



Security Council

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The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 1 November 2024 ([S/PRST/2024/7](#)), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed about the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) every six months. It provides an assessment of the major political and security trends in Central Africa since the report dated 29 November 2024 ([S/2024/865](#)). It also provides an update on the situation in the Lake Chad basin region, pursuant to Council resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#).

II. Major developments in the Central Africa subregion

A. Political, peace and security developments and trends

2. As several countries in the region have started to prepare for elections, the reporting period was characterized by intensifying political debates, government reshuffles and growing calls for fair and transparent elections. It was also marked by the completion of the political transition in Chad. Progress towards the full restoration of constitutional order was made in Gabon, with the holding of the presidential election and planning for the upcoming legislative and local elections. The conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to escalate, adding to regional insecurity (see [S/2025/176](#) and [S/2025/202](#)).

Political development and trends

3. In Angola, on 16 and 17 December, the ruling party, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, held its eighth extraordinary congress, during which the party statutes were revised and the obligation for the party leader to be the candidate for the presidential election was abolished. On 25 January, the authorities announced that a group named Frente Unida de Reedificação da Ordem Africana had planned to launch terrorist attacks and destabilize the country during the visit of the then President of the United States of America in December 2024, but that the plan had been thwarted. On 30 January, the main opposition party, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, denounced the allegations of a planned coup as an



attempt by the ruling party to create instability and remain in power. On 27 March, the leader of the Frente Unida group was convicted by a court of having planned a terrorist attack and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Meanwhile, on 6 March, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola submitted a petition for the Constitutional Court to condemn the Government's failure to act on the constitutional mandate to hold local elections, which have not been held, despite provisions for such elections being set out in the Constitution of 2010.

4. Through a decree enacted on 7 December, the President of Burundi, Evariste Ndayishimiye, announced that legislative and local elections would be held on 5 June 2025. Eligibility requirements for candidates were also set, including a stipulation that independent candidates must not have been members of a political party for at least one year. After having all their candidates for the upcoming legislative elections rejected by the Independent National Electoral Commission on the grounds of infringement of electoral laws, a newly formed coalition, Burundi Bwa Bose, and the opposition Congrès national pour la liberté party appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court on 2 January. On 7 January, the Court granted the applicants three days to submit revised candidate lists. It also upheld the decision by the Electoral Commission requiring the coalition to exclude opposition figure Agathon Rwasa and other members of Congrès national pour la liberté from its candidate lists.

5. In Cameroon, political parties were preparing for the presidential election scheduled for October 2025. The President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, had not yet declared his candidacy, while the head of the Central Committee of the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement, reaffirmed on 24 March, during the celebration to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the party, that the incumbent would be the party's presumptive candidate. On 3 January, members of the Catholic clergy in Cameroon criticized Mr. Biya's long tenure and governance, as well as his purported intention of seeking an additional term. Several bishops, mostly from the Far North and West Regions, called upon Mr. Biya not to run for another term. On 27 January, the National Council of Traditional Rulers of Cameroon expressed its support for Mr. Biya's candidacy. Opposition figures, such as Maurice Kamto and Cabral Libii, continued to rally support for their own candidacies.

6. On 5 December, Elections Cameroon reinstated 120,000 voters who had been removed from the electoral roll because no biometric fingerprints were held on file for them. The reinstatement was prompted by concerns raised by Mr. Kamto, who accused Elections Cameroon of rejecting over 73,000 registrations, primarily in regions that were supportive of his Mouvement pour la renaissance du Cameroun party. His party also accused the Director General of Elections Cameroon of violating the electoral code by not publishing the updated national electoral roll by 30 December. The case was brought to the Constitutional Court and the Court of Appeal, both of which declared that they lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. On 17 February, members of the opposition and civil society submitted a proposal for a revised electoral code to the President, which, among other changes, provides for the expansion of the use of biometric technology in the electoral process, the harmonization of deadlines for filing electoral disputes, the removal of obstacles to obtaining birth certificates and the introduction of national identity cards to ease voter registration.

7. On 9 December, the President of Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, was awarded the rank of Marshal by the National Transitional Council. Previously, the only person to hold that title had been his late father, Idriss Déby Itno. On 29 January, the President was named National Chair of the ruling party, Mouvement patriotique du salut. Some opposition members criticized his active role in the party, citing the Constitution, which prohibits the Head of State from holding a position within a political party.

8. Legislative, provincial and municipal elections were held in Chad on 29 December. These were the first legislative elections since 2011 and the reported voter turnout was 52.37 per cent. The ruling party won 124 of 188 seats in the National Assembly, followed by Rassemblement national des démocrates tchadiens – Le Réveil, winning 12, Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès, winning 8, and Union nationale pour la démocratie et le renouveau, winning 7. Women represent 34 per cent of the new Assembly, marking an increase since the previous legislature. The ruling party also secured 75.1 per cent of seats in the new provincial councils and 87.8 per cent of seats for municipal councillors. Some irregularities were reported and a few parties contested the results. Les Transformateurs (the main opposition party, led by the former Transition Prime Minister, Succès Masra) and Groupe de concertation des acteurs politiques (a coalition of opposition parties) boycotted the electoral process, denouncing a lack of credibility and transparency. On 29 January, Mr. Masra expressed his willingness to work with the President, acknowledging the results of the presidential and legislative elections, which his party did not contest. On 4 February, Allah-Maye Halina was reappointed Prime Minister of Chad. On 6 February, the Prime Minister announced a new Cabinet, comprising 37 members, including 12 women. Women make up 32.4 per cent of the new Cabinet, compared with 29.6 per cent in the previous Government.

9. On 25 February, senatorial elections were held in Chad, marking the final step of the political transition. The ruling party secured 43 of 46 seats, while Rassemblement national des démocrates tchadiens – Le Réveil and Union pour le renouveau et la démocratie parties won 2 seats and 1 seat, respectively. On 4 March, the Constitutional Council announced the final results. Two complaints from candidates were upheld, resulting in the ruling party losing one seat to each of the above-mentioned parties. On the same day, the President appointed the remaining 23 senators by decree, as provided for by the Constitution. On 19 March, a new national demobilization, disarmament and reintegration strategy was validated at the technical level, rendering members of non-State armed groups eligible for the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process, whether or not they are signatories to the Doha Agreement for Peace and the Participation of the Political-Military Movements in the Inclusive National and Sovereign Dialogue.

10. On 16 May, Mr. Masra was arrested at his home in N'Djamena. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, the arrest is linked to intercommunal violence on 14 May in Mandakao, Logone Occidental Province, during which 42 people were killed. Mr. Masra is accused by the authorities of instigating the violence through social media. He faces charges including incitement to hatred, complicity in armed violence, murder, arson and the desecration of graves. Mr. Masra's lawyers described the charges as politically motivated and his party called for his immediate release.

11. On 10 January, the President of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, issued a decree to reshuffle the Government. On 27 February, he appointed a Vice-High Commissioner and three Commissioners of the High Commission for the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. A former rebel leader, Pastor Ntumi, expressed discontent with the appointments, alleging a lack of consultation. On 19 April, Congolese authorities signed an agreement with the United Nations Development Programme on the implementation of a project to support the reintegration of 7,500 ex-combatants, 2,500 persons formerly associated with those combatants and 10,000 vulnerable members of the community and residents of the Pool Department.

12. In Equatorial Guinea, the signature of bilateral agreements with such countries as Angola, Chad and Gabon represented a step towards greater regional integration. On 5 December, several individuals received sentences ranging from 20 years to life in prison for the murder of Jose Lima Gonzalo, who was the brother-in-law of the

President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. On 12 February, a trial involving the national electricity company started, in which 23 individuals, including the former Minister and Deputy Minister of Electricity, are accused of embezzlement of public funds and influence peddling, among other charges.

13. In Gabon, on 29 November, the Constitutional Court confirmed the results of the constitutional referendum of 16 November, in which 91.6 per cent of participants voted in favour and voter turnout was 54.2 per cent. On 15 January, the Transition President of Gabon, Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, reshuffled the Transitional Government, increasing the number of ministers by 5 to a total of 35, including 11 women, compared with 8 previously. On 20 January, the transitional parliament adopted a new electoral code. While the organization of elections remains under the purview of the Ministry of the Interior, the electoral code provides for the establishment of an independent, non-permanent supervisory body tasked with monitoring the electoral process. It further provides for two-round elections, and a 30 per cent quota for women and 20 per cent for young people on the lists of candidates put forward by political parties for the legislative and local elections. The code authorizes military personnel and magistrates to run as candidates in elections with the prior authorization of their superiors. The code also instructs that election results from each polling station be published.

14. On 23 January, the Transitional Government of Gabon announced that the presidential election, which was initially planned for August 2025 according to the transition timeline, would be held on 12 April. On 26 January, the Minister of the Interior announced the members of the new electoral supervisory body. Some opposition figures alleged that the body lacked independence. On 30 January, the former ruling party, Parti démocratique gabonais, selected a new party leader during its first extraordinary congress since the military coup d'état of August 2023. On 5 February, members of the National Commission for the Organization and Coordination of Elections and the Referendum, led by the Minister of the Interior, were sworn in by the President of the Constitutional Court. In a joint press conference on 1 March, several opposition figures called for the elections to be postponed, stating that the conditions at the time were not conducive to holding inclusive and democratic elections. On 13 February, the former Prime Minister, Alain Claude Bilie By Nze, leader of the opposition platform Ensemble pour le Gabon, said that he had been threatened and intimidated during campaign events in Woleu-Ntem Province in northern Gabon, which he viewed as attempts by the transitional authorities to silence the opposition. On 20 February, the spokesperson for the presidency of Gabon expressed the indignation of the Transition President about these events, stating that the country was moving towards national reconciliation, with freedom of speech guaranteed to all, including to members of the opposition.

15. On 9 March, the National Commission for the Organization and Coordination of Elections and the Referendum in Gabon announced that 4 of 23 presidential candidates had been validated, including Mr. Oligui Nguema and Mr. Bilie By Nze. Following the announcement, 13 of the rejected presidential candidates appealed to the Constitutional Court, which approved the candidacy of 4 of those candidates on 21 March. That decision brought the final number of validated presidential candidates to eight, including one woman. The presidential election was held on 12 April. On 25 April, the Constitutional Court confirmed the final results; Mr. Oligui Nguema won 94.85 per cent of the votes, followed by Mr. Bilie By Nze with 3.11 per cent. Voter turnout was 70.11 per cent. In a meeting held on 30 April, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union lifted the sanctions it had imposed on Gabon after the military coup d'état and authorized Gabon to immediately resume its participation in the activities of the organization. On 3 May, Mr. Oligui Nguema was inaugurated as President and on 5 May he appointed a 30-member Cabinet, including 10 women,

with the former Transition Deputy Prime Minister, Alexandre Barro Chambrier, as the Vice-President in charge of the Government.

16. On 6 January, the President of Sao Tome and Principe, Carlos Manuel Vila Nova, dismissed the Prime Minister, Patrice Trovoada, and his Government. The President cited the Government's inability to provide effective solutions to the country's challenges; the Prime Minister's prolonged overseas trips, resulting in significant and unjustifiable expenses for the national treasury without tangible benefits for the people; and a lack of strategic cooperation and institutional loyalty that undermined the relationship between the President and the Government. The majority Acção Democrática Independente party proposed several candidates for the post of Prime Minister to the President. On 12 January, the President appointed Américo d'Oliveira dos Ramos, a member of Acção Democrática Independente and the former Governor of the Central Bank, whose name had not been proposed by the party. A 10-member Government, including 4 women, was sworn in on 14 January. Mr. Trovoada, who remained the leader of Acção Democrática Independente, characterized the President's actions as unconstitutional. On 13 February, the Constitutional Court unanimously rejected the petition from the leadership of that party to annul the presidential decree appointing the new Prime Minister, and to suspend the inauguration of the new Government. On the same day, the National Assembly approved the Government's programme, in which it renewed commitments to reforming the justice and security sectors in the light of ongoing strikes by judicial employees.

Security development and trends

17. In Cameroon, insecurity in the North-West and South-West Regions persisted, with separatist groups carrying out violent attacks, kidnappings and extortion. On 7 December, an explosion and gunshots were heard in Bamenda, North-West Region, reportedly due to separatist fighters enforcing a lockdown. Civilians were caught in the crossfire, which resulted in displacement, the destruction of homes and widespread insecurity. On 7 January, in Bamenda, suspected separatist fighters set fire to the family home of Emmanuel Ngong Ndong, also known as Capo Daniel, who had been a member of separatist groups until 2023 but had since advocated a peaceful resolution. On 16 February, Cameroonian security forces reported having killed Christopher Funwi, also known as General JC, who had been a commander of the so-called "Ambazonia defence forces" armed group.

18. Intercommunal tensions and violence in Cameroon continued, with reported clashes between ethnic groups in the Adamaoua, Centre, Far North and West Regions. Clashes between Bororo and Gbaya communities in Adamaoua, as well as tensions between Musgum and Arab Choa groups in the Far North Region, led to deadly confrontations and forced displacement. Farmer-herder disputes remained a major driver of localized violence. Inflammatory language, hate speech and disinformation reportedly contributed to rising ethnic and political tensions and violence, including on 2 March in Mbalda in the Far North Region, where two researchers and their guide were mistaken for members of armed groups and killed. On 11 March, approximately 20 suspects were arrested in connection with the killings.

19. In Chad, on 8 January, a group of 24 armed men reportedly attacked the presidential palace in N'Djamena, resulting in an hour-long exchange of gunfire with members of the presidential guard. The attack left 18 assailants dead and 6 others were arrested. Two military officers were killed, while five sustained serious injuries. The investigation by the Government into the incident is ongoing.

20. Intercommunal clashes over access to natural resources persisted in Chad. Between 30 November and 10 December, violence between communities in Timbéri,

Logone Oriental Province, resulted in at least 20 deaths and 15 injuries. On 14 January, residents of Laramanaye, Logone Occidental Province, protested the killing of a local young man by herders and denounced the impunity of the perpetrators. Police forces and soldiers used live ammunition against the demonstrators, resulting in four fatalities.

21. On 17 January, the authorities of Chad and of the Central African Republic inaugurated the first multiservice border post at Bembéré, located on the border between the two countries. On 26 January, a border security agreement was signed in N'Djamena between the two countries, establishing a joint border security force. The joint border had been closed for over 10 years.

Boko Haram/Lake Chad basin crisis

22. In Cameroon, between 1 December and 15 May, 351 Boko Haram-related security incidents resulting in 54 civilian fatalities were confirmed and reported by the United Nations, compared with 66 incidents resulting in 89 civilian fatalities for the same period in 2024. In Chad, also between 1 December and 15 May, 91 Boko Haram-related security incidents resulting in 82 civilian fatalities were confirmed and reported by the United Nations, compared with 6 incidents resulting in 75 civilian fatalities for the same period in 2024. The increase in the number of incidents can be attributed to armed groups focusing on replenishing their resources, including food, medical materials and weapons, after reportedly suffering significant losses due to Nigerian air strikes and other military operations in 2024.

23. In Chad, on 18 December, unidentified armed elements attacked the village of Barkaram, Lac Province, and killed eight people. On 18 February, the army of Chad announced the end of its “Haskanite” counteroffensive operation. Launched in response to the Boko Haram attack on a military base in Lac Province at the end of October 2024, the operation reportedly resulted in the deaths of 297 alleged terrorists, 24 Chadian soldiers and 3 civilians, while 37 soldiers and 4 civilians were wounded. Sector 2 of the Multinational Joint Task Force, covering Lac and Hadjer-Lamis Provinces in Chad, which had been dissolved by Chad at the onset of Operation Haskanite, was not reinstated when the operation concluded.

24. On the night between 24 and 25 March, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) launched an attack on a post of the Multinational Joint Task Force in Wulgo, Nigeria, near Soueram in the Far North Region of Cameroon. At least 19 Cameroonian soldiers were killed. The attack involved the use of drones loaded with explosives, marking the first time such tactics had been used against Cameroonian forces.

Lord's Resistance Army

25. On 26 February, authorities in Uganda reported that one of the wives and three children of the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Joseph Kony, had agreed to be repatriated from the Central African Republic to Uganda. On 25 February, in Sam Ouandja, Central African Republic, the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic, supported by other security personnel, reportedly rescued six children who had been abducted and enslaved by LRA. An international non-governmental organization, Invisible Children, reported that, according to recent defectors, as of early 2025, Kony led a force of fewer than 100 people, the majority of whom were women and children. The group operated along the border region of north-eastern Central African Republic and the South Darfur State of the Sudan.

26. On 7 April, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court upheld the Trial Chambers decision awarding 52 million euros in reparations to the victims of former LRA commander Dominic Ongwen, rejecting his appeal. The Court also

announced that it would hold a hearing in absentia on 9 September 2025 to establish the charges against Kony.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea

27. On the night of 31 January, three crew members of a trawler sailing to Port-Gentil, Gabon, were reportedly abducted by pirates near the coast of Gabon. The abductees, who were all Senegalese nationals, were reportedly freed in Nigeria on 19 February.

28. On the night of 17 to 18 March, a tanker bearing the flag of Panama was boarded by three armed pirates south-east of Sao Tome and Principe. Shots were reportedly fired and 10 of the 18 crew members were kidnapped. The crew members, who were Indian and Romanian nationals, were reportedly freed on 13 April.

Effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on regional stability, including farmer-herder dynamics and intercommunal conflict in Central Africa

29. The subregion continued to experience the impacts of climate change, which have wide-ranging implications for regional stability. Heavy rains on 4 April triggered severe flooding in Kinshasa that killed at least 45 people, destroyed homes and disrupted transportation and power supplies. According to the Climate Application and Prediction Centre of Central Africa, from December 2024 to early April 2025, an increase of 0.5°C to 2.5°C in maximum temperatures compared with the 1991–2020 baseline was observed over a large part of Central Africa. These climatic shifts resulted in water shortages, declining crop yields and widespread livestock stress across the subregion, further worsening food insecurity and deepening economic hardship.

30. Tensions between farmers and herders led to 77 clashes over dwindling natural resources between 1 December 2024 and 31 March 2025 in Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

B. Humanitarian developments

31. As at 31 March, the total number of refugees and asylum-seekers in the 11 countries of the subregion was over 2.75 million and the total number of internally displaced persons was approximately 9.65 million. The conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo created severe humanitarian challenges, affecting neighbouring countries. As at 30 April, 71,000 individuals fleeing ongoing violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had arrived in Burundi since the beginning of 2025. The Government of Burundi recognized the refugees on a prima facie basis.

32. The conflict in the Sudan continued to have an impact on Chad and the Central African Republic. As at 30 April, over 779,580 refugees and over 220,000 Chadian returnees had sought refuge in Chad since the onset of the fighting in the Sudan in April 2023, including more than 50,000 Sudanese refugees and 25,000 Chadian returnees since January 2025. As at the same date, over 37,400 Sudanese refugees had arrived in the Central African Republic since April 2023.

33. Angola has faced cholera outbreaks in 18 of its 21 provinces since January 2025. As at 17 May, almost 20,880 cases and 628 deaths had been reported, with a fatality rate of 3 per cent. Efforts were ongoing to manage the outbreaks through detection, community engagement and vaccination campaigns, led by the Government and

supported by the United Nations. The Central Emergency Response Fund allocated \$1.8 million to address the outbreak.

34. On 12 February, Chad launched a humanitarian response plan, requiring \$1.45 billion and targeting 5.5 million of the 7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. About 3.7 million people were expected to face severe food insecurity during the June to August lean season, and 2.1 million children under 5 were projected to suffer from malnutrition.

35. Cameroon continued to face the humanitarian impact of the crises in the Far North, North-West and South-West Regions and the influx of refugees from the Central African Republic. Overall, the country had more than 1 million internally displaced persons and hosted over 410,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers, as at 30 April. In 2025, 3.3 million people require humanitarian assistance, with 2.1 million targeted for support at a cost of \$359.3 million. The humanitarian response plan was only 6.8 per cent funded as at 7 April. In the North-West and South-West Regions, nearly 490,000 internally displaced people and 490,000 returnees had been uprooted and were facing heightened protection risks and limited access to essential services. As at 30 April, the East Region hosted more than 250,000 refugees from the Central African Republic, placing additional pressure on overstretched host communities. Across the Far North, North-West and South-West Regions, humanitarian access was being impeded by insecurity, poor infrastructure and administrative barriers.

Lake Chad basin crisis

36. Activities by armed groups in Lac Province in Chad continued to cause internal displacement, with the province hosting more than 225,600 internally displaced persons and 42,365 returnees as at 30 April. In the Far North Region of Cameroon, as at the same date, there were more than 475,800 internally displaced persons and 205,000 returnees due to attacks by armed groups and intercommunal violence, as well as more than 125,000 refugees.

37. In December 2024, Foulé Department, in Lac Province, experienced rising water levels that caused flooding and resulted in secondary displacement. Climatic shocks, notably flooding, continued to disrupt agriculture, damage infrastructure and threaten livelihoods.

38. On 5 February, the Governments of Chad and Nigeria and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees signed a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement on Nigerian refugees, creating an appropriate framework under which returns would occur. On 6 February, the Governor of Borno State led a Nigerian delegation to repatriate 7,790 Nigerian refugees from Baga-Sola, Chad.

C. Human rights trends

39. In Angola, in January, a presidential pardon issued on 25 December led to the release of 51 individuals, including journalists and social media influencers who had criticized the President, as well as individuals who had been arrested for planning a protest in solidarity with motorcycle taxi drivers in September 2023.

40. In April, the President of the National Independent Human Rights Commission of Burundi reportedly left the country following allegations of political bias and financial mismanagement. On 5 May, the Parliament appointed new members of the Commission, replacing all previously serving members.

41. In Cameroon, ahead of the presidential election, an increase in the number of alleged incidents of restrictions on freedom of expression and association was reported. On 6 December, the Minister of Territorial Administration signed five decrees, banning two civil society organizations and suspending the activities of three others on the grounds of “lack of authorization and activities likely to undermine the integrity of the national financial system”. On 6 February, the Divisional Officer of Yaoundé IV Subdivision banned the opposition political party Mouvement pour la renaissance du Cameroun from participating in the National Youth Day celebrations on 11 February, citing the party’s lack of representation in the National Assembly. On 7 February, the opposition Cameroon Party for National Reconciliation was also excluded from the national celebrations.

42. In the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon, armed separatist groups perpetrated grave human rights abuses, including killings, kidnappings, extortion and the enforcement of weekly lockdowns that severely restricted freedom of movement and access to basic services. On 9 February, armed separatists reportedly killed two civilians in Naka, and another individual in Bamenda, in the North-West Region. Such incidents were part of a broader pattern of violence by armed groups that also targeted students, teachers and civilians for refusing to comply with imposed lockdowns. Also in the North-West Region, armed separatists abducted a British Catholic missionary and his Cameroonian aide on 2 April and a secondary education delegate on 5 April. They also killed a youth coordinator for the Social Democratic Front on 7 April. Allegations of serious human rights violations by Government security and defence forces persisted. On 23 February, six civilians were reportedly killed and two others injured in Pinyin, Mezam Division, North-West Region, during a military operation at a bar said to be frequented by armed separatist groups. According to the Government, suspected perpetrators were sanctioned.

43. In Chad, on 10 December, 10 victims of the deadly protests of 20 October 2022 filed a complaint against several high-ranking civilian and military officials of the transitional government alleging torture, attempted murder, kidnapping, arbitrary arrest and detention, intentional assault and battery, and detention in an unofficial facility. On 21 January, the presidency issued an ordinance on the prevention and repression of violence against women and girls, which reinforced existing preventive and punitive measures. Meanwhile, reports of multiple incidents of sexual violence emerged, including the case of a 17-year-old girl raped while in police custody on 7 February. In a communiqué, judicial authorities stated that the perpetrators had been arrested and faced legal proceedings. On 11 February, two human rights defenders received death threats from senior military officers in connection with a child trafficking case. On 20 and 21 February, the Office of the Mediator of the Republic and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) organized a workshop in N’Djamena to strengthen the technical capacities of the former on transitional justice and to prepare a road map for the development of a national reconciliation and peacebuilding strategy by the end of June 2025.

44. In Equatorial Guinea, 37 individuals associated with protests on the island of Annobón in July 2024 were reportedly still being detained under inhumane conditions at the time of writing. In March 2025, they reportedly appeared in court, but were denied access to their lawyers. Several human rights defenders continued to face threats of suspension or imprisonment. Meanwhile, the report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of Equatorial Guinea, the review of which was held in November 2024, was adopted by the Human Rights Council at its fifty-eighth session, in March 2025 (A/HRC/58/14). Equatorial Guinea accepted 163 of the 218 recommendations received and took note of the other 55 (A/HRC/58/14/Add.1). At the time of writing, with the support of OHCHR, a national mechanism chaired by

the Prime Minister was developing a national action plan to ensure effective implementation of the accepted recommendations.

45. In Gabon, on 18 December, the transitional authorities lifted the curfew that had been in place since the military takeover of August 2023, following a public outcry over mass arrests during an operation in the night of 13 to 14 December, which led to the detention of 348 people, including 111 women, for curfew violations. On 5 February, an online influencer was arrested and detained after posting images of a hospital emergency department affected by power outages. His arrest, reportedly following a complaint from the hospital administration, raised concerns over restrictions on the right to freedom of expression. The influencer was released on 6 February, while a protest against his arrest planned for 8 February was banned.

46. In the Congo, on 29 January, a coalition of nine civil society organizations called upon the authorities to adopt legislation protecting the right to peaceful assembly, citing concerns over restrictions on the freedom of association and prior authorization requirements.

47. In Rwanda, on 4 December, the trial of eight opposition activists and a journalist began after three years of preventive detention. The activists and the journalist were arrested on allegations of participating in and covering a training session on non-violent action and campaign planning organized by an unregistered political pressure group. They face charges that include forming a criminal association, conspiracy and organizing unlawful demonstrations and, if convicted, would face prison sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment. The trial was adjourned sine die.

D. Socioeconomic trends

48. The economy in the subregion continued to grow steadily, with a projected gross domestic product growth rate of 4 per cent in 2025, according to the African Development Bank. On 13 December, Sao Tome and Principe officially graduated from the category of least developed countries.

49. Concerns over growing external imbalance along with high public deficit and debt levels persisted. On 16 December, at the initiative of the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, and the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadera, an extraordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) was held in Yaoundé to address the sustainability of high public debt levels, macroeconomic instability and the fragility of the financial system in the CEMAC zone. Held in the context of a significant decline in foreign exchange reserves in the subregion, the extraordinary session resulted in commitments to reforms, including measures aimed at ensuring financial stability.

50. Rising public debt and reduced external financing compelled Governments to adjust public spending while increasing and diversifying revenue sources. On 20 January, the Congo announced a comprehensive plan to address its debt challenges, with a focus on adjusting borrowing and spending practices and increasing the country's foreign exchange reserves. In Cameroon, concerns mounted over debt repayment, while the inflation rate was at 4.5 per cent in 2024. Economic growth remained below the pre-pandemic trajectory. The reduction in fuel subsidies, and increases in taxation on mobile money transactions and essential goods, as well as increased tax collection enforcement measures, led to public dissatisfaction.

51. Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sao Tome and Principe had the highest inflation rates in the subregion in 2024, with a rate of 28 per

cent being recorded in Angola. On 10 January, trade unions in Angola announced a new series of strikes after the Government declared that it would postpone the 25 per cent increase in public sector wages that it had approved in May 2024. The Government subsequently clarified that the increase would be effective as of March 2025, with retroactive payments for January and February, which prevented the announced strikes.

52. The Government of Cameroon promoted the local production of key commodities such as wheat, rice, maize and palm oil, but the country remained heavily reliant on food imports. Food insecurity was particularly severe in conflict-affected regions. In Chad, flooding and crop losses are expected to further depress production and household incomes. Consequently, the extreme poverty rate in the country was projected to increase by an additional 1.2 percentage points, reaching 40.9 per cent in 2025. In March 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund completed the sixth and final review of the Extended Credit Facility programme for the Congo, resulting in the approval of a disbursement of 26 billion CFA francs (approximately \$43.7 million). The programme performance was mixed and the country has taken corrective action to address the unmet criteria.

III. Activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

A. Good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation

Cameroon

53. From 10 to 15 March, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa visited Yaoundé and held meetings with the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President of Elections Cameroon, as well as with representatives of political parties, civil society organizations and religious leaders. In his meetings, the Special Representative expressed concern about the resurgence of hate speech and inter-ethnic violence in the run-up to the elections and encouraged all stakeholders to engage in dialogue.

Chad

54. From 24 to 28 February, the Special Representative visited N'Djamena, where he met with the President of Chad, the President of the National Assembly and the Mediator of the Republic. They discussed possible United Nations support in advancing the country's post-transition priorities, including decentralization, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, stabilization, reconciliation and inclusive development.

Congo

55. From 19 to 21 February, the Special Representative visited Brazzaville and met with the President of the Congo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and various stakeholders. Discussions were focused on the pre-electoral environment, calls from the opposition and civil society actors for an opening of civic space and dialogue, and the impact of the ongoing crisis in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Gabon

56. Throughout the reporting period, the Special Representative held regular meetings with the transitional authorities and other political actors in Gabon. Discussions centred on institutional reforms and the electoral process. He encouraged authorities to continue with the next steps of the transition towards the restoration of constitutional order in a spirit of inclusivity, transparency and openness.

57. Following a request by the transitional authorities in November 2024 for electoral technical assistance by the United Nations, an electoral needs assessment mission, led by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, was deployed to Libreville from 10 to 20 December, resulting in the provision of electoral support through the United Nations Development Programme, with a focus on continued good offices by the Special Representative and the provision of support to the Ministry for the Interior and civil society.

Sao Tome and Principe

58. On 10 and 11 January, the Special Representative visited Sao Tome and Principe shortly after the decision by the President, to dismiss the Government. He encouraged political actors in the country to resolve their differences through dialogue.

B. Enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation

Collaboration with regional, subregional and intergovernmental organizations, including support provided to the Economic Community of Central African States

59. On 30 November and 1 December, UNOCA participated in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) regional workshop on the humanitarian situation in Central Africa, held in Malabo. A total of 58 representatives from national authorities, regional and international organizations and civil society discussed, among other topics, strengthening the subregional humanitarian system and developing coordinated strategies for effective responses to humanitarian crises in Central Africa. Prior to the conference, the Special Representative met with the President of the Commission of ECCAS, Gilberto da Piedade Verissimo, with whom he agreed to organize a joint retreat for UNOCA and the ECCAS Commission.

60. On 7 February, the Special Representative attended and delivered opening remarks at the extraordinary Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS, held in Malabo. The primary focus of the conference was on addressing the humanitarian challenges in the subregion. The leaders expressed their concern about the humanitarian crisis resulting from the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. They tasked the President of the ECCAS Commission with establishing an ECCAS humanitarian assistance fund and developing the ECCAS regional humanitarian policy. The final communiqué condemned “Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) supported by Rwanda” and called for the “immediate withdrawal of the Rwanda Defence Forces from Congolese territory”.

C. Support to the United Nations, regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security

Lake Chad basin crisis

61. Further to their joint visit to Chad in November 2024, the Special Representative for Central Africa and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West

Africa and the Sahel and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) visited Nigeria from 27 to 31 January within the framework of Security Council resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#). They visited Bama in Borno State, a garrison town hosting internally displaced persons, returnees and former members of Boko Haram/ISWAP.

62. On 29 January, the Special Representative for Central Africa attended the fifth Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum in Maiduguri, Nigeria (see [S/2025/187](#)). In all his engagements, the Special Representative reiterated support for the implementation of the adjusted Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region and called for continued collaboration among member States, particularly regarding the Multinational Joint Task Force.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea

63. On 17 December, UNOCA, UNOWAS and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime facilitated a workshop in Abuja to conclude the technical review process of the Yaoundé maritime security architecture and related code of conduct (see [S/2025/187](#)).

Climate, peace and security

64. On 11 December, UNOCA and the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding co-hosted a capacity-building workshop on the climate-peace-security nexus for Congolese officials in Kinshasa.

Transhumance and farmer-herder conflicts

65. On 26 and 27 February, UNOCA and UNOWAS organized a workshop in Dakar on strengthening conflict resolution mechanisms relating to peaceful coexistence between farmers and herders and the management of transhumance (see [S/2025/187](#)). During the event, a collection of best practices for the prevention and resolution of conflicts between farmers and herders in West and Central Africa, which was compiled under the leadership of UNOCA, was published.

D. Enhancing United Nations coherence and coordination in the subregion

Internal United Nations exchanges, collaboration, coordination and joint initiatives

66. On 17 February, UNOCA organized an online meeting with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and UNOWAS to share experiences and best practices across the subregion in relation to addressing the strategic needs and priorities of women and their participation in peacebuilding processes. The meeting resulted in the establishment of a technical exchange group on the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda in Central Africa.

67. During an online meeting on 8 April, UNOCA and UNOWAS addressed issues of common interest such as climate change and transhumance, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and violent extremism in the Lake Chad basin. The Offices agreed on joint regional activities and initiatives to enhance their respective programmes for 2025.

IV. Observations and recommendations

68. The Central Africa subregion is facing complex security, humanitarian and economic challenges. Elections have been held in Chad and Gabon and are planned to be held by the end of the year in Burundi, Cameroon and the Central African Republic. Inclusive, credible and peaceful elections are essential to consolidate democratic institutions and establish support and legitimacy for efforts to comprehensively address the multidimensional challenges faced by the subregion. I call upon all stakeholders to ensure the independence of electoral institutions and uphold the integrity of electoral processes while respecting fundamental freedoms.

69. I welcome the completion of the political transition in Chad and call upon the Chadian authorities to harness this momentum to advance key reforms in areas such as decentralization, national reconciliation and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It will be essential to ensure that these efforts are inclusive and foster the meaningful participation of all segments of society. I welcome the commitment of the authorities to transitional justice and urge them to ensure accountability for all human rights violations and abuses, including those that may have occurred during the transitional period. I remain particularly concerned that the continued massive influx of Sudanese refugees is increasingly straining social cohesion and national resources in Chad, at a time when many Chadian nationals remain displaced as a result of the floods in 2024, the rising waters of Lake Chad and continued attacks by Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups. At the same time, I am alarmed by severe cutbacks in financial contributions, which are compelling humanitarian agencies to reduce or end life-saving support, including to the most vulnerable. It is essential that the international community increase its support to humanitarian, peace and development efforts in Chad.

70. I welcome the holding of the presidential election in Gabon, which marked a key milestone towards the restoration of constitutional order. The forthcoming legislative, senatorial and local elections provide important opportunities to further increase inclusive political representation. I call upon the authorities to pursue the implementation of governance and institutional reforms in line with the new legislative frameworks. I call upon the international community to continue to support Gabon throughout this pivotal period.

71. Cameroon continues to face complex challenges in its Far North, North-West and South-West Regions. I reiterate the importance of finding inclusive political, Cameroonian-led solutions to the crises and reiterate the availability of United Nations support in that regard. The protection of civilians in the affected regions in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, as applicable, and human rights law is of vital importance. I call upon international partners to step up their support to help the Government in its reconstruction and development efforts in the Far North, North-West and South-West Regions.

72. I commend the leaders of Sao Tome and Principe for their ability to resolve political disagreements through existing institutional mechanisms. I call upon all stakeholders to continue to advance long-needed reforms and enter the 2026 electoral period with strengthened institutions.

73. The resurgence of attacks by terrorist groups in the Lake Chad basin is alarming. Regional security challenges can only be addressed through cross-border cooperation. Amid concern over waning commitment to the Multinational Joint Task Force (see [S/2024/865](#) and [S/2024/871](#)), galvanizing sustained engagement and preserving cooperation in the Joint Task Force remains vital for regional stability. While welcoming the progress made by the Lake Chad Basin Commission in implementing the Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by

Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region, greater support from the international community is needed for these two complementary mechanisms, which are key to the restoration of regional stability.

74. The human rights situation in the subregion continues to be of concern, particularly with regard to gender-based violence and restrictions on freedom of expression and association. I call upon all Governments in the subregion to address these issues, given the inextricable connection between respect for human rights, peace, security and sustainable development.

75. High levels of public debt and limited fiscal space persist, impeding the ability of Governments to deliver necessary social and economic services and heightening the risk of negatively affecting social cohesion. In this regard, I welcome the commitments to reforms made by States members of CEMAC. I also reiterate the urgency of the reform of the international financial architecture called for in the Pact for the Future.

76. I deplore the deteriorating humanitarian situations in the subregion, exacerbated not only by escalating conflicts but also by the growing impact of climate change. I commend the decision by ECCAS to establish a humanitarian assistance fund to collectively address these humanitarian challenges. The conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to add to the suffering of the population, especially of women and children. I strongly urge all parties to commit to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, to comply with their respective obligations under Security Council resolution [2773 \(2025\)](#) and to continue dialogue in good faith in search of a sustainable and peaceful solution to this crisis.

77. I express my appreciation to the Governments of the subregion, the African Union, ECCAS, CEMAC, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Gulf of Guinea Commission and other regional and subregional institutions for their continued collaboration with UNOCA. I remain grateful to Gabon for its hospitality towards and support for UNOCA.

78. Lastly, I would like to thank my Special Representative, Abdou Abarry, and the staff of UNOCA for their continuing commitment to and support for regional efforts to advance the cause of peace and security in Central Africa.
