



# Security Council

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## United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

*Reaffirming* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

*Commending* the progress made in Somalia over the past ten years, and especially over the past three years in the fight against Al-Shabaab,

*Emphasising* that the purpose of this resolution is to degrade the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

### **Degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and the Arms Embargo targeting Al-Shabaab**

*Expressing* grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and *further expressing* concern about the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh,

*Condemning* in the strongest possible terms Al-Shabaab's terrorist attacks, *expressing* deep concern at the loss of life from these attacks, *further condemning* Al-Shabaab's radicalisation to violent ends and exploitation, including financially of communities, and *reiterating* its determination to support comprehensive efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

*Strongly condemning* the reported targeting of civilians by Al-Shabaab as well as its indiscriminate use of explosive weapons, in particular in densely populated areas, and the consequences for the civilian population, as recorded by the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) (Panel), including in its final report ([S/2024/748](#)),

*Calling for* compliance with international law, and *expressing* continued concern about all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the targeting of civilians, violations of obligations related to the respect and protection of humanitarian personnel, and any unlawful attacks against civilian objects, and all violations and abuses of human rights, including those involving sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, especially as related to trafficking in persons, forced marriage and sexual slavery in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas,

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\* Reissued for technical reasons on 12 March 2025.



*Expressing* concern about the flow of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab, and *emphasising* the importance of preventing Al-Shabaab from developing and exploiting a relationship with listed groups in the region,

*Recalling* the 2024 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2024/384), *noting* with concern the high levels of abduction and recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law, with almost all instances of recruitment and use and abduction of children attributed to Al-Shabaab, and *urging* the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia (GFRS) and Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS) to further strengthen efforts to end and prevent the "six grave violations" against children as identified by the Secretary-General, including by implementing measures in line with resolutions 1379 (2001), 1998 (2011), 2225 (2015) and 2467 (2019),

*Underscoring* the importance of a holistic, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, including the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation and support for leadership roles of women in Somalia, to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, human rights, humanitarian, development and socioeconomic dimensions of the problem, including youth unemployment and poverty, and *emphasising* the importance of regional and international cooperation to counter terrorism, disrupt terrorist finances and illicit financial flows, and stop arms trafficking,

*Reiterating* that terrorism cannot, and should not, be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group, *condemning* terrorist groups' attempts to craft distorted narratives that are based on misrepresentation of religion to justify violence and to popularise their attempts to undermine Somalia and the region, *expressing* concern over their exploitation of information and communication technologies including through the Internet, particularly social media, for terrorist purposes, and *supporting* the GFRS's renewed efforts to counter Al-Shabaab's narratives,

*Strongly encouraging* Member States to work with the GFRS to prevent Al-Shabaab from using social media platforms for criminal purposes and to counter terrorist propaganda, and *strongly encouraging* the GFRS to develop a communication strategy and a publicity and outreach mechanism to systematically counter the narratives of Al-Shabaab through audio-visual and social media in a manner consistent with their obligations under international law,

*Expressing* serious concern about the humanitarian situation in Somalia, *encouraging* States to scale-up their humanitarian support to Somalia, and *calling for* all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, particularly applicable international humanitarian law, and in a manner consistent with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance (United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182), including humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, full, safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access to all persons in need across Somalia,

*Recognising* the contribution of Somali, African Union, and other forces operating legally in Somalia towards combatting Al-Shabaab, often at great sacrifice, and liberating areas of central Somalia from control by the group, and *welcoming* Somali and international efforts to bring stabilisation support and services to newly liberated communities,

*Urging* continued development of a Somalia-led, coordinated approach in developing Somalia's maritime governance sector, including through the formation

of the Maritime Security Working Group, and support of Somalia's maritime institutions, and *commending* the role played by the GFRS, member states, and regional organisations in maritime security,

*Noting* with concern smuggling and trafficking of weapons, military equipment and ammunition in contravention of the measures imposed by the Security Council in this and previous resolutions, and *urging* the GFRS, FMS and Member States to take appropriate measures to identify smugglers and hold them accountable,

*Expressing concern* about the violation of the charcoal ban by the vessel MV Fox documented by the Panel of Experts on Somalia in its reports of 1 September 2022 (S/2022/754) and 25 August 2023 (S/2023/724), *commending* the Panel's investigations into this incident, *urging* all parties to engage constructively with the Panel and the GFRS on this matter, and *reminding* all Member States of the provisions in its Implementation Assistance Notice No.1,

*Emphasising* that its objective, through this resolution, is to continue to update its consolidated framework to strengthen state- and peace-building, defeat Al-Shabaab and complement the mandates of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), drawing on the technical assessments of Somalia's weapons and ammunition management capability (S/2022/698, S/2023/676 and S/2024/751), and *taking note* of the final report of the Panel and recommendations from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

*Stressing* the primary role of the Central Monitoring Department (CMD), established by the GFRS to provide coordination, oversight, assurance and monitoring of the delivery, marking, circulation and audit of weapons and ammunition across Somalia, with support and advice from Member States as appropriate, *encouraging* Somalia's international partners to strengthen coordination with and capacity-building to the CMD as the primary focal point for weapons and ammunition management assistance to Somalia, and *calling on* the GFRS to continue coordinating all activities related to weapons and ammunition management through the CMD,

*Welcoming* the progress made by the GFRS in developing the firearms bill and the counter-improvised explosive device strategy, *calling on* the GFRS to finalise the establishment of a centralised licensing authority for weapons, in accordance with international best practices, to strengthen oversight and ensure accountability, and *encouraging* Somalia's international partners to continue to support the GFRS's efforts to strengthen weapons and ammunition management, including through technical support and capacity building, as requested by the GFRS,

*Recognising* that Al-Shabaab poses a threat to peace and security in Somalia, and that its terrorist and other activities pose a security threat to the region, and *underscoring* the need to degrade Al-Shabaab through: targeted sanctions, preventing access to weapons and ammunition, disrupting its finances, reducing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, improving maritime domain awareness and through international collaboration,

*Recognising* the need to continuously strengthen due process and to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for delisting individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) as amended, and *welcoming* the adoption of resolution 2744 (2024) enhancing the mandate and procedure of the Focal Point for Delisting,

*Determining* that Al-Shabaab's attempts to undermine peace and security in Somalia and the region, including through acts of terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

#### **A. Targeted sanctions**

1. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008), which imposed targeted sanctions, and its resolutions 2002 (2011), 2093 (2013) and 2662 (2022), which expanded the listing criteria, and *recalls* its decisions in resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018);

2. *Expresses* its intention to support the further development of fair and clear procedures for the delisting of individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) as amended;

3. *Recalls* resolution 2664 (2022), which established a cross-cutting humanitarian exemption to asset freeze measures, including those imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008);

#### **B. Arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab**

4. *Decides* that all States shall, for the purposes of preventing Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region from obtaining weapons and ammunition, take the necessary measures to prevent all deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and *further decides* that these measures shall not apply to deliveries or supplies to the GFRS, the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), the Somali National Police Force (SNPF) and the Somali Custodial Corps;

5. *Takes note* of the recent military operations against Al-Shabaab and *encourages* the GFRS, following consultation with the FMS, with the support of partners as appropriate, to register all weapons, ammunition and military equipment captured or seized from Al-Shabaab in the National Captured Weapons Database and, with the assistance of the Panel as necessary, to investigate their origin;

6. *Affirms* that the GFRS, in cooperation with AUSSOM, shall document and register all weapons, ammunition and military equipment, captured from Al-Shabaab as part of offensive operations, or in the course of carrying out their mandate, including:

(a) recording the type, quantity, lot/batch and serial number of all weapons and/or ammunition;

(b) recording the circumstances of seizure, including location, date and operation details;

(c) photographing all items and relevant markings and/or headstamps; and,

(d) facilitating inspection by the Panel of all captured weapons, ammunition and military items before their redistribution or destruction;

7. *Calls on* Member States to take reasonable steps to prevent smuggling of weapons and ammunition into Somalia and *further calls on* Member States to share data with the GFRS, through the CMD, the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab (Committee), the Panel, AUSSOM and UNTMIS, as appropriate, regarding weapons, ammunition and military equipment captured from

Al-Shabaab and the smuggling of weapons and ammunition into Somalia in violation of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab;

### C. Disrupting Al-Shabaab's finances

8. *Notes* with concern Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources to carry out terrorism and destabilise Somalia and the region, and *requests* the GFRS, working with international partners as appropriate, to continue to develop and implement a comprehensive and coordinated plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's financial operations;

9. *Calls upon* the GFRS to continue working with the FMS, Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to:

(a) identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks by improving anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards, guidance, and compliance with legal frameworks, including those pertaining to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP);

(b) strengthen supervision of, and compliance with, AML and CFT regulations and standards across financial institutions and DNFBPs, including as related to Know Your Customer and customer due diligence procedures and suspicious transaction reporting in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016), as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019), Targeted Financial Sanctions Act (2023) and relevant Financial Action Task Force recommendations, and encourage collaboration with the telecoms sector to reduce the risk of exploitation of the mobile money sector by Al-Shabaab;

(c) continue constructive engagement with the ongoing Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation (MENAFATF) process to address priority areas relating to terrorist financing and money laundering risks;

(d) prioritise the continued development of a secure and inclusive national identification system that improves financial access while countering the financing of terrorism;

(e) improve monitoring, reporting and investigations into money laundering and terrorist financing, including continuing to build financial crime investigative capacity across law enforcement agencies and enhancing inter-agency coordination and collaboration; and,

(f) develop a plan to mitigate the risks posed by Al-Shabaab to personnel working in AML and CFT roles within national competent authorities and the private sector, and a plan to protect those who share information relating to Al-Shabaab's extortion tactics;

10. *Calls upon* the GFRS to improve collaboration and coordination among regulatory and law enforcement agencies at all levels and undertake coordinated and joint approaches to terrorist finance investigations and financial disruption;

11. *Requests* the GFRS, UNODC and the Panel to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's operations and, with support from the international community, implement a comprehensive and coordinated action plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's operations and exploitation of the licit financial system;

12. *Notes* UNODC's coordination role in finalising and implementing the draft Roadmap for Enhanced Inter-Agency Cooperation to Combat Illicit Trade and its Effects, and *encourages* Somalia to work with UNODC to develop a plan to disrupt all illicit trade from which Al-Shabaab profits;

13. *Welcomes* regional and international cooperation to degrade the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, *encourages* continued cooperation at the regional and international level to address the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Somalia and the region, and *further encourages* international cooperation with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism Programme Office in Nairobi in its support for regional countries in their efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;

#### **D. Charcoal Ban**

14. *Reaffirms* its decision to ban the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution [2036 \(2012\)](#), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#);

15. *Welcomes* measures taken by the GFRS, FMS and Member States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, *requests* that AUSSOM, within its existing mandate, support and assist Somalia in implementing the charcoal ban, and facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports, and *reaffirms* the importance of the efforts of the UNODC and its international partners to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia;

16. *Recalls* paragraph 36 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), *welcomes* the collaborative development of a plan to dispose of the charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo and *encourages* Somalia to continue to ensure the sustainable management of domestic charcoal production, with support from other partners, as appropriate;

17. *Recalls* its decision in resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#) to authorise a one-off disposal of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo, and *requests*:

(a) the Panel and UNODC to continue to monitor the charcoal stockpiles and their movement to ensure the complete disposal does not trigger illicit production of charcoal; and,

(b) the GFRS to continue to engage with the Committee throughout the disposal process, including sharing a final record of funds generated upon completion of the disposal process;

#### **E. Reducing the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**

18. *Reaffirms* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in Part I of Annex B to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk exists that they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;

19. *Decides* that:

(a) prior to transferring any items in Part I of Annex B to Somalia, the supplying Member State of the items should notify the GFRS for its awareness;

(b) where an item in Part I of Annex B is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 19, the supplying State shall notify the GFRS for its awareness and the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and *stresses* the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including:

(i) purpose of the use of the item(s);

- (ii) end user;
- (iii) specifications;
- (iv) quantity of the item(s); and,
- (v) intended storage location;

20. *Encourages* the GFRS to implement appropriate legislation to regulate and monitor the import and transit of items listed in Parts I and II of Annex B, and *calls upon* Member States to support the GFRS in this objective;

21. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including, among other things, items in Part II of Annex B, to keep records of transactions and share information with Somalia, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that Somalia is provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

22. *Encourages* international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives and tracing the origin and chain of custody of IEDs and their components;

#### **F. Maritime interdiction and maritime domain awareness**

23. *Decides* to renew, until 13 December 2025, a period of twelve months from the date of adoption of resolution [2762 \(2024\)](#), which mandated a short technical extension, the provisions set out in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#), and expanded by paragraph 5 of resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) to cover IED components, as most recently renewed by paragraph 1 of resolution [2775 \(2025\)](#);

24. *Encourages* the UNODC, within its current mandate, under the Global Maritime Crime Programme, to support the GFRS to counter Al-Shabaab by:

(a) bringing together relevant Member States and international organisations to enhance regional cooperation on responding to illicit maritime flows and disrupt all forms of trafficking in licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities;

(b) supporting Somalia to improve their maritime domain awareness and enforcement, including in relation to the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade;

(c) supporting the GFRS with fisheries protection and its enforcement capability demonstrator project;

(d) supporting the GFRS by extending capacity building on law enforcement and counter-smuggling at ports;

(e) engaging with shipping association representatives to discuss possible ways to make these measures more implementable and propose recommendations in its next briefing to the Committee in 2024;

(f) supporting the GFRS, where resources permit, with identification and disruption of smuggling routes exploited in violation of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab; and,



(g) supporting the GFRS, where resources permit, in establishing information sharing mechanisms with Member States of the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime and regional states on trafficking of weapons, ammunition and IED components;

#### **G. Panel of Experts and Security Council Committee**

25. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution until 13 January 2026, the Panel, with the following mandate:

(a) to conduct the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#) and paragraph 26 of resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#);

(b) to conduct the tasks referred to in paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 17 of this resolution; and,

(c) to assist the Committee in monitoring the implementation of the measures detailed in paragraphs 1, 4, 14, 18, 19, 21, and 23 of this resolution, with due regard for the stipulations in paragraphs 37, 38, 39, 40 and 45 of this resolution, including by reporting any information on violations;

26. *Requests* the Secretary-General to include dedicated sexual violence and gender expertise on the Panel, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#) and *further requests* the Panel to include gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting;

27. *Emphasises* that the Panel's activities shall support the Council in degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, *stresses* that panels of experts operate pursuant to mandates from the Security Council and that the Panel acts under the direction of the Committee, and *encourages* the Panel to clarify its terms of reference with the Committee, in line with document [S/2006/997](#);

28. *Recalls* the importance of full co-operation between Member States and the Panel, *requests* the GFRS to facilitate for the Panel interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, and *stresses* the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document [S/2006/997](#);

29. *Reiterates* its request for the GFRS, Member States, and AUSSOM to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations; and,

(a) *requests* the GFRS to facilitate, on the basis of written requests to the GFRS by the Panel, access for the Panel to armouries, military storage facilities in SNA sectors and captured weaponry in Somali custody, and to facilitate photographs of weapons and ammunition held in Somali custody and access to logbooks and distribution records;

(b) *encourages* the Panel to coordinate closely with the CMD on paragraph 29 (a);

(c) *urges* the GFRS, AUSSOM and partners to share information with the Panel regarding conduct or activities, in particular on illicit flows of finances, charcoal, weapons, ammunition and military equipment by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region, where covered by listing criteria for targeted sanctions;

(d) *encourages* strengthened cooperation and coordination between the Panel and the GFRS and *further encourages* the Panel, with due regard for its impartiality and confidentiality obligations, to engage regularly with the GFRS, in line with document [S/2006/997](#) and the mandate in paragraph 25 of this resolution; and,



(e) *urges* the GFRS to facilitate, in support of the implementation of the Panel's mandate, engagement between the Panel and relevant authorities, including as relates to paragraph 29 (c);

30. *Encourages* Somalia, Member States, in particular neighbouring States, and regional and subregional organisations to provide regular inputs to the Committee regarding the implementation and monitoring of the sanctions regime, and *stresses* that requests regarding frameworks for cooperation and engagement with the Panel should be directed to the Committee;

31. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010), paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2467 (2019), and *invites* the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee, and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to communicate to the Committee pertinent information, in writing, with regard to paragraph 43 (e) of resolution 2093 (2013), as appropriate;

32. *Requests* the Panel to provide:

(a) regular updates to the Committee, in collaboration with independent experts appointed to help the work of other sanctions committees and relevant UN entities if appropriate, including a minimum of two different thematic reports by 31 August 2025 and 13 January 2026 respectively;

(b) a comprehensive mid-term update; and

(c) for the Security Council's consideration through the Committee, a final report by 13 November 2025;

and *urges* the Panel to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;

33. *Requests* UNODC to update the Committee on its work related to this resolution by 13 November 2025;

34. *Decides* that briefings from the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) to the Security Council shall take place on an annual basis to align with the latest scheduled Somalia meeting before 13 December 2025;

35. *Expresses* its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding any extension and modification of this mandate, no later than 13 December 2025;

#### **H. Preventing Al-Shabaab from accessing weapons, ammunition and military equipment**

36. *Encourages* the GFRS to share with the Committee a list of licenced private security companies operating in Somalia that shall be allowed to import weapons, ammunition and military equipment required for static and mobile protection;

37. *Affirms* that paragraph 4 does not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:

(a) GFRS;

(b) SNA;

(c) NISA;

- (d) SNPF; and,
- (e) the Somali Custodial Corps;

38. *Decides* that paragraph 4 shall not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:

- (a) United Nations personnel, including UNTMIS and UNSOS;
- (b) AUSSOM, and the Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries to AUSSOM; and,

- (c) European Union training and support activities, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as any other Member State forces, with a status of forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the GFRS, provided that they inform the Committee, for information purposes only, about the existence of such agreements;

39. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia as defined in the list requested in paragraph 36 of this resolution, to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, may only be provided in coordination with the GFRS and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification in accordance with the process set out in paragraph 42 of this resolution;

40. *Decides* that deliveries of all weapons, ammunition and military equipment not covered by Annex A to this resolution to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia as defined in the list requested in paragraph 36 of this resolution, to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, may only be provided in coordination with the GFRS and are subject to notification to the Committee, for information only, at least five working days in advance in accordance with the process set out in paragraph 42 of this resolution;

41. *Decides* that all notifications should include:

- (a) details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment, including type, lot/batch and serial numbers;
- (b) a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity;
- (c) proposed date and place of delivery; and
- (d) all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit, or the intended place of storage;

42. *Decides* that, prior to delivering any weapons, ammunition and military equipment to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia, to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, the supplying Member State of the items shall notify the GFRS, *notes* the CMD's role as the focal point for the GFRS on weapons and ammunition management, and *affirms* that the GFRS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 39 and 40, of any deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Somalia, within five working days of receiving notification from the supplying Member State;

43. *Affirms* that to further avoid Al-Shabaab obtaining weapons and ammunition, weapons, ammunition and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with paragraphs 37, 38, 39 and 40 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service

of the recipient to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation and requests the Committee to share all notifications pertaining to paragraphs 39 and 40 submitted to the Committee with the CMD and the Office of National Security, for their information;

44. *Requests* the Secretariat to support the GFRS' dissemination efforts in relation to the control of arms, ammunition and related materiel in the local language, if necessary, within its existing resources;

45. *Decides* that paragraph 4 shall not apply to:

(a) supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media, private security contractors and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

(b) the delivery of non-lethal military equipment by States, or international, regional or sub-regional organisations intended solely for humanitarian or protective use; and

(c) entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;

## **I. Reporting**

46. *Requests* the GFRS, following consultation through the structures of the National Security Architecture and Somali Security Development Plan, and in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), to provide to the Security Council, by 1 May 2025 and then by 1 October 2025, reports which include:

(a) a description of the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;

(b) a description of the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;

(c) a consolidated list of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment imported in the reporting period, including: the manufacturer, type, calibre, and lot/batch and serial numbers;

(d) the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014) and paragraph 37 of resolution 2551 (2020);

(e) an update summarising suspicious activity documented by domestic financial institutions, and investigations and actions undertaken by the Financial Reporting Centre to counter the financing of terrorism and in a manner so as to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information; and,

(f) an update on specific actions taken to counter the financing of terrorism in Somalia;

47. *Requests* the organisations and states listed in paragraph 38 (c) of this resolution, or subsequently added, to provide to the Security Council, and to the CMD and the Office of National Security, by 13 November 2025, an update on the support provided to Somalia since the adoption of this resolution and a consolidated list of

the weapons, ammunition and military equipment imported in the reporting period, including: the manufacturer, type, calibre, and lot/batch and serial numbers;

48. *Affirms* its commitment to working with Somalia to ensure that the measures set out in this resolution continue to be adjusted progressively and in a timely manner to further degrade the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and that it shall keep the situation under constant review; and,

(a) *requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council, by 1 November 2025, a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab, in consultation with the GFRS, relevant UN entities as appropriate and other relevant stakeholders, with specific recommendations as appropriate;

(b) *expresses* its intention to meet, following receipt of the technical assessment requested in paragraph 48 (a) of this resolution, to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution and the alignment of the structure and capabilities of the Panel to the evolving security context in Somalia and make any necessary further adjustments, including modification, suspension or lifting of the measures and mandated activities, as appropriate and in a timely manner, to support GFRS efforts in effectively countering the threat of Al-Shabaab;

49. *Encourages* the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to support the GFRS with analysis and reporting on the use of online platforms for terrorist purposes by Al-Shabaab, and work in collaboration with Member States in the region to facilitate capacity building in detecting and disrupting Al-Shabaab's terrorist activities;

50. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## **Annex A – Items subject to a no-objection process<sup>1</sup>**

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);
2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;
  - (a) Note: (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), recoilless rifles, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);
3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;
4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel; and fuses;
6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability, including thermal and infrared, and accessories;
7. Fixed wing, swivel wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;
8. ‘Vessels’ and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
  - (a) Note: ‘Vessel’ includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel;
9. Uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

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<sup>1</sup> (Not applicable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Somali National Army, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Police Force and the Somali Custodial Corps).

## **Annex B – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components**

### **Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology**

#### **Part I<sup>2</sup>**

1. Explosive materials and precursors, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
  - (a) Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
  - (b) Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
  - (c) Nitroglycerin (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses);
  - (d) Nitric acid;
  - (e) Sulphuric acid;
2. Explosive-related goods:
  - (a) Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord);
  - (b) “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paragraphs 1 and 2 (a);

#### **Part II**

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
  - (a) Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
  - (b) Nitroglycol;
  - (c) Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
  - (d) Picryl chloride;
  - (e) 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT);
2. Explosives precursors:
  - (a) Ammonium nitrate;
  - (b) Potassium nitrate;
  - (c) Sodium chlorate;
3. Dual use items identified by the Panel:
  - (a) Alarm systems with disturbance sensors, including motorcycle alarms;
  - (b) Learning code receivers.

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<sup>2</sup> To be notified to Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in advance of intended shipment.