

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON KOREA

SECOND INFORMATION REPORT

(Period 20 February - 12 March 1949)

Note by the Secretary-General: The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the General Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 (f) of General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948, the second information report of the United Nations Commission on Korea.

Seoul, 26 March 1949

- I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION
- II. MAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS SUB-COMMITTEES
- III. OTHER ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION

(a) Meetings of the Commission and Sub-Committees

1. During the three-week period covered by this report, seven plenary meetings of the Commission were held (thirteenth through nineteenth). Sub-Committee I held nine meetings (sixth through fourteenth), including two hearings of Korean personalities, and Sub-Committee II held six meetings (third through eighth), including three hearings.

(b) Office of the Chairman

2. In accordance with the decision of the Commission at its sixth meeting, which provided for a rotating chairmanship every thirty days in the English alphabetical order of countries represented, the representative of China, Mr. Liu Yu-Wan, took the chair on 12 March 1949.

(c) Membership of the Commission

3. Notification of the appointment to the Commission of Mr. Miguel Angel Magana as representative of El Salvador was received on 11 March 1949.

4. The representative of Australia, Mr. Patrick Shaw, returned to his post in Japan on 23 February and was succeeded by Mr. A. B. Jamieson.

* First issued at Seoul as A/AC.26/12.

II. MAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS SUB-COMMITTEES

(a) Plenary meetings of the Commission

(1) Report of the Chairman concerning a discussion with President Syngman Rhee

5. At the thirteenth meeting on 21 February 1949, Mr. Patrick Shaw (Australia) presented to the Commission a summary of his discussion with President Syngman Rhee on 20 February. As Chairman, he had communicated to the President the attitude of the Commission toward the Korean Government. The President, in turn, had stated the position of the Government in relation to the work of the Commission. The discussion between the Chairman and the President had centered on two main issues: contact with North Korea, and consultation with individuals and organizations. The discussion is summarized in Annex 1.

6. The Commission requested the Sub-Committees to present their views concerning the discussion. At the fifteenth meeting on 25 February 1949, Sub-Committee II stated that the Commission must conduct its consultations in complete independence. At the sixteenth and seventeenth meetings, held on 28 February and 2 March respectively, Sub-Committee I, in evaluating the position of the Commission in relation to the Government of Korea, stated that no change in the basic policy of the Commission was required unless or until there was concrete evidence that the attitude of the Government was hindering its work. The reports of the Sub-Committees*, as amended, were approved by the Commission (Annexes 2 and 3).

(ii) Consultations with individuals and topics for discussion

7. At the fourteenth and seventeenth meetings, the Commission approved the reports of Sub-Committees II and I respectively concerning consultations with individuals and topics for discussion.

8. The report of Sub-Committee II provided, among other things, for hearing officials, experts and organizations in order to facilitate further studies on different aspects of the problems of representative government and of political unification which it might undertake. (Annex 4)

9. The report of Sub-Committee I provided for obtaining information and opinions on problems arising out of the division of Korea, and on possible methods for removing existing economic, social and other barriers, with a view to promoting unification. (Annex 5)

10. The first group of persons to be heard by both committees included official as well as non-official personalities.

(iii) Access of Koreans to the Commission

11. At the thirteenth meeting, the Commission appointed an ad hoc committee composed of the representatives of Australia and Syria, to examine the problem of access of Koreans to the Commission.

12. In a letter from the Chairman of the Korean Government Liaison Committee to the Principal Secretary, it was suggested that the references of persons desiring to approach the Commission should be cleared by the Liaison Committee (Annex 6).

13. The report of the ad hoc Committee (Annex 7) recommended in part, that a pass office be established in Seoul, where Koreans wishing to visit the Commission could apply for an appointment. The decision to establish a pass office was deferred pending further examination of the problem.

(iv) Social functions

14. At the sixteenth meeting, on 28 February 1949, the Commission adopted with amendments, a draft resolution proposed by the Syrian representative, recording its desire that invitations to Commission members to attend functions be limited so that it might devote its time and energy to the accomplishment of its main task (Annex 8).

(v) Relations between the Commission and the Press

15. At the eighteenth meeting, on 9 March 1949, a discussion took place concerning relations between the Commission and the Korean press. Distorted accounts concerning the Commission which had appeared in the local press, had given rise to some speculation in the National Assembly and in other circles concerning the policies and activities of the Commission.

16. The Commission agreed that while it was important to maintain good press relations, certain procedural safeguards should be employed with a view to preventing as far as possible misunderstandings between the Commission and the Korean Press.

(vi) Contact with North Korea

17. At the nineteenth meeting, on 10 March, the Commission began consideration of a report of Sub-Committee I, recommending that a letter be forwarded to a leading personality in North Korea at the earliest possible date with the request that a visit of the Commission be facilitated. The Chairman of Sub-Committee I informed the Commission that, as a result of inquiries in Hong Kong, a channel of communication and transportation had been found to be available via ship between that port and North Korea.

18. Following a discussion of the report, the Commission agreed that in the light of views expressed regarding methods of approach to North Korea, Sub-Committee I should prepare a new report to be considered by the Commission at a subsequent meeting.

(b) Work of the Sub-Committees

(i) Sub-Committee I

19. Sub-Committee I held nine meetings, including two hearings, during the period covered by the present report.

20. In accordance with its report adopted by the Commission at the seventeenth meeting (Annex 5), the Sub-Committee began consultations with leading official and non-official personalities in order to obtain information and opinions on problems arising out of the division of Korea, and on possible methods for removing existing economic, social and other barriers. Mr. Lee Bum Suk, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense appeared before the Sub-Committee on 8 March and Mr. Kim Yak Soo, Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly, on 10 March.

21. At the seventh meeting, the Sub-Committee considered the report of the Chairman of the Commission on his discussion with President Rhee on 20 February 1949 (Annex 1). The Sub-Committee agreed that the Commission should have complete freedom in selecting personalities it wished to consult. In so doing, however, the Commission would bear in mind the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea and the possible consequences resulting from such consultation.

22. At the eighth meeting, the Sub-Committee completed a draft statement of the position of the Commission in relation to the Government of Korea for the consideration and approval of the Commission. The report, as amended, was approved by the Commission at its seventeenth meeting (Annex 2).

23. At the ninth meeting, the Sub-Committee agreed upon a first list of persons to be consulted and the main topics for discussion at the hearings. The Sub-Committee's report was adopted by the Commission at its seventeenth meeting on 2 March (Annex 5).

24. At the tenth, twelfth and fourteenth meetings, the Sub-Committee considered the problem of contacting North Korea. The Secretariat presented a report of its technical inquiries at Seoul, Shanghai and Hong Kong concerning possible links with North Korea. The only practicable method of communication and transportation was reported to be via ship from Hong Kong to a North Korean port, and it was indicated that a message from the Commission and a reply from North Korea would in all probability be required before the Commission or any of its members could travel to the North.

25. In the light of the Secretariat's report, the Sub-Committee decided to recommend to the Commission the transmission of a letter addressed to a leading personality in North Korea, requesting that a visit of the Commission to the North be facilitated at the earliest possible date. The Commission, at its nineteenth meeting on 10 March, deferred taking action on the Sub-Committee's recommendation, pending consideration of other

/methods

methods of approach to the North, including alternative forms of letter communication.

(11) Sub-Committee II

26. Sub-Committee II held six meetings, including three hearings, during the period covered by this report.

27. In accordance with its report adopted by the Commission at the fourteenth meeting (Annex 4) the Sub-Committee began consultations on various aspects of the development of representative government in Korea, particularly in relation to the problem of unification. Mr. Sin Ik Hi, Chairman of the National Assembly; Mr. Yoo Chin O, Director of the Office of Legislation; Dr. L. G. Paik, President of Chosen Christian College; and Mr. Yun Chi Yung, member of the National Assembly and former Minister of the Interior, appeared before the Sub-Committee on 28 February, 2 and 9 March respectively.

28. At the third and fourth meetings, the Sub-Committee considered the list of persons to be consulted and the main topics for discussion at the hearings. The Sub-Committee's report, as amended, was adopted by the Commission at its fourteenth meeting on 23 February.

29. At the fourth meeting, the Sub-Committee discussed the relevant points contained in the report of the Chairman of the Commission on his discussion with President Rhee (Annex 1). It was agreed that the Chairman of the Sub-Committee should convey to the Commission the opinion of the members that, in principle, the Commission should hear the views of all Koreans though consideration should be given to the desires of the Government regarding certain individuals and to the possibility of reprisals against such individuals.

30. At the seventh meeting the members considered and approved a draft chronology of important developments in Korea from 15 August 1948 to 31 January 1949.*

* A/AC.26/SC.2/5.

III. OTHER ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

(a) Visit of the Commission to the Korean National Assembly

31. On 23 February 1949, the Commission attended a session of the National Assembly in Seoul. The Chairman of the Assembly, Mr. Sin Ik Hi, presented an address of welcome to the Commission, and the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. A. B. Jamieson (Australia) addressed the Assembly in reply.*

(b) Public mass meeting at Seoul Stadium

32. On 1 March, a Korean National holiday commemorating the Korean bid for independence in 1919, members of the Commission attended a public mass meeting at Seoul Stadium. The Chairman of the Commission, Mr. A. B. Jamieson, addressed the gathering.

(c) Visits to American and Korean army installations

33. On 24 February, the Commission, at the invitation of Brigadier General W. L. Roberts, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, visited American army installations in Seoul and at Ascom City.

34. The Commission visited the Korean Military Academy on 3 March, and several Korean military installations in and around Seoul on 7 March. The Commission witnessed infantry, artillery and cavalry exercises, and inspected camps and troops, as well as special detachments.

* A/AC.26/W.7 and A/AC.26/W.8

ANNEX 1*

EXTRACT FROM THE SUMMARY RECORD OF THE
THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE COMMISSION

Monday, 21 February 1949 at 2.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN summarized his conversation of the previous evening with President Rhee of the Republic of Korea. He had tried to communicate clearly to the President the attitude of the Commission towards the Korean Government. He had pointed out that the Temporary Commission had been granted full facilities for travel and observation as well as free access to all political leaders in South Korea. Consequently, it had been able to convey to the General Assembly a full and factual account of conditions in South Korea, though it could make no report on the inaccessible North. He had impressed upon the President that the General Assembly had been able to formulate its recommendations largely on the basis of the Temporary Commission's freedom of observation and its verdict that the elections in South Korea had been reasonably free.

The Chairman had suggested to President Rhee that it would be to the interest of the latter's own Government to allow the present Commission the same freedom of operation which had been extended to the Temporary Commission. He had told the President that the entire Commission was disturbed by the implied desire of the Korean Government to restrict its work.

The Chairman had made it clear that the Commission wanted to explore every channel of contact with North Korea, even though it did not hope for miracles. The General Assembly would scrutinize the report of the present Commission as closely as it had that of the Temporary Commission, and many delegations would protest that the Commission had not made an honest effort to carry out its mandate if it merely remained in Seoul and requested assistance from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to enter North Korea. An approach to the North through the good offices of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was only one form of approach.

Secondly, the Chairman had pointed out that the General Assembly expected a report from the Commission on the development of representative institutions in Korea. Therefore, the Commission was obligated to interview the largest possible number of representative Koreans; it might even wish to consult people whose views were not acceptable to the Government. The Commission felt that it would be to

President Rhee's own interest to assist it in making a full and frank report to the General Assembly. Members regarded as an unjustifiable limitation the Government's attitude of frowning on interviews with unofficial persons, and the fact that this intimidation had prevented some political leaders from approaching the Commission through the machinery established by the Korean Government.

President Rhee had replied to these points at great length. Referring to the period immediately following the war when he was named President of the People's Republic of South Korea, he had claimed to have foreseen future developments in North Korea at that time. He had joined with Messrs. Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik, when they returned from China, to remove the threat that Korea would be placed under trusteeship, as advocated by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

At that time Communists were so few in number as to constitute little threat. American laxity, which his warnings had not been able to overcome, had allowed the danger from that source to grow.

According to President Rhee, the American authorities had allowed an influx of Communists from the North and had attempted to promote compromises with them. This American policy was responsible for the present problem of Korea and for the atrocities being perpetrated throughout the country. He recalled that he had refused to attend the conference arranged by the Temporary Commission between leaders of the North and South because he had thought it might adversely affect the May elections. Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik, who did attend the conference, had returned with glowing reports of the northern government's desire for unity, but within a few days of their return that government had cut off the flow of electric power to South Korea. The conference had indeed produced disorder and unrest throughout Korea, for people had feared an invasion from the North and had been uneasy concerning their ability to repel it.

President Rhee had declared that Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik, by boycotting the May elections, had forfeited any right to participate in elections in South Korea. It would not be possible for the Commission to hold even confidential talks with those two leaders for, last year, the Temporary Commission's private conversations with them had leaked to the Press the next day.

The President had spoken in detail of the Communist menace in South Korea, attributing the infiltration of Communists into high places in the Korean army to the American policy of not screening army

candidates effectively. The process of purging the Korean army of Communists was not yet completed. He had quoted figures, which seemed to the Chairman rather alarming, to show that this internal problem was one of great concern to the Government.

The President had pointed to the frequency of terrorist incidents in South Korea, such as the attempt to bomb the Stadium before the mass meeting to welcome the Commission, and the nightly assaults and murders in Seoul. He had declared that evidence showed that, in all the plots to overthrow the Government of the Republic, Messrs. Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik were implicated. Those former leaders of Korea must now be regarded as traitors and rebels with whom the Commission should not deal.

President Rhee had warned against any policy of compromise which, he said, would only strengthen the Communists. The function which he apparently envisaged for the Commission was that of helping to mobilize world opinion in favour of the Korean Government. He considered that the General Assembly discussions had shown that the preponderance of opinion in democratic countries already favoured his regime. If those democratic nations would now reaffirm their support of the Government, the Russians might be prepared to yield their foot-hold in North Korea. The way would then be open for the South Korean Government to unify the country, with the support of friendly forces in North Korea. The backing of world opinion would make unification relatively easy if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were to adopt a policy of non-intervention.

President Rhee was somewhat critical of the interference of the Temporary Commission in local politics, which he appeared to think had done some harm. He said that the task of the present Commission was not the same as that of the Temporary Commission, and inferred that he could not be tolerant of activities which upset people's confidence in their Government.

To these views the Chairman had replied that the present Commission also needed the support of the Korean Government to discharge its instructions from the General Assembly. He had taken the liberty of informing the President that the Commission was in process of sending a message to Moscow with a request to forward it to North Korea, and that this step would be publicly announced within a day or two. He had pointed out that the General Assembly would not consider this step as a full implementation of its instructions and that the Commission was seeking contact through other channels.

/With regard

With regard to the internal situation, he had said that the Commission would seriously heed the views and requests of President Rhee, who would have to be the judge of his country's security. The Chairman held no particular brief for either of the two opposition leaders mentioned by the President, but was concerned with the principle of free consultation with all Korean leaders.

President Rhee had agreed that the Commission had to solicit Russian co-operation in making contact with North Korea, though he did not expect the attempt to be productive. He had volunteered the aid of his Government in passing on through its own underground channels any message the Commission wished to send to Communist leaders in North Korea, and had assured the Chairman that he could guarantee delivery and produce proof of its receipt. If there were no response within a few weeks, the text could be broadcast to North Korea and the world at large.

The Chairman had thanked President Rhee for his views without committing the Commission, to which he said he would refer them. When he had said that in the meantime the Commission was exploring other means of contact with the North, the President had apparently agreed that this was the Commission's duty. The President had been less compromising, however, in his opposition to the Commission's interviewing unofficial figures, and had reiterated that he would not like the Commission to have any contact with Kim Koo or Kim Kiu Sik, for fear of grave consequences. He had offered to arrange contacts for the Commission with the National Assembly, and the Chairman had replied that the Commission was interested in meeting individual members of that body.

The Chairman concluded by saying that his interview with President Rhee had raised two important points: the possibility of contact with the North through government channels, which would have to be considered by Sub-Committee I, and that of the President's views regarding Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik, which concerned Sub-Committee II.

Mr. SINGH (India) asked that discussion of the Chairman's report should be postponed until the Sub-Committee had considered it.

Mr. MUCHIR (Syria) agreed with this proposal. He felt that the Commission was already clearly on record regarding its right to interview both official and non-official persons. This was a problem for the whole Commission, for Sub-Committee I contemplated holding hearings as did Sub-Committee II.

/Mr. COSTILNES

Mr. COSTILHES (France) inquired whether the Chairman had asked President Rhee why he did not arrest Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik.

The CHAIRMAN replied in the negative, adding that President Rhee had said he possessed documentary proof of their plotting.

Mr. SINGH (India) found the President's observations on the extent of Communist infiltration into the South Korean army somewhat inconsistent with his assertion that it could defeat the North within two weeks if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not intervene.

The CHAIRMAN quoted the President as saying that the situation was under control and that the purge of the army would soon be completed.

Mr. SINGH (India) asked whether the President had opposed individual conferences with Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik, or had opposed the Commission's meeting with them.

The CHAIRMAN replied that President Rhee did not want the Commission to meet them, because the resulting publicity would cause unrest.

Mr. LUNA (Philippines) inquired whether the President had specified the nature of his evidence against Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik, or the consequences of the Commission's conferring with them.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the President had given no particulars regarding his evidence, but had said that any interview with the opposition leaders would occasion local unrest and undermine his own position. In reply to another question by the Philippine representative, the Chairman said President Rhee had implied that the Commission's activities would have an unsettling effect in South Korea, just as the Temporary Commission's "interference" in arranging the North-South Conference had unsettled Mr. Rhee's plans for the May elections.

Mr. SINGH (India) wondered what interest the United States could have had in furthering Communist infiltration into South Korea, as President Rhee had implied.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the President had drawn a parallel with China, where, he said, the American policy of trying to bring the two parties together in a compromise had merely played into the hands of the Communists. To Mr. Singh's question as to whether the President had commented on United States policy at present, he replied that the latter had only complained of a lack of American arms.

/The Chairman

The Chairman agreed with the Syrian representative that the interview should be considered by the whole Commission after study by the Sub-Committees, and added that the Sub-Committees might wish to seek the opinion of a third party, such as the United States military advisers.

Mr. SINGH (India) endorsed the view of the Syrian representative that the Commission had already made clear its unwillingness to be restricted in its inquiries. But it would be unwise not to keep in mind the strong feelings of the South Korean Government, which the Commission could ill afford to antagonize if it wished to help unify the country.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the Commission would have to consider and evaluate the attitude of the Government of the Republic.

It was agreed to postpone discussion of the interview until the next meeting, when the Sub-Committees could present their views concerning it.

ANNEX 2*

POSITION OF THE COMMISSION IN RELATION
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF KOREA

Report of Sub-Committee I

The position of the Commission in relation to the Government of Korea may be stated in terms of two main issues involved, namely: contact with North Korea with a view to breaking down existing barriers between the North and the South, and consultation with individuals and organizations. On both issues, the Government of Korea and the Commission have expressed themselves clearly and emphatically. The Commission announced its fundamental aims and purposes in a policy statement read by the Chairman at the first public meeting, and views have been exchanged between the Commission and the Government of Korea on at least three occasions: at an interview between Sub-Committee I and President Rhee and his cabinet on 11 February 1949**; at an interview between members of the Commission and the Korean Government Liaison Committee on 16 February 1949***; and in a discussion between the Chairman of the Commission and President Rhee on 20 February 1949****. There has also been an exchange of correspondence on the question of consultation (Annex 6).

The respective positions of the Government of Korea and the Commission may be summarized as follows:

In respect to contact with North Korea, the Government of Korea has declared that it disapproved of any approach except through the Soviet Union, and it would adopt a non-co-operative attitude in any efforts which the Commission might make in seeking to establish direct contact with the Government or leaders of the North. However, in the course of the Chairman's discussion with the President, the latter stated that he would guarantee the receipt, by leaders in the North, of a communication from the Commission.

The Government has further indicated that, in its opinion, economic and social intercourse between the North and the South did not exist, and the Government does not intend that there should be any. Assuming that a contact were to be made with the North, the Government of Korea might be unwilling to co-operate in efforts of the Commission to remove existing barriers.

* A/AC.26/SC.1/4/Rev.1.

** See A/822, Annex 2.

*** Ibid., Annex 4.

**** See Annex 1 to the present document.

The Commission has declared, in its resolution of 9 February 1949*, and in the report of Sub-Committee I adopted on 18 February 1949**, that it sought to make immediate contact with North Korea as a means of seeking to remove economic, social and other barriers, and that it would continue to explore practical means of travelling to North Korea.

The Commission, in requesting the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to lend its good offices to establish contact with leading personalities in North Korea, has taken this as a first step, and in the meantime will explore other avenues of approach to the North.

The Commission has been unanimous in its agreement that it does not propose to communicate with a government in North Korea, recognizing that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful government in the country.

In respect to consultation with individuals and organizations, the Korean Government has made it clear that it disapproved of the Commission consulting personalities outside the Government without its consent. The Government, through its Liaison Committee, has suggested that if any person desired to approach the Commission for purposes of consultation, his references should be cleared with the Liaison Committee.

The President and the Liaison Committee have indicated that consultation with certain personalities such as Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sik would throw the public into confusion and would result in grave consequences. However, the President offered to arrange contacts for the Commission with members of the National Assembly.

By its resolution of 16 February 1949***, the Commission has declared that reputable Koreans wishing to approach the Commission or its members for bona fide purposes should be freely permitted to do so.

The Chairman informed President Rhee that the Commission was disturbed by the implied desire of the Korean Government to restrict its work, and regarded as an unjustifiable limitation the Government's attitude of disapproval of interviews with unofficial persons. In order to carry out its work effectively, the Commission required freedom of operation, even involving consulting people whose views were not acceptable to the Government.

* See A/822, Annex 1.

** Ibid., Annex 3.

*** See A/822, paragraph 26.

The Commission is, however, cognizant of the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea as defined in the General Assembly's resolution.

Having examined the record of the Government's position and the Commission's policy summarized above, Sub-Committee I is of the opinion that no change in the basic policy of the Commission is restricting it in its work.

ANNEX 3*

EXTRACT FROM THE SUMMARY RECORD OF THE
FIFTEENTH MEETING OF THE COMMISSION

Friday, 25 February 1949, at 3 p.m.

Report of Sub-Committee II**

.

Mr. COSTILHES (France), as Chairman of Sub-Committee II, reported that that group had not given any further consideration to the letter from the Korean Government's Liaison Committee (Annex 6), but had discussed the informal meeting of Commission members with the Liaison Committee and the conversation between the Commission's former Chairman and President Rhee.

First, the Sub-Committee shared what appeared to be the unanimous feeling of the Commission that the Sub-Committee must conduct its hearings in complete independence, without being influenced by the point of view expressed by Korean authorities.

Secondly, the Sub-Committee expected that this independent attitude would be demonstrated in the first hearings, for which both official and unofficial persons were to be called.

However, if there were any question regarding the advisability of calling certain persons for future hearings, the Sub-Committee would consult the full Commission.

The Chairman's suggestion of consulting an American official regarding such doubtful cases seemed an excellent one: in case the latter should not consider a certain person too controversial, the Sub-Committee could proceed to interview him; in case of a contrary opinion, it could either abandon the proposed interview or hold it in private. The possibility of Government reprisals against opposition figures interviewed should be borne in mind.

The Sub-Committee had not discussed the problem of establishing a pass office, but this question probably would not arise in connection with the hearings.

* A/AC.26/SR.15.

** See also Annex 4.

ANNEX 4*

PERSONS AND TOPICS FOR HEARINGS

Report of Sub-Committee II adopted by the Commission
at its fourteenth meeting, 23 February 1949

The following recommendations of Sub-Committee II were adopted by the Commission:

- I. The Sub-Committee to complete a chronology of important developments since the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, with a brief commentary and documentation, for the information of and reference by the members of the Commission**.
- II. The Sub-Committee to gather the views and opinions of officials, experts and organizations by conducting hearings, in order to facilitate further and extensive studies on different aspects of the problems of representative government and political unification which it may undertake.

The first group of persons, in alphabetical order, to be heard should include:

1. AN Chai Hong - Civil Administrator of the defunct Military Government;
2. PARK, L. G. - President of Chosen Christian College and Chairman of the National Reception Committee;
3. SIN Ik Hi - President of the National Assembly;
4. SIN Sung Mo - Minister of the Interior;
5. YOO Chin O - Director of the Office of Legislation;
6. YUN Chi Yung - Former Minister of the Interior.

The list of subsequent groups of persons to be heard shall be prepared and submitted later in consultation with Sub-Committee I, for the information of the Commission.

III. Main topics for discussion at the hearings (specific questionnaires may be drawn up by the Sub-Committee for the purpose of certain hearings).

- A. The development of representative government in Korea:
 - (1) Steps taken in the development of representative government from the establishment of the Republic of Korea to the present;
 - (2) Problems confronting the Government and the people in their efforts for the development of representative government;

* A/AC.26/5.

** A/AC.26/SC.2/5.

(3) Specific views and proposals on the further development of representative government.

B. The development of representative government in relation to the problem of unification:

- (1) Political basis for unification;
- (2) Comments on the structure of government and conditions in North Korea;
- (3) Possibilities of extending representative government within North Korea;
- (4) Representation and participation of all Koreans in a unified Korea.

ANNEX 5*

PERSONALITIES TO BE HEARD AND MAIN TOPICS OF DISCUSSION

Report of Sub-Committee I adopted by the Commission
at its seventeenth meeting, 2 March 1949

The following report of Sub-Committee I was adopted by the Commission:

1. The Sub-Committee to gather information from and obtain the opinions of personalities on problems arising out of the division of Korea, and on possible methods for removing existing economic, social and other barriers, with a view to promoting unification.
2. The first group of personalities, in alphabetical order, to be heard, include:

HAR Kyawng Dawk - Editor, Seoul Shinmun

LEE Bum Suk - Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense

Lee In Soo - Editor, Seoul Times**

KIM Yak Soo - Vice Chairman, National Assembly

MIN Won Sik - Publisher, Seoul Times**

PAK Kun Oong - Former Chairman, Industrial, Labour and
Agricultural Committee - KILA

YIM Louise - Minister of Commerce and Industry

3. Main topics of discussion:

- (1) What are your views concerning the problem of unification?
- (2) What steps, if any, have been taken to promote unification since the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, and what steps should be taken in this direction?
- (3) To what extent is it possible to remove economic, social and other barriers in Korea?

* A/AC.26/7.

** Note: To be heard together.

ANNEX 6*

CONTACTS WITH THE NORTH: CONSULTATIONS

Letter from the Chairman of the Liaison Committee
to the Principal Secretary of the Commission

13 February 1949

In behalf of the Committee, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two notes both of which are dated 17 February 1949, the one dealing with the proposed trip to the 38th parallel, and the other notice of the adoption of the Australian resolution at the tenth meeting of the United Nations Commission on Korea.

As for the plan for a trip to the 38th parallel, I can assure you that the Government will do everything possible to facilitate it.

With regard to the Australian resolution, I seriously doubt what the Commission can expect to achieve by meeting and consulting with any private organization or individual who opposed the 10 May election and still remains disloyal to the Government. It will confuse the issue and encourage the Communists and other subversive elements. Therefore, I wish to suggest that, if any person desires to approach the Commission, his reference should be cleared by this Committee.

Since it is a well-known fact that neither the Koreans in the North nor those in the South can solve any of these problems, the Commission is trying to settle them through persuasion or negotiation. So long as the Soviet authorities do not agree, it is quite clear that the Commission should approach the official representatives of the Soviet Union in the North. I am sure your plan to go up north will lead to the objective and I believe this is the first step to take. In all events, whatever measure you may take should not give them any excuse for saying that the Commission has equally recognized the Communist set-up in the North, for that will create a profound repercussion.

(Signed) CHOUGH, PYUNG OK
Chairman, Liaison
Committee to the
United Nations
Commission on Korea

* A/AC.26/W.9.

ANNEX 7*

ACCESS OF KOREANS TO THE COMMISSION

Report of the ad hoc Committee

The ad hoc Committee (representatives of Australia and Syria), appointed by the Commission at its thirteenth meeting to investigate the technical aspects of access of Koreans to the Commission, met on 22 February 1949 at 10.30 a.m.

The ad hoc Committee recommends that the Secretariat be authorized to complete arrangements to establish a pass office in Seoul. This would be manned by a Secretariat member on designated days. Koreans wishing to visit the Commission could apply at the pass office for an appointment.

Notice of the establishment of the pass office should be given to the Government Liaison Committee and the Reception Committee. At the same time, it should be made clear to those bodies that the Commission expects that its passes will be honoured by the police without question.

Information concerning pass arrangements will be circulated to the members of the Commission as soon as completed.

The Committee desires to point out that in the foregoing suggestions, it has limited itself to technical questions of access to the Commission. The problems of access by the Commission to Koreans and of the independence of the Commission are still unresolved and will have to be fully considered by both Sub-Committees and by the Commission.

* A/AC.26/SC.3/1

ANNEX 8*

INVITATIONS TO SOCIAL FUNCTIONS

Resolution adopted by the Commission at its
sixteenth meeting, 28 February 1949

The United Nations Commission on Korea deeply appreciates the welcome which it has received from the Korean population, its authorities and organizations and is grateful for the many signs of helpfulness and friendliness.

It appreciates the many invitations to social functions which it has received, but it feels that its first duty is to devote its time and energy to the achievement of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Therefore, in the interest of the accomplishment of its task, it requests all concerned to limit as far as possible invitations to purely social functions.

In making this appeal, it would like to avoid possible misunderstandings which might arise if members of the Commission should find themselves unable to accept invitations in order to devote themselves to their primary task.

* A/AC.25/6.