

Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Explanatory note

In the outcome document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States Parties agreed that “at its third and, as appropriate, fourth sessions, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference” ([NPT/CONF.2000/28 \(Parts I and II\)](#)).

Achieving consensus on recommendations in the final preparatory meeting has traditionally been challenging for various reasons. In the absence of consensus on the draft recommendations of the third and final session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chair of the session has decided, under his own authority, to convey to the 2026 Review Conference the recommendations in the form of a working paper.

The recommendations of the Chair are submitted to the 2026 Review Conference without prejudice to the position of any State Party and are not intended to convey the final position of any delegation on any matter within the mandate of the Review Conference. The President of the Review Conference may also wish to undertake, in exercise of his pre-Conference role, further engagements on the recommendations, especially on regional issues, which proved the most contentious.



Chair's working paper

Recommendations by the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The recommendations of the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee are set out below for consideration by the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 2026 Review Conference.

1. Recognize the continuing role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, as well as an important instrument for pursuing international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
2. Reaffirm the commitment to the full, effective, non-discriminatory and balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty in all its aspects in order to preserve the credibility and effectiveness of the operation of the Treaty. Recognize the mutually reinforcing nature of all three pillars of the Treaty.
3. Reaffirm the essential contribution of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to international peace and security and of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to development.
4. Reaffirm also the continuing validity of the commitments and undertakings of past Review Conferences, especially the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
5. Note with growing concern the unfolding unrestrained strategic competition, deepening geopolitical tensions and heightened nuclear dangers that are putting at risk the cooperation required for the effective operation of the Treaty and the achievement of its objectives on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
6. Emphasize the urgency and importance of the universalization of the Treaty, and strongly urge all States Parties to promote the universalization of the Treaty and to avoid actions that impair the objective of the universalization of the Treaty and its effective operation. Call upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without conditions, to bring their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as required by the Treaty for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms, in particular those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; and call upon South Sudan to accede, as soon as possible, to the Treaty.
7. Reaffirm the responsibility of States Parties to review the operation of the Treaty and recognize the useful contributions that observer States, intergovernmental organizations and civil society groups make to the review process.
8. Encourage States to work towards the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation processes, as well as in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and promote the inclusive participation of women and men across all disarmament forums.
9. Encourage States to promote and support the participation of young people in disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, recognizing the role that young people can play in advancing those efforts.

I. Nuclear disarmament

10. Reaffirm that achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and a safer and more secure world for all is the ultimate goal of the international community. Recommit to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control as provided for in article VI of the Treaty.

11. Recognize that, in the efforts to ensure international peace and security for all, the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

12. Reaffirm the obligation of States Parties to achieve the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty and the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals by taking timely and practical steps to fulfil their nuclear disarmament obligations, leading to nuclear disarmament; and to enact and pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

13. Emphasize the pressing need for the urgent implementation of the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in line with the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Review Conference and through concrete measures for the realization of the 64-point action plan of the 2010 Review Conference.

14. Commit to the strict application of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the Treaty, and encourage the further work required to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.

15. Acknowledge the increasing concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States over the qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals and their means of delivery by nuclear-weapon States, the quantitative advancement of some nuclear arsenals, the intensification of nuclear rhetoric, the reinterpretation of nuclear doctrines, the increasing salience of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and the lowering of thresholds for the actual use of nuclear weapons in military doctrines.

16. Recognize the importance of undertaking education and awareness-raising programmes, including interacting with and directly sharing the experiences of the people and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing, in all States Parties and targeting all generations, especially young people, on the dangers of nuclear weapons, especially nuclear war and the urgency of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

17. Reaffirm that States Parties should commit to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again; and call upon nuclear-weapon States to continue to make efforts among themselves and with other State Parties to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, within the context of achieving nuclear disarmament, by developing policies and measures aimed at contributing to enhancing transparency, building confidence and reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, whether intentionally, by miscalculation or by accident, noting the contribution that such policies and measures could make to conflict prevention, including through preventive diplomacy and crisis prevention, and to the attainment of arms control and disarmament. Stress that risk reduction, while important, cannot be a substitute for nuclear disarmament.

18. Note the need to increase awareness of the risks and opportunities associated with the use of emerging technologies, especially in assisting in nuclear risk reduction; encourage discussions on ways in which emerging technologies can benefit disarmament; and underscore that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States must reaffirm their commitment to maintaining human control over decisions to use nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, while taking into account the need for the development of an international law regime for emerging technologies.

19. Recognize that strengthening negative security assurances would contribute to building confidence in the non-proliferation regime and to progress in nuclear disarmament, as well as improving the overall security environment. In that context, recall Security Council resolution [984 \(1995\)](#), in which the Council noted the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty and to the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties; and call upon the nuclear-weapon States to remove any reservations that are not compatible with the object and purpose of those treaties.

20. Call upon the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish an ad hoc committee on an international legal instrument on negative security assurances; and, pending negotiations, encourage States Parties to explore other ways to further strengthen negative security assurances, including through substantive discussions with a view to elaborating recommendations on a universal legally binding instrument on unconditional and non-discriminatory negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

21. Recognize the importance of further reducing the stockpiles of nuclear arsenals so as to create the necessary conditions for general and complete nuclear disarmament. Reaffirm the continuing importance of the implementation of the bilateral arms control agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and underscore the need for urgent action for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) and the negotiation in good faith, before its expiration on 5 February 2026, of a successor agreement that leads to further reductions of nuclear arsenals.

22. Call upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to engage in meaningful dialogue and cooperate towards the development of a robust and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

23. Call upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to recommit to the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of 3 January 2022, bearing in mind that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

24. Encourage States Parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, in furtherance of efforts to improve transparency and accountability, to report at Review Conferences on their implementation of the Treaty, including on commitments undertaken during previous review cycles, and urge nuclear-weapon States to systematically and progressively pursue efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

25. Call upon all nuclear-weapon States to report using a standard template that builds upon the elements of the 2013 common reporting framework, without prejudice

to national security, and includes comparable and numerical information on their Treaty obligations and related commitments.

26. Reaffirm the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and encourage its early entry into force through universal adherence to the Treaty, especially the signatures and ratifications required of annex 2 States, without delay or precondition; and reiterate that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility of encouraging annex 2 States, in particular those that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty, in accordance with action 10 of the 2010 action plan.

27. Urge all States to refrain from conducting nuclear weapons test explosions or any other explosions and for nuclear-weapon States and all other States to commit to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions and any other explosions, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Acknowledge the work of the International Monitoring System and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

28. Note the significant contribution that a verifiable, non-discriminatory and universal treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could make towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Reaffirm that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately commence negotiation of such a treaty in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Note the need to mobilize a common resolve on the question of voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

29. Encourage nuclear-weapon States to recommit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes, in line with action 16 of the 2010 action plan.

30. Reiterate with deep concern the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences that would result from the testing and use of nuclear weapons and reaffirm the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations. Observe that 80 years after the first testing and use of nuclear weapons represents an important moment for States to renew the global commitment for a world free of nuclear weapons.

31. Take note of the entry into force on 22 January 2021 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the view of its 94 signatories and 74 States Parties that it contributes towards a world free of nuclear weapons; recognize the efforts being made towards the universalization of the Treaty; and take note of the convening of the third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty, held at United Nations Headquarters from 3 to 7 March 2025.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

32. Reaffirm the obligation of nuclear-weapon States not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise

acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices in accordance with article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

33. Underscore that all arrangements between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States are to be in conformity with the Treaty and without prejudice to the obligations and commitments of nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

34. Reaffirm the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

35. Reiterate the importance of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties complying with their non-proliferation obligations under article III of the Treaty and the requirement for all non-compliance concerns and outstanding issues with safeguards obligations to be resolved in conformity with the Statute of IAEA and in accordance with the respective legal obligations of States in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and the authority of the safeguards system.

36. Appreciate the ongoing efforts of IAEA to conduct verification and monitoring activities in States Parties with unresolved safeguards concerns; and urge any such State Party to maintain full cooperation with IAEA in the discharge of its mandate, including, where applicable, confirmation that enrichment and stockpile activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes and in conformity with the Treaty.

37. Express concern over existing and emerging risks of nuclear proliferation.

38. Reaffirm that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States Parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty; and underscore that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard.

39. Support the strengthening of the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards; welcome the efforts being made by IAEA to strengthen its safeguards; call upon all States to give their full and continuing support to IAEA to facilitate the implementation of safeguards agreements; and request States to adhere to their respective IAEA safeguards agreements and, where applicable, their additional protocols.

40. Recall the central importance of comprehensive safeguards agreements for the implementation by non-nuclear-weapon States of their obligations pursuant to article III of the Treaty, and note that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations.

41. Express support for IAEA to further facilitate and assist States Parties, upon request, in the conclusion, entry into force and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and amendment or rescission of small quantities protocols, and welcome the efforts of the IAEA Director General in this regard.

42. Urge the remaining States with original small quantities protocols to amend or rescind them and also urge States that are yet to do so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements, without further delay. Encourage States that are yet to do so

to consider concluding an additional protocol (see IAEA document INFCIRC 540/Corrected) thereto, with due regard for their rights regarding sovereign decision-making, bearing in mind that, once in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation.

43. Encourage IAEA efforts to strengthen the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and the Network of Analytical Laboratories, especially in developing countries.

44. Reaffirm the need to maintain an effective system of export controls on nuclear-related and dual-use items, while recognizing and upholding the inalienable rights of States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty.

45. Encourage States Parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls; and call upon all States Parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States Parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

46. Encourage States Parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions, in line with article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

47. Recognize that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State.

48. Emphasize the importance of securing nuclear and other radioactive material and enhancing international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism and other malicious acts; and, in furtherance of the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), urge all States to adopt and enforce appropriate effective national laws to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery, related materials, equipment and technology, to non-State actors, and to establish appropriate controls over related materials.

49. Support international efforts to enhance nuclear safety and security, especially through IAEA.

50. Recognize the importance of acceptance, approval or ratification by further States of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and note the importance of its full implementation and universalization; and encourage States to become Party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

51. Note the continuing interest of States Parties to the Treaty in the topic of naval nuclear propulsion, take note of the IAEA secretariat's continued engagement with the relevant Parties in accordance with the safeguards agreements of the Parties concerned and also take note of the discussions by the IAEA Board of Governors concerning safeguards arrangements related to naval nuclear propulsion. Emphasize the importance for IAEA to regularly update States on the matter and on efforts to advance safeguards approaches, legal arrangements and verification measures required for naval nuclear propulsion.

52. Recognize the contribution of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones to the non-proliferation and disarmament regime in accordance with article VII of the Treaty, while also recognizing that nuclear-weapon-free zones are not an end in themselves, but an interim measure pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

53. Support the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones and the entry into force of all protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties; and encourage

nuclear-weapon States to review their reservations and interpretive statements on existing treaties and protocols and/or to join, without reservations, the protocols of treaties establishing such zones through which they undertake the obligation to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against States Parties of such zones and to engage in dialogue in this regard with the members of the zones.

54. Reaffirm support for the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the validity of its goals and objectives until they are achieved, and recall the reaffirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States at the 2010 Review Conference of their commitment to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

55. Reaffirm also the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, including in the Middle East, and the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, including in the Middle East.

56. Reiterate the importance of advancing the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference and note the developments at all five sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, the most recent of which was convened at United Nations Headquarters in New York in November 2024.

57. Express support for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and reiterate the strong concern over the continuing advancement of the nuclear weapons and delivery systems programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in contravention of relevant Security Council resolutions.

58. Stress the urgent need for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its international obligations and the relevant Security Council resolutions, to cease all ongoing nuclear activities and to take concrete measures to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; and reiterate that, in accordance with the Treaty, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can never have the status of a nuclear-weapon State.

59. Call upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return at an early date to and fully comply with the Treaty and IAEA safeguards; and emphasize that, to contribute to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, the resolution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear weapons programme should be undertaken through negotiations and diplomacy.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

60. Reaffirm that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the Treaty, and recognize the important contribution of nuclear science and technology to addressing global challenges and the greatest socioeconomic development needs of the present time.

61. Reaffirm also that States Parties undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Urge States Parties to give preferential treatment to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries, and emphasize that transfers of nuclear

technology and international cooperation among States Parties should be in conformity with the Treaty and on a non-discriminatory basis.

62. Reiterate that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and the ongoing implementation of IAEA safeguards, as well as the highest levels of safety and security, consistent with States Parties' national legislation and respective international obligations.

63. Acknowledge the importance of providing assistance, in particular to developing countries and the least developed countries, in order to enhance their access to nuclear science and technology, through capacity-building, the provision of equipment and the strengthening of regional networking and regional cooperation frameworks, as well as of North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation. Recommit to action 56 of the 2010 action plan and continue to encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop and sustain peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

64. Reaffirm strong support for the indispensable role of IAEA in encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, in nuclear science, technology and applications, and in technology transfer to developing countries, all of which, inter alia, provide a tangible manifestation of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in line with the Treaty.

65. Support the strengthening of IAEA technical cooperation activities, with the aim of promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy, which contributes to efforts in accelerating the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, especially for food and agriculture, human health, water resource management, the environment, industry, knowledge management, and nuclear energy programming, planning and production. Call upon States Parties to make every effort and take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.

66. Welcome IAEA initiatives for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, such as Rays of Hope, Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution, Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action, Atoms4Food and the Peaceful Uses Initiative, as well as the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme and the Lise Meitner Programme in the area of women in nuclear; and urge States to take concrete measures to further promote international cooperation on nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

67. Stress the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security, including relevant conventions, for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and reaffirm the central role of IAEA in the development of safety standards and nuclear security guidance, based on best practices, and in strengthening and coordinating international cooperation on nuclear safety and security.

68. Take note of the IAEA programme of assistance to support Ukraine in maintaining continued nuclear safety and security, including through the continued presence of IAEA staff at all nuclear power plants, and encourage further efforts of IAEA and the concerned States Parties to ensure nuclear safety and security in all concerned facilities, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

69. Recall the continuing validity of IAEA decision GC(53)/DEC/13 of 18 September 2009, entitled "Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction", and recognize that attacks or threats of attack, including cyberattacks, against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes may compromise nuclear security.