



安全理事会

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2024 年 10 月 21 日至 2025 年 2 月 20 日期间安全理事会第 1701(2006)号决议的执行情况

秘书长的报告

一. 导言

1. 本报告全面评估了自 2024 年 11 月 13 日发表上一次报告(S/2024/817)以来安全理事会第 1701(2006)号决议的执行情况。真主党和以色列国防军继续违反第 1701(2006)号决议，激烈交火，造成蓝线两侧人员伤亡、流离失所和破坏，直到 2024 年 11 月 27 日停止敌对行动生效。正如美利坚合众国和法国 11 月 26 日宣布的那样，有关停止敌对行动的承诺包括，在 60 天内“以色列将分阶段从蓝线以南撤军，与此同时，黎巴嫩武装部队将部署到利塔尼南部地区的阵地”，并将拆除“未经许可的场所和基础设施”，没收“未经许可的武器和有关物资”。以色列国防军随后开始撤出黎巴嫩领土，黎巴嫩武装部队开始在利塔尼河以南重新部署。1 月 26 日，美国宣布“由美国监测的黎巴嫩与以色列之间的安排将继续有效，直至 2025 年 2 月 18 日。”截至 2 月 18 日，以色列国防军仍驻扎在蓝线以北的五个阵地。虽然暴力程度在 11 月 27 日之后急剧下降，但以色列国防军继续驻扎在蓝线以北，黎巴嫩武装部队继续部署在利塔尼河以南，并在那里发现大量未经许可的资产和武器，这些突出表明各方需要采取紧急步骤，巩固停止敌对行动，充分执行第 1701(2006)号决议。

二. 第 1701(2006)号决议执行情况

A. 联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队行动区的局势


2. 10 月 21 日至 11 月 26 日，联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队(联黎部队)记录了自行动区内向蓝线以南发射的 2 182 道射弹轨迹、从蓝线以南向北发射的 14 172 道射弹轨迹，以及以色列国防军的 633 次空袭。10 月 24 日探测的弹道轨迹数量最多，为 1 527 道，其中 83 道来自蓝线以北，1 443 道来自蓝线以南。每道轨迹可代表



多个射弹。几乎所有射弹都是火箭弹、迫击炮和炮弹。联黎部队的雷达无法探测某些类型的射弹，如空对地导弹、坦克炮弹、便携式反坦克导弹或轻武器的射弹。

图一

2024 年 10 月至 11 月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队探测到的每日射弹轨迹



来源：联黎部队。

3. 联黎部队观察了以色列国防军在蓝线以北的每日军事活动，11 月 27 日之后转向大规模摧毁以色列所称的真主党基础设施。10 月 21 日至 11 月 27 日，以色列国防军声称在黎巴嫩，包括在联黎部队行动区，打死了数名真主党高级军事人员。真主党和以色列国防军在联黎部队行动区内的每日冲突持续到 11 月 27 日上午。黎巴嫩南部的居民区、民用基础设施和农田遭到以色列行动的广泛破坏或摧毁。

4. 10 月下旬，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军侵入东区和西区蓝线以北的村庄。随后，在更靠北的希亚姆(东区)和宾特朱拜勒(西区)附近观察到以色列国防军。11 月，以色列对西区的 Shama 和 Bayyadah 及希亚姆附近地区的袭击以及与真主党的地面冲突升级。Shama 和 Bayyadah 是 2024 年 10 月 1 日以来以色列国防军在黎巴嫩纵深最大的地面存在(见 [S/2024/817](#)，第 16-17 段)。

5. 直到 11 月 27 日，联黎部队的业务和后勤活动仍受动态活动的严重限制。道路受损、主要道路被瓦砾阻断以及以色列国防军迟迟不作出必要的消除冲突答复都是进一步的障碍。10 月 21 日至 11 月 27 日，特派团开展了 1 204 次业务活动，包括 276 次乘车巡逻，优先为联黎部队阵地提供再补给。

6. 随着以色列继续袭击黎巴嫩各地，真主党继续袭击以色列纵深地区的目标，并向联黎部队行动区上空的以色列国防军飞机和无人机发射导弹，直至 11 月 27 日。10 月 22 日，真主党声称对 10 月 19 日无人机袭击以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡位于以色列凯撒利亚的私宅负责。真主党还声称对袭击特拉维

夫和海法附近的几个以色列国防军基地负责。11月24日，真主党声称对袭击阿什杜德的一个海军基地负责，这是自2023年10月8日以来其对以色列领土发动的纵深最大的袭击，该目标位于蓝线以南约150公里处。11月25日，真主党声称发动了51次袭击，达到2023年10月8日以来的最高单日次数。

7. 在黎巴嫩，以色列的袭击，包括对居民楼的袭击，造成包括妇女和儿童在内的数百人死亡。10月21日，贝鲁特 Janah 的拉菲克·哈里里大学医院附近遭到袭击，包括4名儿童在内的18人被打死，60人受伤。10月25日，以色列对哈斯巴亚(东区)一家宾馆的空袭导致至少3名记者死亡，另有数人受伤。以色列国防军表示，该事件正在审查中。10月28日和30日，至少有60人在对贝卡谷地的袭击中被打死，以色列国防军则对整个巴勒贝克市发布了撤离令。11月5日，包括妇女和儿童在内的20多人在舒夫区的 Barja 被打死。11月10日至12日，70人在对阿卡尔区、Alayh 区、舒夫区和朱贝勒区据报收容流离失所者的建筑物的袭击中丧生。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在11月5日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/591-S/2024/804)中指出，“以色列公然违反国际法，蓄意攻击黎巴嫩各地的民用设施，其借口是这些设施为武器库或军事总部。”

8. 11月14日，以色列空袭了贝卡 Duris 的一个民防中心，打死15名民防人员。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在11月20日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/620-S/2024/841)中指出，[以色列]“蓄意升级对黎巴嫩民防人员、哨所和车辆的攻击，打死27人，打伤76人，”[这种行为]“公然违反国际人道法，等同于战争罪”。

9. 11月2日，以色列国防军表示，11月1日，它在黎巴嫩北部拜特龙海岸的一次海军行动中抓获了“真主党的重要海上行动人员”Imad Amhaz。真主党否认他与该团体有关联，黎巴嫩当局则称该行动是“对黎巴嫩主权的公然侵犯”。11月7日，继真主党11月6日对特拉维夫本古里安机场附近发射火箭后，以色列国防军袭击了贝鲁特的拉菲克·哈里里国际机场。在以色列11月17日和18日对贝鲁特中心街区进行三次空袭后，真主党称其发言人 Mohammad Afif 被打死。11月23日，至少有29人在以色列对贝鲁特市中心的一次袭击中丧生。11月26日，以色列国防军表示再次(见 S/2024/817，第14段)袭击了与真主党有关联的金融协会 Al-Qard Al-Hassan 在黎巴嫩南部和东部以及贝鲁特南郊的几十个分支机构。10月下旬和11月，以色列国防军多次轰炸提尔(西区)及其周边地区，造成包括妇女和儿童在内的多人伤亡，并导致大规模流离失所。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在12月13日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/700-S/2024/912)中指出，“在敌对行动停止前的几个星期里，以色列在亚伦、阿伊塔伦、马伦拉斯、迈斯杰贝勒、Muhaybib、Dayr Siryan、欧代塞等村庄埋设炸药并炸毁了整个居民区”。以色列国防军还表示曾多次在联黎部队行动区内的清真寺发现武器。

10. 尽管黎巴嫩武装部队避免参与敌对行动，但2023年10月8日以来，至少46名黎巴嫩武装部队人员被打死，其中约20人在执勤时丧生，包括在联黎部队行动区被打死。11月17日，4名士兵在以色列对马利(东区)黎巴嫩武装部队阵地的


袭击中丧生。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在 11 月 18 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/616-S/2024/839)中指出,“袭击黎巴嫩军队破坏了执行第 1701(2006)号决议的国际努力”。据报以色列国防军 11 月 20 日表示,其行动“专门针对真主党,而不是针对黎巴嫩武装部队”。

11. 据报,以色列的民用基础设施也遭到真主党袭击,包括在阿科、Avivim、海法、谢莫纳村、Ma'alot Tarshiha、Manara、梅隆、纳哈里亚、Tsfat、Shomera 和特拉维夫。以色列常驻联合国代表在 2025 年 1 月 13 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2025/29)中指出,“在整个战争期间,真主党向以色列社区发射了 22 000 多枚火箭弹、1 500 多枚反坦克导弹和 700 多架无人机,迫使 63 000 多名以色列平民在一年多的时间里撤离家园”。

12. 据报,10 月 31 日,真主党在梅图拉附近发动袭击,打死 3 名以色列人和 4 名泰国国民。以色列常驻联合国代表在 2024 年 11 月 12 日给安全理事会主席和我的同文信(S/2024/881)中指出,“自战争开始以来,已有 72 名平民和士兵丧生,其中 6 人是外国平民,636 人受伤”。截至 2 月 13 日,以色列当局报告称,自 2023 年 10 月 8 日以来,真主党在蓝线以南发动的袭击造成以色列国防军 30 人死亡,自 2024 年 10 月 1 日以来,在蓝线以北和以色列北部的袭击造成以色列国防军 52 人死亡。

13. 以色列国防军继续每天侵犯黎巴嫩领空。10 月 21 日至 11 月 26 日,联黎部队记录了 1 295 起侵犯领空事件,11 月 27 日至 2 月 20 日记录了 1 331 起。在侵犯领空事件中,无人机占 55%,战斗机占 41%,直升机和不明航空器占 4%。10 月 24 日观察到侵犯领空 66 次,这是单日次数最多的一天。


图二
2024 年 10 月至 2025 年 2 月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队探测到的以色列国防军侵犯黎巴嫩领空的情况



来源: 联黎部队。

图三

2024 年 10 月至 2025 年 2 月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队观察到的以色列国防军每周空袭情况观察




来源：联黎部队。

14. 11 月 27 日之后，尽管蓝线两侧几乎没有交火，但局势仍然紧张。以色列国防军多次宣布袭击了真主党人员、资产和基础设施，据报有几起死亡事件，包括 2 月 19 日在艾塔沙卜(西区)发生的一起死亡事件。联黎部队记录了在其行动区内的小武器射击事件，主要归因于以色列国防军的挨家挨户搜查行动。联黎部队观察到以色列国防军数次沿蓝线喷洒脱叶剂。12 月 2 日，真主党向沙巴阿农场(多夫山)的 Rouwaysat al-Alam 地点发射了两枚火箭弹。11 月 27 日至 2 月 20 日，联黎部队探测到从蓝线以北发射的 12 道弹道轨迹，从蓝线以南发射的 617 道弹道轨迹，以及以色列国防军进行的 19 次空袭。11 月 27 日探测到从北向南发射的 8 道弹道轨迹，12 月 2 日 1 道，2 月 15 日 2 道，2 月 16 日 1 道。

图四

2024 年 11 月至 2025 年 2 月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队探测到的每日射弹轨迹



来源：联黎部队。

15. 以色列国防军继续在黎巴嫩领土上开展行动，包括在 11 月 27 日之前无法进入的地区，同时在 1 月 26 日之前从一些西区地区以及包括希亚姆在内的一些东区地区撤出。
16. 直到 2 月 18 日，以色列国防军一再警告黎巴嫩民众不要进入黎巴嫩南部大约 60 个村庄，这些村庄大多在蓝线 5 至 7 公里范围内。联黎部队观察到以色列国防军在蓝线以北安装了贴有阿拉伯语警示的白桶，告诫民众不要通行，地点包括 Arab al-Luwayzah、萨尔达附近以及迈尔凯巴和胡拉之间(全部在东区)。2 月，以色列国防军封锁了从蓝线以北进入胡拉的 Shaykh Abbad 墓的通道。
17. 1 月 2 日，以色列国防军在杰津区和纳巴提亚区发动袭击，称黎巴嫩武装部队没有回应其关于消除已查明的真主党威胁的要求。1 月 28 日，以色列在纳巴提亚空袭了“一辆真主党的卡车和另一辆运送武器的车辆”，造成 24 人受伤。
18. 11 月 27 日之后，黎巴嫩武装部队立即开始在利塔尼河以南重新部署，根据停止敌对行动机制减少冲突(见上文第 28 段)，并得到了联黎部队的协助。在以色列国防军撤出后，联黎部队协助将黎巴嫩武装部队部署到 50 多个阵地，包括 12 月 10 日部署到希亚姆，1 月初部署到阿尔马萨阿布、Bayt Lif、纳古拉和 Tayr Harfa(均在西区)。截至 2 月 20 日，黎巴嫩武装部队已部署到利塔尼河以南约 100 个阵地，包括重建检查站，而 11 月 27 日为约 10 个阵地。
19. 1 月 24 日，以色列政府宣布，“鉴于黎巴嫩尚未完全执行停火协议，将与美国充分协调，继续开展逐步撤出进程”。
20. 1 月 26 日，数百名手无寸铁的平民，其中一些人举着真主党旗帜，试图通过蓝线沿线有以色列国防军驻扎的村庄附近的黎巴嫩武装部队检查站返回自己的村庄。以色列国防军向人群开火，包括使用实弹。黎巴嫩公共卫生部报告说，包括 6 名妇女和 1 名黎巴嫩武装部队士兵在内的 24 人被打死，134 人受伤。
21. 截至 2 月 18 日，以色列国防军已撤出黎巴嫩南部的人口中心，但在蓝线沿线的五个地点保留了存在，即阿伊塔伦、胡拉、Labbunah、迈尔瓦欣和萨尔达附近。此外，他们在杜哈拉和基拉村附近指定了两个“缓冲区”。
22. 2 月 19 日，黎巴嫩武装部队宣布其“军事部队继续在所有南部边境城镇进行部署”，但注意到“敌人没有完全遵守从被占领的黎巴嫩领土撤出的要求”。
23. 11 月 27 日之后，联黎部队日益调整态势，并增加了业务活动数量，因为特派团的重点从为联合国阵地提供再补给转向支持黎巴嫩武装部队的重新部署，以协调以色列国防军的撤离，并在可能的情况下恢复巡逻。业务活动增加到每月平均 2 123 次，包括每月约 1 100 次乘车巡逻，其中每月在蓝线沿线巡逻 100 多次。特派团在 1 月 16 日之后进行了 24 次空中行动，在 1 月 10 日之后进行了 44 次徒步巡逻。联黎部队 9% 的执勤巡逻至少有一名女性维和人员参加。联黎部队和黎巴嫩武装部队设立了常设检查站，包括在进入行动区的主要通道上。在可联合开展的活动中，联黎部队与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调开展的行动平均占比增加到 49%，而 9 月 23 日之前为 16.8%(见 [S/2024/817](#)，第 26 段)。

24. 10月21日至2月20日，联黎部队独立或与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调，发现了194个武器储藏处，其中大部分是据信属于真主党的被遗弃的移动火箭发射平台、火箭弹、地雷和弹药，以及6个据信属于以色列国防军的储藏处。联黎部队观察到31起个人携带武器事件，包括21起携带狩猎武器事件。黎巴嫩武装部队还独立侦破了几个未经许可的资产和武器储藏处。黎巴嫩武装部队对停止敌对行动机制(见第28段)提出的60%以上的请求作出了回应，其中包括涉及以色列国防军撤军前单方面确定的“协调线”以北未经许可的武器和武器储藏处的请求，并对联黎部队移交的“协调线”以南近14%的此类发现作出了回应。

图五

2024年10月至2025年2月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队的业务活动



来源：联黎部队。

25. 2月7日，联黎部队向黎巴嫩武装部队提交了包括潜在隧道地点在内的17个相关地点的清单，并于2月20日检查了其中两个地点。

26. 10月21日至2月20日，联黎部队就联黎部队人员、资产或房地受到的影响启动了9项技术调查。已完成5项调查。联黎部队与各方分享了已完成调查的结果。

27. 自2024年9月23日以来，联黎部队和黎巴嫩武装部队在战略对话进程下的所有联合训练活动仍然暂停。10月21日至2月20日，联黎部队海上特遣队支持海上封锁行动，拦截了2115艘船只。黎巴嫩武装部队放行了联黎部队知会检查的所有430艘船只。黎巴嫩武装部队首次邀请联黎部队参加港口检查；联黎部队从1月22日起参加了8次此类检查，没有发现任何未经许可的物资。

B. 安全和联络安排

28. 停止敌对行动协定规定，现有的三方机制将得到重新制定和加强，“由联黎部队主持，由美国担任主席，法国参与其中，[并]将监测和核查这些承诺的履行情况，并协助确保这些承诺得到各方履行”。2024 年 12 月 9 日和 18 日、2025 年 1 月 6 日和 20 日以及 2 月 14 日，联黎部队主持了该机制的会议。在 1 月 6 日由美国特使阿莫斯·霍赫施泰因共同主持、联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员出席的会议上，美国提出了一项以色列国防军在拟议 60 天时限内分阶段从黎巴嫩撤出并同时部署黎巴嫩武装部队的计划。双方还明文同意联黎部队与该机制分享有关违反第 1701(2006)号决议的信息。1 月 16 日，安全理事会主席(S/PRST/2025/1)指出，“安全理事会促请各方忠实执行该安排的各项规定，并呼吁在联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员(联黎协调员)和联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队(联黎部队)根据各自任务授权提供的支持下，全面落实停止敌对行动”。2 月 14 日，以色列国防军表示，尽管联黎部队提议在黎巴嫩境内与以色列村庄对峙的阵地建立安保安排，但他们将保留这些阵地。联黎部队已开始与各方讨论引进新的技术能力，以加强其监测能力。

29. 联黎部队不断与各方接触，以消除黎巴嫩武装部队部署方面的冲突，为撤离和人道准入提供便利，并支持将紧张局势降级。联黎部队协调了 1 578 次民事或人道主义活动，包括运输医疗用品、通知葬礼、修复民用基础设施、运送包括记者在内的平民、救援和恢复行动以及清理道路。联黎部队与以色列国防军进行了 1 454 次联络，讨论黎巴嫩武装部队的安全和安保以及便利其巡逻、向固定阵地和检查站重新部署和处理爆炸物。联黎部队与各方进行了 727 次联络，以确保部队保护以及联黎部队阵地和业务活动的安全安保。12 月 22 日，联黎部队支持了黎巴嫩红十字会和红十字国际委员会从以色列遣返 7 名黎巴嫩公民，1 月 10 日，协助了 3 名叙利亚国民从以色列返回黎巴嫩。由于 Rosh Haniqra 过境点关闭，联黎部队与以色列国防军的实际接触受到限制，而且各方经常不及时回应，联黎部队的联络职能受到阻碍。1 月，联黎部队向提尔的黎巴嫩武装部队南利塔尼区总部部署了两名联络官。尽管以色列同意 2008 年提出的在特拉维夫设立联黎部队联络处的建议，但该建议仍有待落实。

30. 联黎部队核准了 11 个速效项目，其中 8 个项目旨在支持危机应对工作，包括支持在提尔的黎巴嫩红十字会和提供食品包、毯子、盥洗用具包和冬衣。

31. 联黎部队继续支持执行安全理事会关于妇女与和平与安全的第 1325(2000)号决议，包括对 2 992 名联黎部队军事和文职人员，其中包括 361 名妇女，进行性别平等主流化培训。

C. 解除武装团体的武装

32. 如上所述，直到 11 月 27 日，真主党通过袭击以色列展示了其军事能力。自 11 月 27 日以来，黎巴嫩武装部队已开始在利塔尼河以南拆除军事基础设施，并没收据信属于真主党的武器。真主党和其他非国家团体违反第 1701(2006)号决议，

持有不受国家管控的武器，这继续制约国家在本国领土上全面行使主权和权力的能力。

33. 10 月 29 日，真主党宣布自 1991 年以来担任该团体副手的纳伊姆·卡西姆为新任秘书长。卡西姆先生在 10 月 30 日表示，“[对真主党的]打击是痛苦的，但我们已经重新站起，我们具有凝聚力，人数众多，能力强大。”

34. 11 月 3 日，真主党公布了一段显示配备导弹发射台的地下隧道网络的录像。11 月 6 日，卡西姆先生说：“我们有成千上万训练有素的战士能够坚守阵地，有资源维持长期对抗[……]在[以色列]实体内没有任何地方无法进入。”同一天，真主党称其“利用先进的导弹和无人机，已深入被占领土内 145 公里开展行动”。

35. 11 月 26 日，以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡说：“一年后[自 2023 年 10 月 8 日起]，真主党不再是原来的真主党。我们把他们打回到几十年前。我们消灭了轴心中的轴心纳斯鲁拉。我们消灭了该团体的最高领导层，摧毁了他们的大部分火箭弹和导弹，杀死了数千名恐怖分子，摧毁了他们毗邻我们边界的地下恐怖基础设施[……]停火的时间长短取决于黎巴嫩境内的情况[……]如果真主党违反协议并企图武装自己，我们将发动攻击。如果它企图在边境附近重建恐怖主义基础设施，我们将发动攻击。如果它发射火箭弹，如果它挖掘隧道，如果它开进来一辆运载火箭弹的卡车，我们将发动攻击。”

36. 12 月 3 日，内塔尼亚胡先生表示“目前与真主党的停火并不等于战争的结束”，并誓言以色列将“以铁腕手段实施停火，并对任何违反行为作出果断反应，无论是轻微还是严重的违反行为。”同一天，以色列国防部长伊斯雷尔·卡茨说，黎巴嫩必须“授权黎巴嫩军队执行任务，将真主党赶出利塔尼河，并拆除所有基础设施”。

37. 12 月 14 日，卡西姆先生说：“这项协议旨在停止侵略，而不是解散真主党。该协议是根据第 1701 号决议执行的，仅适用于利塔尼地区南部。这与黎巴嫩内部事务、抵抗力量与国家、军队之间的关系、武器的存在或任何其他需要对话和讨论的问题无关。”1 月 18 日，他说“[真主党的]武器问题将通过对话在防御战略中讨论。”1 月 27 日，卡西姆先生说“违反协议的行为证实黎巴嫩需要抵抗。以色列正在为抵抗运动提供理由。”

38. 12 月 25 日，以色列国防军称，“以色列国防军在黎巴嫩南部缴获了属于真主党的 85 000 多件武器、导弹和军事物品”。以色列常驻联合国代表在 1 月 13 日的同文信(S/2025/29)中说：“以色列国防军在黎巴嫩南部的行动进一步揭露了[……]在黎巴嫩南部建造的大规模军事和恐怖主义基础设施[……]其目的是攻击以色列平民、村庄和城市。[……]黎巴嫩武装部队和黎巴嫩政府采取了一些令人鼓舞的步骤，拆除真主党在利塔尼河以南的一些非法军事基础设施，但遗憾的是，考虑到发现的大量军事武库，黎巴嫩武装部队的行动速度还不够”。

39. 黎巴嫩各地的四个巴勒斯坦难民营受到以色列定点空袭的影响。10 月 31 日，以色列国防军对提尔、包括拉什迭难民营发布了撤离令。11 月 21 日和 26 日

分别对 El Buss 和拉什迭难民营发动的空袭造成人员伤亡和财产损失。联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处(近东救济工程处)在巴勒贝克、提尔和贝鲁特的四个设施被附近的空袭损坏。2 月 17 日,以色列国防军称,它们在西顿的一次袭击中消灭了一名哈马斯官员。

40. 11 月 27 日之后,近东救济工程处 11 个紧急收容所的 6 172 名流离失所者中的许多人返回了居住地,同时近东救济工程处恢复了在利塔尼河以南难民营的业务。由于武装行为体的继续存在,近东救济工程处在艾因希勒沃的四所学校仍然无法进入。

41. 12 月 24 日,解放巴勒斯坦人民阵线总指挥部派表示“该阵线已经撤离其在黎巴嫩所有地区难民营外的所有阵地……并将这些阵地连同那里的武器和装备移交给黎巴嫩军队。”

D. 武器禁运和边境管制

42. 11 月 24 日至 26 日,以色列国防军袭击了黎巴嫩和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国边界的几个正式过境点,称它们袭击了真主党用于武器转运的军事基础设施。12 月 8 日和 27 日,以色列国防军再次袭击过境点,称袭击了用于向真主党运送军事装备的建筑物。1 月 12 日和 31 日,以色列在 Janta 袭击了据其称用于制造和走私武器的基础设施,并于 2 月 9 日在贝卡袭击了据其称用于从阿拉伯叙利亚共和国向黎巴嫩运送作战装备的隧道。

43. 2 月 12 日,以色列国防军称,从德黑兰飞往贝鲁特的航班被用来“走私旨在武装真主党的资金,目的是对以色列国进行攻击,”并补充说,以色列国防军“不会允许真主党武装自己,并将采取一切手段强制执行停火谅解,以确保以色列国公民的安全。”2 月 13 日,黎巴嫩当局以安全考虑为由暂停了来自德黑兰的航班。

44. 以色列国防军多次表示在对叙利亚领土的空袭中打死了真主党成员,包括 12 月 3 日打死“真主党在叙利亚军方的代表萨尔曼·内梅尔·贾马”。据报,11 月 9 日,因 2005 年暗杀黎巴嫩前总理拉菲克·哈里里被缺席定罪的 Salim Ayyash(见 S/2020/1110,第 69 段)在对阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的一次空袭中被打死。

45. 12 月和 1 月,黎巴嫩武装部队和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国武装分子在黎巴嫩东北部与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国接壤的边界附近发生了几次冲突。2 月,叙利亚安全部队和黎巴嫩部族之间的武装冲突从阿拉伯叙利亚共和国蔓延到黎巴嫩东北部。作为回应,黎巴嫩武装部队随后宣布“建立了观察点,进行巡逻,并设立了临时屏障”。

46. 12 月 28 日,黎巴嫩安全部队在朱贝勒地区逮捕了约 70 名非法进入黎巴嫩的叙利亚前军事人员,并将他们移交给叙利亚看守当局。

E. 地雷和集束炸弹

47. 虽然例行排雷活动仍然暂停，但联黎部队在部队阵地受到影响后处理了 34 次未爆弹药和简易爆炸装置，清除了 91 个装置，为联黎部队巡逻和后勤调动扫清道路，并支持黎巴嫩武装部队的重新部署。联合国地雷行动处为 192 名军事和文职人员举办了 10 次提高爆炸物风险认识的课程，并为排雷组核证举办了 9 次培训课程。

F. 边界划定

48. 虽然在划定或标定黎巴嫩与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国之间边界方面没有取得任何进展，但时任黎巴嫩看守总理纳吉布·米卡提在 1 月 11 日正式访问大马士革期间宣布将成立一个黎巴嫩-叙利亚联合委员会来开展划界工作。我在 2007 年 10 月 30 日关于第 1701(2006)号决议执行情况的报告(S/2007/641，附件)中提出沙巴阿农场地区的临时界定，阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和以色列都尚未作出回应。

G. 政治和体制稳定

49. 在跨越蓝线敌对行动爆发近 14 个月后，美国和法国于 2024 年 11 月 26 日宣布“黎巴嫩和以色列寻求可持续地结束目前跨越蓝线敌对行动升级状况，双方均准备采取步骤，为永久和全面解决创造条件。”美法进一步表示“以黎将于 2024 年 11 月 27 日 04:00 时(以色列标准时间/东欧时间)开始停止敌对行动”。

50. 继以色列内阁 11 月 26 日核可该协议后，黎巴嫩看守内阁于 11 月 27 日核可宣布停止敌对行动，米卡提先生前一天对此表示欢迎，认为这是在黎巴嫩建立平静和稳定以及流离失所者回返的重要一步。

51. 12 月 7 日，黎巴嫩看守内阁核准了黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南的部署计划。早些时候，看守内阁于 11 月 6 日核准向国防部拨付一笔国库预付款，用于招募 1 500 名新兵(见 S/2024/817，第 65 段)。1 月 14 日，黎巴嫩武装部队宣布第一批新兵已经开始训练，并重申 6 000 名新兵的招募目标。另外，黎巴嫩武装部队还敲定了打击性骚扰政策和性别平等战略。

52. 在 26 个月的总统真空之后，黎巴嫩议会于 1 月 9 日选举黎巴嫩武装部队司令约瑟夫·奥恩为黎巴嫩第 14 任总统。奥恩先生在第二轮投票中获得了 128 名议员中 99 人的支持。奥恩先生在总统就职演说中宣布“黎巴嫩历史进入了一个新阶段”，并表示致力于“确保国家有权垄断武器，投资于军队，以监测边界，维护南部的安全，划定东部、北部和海上的边界，防止走私，打击恐怖主义并维护黎巴嫩领土的统一。”奥恩先生还表示，他承诺“要求就一项综合国防政策进行辩论，作为外交、经济和军事层面的国家安全战略的一部分，使黎巴嫩国家，我重复一遍，黎巴嫩国家，能够消除以色列的占领并击退其对所有黎巴嫩领土的侵略。”

53. 黎巴嫩武装部队参谋长哈桑·奥迪少将随后出任黎巴嫩武装部队代理指挥官。

54. 在与议会各集团进行具有约束力的协商后，1月13日，总统指定国际法院院长纳瓦夫·萨拉姆为总理，负责组建政府。萨拉姆先生获得了128名议员中84人的支持，他在1月14日表示，他的任命是一个“行动呼吁”，以实现“进行变革和建设一个公平、强大、现代和文明国家的愿望”。2月8日，总统签署了组建总理“改革和拯救政府”的法令。24名部长中有5名是女性。

55. 继1月26日白宫关于延长黎巴嫩和以色列之间协议的声明(见上文第1段)之后，奥恩先生于2月7日指出，“南部的永久稳定与以色列完全撤出在上次战争中占领的领土以及充分执行第1701号决议、包括11月27日协议的规定密切相关。”1月26日的公告进一步指出：“黎巴嫩政府、以色列政府和美国政府还将开始谈判，讨论归还2023年10月7日之后抓获的黎巴嫩囚犯。”在以色列宣布其部队将在2月18日之后继续留在黎巴嫩南部的五个阵地之后，奥恩先生、纳比·贝里议长和萨拉姆先生发表了一份联合声明，呼吁安全理事会“迫使以色列立即撤军”，并声明黎巴嫩有权使用一切必要手段确保以色列敌人的撤离。

56. 抗议政府拒绝来自伊朗伊斯兰共和国的航班入境的决定(见第43段)的活动演变成暴力事件。2月14日，联黎部队的一个车队在贝鲁特拉菲克·哈里里国际机场外遭到抗议者袭击，造成部队副指挥官和另一名维和人员受伤(见附件一)。^{*}2月15日，奥恩先生谴责了这次袭击，他说：“安全部队不会宽恕企图破坏国家稳定和国内和平的任何一方”。内政部宣布，与一项调查有关的“超过25人被捕”。2月15日，抗议者在机场外与黎巴嫩武装部队发生冲突。

57. 黎巴嫩议会于11月28日召开会议，再次通过立法，将军事和安全机构中的将军退休时间推迟一年(见S/2024/222，第55段)。

58. 12月4日，看守内阁核准了790万美元的援助资金，包括用于向黎巴嫩南部有需要的人提供医疗。12月17日，内阁核准了重建工作资金，包括为南部和贝鲁特南郊各划拨约1000万美元。

59. 截至2025年2月13日，黎巴嫩公共卫生部表示，由于2023年10月8日以来的敌对行动，超过4244人被杀，其中包括341名儿童和962名妇女，17506人受伤。自2024年11月27日以来，超过55名黎巴嫩平民在以色列的军事行动中丧生，其中包括至少9名妇女和7名儿童。

60. 由于90000多套住房被损坏或摧毁，民用基础设施遭到广泛破坏，而且存在爆炸物，许多在敌对行动期间流离失所的人在返回家园、特别是蓝线附近村庄时面临重大障碍。截至2月19日，仍有98994人流离失所，950652人已开始返回原籍地。

61. 2023年10月8日至2025年2月20日，至少160个卫生机构受到空袭影响，241名卫生工作者殉职，295人受伤。截至2月20日，3家医院和26个初级卫生保健中心仍然关闭。至少45个供水设施受损，影响到近500000人。约165万人

^{*} 仅以案件所用语文分发。

面临重度粮食不安全状况。此外，自 2023 年 10 月 8 日以来，至少 14 所公立学校被毁，105 所严重受损。

62. 黎巴嫩紧急呼吁要求提供 4.257 亿美元，以满足 10 月 1 日至 12 月 31 日期间 100 万弱势民众的需求，该呼吁已延长至 2025 年 3 月，并要求追加 3.714 亿美元。截至 12 月 31 日，2024 年的呼吁已筹到 71% 的资金，即 3.04 亿美元。2024 年黎巴嫩应急计划呼吁要求提供 27.2 亿美元，已筹得 49% 的资金，即 13.2 亿美元。10 月 24 日，法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙主持了一次支持黎巴嫩人民和主权国际会议，动员向黎巴嫩武装部队提供人道主义援助和支持。

63. 黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在 12 月 17 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/703-S/2024/933)中指出，“由于农田和作物被毁，牲畜死亡，基础设施遭到破坏，黎巴嫩面临重大经济挑战”。在 11 月 6 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/671-S/2024/806)所附的信中，看守总理纳吉布·米卡提指出，“以色列的持续侵略，特别是对巴勒贝克和提尔等城市的攻击，导致全体民众流离失所，宝贵的文化遗址遭到破坏”。

64. 2 月 7 日，Tarek Bitar 法官继续调查 2020 年 8 月 4 日贝鲁特港口爆炸事件，传唤海关总署、安全总局、黎巴嫩武装部队情报局和贝鲁特港口管理局的官员接受询问。

65. 截至 1 月 31 日，有 763 707 名难民和寻求庇护者在黎巴嫩向联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)登记，其中包括 752 675 名叙利亚难民和 11 032 名其他国籍的难民和寻求庇护者。自 2015 年以来，黎巴嫩政府暂停了难民署对叙利亚难民的新登记，难民的实际人数仍然未知，但政府估计为 150 万。

66. 2023 年 10 月 3 日至 2024 年 11 月 27 日，估计有 540 000 人(63%为叙利亚人，37%为黎巴嫩人)从黎巴嫩进入阿拉伯叙利亚共和国寻求保护。大多数人在 11 月 27 日之后返回黎巴嫩。12 月 8 日之后，估计有 95 500 名黎巴嫩和叙利亚国民从阿拉伯叙利亚共和国进入黎巴嫩，同时至少有 112 700 人离开黎巴嫩进入阿拉伯叙利亚共和国。自 2025 年 1 月 1 日以来，难民署记录了 120 起黎巴嫩当局驱逐出境事件，影响到至少 5 303 名叙利亚国民。

三. 安保和安全措施

67. 利塔尼河北南两侧的指定官员继续进行协调，确保黎巴嫩境内所有联合国人员的安全和安保。从 11 月 27 日起，一些对方案至关重要的人员获准在采取额外安全措施后返回利塔尼河以南。对利塔尼河以北的非方案关键类联合国文职人员的限制(见 S/2024/817，第 71 段)从 2 月 1 日起取消。

68. 10 月 21 日至 2 月 20 日，联黎部队记录了至少 39 起影响联合国阵地和车辆的事件，其中 10 起发生在 11 月 27 日之后(见附件一)。受影响最大的是纳古拉总部、西区总部和舒巴村(东区)附近的一个阵地。10 月 21 日至 2 月 20 日，联黎部队的阵地或车辆遭到射击，导致 25 名维和人员受伤，其中 3 人是在 11 月 27 日

之后受伤的。联黎部队维和人员还数次遭到小武器射击，但没有造成任何伤亡。11月7日，以色列国防军损坏了纳古拉附近的一个联黎部队阵地，并从迈斯杰贝勒、胡拉、Yarun 和 Labbunah 附近移走了四个蓝桶。

69. 在本报告所述期间，联黎部队所有阵地仍有人驻守。然而，特派团的行动自由受到限制，包括以色列国防军建议维和人员为了自身安全留在基地(2级)或避难所(3级)。唯一例外的是西区北部的两个营，它们在11月27日之后部分恢复到1级，即正常活动(见附件一)。

70. 原定于2025年2月12日举行的关于2022年12月14日在阿吉比耶附近对联黎部队的致命袭击案的下一次庭审再次推迟至2025年9月17日。关于2018年8月4日在迈季代勒尊(西区)发生的事件，联合国仍未获悉有关提起任何刑事诉讼将施害者绳之以法的信息。对2021年12月22日在沙克拉、2022年1月4日在宾特朱拜勒和2022年1月25日在拉米耶对联黎部队维和人员的侵犯行为的调查仍在继续。

四. 部署联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队

71. 截至2月20日，联黎部队有来自48个部队派遣国的10 280名军事人员，其中包括891名妇女(8.7%)，以及782名文职人员(238名国际工作人员和544名本国人员)，其中包括254名妇女(32.5%)。联黎部队海上特遣队由5艘船只组成，有620名特派团军事人员，其中包括54名妇女(8.7%)。此外，联合国停战监督组织的43名军事观察员，其中包括9名妇女(21%)，在黎巴嫩观察员小组工作，在行动上接受联黎部队的指令。最高级别的女军官拥有上校军衔，而最高级别的女文职人员为D-2职等。

72. 特派团正与联合国总部和部队派遣国合作，在排雷、未爆弹药处置和工程领域迅速部署强化能力，以清理道路，促进在整个行动区全面恢复巡逻和监测职能。自11月27日以来，已部署两个爆炸物侦察队和四个爆炸物处理队。

73. 联黎部队继续发表声明，接受采访，并进行面对面和虚拟媒体访问，以澄清其任务和活动，并反击错误信息和虚假信息。在以色列海军袭击拜特龙(见第9段)之后，联黎部队发表声明，驳斥媒体关于特派团卷入该事件的虚假指控。

74. 联黎部队根据安全理事会第2539(2020)号决议，继续实施全面规划和业绩评估系统，并评估联黎部队资源的持续相关性(见S/2020/473)。特派团还利用“以行动促维和+”监测框架中的指标来加强其数据驱动的分析 and 报告。联黎部队对各单位执行“以行动促维和”承诺和安全理事会第2436(2018)号决议的准备情况进行了15次评价。没有发现重大不足之处。

五. 行为和纪律

75. 10月1日至1月30日，联黎部队记录了7起可能失当行为指控，没有任何性剥削和性虐待指控。向1名文职人员和2 601名军事人员提供了联合国行为标

准的上岗培训。向 728 名文职人员和 217 名军事人员提供了关于防止性剥削和性虐待以及防止性骚扰的自学模块。

六. 意见

76. 我欣见，尽管面临挑战，自 11 月 27 日以来，停止敌对行动继续得到维持，在以色列国防军撤出黎巴嫩领土方面取得了进展，同时黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南加强了部署。恢复停止敌对行动给蓝线两侧社区带来了很大的缓解，他们在过去一年里遭受了严重的暴力、破坏和痛苦。这种缓解绝不能昙花一现。在我 1 月份访问黎巴嫩期间，机会和希望的气氛显而易见。现在出现了一个期待已久的机会，可以实现黎巴嫩和以色列人民理应享有的持久安全与稳定，使双方的流离失所者能够返回家园，重建生活。

77. 然而，局势仍然脆弱。以色列国防军尚未完全撤出黎巴嫩领土，仍留在五个地点，并指定两个地区为蓝线沿线的“缓冲区”。在联黎部队的积极支持下，黎巴嫩武装部队继续在整个黎巴嫩南部进行部署，同时流离失所社群也在返回家园。黎巴嫩武装部队还继续处置据信属于真主党的大量遗弃武器。我呼吁所有相关行为体不采取可能破坏停止敌对行动的单边或挑衅行动。我敦促各方充分尊重并迅速履行承诺，包括尊重蓝线，借助这一政治势头，充分执行第 1701(2006)号决议并实现其最终目标，即黎巴嫩和以色列之间的永久停火。我欢迎联黎部队、各方和根据停止敌对行动所设的机制之间的协调。我重申，联合国随时准备支持能够加强蓝线两侧社区对返回家园的信心的安排。

78. 从双方利益出发，黎巴嫩武装部队应能按照停止敌对行动协定和第 1701(2006)号决议，在全境重新确立和巩固其权力和黎巴嫩国家权力，包括确保利塔尼河和蓝线之间地区没有国家权力之外的任何武装人员、资产和武器。我感到遗憾的是，尽管黎巴嫩武装部队没有采取敌对行动，但还是遭受了伤亡。加强黎巴嫩武装部队的存在和能力是第 1701(2006)号决议的核心内容。我感谢会员国迄今提供的支持，并呼吁捐助者提供与其充分执行第 1701(2006)号决议的承诺相称的物质和财政支持。

79. 与此同时，以色列国防军必须完全撤出黎巴嫩领土。以色列国防军在蓝线以北的存在侵犯了黎巴嫩的主权和领土完整，违反了第 1701(2006)号决议，并破坏了黎巴嫩当局将国家权力扩展到全境的努力。我再次谴责一切从以色列侵犯黎巴嫩主权的行，并再次促请以色列政府停止一切飞越黎巴嫩领土的行为。我也谴责任何从黎巴嫩侵犯以色列主权的行。

80. 以色列国防军继续占领盖杰尔北部和蓝线以北毗邻地区也违反了第 1701(2006)号决议，必须停止占领。我再次敦促以色列当局履行第 1701(2006)号决议规定的义务，从盖杰尔北部和蓝线以北毗邻地区撤出。我注意到黎巴嫩政府欢迎联黎部队 2011 年关于协助以色列国防军撤出被占地区的提议，而以色列政府尚未作出回应。

81. 我欢迎选举黎巴嫩总统、指定总理以及随后迅速组建新政府。联合国期待与新总统、新总理和新政府就其优先事项密切合作，包括巩固停止敌对行动和充分执行第 1701(2006)号决议，同时支持为满足黎巴嫩人民的迫切需求和愿望所作的一切努力，包括人道主义应急行动、恢复和重建以及推进全面、包容和可持续的改革议程。

82. 敌对行动造成了巨大破坏，需要一个全面、包容的恢复和重建进程。尽管停止敌对行动使大多数流离失所者得以返回原籍地，但还有许多人无法返回，因为民用基础设施和家园被毁，基本服务中断，爆炸物继续存在，谋生机会有限。我呼吁捐助者为 2025 年黎巴嫩应急计划和紧急呼吁提供充分资金，以满足持续的人道主义需求，支持黎巴嫩的恢复、重建和稳定，这对于将黎巴嫩国家权力扩展到全境也至关重要。一个有能力实施早该进行的改革以恢复国际信心和挖掘捐助资金的赋权政府将至关重要。为此，我欢迎约瑟夫·奥恩总统和纳瓦夫·萨拉姆总理承诺推进全面的经济和治理改革，包括司法独立和法治。

83. 我还感到鼓舞的是，奥恩先生承诺确保黎巴嫩国家对全境所有武器拥有垄断权，并就制定国家安全战略举行对话。交火表明，真主党和其他非国家武装团体违反第 1701(2006)和 1559(2004)号决议，在利塔尼河和蓝线之间地区在国家权力之外拥有武器。我呼吁黎巴嫩政府为充分执行《塔伊夫协议》以及第 1559(2004)、1701(2006)和 1680(2006)号决议的有关规定提供便利，这些规定要求解除黎巴嫩境内所有武装团体的武装，并将黎巴嫩政府的控制权扩展到黎巴嫩全境。在这方面，黎巴嫩武装部队为拆除解放巴勒斯坦人民阵线-总指挥部派和“法塔赫起义”组织的基地而采取的积极步骤值得关注。

84. 为了支持各方在新的行动环境下履行承诺，联黎部队正在调整其态势。在这方面，我欢迎部队派遣国的支持，它们正与特派团合作，迅速加强特派团的能力，以促进在整个行动区全面恢复巡逻和监测职能。根据第 1701(2006)号决议的要求，全面恢复联黎部队的授权活动需要任何一方不施加限制，包括保证特派团行动自由以及进入所有相关地点和蓝线所有部分。此外，联黎部队正计划采用新技术，以改善监测和核查；增强战术应对能力；与黎巴嫩武装部队和以色列国防军一起重新评估业务框架。各方接受这些调整将证明他们致力于履行决议规定的义务。此外，联黎部队和黎巴嫩武装部队之间的重要伙伴关系必须继续更加有效，包括制定联合业务规划，以支持执行第 1701(2006)号决议。

85. 我再次呼吁双方遵守包括国际人道法在内的国际法规定的义务，确保联合国人员的安全保障、行动自由以及联合国房地和财产在任何时候绝对不受侵犯。我强烈谴责 2 月 14 日在机场附近对联黎部队车队的袭击，在这次袭击中，数名维和人员受伤。必须追究袭击联黎部队的肇事者的责任。

86. 我再次促请以色列和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国对秘书长 2007 年 10 月 30 日报告 (S/2007/641)中暂时确定的沙巴阿农场地域范围作出答复。

87. 阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的事态发展也为叙利亚难民最终安全、自愿和有尊严地回返带来了希望。我呼吁国际社会与叙利亚看守当局合作，为这种回返创造有利条件。始终如一地适用法律和程序保障，包括不推回原则，仍然至关重要。

88. 我再次呼吁支持近东救济工程处的工作，呼吁捐助者增加财政支助，确保工程处继续向黎巴嫩境内的所有巴勒斯坦难民提供基本服务和支助。

89. 我欢迎恢复对 2020 年 8 月 4 日贝鲁特港口爆炸的司法调查，以及总理萨拉姆先生声明承诺确保为爆炸受害者及其家人伸张正义。

90. 最后，正如我在访问黎巴嫩期间表述的那样，我对我们维和人员深表钦佩和赞赏，尽管危险持续存在，他们仍然坚守岗位，勇于奉献。他们在很大程度上促成了恢复停止敌对行动，他们继续努力执行第 1701(2006)号决议规定的任务对支持各方履行停止敌对行动和第 1701(2006)号决议规定的义务至关重要。我衷心感谢所有向联黎部队和黎巴嫩观察员小组提供军事人员和装备的国家。我感谢黎巴嫩问题特别协调员雅尼娜·亨尼斯-普拉斯哈特、联黎部队特派团团长兼部队指挥官阿罗尔多·拉萨罗·萨恩斯中将以及在这一困难时期保持团结的部队派遣国和联合国国家工作队所有成员继续致力于实现和平与稳定。

Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

2. From 21 October to 26 November, normal operational and logistical activities outside UNIFIL positions were suspended throughout the area of operations. Only essential logistics movements to resupply UNIFIL positions with food, water and fuel were conducted during this period. The prolonged periods of time that UNIFIL peacekeepers spent in shelter following security advisories from the Israel Defense Forces, stated by the latter to be necessary for the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel, further impeded mandated activities. Between 16 and 18 November, for instance, some positions were in bunkers for a continuous 57 hours.

3. From 27 November to 26 January, UNIFIL conducted 1,632 patrols. Of these, an average of 70 independent vehicle patrols were conducted each month along the Blue Line, out of an overall monthly average of 810 vehicle patrols, conducted during the day and at night. Some foot patrols resumed in January in Sector East, while market walks remained suspended. Air operations, including image collection, also resumed in January. In addition, the mission conducted an average of 412 inspection activities each month, which included the operation of permanent checkpoints and the conduct of counter-rocket-launching patrols.

4. From 27 January to 20 February, operational activities continued to increase, with UNIFIL conducting 3,496 operational activities, including 1,706 patrols. Of the patrols, 160 independent vehicle patrols were conducted along the Blue Line, during both the day and at night. In addition, the mission conducted 1,376 inspection activities, which included the operation of permanent and temporary checkpoints as well as the conduct of counter-rocket-launching patrols.

5. During the conduct of ground operations by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, Israel Defense Forces personnel and infrastructure were on occasion situated directly next to United Nations positions. In several instances, UNIFIL positions were damaged as a result of exchanges of fire between the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah. Blue Line barrels, marking the Blue Line, were removed or damaged on four occasions by the Israel Defense Forces in Mays al-Jabal, Hula, Labbunah and Rumaysh.

6. During the reporting period, UNIFIL observed white barrels placed by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, near Arab al-Luwayzah, Sarda, and between Markaba and Hula (all Sector East). A warning sign reading, in Arabic, “beware, your life is in danger, passing prohibited” was seen on some of the barrels. UNIFIL movement beyond those white barrels was thus restricted. In addition, the movements of UNIFIL patrols continued to be impeded on several occasions due to IDF checkpoints and roadblocks that were either human-made or caused by debris or the cratering of roads in air strikes.

7. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents of restrictions of movement with both Lebanese and Israeli authorities. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission continued to experience restrictions, as

detailed below. In addition, between 21 October and 20 February, UNIFIL access was restricted by the Israel Defense Forces on at least 16 occasions and by population gatherings on 12 occasions, in various locations within the mission's area of operations. In most cases, patrols resumed on alternative routes.

Access to all locations of interest

8. Owing to the security situation during the reporting period, UNIFIL was not able to systematically monitor locations of interest, including Green without Borders sites. Many of these sites were destroyed or damaged by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL continues to request unrestricted access to the entire area of operations. On 7 February, UNIFIL communicated a list detailing 17 locations of interest to the Lebanese Armed Forces and requested coordinated inspections of these locations. UNIFIL visited two of these locations independently on 20 February. A series of tunnel openings was discovered by UNIFIL patrols on 19 February. UNIFIL communicated the coordinates to the Lebanese Armed Forces and they inspected the sites the next day.

Freedom of movement incidents

9. On 21 October, Israel Defense Forces soldiers with two tanks blocked the movement of a UNIFIL logistical convoy on a road near Rumaysh (Sector West), with the soldiers stating that UNIFIL could not proceed as there was armed activity in the area. As the patrol was not able to use an alternative route, the activity was cancelled and the peacekeepers returned to their position.

10. On 23 October, a UNIFIL team conducting a medical evacuation encountered rubble blocking a road south-west of Yarin (Sector West). As the patrol could not proceed, an additional team from another UNIFIL position was dispatched to retrieve the patient. As the first UNIFIL team was waiting for the second team to arrive, it was caught in crossfire of unknown origin. The team was forced to withdraw, together with the patient, to a UNIFIL position. A few minutes later, the second team arrived at the location and was also caught in the crossfire. The second team also withdrew, but one of the vehicles was damaged by the gunfire and had to be left at the scene. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that the firing was probably not deliberately targeting the peacekeepers' vehicles.

11. Also on 23 October, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL logistics convoy in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East) and questioned the peacekeepers about the convoys' route, the number of peacekeepers and the movement order, while a second Israel Defense Forces soldier filmed the convoy. The Israel Defense Forces told the peacekeepers that the area was not safe and requested the UNIFIL convoy to return to its position. On its way back, the UNIFIL convoy was stopped by two Israel Defense Forces bulldozers placing trees, debris and rocks on the road, impeding the movement of the convoy. The convoy continued its movement on an alternative route. UNIFIL protested the incidents to the Israel Defense Forces, which said that the movement had not been coordinated in advance and had to be stopped as the convoy was approaching an active combat zone. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

12. On 1 November, 15 Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol on the way back to its position north of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). The patrol was returning from having cleared debris and unexploded ordnance near Hula. The Israeli soldiers instructed the patrol to move back to the nearest UNIFIL position. The patrol diverted from its planned itinerary and continued to a nearby observation post.

13. On 3 November, 10 armed individuals on scooters encircled a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Burj al Qibli (Sector West) and looked into the UNIFIL vehicles. UNIFIL contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces, which reached the location shortly thereafter. An additional Lebanese Armed Forces team arrived at the location approximately an hour later and spoke with the individuals, following which the individuals left the area. The Lebanese Armed

Forces accompanied the UNIFIL patrol out of the area, whereafter the patrol resumed its planned itinerary. In official correspondence, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that the patrol had been stopped as it had conducted some road works that had raised suspicion among the local residents.

14. On 6 November, a stone was thrown towards a UNIFIL logistical convoy near the Sidon-Tyre highway (outside the area of operations). The convoy continued its planned itinerary without interruption. One UNIFIL vehicle sustained minor damage to a door.

15. On 7 November, five UNIFIL peacekeepers conducting a logistics movement on the Beirut-Sidon highway (outside the area of operations) were injured following an Israel Defense Forces drone strike on a vehicle that was in close proximity to the UNIFIL convoy. The windows and windshields of two UNIFIL vehicles were also damaged. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces, which erroneously stated that the movement had not been coordinated in advance.

16. On 14 November, south-west of Qallawiyah (Sector West), a UNIFIL patrol was subject to direct fire. The shots came from an approximate distance of 75 m. The peacekeepers responded by firing warning shots into the air, whereafter they continued to a nearby UNIFIL position. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel or damage to vehicles. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed of the incident and responded that access to narrow roads in neighbourhoods and to private properties and the inspection of locations without prior coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces were not in keeping with national laws. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

17. On 16 November, a UNIFIL patrol observed an abandoned rocket launcher near Hallusiyat al Tahta (Sector East). Shortly thereafter, five individuals, at least one of whom was armed with a rifle, attempted to block the patrol on a road in the vicinity of Bidyas and Maarakeh (Sector East), but the patrol was able to bypass the individuals and continued its movement. An hour later, as the patrol passed Maarakeh (Sector East), three individuals fired approximately 40 times towards the rear vehicle of the patrol. Two UNIFIL vehicles were damaged by bullets. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident. The mayor of Bidyas informed UNIFIL that he had engaged with the youths involved in the incidents and expressed his disapproval of actions interfering with UNIFIL patrols.

18. On 19 November, two unknown individuals in a building opened fire at a UNIFIL patrol near Khirbat Silm (Sector East), prompting the patrol to fire warning shots. The patrol then continued to its position south-east of Haddatha (Sector West) approximately 30 minutes later. Due to the rapid manoeuvring and the firing of warning shots from inside the patrol vehicle, one peacekeeper sustained acoustic trauma and light bruising on his leg. A second peacekeeper reported pain under his right eye. There was no damage to the UNIFIL vehicles. UNIFIL liaised with the local municipal authorities, which described the incident as an act of mistrust against UNIFIL troops amid ongoing hostilities.

19. On 19 November, armed individuals who identified themselves as Hizbullah members stopped a UNIFIL vehicle on the Damascus highway in Beirut (outside the area of operations). The peacekeepers were told to refrain from using any electronic equipment. The armed individuals took the peacekeepers' UNIFIL identification cards. One of the armed individuals forcibly entered the UNIFIL vehicle and drove it to what appeared to be an unofficial checkpoint. At the checkpoint, the identification cards were returned, and another driver took over and drove to nearby Lebanese Armed Forces barracks. The peacekeepers had remained in their vehicle throughout. Subsequently, the Lebanese Armed Forces accompanied the patrol to UNIFIL House in Beirut. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Lebanese Armed Forces and has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

20. On 21 November, approximately 20 individuals surrounded a UNIFIL convoy in the southern suburbs of Beirut (outside the area of operations). The convoy had to divert from

the main road due to a roadblock, and while trying to exit the area, the individuals started to fire shots in the air and subsequently also directly at the UNIFIL vehicles. The convoy managed to move out of the area while being pursued by individuals on scooters and in vehicles. Both UNIFIL vehicles were damaged, one with bullet holes. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

21. On 27 November, a crowd of 12 individuals blocked a UNIFIL logistical convoy on a road north-west of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) by placing vehicles across the road. Peacekeepers asked the individuals to allow them to pass, but the crowd refused. The peacekeepers cancelled their activity and returned to their position. The local civil defence informed UNIFIL that the incident was not directed against the mission but was a show of general discontent from residents at not being allowed to enter their village.

22. On 27 November, a UNIFIL patrol was told to wait by Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers in the vicinity of Kfar Kila (Sector East). After waiting for about 10 minutes, the patrol continued its movement. A few minutes later, the patrol observed two Israel Defense Forces tanks, with a soldier on one of the tanks signalling that the patrol could continue. The patrol therefore proceeded but encountered debris blocking the road. While the peacekeepers tried to clear the road, eight Israel Defense Forces soldiers approached the peacekeepers and said that the patrol had to turn back. The peacekeepers cancelled the activity and returned to their position.

23. On 29 November, approximately 30 individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-east of Naffakhiyah (Sector West). The individuals were neither armed nor aggressive but did not let the patrol continue towards the village centre. As the peacekeepers were not able to continue, they cancelled the patrol and returned to their position.

24. On 30 November, nine Israel Defense Forces soldiers with four vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-east of Jubbayn (Sector West) and told the peacekeepers they could not pass. The patrol returned to its position. Later the same day, the patrol resumed the activity without restriction.

25. On 1 December, Israel Defense Forces soldiers with two tanks stopped a UNIFIL patrol south-west of Zallutiyah (Sector West) and instructed the peacekeepers to return to their position. The peacekeepers cancelled the activity and returned to their position.

26. On 3 December, a UNIFIL patrol observed a cache of rockets on the side of the road, south-east of Udaysah (Sector East). As the patrol continued its movement, two individuals in civilian clothes and armed with a machine gun and a rifle fired at the patrol. The patrol fired back in the direction of the assailants and accelerated to leave the area. The patrol activity was subsequently cancelled, with the peacekeepers returning to their position. No damage or injury was detected. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

27. On 4 December, 10 individuals, one of whom had a concealed gun, stopped a UNIFIL patrol north-west of Suwwanan (Sector East). The peacekeepers reversed and used an alternative route to return to their position.

28. On 5 December, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Sarda (Sector East) and requested the patrol to turn back. The patrol returned to its position.

29. On 10 December, after having encountered Israel Defense Forces soldiers and an infantry vehicle, 10 (warning) shots of unknown origin were fired, impacting approximately 100 m ahead of a UNIFIL patrol west of Yarun (Sector West). The patrol continued its activity, using an alternative route.

30. On 16 December, 12 Israel Defense Forces soldiers blocked a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Yarin (Sector West) and asked the peacekeepers to turn back. The patrol, which was escorting a truck with gravel from one UNIFIL position to another, had to interrupt its

activity, with the truck proceeding to a nearby UNIFIL position south of Marwahin, while the escort team returned to its position south-east of Bayt Lif (Sector West).

31. On 23 December, Israel Defense Forces soldiers with a tank blocked a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Yarun (Sector West). The peacekeepers engaged with the Israeli soldiers but were not allowed to proceed. The patrol returned to a nearby UNIFIL position, south-west of Aytarun (Sector West).

32. On 25 December, unknown individuals fired small-arms fire over a UNIFIL patrol escorting the Lebanese Red Cross on a mission to evacuate an elderly woman, north of Yarun (Sector West). The convoy observed one tank, one heavily armoured combat engineering vehicle and five Israel Defense Forces soldiers, approximately 200 m to the south. The convoy withdrew from the location, moving north. Five minutes after the first shots were fired, a second sequence of three bursts was fired from the south towards the convoy. Shortly thereafter, a third burst was fired towards the convoy. At the request of the Lebanese Red Cross, the activity was cancelled, with the patrol returning to UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah (Sector West). No casualties or damage was reported. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

33. On 26 December, six Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Qantarrah (Sector East) and informed the peacekeepers that they could not proceed due to operations in the area. The patrol cancelled the activity and returned to its position.

34. On 29 December, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that patrols should avoid passing near Taybah (Sector East), as the security of the peacekeepers could not be guaranteed. UNIFIL protested to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL resumed patrolling in the area on 30 December.

35. On 10 January, 20 Israel Defense Force soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol, which was preparing to support the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to a position in Salihani (Sector West), as the patrol was passing south-east of Ramiyah (Sector West). The patrol cancelled the activity and returned to its position.

36. On 14 January, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by an Israel Defense Forces vehicle parked across the road south-east of Dayr Mimas (Sector East). Peacekeepers engaged with the Israel Defense Forces soldiers, but they refused to remove the vehicle. The patrol cancelled its activity and returned to its position.

37. On 16 January, a UNIFIL patrol attempting to access an area to dispose of an improvised explosive device north-east of Marwahin (Sector West) was blocked by debris placed on a road by the Israel Defense Forces. The UNIFIL patrol had to wait until the roadblock was removed seven hours later before carrying out the disposal.

38. On 16 January, Israel Armed Forces soldiers with two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East) and told the patrol that it had to turn around. The peacekeepers cancelled the patrol and returned to their position.

39. On 17 January, 11 Israel Defense Forces soldiers with four vehicles again stopped a UNIFIL patrol south of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East) and instructed the patrol to turn around. Peacekeepers engaged with the Israel Défense Forces soldiers but were not granted passage. The patrol cancelled its activity and returned to its position. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

40. On 20 January, Israel Defense Forces soldiers blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-west of Duhayrah (Sector West). Peacekeepers engaged with the Israel Défense Forces soldiers but were not granted passage. The patrol cancelled the activity, and the peacekeepers returned to their position.

41. On 22 January, an explosion occurred approximately 20 m from a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Markaba (Sector East). UNIFIL has launched an investigation to determine

the origin of the explosion. Three UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained minor injuries and one UNIFIL vehicle was severely damaged.

42. On 22 January, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol that was supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces in redeploying to a position in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) and asked where the patrol was going and who had sent them. The Israeli soldiers informed the patrol that it could not pass, since the Israel Defense Forces were conducting demolitions and search and destroy operations in the area. The patrol cancelled its activity and returned to its position.

43. On 22 January, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed a weapon at UNIFIL peacekeepers carrying out a reconnaissance mission of a Lebanese Armed Forces position west of Sarda (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces soldier threatened to “take action” if UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces returned, stating that the position was under the control of the Israel Defense Forces. The UNIFIL patrol turned back and proceeded with another planned activity.

44. On 23 January, five individuals in civilian clothes, armed with at least three pistols and two automatic weapons, stopped a UNIFIL reconnaissance team returning from a mission in Sector East, close to the Sidon-Tyre highway (outside the area of operations). The patrol immediately alerted the Lebanese Armed Forces, which arrived at the location after about five minutes. The Lebanese Armed Forces personnel talked to the five individuals, and after approximately 15 minutes the patrol was able to continue its movement.

45. On 23 January, 11 Israel Defense Forces soldiers instructed a joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces patrol south-west of Naqurah (Sector West) to leave the area, stating that the Israel Defense Forces were about to dispose of unexploded ordnance. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces cancelled their patrol and left the area.

46. On 27 January, a crowd of individuals south-west of Marun al-Ra’s shouted, threw stones and displayed aggressive gestures towards a UNIFIL patrol, which was conducting a joint patrol with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces tried unsuccessfully to calm the crowd. After 10 minutes the peacekeepers and the Lebanese Armed Forces left the location and continued their activity on an alternative road. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported but a camera on one vehicle was damaged.

47. On 27 January, approximately 700 individuals in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) impeded the movement of a UNIFIL patrol. The patrol stopped and after 10 minutes the individuals started throwing stones towards the UNIFIL vehicles, climbed on top of them and told peacekeepers to leave. Due to the large crowd, it took the patrol 15 minutes to leave the location. The peacekeepers returned to their position. One vehicle sustained minor scratches on the windscreen.

48. On 28 January, approximately 10 individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol south-west of Bint Jubayl (Sector West). The patrol turned back to reach their UNIFIL position, east of Bint Jubayl, while some of the individuals followed it for a few minutes on motorcycles. No injury to peacekeepers or damage to UNIFIL property was reported.

49. On 29 January, approximately 30 individuals sitting on a road south-east of Marun al-Ra’s (Sector West) blocked a UNIFIL patrol. The individuals approached the patrol and told the peacekeepers that the Israel Defense Forces had apprehended some individuals and seized an ambulance, and that they would not release the patrol until the Israel Defense Forces released the individuals. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and arrived at the location 30 minutes later, stating that the apprehended individuals would be released shortly. The patrol was able to leave and returned to its position, south of Marun al-Ra’s (Sector West).

50. On 29 January, peacekeepers heard two rounds of gunfire fired just above their vehicles while on patrol in the vicinity of Taybah (Sector East). The peacekeepers, who had just deviated from the original itinerary due to an Israel Defense Forces roadblock, estimated that the shots originated from an approximate distance of 300 m. While advancing, the patrol encountered a second Israel Defense Forces roadblock, where Israeli soldiers warned the peacekeepers that they would open fire if they attempted to proceed. The patrol diverted and returned to its position, south of Marji'yun (Sector East).

51. On 31 January, an entrance to a UNIFIL position north-west of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) was blocked with a barbed wire fence, preventing a UNIFIL patrol's planned movement to enter the position. Three Israel Defense Forces soldiers, two tanks and an armoured fighting vehicle were observed 300 m away from the position. The peacekeepers waited for five minutes, then turned back, and continued patrolling without concluding the planned stop at the UNIFIL position.

52. On 31 January, a UNIFIL patrol moving between Taybah and Udaysah (Sector East) encountered an Israel Defense Forces roadblock. The Israel Defense Forces soldiers told the patrol to continue towards Udaysah. Shortly thereafter, peacekeepers heard approximately 10 gunshots impacting close to their location. The patrol continued its itinerary but later encountered another Israel Defense Forces roadblock. Peacekeepers then moved along a secondary road to reach their United Nations position north-east of Dayr Kifa (Sector East).

53. On 2 February, approximately 100 individuals, acting aggressively, denied a UNIFIL patrol passage near Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). The Lebanese Armed Forces, which were part of the joint patrol, intervened but could not persuade the crowd to allow the patrol to continue. The peacekeepers interrupted the movement and returned to their position north-west of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East).

54. On 7 February, 11 young individuals with two motorcycles and two cars blocked a UNIFIL patrol, south-west of Frun (Sector East). The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and advised that the peacekeepers should stay on main roads. The peacekeepers did not observe any weapons, nor did the individuals behave aggressively, but they refused to clear the road. The peacekeepers decided to interrupt the activity and returned to their position, north-east of Dayr Kifa (Sector East).

55. On 10 February, a group of individuals on a road in the vicinity of Suwwanan (Sector East) threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, and arrived after 10 minutes at the location and calmed the situation down. The patrol continued its planned movement. One side mirror was damaged in the incident.

56. On 14 February, a crowd ambushed a UNIFIL convoy, consisting of three vehicles and nine peacekeepers, in the southern suburbs of Beirut (outside the area of operations) (see para. 56 of the main report) as the peacekeepers were driving towards Rafic Hariri International Airport. Peacekeepers in two of the vehicles were able to escape, but the third vehicle was blocked by the crowd. The crowd set the vehicle on fire and, as fire broke out, the four peacekeepers exited the vehicle. Two peacekeepers, including the outgoing Deputy Force Commander of UNIFIL, were attacked and injured while trying to escape. The injured peacekeepers were transported to a nearby hospital where they underwent treatment. The following day, the Deputy Force Commander was able to continue his repatriation flight to his home country while the other peacekeepers returned to UNIFIL headquarters at Naqurah.

57. On 15 February, a warning shot was fired at a UNIFIL patrol by Israel Defense Force soldiers in the vicinity of a UNIFIL position north-west of 'Aytit (Sector West). The UNIFIL patrol quickly left the area and returned to its position, north of Dayr Kifa (Sector East). No injury to UNIFIL personnel or damage to the vehicles was reported.

Impact on United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon positions and personnel

58. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL positions and assets were directly or indirectly impacted on at least 39 occasions. At least 12 of these incidents had implications for UNIFIL freedom of movement. UNIFIL continued to protest to Lebanese authorities, where non-State armed groups were seen to be operating in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. UNIFIL also protested to the Israel Defense Forces regarding incidents involving their troops.

59. On 22 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers at the permanent UNIFIL observation post in Duhayrah (Sector West) observed Israel Defense Forces soldiers conducting “house-clearing” operations nearby. After the Israel Defense Forces soldiers noticed the UNIFIL peacekeepers, they fired at the peacekeepers. The peacekeepers cancelled their activity and sought shelter within the position. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation and protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. The Israel Defense Forces launched an internal investigation into the incident, concluding that it could not determine whether the incident was the result of an Israel Defense Forces operation.

60. On 23 October, four points of impact were reported inside a UNIFIL position south-east of Kfar Shuba (Sector East), likely from rocket fire from north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL filed a complaint with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

61. On 25 October, an artillery rocket hit the level 1 hospital located inside a UNIFIL position south-east of Yater (Sector West), causing extensive damage to several buildings. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

62. On 29 October, a workshop building and a vehicle in the UNIFIL headquarters Green Hill camp, south-west of Naqurah (Sector West), were damaged as a 122 mm rocket impacted inside the position. A fire ignited but was extinguished shortly thereafter. Two peacekeepers sustained minor injuries. At the time of the incident, UNIFIL radars detected several rockets fired from the outskirts of Tyre (Sector West) in a southerly direction. UNIFIL conducted an investigation into the incident and determined that the rockets were likely fired by Hizbullah, falling short of their target. The investigation report was shared with the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL strongly protested the incident.

63. On 6 November, an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer forcefully removed a Blue Line barrel from its position in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East).

64. On 7 November, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported that a Blue Line barrel in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East) had been removed. Israel Defense Forces construction machinery had been observed in the area earlier the same day.

65. On 10 November, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed a Blue Line barrel south-west of Rumaysh (Sector West) having been knocked over, with an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer working adjacent to a nearby Blue Line barrel. UNIFIL protested these incidents to the Israel Defense Forces. On 10 November, the Israel Defense Forces stated that “it is possible that as part of the troops’ activity, part of the Blue Line infrastructure was harmed”. The Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “no intention of altering the Blue Line”. The Israel Defense Forces further informed UNIFIL that three Blue Line barrels “may have been unfortunately displaced”.

66. On 7 November, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed an arm of an Israel Defense Forces excavator extending into a UNIFIL position south of Naqurah (Sector West) while conducting digging and clearing works inside the position, destroying parts of the position’s protective fence and one concrete garret. Later the same day, two Israel Defense Forces excavators and one bulldozer again intruded into the UNIFIL position and conducted clearing and digging works. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces, which denied any activity had taken place inside UNIFIL positions.

67. On 15 November, an undetonated 155 mm artillery shell hit a UNIFIL position in Shama (Sector West). The shell did not detonate, and a UNIFIL explosive ordnance disposal team secured the area, removed the ordnance and conducted a controlled detonation. There was no injury among peacekeepers, but there was minor damage to a gym. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that the shell was inert and did not contain explosives but had the colorations and markings attributable to a 155 mm projectile used by the Israel Defense Forces.

68. On 16 November, UNIFIL reported damage to a mural and two barriers at a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West), likely caused by an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

69. On 19 November, a rocket impacting a UNIFIL position south-east of Ramiyah (Sector West) resulted in six peacekeepers sustaining injuries. Three of the six peacekeepers were evacuated to Tyre hospital for further treatment. There was extensive damage to the UNIFIL position. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that a rocket fired from north of the Blue Line had impacted the position. The investigation did not find evidence of a deliberate attack. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

70. On 19 November, eight rockets impacted a workshop, the warehouse and a military vehicle inside a UNIFIL position north-west of Shama (Sector West). One peacekeeper sustained minor injuries. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that the rockets were fired by Hizbullah or an affiliated group, from the vicinity of Malkiyah (Sector West). At the time of the incident, the Israel Defense Forces were operating in the proximity of the impacted UNIFIL position. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

71. On 22 November, two 122 mm rockets launched from an unidentified position impacted a UNIFIL position north-west of Shama, resulting in four peacekeepers injured and damage to a bunker, the base's post exchange, the gym, the chapel and a military vehicle. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

72. On 23 November, initial assessment showed that an uncrewed aerial vehicle impacted the external barrier at a UNIFIL position near Shama (Sector West). In addition, parts from a 122 mm rocket were found inside the UNIFIL position. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

73. On 24 November, a briefing room and the campsite warehouse at a UNIFIL position north-east of Bayyadah (Sector West) sustained damage due to direct fire in the area.

74. On 26 November, a UNIFIL peacekeeper sustained a minor injury to his leg after debris fell through the roof at his office in UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah, following a nearby Israeli air strike.

75. On 7 December, an accommodation unit at a UNIFIL position southwest of Burj Qallawiyah (Sector West) sustained damage due to gunshots fired during a funeral procession in the area. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel.

76. On 10 December, a bullet from nearby firing impacted an office building at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah (Sector West). There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel.


77. On 26 December, a civilian UNIFIL contractor was shot and injured by the Israel Defense Forces on his way to work at the nearby UNIFIL position near Qantarrah (Sector West). UNIFIL escorted an ambulance to pick the civilian up and take him to a civilian hospital close by.

78. On 4 January, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer destroying a Blue Line barrel in Labbunah (Sector West).

79. On 15 January, a UNIFIL vehicle inside a UNIFIL position north-west of Shama (Sector West) was pierced by bullets. An additional 7.62 mm bullet projectile was found inside the position.

Figure

Incidents of restriction of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon freedom of movement and impacts on the mission's positions and personnel, October 2024 to February 2025



Source: UNIFIL.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

2. In identical letters dated 13 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/29](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “Israel has sounded the alarm bells in consistent letters and briefings, alerting that Hezbollah is building a massive military infrastructure south of the Litani River and beyond, that advanced weapon systems are being smuggled from Iran into Lebanon in flagrant breach of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), but unfortunately no action was taken.” The Permanent Representative of Israel further stated that “they [Hizbullah] are now attempting to regain strength and rearm with the assistance of Iran, and thus, remain a serious threat to Israel and to regional stability. To prevent further escalation, it is imperative that the government of Lebanon and the international community focus on curbing the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and financial support through the Syria-Lebanon border and via air and sea routes. Since the Understandings were reached, there have been several attempts to transfer weapons and cash to Hezbollah.”

3. In response to the above-mentioned letters, in a letter dated 24 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/55](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated: “The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects this unfounded accusation [that ‘advanced weapon systems are being smuggled from Iran into Lebanon’], which is nothing more than a pretext to justify Israel’s persistent violations of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and its blatant disregard for the ceasefire arrangements with Lebanon. [...] it [Israel] fabricates such groundless allegations to legitimize its continued illegal occupation of Lebanese territory.”

4. In identical letters dated 20 February addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/107](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated: “Since the entry into force of the Ceasefire Understandings between the parties, Israel has reported to the mechanism hundreds of violations by Hezbollah in breach of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and contrary to the Ceasefire Understandings. These violations include, inter alia, continued Hezbollah military activity, including south of the Litani River, arms smuggling through the Syria-Lebanon border, money transfers through the Beirut International Airport, active weapons production facilities and launching of uncrewed aerial vehicles towards Israel.”

5. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), in which it urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, and all State security institutions, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as in the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection and naval capacity.
2. In identical letters dated 9 January 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/78/712-S/2024/36](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: "The Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with UNIFIL [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon], so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)." Subsequently, on 29 February 2024, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated that, to implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), the army would need allied countries to help with everything from "fuel to equipment to means of transportation to the barracks and even to weapons – everything the army needs".
3. In the statement by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2025 ([S/PRST/2025/1](#)), the Council called for further international assistance to strengthen State institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces.
4. A key aim of the International Conference in Support of Lebanon's People and Sovereignty, convened by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, on 24 October 2024, was the mobilization of support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. According to a communiqué released by France, the Conference "enabled the Lebanese security forces, guarantors of [Lebanon's] unity, stability and sovereignty, to be lent additional support".
5. The Announcement of a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements and Toward the Implementation of UNSCR 1701, which was circulated to the Security Council at the request of the United States of America and France (see [S/2024/870](#)), noted the intention of the United States and France to work with the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon and the wider international community to support enhanced Lebanese Armed Forces deployment to southern Lebanon and to strengthen the capabilities of the army.
6. During the reporting period, regional and global leaders have strongly advocated a surge in support to enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Similarly, Lebanese leaders have made several calls for increased international support to be channelled to the army. In his inaugural address on 9 January, the President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, underscored the need to invest in the Lebanese Armed Forces, including through investment from the Lebanese State itself, in order to secure the country's borders and contribute to stabilization in the south. During my visit to Lebanon in January, I also encouraged the international community to strengthen its support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United Nations, including the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), continued to

leverage advocacy and engagement opportunities to highlight the funding needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

7. The Military Technical Committee for Lebanon was convened in Rome, on 25 November, and in Madrid, from 27 to 28 February. These meetings were attended by military representatives of France, Germany, Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, with both military and civilian officials from observer States and entities also present, including the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL. Representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces participated in both meetings, providing updates on progress made in capability enhancement, the extension of State authority and support for reconstruction and service resumption in southern Lebanon, while highlighting remaining capability and financial needs.

8. Meanwhile, the Beirut Executive Committee Working Group, an in-country technical forum chaired by the United Kingdom within the overarching framework of the Military Technical Committee, which aims to enhance the coordination of bilateral efforts to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, scaled up its efforts to ensure a responsive posture following the coming into effect of the cessation of hostilities on 27 November 2024. Several sub-working groups under the auspices of the Working Group became operational during the reporting period, through which representatives of Military Technical Committee member countries and observers collaborated with representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces in several priority areas, including strategic communications, planning and recruitment. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL supported such efforts, including to enhance joint engagement with the Lebanese Armed Forces and donors to enable their timely deployment in southern Lebanon and to coordinate and align efforts with national priorities.

9. UNIFIL participates in four subcommittees of the Joint Supervision and Coordination Committee, constituted by the Lebanese Armed Forces in December 2024, to support the efforts to coordinate international assistance and plans with the partner nations to recruit, train, equip and deploy additional troops to southern Lebanon in support of the cessation of hostilities and resolution 1701 (2006).

10. The European Union continued its support of the Lebanese Armed Forces through a grant of €15 million, approved by the European Council on 13 November, and the announcement on 21 January of a third assistance measure from the European Peace Facility amounting to €60 million to support the Lebanese Armed Forces to “redeploy, secure and maintain stability” in southern Lebanon, among other objectives.

11. On 16 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, José Manuel Albares Bueno, announced that his country would provide €10 million to support the Lebanese Armed Forces. Two days later, the United States announced that it would provide “more than \$117 million in new, expanded security assistance” to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces, while noting that such assistance would directly support both security institutions “as they work to assert Lebanese sovereignty across the country and fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701”. Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States continued to provide in-kind support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, most of which was directed towards equipment, infrastructure and training needs.

12. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces also accelerated during the reporting period. Funding from Denmark (\$1 million), France (\$3 million), Germany (\$5 million) and Norway (\$2.7 million) was provided to support the well-being and livelihood of Lebanese service members and their families. Ongoing projects supported by the European Union entailed the provision of sustainable energy equipment and other energy

efficient measures (amounting to \$4 million) and support for the maritime technical and operational capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces (\$6.2 million), while Japan supported the delivery of medical equipment and renewable energy solutions (\$1 million).

13. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support for the Lebanese Armed Forces.
