



Security Council

Distr.: General
25 April 2025

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

Forty-first semi-annual report of the Secretary-General

I. Background

1. The present report is the forty-first semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). It provides a review and an assessment of the implementation of the resolution since the issuance of the previous report ([S/2024/723](#)), which covered developments until 16 September 2024. The present report covers developments until 28 March 2025.

II. Implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

2. Exchanges of fire across the Blue Line between Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces escalated dramatically during the reporting period. The launch by the Israel Defense Forces of Operation Northern Arrows on 23 September, with ground operations north of the Blue Line starting on 1 October, represented a new phase of the conflict. Heavy Israeli bombardments across Lebanon, including in Beirut, led to significant casualties, displacement and destruction until a cessation of hostilities came into effect on 27 November 2024. Intensified daily attacks by Hizbullah into Israel also resulted in casualties, displacement and damage to civilian infrastructure. Those developments are covered in detail in the two most recent reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) ([S/2024/817](#) and [S/2025/153](#)). As a result of the hostilities, the leadership, capabilities and access to financial resources of Hizbullah were affected. In addition, political developments in the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period led to renewed engagement with Lebanon on outstanding issues, including border delineation and demarcation. Hizbullah has acknowledged that the fall of the Government of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Arab Republic affected its ability to resupply. Meanwhile, the Lebanese State made efforts to extend its authority throughout its territory, and increasingly so since the cessation of hostilities entered into effect on 27 November. In that context, the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed greater numbers of troops to southern Lebanon and several positions where armed Palestinian factions across Lebanon had previously been present, while conducting weapons seizures.



A. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon

3. In its resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#), the Security Council reaffirmed its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the country, in accordance with the Taif Accords of 1989, to which all the political parties in Lebanon had committed themselves. That objective has remained the priority of United Nations efforts.

4. The reporting period was marked by a dramatic escalation in hostilities between Hizbullah and Israel. On 17 and 18 September, thousands of pagers and handheld radios primarily used by Hizbullah exploded simultaneously, causing at least 40 fatalities, including two children, and more than 3,400 injuries, including to the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Lebanon. Subsequently, Israel conducted intense waves of air strikes against what it stated were Hizbullah targets across Lebanon, including in the capital, Beirut. In identical letters dated 19 September 2024 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/79/367-S/2024/685](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that this "large-scale cyberattack [...] targeting thousands of people of different age groups in large and densely populated areas [...] is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights, and should be classified as a war crime". In a letter dated 18 September 2024 to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/79/359-S/2024/684](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations denounced the events as attacks against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, noting that his country's ambassador had also been targeted. In a letter dated 1 October addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2024/713](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated: "Iran carried out a series of missile attacks against the military and security targets of the Israeli regime [...] in response to [...] the injuring of Iran's Ambassador to Lebanon due to the deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilians in Lebanon by detonating pagers on 17 September 2024, and the assassinations of the Secretary-General of Hizbullah in Lebanon and General Abbas Nilforoushan, an Iranian senior military adviser, in Beirut on 27 September 2024" (see [S/2024/817](#)).

5. On 1 October, the Israel Defense Forces started a ground operation in Lebanon, carrying out incursions across southern Lebanon, where, they stated, they had engaged with and allegedly captured some Hizbullah members, dismantled Hizbullah positions, tunnels and arms depots, and demolished infrastructure, including of a civilian and religious nature. The Israel Defense Forces intensified their air campaign, striking targets across Lebanon, including in northern Lebanon and along the Lebanon-Syrian Arab Republic border. Hizbullah claimed responsibility for multiple daily attacks on targets in northern Israel and the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan, using rockets, missiles, artillery and offensive drones. Those developments, as well as the fatalities and displacement, including of women and children, and the material damage on both sides of the Blue Line that resulted from these hostilities are covered in detail in the two most recent reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) ([S/2024/817](#) and [S/2025/153](#)).

6. Following these intense hostilities, on 26 November, the United States of America and France made public the announcement of a cessation of hostilities and related commitments on enhanced security arrangements and towards the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), which was circulated at their request as a document of the Security Council ([S/2024/870](#), annex). The announcement provides that "Israel and Lebanon will implement a cessation of

hostilities beginning at 04:00 hours (IST/EET), November 27, 2024”. It also contains several commitments related to the cessation of hostilities, including, inter alia, that “Israel will withdraw its forces in a phased manner south of the Blue Line, and in parallel the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] will deploy to positions in the Southern Litani Area” and will dismantle “unauthorized sites and infrastructure and confiscat[e] unauthorized arms and related materiel” in a period that “should not exceed 60 days”. In addition, the announcement indicates that “[t]hese understandings reflect steps to which Israel and Lebanon are committed in order to implement fully United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, recognizing that UNSCR 1701 also calls for full implementation of its predecessor UNSC resolutions, including “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon” [...]. The Cabinet of Israel endorsed the announcement on 26 November, and the then caretaker Cabinet of Lebanon endorsed it on 27 November. In a Presidential Statement issued on 16 January (S/PRST/2025/1), the Security Council welcomed the cessation of hostilities and called for the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the previous relevant resolutions by all parties, notably resolutions 1680 (2006) and 1559 (2004).

7. On 26 January, the United States announced that “[t]he arrangement between Lebanon and Israel, monitored by the United States, will continue to be in effect until February 18, 2025”. The United States added that “[t]he Government of Lebanon, the Government of Israel, and the Government of the United States will also begin negotiations for the return of Lebanese prisoners captured after October 7, 2023”. On 18 February, the Israel Defense Forces withdrew from population centres in southern Lebanon, but they subsequently retained a presence in five locations and two “buffer zones” in southern Lebanon. On 11 March, the Deputy Presidential Special Envoy of the United States for the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, announced that “we are bringing together Lebanon and Israel for talks aimed at diplomatically resolving [...]: the release of Lebanese prisoners, the remaining disputed points along the Blue Line, and the remaining five points where Israeli forces are still deployed [...]”.

8. Meanwhile, Lebanon witnessed considerable developments on the domestic political front. On 9 January, after a 26-month presidential vacancy, the Parliament of Lebanon elected the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun, as the country’s fourteenth Head of State. President Aoun secured the support of 99 out of 128 Members of Parliament in the second round of voting. In his inaugural address that same day, Mr. Aoun said that “today begins a new phase in Lebanon’s history” and pledged to pursue justice, the independence of the judiciary, and reforms, as well as to ensure Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence and “positive neutrality”. Furthermore, he pledged to work through the armed forces and the Supreme Defence Council “to confirm the State’s right to hold a monopoly over the possession of weapons” and “to discuss a comprehensive defence policy as part of a national security strategy on diplomatic, economic and military levels, enabling the Lebanese State [...] to remove Israeli occupation and repel its aggression against all Lebanese territories”. In addition, he pledged “to uphold the right of the Lebanese State to exercise its authority over all Lebanese territories, including the Palestinian refugee camps [...]”.

9. On 13 January, following binding consultations with parliamentary blocs, Mr. Aoun designated Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister and tasked him with forming a government. Mr. Salam was backed by 84 of 128 parliamentarians. In remarks after meeting with Mr. Aoun and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, on 14 January, Mr. Salam stated that it was “time to start a new chapter” that requires “serious work to fully implement Security Council resolution 1701 and all the provisions of the ceasefire agreement [...]” and “restore the authority of the Lebanese State over all its territory through its own forces, as explicitly stated in the Taif Agreement.” He also emphasized the need for political reforms, an independent judiciary and effective

security institutions, and pledged to maintain the country's unity and national partnership.

10. On 8 February, Mr. Aoun signed the decree forming Prime Minister Salam's "government of reform and rescue". Five of the 24 ministers are women. On 26 February, the Parliament of Lebanon adopted the ministerial statement, in which the Government committed itself to "taking all necessary measures to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation and to extend the state's sovereignty over all its territories, exclusively with its own forces". The Government also stated that "we want a State that has exclusive authority over decisions of war and peace" and affirmed its commitment to implement the pledge that Mr. Aoun made when he took his oath of office to ensure the Lebanese State monopoly over the possession of weapons. It called for the adoption of "a national security strategy at the military, diplomatic and economic levels". In addition, the Government affirmed "[...] the right of the Lebanese State to exercise its full authority over all Lebanese territories, including the Palestinian camps [...]". In a televised interview on 27 February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Youssef Raji, said that "the ministerial statement stipulates the government's commitment to implement 1701, in all its provisions, which literally stipulates resolutions 1559 and 1680, i.e. disarming all armed organizations in Lebanon, including Hizbullah".

11. Following the fall of the Assad regime in the Syrian Arab Republic on 8 December, the country's then caretaker authorities affirmed their willingness to respect the political independence and sovereignty of Lebanon.

12. Mr. Aoun, upon taking his oath of office on 9 January, noted the "historic opportunity to build a serious and friendly dialogue with the Syrian State with the objective of resolving all outstanding issues between [them], particularly the issue of respecting the independence and sovereignty of both countries, border control in both directions and not intervening in the internal affairs of either one [...]". During an official visit to Damascus on 11 January, the then caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stressed that "the priority is to demarcate the land and sea borders between Lebanon and Syria, and there will be a specialized committee for this matter, and we will work to fully control the land borders to stop any smuggling operation, and we will cooperate in this matter." The then caretaker Syrian authorities stated that "it was [...] agreed to recover all Syrian detainees in Lebanese prisons, secure the borders on both sides and cooperate in the fight against drugs". In that connection, the Government of Lebanon, in its ministerial statement, stated that "[t]he Government believes that we have an opportunity to start a serious dialogue with the Syrian Arab Republic aimed at ensuring respect for the sovereignty and independence of both countries, controlling and demarcating the borders on both sides, not interfering in the internal affairs of either country and working to resolve the issue of displaced Syrians".

13. On 10 December, the then caretaker Minister of the Interior of Lebanon, Bassam Mawlawi, reportedly announced that nine Lebanese detainees held in Syrian prisons, including one who had been held since 1992, had been returned to Lebanon. He added that efforts were being made to determine the whereabouts of the Lebanese detainees who were still missing. On the same day, the caretaker Prime Minister announced the formation of a crisis cell to follow up on the matter, in cooperation with the National Commission for Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Persons.

14. Following announcements and reports that the Israel Defense Forces would retain a presence in five locations and two "buffer zones" north of the Blue Line after 18 February, Mr. Aoun, Mr. Berri and Mr. Salam issued a joint statement calling on the Security Council "to compel Israel's immediate withdrawal", describing any continued Israeli presence on Lebanese soil as "occupation" and stating that Lebanon

was determined to use “all available means to ensure Israel’s withdrawal”. They each reiterated that stance publicly on several occasions.

15. Israel continued to occupy the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). Lebanon has repeatedly condemned Israeli activities in those areas as “violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty and international law”, including in letters addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, as detailed in the two most recent reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) ([S/2024/817](#) and [S/2025/153](#)).

16. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab’a Farms area. Furthermore, neither the Syrian Arab Republic nor Israel has responded to the provisional definition of the area contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) of 30 October 2007 ([S/2007/641](#), annex).

B. Extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory

17. The Government of Lebanon strengthened its efforts to extend the authority of the State over all Lebanese territory, as called for in the Taif Accords and in resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). Moreover, the Lebanese authorities have reaffirmed on several occasions their commitment to ensuring that the Lebanese State is the sole decision maker on security matters. On 18 February, Mr. Aoun stated that “the State has become responsible for controlling security and borders [...], which is the prerogative of the Lebanese alone”. In a visit to southern Lebanon on 28 February, Mr. Salam said that the army is the “backbone of sovereignty and independence” and reaffirmed that it is “entrusted with defending Lebanon, and it is responsible for maintaining the security of the country, protecting its people and preserving its sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity”.

18. On 7 December, the then caretaker Cabinet approved the deployment plan for the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River. That decision was in line with the 27 November announcement of a cessation of hostilities (see para. 6), which provides that “Israel will withdraw its forces in a phased manner south of the Blue Line, and in parallel the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] will deploy to positions in the Southern Litani Area”. Earlier, on 6 November, the caretaker Cabinet approved the allocation of a treasury advance to the Ministry of Defence to finance the enlistment of 1,500 new recruits (see [S/2025/153](#), para. 51). By the end of March, the Lebanese Armed Forces had deployed to all towns and villages south of the Litani River, except the five locations north of the Blue Line and the two “buffer zones” where the Israel Defense Forces are still present. As part of Lebanese plans to deploy more than 4,500 additional troops to the south, 1,500 new recruits are expected to complete their training and be available for deployment by the end of April 2025. The recruitment of another tranche of 1,500 troops is expected to begin in the coming months. On 13 March, Brigadier General Rudolph Haykal was appointed as the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

19. Following the 27 November cessation of hostilities, the Lebanese Armed Forces have dismantled military infrastructure and confiscated weapons believed to have belonged to Hizbullah south of the Litani River (see [S/2025/153](#), para. 32).

20. The Lebanese Armed Forces also increased its efforts to extend the authority of the State along its north-eastern borders. On 9 December, as positions of the Syrian Arab Army were vacated gradually, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that they

were dispatching reinforcements and deploying extensively along the northern and eastern borders of Lebanon with the Syrian Arab Republic, in order to strengthen surveillance and prevent any threat to the country's security.

21. Several clashes between the Lebanese Armed Forces and armed elements from the Syrian Arab Republic near the north-eastern border of Lebanon with Syrian Arab Republic occurred in the reporting period. Many of those clashes occurred in areas where the border is not delineated. On 3 January, according to the Lebanese Armed Forces, a Lebanese military unit intervened to close an illegal border crossing in the Ma'rabun region of Baalbek, along the Lebanese-Syrian border. The situation escalated when Syrian individuals opened fire on the Lebanese soldiers, injuring one and triggering an exchange of gunfire between the two sides. Starting on 6 February, clashes occurred over several days on the outskirts of the border town of Qasr, Baalbek-Hirmil Governorate, as a result of clashes in the Syrian border town of Hawa'iq, reportedly between armed members of Lebanese clans and security forces affiliated with the caretaker authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic. In response, Lebanese Armed Forces deployed along the border. On 16 March, in Qasr, shelling and shooting were reported across the Syrian-Lebanese border, including in the town of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, where the border is not clearly delineated. The clashes reportedly resulted in several casualties. Following talks with the relevant interim Syrian authorities, the Minister of National Defence of Lebanon, Michel Menassa, announced that the two sides had reached a ceasefire agreement. According to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon, the two days of violent clashes resulted in at least seven fatalities and 52 wounded. Despite the ceasefire, cross-border shelling briefly resumed on 18 March. The Lebanese Armed Forces responded to the sources of fire on the Syrian side and subsequently deployed to Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali. On 17 March, the Cabinet established a ministerial committee comprising the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Finance, Interior, Justice, National Defence and Public Works to develop proposals to enhance border control and combat smuggling. The Lebanese army subsequently announced that it had conducted several operations, in particular in Hirmil District, including the closure of at least 10 illegal border crossings and the arrest of several traffickers.

22. On 28 March, the Lebanese authorities and the interim Syrian authorities reportedly signed, under the auspices of the Minister of Defence of Saudi Arabia, an agreement affirming the strategic importance of border demarcation, the formation of joint legal committees in various fields and the activation of coordination mechanisms to address emerging security and military challenges, in particular along the border. Border delineation and demarcation remain critical to enabling proper border control and management, including the movement of people and the potential movement of arms, and to guaranteeing national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

23. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an estimated 350,000 Syrians have crossed back into the Syrian Arab Republic from neighbouring countries since the fall of the Government of Bashar al-Assad. However, that figure does not represent verified, permanent returns to the Syrian Arab Republic. It is also estimated that 89,000 persons coming from the Syrian Arab Republic arrived in Lebanon, including approximately 20,000 Lebanese. Following clashes on the western coast of the Syrian Arab Republic in February and March, an estimated 23,000 persons, including 5,000 Lebanese, also reportedly arrived in Lebanon.

24. Notwithstanding efforts to enhance border security, Israel repeatedly stated that some areas along the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be used for smuggling weapons to Hizbullah. On 26 September, the Israeli Air Force stated that its "fighter jets struck infrastructure along the Syria-

Lebanon border used by Hezbollah to transfer weapons from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon”. On 4 October, the Israel Defense Forces reportedly struck the road leading to the Masna’ crossing at the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. In identical letters dated 11 October 2024 to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2024/734), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations strongly condemned “the deliberate and brutal bombardment of the Iranian Red Crescent Society’s humanitarian aid depot by the Israeli occupying regime on the night of 9 October 2024. This facility [...] was located on the Syrian-Lebanese border”.

25. Between 24 and 26 November, the Israel Defense Forces struck several official border crossings between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, stating that they had “targeted military infrastructure used by Hizbullah for weapons transfers and precision missile production, calling on [the] Lebanese and Syrian authorities to act to prevent the use of civilian crossings for terrorist purposes”. Striking border crossings again on 8 and 27 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had targeted structures used for the transport of military equipment to Hizbullah. On 12 and 31 January, Israel struck infrastructure in Janta, Baalbek-Hirmil Governorate, that it stated was being used to manufacture and smuggle weaponry. On 9 February, Israel struck a tunnel in the Biqua’ that it said was being used to transport combat equipment from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon (see S/2025/153, para. 42). The Israel Defense Forces also carried out strikes in southern Lebanon, against what they said were Hizbullah targets.

26. In identical letters dated 10 October 2024 to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2024/728, annex), the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Israel Katz, stated that “Hezbollah is still working to enhance its military capabilities and amass new and sophisticated weaponry, with support from Iran [...]. The group continues to use the crossings between Syria and Lebanon to smuggle arms from Iran, including through the Masnaa international border crossing”. On 18 November, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, underlined the need to cut off “the oxygen pipeline through the Syrian border to prevent the future arming” of Hizbullah. On 10 December, he stated that “if the new regime in Syria allows Iran to re-establish itself, or allows the transfer of weapons to Hizbullah, we will respond forcefully and exact a heavy price from it”.

27. The Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, stated on 14 December that, “with the fall of the al-Assad regime, Hizbullah lost its military supply route through Syria during this phase, but this is a minor detail in the resistance’s operations. The route might reopen under the new regime or alternative routes could be explored”.

28. As at March, 741,754 refugees and asylum-seekers, including 730,653 from the Syrian Arab Republic, were registered with UNHCR in Lebanon. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the total number of refugees remains unknown. A figure of 1.4 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon was used for planning purposes in the 2025 Lebanon Response Plan.

C. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

29. In its resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, a key provision of the resolution that has yet to be implemented. That provision reflects and reaffirms a decision to which all Lebanese committed themselves in the Taif Accords.

30. While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside government control, Hizbullah is the most heavily armed militia in the country. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups and the use of increasingly advanced weapons by Hizbullah continued to pose a serious challenge to the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and sole and exclusive authority over all its territory. The hostilities between Hizbullah and Israel (see paras. 2, 4 and 5) involved strikes by Hizbullah deep into Israel, including a 19 October drone attack on Mr. Netanyahu's private residence in Caesarea, Israel, for which Hizbullah claimed responsibility. Hizbullah also claimed responsibility for strikes on several Israel Defense Forces bases in the vicinity of Tel Aviv and Haifa. In addition, Hizbullah struck civilian areas in the course of these hostilities (see [S/2024/817](#) and [S/2025/153](#)). Civilian casualties were reported in Israel following strikes from Lebanon. Statistics published on 8 October by Hizbullah indicate that it had conducted 3,194 military operations against Israel since 8 October 2023. On 24 November, Hizbullah claimed an attack on a naval base in Ashdod, its deepest strike into Israeli territory, approximately 150 km south of the Blue Line, since 8 October 2023. On 25 November, Hizbullah claimed 51 attacks, its highest daily number since 8 October 2023 (see [S/2025/153](#), para. 6).

31. On 27 September, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had killed the then Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, along with several Hizbullah commanders, in an intense air attack on southern Beirut. On 28 September, Hizbullah confirmed his death. The bombing levelled at least four residential buildings, causing at least 38 fatalities, including that of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Abbas Nilforoushan, with dozens more wounded or missing, including civilians. On 28 September, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had killed the deputy head of the executive council of Hizbullah, Nabil Qaouk. The following day, Hizbullah acknowledged his death. On 30 September, the Israel Defense Forces, following their first strike in central Beirut since 2006, stated that they had killed three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which acknowledged their deaths the same day. On 30 September, Hamas announced that its leader in Lebanon, Fatah Sherif Abu al-Amin, and his family had been killed in the El Buss Palestine refugee camp near Tyre. On 1 October, the Israel Defense Forces claimed to have killed the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Imam Hussein division, Al-Faqar Hanawi, in an air strike in Beirut. On 3 October, the Israel Defense Forces struck what they said was Hizbullah's "central intelligence headquarters" in the southern suburbs of Beirut, killing the head of the executive council of Hizbullah, Hashem Safieddine, and several other persons. On 7 October, the Israel Defense Forces claimed responsibility for the killing in Lebanon of two senior commanders of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas, Said Alaa Naif Ali and Muhammad Hussein Ali al-Mahmoud. Hamas later confirmed their deaths (see [S/2024/817](#), para. 47).

32. In identical letters dated 1 October 2024 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2024/712](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that "in Lebanon, Iran supplied Hezbollah with 150,000 rockets, anti-tank missiles and explosive unmanned aerial vehicles [...]". In identical letters dated 10 October 2024 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2024/728](#), annex), the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Katz, stated that "hundreds of terrorists have been eliminated, including Hezbollah's senior chain of command and Radwan commanders and operatives. More than 700 Hezbollah terror assets in Lebanon, such as tunnels, weaponry, missiles and launchers [...] have been uncovered and destroyed. The discovery of significant quantities of weapons and military infrastructure in southern

Lebanon used by Hezbollah [is] in clear violation of Security Council resolutions [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [1559 \(2004\)](#) [...]”.

33. The Israel Defense Forces stated on several occasions that they had killed Hizbullah members in air strikes on Syrian territory, including “Hezbollah’s envoy to the Syrian army, Salman Nimr Jama’a”, in Damascus on 3 December. In a speech on 15 October, Mr. Qassem confirmed the deaths of the head and deputy head of the executive council of Hizbullah, Messrs. Safieddine and Qaouk, and of the commander of the Hizbullah southern front, Ali Karaki. The Israel Defense Forces stated on 20 October that they had carried out strikes across Lebanon against branches of the Al-Qard al-Hassan Association, a Hizbullah-affiliated financial institution (see [S/2024/817](#), para. 14). On 26 November, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had again struck dozens of branches of that institution in southern and eastern Lebanon and in the southern suburbs of Beirut (see [S/2025/153](#), para. 9).

34. On 26 November, Mr. Netanyahu stated: “A year later [since 8 October 2023], it is not the same Hezbollah. We have pushed them decades back. We eliminated Nasrallah, the axis of the axis. We have taken out the organization’s top leadership, we have destroyed most of their rockets and missiles, we have killed thousands of terrorists and we have demolished their underground terror infrastructure abutting our border. [...] The length of the ceasefire depends on what happens in Lebanon [...] If Hezbollah violates the agreement and tries to arm itself, we will attack. If it tries to rebuild terrorist infrastructure near the border, we will attack. If it launches a rocket, if it digs a tunnel, if it brings in a truck carrying rockets, we will attack” (see [S/2025/153](#), para. 35).

35. As stated in paragraph 6, a cessation of hostilities entered into force on 27 November.

36. In identical letters dated 13 January 2025 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/29](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “Israel is concerned about Hezbollah’s ongoing military build-up. While Hezbollah’s military capabilities were significantly reduced during the war, they are now attempting to regain strength and rearm with the assistance of Iran, and thus, remain a serious threat to Israel and to regional stability. To prevent further escalation, it is imperative that the government of Lebanon and the international community focus on curbing the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and financial support through the Syria-Lebanon border and via air and sea routes. Since the understandings were reached, there have been several attempts to transfer weapons and cash to Hezbollah. These attempts are in violation of resolutions 1701 and 1559 [...]”. In response, in a letter dated 24 January 2025 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/55](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations rejected what he said was the unfounded accusation that “advanced weapon systems are being smuggled from Iran into Lebanon”. He called it “a pretext to justify Israel’s persistent violations of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and its blatant disregard for the ceasefire arrangements with Lebanon [...]. [I]t [Israel] fabricates such groundless allegations to legitimize its continued illegal occupation of Lebanese territory”.

37. On 29 October, Hizbullah announced that Mr. Qassem, who had served as its Deputy Secretary-General since 1991, had been appointed its new Secretary-General. Mr. Qassem, on 30 October, acknowledged that “the blow [to Hizbullah] was painful [...]”, adding, however, “we have stood up again, we are cohesive, with big numbers and capabilities.” In a speech on 20 November, he stated that “Hizbullah passed through a real crisis after the assassination of our great martyr, Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, but [...] we were able to restore our capabilities on every

level: military, political, media.” In a speech on 29 November, he stated that “the Israelis anticipated achieving their objectives in a short time after targeting our leadership system and the capabilities we possessed. However, Hizbullah managed to remain steadfast on the front lines and began striking the enemy’s internal front, placing Israel in a significant defensive position. [...] We won because we prevented the enemy from destroying Hizbullah, weakening the resistance [...]”. In a speech on 4 January, he stated that “we agreed through the Lebanese State to the ceasefire. [...] The agreement was not reached because the resistance had lost its capabilities [but] because of the capabilities and the resistance fighters and jihad, dignity, steadfastness and sacrifices that the enemy was forced to ask for a ceasefire”.

38. On 23 February, the funerals of Messrs. Nasrallah and Safieddine were held in front of large crowds in Beirut. Hizbullah also announced on 25 February the names of 35 military leaders and commanders who had been killed during the conflict.

39. Hizbullah, in several instances, recognized the lead role of the Lebanese State in addressing the Israeli presence in Lebanon, while reaffirming its ability to make decisions autonomously. In a speech on 14 December, Mr. Qassem stated: “The Government is responsible for monitoring and preventing Israeli violations, and the committee overseeing the agreement is also responsible. We, as Hizbullah, [...] will act according to our assessment of interests and developments.” He added that “this agreement aims at halting the aggression, not dissolving Hizbullah. This agreement is an implementation derived from resolution 1701 and is exclusively applicable to the south of the Litani area. It has nothing to do with Lebanese internal affairs, the relationship between the resistance and the State, the army, the presence of weapons or any other issues that require dialogue and discussion”. Similarly, in a speech on 4 January, he warned that Hizbullah’s “patience may run out” and that “the leadership of the resistance is the one that decides when it resists and how it resists and the form of resistance and the arms it uses”. In a speech on 27 January, Mr. Qassem argued that the ceasefire was meant to “give the Lebanese State an opportunity to fulfil its duties and test its ability to defend its borders and end the occupation”, while underlining that “the recurring Israeli violations justify the continued need for the resistance”. In an interview with a Lebanese media outlet on 9 March, he stated that “we are giving the State the opportunity to work politically in order to prove to the entire world that Israel does not withdraw through politics, but through resistance”.

40. Hizbullah reaffirmed its readiness to discuss what it calls a “national defence strategy”. In a speech on 14 December, Mr. Qassem indicated that Hizbullah was ready to engage “in constructive dialogue on problematic issues, such as Lebanon’s position on the Israeli occupation of its land and how to strengthen the Lebanese army and determining the Lebanese defence strategy.” In a speech on 18 January, he said that “resolution 1701 is a general framework, while plans to exploit the resistance and its weapons are to be discussed within the defensive strategy, through dialogue, while preserving Lebanon’s strength, sovereignty and independence”. In a speech on 23 February, he stated that “[w]e will discuss later how Lebanon can benefit from [Hizbullah’s] strength when we discuss the national defence strategy”.

41. The Israel Defense Forces announced on 28 September that “we will not allow hostile flights with combat equipment to land. [...] Beirut airport is a civilian airport and must be maintained as such”. Similarly, on 12 February, the spokesperson of the Israel Defense Forces for Arab media stated that “the Iranian Quds Force and [...] Hezbollah have been exploiting international flights [to Beirut airport] over the past few weeks [...] to smuggle funds [...] to arm Hezbollah” and carry out attacks against Israel. He added that “the IDF will not allow Hezbollah to arm itself and will act through all means at its disposal to enforce the implementation of the ceasefire understandings in order to ensure the security of the citizens of the State of Israel”.

On 13 February, Lebanese authorities suspended flights from Tehran, citing security concerns. On 14 February, protests against that government decision turned violent and a convoy of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was attacked outside Rafic Hariri International Airport, resulting in injuries to the deputy force commander and one other peacekeeper. Condemning the attack, Mr. Aoun stated on 15 February that the “security forces will not tolerate any party attempting to destabilize the country or disrupt civil peace”. The Ministry of the Interior announced that “more than 25 people have been arrested” in connection with the investigation. Hizbullah distanced itself from the violence and denounced the attack. On 15 February, protesters clashed with the Lebanese Armed Forces outside the airport.

42. On 22 March, the Israel Defense Forces carried out extensive air strikes on southern Lebanon after three rockets launched from Lebanese territory were intercepted over Metulla, in northern Israel. At the time of writing, there had been no claim of responsibility. Denouncing the incident, the Minister of Defence of Israel, Mr. Katz, held the Lebanese Government responsible for operations launched from its territory. Shortly thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces claimed dozens of retaliatory strikes on what they said were Hizbullah positions, including military infrastructure, rocket launchers and command centres. The raids, which targeted areas in six different districts north and south of the Litani river, reportedly resulted in eight deaths. Additional operations in southern Lebanon throughout that week reportedly killed three Hizbullah members, including the commander of the group’s anti-tank missile unit. Mr. Aoun denounced “attempts to drag Lebanon back into the spiral of violence”, while Mr. Salam warned that a return to conflict would have “disastrous consequences”. Both Messrs. Aoun and Salam called on the Lebanese Armed Forces to take action, reaffirming the role of the State as the sole decision maker on matters related to “war and peace”. The Lebanese Armed Forces subsequently announced that it had dismantled three primitive rocket launchers in Arnun, Nabatiyah District, north of the Litani River, and had opened an investigation into the incident. Hizbullah denied its involvement in the incident and reaffirmed its commitment to the cessation of hostilities.

43. The maintenance by Hizbullah of a military arsenal outside state control continued to be denounced by a number of actors in Lebanon. Several Lebanese parties see the continued presence of such arms as an implicit threat that the weapons could be used within Lebanon for political reasons. During the reporting period, several Members of Parliament and party leaders expressed their desire to see Hizbullah become solely a political party, on par with other parties.

44. The reporting period also saw activities by the Lebanese State aimed at disarming and disbanding Palestinian armed groups. On 21 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated: “The army has received the bases in the Sultan Yaqub area, in the western Bika’, and Hoshmash, between the towns of Qusaya and Dayr al-Ghazal in the central Bika’, that were previously affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. In addition, the army has taken over the Halwa camp in Rashaya, which was previously under the Fatah al-Intifada organization, and has confiscated quantities of weapons and ammunition, as well as military equipment.” The bases of these Palestinian armed groups were separate and distinct from Palestinian refugee camps. On 25 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that “in continuation of the army’s process of taking over military bases that were used by Palestinian organizations inside Lebanese territory, army units took over a former base of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and two former bases of the Fatah al-Intifada organization, in the vicinity of the Beddawi camp, Tripoli”. The Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed that they had taken over all bases belonging to Palestinian armed factions that are located outside Palestine refugee camps, in furtherance of the decision adopted by the national

dialogue on 14 March 2006 to disarm Palestinians outside the camps within six months (see [S/2006/248](#), para. 52).

III. Observations

45. I welcome that the cessation of hostilities has continued to hold since 27 November, despite challenges. The recent hostilities have had a staggering human cost, including the resulting casualties, fatalities and displacement, and caused considerable material damage and destruction. The cessation of hostilities must be maintained. The hostilities demonstrated anew the very tangible risks presented by the continued activities of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias that resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) was intended to prevent. Lebanon faces considerably changed circumstances today that are potentially more conducive to the fuller implementation of the resolution, the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, with the Lebanese State extending its control over its entire territory and reappropriating the power to make decisions with regard to “war and peace”.

46. I welcome the election of a President, the designation of a Prime Minister, the formation of a Cabinet, the approval of a ministerial statement and the appointment of a new Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces in short succession. Key positions in Lebanon are now filled, and that should allow for progress on urgent issues, including those addressed in resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). The new Lebanese leadership has already demonstrated the State’s strong willingness to exercise full sovereignty and be the sole and exclusive authority over all its territory. I welcome the stated commitment of Mr. Aoun to ensure a State monopoly over the maintenance of weapons and the reaffirmation of that principle by other State representatives and in the ministerial statement. These are positive signals with regard to the full implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). I welcome the stated commitment by President Aoun to develop a national security strategy.

47. I welcome the steps that have been taken by the Lebanese Armed Forces to advance the implementation of the decision regarding Palestinian armed groups adopted by the national dialogue in 2006. I also welcome the efforts by the Lebanese Armed Forces to deploy to southern Lebanon and consolidate their authority and that of the Lebanese State throughout its territory. The deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to areas of the country where they had not previously had a presence is positive and such efforts should be pursued.

48. I call upon the Lebanese State to further increase its efforts to achieve a monopoly over the possession of weapons throughout its territory. I continue to urge the Government and the security forces to take all measures necessary to prevent Hizbullah and other groups from acquiring weapons and building paramilitary capacity outside the authority of the State, in violation of resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). I have strongly condemned the firing of rockets and other projectiles by Hizbullah at Israel.

49. The present situation offers an opportunity for Lebanon to tackle the outstanding provisions of the resolution. Maintaining weapons outside State authority continues to pose challenges to the sovereignty of Lebanon and demonstrates the failure of Hizbullah to disarm and its refusal to be accountable to the very State institutions that the implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) is intended to strengthen. I reiterate my call upon all parties concerned not to engage in any military activity inside or outside Lebanon, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords and resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). The Accords must be preserved and implemented by all to avoid the spectre of a renewed confrontation among Lebanese citizens and to strengthen the institutions of the State. All parties concerned must contribute to efforts to reinforce the

institutions of the Lebanese State. Countries in the region that maintain close ties with Hizbullah should encourage its disarmament and transformation into a solely civilian political party, in accordance with the requirements of the Taif Accords and resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) and in the best interests of Lebanon and of regional peace and security.

50. Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces is also essential to ensuring the State's ability to assert the sovereignty of Lebanon while affirming the centrality of State institutions across all Lebanese territory. Continued coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces, other State security agencies and international partners is essential in order to address State security concerns. I reiterate the importance of increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and other State security institutions, for the security and stability of Lebanon. I reiterate my call to donors to step up their support.

51. Calls from sections of the Lebanese population for the full implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) and rejecting the possession of arms outside State authority, and other communities asserting the necessity of an armed resistance, indicate that the question of the maintenance of weapons by Hizbullah remains a concern. I continue to encourage relevant Lebanese actors to reinvigorate efforts towards an inclusive national dialogue to address the outstanding issues.

52. The continued Israeli presence in some parts of the territory of Lebanon and its violations of the sovereignty of Lebanon, including the conduct of air strikes in Lebanon and alleged air strikes in the Syrian Arab Republic, is of concern. I strongly condemn all violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. I renew my urgent calls upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions, one of which is its obligation to withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory, including the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, as well as to immediately cease its flights in Lebanese airspace, in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon. I also urge the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms contained in my report on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) of 30 October 2007 ([S/2007/641](#), annex).

53. I welcome the statements that have been made expressing willingness to ensure respect for the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. I also welcome the renewed efforts that the Lebanese State made during the reporting period to extend its authority along its north-eastern border with the Syrian Arab Republic. I welcome the reaffirmation of the strategic importance of border demarcation and encourage concrete steps towards that goal.

54. It is vital that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East receive adequate and predictable funding to meet the protection needs of Palestine refugees. The indispensable role of the Agency in maintaining stability in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon remains critical.

55. I count on the continued commitment of the Government of Lebanon to its international obligations, and I call upon all parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#), [1680 \(2006\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). The United Nations will continue its efforts towards the full implementation of those and all other resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.