



## Security Council

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### Letter dated 4 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to the Security Council the sixth quarterly report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), as reiterated by the Council in paragraph 19 of its resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#). The report includes the requested updated information on the sources and routes of arms trafficking and illicit financial flows, and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present document brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

*(Signed)* António **Guterres**



## Annex

## Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)

### Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023), as reiterated in paragraph 19 of Council resolution 2743 (2024). Specifically, the Council tasked the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with reporting to the Council every three months, concurrently with the reporting cycle of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, through the Secretary-General, on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations. The report covers the period from September to December 2024, a time of persistent instability in Haiti despite the partial deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission authorized by the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

2. In its present report, UNODC considers the significant escalation of gang-related violence between October and December 2024, together with some identified political and economic stakeholders that are responsible for sustaining criminal networks. It explains how several powerful gangs are leveraging social media as a tool of propaganda and recruitment. UNODC also examines the evolution of Haitian drug trafficking connections, with a relatively small network of political and business elites that have operated the drug trafficking business from behind the scenes over the past three decades. The report includes an update on recent incidents of trafficking in arms and ammunition, as well as smuggling of migrants. Finally, UNODC reviews the latest cases involving corruption and money-laundering, with a brief examination of illicit activities associated with the Haitian and international eel trade.

### Escalating gang violence

3. There was a marked escalation in clashes between gangs and the Haitian National Police, so-called “self-defence groups” and vigilante groups, during the reporting period. The number of registered violent deaths and injuries, incidents of reported sexual violence and cases of displacement rose significantly.<sup>2</sup> After a temporary lull in gang violence between May and September 2024,<sup>3</sup> violent clashes erupted in October and November.<sup>4</sup> For example, during a single week in mid-November, at least 150 people were violently killed in clashes and over 40,000 individuals fled their homes in Port-au-Prince amid escalating gang violence.<sup>5</sup> More than half of these deaths

<sup>1</sup> The core mission of the Multinational Security Support Mission is to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to restore the rule of law and build the conditions for holding elections by providing support and securing infrastructure.

<sup>2</sup> See [www.iom.int/news/haiti-displacement-triples-surpassing-one-million-humanitarian-crisis-worsens](https://www.iom.int/news/haiti-displacement-triples-surpassing-one-million-humanitarian-crisis-worsens).

<sup>3</sup> There was reportedly a gang truce during this period. See Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, “Haiti, caught between political paralysis and escalating violence”, 25 November 2024.

<sup>4</sup> The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime describes an “entente” between the main gangs between May and September, as well as a temporary decline in clashes with the police and a declining number of murders during this period. See “Haiti, caught between political paralysis and escalating violence”.

<sup>5</sup> UN News, “Haiti: Over 20,000 flee as gang violence spurs mass displacement”, 18 November 2024; and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Haiti: UN human rights chief urges end to intensifying violence in Port-au-Prince”, 20 November 2024.

occurred as a result of exchanges of fire between gang members and the Haitian National Police.

4. As a result of spiraling violence in recent months, Haiti registered staggering levels of lethal violence in 2024. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that there had been close to 5,600 violent deaths between January and December 2024, although even this may be an undercount.<sup>6</sup> Tens of thousands of people were likewise displaced in recent months as gangs secured control of key city centres.<sup>7</sup> There are currently an estimated 1,000,000 internally displaced persons in the country, and over 2 million Haitians are facing emergency levels of hunger.<sup>8</sup>

5. The reporting period was marked by several incidents involving mass killings. Specifically, on 3 October, the Gran Grif gang massacred at least 115 people in the Artibonite region, reportedly in response to efforts by local community and “self-defence” groups to resist extortion.<sup>9</sup> Also, between 6 and 11 December, another mass killing occurred in Wharf Jérémie in Cité Soleil.<sup>10</sup> There, a gang leader known as Altes “Mikanor” Mones reportedly ordered the execution of 207 people (134 men and 73 women), the majority of whom were elderly, whom he accused of using witchcraft linked to his child’s illness.<sup>11</sup>

6. Gangs further consolidated control of large parts of the capital and in areas bordering the Dominican Republic (see figures I-III). Throughout October and November, gangs affiliated with the Viv Ansanm coalition intensified attacks in and around Port-au-Prince, Croix-des-Bouquets and Carrefour, as well as at ports and borders, including in the Malpasse area near the Dominican Republic. Recent gang advances in the capital include the takeover of the Solino, Nazon, Delmas 32, Delmas 19 and Christ-Roi neighbourhoods since mid-November. Considered to be the last bastion of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, these neighbourhoods include 34 access points to the central areas of Petionville.

7. A notable development was the encroachment of gangs into the wealthy neighbourhood of Petionville. For example, the Laboule 12 neighbourhood in the heights of Petionville was attacked by the Gran Ravine gang, led by an interim gang leader named “Chen Rouj”; however, a different gang leader, named “Didi”, was reportedly installed and is now running the area. Throughout December, several gangs launched attacks to gain control of Petionville. Meanwhile, gangs from the Baz Taliban under the command of Jeff Larose (alias “Gwo Lwa”) also stormed the Sarthe district, north of Toussaint Louverture International Airport.

<sup>6</sup> OHCHR, “Haiti: Over 5,600 killed in gang violence in 2024, UN figures show”, press release, 5 January 2025.

<sup>7</sup> UN News, “Haiti: Over 20,000 flee as gang violence spurs mass displacement”; and UN News, “As violent gangs extend control in Haiti, UN commits to staying the course”, 21 November 2024.

<sup>8</sup> International Organization for Migration, “Situation de déplacement en Haïti – round 9”, December 2024.

<sup>9</sup> Sandra Pelligrini, “Pont-Sondé massacre marks a surge in Gran Grif’s deadly campaign in Artibonite”, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, 11 October 2024; and Evens Sanon and Pierre-Richard Luxama, “The death toll in a gang attack on a Haitian town rises to at least 115”, Associated Press, 9 October 2024.

<sup>10</sup> Vanessa Buschschlüter, “Haiti gang kills 110 people accused of witchcraft”, BBC News, 9 December 2024.

<sup>11</sup> Information shared by OHCHR on 16 December 2024. The massacre continued after the information was shared, and numbers may be updated.

Figure I  
Map of gang-controlled areas in downtown Port au Prince, December 2024








Figure II  
Map of areas newly controlled by gangs in downtown Port-au-Prince, December 2024



8. Meanwhile, several attacks have occurred outside the capital, including on the north shore of the Gulf of Gonâve. As noted above, on 3 October, the *Gran Grif* gang attacked residents in Pont-Sondé, killing at least 115 people in one of the deadliest incidents ever reported in the region. The attack seems to have been a reprisal against residents, whom the gang accused of supporting local rivals.<sup>12</sup> Several punitive attacks by criminal groups such as the so-called 5 Segonn and Baz Taliban gangs also took place in Arcahaie between 10 and 30 October. These incidents forced thousands of households to flee their homes. At least 20 people, including children and infants, were reportedly murdered on 10 and 11 December in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite.

<sup>12</sup> Pelligrini, "Pont-Sondé massacre marks a surge in Gran Grif's deadly campaign in Artibonite".

Figure III  
**Map of gang control in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas, December 2024**



9. Escalating gang violence appears to be connected to political developments in the capital and other parts of the country. Power struggles between several political stakeholders have influenced the intensity and dynamics of violence in the capital and surrounding areas. Disagreements between members of the Transitional Presidential Council and the previous interim Government culminated on 11 November with a decree issued by the Council appointing Alix Didier Fils-Aimé as interim Prime Minister to replace Gary Conille. On 12 November, Mr. Conille acknowledged Mr. Fils-Aimé's appointment as Prime Minister and highlighted the importance of unity and solidarity for the country to move forward. Gang leaders, including Jimmy Chérizier (alias "Barbecue"), speaking on behalf of Viv Ansanm, had publicly called for the end of the Transitional Presidential Council.

10. On the same day that Mr. Fils-Aimé was installed as interim Prime Minister, four commercial aircraft were struck by gunfire, resulting in the closure of the international airport in Port-au-Prince. The United States Federal Aviation Administration prohibited civilian United States aircraft from entering Haitian territory or airspace until late March 2025, and several international carriers have also prohibited their aircraft and crews from entering Haitian territory. Criminal gangs are taking advantage of institutional instability to steadily tighten territorial control over key areas of the capital. They are now estimated by the United Nations to control over 85 per cent of the city.<sup>13</sup>

11. Amid funding and logistical challenges, the Multinational Security Support Mission has yet to fully deploy and has therefore experienced difficulties in supporting national police efforts to suppress gangs and restore stability. As the Mission currently lacks adequate and sustainable resources, specialized equipment and capacities, the deployment of a sufficient number of personnel that would allow the Mission to fulfil its mandated tasks has been delayed.

12. In a letter to the Secretary-General on 21 October, the rotating President of the Transitional Presidential Council, Leslie Voltaire, requested the transformation of the Multinational Security Support Mission into a United Nations peacekeeping operation. On 29 November, the President of the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide, within 60 to 90 days, a comprehensive assessment of the current Haiti context and strategic-level recommendations with a full range of options for the possible role that the United Nations could play. On 23 December, in a press statement, the Council encouraged the Multinational Security Support Mission to accelerate its deployment and called for additional voluntary contributions to and support for the Mission.

13. Gang violence should not be viewed as random or chaotic but rather as consisting of deliberate and instrumental actions aimed at achieving specific goals. Reportedly, many gang leaders (including sanctioned individuals,<sup>14</sup> as well as persons indicted and/or imprisoned for drug trafficking, weapons smuggling and corruption in Haiti or the United States) maintain robust connections to a range of political and business actors in and outside the country. To a large extent, inter-factional gang fighting has declined, with gangs increasingly consolidating their hold on Port-au-Prince, other cities and towns, and road and port infrastructure.

14. There are likewise mounting concerns about the rise of “self-defence” and vigilante groups, some of which appear to be filling security functions no longer performed by the Haitian National Police. Increasing and sustained insecurity has led international organizations and several non-governmental entities to reduce their presence in the capital. The United Nations has reduced its footprint in Port-au-Prince, while maintaining critical humanitarian and development programmatic activities and essential good offices support.

## **Gangs on social media in Haiti**

15. Haitian gangs are increasingly present on social media and encrypted communication platforms. Over the past two years, there has been ample evidence of gang leaders broadcasting threats, engaging with influencers and inciting violence against political opponents and journalists online. In 2020, when Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier sought to unite warring gangs into G9 Family and Allies, he announced the

<sup>13</sup> UN News, “As violent gangs extend control in Haiti, UN commits to staying the course”.

<sup>14</sup> Sanctioned by Canada, the Dominican Republic, the United States of America or the European Union.

alliance on YouTube. In a separate post on X that was purported to belong to him, he urged his followers to “ransack everything”.

16. Gangs are active on popular platforms, but also on encrypted messaging platforms, with the intention of pushing criminal narratives, displaying strength, delegitimizing State institutions and recruiting new members. In 2022, the leader of the 5 Segonn gang, Johnson (“Izo”) André, sent messages to his “soldiers” to avenge gang killings in areas under their control. In a TikTok broadcast in 2024, Chérizier urged fellow gang leaders such as Vitel’homme and their supporters to capture four radio reporters: “consider journalists as enemies, punishable by death if they oppose us ... journalists defending the elite classes need[ed] to be silenced.”<sup>15</sup>

17. Gangs are increasingly promoting and celebrating their criminal activities through their online presence. Gang leaders of the Viv Ansanm coalition have organized “live” sessions on TikTok not only to celebrate exploits and abductions, intimidate rivals and energize recruits, but also to promote the narrative that they are providing “social services” and mobilizing a legitimate “revolution”. Livestreams allow leaders to bypass print and broadcast media and accelerate the spread of misinformation and disinformation. Images of extreme violence, including rape, are routinely shared on private WhatsApp groups.

18. The extensive use of digital platforms also serves as a source of revenue. Some social media platforms allow users to earn money: funds can be received based on the number of followers and through online donations. The routing of funds to gangs and criminal networks via social media warrants further investigation. Several news reports indicate that gang leader Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli”) reportedly provided “gifts” to Haitian influencers, including “Tati Mendel”, “Commandant”, “Parrola”, “Belle-Enfant” and “Trapalman”, all based in the United States. On TikTok, gifts can range from a few cents to hundreds of dollars, with recipients having the option to cash out a share of the contribution.

19. The Government of Haiti has yet to formulate clear legislation on cybercrime, much less policies to regulate social media and enforce penalties for misuse. As a result, gangs and other criminal groups operate with virtual impunity online, including on social media platforms. In October 2022, the Prosecutor of Port-au-Prince, Frantz Louis Juste, called on (unnamed) social media platforms to “block or delete” the accounts of key gang leaders. In October 2024, a commission of the Government of Haiti called for a ban on sharing or publishing “criminal videos” on social media. Proposals by this commission include the suspension of phone services and criminal prosecution. No mechanisms for enforcing these domestic sanctions have been foreseen.

20. Despite calls from government officials and civil society to take more action, social media companies have been slow to respond. There is limited evidence of stricter content controls being imposed on the accounts of gangs and criminal networks.

## **Investigating the trafficking of firearms and ammunition into Haiti**

21. The Security Council decided to strengthen a range of sanctions measures in October 2024, including in relation to trafficking in firearms and ammunition. In its resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), the Council determined that the deteriorating situation continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided to renew for

<sup>15</sup> The targeted reporters include Guerrier Dieuseul, Johnny Ferdinand, Loucko Desir and Essaue César.



one year the travel ban and asset freeze imposed under paragraphs 3 to 9 of its resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) and decided that, for a period of one year from the date of adoption of the resolution, all Member States should take the necessary measures to implement the arms embargo.<sup>16</sup> Despite the reinforcement of the arms embargo, trafficking in weapons and ammunition persists and armed violence continues to rise, with increasingly high-calibre firearms and ammunition being obtained by gangs in Haiti.<sup>17</sup>

22. Throughout the reporting period, firearms and ammunition were diverted and trafficked by civilians and private security companies.<sup>18</sup> Weapons are used for self-defence and to provide security, although they are also often redirected to gangs and criminal groups. For the most part, firearms and ammunition used by civilians and private companies are acquired illegally and are not registered with the national authorities. Publicly and privately managed stockpiles are also routinely mismanaged and often include unregistered handguns and assault rifles.

23. An example of a transfer of firearms between a private security company and gang members was cited by the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#). United Nations reports also make reference to weapons and ammunition acquisitions by paramilitary groups such as the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées. The Brigade expanded between 2017 and 2024 and constitutes a powerful armed entity outside government control with an estimated 6,000 members across the country.<sup>19</sup>

24. The Panel of Experts on Haiti noted that at least 1,000 firearms had been diverted from police stocks over the past four years.<sup>20</sup> Allegedly corrupt Haitian National Police officers supply firearms and ammunition to gangs and criminal networks in Haiti. The deteriorating security situation and lack of police and customs enforcement have created ample space for such illicit practices. For decades, corrupt policemen were a source of firearms and ammunition for gangs, as well as for private citizens and private security companies. The Haitian National Police is characterized by weak oversight, inconsistent recordkeeping and inadequate accountability mechanisms to prevent the diversion of weapons and ammunition. There are frequent reports of police selling weapons and ammunition on the country's illicit market.<sup>21</sup> As previous UNODC submissions have shown, several senior officers have also been implicated in drug trafficking and other crimes, including efforts to overturn legitimately elected Governments.<sup>22</sup>

25. Firearms and ammunition trafficking routes may have also undergone a number of changes during the reporting period. In its most recent report, the Panel of Experts on Haiti noted that while Miami had been the port of departure for most seizures previously reported by the Panel, all those conducted during the reporting period had originated from Port Everglades. In Haiti, most seizures were reported in Cap-Haïtien as opposed to Port-au-Prince. Part of the reason for this may be the intensified interdictions by United States and Haitian authorities, as well as the inaccessibility of

<sup>16</sup> UN News, "UN Security Council extends sanctions, arms embargo on Haiti", 18 October 2024.

<sup>17</sup> See [S/2024/704](#) and previous UNODC reports to the Security Council.

<sup>18</sup> [S/2024/704](#).

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., paras. 41 and 83.

<sup>20</sup> The Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) reports that 54 Galil automatic rifles belonging to the Haitian National Police were diverted from National Palace stockpiles between 2013 and 2016, when Pierre-Leon Junior Saint Rémy, a relative of the wife of President Michel Joseph Martelly, was in charge of security at the Palace and oversaw stockpile management. The Panel claims that weapons were transferred to individuals, including gang members, in return for support for the President.

<sup>21</sup> [S/2024/704](#), paras. 77–79.

<sup>22</sup> See [S/2024/320](#), [S/2024/554](#) and [S/2024/752](#).

the key ports in the Haitian capital. Indeed, there are shipping lines providing direct service from Port Everglades to Cap-Haïtien.<sup>23</sup> Seizure data alone do not fully reflect the amount of firearms and ammunition entering Haiti in violation of the arms embargo, the range of categories of weaponry being trafficked or the extent of channels being used by traffickers to transport materiel, given significant levels of underreporting.

26. One concern is the procurement of increasingly large-calibre rifles and ammunition. Past reports have noted increased evidence of 7.62 x 39 mm, 7.62 x 51 mm and 12.7 x 99 mm weapons in Haiti with the potential to inflict a greater number of casualties and result in more severe injuries. As noted in previous reports, gangs such as Grand Ravine, 400 Mawozo and 5 Segonn appear to be the most active in procuring firearms and ammunition, including with support from a former head of the National Palace General Security Unit.<sup>24</sup> As noted on the social media profiles of several gang leaders, some criminal groups appear to be deploying basic commercial drone technologies to conduct reconnaissance and coordinate attacks.

### **Seizures of firearms and ammunition in Haiti**

27. The ongoing violent clashes and growing number of attacks suggest that there continues to be a significant and sustained amount of firearms and ammunition in Haiti, including in the capital. There are also reports of the Haitian National Police and customs authorities having made several arrests and seizures of firearms and ammunition during the reporting period. For example, a special agent of the Garde présidentielle was apprehended in his vehicle on 31 October while wearing a police uniform and in possession of 2,695 rounds of ammunition (mostly 7.62 x 39 mm) and over 200,000 gourdes. The individual reportedly worked for the security department of one of the country's largest industrial parks.<sup>25</sup>

28. Alongside residents, several small and medium-sized businesses have suffered extortion by gangs, with some being forced to provide them with cash and, where available, arms and ammunition. According to key informants, the businesses in question are based in the centre of Port-au-Prince and have been coerced into "paying" certain gangs to guarantee the security of their physical and operational infrastructure. As gangs fortify themselves against current and impending operations of the Multinational Security Support Mission, some are also demanding that these same companies provide them with shotguns, handguns and ammunition. Gangs are allegedly building stockpiles, including of firearms and ammunition provided by their blackmailed victims.<sup>26</sup>

29. In November, a criminal investigation led by the Haitian National Police uncovered a network of traffickers involved in extorting local businesses in exchange for firearms and ammunition. The operation led to the arrest of four individuals for trafficking in arms and criminal conspiracy. Separately, a police officer assigned to the temporary anti-gang unit was arrested on 8 November at the Champ de Mars while driving a personal vehicle and in possession of 2,400 rounds of ammunition (see figure IV).<sup>27</sup> His companion, a staff member of the firearms department of the Haitian National Police logistics directorate, was also arrested in connection with trafficking

<sup>23</sup> S/2024/704, para. 57.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., para. 72.

<sup>25</sup> Key informant K3, interviewed on 2 November 2024.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> 1,400 7.62 x 39 mm and 1,000 5.56 x 45 mm.

in ammunition. The individual in question allegedly helped remove ammunition from Haitian National Police stocks.<sup>28</sup>

Figure IV

**Image of weapons and ammunition seized on 8 November 2024**



Source: Haitian National Police (see footnote 28).

30. Multiple seizures of firearms and ammunition occurred during the reporting period. For example, police seized a 12-gauge shotgun and 9 kg of marijuana in Hinche on 14 November. During a press conference on 20 November, the “Organization Sociopolitique Résistance Sud-Est”<sup>29</sup> reported on the illegal use of the port of Marigot to smuggle illegal weapons. On 15 November, the anti-narcotics brigade (Brigade de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants) of the North Department police arrested a police officer for drug trafficking and illegal possession of a firearm. This arrest followed a report regarding the arrest of an individual on 11 November for drug trafficking and illegal possession of a firearm.<sup>30</sup> The same unit of the anti-narcotics brigade also arrested four Bahamians for drug trafficking on 18 November in Bandinò, a locality in the commune of Cap-Haïtien. The suspects were carrying 5 kg of cocaine, \$3,380 and several mobile phones (see figure V).

<sup>28</sup> Official social media page of the Haitian National Police (see [www.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=pfbid02uXSDTWJUsm7LBghCLUtpJRR22U3PkYv29fzt8jfmVxacyxH794A6x5xd3Z7hgHl&id=100064495670146&mibextid=ZbWKwL&\\_rdr](https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02uXSDTWJUsm7LBghCLUtpJRR22U3PkYv29fzt8jfmVxacyxH794A6x5xd3Z7hgHl&id=100064495670146&mibextid=ZbWKwL&_rdr)).

<sup>29</sup> This organization is not a governmental body, but a private organization based in the south of Haiti.

<sup>30</sup> Haitian National Police (see [www.facebook.com/pnh.ht/posts/ddn-blts-interpellation-du-policier-stanley-%C3%A9tienne-par-la-police-du-nord-pour-t/980343244125522](https://www.facebook.com/pnh.ht/posts/ddn-blts-interpellation-du-policier-stanley-%C3%A9tienne-par-la-police-du-nord-pour-t/980343244125522)).

Figure V  
Images of drugs seized by agents of the Brigade de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants on 18 November 2024 in Bandinò



Source: Haitian National Police ([www.facebook.com/pnh.ht/posts/pfbid02bLavppJsk8p4UT8PgSDhuTsvxp2SjnSYy1fJrgheVmBNJwqfKeTfcQfopVDNCxNbl](https://www.facebook.com/pnh.ht/posts/pfbid02bLavppJsk8p4UT8PgSDhuTsvxp2SjnSYy1fJrgheVmBNJwqfKeTfcQfopVDNCxNbl)).

31. A recent report shared by Haitian customs with UNODC reveals additional seizures of firearms and drugs in 2023 and 2024.<sup>31</sup> For example, in the port of Cap-Haïtien, 279 rounds of 9 mm ammunition were seized on 25 October 2023, 175 cartridges on 23 November 2023<sup>32</sup> and 170 cartridges on 22 December 2023;<sup>33</sup> there was also a large seizure in April 2024 that was already reported by UNODC in its reports. In addition, there were numerous seizures of banknotes, fake boarding passes, fake passports and spoiled goods during this period.<sup>34</sup>

32. Finally, new reports dated 14 December 2024 refer to the recent acquisition by gangs of multiple Barrett M82A1 (M107) precision rifles (.50 BMG 12.7 × 99 mm calibre). This weapon is known by the United States military as the Special Applications Scoped Rifle and is used as an anti-materiel rifle and explosive ordnance disposal tool. While the number of these specific weapons in circulation is not confirmed, social media video posts released by several gang leaders suggest that at least four of these weapons are in their possession (and possibly two more, although this information has yet to be confirmed).

33. The price of one M82A1 on the black market could be as high as \$22,000, with a magazine costing \$250 and a single round costing \$7. The cartridges used by the gangs appear to be M8 armour-piercing incendiary rounds. The identification of these weapons confirms the findings of the Panel of Experts on Haiti.<sup>35</sup> The gangs that appear to have access to these arms include Ti Bwa and Grand Ravine. Recent videos reveal such arms in the possession of the leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo Sanjou”), and the leader of the Baz Taliban occupying the Canaan area, Jeff Larose (alias “Gwo Lwa”) (see figures VI and VII).

<sup>31</sup> Report received on 15 November 2024 from Haitian customs regarding its seizures of illicit products since July 2023.

<sup>32</sup> Seventy-five 12-gauge and one hundred 9 mm cartridges.

<sup>33</sup> Ninety-two 9 mm and seventy-eight 5.56 x 45 mm and 9 x 45mm cartridges.

<sup>34</sup> In all, \$29,000, 2,000 boarding passes and 17,600 bottles of tainted medicines.

<sup>35</sup> S/2024/704, annex 24.



Figure VI  
Extract from a video published by Jeff Larose (alias “Gwo Lwa”), leader of the  
Baz Taliban, on social media



*Source:* social media post of Jeff Larose (alias “Gwo Lwa”).

Figure VII

**Extract from a video published by Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo Sanjou”), leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, on social media**



*Source:* Social media post of Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo Sanjou”).

### **Dynamics of trafficking in firearms involving the United States**

34. There is a persistent flow of firearms trafficked to Haiti from the United States, and specifically from Florida. Indeed, 90 per cent of Caribbean-bound shipments of illicit firearms reported between 2016 and 2023 were seized in south Florida, including the Miami seaport and Miami International Airport.<sup>36</sup> This is consistent with historical trends. A November 2024 study of gun recoveries from 25 Caribbean countries determined that over 73 per cent of weapons seized between 2018 and 2023 were traced back to the United States.<sup>37</sup> The report also found that most recovered

<sup>36</sup> See Matt Schroeder, “Trends in trafficking: comparing US-based firearms trafficking to the Caribbean and Latin America”, Small Arms Survey, November 2024.

<sup>37</sup> The primary data source was the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. See United States of America, Government Accountability Office, *Caribbean Firearms: Agencies Have Anti-Trafficking Efforts in Place, but State Could Better Assess Activities*, GAO-25-107007 (2024).

firearms – over 70 per cent – were originally sold in the States of Florida, Georgia and Texas, and over 88 per cent of seized weapons were handguns, although long guns and automatic rifles were increasingly being identified.

35. A recent interview conducted with United States Customs and Border Protection officers confirms a reduction in maritime trade between the Miami River and Haiti.<sup>38</sup> At the time of writing, there were just two ships scheduled to leave the Miami River for Haiti, one bound for Port-de-Paix and the other for Miragoâne.<sup>39</sup> The reduction in shipping could be a direct or indirect result of recent actions by United States law enforcement institutions. Despite the high volume of trafficking between the Miami River and Haiti, very few seizures were reported between June 2023 and July 2024. Seizures included a small number of handguns and rifles, as well as limited quantities of ammunition.<sup>40</sup> While maritime traffic from the Miami River to Haiti has diminished, there has been a marked increase in trade between the Miami River and the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos, with possible trans-shipments to Haiti.

### **Dynamics of trafficking in firearms involving the Dominican Republic<sup>41</sup>**

36. The Dominican Republic does not officially produce arms or ammunition, and all related material in the country is imported. Multiple seizures of ammunition in Haiti have been reported over the past two years, some of them announced as having come from the Dominican Republic.<sup>42</sup> The extent of the legal trade and associated profits are unknown and warrant further investigation.

37. A major case involving trafficking in arms and corruption is currently generating considerable attention in the Dominican Republic. The case involves the pilfering of weapons and ammunition from police stockpiles that were seized on Haitian territory from members of Haitian gangs and criminal groups. Specifically, on 31 October 2024, the Director General of the Dominican National Police revealed the existence of a criminal network involved in trafficking in arms and ammunition. Weapons and ammunition, including as many as 900,000 rounds, had been diverted from police stockpiles in the Dominican Republic and resold in illegal markets. On one side, some Haitian media are reporting that a significant quantity was sold to gang members in Haiti. On the other side, according to the current investigation, some of the ammunition stolen from the storage depot used by Department 2 of the Arms Department (Depósito del departamento 2 de la intendencia de armas) of the Dominican National Police by officers involved in this criminal network may have been sold to arms dealers in the Dominican Republic. They then smuggled the ammunition across the border to Haitian nationals, who used it in criminal activities.

38. The investigation began after a new Minister of Interior and Police of the Dominican Republic was appointed in August 2024 and following alerts from the Haitian National Police. The final results of the investigation will be essential to

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Customs and Border Protection officers in charge of the Miami River conducted on 3 December 2024.

<sup>39</sup> This compares with eight for the same period one year earlier.

<sup>40</sup> S/2024/704, para. 62 and annex 21.

<sup>41</sup> The following section has been reviewed and validated by relevant law enforcement institutions in the Dominican Republic.

<sup>42</sup> See, for example, S/2023/780, paras. 30, 34, 49 and 51; S/2024/79, paras. 20–22; S/2024/554, paras. 20 and 21; and S/2024/752, para. 18. On 8 November 2022, soldiers from the Specialized Land Border Security Corps assigned in the Elías Piña border operations base in the Dominican Republic discovered a cargo of clandestine ammunition, including 12,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition and 10,160 5.56 mm rounds, being trafficked from the Dominican Republic into Haiti (S/2023/780, para. 51). For a review of the trafficking of firearms into the Dominican Republic from the United States, see Douwe den Held, “US guns fuel arms trafficking in the Dominican Republic”, InSight Crime, 3 June 2022.

understanding the entire network and its criminal ramifications on both sides of the border.

39. Initial findings from the investigation have already revealed the involvement of both senior and junior officers, underscoring the pervasive nature of these illicit activities and the resolve of the Government of the Dominican Republic to tackle corruption within the public security sector. Findings from the investigation have been submitted to the Public Prosecutor's Office so that it can initiate legal proceedings. On 17 November 2024, the Public Prosecutor's Office launched Operation Pandora against a criminal network led by the colonel who formerly headed the Arms Department of the Dominican National Police and made up of several National Police officers.

40. The investigation process and Operation Pandora resulted in several suspects being apprehended and charged with criminal association to commit robbery and other crimes in October and November. The raids were carried out in the National District and in the provinces of Santo Domingo, Santiago, Sánchez Ramírez and Pedernales, through warrants issued by judges in each jurisdiction. Among the suspects arrested by the Dominican authorities were:

(a) A former colonel of the Arms Department of the Dominican National Police, who was responsible for the custody of arms and ammunition;

(b) The Deputy Superintendent of the Arms Department of the Dominican National Police;

(c) The manager of the Dominican National Police arms, ammunition and equipment depot;

(d) A police captain and auditor who was allegedly involved in altering the results of an audit carried out in February 2024 specifically to conceal ammunition theft, and who later sought to manipulate the figures during the October 2024 investigation;

(e) A second lieutenant, an armourer at the central regional police headquarters in Cibao;

(f) A sergeant major, a corporal and several privates affiliated with the National Police who played central roles in procuring, transporting and selling weapons on behalf of the criminal network.

41. As internal investigations into police criminal activities continue, the Minister of Interior and Police of the Dominican Republic, Faride Raful, has stated that the Public Prosecutor's Office is conducting an investigation into police officers involved in the purchase and sale of ammunition. The case demonstrates how the measures adopted by the Dominican authorities are designed to discourage trafficking in ammunition on national territory and in the border area, dismantle the related trafficking networks and lead to the investigation of any individuals suspected of supporting Haitian gangs.

## **Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants**

42. Growing gang violence, political instability and increasing economic hardship are all contributing to the conditions for increased migration from Haiti. These trends are also influenced by recent changes in migration policies across the region, which in turn are shaping the preferences and modi operandi of migrant smugglers and human traffickers. Another factor that warrants additional attention is the dramatic increase in child recruitment into gangs, which itself constitutes human trafficking. Several gangs appear to be growing more powerful not only because of continued

access to firearms, ammunition and illicit rents, but also because they are growing in absolute numbers. According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the number of children recruited by armed groups in Haiti increased by 70 per cent in 2024, with children now comprising between 30 and 50 per cent of gang membership.<sup>43</sup>

43. The vulnerabilities of Haitians, and in particular children, are being exploited by gangs to facilitate child recruitment. Children that are malnourished, deprived of education and lacking parental supervision are readily exploited by gangs such as 400 Mawozo, but also by others such as Brooklyn, Baz Taliban and Village de Dieu. Children are often deceived, coerced and subjected to physical violence, as well as offered food, shelter and cash in exchange for their engagement in illicit activities. As noted above, gangs are also leveraging social media to increase recruitment, reportedly offering payments of up to \$200 in exchange for membership.

44. Trafficking in persons in and outside Haiti is profoundly gendered. For instance, young boys are being used and exploited as scouts for different gangs, and forced to carry equipment and firearms, participate in violent clashes and roadblocks, and engage in illicit activities such as looting. In addition, young male recruits are periodically encouraged to engage in extreme forms of violence, including killing on command. By contrast, girls are frequently sexually exploited and forced to cook, clean and run errands for gangs. In the process, rape, sexual violence and forced pregnancies have been reported by Oganizasyon Fanm Vanyan an Aksyon, a local non-governmental organization providing critical aid and assistance to younger female victims of gangs.<sup>44</sup>

45. Regional dynamics are also influencing trends and patterns of migration. For example, airspace closures between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the shutdown of the international airport in Port-au-Prince due to gang attacks on commercial airplanes, and migration policies in the United States and other countries, together with deportations of Haitian nationals and stricter controls in the Darién Gap at the border between Colombia and Panama, appear to be having an impact on the dynamics of migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Previously, Haitians relied on smuggling networks to arrange travel to Colombia by air to cities like Bogotá and Medellín, or by sea using small boats to cross the Caribbean Sea to the northern coast of Colombia, in particular to La Guajira and Cartagena, and continued their journey through the Darién Gap. Official figures issued by the Panamanian authorities consistent with identified trends indicate a steady decline in Haitian migration in 2024: 11,820 Haitians reportedly crossed from Colombia into Panama through the Darién Gap in October 2024, a 71 per cent decrease compared with 41,489 Haitians during the same period in 2023. It is likely that heavy rains and floods in the border region may also have influenced trends related to mobility.

46. Increasingly restrictive migration policies are forcing Haitians to adopt riskier measures to migrate using services offered by migrant smugglers. As reported in earlier UNODC reports, Haitian nationals are increasingly being smuggled along more dangerous routes, in particular by sea, to places such as the Bahamas, Jamaica or the Turks and Caicos, which serve as transit points to continue north towards the United States. In one recently reported case of smuggling of migrants in late September and early October 2024, over 100 Haitians were abandoned at sea near the

<sup>43</sup> UNICEF, "Number of children in Haiti recruited by armed groups soars by 70 per cent in one year – UNICEF", 25 November 2024; and UN News, "Haiti: child recruitment by armed groups surges 70 per cent", 24 November 2024.

<sup>44</sup> Marcia Biggs, André Paultre and Eric O'Conner, "Boys forced into gangs, girls face sexual abuse as Haiti violence robs childhoods", PBS, 22 November 2024.



coast of Puerto Rico.<sup>45</sup> During the first quarter of 2024, over 67,000 Haitians were deported from the Dominican Republic.<sup>46</sup> In October 2024 alone, over 30,000 refugees and migrants were deported from the Dominican Republic;<sup>47</sup> 231 from the Bahamas, Jamaica and the Turks and Caicos; and 258 from the United States.<sup>48</sup> Under the new plan of the Dominican Republic to deport 10,000 Haitians each week,<sup>49</sup> a total of 520,000 migrants would be deported within a year.

## The persistence of Haitian drug trafficking connections

47. Drug trafficking operations in Haiti were strongly connected to the expansion of Colombian drug trafficking during the 1980s and 1990s. Over the past three decades, these operations have demonstrated continuity in their core membership and leadership. A review of publicly available indictments, combined with interviews with multiple key informants, highlights the disproportionately influential role of a small group of individuals. This group includes former military personnel, law enforcement officers, members of parliament and businessmen operating in both Haiti and the United States, several of whom remained active as of 2024.

48. Many of these individuals were introduced to the drug trade after the Duvalier family dictatorship and later were connected to the Haitian military. After the dismantling of the Haitian Armed Forces and the establishment of the Haitian National Police, some military officers connected to the drug trafficking network were recruited as senior police officers in several areas of the country. Multiple drug traffickers, after having been accused, arrested and/or convicted, re-emerged as politicians. The drug trafficking operation in Haiti is ongoing despite multiple investigations, indictments and convictions.<sup>50</sup>

49. Drugs and firearms have been trans-shipped through and trafficked into Haiti for decades. As a result, several sites in the capital were widely recognized as nodes in a transnational criminal network. For example, a well-known hotel in Port-au-Prince served not only as a venue for early performances by a former Haitian President, who, before being elected, was a well-known musician in Haiti, but also as a money-laundering conduit for the Colombian drug cartels,<sup>51</sup> international officials and their allies in the Haitian elite. The same former President was recently sanctioned by Canada and the United States for using political influence to facilitate drug trafficking and corruption and exacerbating gang violence.<sup>52</sup>

50. During the 1980s and 1990s, several senior Haitian government officials, including former presidents of Haiti (mentioned in several court transcripts of drug trafficking cases in the United States) and security personnel, were reportedly

<sup>45</sup> Syra Ortiz Blanes and Jacqueline Charles, “As DR ramps up Haitian deportations, smugglers dump over 100 migrants in Puerto Rico”, *Miami Herald*, 3 October 2024.

<sup>46</sup> Dominican Republic, Department of Migration, “In 6 months, more than 67 thousand foreigners of different nationalities have been deported to their countries of origin”, 5 July 2024.

<sup>47</sup> Reuters, “Haiti condemns Dominican Republic's plan to deport 10,000 migrants weekly”, 7 October 2024.

<sup>48</sup> Natricia Duncan, “Stop ‘draconian’ mass deportations of Haitians fleeing gangs, activists say”, *The Guardian*, 14 November 2024.

<sup>49</sup> Vanessa Herrero, “Dominican Republic expels over 10,000 Haitians and plans to do so every week”, *Washington Post*, 11 October 2024.

<sup>50</sup> Key informant K1, interviewed on 11 October 2024.

<sup>51</sup> United States, District Court, Southern District of Florida, *United States of America v. Beaudouin Ketant*, 21 January 2024.

<sup>52</sup> Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada sanctions Haiti ex-President Martelly for financing gangs”, Reuters, 20 November 2022; and United States, Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions former Haitian President for drug trafficking”, 20 August 2024.

involved in the drug trade. Key economic stakeholders were likewise part of a group that worked with the Colombian cartels.<sup>53</sup> One of them was indicted in 1997 for trafficking 30 tons of cocaine from Haiti to the United States, including by paying off police and customs officials in Haiti and baggage handlers in Miami and New York. He was convicted in 2004 and received a 27-year sentence and a \$15 million fine but, after receiving a reduction in his sentence, was released and deported back to Haiti in 2015.<sup>54</sup>

51. Several of the key figures involved in drug trafficking over the past several decades are still active in Haiti today. An early criminal group, known colloquially as “La Familia”, was implicated in cocaine trafficking via commercial flights during the 1990s. United States indictments in the 1990s and 2000s linked several Haitian suspects directly to “political and law enforcement institutions”, noting the existence of a multi-decade “conspiracy to establish a cocaine and heroin transportation and distribution network” to transport cocaine and heroin from Colombia via Haiti to the United States.<sup>55</sup> Several former senators, as well as private sector actors, have been sanctioned by the United States and Canada in connection with involvement in drug trafficking.<sup>56</sup>

52. The modalities of drug trafficking involve several steps. First, dealers based in the United States order cocaine and heroin consignments from Colombia. Consignments of drugs are shipped from Colombian suppliers via small planes and go-fast boats, and then transported to safe houses in Haiti before being routed in smaller shipments to the United States.<sup>57</sup> In collaboration with contacts in Colombia, leaders of Haitian drug trafficking organizations take multiple “orders” for shipments and dispatch smaller shipments via gangs and couriers. Cocaine selling for approximately \$1,000 per kilogram in Colombia can be purchased for between \$5,000 and \$6,000 per kilogram on arrival in Haiti.<sup>58</sup> Drug packets are then packed and shipped by air, water and land (including via the Dominican Republic) and resold for upwards of \$15,000 to 20,000 per kilogram in the United States.<sup>59</sup> The involvement of multiple agents in Haiti serves as a risk mitigation strategy for sellers, distributors and purchasers while complicating investigations and interdiction efforts in and outside of Haiti.

53. The critical strategy that ensures the resilience of drug trafficking is nomination to a political position. Many of the individuals investigated, sanctioned, arrested, convicted and incarcerated for drug trafficking and related crimes have gone on to hold public office. Elections offer a path to protect criminal actors and their drug trafficking networks. Following the appointment of a new President in 2011, for example, there was a plan to resurrect the intelligence and security apparatus to serve drug trafficking. Corrupt police officers were recruited as “consultants” for the National Palace General Security Unit.

<sup>53</sup> Arron Daugherty, “US deports former Haiti cocaine kingpin”, InSight Crime, 24 August 2015; and Kyle Swenson, “The rise and fall of Haitian drug lord Jacques Ketant”, New Times Broward-Palm Beach, 27 May 2015.

<sup>54</sup> David Adams, “Haitian drug trafficker has sentence slashed for cooperation”, Reuters, 20 April 2015; and key informant K1, interviewed on 16 and 18 October 2024.

<sup>55</sup> The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida noted in 1997 that the network’s operations were intended to function “throughout the Republic of Haiti, employing in large part the political and military institutions of the country”.

<sup>56</sup> Key informant K3, interviewed on 12 October 2024.

<sup>57</sup> Key informant K3, interviewed on 17 October 2024, suggested that, between 1997 and 2000, air drops ranged from 250 to 400 kg and boat movements from 600 to 1,000 kg. The value ranged from \$5,000 to \$6,000 per kilogram.

<sup>58</sup> According to key informant K5, interviewed on 17 December 2024, the cocaine was sold at \$3,000 per kilogram.

<sup>59</sup> Key informant K3, interviewed on 17 October 2024.

## The eel industry: a favourable ecosystem for crime

54. There is mounting evidence that several Haitian nationals are part of a wider ecosystem of crime connected to the eel industry. They are operating not only in Haiti, where lucrative eel production is based, but elsewhere in the Caribbean and around the world, especially in Asia, where demand is high. Organized criminal networks are often the key perpetrators of illegal wildlife trade that significantly contributes to the endangerment of species. However, the role of such groups in eel fishing and trade in Haiti over the past decade is less well known. Indeed, there are claims of irregularities in or possible unfair fixing of prices among a small group of entrepreneurs that are members of the National Association for the Protection of Aquatic Resources.

55. Some observers also fear that several individuals connected to the eel trade are involved in money-laundering, including of money derived from drug trafficking and eel exports. Rumours have circulated in Haiti for years that several extremely powerful political and economic actors are involved in both eel trafficking and drug trafficking.<sup>60</sup>

56. The harvest and export of juvenile eels is a lucrative business in Haiti and around the world, although different species of eels are involved. In 2020, UNODC published the *World Wildlife Crime Report*,<sup>61</sup> which has a case study on (European) eels. The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) has also recently documented a surge in the smuggling of European eels.<sup>62</sup> Although there are legal fisheries of eels and legal consumption, an important illegal trade chain exists in parallel to or actually interlinked with the legal trade and market, which provides ample opportunity for money-laundering at various stages of the supply chain. The Financial Action Task Force has outlined several money-laundering risks associated with the illegal wildlife trade, as well as the ways it can threaten biodiversity, fuel corruption<sup>63</sup> and erode the legitimate economy. To move, hide and launder their proceeds, wildlife traffickers exploit weaknesses in both the financial and non-financial sectors. Nevertheless, law enforcement agencies rarely investigate the financial dimensions of these crimes.<sup>64</sup>

## Challenges related to corruption

57. Haiti continues to crack down on corruption. For example, on 4 October 2024, the Anti-Corruption Unit submitted a report to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Commissaire du Gouvernement) alleging corruption involving three members of the Transitional Presidential Council and the president of the National Bank of Credit. In that report, the Unit claims the three Council members solicited a bribe of 100 million gourdes (approximately \$750,000) from the president of the Bank in exchange for renewing his mandate. Lacking the requested sum, the Bank president allegedly

<sup>60</sup> Maria Abi-Habid, "Haiti's leader kept a list of drug traffickers. His assassins came for it", *New York Times*, 12 December 2021.

<sup>61</sup> *World Wildlife Crime Report 2020: Trafficking in Protected Species* (United Nations publication, 2020), chap. 7.

<sup>62</sup> Europol, "Over 5 tonnes of smuggled glass eels seized in Europe this year", 6 November 2019.

<sup>63</sup> The illegal wildlife trade is strongly linked to corruption, although it remains unclear whether corruption drives such trade, the trade fuels corruption or both dynamics are at play.

<sup>64</sup> Financial Action Task Force, *Money Laundering and the Illegal Wildlife Trade* (Paris, 2020). A key overarching comment, and perhaps the most critical one, is that there is a legal eel fisheries industry, along with legal consumption. However, it is equally important to highlight that a significant illegal trade network operates alongside – or is intertwined with – the legal trade and market. Emphasizing this nuance is essential, as countries further down the trade chain have expressed sensitivity to publications implying that all trade in eels is illegal or criminal. See *World Wildlife Crime Report 2020*, chap. 7.

offered credit cards with limits of \$20,000 as an alternative, which were purportedly accepted and used for personal expenses.<sup>65</sup>

58. Following the investigation by the Anti-Corruption Unit, the head of the Public Prosecutor's Office officially referred the matter for the appointment of an investigating judge to conduct an inquiry into the corruption affair.<sup>66</sup> The designated investigative judge issued summonses for the accused members of the Transitional Presidential Council, with appearances scheduled for 9, 10 and 11 December 2024. In addition, a former consul implicated in the case was summoned for 5 December but was reportedly unable to attend due to the suspension of flights to Toussaint Louverture International Airport, according to his lawyer. All have failed to comply with the summonses.<sup>67</sup>

59. On 9 December 2024, Haiti achieved an important milestone in its fight against corruption with the establishment of the inter-institutional Anti-Corruption Task Force, supported by UNODC in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme and the Organization of American States. The initiative unites five key national institutions – the Financial Inspection Authority, the Anti-Corruption Unit, the Public Procurement Commission, the Central Financial Intelligence Unit and the Economic and Financial Crimes Bureau—with the aim of enhancing coordination, streamlining investigations and promoting transparency and accountability.<sup>68</sup>

### Recommendations

60. Recalling the recommendations of UNODC included in its reports in 2023 and 2024, UNODC reiterates the importance of:

(a) Implementing recommendations previously articulated in UNODC reports to enhance capabilities to register firearms and ammunition; increasing accountability and integrity measures for the control of firearms and ammunition; centralizing firearms regulation and management, including for firearms belonging to private security companies; and supporting the safe and secure storage and management of seized and other illicit firearms and ammunitions;

(b) Enhancing the capacities of national authorities to collect and analyse firearms seizure data, including e-trace requests to the United States;

(c) Amplifying the capacities of border and customs control authorities, including on the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, to effectively detect and investigate trafficking in firearms and related offences and improve inter-agency cooperation.

61. In addition, UNODC calls upon Haitian governmental authorities, as well as international stakeholders:

(a) To strengthen control capabilities for ships departing from Florida and calling at the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos before the trans-shipment of goods to Haiti;

<sup>65</sup> “Rapport d'enquête conduite par l'ULCC sur les allégations de sollicitation de cent millions de gourdes (100,000,000.00 gdes) par trois membres du Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT): Smith Augustin, Emmanuel Vertilaire et Louis Gérald Gilles pour la reconduction de Monsieur Raoul Pascal Pierre Louis à la présidence du Conseil d'Administration de la Banque Nationale de Crédit (BNC)”, executive summary.

<sup>66</sup> Roberson Alphonse, “Dossier BNC-CPT-ULCC: le parquet saisit le doyen pour la désignation d'un juge d'instruction”, *Le Nouvelliste* (Port-au-Prince), 16 October 2024. Information confirmed by UNODC staff.

<sup>67</sup> Roberson Geffrard, “Les trois membres du CPT inculpés ont boudé le mandat de comparution”, *Le Nouvelliste* (Port-au-Prince), 11 December 2024.

<sup>68</sup> See the agreement for the creation of an anti-corruption task force, signed on 9 December 2024.

(b) To reinforce maritime controls in the south of Haiti and on the maritime border with the Dominican Republic;

(c) To support the use of technological platforms to increase the maritime domain awareness of the Haitian Coast Guard, which would provide a vastly improved understanding of the country's maritime space;

(d) To encourage the development, establishment and/or operationalization of regional agreements with other Caribbean countries to enhance operational response to maritime threats, as well as to trafficking in drugs, smuggling of firearms and ammunition and organized criminality;

(e) To develop intelligence capacity in Haiti through the establishment of specialized units and seconded experts, with the aim of reinforcing the capacity to combat transnational organized crime and its connections with Haitian gangs;

(f) To foster trans-border technical cooperation to share understanding of criminal networks and undertake joint action against transnational organized groups acting in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Colombia and the United States;

(g) To strengthen the operational capacity of the Brigade de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants to effectively address, investigate and combat trafficking in drugs and arms;

(h) To support the National Drug Control Commission in the implementation of the national policy on trafficking in and consumption of illicit drugs;

(i) To increase understanding among relevant Haitian authorities of money-laundering risks from the illegal wildlife trade and to support financial investigations in that area, including for the purpose of asset recovery;

(j) To strengthen the implementation of existing anti-trafficking laws, with stricter penalties for individuals or groups recruiting children, as well as to train law enforcement units to handle trafficking in persons and gang-related crimes involving children;

(k) To develop and implement comprehensive measures to prevent gang violence and protect children and youth from recruitment by gangs, to support the reintegration of those who were previously part of armed groups, and to ensure the provision of essential services;

(l) To support community watch programmes by engaging local leaders in monitoring gang activity and protecting children and to enhance neighbourhood security by collaborating with police and community groups to create safer environments in gang-prone areas.

62. UNODC calls in particular upon the Haitian authorities:

(a) To consider, with the support of the international community, developing law enforcement capacities in open source and social media intelligence, grounded in human rights, to build greater understanding of gang communications and operations;

(b) To further explore, in cooperation with international partners, the eel trade and its links to money-laundering, drug trafficking and other organized crime in Haiti;

(c) To further investigate, in cooperation with international partners, the possible use of social media platforms by gangs and gang members in Haiti as a possible source of funding and as a tool for promotion and recruitment.



## Annex

## List of firearms seized, 2021–2024

		<i>Pistol</i>	<i>Revolver</i>	<i>Rifle</i>	<i>Shotgun</i>	<i>Home-made weapons</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>2021</b>	January	30	2	8	1	9	50
	February	27	1	8	5	—	41
	March	8	2	3	1	5	19
	April	23	4	2	2	8	39
	May	15	5	3	1	3	27
	June	3	1	2	—	6	12
	July	17	1	13	7	7	45
	August	25	3	2	3	4	37
	September	16	6	6	—	12	40
	October	18	1	3	2	2	26
	November	16	—	6	4	3	29
	December	24	3	3	5	1	36
<b>Total</b>		<b>222</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>401</b>
<b>2022</b>	January	19	—	4	1	1	25
	February	10	2	2	1	6	21
	March	26	5	2	3	5	41
	April	15	5	4	3	5	32
	May	29	6	7	—	6	48
	June	13	1	3	—	2	19
	July	30	3	23	2	1	59
	August	11	—	4	2	2	19
	September	4	1	5	3	4	17
	October	9	2	5	—	6	22
	November	16	2	6	1	1	26
	December	10	1	1	1	—	13
<b>Total</b>		<b>192</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>342</b>
<b>2023</b>	January	14	1	7	1	2	25
	February	16	4	3	2	—	25
	March	9	4	3	—	5	21
	April	20	—	10	1	—	31
	May	4	1	5	1	1	12
	June	4	2	5	1	4	16
	July	9	2	3	1	4	19
	August	13	1	1	—	1	16
	September	13	2	4	1	1	21
	October	18	3	2	3	5	31
	November	10	4	1	—	2	17
	December	10	1	6	1	13	31
<b>Total</b>		<b>140</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>265</b>

		<i>Pistol</i>	<i>Revolver</i>	<i>Rifle</i>	<i>Shotgun</i>	<i>Home-made weapons</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>2024</b>	January	5	1	1	2	1	10
	February	7	1	6	4	3	21
	March	7	1	6	—	3	17
	April	22		13	—	—	35
	May	7	3	2	—	1	13
	June	15	—	5	—	4	24
	July	15	1	3	4	4	27
	August	19	3	6	—	1	29
	September	13	3	14	1	1	32
	October	16	1	17	2	5	41
	November	12	3	4	2	1	22
	December	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Total</b>		<b>138</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>271</b>

*Source:* United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti and United Nations police.