the Armed Opposition Groups. The defections of security elements or forces shall not be allowed during the Transitional Period and all Armed Forces shall remain under their respective command pending their unification. The Officers from Tumaini Parties shall be included in the existing Unified Command.

4.1 Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC)

4.1.1 A Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC) shall be established to conduct reforms by overseeing, directing and supervising the security sector reform during the Transitional Period;

4.1.2 The SSROC shall be headed by a neutral and competent South Sudanese security / military expert who shall be vetted by the National Leadership Council (NLC);

4.1.3 The SSROC shall be further composed of the following:

- 4.1.3.1 Representatives of the Parties and Stakeholders signatory to Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS
 - 4.1.3.2 South Sudanese military and security experts
 - 4.1.3.3 South Sudanese eminent personalities / academics
 - 4.1.3.4 Regional and international experts
- 4.1.4 The Mandate of the SSROC shall be to:

- 4.1.4.1 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of all security forces, organization, screening, training, unification, deployment and provision of logistics in cantonment sites, barracks and movement of forces as per Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) program, including among others;
- 4.1.4.2 Oversee the disarmament and ending of private militias through the JDSB and create political space that promotes peace, national unity, equal opportunity and democratic processes to address underlying issues that drive conflicts;
- 4.1.4.3 Oversee and ensure the deployment of Armed forces across the country and at the borders to maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan;
- 4.1.4.4 Oversee the simultaneous general disarmament, and destruction of the arms collected from civilians using the unified security forces across the country;
- 4.1.4.5 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of forces, organization, screening, training, unification and deployment of all Unified Forces shall be completed within a specified period from the date of signing of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 4.1.4.6 Ensure fair treatment of all the security forces including their remuneration during the training;
- 4.1.4.7 Receive progress reports from mechanisms tasked with security reform processes;
- 4.1.4.8 Report to the National Leadership Council (NLC);

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4.1.4.9 Supervise and oversee the screening of unfit personnel by the JDSB, and coordinate with the DDR Commission on their demobilization and reintegration; and

4.1.4.10 Direct and supervise the establishment of the Committees for Defense and Security which shall be Chaired by the respective heads of the Defense and Security Mechanisms in the JDSB;

4.1.4.11 The Committees of the JDSB shall be as follows:

4.1.4.11.1 Defense/Military;

4.1.4.11.2 Police Service;

4.1.4.11.3 Prison Service;

4.1.4.11.4 Wildlife Service;

4.1.4.11.5 Civil Defense Service [Fire Brigade]; and

4.1.4.11.6 National Security Service.

4.1.5 There shall be established a force to be known as VIP Protection Units whose functions and duties shall be determined by law.

4.2 Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB)

4.2.1 The Joint Defense Board (JDB) shall be renamed as the Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) and shall be reconstituted at the level of Chiefs of Defense Forces/Staff, Inspector General of Police and Directors General of National Security Service and all other organized forces to exercise command and control over all forces during the Transitional Period.

4.2.2 The functions of the JDSB shall be to:

4.2.2.1 Recommend to Commanders in Chief, the reconstitution of Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and Joint

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) to include representatives of the Armed Opposition Groups;

4.2.2.2 Restructure and unify the army and other organized forces in accordance with the provisions of R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus;

4.2.2.3 Fast-track general and simultaneous disarmament across the country and destroy the arms collected from the civilians and ensure provision of the state security for all the people in South Sudan;

4.2.2.4 Take measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline in the Security Sector; and

4.2.2.5 Ensure deployment of Armed Forces across the Country, including at the Borders, to maintain territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.

4.3 Further Commitments by Parties and Stakeholders on Security Sector Reforms

4.3.1 Development and implementation of a transformational policy framework to govern the security sector institutions on matters including language, recruitment, retirement and oversight, reorganize and professionalize the security sector;

4.3.2 Incorporation of a general amnesty for persons who rebelled against the Government into the final outcome of the Tumaini Initiative as an avenue for fostering peace and reconciliation;

4.3.3 Taking measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline mechanisms in the Security Sector; and

4.3.4 Taking measures including legislative reforms, to address inter-communal violence, child abduction, movement of cattle, cattle-raiding/rustling in South Sudan.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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5. Protocol on Communal Conflicts, Armed Civilians, and Land Disputes

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders recognize the importance of advancing sustainable peace, security and stability at local levels, acknowledge the intricate connection between national and local conflicts and insecurity, particularly the prevalence of cattle rustling, child abduction, revenge killings, land-related disputes, climate change-induced conflicts and inter-communal violence, and the prevailing inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms.

The Parties and the Stakeholders agree that the Government, through public participation, shall:

5.1 Identify the root causes of communal conflicts and violence and land disputes and provide solutions so as to contribute to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

5.2 Conduct a comprehensive inquiry into land- and natural resources-related conflicts and climate change-induced disputes across South Sudan and make recommendations, including policy and legal actions required to address these disputes effectively;

5.3 Formulate policies, laws, and establish institutions for addressing root causes of conflict, communal violence, armed civilian groups, and land disputes, thereby contributing to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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5.4 Enhance coordination and implementation of community dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing land issues, local conflicts, peacebuilding, reconciliation, social cohesion and integration whose functions and composition shall be determined by law;

5.5 Undertake research and analysis on social cohesion, values, peacebuilding and conflict management, and make recommendations to the relevant Government agencies;

5.6 Foster partnerships with the relevant state actors, non-state actors, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies on peacebuilding and conflict management;

5.7 Establish early warning and response systems for conflicts and put in place an emergency preparedness and response systems to curb imminent conflicts;

5.8 Promote peaceful co-existence, tolerance, respect and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of life, and encourage appreciation by all ethnic and religious communities for the social, economic, cultural, spiritual and political life of all communities;

5.9 Formulate and implement strategies, plans, educational and training programs to create public awareness and support on the importance of social cohesion, integration, peacebuilding and reconciliation;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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- 5.10 Facilitate nationwide consultations on the management of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians, in order to disarm them in accordance with the law and human rights principles; and

- 5.11 Establish a mechanism for the operationalization of this protocol.



Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Handwritten signatures and initials: A, PJ, N.B, G.D, Maud, PAG, PER.

6. Guarantors

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders shall establish internal and external processes and structures that will have a permanent and consistent role in guaranteeing and taking lead responsibility in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus as provided.

The Parties and Stakeholders have resolved to commit to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus with both internal and external guarantors as detailed below:

6.1 Internal Guarantors

- 6.1.1 The Parties and Stakeholders shall establish the National Leadership Council (NLC) that shall be the national / internal guarantor of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2 The main roles and responsibilities of the NLC shall be to:

- 6.1.2.1 Provide political stewardship and oversight in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.2 Provide strategic leadership and guidance to the Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission, the Governance Oversight Commission, and other public agencies whose mandate is relevant to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.3 Preside over and resolve disputes and conflicts in matters

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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related to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.4 Receive reports from all mechanisms established under the R-ARCSS as amended and the Tumaini Consensus; and

- 6.1.2.5 Coordinate with Tumaini Initiative on implementation of the key elements of this framework and on meeting of the deadlines of scheduled actions.

- 6.1.3 The NLC shall have a Chairperson, in the absence of whom, the Deputy Chairperson shall act;

- 6.1.4 The NLC shall hold regular meetings to deliberate and make decisions, including seeking political consensus, regarding the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.5 The NLC, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, shall establish measures and systems to carefully track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.6 Decision-making in the NLC shall be by consensus and, in lieu of that, by two thirds (2/3rd) majority;

- 6.1.7 The decisions of the NLC shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature;

- 6.1.8 The NLC shall establish a National Implementation and Oversight Committee (NIOC) composed of members seconded by each party represented at the NLC, nominees of Civil Society Organisations, Faith-Based groups, other Stakeholders, Donors and Partners, and whose mandate shall be to:

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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- 6.1.8.1 Act as secretariat of the NLC and, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, provide technical and administrative support to the NLC to enable the Council to carry-out its functions and duties;

- 6.1.8.2 Manage the day-to-day coordination of activities in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

- 6.1.8.3 Establish a system to track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus in coordination with Tumaini Initiative.

- 6.1.9 The NIOC shall have a Head of the Secretariat and a Deputy, whom shall be appointed by the NLC;

- 6.1.10 The NIOC shall establish its structures and transparently and competitively recruit staff to carry out its day to day activities;

- 6.1.11 The NIOC shall be funded by the Government, the Tumaini Initiative and Donors;

- 6.1.12 Funds received for the NIOC shall be deposited into the account of the NIOC and shall be jointly managed by the Head of the Secretariat, Representatives of the Tumaini Initiative and Donors/Partners, who shall be the signatories to the Account;

- 6.1.13 All public institutions and agencies of Government, civil society and faith-based organisations, and other stakeholders shall provide the necessary assistance and

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Handwritten signatures and initials: A, PJ, N.B, G.D, Maud, PAG, PER.

Annex 27: Withdrawal of SPLM-IO from Tumaini Initiative



SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (IO) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SPLM/SPLA (IO) FROM THE TUMAINI INITIATIVE

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau met on July 16, 2024 to deliberate on the Protocols of "Tumaini Consensus for Sustainable Peace in South Sudan" that were initiated by the Parties and Stakeholders to the Tumaini Initiative.

The initialed Protocols establish alternative institutions, replacing or running in parallel with those in R-ARCSS besides repeating most provisions in R-ARCSS or existing national laws. The Protocols clearly breach the R-ARCSS and undermine the ongoing peace implementation processes.

The Tumaini Initiative was supposedly a mediation forum. However, in the initialed Protocols, this is not the case. The Initiative has arrogated to itself many roles including being a funder, a supervisor, a coordinator, a convener of a donor conference, a fund manager, a monitor of the implementation, a guarantor and a governing authority. Therefore, the "Tumaini Initiative" undermines the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan.

The proposed Security Sector Reforms/Oversight Commission takes over functions of the following existing mechanisms and institutions of R-ARCSS:

1. Security Supervision Mechanism (SSM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
2. Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
3. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
4. Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB), co-chaired by the Parties to the R-ARCSS and
5. National Transitional Committee (NTC).

The proposed National Leadership Council (NLC) whose decisions "shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature" usurps the powers of:

1. The Presidency.
2. The Council of Ministers.
3. The National Legislature and
4. The National Security Council.

The roles of the guarantors namely; IGAD, AU, C5, UN, EU, Troika, and IGAD Partners Forum, who are seized of the peace process in South Sudan, are muted.

RMTD




Page 1 of 2

In light of the above development, the SPLM/SPLA (IO) rejects the initialed Protocols and declares its withdrawal from the Tumaini Initiative as it has deviated from the intended purpose of being an Annex to R-ARCSS and not a stand-alone Agreement.

In conclusion, we would like reiterate our unwavering commitment to inclusive peace and implementation of the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for attaining sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan.

Sign:



Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/SPLA (IO), and First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan, Juba

16 July 2024

Annex 28: UPDF in Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria State

1.Excerpts of a video of the detention of South Sudanese men by armed UPDF soldiers in August 2024 in Kajo Keji.

Note: the UPDF soldiers' patches are visible. An SSPDF soldier can be heard in the background reporting the event over the phone to his superior.



2. Mediation meeting in the presence of the Kajo Keiji county commissioner, David Lisi Christopher, UPDF, Ugandan police and SSPDF officers on 6 September 2024 in Kajo Keiji county in South Sudan.



Annex 29: Statement by Kajo Keji County Commissioner, 29 August 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2024

TO MJ. GENERAL KULANG MAYEN
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SSPDF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
29/8/2024

AREAS OF KAJO KEJI COUNTY CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN ENCROCHED (GRAPPED) BY UGANDA

Kajo-Keji is a county in central Equatoria state republic of south Sudan that borders the neighboring Uganda in the districts of moyo, and yumbe.

These districts of Uganda had been engaged in encroachment of land of Kajo-Keji and causing insecurity within the border communities.

Find below the areas graphed and re-named by Uganda

S/No	Payam of origin	Name of area taken	New name given by Uganda	Approximate area in kms
1	Liwolo payam	Sokodo/ tirye	Tire village Kerwa SC	25Kms
2		Kaboro village	Kaboro A&B KSC	26kms
3		Kulasar village	Kulasar village KSC	25 kms
4		Mijale village	Mijale, kerwa sub county	20kms
5		Pingo village	Pingp Kerwa sub county	22kms
6		Rodo village	Rodo kerwa sub county	20kms
7		Merewa village	Merwa KSC	30akm
8		Gorbeleng village	Gorbeleng KSC	30km
9		Mokaden village	Mokaden v11	20kms
10		Guruwa village	Woroworo village	28kms
11		Kolorunga village	Kulurung village	20kms
12		Mapu village	Mapu village KSC	20kms
13		Kopionga village	Kapionga parish KSC	22kms
14		Kolorok village	Uturuko village	22kms
15		Erepunga village	Erepunga KSC	21kms
16		Limu village	Limu parish	21kms
17		Kogwo village	Kogwo village KSC	20kms
18		Longolijo village	Longolijo village KSC	21dkms
19		Wangor village	Wangor village KSC	17kms
20		Alidoro village	Alidoro KSC	15kms
21		Tigawate village	Central mijale village	20kms
22		Matkulu village	Markulu KSC	20kms
23		Aludu village	Centre liku village	15kms
24		Buyi village	Uluga village	20kms
25		Kobe village	Usubira village	15kms
26		Gwuto ko tokoyot	Ura village	22kms

	village		
27	Lema village	Lema KSC	24kms
28	Kukuduk village	Kukuduk KSC	4kms
29	Koburuwa village	Koburuwa KSC	23kms
30	Kilaji village	Kilaji KSC	21kms
31	Kupiya village	Loguteleng village	21kms
32	Sisi village	Sisi KSC	20kms
33	Loduwa village	Midigo Sub county	3kms
34	Dukulya village	Ubetiku village midigo	4kms
35	Biyabe village	Gumbiri village	16kms
36	Lobe village	wombe village	5kms
37	Morsak village	Achilaya villageeg	4kms
38	Muluwe village	Sere village	5kms
39	Gwongatulu village	Gwongatulu KSC	23kms
50	Letimekor village	Letimekor KSC	23kms
51	Baranya kuto village	Baranyakuto KSC	22kms
52	Kambala village	Ambala village	24kms
Kangapo 2 payam			
1	Gwere village	Gwere sub county	25kms
2	Masaka village	Masaka GSC	25kms
3	Murerya village	Murerya GSC]	25kms
4	Lunyamiro village	Linyamiro GSC	10kms
5	Morod village	Morodo GSC	15kms
6	Lojili village	Lojili village GSC	12kms
7	Manse village	Manse GSC	10kms
8	Worilowoga village	Worilowoga GSC	8kms
9	Tiwoyo Village	Tiwoyo village GSC	7kms
10	Lere village	Lere village GSC	8kms
11	Ebeya village	Ebeya village GSC	13kms
12	Garamba village	Wakale village]	10kms
13	Monikdisi village	Malanga village	18kms
14	Komba village	Mundusaku village	26kms
15	Majaburo village	Elema east	32kms
16	Gorbeleng village	Kamurope villae	30kms
17	Amerok village	Maru village	16kms
18	Ayumani village	Gobor village	35kms
19	Kolipi village	Elema village	17kms
20	Nyaingamuda village	Fitinabaya village	25kms
21	Lepori village	Lefori sub county	19kms
Kangapo 1 payam			
1	Lojore Village	Lojore afoji Sub county	15kms
2	Koru koria	Koruo village ASC	15kms
3	Loruwondi village	Inigo village	18kms
4	Magorlobong village	Magorlobong village	20kms
5	Waalo village	Wano village	18kms
6	Ludara village	Ludara village	13kms
7	Robojo village	Robojo village	12kms
8	Kimu village	Kimu village	9kms
9	Tor-li village	Tor-li village	15kms
10	Danakorwi village	Danakorwi village	10kms
11	Kiyongo village	Edefia village	20kms
12	Koree village	Eriya village	20kms
13	Masalowa village	Macholola village	25kms



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

14		Yakijimiji village	Abaya village	19kms
15		Gworong lolyong village	Moi anzo village	19kms
16		Apoji village	Afoji village	17kms
17		Fudia village	Fudia village	15kms
18		Onyire village	Onyire village	13kms
19		Gwulukuk village	Gwulukuk village	16kms
20		Minje village	Minje village	17kms
21		Kongolo village	Kongolo village	18kms
22		Pasokwi village	Pasokwi village	16kms
23		Itiya village	Itiya village	17kms
24		Eduwa village	Edua village	20kms
25		Moipileya village	Moipi lea village	15kms
26		Lugwakiya village	Lugwakia village	17kms
27		Aripijo village	Aripijo village	18kms
28		Kerepi village	Kerepi/arepi	20kms
29		metutametun	Metu sub county	25kms
30		Longirakoru	Lepo village	18kms
31		Kuruse village	Wuruse village	15kms
32		Suluwa village	Soloa village	18kms
33		Marindi village	Mulango/ moyo hospital	25kms

These are real fact from the land lords of the three payams.



David Lisi Christopher
County Commissioner Kajo-Keji County
Central Equatoria State Juba

Annex 30: SSPDF Press Release concerning meeting with UPDF, 2 October 2024

 **REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES
DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS 

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

Your Ref: Date:


Our Ref:

Press Release on the meeting between SSPDF and UPDF Chiefs of Defence Forces

On September 28th, 2024, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces travelled to meet with his Ugandan counterpart. The two army chiefs met, held and concluded a very successful meeting. They agreed on immediate implementation of the following points:

1. UPDF stops further encroachment into South Sudan territories. This pause is aimed at giving time to the two governments to find lasting solutions to the recurrent border issues (in other words, allow the High-Levelled Technical Committee, to continue deliberations on Border delimitations and demarcations)
2. Observe & maintain a cordial and harmonious working relationship along the common border.
4. Trade and commerce to continue.
5. SSPDF to deploy additional forces along Juba-Nimule Road to ensure and enhance safety of public road users.
6. SSPDF army chief secured the release of three own servicemen that were arrested and detained by UPDF in July 2024. The army chief had also technically succeeded in securing release of Capt. Machol Major Madol, from South Sudan National Police Service, Department of Traffic Police, who was arrested in July 2024 by Uganda Revenue Authorities while in possession of a fully loaded pistol.

Signed: 
Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC(ET)
Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,
SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam



TEL: +211 922 282 534, +211 914 917 786
Email: lul_orcd@hotmail.com

Annex 31: UPDF Press Statement concerning meeting with SSPDF, 28 September 2024

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & VETERAN AFFAIRS
UGANDA PEOPLES' DEFENCE FORCES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION
MoDVA Headquarters



Our Ref: UPDF/DDPI/83A
Your Ref:

28 September 2024

PRESS STATEMENT
BILATERAL RELATIONS

Gen Kainerugaba Discusses Security Cooperation with his South Sudan Counterpart.

The Chief of Defence Forces and Senior Presidential Adviser for Special Operations, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba this afternoon held talks with his South Sudan counterpart Gen Santino Deng Wol.

The meeting at the Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters focused on regional security issues of mutual interest.

The two military leaders acknowledged the longstanding relationship between Uganda and South Sudan, committing to further enhancing military to military relations, that are equally historic.

The meeting was attended by several UPDF leaders including the deputy CDF Lt Gen Sam Okiding, Airforce Commander Lt Gen Charles Okidi, the Deputy Commander Land Forces Maj Gen Francis Takiwa and the Chief of Defence Intelligence and Security Maj Gen James Birungi.

The meeting was also attended by Chiefs of Staff of Services, the 4Division Commander Brig Felix Busizoori and the 5Division Commander Brig Keith Katungyi among others.

The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.



DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC
INFORMATION
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)
Brigadier General
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
VETERAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

P.O. Box 3796 Kampala – Uganda Tel: +256 -(0) 414 -545344/7/8/9
Email: ddpi@updf.go.ug / modva.updf.spokesperson@gmail.com
Website: www.updf.go.ug

Annex 32: Pictures of meeting between UPDF and Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004)

On 28 September 2024, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, travelled to Uganda in violation of the travel ban, one of the restrictive measures established by Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015), most recently extended by resolution 2731 (2024).

The meeting was confirmed by a UPDF press release, issued on 28 September 2024. It is available from: https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095



The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.



DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC
INFORMATION
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Brigadier General
VETERAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Additional photographs are also available, depicting the two military leaders meeting at the UPDF Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters. See for example:

Sudan Tribune, Ugandan army chief meets South Sudanese counterpart in Kampala, 28 September 2024:


<https://sudantribune.com/article291467/> see also a video of the event, available from:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3quUP4eZBac>





Annex 33: Partial flight-data for flights between Uganda and South Sudan



Annex 34: SSPDF statement refuting a “vehicles supply deal,” 19 August 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES
DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS



OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

August 19th, 2024



SSPDF Refutes Vehicles Supply Deal

The Office of SSPDF would like to unequivocally deny claims by Dynamic Defence Solutions that it had reached an agreement to supply vehicles to the national army.

To the contrary, on August 12th, 2024, some representatives from aforementioned company, accompanied by Assistant Chief of Defence Forces for Logistics and Director for Transport and Maintenance paid a courtesy visit to the Director General for Procurement.

The officials, only used opportunity availed to them to market company's areas of specialty and capabilities. In the light of above, SSPDF command/leadership would like to conclude by underscoring the following:

1. No Memorandum of Understanding was signed between SSPDF and Dynamic Defence Solutions,
2. No contract was offered to Dynamic Defence Solutions to supply vehicles to SSPDF;
3. Purchase of classified/strategic equipment is beyond the jurisdiction of SSPDF and the Directorate of Procurement;
4. SSPDF is still under arms embargo hence has no legal basis and authority to engage in defence contracts and
5. Finally, SSPDF takes this opportunity to officially distance itself and brush aside claims by Dynamic Defence Solutions that it was contracted to supply vehicles.

Signed.....

Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC (ET)
Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,
SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam

TEL: +211 922 282 534, +211 914 917 786
Email: lul_orcd@hotmail.com

Annex 35: Final list of military items requested by Peter Biar Ajak

Source: US District court for the district of Arizona¹³⁴

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. AK-47 Rifles (Full Auto)	1,000	\$350.00	\$350,000.00
2. PKM Rifles	300	\$675.00	\$202,500.00
3. RPG-7 launcher	200	\$575.00	\$115,000.00
4. 7.62x39 ammo	2,000,000	\$.17	\$340,000.00
5. 7.62x54 ammo	1,500,000	\$.21	\$315,000.00
6. PG-7 HE round	1000	\$600.00	\$600,000.00
7. PSL Sniper Rifle	70	\$1092.50	\$76,475.00
8. FIM92 Stinger System	10	\$80,000.00	\$800,000.00
9. Satellite phone	20	\$1,200.00	\$24,000.00
10. Handheld Radio	50	\$500.00	\$25,000.00
11. M67 Hand Grenades	500	\$60.00	\$30,000.00
12. PG-7VT/PG-7T AT Round	500	\$800.00	\$400,000.00
13. AN/PVS Monocular	10	\$12,000.00	\$120,000.00
		Subtotal-	\$3,397,975.00
		Transportation-	\$575,000.00
		Total -	\$3,972,975.00

¹³⁴ See https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al__azdce-24-00394__0022.0.pdf.

Annex 36: Allocation of Nile blend cargos, May and September 2024


REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM

REF: RSS/MOP/J/O/U/5/24/120 17th May, 2024

[REDACTED]

Hai Matar
Juba South Sudan

RE: NOMINATION LETTER FOR ALLOCATION IN JULY, 2024

Reference to the above and the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) Ref: RSS/MOFP/J/1STUSF14/5/24-1, regarding advance payment on the Cargo.


The Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan is pleased to allocate one cargo (600,000 BBL) of Nile Blend loading July 2024, to [REDACTED] LTD.

Final award letter will later indicate the discount/Premium and the lifting window.

[REDACTED] is expected to advance forty million (40m) United States Dollars, after receiving this award letter.

Please accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

Regards.


Dr. William Anyak Deng
Undersecretary



The Undersecretary

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J1), Juba - South Sudan
General Line : +211 915 177 770 | E-mail : undersecretary@mop.gov.ss | www.mop.gov.ss

Republic of South Sudan (RSS)



MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING (MoFP) 1st Undersecretary of Finance

REF:RSS/MoFP/J/1stUSF/27/08/2024/05

September 10, 2024

Hon. Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel
Undersecretary,
Ministry of Petroleum

Dear Hon. Undersecretary,

RE: Allocation of One (1) Crude Oil Cargo for the Month of April, 2025 to [REDACTED]

Greetings and best wishes from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Reference is made to the aforementioned subject. I am writing to respectfully request your office to purpose allocation of **One (1) Crude Oil Cargo** for the month of **April, 2025** to [REDACTED] as directed by the Minister of Finance and Planning.

Let me avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Hon. Garang Majak Bol
1st Undersecretary
Ministry of Finance and Planning



Copy Furnished:

- Hon. Minister of Finance and Planning
- File


REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM

RSS/MOP/J/O/U/9/24/061

19th September 2024


RE: REVOCATION OF ALLOCATION OF ONE CARGO OF NILE BLEND FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 2025 TO [REDACTED]

Reference is made to the above-mentioned subject and the letter of the 1st Undersecretary of Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 10th September 2024 with Ref: No. **RSS/MOFP/J/1stUSF/27/8/24/05** to Ministry of Petroleum (MoP) pertaining to the allocation of one (1) Cargo of Nile Blend for the Month of **April 2025 to** [REDACTED]

Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan, scrutinizes and ultimately registers potential oil lifting companies through a set of technical requirements, including, but not limited to, checking their presence in both regional and international oil lifting markets, submission of financial statements, approval by the Bank of South Sudan (BSS). [REDACTED] is not registered as one of the oil marketing companies.

Premised on the foregoing, MoP is hereby informing your reverenced office about the revocation of allocation of one (1) cargo of Nile Blend equivalent to 600,000 bbl due to lack of registration and conflicting schedules.

Please, accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.


Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel
Undersecretary
Ministry of Petroleum



Cc: 1st Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Cc: File

The Undersecretary

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (JI), Juba- South Sudan
General Line: +211 915177770 | Email: undersecretary@mop.gov.ss | www.mop.gov.ss

Annex 37: Legal framework for oil-related payments and transparency

Extracts from the 2012 Petroleum Revenue Management Act

Councils. CHAPTER IX TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 30. Transparency as a Fundamental Principle (1) The management of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, and any related duty of any relevant party, shall be carried out in an open and transparent manner. (2) In the exercise of their functions and competencies, and as provided for in this Bill, the National Legislature, Ministry, Bank of South Sudan and Investment Advisory Committee shall take all necessary measures to ensure free access to public information. (3) Access to public information shall be in accordance with the Right to Information Act 2013. 31. Declaration of Confidentiality (1) Information or data may be declared confidential and not to be disclosed to the public if such information: (a) significantly prejudices the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds; (b) jeopardizes the independence of the Investment Advisory Committee, any of its members, or both; (c) prejudices the freedom of discussion within or among the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan, or the Investment Advisory Committee; or (d) may lead to unfair competition, improper gains or advantage for a third party or unfair disadvantage for the parties involved. (2) The declaration of confidentiality shall be made by the Ministry, Bank of South	Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee and shall provide: (a) a justification based on one or more grounds detailed in subsection (1) of this Section; and (b) the period in which such information shall be declared confidential. (3) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this Section, and unless the parties agree to disclose such communication, internal communications within the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall be kept confidential. (4) Any party affected by the disclosure of information on grounds detailed in subsection (1)(d) of this Section may request a declaration of confidentiality of such information to the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee. (5) The Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall issue a decision on the request for declaration of confidentiality under subsection (4) of this Section. (6) In case of denial, the interested party may appeal to the Competent Court within fifteen days from the date in which the decision under subsection (5) of this Section was communicated to him or her. (7) The Minister shall issue regulations on further detail procedures under subsections (4), (5), and (6) of this Section. (8) The justification on the confidentiality of information shall be made available to the public upon request. (9) Upon expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (2) (b) of this Section, and if any grounds on which the declaration of confidentiality was based no longer exists, information shall be disclosed to the public.
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- not financial assets of government and the rate of savings; and
- (f) a list of names of persons holding positions relevant for the operation and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including:
- (i) the Minister;
 - (ii) the director general of accounts of the Ministry;
 - (iii) the chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Investment Advisory Committee;
 - (iv) the Governor;
 - (v) the external investment manager(s), if any; and
 - (vi) the designated signatories that are authorized to request transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.

(3) The sources of the information described in subsection (2) of this Section, in whatever form, including the reports and statements, shall be annexed to the annual report in unedited form.

(4) The annual report shall be published by the Ministry within fifteen days of its submission to the National Legislature.

15. Annual Disclosure and Publication of Payments

(1) Licensees, contractors and sub-contractors shall annually disclose information on all payments, monetary or in kind, made to Government agencies in connection with Petroleum Activities. The Government shall disclose the revenue received in connection with Petroleum Activities without regard to any provisions of confidentiality.

(2) Any disclosure under this Section shall be reported to an independent entity, selected and appointed for this purpose, and the information shall be published and verified in accordance with the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as prescribed in the regulations.

(3) Confidentiality sections or other sections in a Petroleum Agreement that prevent

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disclosure of information on any payments made and revenues received in connection with Petroleum Activities conducted in South Sudan shall be void to the extent required for disclosure of such information as set out in subsection (1) of this Section.

(4) The Ministry shall issue regulations respecting all matters relating to disclosure and publication of information under this Section, including orders to administrative agencies requiring them to provide information relating to payments and revenues.

36. Publication of Information

(1) The Ministry shall ensure that this Bill and any of its regulations, the Investment Policy, the Investment Guidelines, the operational management agreements provided in Section 8 and 14(7) of this Bill, and the rules and procedures of the Investment Advisory Committee provided in Section 21(6) of this Bill, are readily available to the public not later than thirty days after their respective enactment or adoption.

(2) Appointment of the Investment Advisory Committee shall be published in the Official Gazette.

(3) Information required to be made public under this Chapter shall also be published online on the website of the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan and the National Legislature.

(4) The Ministry shall also make copies of the information available at its headquarters.

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32. Records of Petroleum Revenue

- (1) The Ministry shall publish the records of Petroleum Revenue in accordance with Section 6 of this Bill no more than six weeks after the end of each Quarter.
- (2) The records of Petroleum Revenue published under subsection (1) of this Section shall be disaggregated by type of revenue and individual transaction.
- (3) In addition to the records of Petroleum Revenue, the information shall include transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account to the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and the Consolidated Fund, transfers from the Consolidated Fund to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and the balance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.
- (4) The information shall be published simultaneously in the official gazette, the Ministry's website and in at least two national daily newspapers and duly communicated to the National Legislature;

33. Quarterly Reports

- (1) The Bank of South Sudan shall present to the Minister and the Investment Advisory Committee quarterly reports on the in- and outflow and the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds during the Quarter and the value of the assets and where the assets are held at the end of the Quarter, no later than by the end of the ensuing month.
- (2) The Bank of South Sudan shall make the quarterly reports publicly available no later than six weeks after the end of the Quarter.
- (3) The Bank of South Sudan shall ensure that in releasing, or allowing access to, such reports, measures are taken to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.

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34. Annual Reports

- (1) The Minister shall submit an annual report for the Petroleum Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds to the National Legislature no later than four months after the end of the Financial Year.
- (2) The annual report shall be prepared in such manner that makes it readily adaptable for dissemination to the public and shall contain the following information for the Financial Year for which the report is prepared:
 - (a) a report signed by the Minister describing the Investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, any advice received from the Investment Advisory Committee, and any other matter related to the management of Petroleum Revenue and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds that may be of concern or interest to the National Legislative Assembly;
 - (b) a report signed by the Investment Advisory Committee describing the Investment Guidelines and any changes made during the Financial Year, a comparison of the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds against the established benchmark indices of the investments and against the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds for the previous three years, and any other matter relevant for the implementation of the Investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including, but not limited to, an assessment of the internal and external audits and risk management and control systems in place by the Bank of South Sudan;
 - (c) the Auditor General's report, including the audited financial statements with notes of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and any report from the independent auditor;
 - (d) a list of all payments of Petroleum Revenue made to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and payments of Petroleum Revenue by the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities to each applicable Local Government Councils, for the Financial Year;
 - (e) the liabilities of government borrowings in a manner that provides an accurate representation of the past and expected future development of the

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Annex 38: Budget for the financial year 2024/25

Panel analysis, based on first draft of budget presented to the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 25 September 2024

Official exchange rate SSP/US\$ (Oct 2024)	3,098		
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
	SSP	US\$ (est.)	
Projected government revenue			% of total revenue
Projected oil revenues			
DPOC	0	0	
GPOC	943,610,579,883	304,587,017	
SPOC	194,823,738,558	62,886,939	
Total oil revenue	1,138,434,318,441	367,473,957	50.43%
Projected non-oil revenue			
Customs duty	552,284,081,279	178,271,169	
Misc taxes and fees	566,920,329,811	182,995,587	
Total non oil revenue	1,119,204,411,090	361,266,756	49.57%
Total projected government revenue	2,257,638,729,531	728,740,713	

Government expenditure			% of total spending
"Mandatory government expenditure"			
Transfers to Sudan for oil pipeline	157,035,230,468	50,689,229	3.76%
Transfers to oil producing states (2%)	22,768,686,369	7,349,479	0.55%
Transfers to oil producing communities (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Transfers to Ministry of Petroleum (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Debt repayment	286,642,748,700	92,525,096	6.87%
National Revenue Authority Retention	54,957,368,080	17,739,628	1.32%
Oil for roads	0	0	0.00%
Other capital projects	493,482,795,275	159,290,767	11.83%
Total "mandatory expenditure"	1,083,192,887,998	349,642,637	25.96%
Salary payments			
Salaries	773,759,678,293	249,761,032	18.55%
Salary arrears	642,316,055,668	207,332,491	15.40%
Foreign mission salary arrears	96,003,600,000	30,988,896	2.30%
Total salary expenditure	1,512,079,333,961	488,082,419	36.24%
Other expenditure			
Operating expenditure	413,329,279,511	133,418,102	26.21%
Transfers to States for State budgets	419,306,834,843	135,347,590	26.59%
Peace budget	93,794,227,620	30,275,735	5.95%
Constituency Fund for MPs	30,000,000,000	9,683,667	1.90%
December 2024 Elections	257,521,457,127	83,125,067	16.33%
Humanitarian and emergency fund	173,660,000,000	56,055,520	11.01%
Various other budget lines	189,336,691,868	61,115,782	12.01%
Total other expenditure	1,576,948,490,969	509,021,463	37.80%
Total all government spending	4,172,220,712,928	1,346,746,518	
Deficit	-1,914,581,983,397	-618,005,805	


Agency spending:

	Salary budget (SSP)	% of total salary budget	Goods and services (SSP)	% of total goods and services	Total budget (SSP)	% of total Ministry spending
Accountability cluster	894,932,810	0.12%	5,848,736,009	1.45%	7,370,156,266	0.39%
Economic Cluster	19,109,574,136	2.47%	49,631,570,445	12.31%	197,443,429,349	10.48%
Of which Ministry of Finance and Planning	1,832,456,166	0.24%	28,331,191,362	7.03%	32,480,160,993	1.72%
Education cluster	84,975,288,417	11.00%	48,077,271,655	11.92%	225,135,744,981	11.95%
Health cluster	5,326,514,447	0.69%	31,156,159,400	7.73%	54,855,922,636	2.91%
Infrastructure cluster	1,595,558,604	0.21%	8,382,367,085	2.08%	13,336,454,811	0.71%
Natural resources cluster	22,406,328,022	2.90%	33,863,145,894	8.40%	351,649,759,145	18.67%
Public administration cluster	75,991,334,896	9.84%	168,546,330,203	41.80%	290,284,083,280	15.41%
Of which Presidential Affairs	2,577,606,960	0.33%	15,594,234,618	3.87%	23,383,834,620	1.24%
Of which Cabinet Affairs	1,465,091,532	0.19%	7,625,921,167	1.89%	16,773,997,323	0.89%
Of which Foreign Affairs	50,377,424,952	6.52%	4,254,097,101	1.05%	55,111,798,592	2.93%
Of which Parliament	10,277,629,488	1.33%	81,444,261,374	20.20%	114,571,166,718	6.08%
Of which Council of States	6,504,809,940	0.84%	25,000,499,165	6.20%	38,371,858,427	2.04%
Security sector	505,880,647,927	65.51%	35,430,397,122	8.79%	599,433,387,770	31.82%
Of which Police	100,406,257,704	13.00%	4,198,497,310	1.04%	158,507,540,170	8.42%
Of which Ministry of Defence	268,614,128,198	34.78%	15,735,791,888	3.90%	288,412,061,028	15.31%
Of which Veterans Affairs	84,588,459,037	10.95%	6,419,463,234	1.59%	91,007,922,271	4.83%
Of which NSS	51,827,888,804	6.71%	6,812,984,565	1.69%	58,737,678,439	3.12%
Rule of law	56,064,967,796	7.26%	22,327,870,875	5.54%	144,039,451,614	7.65%
Totals	772,245,147,055		403,263,848,688		1,883,548,389,852	

Distribution of salary payments:



Distribution of goods and services spending



Annex 39: Response from the Government of Uganda dated 7 November 2024



REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UGANDA HOUSE
336 EAST 45th STREET
NEWYORK, N.Y 10017-3489
Tel: (212) 949-0110
Fax: (212) 687-4517
E-mail: admin@ugandaunyny.com

Our Reference: **UN-NY/TECH/38**


The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on South-Sudan, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) and extended pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024) and with reference to letters Ref: S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.34 dated 14th October 2024 and Ref: S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.38 dated 1st November 2024, has the honour to present the response as follows;

- a. Under bilateral security arrangements, the UPDF carried out operations against the LRA in CAR while based at Wau in South Sudan but at the end of the operation, they left with all that remained back to Uganda. There was therefore no direct or indirect transfer of lethal military equipment in violation of the UNSC resolution 2428 (2018) and renewed by UNSCR 2713 (2024).
- b. The aircraft including a Lockheed L-100 Hercules and a helicopter owned and operated by Bar Aviation, a registered company in Uganda, were used by the UPDF in this operation. However, throughout this operation, Lockheed maintained its registration of 5X-HBR and not EK-RSX as alleged.
- c. The Republic of Uganda is alive to the UNSCR 2206(2015) and renewed by UNSCR 2731 (2024) wherein the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Santino Deng WoI, is subject to travel ban. We acknowledge that the SSPDF visited his Uganda counterpart due to serious regional security concerns that needed to be addressed by the two as both countries are members of the East African Community among others. Uganda has however taken note of the Panel of Experts concern and pledges to adhere to the requirements in the UN resolution.
- d. Where the Panel of Experts alleges several incursions by the UPDF Forces into the South Sudan Territory and where in some incidents these incursions reportedly resulted in death, detention and harassment of South Sudanese civilians and security forces;

- (i) It is noteworthy, there have been persistent border demarcation disputes between the Republic of Uganda and that of South Sudan, where South Sudan Republic claims ownership of some border areas which form part of the Republic of Uganda territory.
 - (ii) It is possible for some elements in the Republic of South Sudan to allege that UPDF is on South Sudan territory when they are actually on the Republic of Uganda territory. A case in point is in Ngomoromo area in Uganda's Kitgum District that is currently occupied by SSPDF yet it is 27km inside the territory of the Republic of Uganda. Therefore, the allegation of transfer of military equipment does not hold here.
 - (iii) The UPDF operational doctrine upholds, respects and promotes the fundamental principles of Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws as enunciated under the UN Charter and encapsulated in the Uganda Constitution. There is therefore no way this would go unnoticed and where negligent breaches occur, the UPDF is on record for punishing errant commanders and soldiers who violate Human Rights.
- e. All the allegations are malefide and malicious simply intended to malign and damage the reputation of the UPDF and the Republic of Uganda as a whole.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on South-Sudan, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) and extended pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024), the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 7th November, 2024



The Office of the Coordinator
Panel of Experts on South Sudan established
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) and extended pursuant
to resolution 2731 (2024) concerning South-Sudan
New York.

Annex 40: Response from the Government of Uganda dated 15 November 2024

GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA RESPONSE TO REQUESTS BY THE PANEL OF EXPERTS ON SOUTH SUDAN: ADDENDUM

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Government of Uganda received two letters from the Security Council Panel of Experts (PoE) on South Sudan, vide Ref. S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.34 dated 14th October, 2024 and S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.38 dated 1st November, 2024. Broadly, the two letters requested for information in relation to the following issues:

- Presence of armed foreign troops in Western Bahr el Ghazal State in South Sudan in July and August, including members of the UPDF.
- Involvement of the UPDF forces in Western Bahr el Ghazal in several joint security operations with South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and National Security Service (NSS).
- Incursions of the UPDF forces in July and August, 2024 in Central Equatorial State and Eastern Equatorial State, which in some cases resulted into death, detention and/or harassment of South Sudanese civilians and security forces.
- Flights from Uganda towards Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, recorded to have been carried out by a Lockheed L-100 Hercules cargo plane, registered 5X-HBR, and on occasion as EK-RSX.
- The role of Bar Aviation, a Uganda-registered company, in transporting the UPDF to South Sudan.
- A meeting in Uganda of the Chief of Defence Forces of the UPDF and SSPDF on 28th September, yet the SSPDF CDF is subject to a travel ban, since July 2015.

This response is an addendum to the preliminary response provided to the PoE, vide Reference UN-NY/TECH/38 dated 7th November, 2024

2.0 BACKGROUND

Some of the major principles of Uganda's foreign policy include peaceful co-existence and respect for international law and treaty obligations. In this regard, the Government of Uganda values, and attaches great importance to a harmonious existence with all its neighbors. The Government also values

and respects the importance the promotion of regional and international peace and security. It is in Uganda's national interest to work for peace.

In this regard, the Government of Uganda continues to cooperate closely with all its neighbors, including the Republic of South Sudan towards promoting and sustaining peace. Indeed, peace in South Sudan is not only good for the country, it is equally good for Uganda, especially as it facilitates trade and movement of people, good and services.

Uganda is also an active member of the region and the international community working towards the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in South Sudan. As Guarantors to the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the Government of Uganda is closely monitoring its implementation and supports the democratic aspirations of the peace partners and the people of South Sudan. Uganda is also actively involved in the activities of:

- i) The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC) which is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), including the adherence of the Parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule; and
- ii) The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), responsible for monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA), as laid out in Chapter II of the Agreement.

At a bilateral level, Uganda and South Sudan, in the spirit of good neighborliness, and as members of the East African Community, continue to look for a solution to the occasional insecurity issues arising from delayed border reaffirmation and demarcation. Severally, there have been skirmishes between the people of Uganda and South Sudan in these border areas, especially around the Ugandan districts of Yumbe and Moyo. Sometimes, regrettably, the two armies have been involved, and or called upon to address these skirmishes.

In addition to the efforts above, Uganda and South Sudan have historically collaborated and indeed worked together to address the menacing challenges arising from Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), based in the Central African Republic. Indeed, following the designation of the LRA as a terrorist organization by the African Union Peace and Security Council,

Uganda worked jointly with the affected regional neighbors, including South Sudan, through the African Union Regional Task Force on the LRA. While the LRA threat to Uganda and the region has lessened over the years, it still remains an issue of concern for the region, especially Central African Republic and the territories of the countries bordering Central African Republic.

The responses by the Government of Uganda below, therefore, should be read and appreciated in line with this background.

3.0 RESPONSES TO THE REQUESTS

3.1 UPDF Presence in South Sudan

The Government of Uganda has taken note of the reminder by the PoE regarding the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 2428 (2018), wherein, Member States are required to “take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the territory of South Sudan from or through their territories or by their nationals, ...arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned; and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related material....”.

Following the inquiry from the PoE, the Government of Uganda has also taken cognizance of the exemptions related to the arms embargo on South Sudan, in relation to “arms and related material, as well as technical training and assistance, to or in support of the African Union Regional Task Force intended solely for regional operations to counter the Lord's Resistance Army, as notified in advance to the Committee”. The Government has also particularly noted the need to notify the Committee for any such operations.

While the operation against the LRA was not under the auspices of the AU Regional Task Force, this exemption recognizes the menacing danger the LRA continues to pose in the region. The Government also recognizes the importance of restricting the distribution and sharing of information for such intelligence-led operations, and commits to undertake appropriate consultations with the Committee going forward.

With regard to allegations of incursion into South Sudan by the UPDF, leading to death, detention, and/or harassment of South Sudanese civilians and security forces, the Government of Uganda wishes to state the following:

- i) The UPDF has no policy of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Any incursions that may have been recorded was in line with the border demarcation issues outlined in the background above.
- ii) The UPDF is renown in the region, and indeed globally, as one of the most professional and disciplined armies, and has consistently endeavored to protect people's rights, in accordance with the provisions of humanitarian law. The reported death, detention and/or harassment of South Sudanese civilians, therefore, is beyond the methods of work of the UPDF as an institution. The Government would appreciate receipt of the photographs and videos the PoE is reported to have to enable further investigations and appropriate action.

3.2 Bar Aviation

The preliminary response provided by the Mission, as referenced in the introduction above, is adequate.

3.3 Meeting between the Uganda and South Sudan Chiefs of Defence Forces

The Government of Uganda takes note of the information that has been provided that Gen. Santiago Deng Wol, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, is a travel-ban sanctioned individual.

The Government also notes that the sanctions regime on travel bans provides for exemptions, including, "where the Committee determines, on a case-by-case basis, that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in South Sudan and stability in the region".

It must, however, be registered that the sanctioning of the Chief of Defence Forces of South Sudan is not a fact that has been known to, or specifically brought to the attention of, the Government of Uganda. Had the decision to place the CDF of that country under a travel ban been preceded by consultations with the key regional stakeholders, i.e., those directly affected by the consequences of such decisions, the Government of Uganda would have opposed it, aware that such a restriction hampers regional peace efforts and, hence contributes to the perpetuation of conflict in that country and, potentially in the region.

The Government of Uganda, thus, calls for a more transparent, consultative and practical sanctioning process, as well as effective protocols for the continuous updating, reviewing and disseminating to UN member State governments of decisions taken by UN sanctioning bodies or mechanisms.

Accordingly, while the Government of Uganda regrets the omission to consult with and/or inform the Committee in advance of Gen, Deng Wol the Chief of Defence Forces of South Sudan's visit to Uganda, it underscores the need for the Sanctions regime to be cognizant of the need to further the objective of peace and stability in the region, which is dependent on continuous and effective engagement with the key players.

Consequently, Uganda and South Sudan inevitably maintain a security cooperative and consultative mechanism, aimed at addressing pressing joint security concerns and interests. The Chiefs of Defence Forces, as the leaders and commanders of the two armies, regularly consult as appropriate. This time, it was vital and critical, for national security reasons, to have face-to-face interactions, solely for the purpose of addressing security issues between the two countries, whose possibility was, indeed, envisaged by the spirit of the sanctions exemption highlighted above. In Uganda's and the region's present circumstances, and if regional peace and security is to be cultivated and maintained for the benefit of the people of Uganda and of the region, there is no way Uganda can avoid working with the CDF of South Sudan – if we are fortunate that they agree and are willing to work with us.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Government of the Republic of Uganda reaffirms its readiness to enhance its cooperation with the PoE and Sanctions Committee on South Sudan towards the promotion of international peace and security in the country.

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA,
NOVEMBER, 2024**