

Distr.: General
27 December 2024
Arabic
Original: English



رسالة مؤرخة 27 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2024 موجهة إلى رئيسة مجلس الأمن من فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

يتشرف أعضاء فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، الذي مُدّدت ولايته عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن 2738 (2024)، بأن يحيلوا طيه، وفقاً للفقرة 6 من ذلك القرار، تقرير منتصف المدة عن أعمالهم.

وقد قُدم التقرير إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار 1533 (2004) بشأن جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في 29 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024، ونظرت فيه اللجنة في 27 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2024. ويرجو الفريق ممتناً إطلاع أعضاء مجلس الأمن على هذه الرسالة وعلى التقرير وإصدارهما باعتبارهما وثيقة من وثائق المجلس.

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المنسقة

فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

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الرجاء إعادة استعمال الورق



تقرير منتصف المدة لفريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

موجز

أثر العنف المستمر في شرق جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية على الحالة الأمنية والإنسانية. واستمر النزاع في التأثير سلباً على العلاقات في المنطقة.

وأدت الهجمات المحددة الأهداف التي شنتها عملية شجاع إلى إضعاف القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة المدرج اسمها في قائمة الجزاءات، مما أجبرها على التوسع في مقاطعة إيتوري وإقليم لوبورو في مقاطعة كيفو الشمالية. ووسع نطاق عملية شجاع خارج حدودها الرسمية بغرض ملاحقة خلايا القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة. ورداً على ذلك، شنت القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة هجمات على المدنيين، مما أدى إلى أعلى حصيلة مسجلة من القتلى أوقعتها في صفوف المدنيين، وذلك في شهر حزيران/يونيه. وعلى الرغم من الخسائر التي تكبدتها القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة، إلا أنها أظهرت قدرة على التكيف، مما أثار تساؤلات حول فعالية عملية شجاع في الحد من التهديدات التي يتعرض لها المدنيون في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

وقد جدّ كل من تحالف نهر الكونغو، وهو تحالف سياسي - عسكري، وحركة 23 مارس المدرج اسمها في قائمة الجزاءات في تحقيق أهدافهما التوسعية، بهدف حشد الدعم من جميع الجماعات المسلحة في مقاطعتي إيتوري وكيفو الجنوبية. وقد انحاز عدد متزايد من الجماعات المسلحة إلى تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، إما علناً أو سراً، مما أثار تدرجياً على ديناميات النزاع وتشابكها في جميع أنحاء المقاطعات الشرقية.

ففي كيفو الشمالية، فشل وقف إطلاق النار الذي اتفق عليه بين جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا في منع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، المدعوم بشكل منهجي من قبل قوة الدفاع الرواندية، من الاستيلاء على مساحات شاسعة من الأراضي، بما في ذلك في إقليم واليكالي الغني بالمعادن. وكفلت التكنولوجيا العسكرية المتقدمة التي تستخدمها أساساً قوة الدفاع الرواندية بشكل أساسي الهيمنة العسكرية لتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس في منطقة بُتي نور. وقد أدانت أنغولا ومجلس الأمن هذه الأعمال باعتبارها انتهاكاً لوقف إطلاق النار.

واستولى تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس على مدينة روبايا، التي يوجد بها أكبر منجم للكولتان في منطقة البحيرات العظمى. وأنشأ تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس إدارة موازية تتحكم في أنشطة التعدين وفي التجارة والنقل وتفرض الضرائب على المعادن المنتجة. وصُدِر ما لا يقل عن 150 طناً من الكولتان بوسائل احتيالية إلى رواندا وخلطت بالإنتاج الرواندي، مما أدى إلى أكبر تلوث لسلاسل إمدادات المعادن في منطقة البحيرات الكبرى مسجل حتى الآن.

واتفقت جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا على تفعيل خطة لتحييد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، ووضع خطة لإنهاء تدخل قوة الدفاع الرواندية. وحالت الاختلاف العميق وانعدام الثقة المتبادل بشأن تنفيذ الخطتين وتسلسل تنفيذهما دون إبرام اتفاق سلام شامل برعاية أنغولا، الجهة الميسرة المعيّنة من الاتحاد الأفريقي. وتثير خطة تحييد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا أو نقلها أو إعادة أفرادها إلى الوطن مخاوف تتعلق بحقوق الإنسان والقانون الإنساني.

وفشل الهجوم المحدود الذي شنته القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا في تحييد أي من القادة البارزين أو أسرهم. وردا على ذلك، قامت القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا بتعزيز دفاعاتها ونقل مواقعها الرئيسية والاندماج مع جماعات وازاليندو المسلحة. وقد كشفت العملية القيود العملية التي تعوق القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والخلافات الداخلية داخل هيكل قيادتها، بما في ذلك مسألة مماثلة القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا. وواصلت حكومة جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية الاعتماد على جماعات وازاليندو والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا كقوات عاملة بالوكالة في الاقتتال مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية، على الرغم من النداءات المتكررة لإنهاء دعمها للقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا.

أما في مقاطعة إيتوري، فركزت جماعة زائير المسلحة المتحالفة مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس جهودها على إنشاء جبهة جديدة ضد القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية. وقام الأفراد المدرجة أسماؤهم في قائمة الجزاءات توماس لوبانغا ندييلو وإيف كاوا بانغو ماندرو بأدوار حاسمة في تعبئة جماعة زائير وتعزيز مماثلة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس. وكثفت جماعة زائير أنشطة التجنيد، ودربت آلاف المقاتلين استعدادا لشن هجوم واسع النطاق في مقاطعة إيتوري.

واستمر استغلال الذهب في مقاطعة إيتوري خارج سيطرة الدولة، مما أدر على الجماعات المسلحة والشبكات الإجرامية عائدات سنوية بقيمة لا تقل عن 140 مليون دولار.

وفي مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية، أدى فك ارتباط بعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في منتصف عام 2024 إلى تدهور الحالة الأمنية، مما أثر على المدنيين الذين تُركوا عرضة لانتهاكات حقوق الإنسان على يد قوات الأمن والجهات الفاعلة المسلحة التابعة للدولة. ووسّع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس نطاق نفوذهما، إذ قاما بالتجنيد وحشد الدعم من الجماعات المسلحة الناشطة في مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية. وأبرم ائتلاف تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس تحالفا مع كل من جماعة توبروانيهو والمقاومة من أجل سيادة القانون في بوروندي وقوات "بيلوزي بيشامبوكي" المسلحة. واجتمع وفد من جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية مع ما يفوق العشرة من جماعات الماي - ماي للتوقيع على ميثاق لعدم الاعتداء، بهدف تضييقها عن التحالف مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس.

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* تعمّم المرفقات باللغة التي قُدمت بها فقط وبدون تحرير رسمي.

أولا - مقدمة

- 1 - مدد مجلس الأمن ولاية فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في 27 حزيران/يونيه 2024 بموجب قراره 2738 (2024). وعيّن الأمين العام خمسة أعضاء في فريق الخبراء في 19 آب/أغسطس 2024 (S/2024/620). ولم يُعيّن العضو الخبير السادس بعد.
- 2 - ويُقدّم تقرير منتصف المدة للفريق عملاً بالفقرة 6 من القرار 2738 (2024). وقد تبادل الفريق المعلومات مع أفرقة الخبراء المعنية بجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى وجنوب السودان وهابيتي.

التعاون مع بعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

- 3 - يعرب الفريق عن امتنانه لما قدمته بعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية من دعم وعون قيّمين خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير.

المنهجية

- 4 - استخدم الفريق معايير الإثبات التي أوصى بها الفريق العامل غير الرسمي التابع لمجلس الأمن والمعني بالمسائل العامة المتعلقة بالجزاءات (S/2006/997). واستند الفريق في استنتاجاته إلى الوثائق، كما استوثق من صحة المعلومات باستخدام ما لا يقل عن ثلاثة من المصادر المستقلة الموثوقة.
- 5 - وبالنظر إلى طبيعة النزاع الدائر في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، لا يوجد إلا القليل من الوثائق التي تقدم دليلاً قاطعاً على عمليات نقل الأسلحة، والتجنيد، ومسؤولية القادة عن الانتهاكات الجسيمة لحقوق الإنسان، والاستغلال غير القانوني للموارد الطبيعية. ولذلك اعتمد الفريق على شهادات شهود عيان من أبناء القبائل ومن مقاتلين سابقين وأفراد حاليين في الجماعات المسلحة. وأخذ الفريق أيضاً في الاعتبار شهادات الخبرة التي حصل عليها من مسؤولين حكوميين وضباط عسكريين من بلدان في منطقة البحيرات الكبرى ومن بلدان أخرى، وكذلك من مصادر الأمم المتحدة.
- 6 - ويغطي هذا التقرير التحقيقات التي أُجريت حتى 8 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024. ونظراً لاشتراط عدم تجاوز التقارير عدداً محدداً من الكلمات، أدرج الفريق أدلة ونتائج معينة في مرفقات هذا التقرير.

ثانياً - القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة في مقاطعتي إيتوري وكيفو الشمالية

ألف - عملية شجاع

النجاح النسبي لعملية شجاع

- 7 - أُعيد، في 20 أيار/مايو 2024، إطلاق المرحلة الرابعة من عملية شجاع المشتركة بين القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وقوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية (S/2022/479)، الفقرات 19-21، التي كانت قد بدأت في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023 وحقت نجاحاً محدوداً، حيث كُثفت الهجمات البرية والجوية ضد القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة المدرج اسمها في قائمة الجزاءات (CDe.001)، وهي الهجمات التي نفذت أساساً غرب الطريق الوطنية رقم 4⁽¹⁾.

(1) باحثون، والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

- 8 - وخلافا للمراحل السابقة التي حققت نجاحا محدودا، فقد أضعفت العمليات المنفذة مؤخرا القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة بشكل ملحوظ، إذ دمرت معارقلها واستنزفت صفوفها القتالية والقيادية، وأدت إلى فرار مئات الرهائن (S/2024/432، الفقرات 9-12)⁽²⁾. وقُتل العديد من قادة القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة، ومنهم برايدا⁽³⁾ وأميجو⁽⁴⁾ (انظر المرفق 1). وأجبرت القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة على التحرك باستمرار، مما أدى إلى تدهور قدراتها العمليات تدهورا شديدا وتعطيل سلاسل إمداداتها. وظلت تلك الجماعة تعاني من المجاعة والمرض⁽⁵⁾.
- 9 - وردًا على تكثيف الهجمات، لجأت القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة إلى أساليبها المعتادة، أي زيادة التنقل والانتقال إلى أماكن أخرى لتجنب المواجهات المباشرة وتحويل الانتباه عن مواقع المعسكرات الرئيسية، ومهاجمة المدنيين (S/2024/432، الفقرتان 9 و 11). وجُمعت المعسكرات الصغيرة في عدد أقل من المعسكرات الكبيرة، بسبب الضعف والبحث عن سبل لتعزيز القوة والبقاء، ونُقلت مواقعها إلى مناطق نائية (انظر الفقرات 15-17 والمرفق 2 أدناه).
- 10 - وقد أدت هذه الانتكاسات إلى تنامي عنف القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة ضد المدنيين، بما في ذلك عمليات القتل الانتقامي والخطف والنهب والهجمات التي استهدفت العاملين في القطاع الطبي والمرافق الطبية (انظر الفقرات 19-22 أدناه).
- 11 - وبدلا من الحد من التهديد الذي يتعرض له المدنيون، وسعت عملية شجاع عملياتها أكثر باتجاه الغرب، إلى المناطق التي ليس فيها إلا القليل من الوجود الأمني للدولة (S/2022/479، الفقرة 26؛ و S/2023/990، الفقرة 15؛ و S/2024/432، الفقرتان 9 و 10)⁽⁶⁾. وفي حين أن هجمات القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة على الأراضي الأوغندية قد توقفت منذ نهاية عام 2023 (S/2023/990، الفقرتان 17 و 18)، فقد كُثفت الهجمات داخل جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، مما يثير مخاوف جدية بشأن تأثير عملية شجاع على المدنيين. وأدت إعادة التوضع الاستراتيجي التي قامت بها القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة، وهو أمر حاسم لبقائها، إلى توسيع كبير لوجودها في الأراضي في كل أنحاء مقاطعتي إيتوري وكيفو الشمالية.

التوترات بشأن عملية شجاع

- 12 - قامت قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية بعمليات جوية من حين لآخر دون إخطار القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، ووسعت عملياتها في بعض الأحيان خارج المناطق المحددة، مما أدى إلى توتر العلاقات بين القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وقوات الدفاع الشعبي الأوغندية⁽⁷⁾. وفي 11 آب/أغسطس، تحطمت طائرة مسيرة تابعة لقوات الدفاع الشعبي الأوغندية بالقرب من كوتوني، خارج

(2) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية، وباحثون، ورهائن سابقون، ومقاتلون سابقون.

(3) S/2019/469، الفقرة 24.

(4) S/2020/482، الفقرات 36-41؛ و S/2022/479، الفقرة 42؛ و S/2023/431، الفقرتان 17 و 25.

(5) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة، وباحثون، ورهائن سابقون، ومقاتلون سابقون.

(6) باحثون، ومصادر إنسانية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية.

(7) باحثون، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية.

منطقة العمليات لعملية شجاع، دون إخطار القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية مسبقاً بمسار طيرانها، مما زاد من تقويض الثقة (انظر المرفق 3).

13 - وإضافة إلى ذلك، قامت قوات الدفاع الشعبي الأوغندية في كثير من الأحيان بنقل رهائن ومحتجزين سابقين لدى القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة إلى أوغندا دون تبادل المعلومات على الفور، مما أدى إلى تعقيد العمليات الاستخباراتية والقضائية في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية⁽⁸⁾.

14 - ونتيجة لذلك، أُخِّرت القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية انتشار قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية في المناطق التي لا وجود فيها للقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، رغم المساهمة المحدودة من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في عملية شجاع (S/2024/432، الفقرة 19)⁽⁹⁾. والأهم من ذلك أن جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ترددت في توسيع منطقة العمليات لعملية شجاع شمال نهر إيتوري حيث نُقل حديثاً مقر قيادة القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة، معسكر المدينة، وذلك خوفاً من أن تكون لأوغندا أجندة خفية⁽¹⁰⁾ مرتبطة بمصالحها التاريخية في مقاطعة إيتوري⁽¹¹⁾. ومع ذلك، فقد تم التوصل في تموز/يوليه إلى اتفاق لتوسيع نطاق عملية شجاع غرب الطريق الوطنية رقم 44 وإلى منطقة مانغوريجيبيا، حيث كان ينشط الفرد المدرج اسمه في قائمة الجزاءات أحمد محمود حسن، وكنيته أبواكاسي (CDi.040) (انظر المرفق 4).

باء - إعادة التشكيل الجغرافي للقوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة وقدرتها على التكيف

15 - منذ شهر أيار/مايو، تعرض معسكر زعيم القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة المدرج اسمه في قائمة الجزاءات سيكا بالوكو (Seka Baluku (CDi.036)) والجماعة التي يقودها أبواكاسي لاستهداف مكثف في العمليات البرية والجوية التي نفذت في إطار عملية شجاع. وقد دفع هذا الأمر بالوكو إلى نقل مقره قيادته، معسكر المدينة، إلى موقع أبعد باتجاه الشمال في إقليم مامباسا بمقاطعة إيتوري، خارج نطاق منطقة العمليات الرسمية لعملية شجاع⁽¹²⁾. وبناءً على أوامر أصدرها بالوكو، تُمَجَّع العديد من المعسكرات المنفصلة بقيادة مزي مايور ومزي واكازي، وكنيته "لوميسا" (S/2022/479، المرفق 5)، مع معسكر المدينة⁽¹³⁾، كما نُقل إليه العديد من المعالين والرهائن من معسكرات أخرى⁽¹⁴⁾. وفي تموز/يوليه، تُمَجَّع معسكرات القادة تاباني وديفندر وبرابدا لتعزيز أمن القوات، إذ كانت تلك المعسكرات تتعرض للهجوم في كثير من الأحيان⁽¹⁵⁾.

16 - وتقع غالبية معسكرات القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة الآن في مقاطعة إيتوري. وعُوِّنت جماعة بالوكو ومعسكره، معسكر المدينة، شمال قرية لولوا، على طول طريق إرينغيتي - كوماندا، في إقليم مامباسا.

(8) باحثون، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومسؤولون قضائيون واستخباراتيون.

(9) باحثون، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية.

(10) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر استخباراتية.

(11) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2005, p. 168.

(12) مقاتلون سابقون، وrehائن سابقون، وباحثون، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

(13) باحثون وrehائن سابقون.

(14) رهائن سابقون، وباحثون، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(15) المرجع نفسه.

وتحرّكت كوكبة من الجماعات التابعة للقادة برايدا وتاباني وديفندر غرب محور أويشا - إرينغيتي (الطريق الوطنية رقم 4) وقامت بعمليات حول بياكاتو (على طول الطريق الوطنية رقم 44)⁽¹⁶⁾.

17 - وفي الوقت نفسه، واعتباراً من حزيران/يونيه 2024، تحرّكت جماعة أبواكاسي، الخلية الأكثر نشاطاً وفتكاً في القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة، في الاتجاه المعاكس، جنوب - غرب قطاع بابيري في إقليم لوبيرو ابتغاء تحويل التركيز العسكري عن معسكر المدينة وشن هجمات انتقامية على المدنيين على طول الطريق⁽¹⁷⁾. وفي آب/أغسطس 2024، كان أبواكاسي يقوم بعمليات حول مانغوريجيبا في شمال - غرب لوبيرو، فطاردته قوات عملية شجاع واشتبك مع الجماعات المسلحة المحلية (انظر الفقرة 20 والفقرتين 30 و 31 أدناه). وفي أيلول/سبتمبر، انضمت عدة جماعات فرعية من المعسكرات التابعة للقائدين برايدا وتاباني، بقيادة القائد سيكا دادي (أو أدادي)، إلى أبواكاسي في مانغوريجيبا⁽¹⁸⁾.

18 - ويتضمن المرفق 5 تفاصيل عن الاستراتيجيات الموجهة للبقاء التي تنتهجها القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة والابتكارات التكنولوجية التي تستخدمها، ومن ذلك استخدامهما الاتصالات الساتلية واختبارات المتجربات المركبة في طائرات مسيرة تجارية.

الهجمات على المدنيين

19 - منذ حزيران/يونيه 2024، كانت القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة مسؤولة عن قتل أكثر من 650 مدنياً⁽¹⁹⁾ في هجمات شنت في مقاطعتي كيفو الشمالية وإيتوري (انظر المرفق 6)⁽²⁰⁾.

20 - وقد كان شهر حزيران/يونيه، في حد ذاته، أكثر الشهور التي سفكت فيها القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة الدماء على الإطلاق، حيث قُتل أكثر من 200 مدني في منطقة بيني وفي جميع أنحاء إقليم لوبيرو، وذلك على يد جماعة أبواكاسي بشكل رئيسي أثناء تقدمها غرباً. وفي الفترة ما بين 3 و 12 حزيران/يونيه، هاجمت جماعة أبواكاسي أكثر من 10 محليات غرب بيني، في المنطقة المحيطة بكانتين، مما أسفر عن قتل ما لا يقل عن 150 مدنياً⁽²¹⁾. وبمجرد وصول تلك الجماعة إلى إقليم لوبيرو، سُجلت، حتى 13 حزيران/يونيه، سلسلة من الهجمات في قطاع بابيري، على طول الحدود بين إقليمي بيني ولوبيرو. ووصلت جماعة أبواكاسي إلى منطقة نجاباندا ومانغوريجيبا في مستهل آب/أغسطس، واستقرت في المنطقة المحيطة بغابة باندولو في لوبيرو⁽²²⁾. وظل أبواكاسي يكثر التقتل، واستمر في قتل المدنيين⁽²³⁾.

21 - وعلى نحو مماثل، في الفترة من حزيران/يونيه إلى آب/أغسطس، تحرّكت القوات التابعة للقادة برايدا وديفندر وتاباني شمال - غرب أويشا باتجاه ماموف وبياكاتو، فهاجمت قرى صغيرة وارتكبت عمليات

(16) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية، وباحثون، ورهائن سابقون، ومقاتلون سابقون.

(17) المرجع نفسه.

(18) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورهائن سابقون.

(19) باحثون، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(20) باحثون، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر استخباراتية.

(21) باحثون، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر سرية واستخباراتية.

(22) باحثون، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة، ورهائن سابقون، ومقاتلون سابقون.

(23) المرجع نفسه.

اختطاف وقتل وإعدامات⁽²⁴⁾. وبحلول شهر أيلول/سبتمبر، عبرت جماعتا القائدين تاباني وديفندر غرب الطريق الوطنية رقم 44 وبياكاتو، وكانت قوات عملية شجاع تلاحقهما. وكان برايدا وديفندر مسؤولين عن معظم عمليات القتل في المنطقة المحيطة بماموف وبو مانياما. وقد قُتل برايدا في منتصف آب/أغسطس بالقرب من بياكاتو⁽²⁵⁾.

22 - وكانت الهجمات أقل تواتراً في إقليمَي إيرومو ومامباسا، حيث تحركت جماعة بالوكو الكبيرة، بعيداً أفراد يناهز 1 000 مقاتل ومدني شمال نهر إيتوري، متجاوزةً قرية لولوا. وعكس هذا الهدوء النسبي على الأرجح ضعف الجماعة وبطء ونتيرة سيرها، مثقلةً بعبء المعالين ومركزةً على تحديد مواقع للمعسكرات الجديدة. كما بدا أن الجماعة كانت تتوارى عن الأنظار لتجنب قوات عملية شجاع. وتشير العديد من الهجمات على مراكز الرعاية الصحية وعمليات اختطاف العاملين في القطاع الطبي في المنطقة المحيطة بقرية لولوا في أواخر آب/أغسطس⁽²⁶⁾ إلى الحاجة الماسة للرعاية الطبية، حيث أفاد رهائن سابقون أن جماعة بالوكو تكبدت خسائر فادحة من جراء عملية شجاع.

توحيد القيادة والسيطرة للقوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة

23 - حافظت القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة على هيكل قيادة مبسّط. ورغم أن الجماعات الفرعية كانت تعمل بدرجة معينة من الاستقلالية، إلا أنها كانت كلها تحت إشراف بالوكو (انظر المرفق 7)⁽²⁷⁾.

24 - ورغم الشائعات المستمرة بشأن اعتقال صحة بالوكو، إلا أن الرهائن والمقاتلين الأسرى أفادوا بأنه ما زال نشطاً ويحافظ على سيطرته القوية على أبواكاسي وقادة آخرين. وقد عوّن بالوكو وهو يرتدي سترة متجبرة بنّية معلنة لتجوير نفسه إذا أُسر. وخليفته المعين هو سيكا أومارو، نائبه الحالي الذي هو موضع ثقته (S/2023/431، الفقرة 17)⁽²⁸⁾.

25 - وفي حين أن الهجمات الصغيرة والتلقائية يمكن أن تتم دون موافقة مسبقة من بالوكو، إلا أن جميع العمليات الكبرى تتطلب إذنًا منه. وفي أعقاب كل هجوم، كانت التقارير والصور الفوتوغرافية تُرسل إلى بالوكو لاتخاذ القرار ولأغراض الدعاية⁽²⁹⁾. وتؤكد المقابلات التي أجريت مؤخراً مع مقاتلين سابقين في صفوف القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة ومعاليمهم أن انتقال أبواكاسي إلى لوبورو ونقل المعسكرات الأخرى قد تم بأوامر أصدرها بالوكو.

جيم - تضخيم الهجمات التي أعلن تنظيم داعش مسؤوليته عنها

26 - أظهر تنظيم داعش اهتماماً متزايداً بأنشطة القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة في شرق جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية. فمنذ شهر حزيران/يونيه 2024، كان هناك ارتفاع ملحوظ في عدد هجمات القوات الديمقراطية

(24) رهائن سابقون، بمن فيهم شهود عيان، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

(25) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة، ورهائن سابقون، ومقاتلون سابقون، وباحثون.

(26) باحثون، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر إنسانية.

(27) رهائن سابقون، ومقاتلون سابقون، وباحثون، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومن بعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر استخباراتية.

(28) المرجع نفسه.

(29) رهائن سابقون.

المتحالفة التي أعلن تنظيم داعش مسؤوليته عنها مقارنة بالأشهر السابقة، حيث تم نشر 111 إعلانا للمسؤولية عن الهجمات في الفترة من 2 حزيران/يونيه وتمت تشرين الأول/أكتوبر. وقُلِّل الوقت الذي كان يُستغرق لإعلان المسؤولية عن الهجمات بشكل ملحوظ، من عدة أيام إلى 24 ساعة بعد وقوعها في بعض الأحيان. ويشير هذا الاتجاه إلى تعزيز التعاون بين تنظيم داعش والقوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة (S/2022/967، الفقرتان 27 و 28)، وكذلك إلى التواصل السريع والمباشر (انظر المرفق 8).

دال - الاتصالات مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس

27 - على مدى عام 2024، استمرت الشائعات بشأن وجود اتصالات محتملة بين القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة وانتلاف جماعتي تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس. ومع تقدم تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس في لوبيرو، تكتفت التكهات بشأن ذلك التعاون، رغم كون تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس قد نفيا ذلك نفياً صريحاً (انظر المرفق 9).

28 - وأفادت عدة مصادر عن وجود اتصال بين قيادة القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة وأفراد سابقين في التجمع الكونغولي من أجل الديمقراطية - كيسنغاني، حركة التحرير وأفراد سابقين في الشبكات التابعة لحركة 23 مارس (S/2013/433، الفقرات 62-71؛ و S/2016/466، الفقرة 193)، ممن كانت لهم أيضاً علاقات تربطهم بتحالف نهر الكونغو⁽³⁰⁾. وفي آذار/مارس 2024، اجتمعت الجماعة بعضو سابق في هذه الشبكات، والذي كشف أنه اجتمع، في كامبالا في شباط/فبراير، مع أحد شركاء كورني نانغا، ثم اجتمع مع نانغا نفسه لمناقشة التعاون المحتمل مع تحالف نهر الكونغو. وحافظ هذا الفرد أيضاً على اتصال وثيق مع عائلة كل من أبولكاسي وبالوكو. وأشارت مصادر مقرّبة من القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة إلى أن هذه التفاعلات كانت جزءاً من جهود التواصل التي بذلها تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس لإقامة روابط مع القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة، بغية التفاوض بشأن الوصول إلى الأراضي التي تسيطر عليها القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة.

29 - وفي حين أن تفاصيل الاتفاقات لا تزال غير واضحة، تؤكد مصادر متعددة أن تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس سعيًا إلى إبرام ميثاق عدم اعتداء مع القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة، وطلب تأمين المرور، بما في ذلك للمجندين العابرين من إيتوري إلى الأراضي التي يسيطر عليها تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، وحث القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة على الحد من الهجمات على جنود القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية⁽³¹⁾. وقد أفاد أحد المقاتلين السابقين في القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة بأنه عاين بالوكو وهو يصرح خلال أحد التجمعات بأن تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس قد اقترحا التعاون. وأفيدَ بأن بالوكو رفض ذلك، معللاً الأمر بعدم الثقة في تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس ومؤكداً التزامه بمواصلة استهداف المدنيين "الكفار".

(30) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر استخباراتية وأمنية، وباحثون، وأحد المطلعين الذي اجتمع مع تحالف نهر الكونغو للتفاوض بشأن الاتصالات.

(31) باحثون، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية.

هاء - اعتماد جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية على جماعات وازاليندو لأغراض الأمن

30 - لملء الفراغ الأمني المتزايد والدفاع ضد القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة ، كثيرا ما اعتمدت القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية على جماعات الماي - ماي، ولا سيما الجبهة الوطنية من أجل الشعب/جيش الشعب التابعة لكابيدون واتحاد الوطنيين من أجل تحرير الكونغو التابع "للجنرال" مايناي (S/2024/432، المرفق 9)⁽³²⁾. وفي الآونة الأخيرة، انتشرت جماعات وازاليندو المسلحة، مثل جماعة ندوما للدفاع عن الكونغو - فصيل التجديد التابعة للفرد المدرج اسمه في قائمة الجزاءات غيدون شيميراي مويسا ((Guidon Shimiray Mwissa (CDi.033) في المناطق الغنية بالمعادن في إقليم لوبيرو، ولا سيما في محيط مانغوريجيبا، بذريعة حماية المدنيين من تحالف القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة (انظر المرفق 10). وقد اشتبكت القوات الديمقراطية المتحالفة مع هذه الجماعات المسلحة ونصبت لها كمائن⁽³³⁾.

31 - وقد أدى تكاثر هذه الجماعات المسلحة، التي ارتكبت انتهاكات ضد السكان (S/2024/432، الفترتان 21 و 22)، إلى زيادة انعدام الأمن وإثارة التوترات مع السكان المحليين الذين طالبوا برحيل تلك الجماعات (انظر المرفق 11).

32 - ومن المرجح أن تتدهور ديناميات النزاع في ظل تقدم تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس أكثر باتجاه الشمال في لوبيرو، ووجود أبوكاسي في مانغوريجيبا، وسعي جماعات وازاليندو، بما في ذلك جماعة ندوما للدفاع عن الكونغو - فصيل التجديد، جاهدة لبسط سيطرتها في المنطقة.

ثالثا - الأزمة المتعلقة بتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس في مقاطعة كيفو الشمالية

ألف - استغلال الهدنة الإنسانية ووقف إطلاق النار وعملية لواندا لتحقيق أهداف توسعية

33 - في 4 تموز/يوليه 2024، اتفقت جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا على هدنة إنسانية لمدة أسبوعين⁽³⁴⁾، بوساطة من الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، في شرق جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية⁽³⁵⁾، تقضي بوقف الأعمال العدائية والعودة الطوعية للنازحين وإيصال المساعدات الإنسانية دون قيود إلى السكان الضعفاء. وبخلاف وقف إطلاق النار المبرم مرتين، في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ثم في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2023 (S/2024/432، الفقرة 31 والمرفقان 20 و 21)، لم تنص هذه الهدنة على انسحاب قوة الدفاع الرواندية أو التزام القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بوقف التعاون مع الجماعات المسلحة.

34 - ومُددت الهدنة بوقف لإطلاق النار اعتبارا من 4 آب/أغسطس 2024. ووقعته جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا برعاية أنغولا، الميسر المعين من الاتحاد الأفريقي (S/2024/432، المرفق 20)؛

(32) المرجع نفسه.

(33) مصادر إنسانية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وباحثون، وإعلانات للمسؤولية على الهجمات نشرها تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية - ولاية وسط أفريقيا.

(34) مُددت الهدنة حتى 3 آب/أغسطس 2024.

(35) أدريان واتسون، المتحدث الرسمي باسم مجلس الأمن القومي للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، واشنطن العاصمة، 4 تموز/يوليه 2024. متاح على الرابط التالي: www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/04/statement-from-nsc-spokesperson-adrienne-watson-welcoming-the-humanitarian-truce-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

و S/2023/431، المرفق 20⁽³⁶⁾). وادعى ائتلاف جماعتي تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس أن الائتلاف "غير ملزم تلقائياً باستنتاجات" الاتفاق لأنه لم يكن من ضمن الأطراف الموقعة عليه (انظر المرفق 12).

35 - وفي حين التزمت قوة الدفاع الرواندية والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في البداية بوقف إطلاق النار مؤقتاً (انظر الفقرتين 36 و 37 والفقرات 44-47 أدناه)، إلا أن الجماعتان العاملتان بالوكالة عنهما، إلى جانب القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، سرعان ما عادت إلى الاشتباك⁽³⁷⁾. واستغلت القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وجماعات وازاليندو والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وقوة الدفاع الرواندية وحركة 23 مارس الهدوء النسبي لتعزيز صفوف القوات وتجديد الأسلحة (انظر الفقرات 39-43 و 48-55 و 80 أدناه).

36 - ومنذ أواخر نيسان/أبريل 2024 (S/2024/432)، حققت حركة 23 مارس، بدعم من قوة الدفاع الرواندية، مكاسب ميدانية كبيرة وعززت سيطرتها على المناطق المحتلة (انظر الفقرات 41-47 أدناه). واستمر هذا النمط رغم الهدنة ووقف إطلاق النار، مما يشير إلى أن الهدف الحقيقي لحركة 23 مارس ظل يتمثل في توسيع رقعة الأراضي المسيطر عليها وفي احتلال واستغلال الأراضي المسيطر عليها على المدى الطويل.

37 - وفي أواخر تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، أدى توسيع حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية رقعة الأراضي المسيطر عليها في إقليم واليكالي إلى اندلاع مواجهات مباشرة على طول طريق مويسو - بينغا مع القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وحلفائها (انظر الفقرة 46 أدناه). وأدان الوسيط الأنغولي ومجلس الأمن هذه العمليات باعتبارها انتهاكا لاتفاق وقف إطلاق النار⁽³⁸⁾. وفي وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، كان من المحتمل أن تُستأنف على نطاق واسع العمليات التي تشارك فيها القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وقوة الدفاع الرواندية.

38 - وواصلت أنغولا تيسير المفاوضات الرامية إلى التوصل إلى حل طويل الأجل للنزاع. ورغم أن جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا اتفقتا على تفعيل خطة لتحييد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وعلى وضع خطة لفض الاشتباك بين القوات ورفع التدابير الدفاعية المتخذة من قبل رواندا، فإن الخلاف العميق وانعدام الثقة المتبادلة بشأن تنفيذ الخطتين وتسلسل تنفيذهما يحولان حتى الآن دون التوصل إلى اتفاق سلام شامل (انظر الفقرات 48-55 و 67-80 والمرفق 13 أدناه).

(36) وزارة خارجية أنغولا، إعلان وقف إطلاق النار، منصة إكس. متاح على الرابط التالي: https://x.com/angola_Mirex/status/1818436276996968860

(37) باحثون، ومصادر من القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا ومن جماعات وازاليندو وتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس ومصادر الأمم المتحدة. انظر أيضاً المرفقات 17-19 و 45.

(38) وزارة خارجية أنغولا، بيان صحفي، 21 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: www.facebook.com/61556720147590/posts/122186129660224004/?mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=XJXuV8Q5mFx7SEah، والأمم المتحدة، "Security Council press statement on Democratic Republic of the Congo"، 25 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15866.doc.htm>

باء - تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية

ائتلاف تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس وحشد قواتهما

39 - ظلت حركة 23 مارس تحت القيادة العسكرية العامة "للجنرال" سلطانني ماكينغا (Sultani Makenga (CDi.008)، الذي ظل يتلقى التعليمات والدعم من قوة الدفاع الرواندية والمخابرات الرواندية (انظر الفقرات 49-55 أدناه و S/2024/432، الفقرة 36)⁽³⁹⁾. ورغم أن حركة 23 مارس وتحالف نهر الكونغو، التحالف السياسي - العسكري الذي أنشأه كورني نانغا (S/2024/432، الفقرات 23-29)، ظلًا كيانين منفصلين، إلا أن أنشطة الجماعتين كانت مترابطة، ذلك أن: (أ) كلاهما أصدر بلاغات مشتركة تحت راية "تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس"؛ و (ب) ظلت حركة 23 مارس الجناح العسكري لتحالف نهر الكونغو، بحكم الواقع؛ و (ج) استمر تحالف نهر الكونغو التابع لنانغا في اشتراط موافقة ماكينغا على كل عمل يُنفَّذ (S/2024/432، الفقرة 25)⁽⁴⁰⁾.

40 - وكثّف ائتلاف تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس جهوده لإعادة تشكيل المشهد السياسي والعسكري في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، حيث سعى جاهدًا للحصول على دعم الجماعات المسلحة في جميع أنحاء مقاطعات إيتوري وكيفو الشمالية وكيفو الجنوبية، فحقق نجاحات ملحوظة (انظر الفقرات 83-97 و 104-106 أدناه). وأعاد الائتلاف كلا من الكادر السياسي السابق في المؤتمر الوطني للدفاع عن الشعب/حركة 23 مارس رينيه أباندي وجان ماري رونيجا المدرج اسمه في قائمة الجزاءات (Jean-Marie Runiga (CDi.028؛ S/2022/479، الفقرة 58) إلى صفوف الائتلاف، وكُلف هذا الأخير بحشد شبكته دعماً لتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس⁽⁴¹⁾. وعقدت حركة 23 مارس وتحالف نهر الكونغو اجتماعات منتظمة في الأراضي التي تمت السيطرة عليها حديثاً للترويج لخطابهما ولتجنيد أعضاء جدد وتوطيد الإدارة الموازية (S/2024/432، المرفق 25)⁽⁴²⁾.

استمرار التدريب والتجنيد القسري

41 - زاد تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس أنشطة تجنيد وتدريب الكوادر الإدارية المدنية والمقاتلين لإدارة المحليات المخضّعة للسيطرة (S/2024/432، المرفق 5) وتعزيز القدرات العسكرية لبسط السيطرة على المزيد من الأراضي⁽⁴³⁾.

42 - واستمرت عمليات التجنيد لتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، طوعاً وقسراً على السواء، بما في ذلك تجنيد القاصرين، وذلك منذ نيسان/أبريل 2024 (انظر المرفق 14). ودُرب الآلاف من المجندين الجدد من الأراضي التي بسط تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس سيطرته عليها ومن المقاطعات المجاورة (انظر الفقرات 83-97 و 104-106 أدناه)، وذلك في المعسكرات التابعة لتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة

(39) مصادر مقربة من حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية وتحالف نهر الكونغو.

(40) المرجع نفسه، وباحثون ومصادر استخباراتية.

(41) مصادر مقربة من حركة 23 مارس وتحالف نهر الكونغو، وتسجيل صوتي مسجل محفوظ لدى الفريق.

(42) شهود عيان، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(43) مقاتلون من حركة 23 مارس، ومصادر مقربة من تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر الأمم المتحدة، وقادة مجتمعيون، وشهود عيان.

23 مارس. فعلى سبيل المثال، في الفترة ما بين 25 أيلول/سبتمبر و 31 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، أكمل ما لا يقل عن 3 000 مجند تدريبهم. وكان 500 2 مجند آخرين، بما في ذلك 600 مجند من الجماعة المسلحة زائير في مقاطعة إيتوري، ما زالوا قيد التدريب وقت كتابة هذا التقرير (انظر المرفق 15). وفي 2 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، أقيم حفل تخرج بمناسبة إكمال خمسة أشهر من التدريب لما عدده 300 ضابط من حركة 23 مارس في تشانزو (S/2024/432، الفقرات 104-108)⁽⁴⁴⁾. وأبلغ مقاتلو حركة 23 مارس باستمرار عن وجود ضباط تدريب كونغوليين ومن قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية وقوة الدفاع الرواندية في تشانزو.

43 - وركز تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس بشكل متزايد على التدريب على الأيديولوجيا وعلى جمع المعلومات الاستخباراتية والتلقين العقائدي وأساليب التجنيد (انظر الملحق 16). ونُشر مجندون مدربون نشرا استراتيجيا في مناطق لم يكن تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس يسيطران عليها بعد، لأغراض جمع المعلومات الاستخباراتية والتلقين العقائدي للسكان المحليين (انظر الفقرات 104-106 أدناه). وكان تجنيد أعضاء الجماعات المسلحة الأخرى أمرا أساسيا في استراتيجية تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس للنجاح في بسط سيطرتها على أراضٍ جديدة.

استمرار بسط السيطرة على الأراضي

44 - على الجبهة الجنوبية بمنطقة بُتي نور، تقدمت حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية في 30 نيسان/أبريل باتجاه جنوب إقليم ماسيسي، واستولت على مواقع التعدين في روبايا، وهي واحدة من أكبر مصادر الكولتان في العالم (انظر الفقرات 56-66 أدناه). واعتبارا من أيار/مايو، شنت حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية هجمات جديدة استهدفت مواقع القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وبعثة الجماعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بالقرب من بلدة ساكي، وكذلك في المناطق القريبة من حدود مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية، مما تسبب في كثير من الأحيان في وقوع إصابات في صفوف المدنيين (انظر المرفق 17)⁽⁴⁵⁾.

45 - أما على الجبهة الشمالية بمنطقة بُتي نور، فقد استولت حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية، في 27 حزيران/يونيه 2024، على بلدة كانيايونيغا ذات الموقع الاستراتيجي في إقليم روتشورو (S/2024/432، المرفق 29). وبعد ذلك، تقدمت حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية أكثر شمالا باتجاه جنوب إقليم لوبورو، فسيطرت على منطقة تمتد 50 كيلومترا على طول طريق كانيايونيغا - كاسيغي، وذلك في ثلاثة أيام. وفي أوائل آب/أغسطس، أحرزت حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية تقدما كبيرا في شمال - شرق إقليم روتشورو، حيث استولت على عدة محليات على طول طريق كيوانجا - إيشاشا، بما في ذلك مركز إيشاشا الحدودي مع أوغندا (انظر المرفق 18).

46 - وعلى الجبهة الغربية، وبعد اشتباكات عنيفة مع جماعات وازاليندو المسلحة والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، أحرزت حركة 23 مارس وقوات الدفاع الرواندية تقدما كبيرا على محور كالمبي - مبيتي في أواخر تشرين الأول/أكتوبر، واستولت على عدة

(44) مقاتلون سابقون في حركة 23 مارس، ومصادر أمنية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية.

(45) شهود عيان، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر أمنية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية.

محلّيات في إقليم واليكالي وكانت من قبل تخضع لسيطرة القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وجماعات وازاليندو حصرا. وقد وُصف بسط السيطرة على الأراضي هذا بأنه "انتهاك صارخ لاتفاق وقف إطلاق النار" الساري منذ آب/أغسطس (انظر الفقرات 33-37 أعلاه، والمرفق 19)⁽⁴⁶⁾.

47 - وفي الفترة من نيسان/أبريل إلى أوائل تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024، زادت مساحة الأراضي التي تسيطر عليها حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية بنسبة 30 في المائة (انظر الملحق 20).

الدعم المنهجي المقدم من قوة الدفاع الرواندية لحركة 23 مارس

48 - كانت الشروط والجدول الزمني لفك ارتباط قوة الدفاع الرواندية محور الخلافات بين جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا، مما أعاق إبرام اتفاق سلام. ولم ترفض حكومة جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ما اشترطته الحكومة الرواندية لسحب القوات الرواندية إلا بعد أن اتخذت القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية إجراءات محددة الأهداف ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا. ورفضت أيضا التوقيع على "خطة تحييد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وفك ارتباط قوة الدفاع الرواندية" التي اتفق عليها رئيسا مخابرات البلدين (انظر المرفق 13). ويخشى العديد من المسؤولين في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وجنرالات القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية من أن يمنح قبول ما تشترطه رواندا تفويضا مطلقا لاستمرار وجود قوة الدفاع الرواندية في حال فشل خطة التحييد.

49 - ونتيجة لذلك، لا يزال ما لا يقل عن 3 000 إلى 4 000 جندي من قوة الدفاع الرواندية منتشرين في أقاليم نييراغونغو وروتشورو وماسيسي (انظر S/2024/432، الفقرة 43 والمرفق 30)⁽⁴⁷⁾. وفي أواخر تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، قدم جنود قوة الدفاع الرواندية أيضا الدعم لتقدم قوات حركة 23 مارس في إقليم واليكالي⁽⁴⁸⁾. وكانت كل وحدة من وحدات حركة 23 مارس تخضع لإشراف ودعم القوات الخاصة التابعة لقوة الدفاع الرواندية⁽⁴⁹⁾.

50 - وكانت قيادة قوة الدفاع الرواندية للعمليات المحددة الأهداف والتعامل مع الأسلحة ذات التقنية العالية من قبل قوة الدفاع الرواندية (انظر الفقرات 51-55 أدناه) أمران حاسمان في السيطرة على أراضي جديدة (انظر الفقرات 44-47 أعلاه). واستمر الدعم المنهجي الذي تقدمه قوة الدفاع الرواندية لحركة 23 مارس وسيطرتها الفعلية على عمليات حركة 23 مارس (S/2024/432، الفقرة 45)⁽⁵⁰⁾. ويتضمن المرفق 21 أدلة على التوغلات عبر الحدود والتحركات الاستراتيجية لقوة الدفاع الرواندية في منطقة بُتي نور (S/2024/432، الفقرات 40-54)⁽⁵¹⁾.

(46) وزارة خارجية أنغولا، بيان صحفي، 21 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(47) أفراد مقربون من تحالف نهر الكونغو وحركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية، ومصادر استخباراتية.

(48) المرجع نفسه. انظر أيضا المرفق 19.

(49) مقاتلون من حركة 23 مارس، وأفراد مقربون من قوة الدفاع الرواندية وحركة 23 مارس، ومصادر استخباراتية.

(50) المرجع نفسه، وشهود عيان ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(51) صور فوتوغرافية، وتسجيلات فيديو، وروايات شهود عيان، ومصادر استخباراتية.

استخدام المعدات العسكرية المتطورة

51 - واصل الفريق توثيق استخدام حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية التكنولوجيا والمعدات العسكرية المتطورة (S/2023/990، الفقرتان 31 و 32؛ و S/2024/432، الفقرات 46-54). ويتيح كشف هذه المنظومات العسكرية، وهي عامل أساسي لتفوق حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية من حيث القوة القتالية، دليلاً جديداً على الدعم الخارجي الذي تتلقاه حركة 23 مارس، انتهاكا لحظر توريد الأسلحة المفروض.

52 - وفي 3 أيار/مايو 2024، أطلقت صواريخ من عيار 122 ملم، وهي أسلحة نطاقية غير موجهة تُعتبر عشوائية عند استخدامها في المناطق المأهولة بالسكان، من مواقع عسكرية يتمركز فيها جنود من الكتيبتين الـ 93 والـ 109 التابعتين لقوة الدفاع الرواندية بالقرب من قرية كاروبا، بإقليم ماسيسي، مستهدفة مواقع عسكرية على طول محور ساكي - غوما المكتظ بالسكان. وقد أدت هذه الهجمة العشوائية، التي شُنّت بعد العديد من الهجمات الأخرى الموثقة منذ كانون الثاني/يناير 2024 في المنطقة نفسها (S/2024/432، الفقرات 93-98)، إلى قتل وجرح عشرات المدنيين في مستوطنات النازحين داخلها الشديدة الاكتظاظ بالسكان في مونغوغا، بالقرب من غوما (انظر المرفق 22).

53 - وفي 10 و 15 حزيران/يونيه 2024، أصاب صاروخان موجهان من طراز "سبايك - البعيد المدى" بعثة الجماعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في موبامبيرو (انظر المرفق 23)، ثم الموقع المشترك بين القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والشركة العسكرية Congo Protection في قرية كانياماهورو، بإقليم نيراغونغو (انظر المرفق 24). ويشير تحليل مسار الصاروخين والمعلومات التي قدمها شهود عيان ومصادر عسكرية واستخباراتية وأمنية إلى أن الصاروخين أُطلقا من المناطق التي تسيطر عليها حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية. وهذا النوع من الصواريخ المضادة للدبابات، الذي يتميز بتوافره على نظم للتوجيه المزدوج (أي التوجيه بالليزر والتوجيه سلكيا)، لم يسبق قط توثيق وجوده في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ولا يشكل جزءا من ترسانة القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

54 - وفي الفترة من أواخر أيار/مايو إلى أوائل آب/أغسطس 2024، أدت عمليات الخداع والتشويش المقصود بالقرب من المناطق التي تسيطر عليها حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية إلى تعطيل استخدام النظام العالمي لتحديد المواقع وتعطيل قدرات الملاحة للطائرات، مما أثر بشكل عشوائي على رحلات الأمم المتحدة والرحلات الجوية الإنسانية والتجارية والطائرات المسيرة للمراقبة⁽⁵²⁾. وكانت منظومتان للخداع والتشويش المقصود متموقعتين في الأراضي الرواندية. وتم تحديد منظومة ثالثة في كانيابايونغغا، في مقاطعة كيفو الشمالية، بعد فترة وجيزة من سيطرة حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية على المنطقة (انظر المرفق 25). وفي 29 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، تحطمت طائرة مسيرة تابعة لبعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بعد استهدافها بتشويش مقصود على النظام العالمي لتحديد المواقع، وذلك أثناء تحليقها فوق منطقة قتال نشطة. وقبيل وقوع الحادث، كان تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس قد حذرا بعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية من استخدام طائراتها المسيرة (انظر المرفق 26).

(52) شهود عيان، ومصادر استخباراتية وأمنية وعسكرية، وصور محفوظة لدى الفريق.

55 - وفي 25 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، لوحظت منظومة دفاع جوي قصيرة المدى تشغيلها قوة الدفاع الرواندية في بلدة كاروبا، بإقليم ماسيسي (انظر المرفق 27، و S/2024/432، الفقرات 47-49). ويتيح نشر المنظومات الدفاع الجوي القصيرة المدى ومنظومات الخداع والتشويش المقصود، ذات القدرة على إعاقه العتاد الجوي أو تحييده، ميزة تكتيكية كبيرة لحركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية (S/2024/432، الفقرة 49)⁽⁵³⁾.

سيطرة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس على إنتاج المعادن في روبايا والمتاجرة بها ونقلها وتصديرها

56 - منذ 30 نيسان/أبريل 2024، احتل تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس بلدة روبايا وكامل منطقة التعدين المحيطة بها وسيطر عليها، حيث استمر استخراج الكولتان والقصدير (الكاسيتيريت) والمنغنيز (S/2024/432، الفقرة 138). وبعد استئناف قصير ومحدود لمبادرة سلسلة توريد القصدير في نيسان/أبريل 2024، عُلِّقَت من جديد في 8 أيار/مايو جميع عمليات الوسم في إقليم ماسيسي (انظر المرفق 28).

57 - وسيطر تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس على مراكز التجارة في روبايا وموشاكي، بالإضافة إلى طرق نقل المعادن من روبايا إلى رواندا⁽⁵⁴⁾، حيث كانت المعادن المستخرجة من روبايا تُخَلَطُ بالإنتاج الرواندي⁽⁵⁵⁾. ويشكل ذلك أبرز تلوّث لسلاسل التوريد بمعادن القصدير والتنتالوم والتغستن غير المؤهلة سُجِّلَ في منطقة البحيرات الكبرى على مدى العقد الماضي (انظر الفقرات 64-66، والمرفق 29 أدناه).

58 - وكُرِّس تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس احتكاراً لتصدير الكولتان من روبايا إلى رواندا، حيث أعطيا الأولوية لتجارة الحجم الكبير وفرضا ضرائب مهمة. وبالتالي فإن استخراج معادن روبايا والمتاجرة بها وتصديرها إلى رواندا بطريقة احتيالية قد أفادت كلا من تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس واقتصاد رواندا (انظر المرفق 30)⁽⁵⁶⁾.

إدارة التعدين في روبايا من قبل تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس

59 - منذ الأيام الأولى لاحتلال روبايا، حثَّ كورني نانغا، الذي كان يتحدث علناً باسم تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، الجهات الفاعلة الموجودة في المنطقة على مواصلة أنشطة التعدين والمتاجرة (انظر المرفق 31، و S/2024/432، المرفق 81). ولم يطرأ تغيير كبير على العدد الإجمالي للحقَّارين العاملين في مناجم روبايا (انظر المرفق 32)⁽⁵⁷⁾. ومع ذلك، فقد قام تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس

(53) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(54) مصادر من جهات فاعلة اقتصادية ومن المجتمع المدني ووزارة المناجم في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر أمنية.

(55) جهات فاعلة اقتصادية.

(56) حقَّارون وتجار في روبايا، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر أمنية.

(57) سكان، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وحقَّارون، وتجار، وباحثون. وقد عمل حوالي 10 000 شخص في روبايا، في مراحل شتى من عملية التعدين.

بترد شامامبا باريجارويي اينوك، رئيس تعاونية المنقبين الحرفيين في ماسيسي وزعيم ائتلاف الوطنيين المقاومين الكونغوليين، من روبايا (S/2024/432، الفقرات 138-140)⁽⁵⁸⁾.

60 - ونظمت قوات تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس الموجودة في موشاكي جميع جوانب إنتاج المعادن والمتاجرة بها ونقلها، وأقامت إدارة شبيهة بإدارة الدولة. وأنشأت "وزارة" مسؤولة عن استغلال المعادن في المنطقة التجارية في روبايا⁽⁵⁹⁾. وسلّمت هذه "الوزارة" تراخيص للحقّارين والتجار يشار فيها إلى "جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية - مقاطعة كيفو الشمالية"⁽⁶⁰⁾. وألزم طالبوا تلك التراخيص بتقديم وثائق هوية. وأجبر الحقّارون والتجار على دفع رسوم سنوية قدرها 25 دولارا و 250 دولارا، على التوالي⁽⁶¹⁾. وضاعف تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس أجور الحفارين، مما أضعف معظمهم بالاستمرار في العمل في روبايا⁽⁶²⁾.

61 - وكان مقاتلو حركة 23 مارس يسيرون دوريات في بلدة روبايا ومواقع التعدين لضمان عدم بيع التجار والحفارين المعادن إلا للتجار الكونغوليين والروانديين المرخص لهم من تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس. وعوقب من انتهك القواعد المفروضة من قبل تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس بالاعتقال والاحتجاز في موشاكي⁽⁶³⁾.

طريق تصدير جديدة من روبايا إلى رواندا

62 - سيطر تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس على كامل الطريق من منطقة التعدين إلى الحدود الرواندية (انظر المرفق 33). ونقلت المعادن من روبايا عبر بيهامبوي وموشاكي وكيروليروي في إقليم ماسيسي؛ وكيتشانغا وكيزيمبا وبيشوشا وموليمبي وتونغو وكالغيرا في إقليم روتشورو؛ وكيبومبا في إقليم نيراغونغو⁽⁶⁴⁾.

63 - وتم تحميل المعادن المفرّغة في موقف السيارات المجاور لسوق كيبومبا في شاحنات ثقيلة دخلت جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية من رواندا عبر كابوهانغا، وهو ما التقطته صور ساتلية أيضا (انظر المرفق 34)⁽⁶⁵⁾. وفرض تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس ما يطلق عليه اسم "سالونغو"

(58) سكان، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وحقّارون، وتجار، وباحثون، وسلطات تعدين ومنظمو أنشطة تعدين. وأتاح إجراء مزيد من التحقيقات التأكد من أن شامامبا هو زعيم ائتلاف الوطنيين المقاومين الكونغوليين (فصيل "الجنرال" ماهورو)، وليس زعيم ائتلاف الوطنيين المقاومين الكونغوليين - القوة الضاربة كما جاء ذكره في التقرير السابق (S/2024/432).

(59) مقاتلون من حركة 23 مارس، وسكان، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وباحثون، وحقّارون، وتجار.

(60) المرجع نفسه.

(61) المرجع نفسه.

(62) سكان، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وحقّارون، وتجار، وباحثون.

(63) أفراد تعرضوا للاعتقال والاحتجاز من قبل تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس. وفي 17 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، اعتقل تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس ثمانية سائقي دراجات نارية كانوا ينقلون 800 كيلوغرام من الكولتان إلى خارج روبايا على الطريق المؤدية إلى نغونغو وكاليجي (مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية)، وثلاثة تجار كانوا قد كلفوا بنقلها.

(64) مصادر من المجتمع المدني، وسكان، وجهات فاعلة اقتصادية.

(65) المرجع نفسه.

(العمل القسري)، حيث سُخِّرَ السكان المحليون لتوسيع الطرق الرابطة بين كيبومبا وكابوهانغا وبين روبايا وكيروليروي، لاستيعاب عبور الشاحنات (انظر الملحق 35)⁽⁶⁶⁾.

الكميات المقدرة من المعادن المتاجر بها والأرباح التي جناها تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس

64 - في روبايا، أفاد شهود عاينوا قوافل المعادن التابعة لتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس أن المعادن كانت تحمّل مرتين في الأسبوع في قوافل تتألف من أربع إلى خمس مركبات قادرة على نقل ما يصل إلى خمسة أطنان لكل شحنة. وفي الفترة من منتصف أيار/مايو إلى أواخر تشرين الأول/أكتوبر، ظل تواتر وأحجام المعادن الخارجة من روبايا ثابتة⁽⁶⁷⁾. وعلى هذا النحو سيطر تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس على المتاجرة بحوالي 120 طنا من الكولتان ونقلها شهريا.

65 - وفرض تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس ضرائب ومدفوعات عينية على بيع المعادن ونقلها. وكان مبلغ الضريبة المفروضة لكل كيلوغرام من الكولتان والمنغنيز هو 7 دولارات، بينما كان مبلغ الضريبة المفروضة لكل كيلوغرام من القصدير (الكاسيتيريت) هو 4 دولارات⁽⁶⁸⁾.

66 - وعلى هذا النحو، حصّل تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس ما لا يقل عن 800 000 دولار شهريا من الضرائب المفروضة على إنتاج الكولتان والمتاجرة به في روبايا.

جيم - عمليات القوات العاملة بالوكالة عن الحكومة وعمليات القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا - قوات أبكونغوزي المقاتلة

العمليات غير الناجحة للقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا - قوات أبكونغوزي المقاتلة

67 - في أعقاب التزام حكومة جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في إطار عملية لواندا "بتحيد" القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا (انظر الفقرة 38 أعلاه)، شنت القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية هجوما عسكريا قصيرا ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا - قوات أبكونغوزي المقاتلة في أواخر أيلول/سبتمبر 2024. وبناءً على أوامر صادرة عن رئيس جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، فيليكس أنطوان تشيسيكيدى تشيلومبو، تولى الجنرال شيكو تشيتامبوي، نائب رئيس هيئة الأركان العامة في القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية لشؤون العمليات والاستخبارات⁽⁶⁹⁾، القيادة العامة للعمليات، متجاوزا بذلك الفريق فال سيكابوي⁽⁷⁰⁾، الذي خدم بصفة قائد عمليات القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

(66) المرجع نفسه.

(67) شهود عاينوا تسير قوافل المعادن. وفي أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، قدمت الممثلة الخاصة للأمين العام في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، بنتو كيتا، تقديرا متحفظا مقداره 100 طن من الكولتان تُنتج شهريا في روبايا. انظر Sonia Rolley, "UN says Congo rebels generating \$300,000 monthly in seized mining area", Reuters, 30 September 2024.

(68) سكان، وجهات فاعلة اقتصادية، وباحثون.

(69) S/2024/432، المرفق 29.

(70) مصادر استخباراتية ودبلوماسية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وسلطات محلية.

في مقاطعتي كيفو الشمالية وكيفو الجنوبية، وحاكم مقاطعة كيفو الشمالية اللواء بيتر سيريموامي، المعروف بعلاقاته الطويلة الأمد مع القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا - قوات أبكونغوزي المقاتلة⁽⁷¹⁾.

68 - وكان الهدف المتوخى من هذه العمليات هو إظهار استجابة جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية للضغوط الدولية لوقف دعمها للقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا (انظر المرفق 36). وقد تكثفت هذه الضغوطات بعد تسريب مذكرة شفوية سرية متحقق من صحتها، موقعة من قبل مدير ديوان الرئيس قبل أيام قليلة من شن ذلك الهجوم. وتضمنت الوثيقة اقتراحاً بنقل ستة مواطنين روانديين حوكموا بتهمة الإبادة الجماعية من قبل المحكمة الجنائية الدولية لرواندا إلى جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية (انظر المرفق 37).

69 - وفي يومي 23 و 24 أيلول/سبتمبر، نفذت القوات الخاصة التابعة للقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بقيادة المقدم دونسيان باويلي⁽⁷²⁾ عمليات بالقرب من ساكي، خاصة في شوفي وكيموكا ولوبانغو وموبامبيرو، ضد مواقع القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا - قوات أبكونغوزي المقاتلة، بما في ذلك وحدة كومانندو البحث والعمليات في العمق التابعة للقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا. وكان الهجوم يهدف إلى تفكيك معاقل القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا و "تحييد" (أي أسر أو قتل) القائد العسكري "اللواء" باسيفيك نتاووغوكا، وكنيته أوميغا إسرائيل (Ntawuguka Pacifique (CDi.024)، وغيره من قادة القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا (S/2024/432، الفقرات 73-79)⁽⁷³⁾.

70 - وفي يومي 25 و 26 أيلول/سبتمبر، توخى اللواء الحادي عشر التابع للقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بقيادة الجنرال بابي لوبيمبي تفكيك موقع آخر للقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، لكنه هاجم عن طريق الخطأ موقعاً لتحالف الوطنيين من أجل كونغو حر وذي سيادة في قرية روسايو، بإقليم نيراغونغو⁽⁷⁴⁾. وقد أثار هذا الحادث غضب تحالف الوطنيين من أجل كونغو حر وذي سيادة وجماعات وازاليندو الأخرى، الذين هددوا بالانسحاب من الخطوط الأمامية (انظر الفقرة 80 أدناه).

71 - وقد سرب الحاكم سيريموامي معلومات عن العمليات المخطط لها إلى قيادة القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا - قوات أبكونغوزي المقاتلة⁽⁷⁵⁾، فلم يُقتل أو يُأسر أي قائد رفيع المستوى. وقد فرّ أوميغا وقادة آخرون من القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا إلى مواقعهم في كيليمانوكا، بإقليم نيراغونغو، وقاموا بتعزيزها⁽⁷⁶⁾.

72 - وطردت القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بعض وحدات القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا من موبامبيرو وشوفي واعتقلت العديد من مقاتلي القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وتحالف الوطنيين من أجل كونغو حر وذي سيادة من ذوي الرتب الدنيا، بمن فيهم العديد من القاصرين. وقتلت القوات المسلحة

(71) S/2024/432، الفقرة 72؛ و S/2023/990، الفقرة 36؛ و S/2022/967، المرفقان 41 و 50؛ ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا ومن جماعات وازاليندو ومصادر استخباراتية.

(72) S/2023/990، المرفق 38.

(73) وثائق محفوظة لدى الأمانة العامة.

(74) مصادر استخباراتية ودبلوماسية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وسلطات محلية.

(75) مصادر من القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، ومصادر أمنية واستخباراتية.

(76) مصادر من ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن ومن المجتمع المدني والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية أيضا 3 مقاتلين وجرح 12 مقاتلا وعدة مدنيين⁽⁷⁷⁾. وكان من بين قطع الأسلحة الـ 22 وطلقات الذخيرة الـ 259 التي صودرت خلال العملية معداتٌ صُنعت خلال عامي 2021 و 2022، مما يؤكد التزويد الموثق بالأسلحة واللوجستيات للقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وجماعات وازاليندو (انظر المرفق 38؛ و S/2024/432، الفقرة 64؛ و S/2023/990، الفقرة 39).

73 - وكشفت العملية عن نقاط الضعف العملية التي تعاني منها القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والخلافات الجوهرية داخل قيادتها بشأن العلاقة بين القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا.

رد فعل القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وجماعات وازاليندو

74 - اعتبرت جماعات وازاليندو، بما في ذلك القيادة العسكرية لائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن (S/2024/432، الفقرات 60-65)، أن التحييد المخطط له للقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، حليفها في العمليات ضد تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية (S/2024/432، الفقرات 70-72)، ضربا من ضرب الخيانة (انظر المرفق 39). وأدان الهجوم غيدون شيميراي موييسا، القائد العسكري لائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو (S/2024/432، الفقرة 61)، لكنه دعا إلى الوحدة بين القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو (انظر المرفق 40).

75 - وتخوفاً من عمليات جديدة للقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ضد قيادة القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وقواعدها، قامت القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وجماعات وازاليندو بتعزيز دفاعاتها بشكل مشترك. وتمثلت الاستراتيجية الرئيسية في إدماج مقاتلي القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا ضمن وحدات ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو والادعاء بأن القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا قد زالت نهائيا⁽⁷⁸⁾. وأصدر قادة القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا تعليمات للمقاتلين بالتعريف عن أنفسهم كأعضاء في جماعات أخرى (انظر المرفق 41)⁽⁷⁹⁾.

76 - وفي رسالة رسمية، طلبت القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا من الميسر الأنغولي التمكين للحوار مع كيغالي (انظر المرفق 42). وكان هناك توافق متزايد في الآراء على أن مسألة القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا تستلزم اتباع نهج أكثر شمولاً، يتجاوز مجرد العملية العسكرية⁽⁸⁰⁾. ويتوخى مفهوم العمليات لخطة تحييد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، التي تمت الموافقة عليها على مستوى الخبراء في لواندا في 31 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر، تحديد مواقع القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وعتادها، ثم تبادل المعلومات لتحديد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا و "الجماعات المنشقة عنها" (المرحلة 1)، قبل الانتقال

(77) مقابلات جماعية مع أسرى في غوما، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومن ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا والمجتمع المدني.

(78) مصادر من القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وجماعات وازاليندو ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني، وسلطات محلية.

(79) المرجع نفسه.

(80) مصادر دبلوماسية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من جماعات وازاليندو ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومن سلطات محلية.

إلى عمليات التحييد والإجراءات المحددة الأهداف ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا (المرحلة 2)، بما يتجاوز أي خطوات صريحة لتوعية المقاتلين ولتحقيق الاستسلام الطوعي. ولا يُتوقع تسريح مقاتلي القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وإعادتهم إلى الوطن وإعادة إدماجهم إلا في المرحلة 4 من مفهوم العمليات (انظر المرفق 13)⁽⁸¹⁾.

77 - وتثير الخطة التي اقترحها خبراء الاستخبارات مخاوف أساسية تتعلق بحقوق الإنسان والقانون الدولي الإنساني. ذلك أن مصطلح "التحييد" قد ينطوي على استخدام القوة المفرطة، بما في ذلك الإجراءات خارج نطاق القضاء من قبيل الإعدام بإجراءات موجزة. أما عبارة "الأعضاء في القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا"، فتتطوي على مخاطر العقاب الجماعي واستهداف المدنيين المرتبطة بالقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا. فقد ارتكبت القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية/جماعات وازاليندو وحركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية، وهي جهات من المتوقع أن تكون مشاركة في تنفيذ الخطة، انتهاكات جسيمة لحقوق الإنسان والقانون الدولي الإنساني في سياقات مماثلة (S/2023/431، الفقرة 56 والفقرتان 66 و 67؛ و S/2023/990، الفقرات 55-58). وقد يؤدي تنفيذ الخطة أيضا إلى الإعادة إلى الوطن قسرا وانتهاك مبدأ عدم الإعادة القسرية.

تغير موقف القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية واستمرارها في استخدام القوات العاملة بالوكالة

78 - دعت السلطات العسكرية في كيفو الشمالية، في 27 أيلول/سبتمبر، قادة ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن إلى الإعراب عن أسفهم للهجمات التي شُنت على القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وتحالف الوطنيين من أجل كونغو حر وذي سيادة، وذلك لإصلاح العلاقات المتضررة مع ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو (انظر المرفق 43). وأكد قادة ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن، من جديد، ثقتهم وتعاونهم. وأفاد قادة من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومن ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن بأن السلطات العسكرية طلبت خُفية من ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو طمأنئة القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا على استمرار التحالف معها.

79 - وبعد أسبوع واحد، أصدر الجنرال ديوجونتي نزامبي⁽⁸²⁾ تعليمات إلى وحدات القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بتعليق العمليات ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا وائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن، وبإصلاح العلاقات مع "جميع الوحدات الصديقة" (انظر المرفق 44). وقد سُربت معلومات عن هذه الأوامر على وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي، مما أدى إلى إرباك عملية لواندا (انظر المرفق 13).

80 - ورغم النداءات المتكررة الموجهة لحكومة جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بأن توقف دعمها للقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا (انظر الفقرة 68 أعلاه)، وبصرف النظر عن العملية القصيرة ضد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا - قوات أبكونغوزي المقاتلة، واصلت الحكومة الاعتماد بشكل منهجي على ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا والتعاون معها

(81) وثيقة سرية.

(82) قائد المنطقة العسكرية الرابعة والثلاثين في مقاطعة كيفو الشمالية.

(S/2024/432، الفقرات 60-79)⁽⁸³⁾. ويتضمن المرفق 45 تفاصيل عن التعاون بين القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو والقوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، ومشاركتهما في القتال، وعن التجنيد لائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن/جماعات وازاليندو وتنظيمها.

رابعاً - مقاطعة إيتوري

ألف - تنظيم جماعة زائير وتعبئتها وتحالفها مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس

التنظيم

81 - بدأت جماعة زائير تطلق على نفسها اسم جماعة "الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري"⁽⁸⁴⁾. وحتى شهري أيار/مايو وحزيران/يونيه 2024، كثفت الجماعة عمليات التجنيد (S/2024/432، الفقرة 150)، ودربت آلاف المقاتلين (انظر الفقرة 83 أدناه). وحصلت جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري على عتاد عسكري وشاحنات بيك - آب وقوارب مُعدّة لأغراض حربية، مما زاد من قدرتها على القيام بعمليات في بحيرة ألبرت⁽⁸⁵⁾. وطورت قدرتها على المراقبة الجوية بنشر طائرات مسيّرة تجارية صغيرة الحجم⁽⁸⁶⁾.

82 - ورغم محاولة جماعة زائير المستمرة لتصوير نفسها على أنها جماعة للدفاع عن النفس (S/2022/479، الفقرة 101؛ و S/2024/432، الفقرتان 149 و 150)، فقد شنت هجمات استنزائية ضد الجماعة التي تنافسها، التعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو، واستهدفت بشكل متزايد القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والشرطة الوطنية الكونغولية⁽⁸⁷⁾.

التجنيد والتدريب

83 - شرعت جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري في حملة تجنيد واسعة النطاق في جميع مجتمعات المجموعة الخماسية لبلدان منطقة الساحل⁽⁸⁸⁾ في أقاليم دجوغو ومهاجي وأورو (S/2023/990، الفقرتان 76 و 77)⁽⁸⁹⁾. وأعيدت تعبئة قادة ومقاتلين من اتحاد الوطنيين

(83) S/2023/431، الفقرة 79؛ و S/2024/432، الفقرات 60-65.

(84) S/2022/967، الفقرات 87-91؛ و S/2024/432، الفقرات 149-152؛ ومقاتلون سابقون في جماعة زائير، ومصادر استخباراتية. انظر أيضاً المرفقات 46-48.

(85) مقاتلون من جماعة زائير، ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني.

(86) مقاتلون من جماعة زائير، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني.

(87) مصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من المجتمع المدني والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر استخباراتية.

(88) ألور، وهياما، ومامبيسا، وندو أوكيبو، ونيالي.

(89) مقاتلون سابقون في جماعة زائير، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر استخباراتية.

الكونغوليين⁽⁹⁰⁾ السابقين من ذوي الخبرة⁽⁹¹⁾. وقامت جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري أيضا بالتجنيد في مخيمات النازحين داخلها في جميع أنحاء مقاطعة إيتوري⁽⁹²⁾. ودُرب عدة آلاف من المقاتلين⁽⁹³⁾ في مراكز للتدريب في إيتوري، وفي مركز التدريب التابع لتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس في تشانزو (S/2024/432، الفقرة 152)، وفي أوغندا⁽⁹⁴⁾.

84 - وفي إيتوري، كانت هناك معسكرات تدريب كبيرة في بيني، في مشيخة مامبيسا، تخضع لقيادة القائد في جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري، باراكا أموس ماكي (انظر الفقرات 98-103 أدناه، و S/2024/432، الفقرات 167-170)، وفي بوا، في مشيخة باهيمبا بانويواغي، بالقرب من تشوميا، تخضع لقيادة القائد في جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري، ماندرو ساليكو⁽⁹⁵⁾. ودُرب أيضا مجندون في مابانغا وكاتوتو ونزيبو ودهيغو وبيروندا وبوا في إقليم دجوغو⁽⁹⁶⁾.

85 - وأفاد متدربون من بيني أن معظم المدربين كانوا مقاتلين سابقين في اتحاد الوطنيين الكونغوليين. وأبلغوا أيضا عن تناوب المدربين العسكريين من أوغندا ورواندا⁽⁹⁷⁾. واستمر التدريب في بيني شهرا واحدا⁽⁹⁸⁾، وركز فيه على التكتيكات القتالية الأساسية والتدريب واستخدام الأسلحة. وتلقى مجندون مختارون تدريباً متقدماً على استخدام المدفعية (انظر المرفق 46). ورؤد المقاتلون بعد إنهاء تدريبهم على بطاقات هوية مطبوعة في بيني (انظر المرفق 47). وبعد ذلك، أرسل المجندون إلى بيروندا لاستلام الزي الرسمي، قبل العودة إلى الوطن في انتظار أوامر التعبئة⁽⁹⁹⁾.

86 - وفي أواخر أيلول/سبتمبر، تعرض معسكرا التدريب في بيني وبوا للهجوم والتدمير من قبل القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية. وبحلول ذلك الوقت، كان قد دُرب بالفعل في معسكر بيني أكثر من 3 000 مقاتل⁽¹⁰⁰⁾.

(90) S/2023/990، الفقرة 76 والمرفقان 49 و 50.

(91) المرجع نفسه.

(92) مقاتلون سابقون، ومصادر من السلطات المحلية ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

(93) المرجع نفسه.

(94) المرجع نفسه، ومقاتلون من جماعة زائير.

(95) مقاتلون من جماعة زائير، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني.

(96) مجندون سابقون، ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من المجتمع المدني.

(97) المرجع نفسه.

(98) المرجع نفسه.

(99) المرجع نفسه.

(100) مقاتلون سابقون، ومصادر من السلطات المحلية ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

87 - ويتضمن المرفق 48 معلومات إضافية عن تدريب مقاتلي جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري والحركة الشعبية للدفاع عن النفس في إيتوري في مركز التدريب التابع لتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس في تشانزو.

أهداف تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس وجماعة زائير في إقليم إيتوري

88 - عززت جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري تحالفها مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس استعدادا لشن عمليات هجومية ضد القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في إقليم إيتوري. وبدعم من تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، وضعت جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري استراتيجية شاملة، وحددت مناطق العمليات وقواعد العمليات وطرق عبور الأسلحة وتحركات القوات عبر بحيرة ألبرت من أوغندا، توقعا لشن هجوم واسع النطاق⁽¹⁰¹⁾.

89 - وأكد ائتلاف تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس عزمه على حشد كل الجماعات المسلحة في إيتوري لصالح قضيته (S/2024/432، الفقرة 152). وفي الأشهر الأخيرة، اتصل نانغا وممثلون آخرون عن تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس بقيادة قوات المقاومة الوطنية في إيتوري والتعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو⁽¹⁰²⁾. وقوبلت باهتمام كبير رؤية تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس فيما يتعلق بالتنمية الاقتصادية والمصالحة في إيتوري، والتي تعد بإتاحة فرص متكافئة للجميع، لا سيما في المجتمعات المهمشة مثل الليندو والنغيتي⁽¹⁰³⁾.

90 - وفي وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، كان كل من قوات المقاومة الوطنية في إيتوري وتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس بصدد التفاوض⁽¹⁰⁴⁾. واتصل تحالف نهر الكونغو كذلك بالتعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو، وهما خصمان قديمان لجماعة زائير وينظر إليهما عموما على أنهما العقبة الرئيسية أمام سيطرة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس بسرعة على إقليم إيتوري. وظل تحالف نهر الكونغو واثقا من أن التعهد بالتحالف بين النغيتي وقوات المقاومة الوطنية في إيتوري من شأنه أن يقنع التعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو الذين يهيمن عليهما الليندو بالانضمام إلى الائتلاف الذي أنشأه تحالف نهر الكونغو⁽¹⁰⁵⁾.

إقامة القادة المدرجة أسماؤهم في قائمة الجزاءات تحالفا مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس

91 - قام الفردان المدرج اسمهما في قائمة الجزاءات توماس لوبانغا ديبلو (Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (CDi.007) وإيف كاوا بانغا ماندرو (Yves Khawa Panga Mandro (CDi.009)⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ بدور رئيسي في تعزيز التعاون بين تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس وجماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري (S/2024/432، الفقرة 152). وقاما، متصرفين باعتبارهما

(101) المرجع نفسه، ومقاتلون سابقون، وسلطات محلية.

(102) اثنان من قادة الجماعات المسلحة المتمركزة في إيتوري، بما فيها التعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو.

(103) المرجع نفسه.

(104) مصادر من تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، ومقاتلون سابقون، وسلطات محلية.

(105) مصدر من التعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو ومصادر استخباراتية.

(106) S/2023/990، الفقرتان 76 و 77 والمرفقان 49 و 50.

”السلطات المعنية“ لجماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري، بتسهيل تجنيد وتدريب مقاتلي جماعة زائير وتنظيم سفرهم للتدريب في تشانزو ثم إعادة نشرهم في إيتوري. وقد عمل إنوسنت كاينا (Innocent Kaina)، وكنيته ”India Queen (CDi.004)“، هو حاليا قائد مؤثر في حركة 23 مارس، عن كُتب بشأن هذه المسائل مع لوبانغا في كمبالا⁽¹⁰⁷⁾.

92 - وشهد جميع الأفراد الثلاثة المدرجة أسماؤهم في قائمة الجزاءات في كمبالا منذ تموز/يوليه 2024. وغادر لوبانغا إقليم إيتوري في تموز/يوليه واتخذ كمبالا مقرا لإقامته⁽¹⁰⁸⁾. والتقى لوبانغا بكورني نانغا في كمبالا في مناسبة واحدة على الأقل⁽¹⁰⁹⁾.

93 - وكانت مزرعة إيف كاوا في مقاطعة هويما في أوغندا، بالقرب من بحيرة ألبرت، بمثابة نقطة دعم وعبر لمقاتلي جماعة زائير من إيتوري، بما في ذلك، في وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، بعض المقاتلين الذين عادوا من التدريب في تشانزو وتمركزوا على الجانب الأوغندي من بحيرة ألبرت، والذين اعتبروا مستعدين للعبور إلى إيتوري للقتال فيها⁽¹¹⁰⁾. وفي حزيران/يونيه وتموز/يوليه 2024، سهّل كاوا نقل الأسلحة والذخيرة إلى مقاتلي جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري (S/2022/967، الفقرة 88)، كما يَسّر إجراء التدريب في معسكر بيروندا⁽¹¹¹⁾.

94 - وردًا على استفسارات الفريق بشأن وجود هؤلاء الأفراد المدرجة أسماؤهم في قائمة الجزاءات في كمبالا وأنشطتهم فيها حديثًا، ادعت حكومة أوغندا أنها لا تعلم بوجودهم على الأراضي الأوغندية⁽¹¹²⁾.

95 - وسافر أيضا القائدان ”الجنرال“ لوغو مارين⁽¹¹³⁾ وباراكا⁽¹¹⁴⁾ (انظر الفقرات 98-103 أدناه) إلى أوغندا بشكل متكرر. واستقر مارين في كمبالا، وعمل عن كثب مع لوبانغا. وسافر إلى رواندا وإلى بوناغانا، في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، للاجتماع مع مندوبي تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس⁽¹¹⁵⁾، ويسّر تدريب عناصر من جماعة زائير في تشانزو⁽¹¹⁶⁾.

96 - وفي أواخر تموز/يوليه 2024، أرسل لوبانغا موفدين إلى إيتوري بغرض المصالحة بين الحركة الشعبية للدفاع عن النفس في إيتوري وجماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري، ودمج الفصيلين⁽¹¹⁷⁾ (S/2022/967، الفقرات 87-91؛ و S/2023/431، الفقرات 113-117)

(107) مقاتلون سابقون، ومصادر من السلطات المحلية ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

(108) المرجع نفسه.

(109) المرجع نفسه.

(110) المرجع نفسه.

(111) المرجع نفسه.

(112) رد حكومة أوغندا المؤرخ 1 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024، محفوظ لدى الأمانة العامة. انظر أيضا S/2024/432، الفقرات 55-58.

(113) S/2024/432، الفقرة 152.

(114) المرجع نفسه، الفقرات 167-170.

(115) مقاتلون سابقون، وباحثون، ومصادر من السلطات المحلية والمجتمع المدني ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

(116) المرجع نفسه.

(117) مصادر استخباراتية وقائد جماعة مسلحة.

وربطهما بتحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس. وقرر قادة الحركة الشعبية للدفاع عن النفس في إيتوري الإبقاء على استقلاليتهم، إلا أن الحركة الشعبية للدفاع عن النفس في إيتوري وجماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري وافقت على التعاون المشترك مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس. وانضم بنيامين باهاتي، المتحدث الرسمي باسم الحركة الشعبية للدفاع عن النفس في إيتوري، إلى تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس في بوناغانا (انظر المرفق (49)(118)).

97 - وتسارعت وتيرة هذه التعبئة والتعاون على نطاق واسع مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس منذ آب/أغسطس 2024، حيث أُبلغ عن عقد اجتماعات متكررة في مواقع مختلفة في أوغندا⁽¹¹⁹⁾.

باء - سيطرة الجماعات المسلحة على إنتاج الذهب في مقاطعة إيتوري

98 - استمر استغلال الذهب في مقاطعة إيتوري خارج نطاق سيطرة الدولة (S/2022/967، الفقرة 95 والمرفق 64)، مما أدّر على الجماعات المسلحة والشبكات الإجرامية عائدات سنوية بقيمة لا تقل عن 140 مليون دولار⁽¹²⁰⁾. وتشير الإحصاءات إلى وجود تباين كبير بين الإنتاج المقدر للذهب المستخرَج بالوسائل الحرفية وعلى نطاق ضيق والإنتاج الفعلي المسجل. وقد تقرير رسمي كمية إنتاج الذهب المستخرَج بالوسائل الحرفية وعلى نطاق ضيق في إيتوري بـ 1 800 كيلوغرام سنوياً⁽¹²¹⁾. ومع ذلك، ففي النصف الأول من عام 2024، سجلت دائرة المساعدة والإشراف على الاستغلال الحرفي والصغير النطاق للمناجم وتعاونية تجار الذهب في إيتوري⁽¹²²⁾ إنتاج 17 كيلوغراماً من الذهب و 24 كيلوغراماً من مشتريات الذهب، على التوالي⁽¹²³⁾.

99 - وعزت سلطات التعدين التباين بين الإنتاج الرسمي والإنتاج المسجل إلى محدودية الوصول إلى المواقع التي تسيطر عليها الجماعات المسلحة⁽¹²⁴⁾. وعلى الرغم من دفع تعاونيات التعدين أموالاً للشرطة الوطنية الكونغولية والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية مقابل الحماية⁽¹²⁵⁾، ظلت معظم مواقع التعدين تحت سيطرة جماعات مسلحة مثل التعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو وجماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري في إقليم دجوغو، وقوات المقاومة الوطنية في إيتوري والجهة الوطنية والداعية إلى الاندماج في الكونغو والحركة الشعبية للدفاع

(118) مصادر من الحركة الشعبية للدفاع عن النفس في إيتوري، وباحثون، ومقاتلون سابقون، ومصادر من السلطات المحلية والمجتمع المدني ومصادر استخباراتية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية.

(119) مصادر استخباراتية ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(120) في 8 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024، كان سعر الذهب هو 89 314 دولارا للكيلوغرام الواحد.

https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_action_plan/RDC-NAP-2021-FR.pdf (121) انظر (بالفرنسية).

(122) تعاونية تجار الذهب في إيتوري هي المشتري الوحيد الذي يخضع لإشراف دائرة المساعدة والإشراف على الاستغلال الحرفي والصغير النطاق للمناجم.

(123) التقريران المودعان لدائرة المساعدة والإشراف على الاستغلال الحرفي والصغير النطاق للمناجم الخاصين بإيتوري لعامي 2023 و 2024.

(124) المرجع نفسه.

(125) بشكل رسمي (من خلال وحدة حماية المؤسسات وكبار الشخصيات) وبشكل غير رسمي.

عن النفس في إيتوري في إقليم إيرومو، كما ظلت التعاونية من أجل تنمية الكونغو/اتحاد الثوار للدفاع عن شعب الكونغو ناشطة أيضا في إقليم مهاجي (S/2024/432، الفقرة 163؛ و S/2023/990، المرفق 50؛ و S/2022/479، الفقرات 107-123)⁽¹²⁶⁾.

100 - ونتيجة لذلك، دفع مالكو تعاونيات التعدين الرئيسية في إيتوري، وجميعهم من المساهمين في تعاونية تجار الذهب في إيتوري، رسوما لقادة الجماعات المسلحة المسيطرة على مواقع التعدين، بمن فيهم القائد باراكا من جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري وقائد الجماعة المسلحة المكنى "50 cent" من تحالف الديمقراطيين الكونغوليين، للحفاظ على أصولهم وأنشطتهم (انظر المرفق 50)⁽¹²⁷⁾. وتشكل المدفوعات للجماعات المسلحة أفعالا تخضع للجزاءات.

101 - وكما ورد في تقارير سابقة، كان باراكا، وهو قائد في جماعة زائير/جماعة الدفاع عن النفس للمجتمعات الضحايا في إيتوري مستقر في بلدة مابانغا في إقليم دجوغو، يمارس سيطرة حصرية على جميع الأنشطة الاقتصادية في مشيخة مامبيسا (S/2024/432، الفقرات 167-170؛ و S/2023/990، المرفق 47).

102 - وكانت عملياته، بما في ذلك التعدين غير القانوني للذهب وفرض الضرائب والرسوم في نقاط التفتيش، تدر عائدات تبلغ حوالي 1,6 مليون دولار شهريا من إنتاج الذهب وحده. وأضافت إيراداته من الضرائب غير القانونية على الأعمال التجارية المحلية ومن الرسوم في نقاط التفتيش مبلغا يقدر بـ 70 000 دولار إلى إيراداته الشهرية. وقد مكنت هذه الأموال، التي تم غسلها من خلال الاستثمارات العقارية والتجارية في مابانغا وإيغا باربير وبونيا، باراكا من تعزيز نفوذه كفاعل اقتصادي في المنطقة وكزعيم لجماعة مسلحة (انظر المرفق 51).

103 - ويمكن تكييف تصرفات باراكا على أنها تشكل استغلالا غير مشروع للموارد الطبيعية يخضع للجزاءات بموجب الفقرة 7 (ز) من قرار مجلس الأمن 2293 (2016).

خامسا - مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية

ألف - تعبئة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس

104 - تأثرت الأقاليم الشمالية في مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية من جراء القصف المنطلق من مواقع حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية في إقليم ماسيسي وما تقوم به من توغلات من حين لآخر في إقليم كاليهي في كيفو الجنوبية، كما حدث في لومبيشي في أواخر أيار/مايو 2024 (انظر المرفق 52). وواصل تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس حشد الدعم من الجماعات المسلحة والمجتمعات المحلية⁽¹²⁸⁾.

105 - وكان الفرد المدرج اسمه في قائمة الجزاءات بيرنار بيامونغو (Bernard Byamungu) (CDI.038)، أحد قادة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس الذي يعمل في المنطقة المحيطة بساكي

(126) مسؤولون في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وتقرير محفوظ لدى الأمانة العامة.

(127) شهود عيان، وباحثون، والمفتشية العامة للتعدين، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر قضائية واستخباراتية.

(128) باحثون، ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر أمنية ومصادر مقربة من حركة 23 آذار/مارس وتحالف نهر الكونغو.

(S/2024/432، الفقرة 41)، عنصرًا رئيسيًا في إقامة الروابط مع بعض فصائل ماي - ماي رايا موتومبوكي ووماي - ماي كيريكيشو، مما أدى إلى انشقاقات في صفوفها للانضمام إلى تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس (انظر المرفق 53).

106 - وشكّلت جماعة توپروانيهو، التي تعاونت مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس⁽¹²⁹⁾، والمقاومة من أجل سيادة القانون في بوروندي التي تلقت الدعم من رواندا⁽¹³⁰⁾، تحالفًا بحكم الأمر الواقع وأصبحت كلتا الجماعتين المسلحتين تعملان بالوكالة لصالح تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس (S/2024/432، الفقرة 179)⁽¹³¹⁾. وتعاونت قوات "بيلوزي بيشامبوكي" المسلحة، بقيادة نغومانزيتو، سرا مع تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس، من خلال صلاتها مع المقاومة من أجل سيادة القانون في بوروندي وجماعة توپروانيهو (S/2024/432، المرفق 106)، على الرغم من توقيع ميثاق عدم اعتداء مع جماعات ماي - ماي (انظر الفقرة 109 أدناه)⁽¹³²⁾.

باء - تعبئة جماعات وازاليندو

107 - أدت أزمة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس إلى بذل جهود لتوحيد جماعات وازاليندو في مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية (S/2024/432، الفقرات 175-177) تحت قيادة واحدة لتشكيل جبهة موحدة ضد تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس.

108 - وفي أواخر تموز/يوليه وأوائل آب/أغسطس 2024، نُظمت اجتماعات مع ممثلين عن جماعات مسلحة من قبل جوستين بيتاكويرا، وهو عضو في الجمعية الوطنية لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية معروف بخطابه المناوئ للتوتسي (S/2023/990، المرفق 34)، وجول مولومبا، المتحدث الرسمي باسم ائتلاف المتطوعين من أجل الدفاع عن الوطن ومنسق الاتصال مع سلطات جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية (S/2024/432، الفقرة 61). وشارك فيها أيضًا ممثلان عن قوة الدفاع الوطني الاحتياطية، المعروفة باسم جيش الاحتياط⁽¹³³⁾. وكان الهدف المتوخى هو المصالحة بين جماعتي ماي - ماي ياكوتومبا وقوات "بيلوزي بيشامبوكي" المسلحة وإقناع جماعات ماي - ماي بدعم جماعات وازاليندو في مقاطعة كيفو الشمالية وثنائها عن الانضمام إلى تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس (S/2024/432، المرفق 106). وشارك في الاجتماعات عدد يفوق العشرة من جماعات ماي - ماي من أقاليم فيزي وموينغا وأوفيرا، بما في ذلك ماي - ماي ياكوتومبا، بقيادة الفرد المدرج اسمه في قائمة الجزاءات ويليام ياكوتومبا (William Yakutumba (CDi.043))، وقوات "بيلوزي بيشامبوكي" المسلحة، بقيادة نغومانزيتو، وقوات الوطنيين للدفاع عن الكونغو، بقيادة إيبويلا متيتيتي⁽¹³⁴⁾.

(129) S/2024/432، الفقرة 188؛ و S/2023/990، الفقرات 88-90؛ و S/2023/431، الفقرة 139.

(130) S/2024/432، الفقرات 179-181.

(131) مصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر الأمم المتحدة ومصادر أمنية واستخباراتية، وباحثون، ومصادر مقربة من جماعة توپروانيهو.

(132) المرجع نفسه، ومصادر مقربة من جماعات ماي - ماي.

(133) باحثون، ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(134) S/2024/432، المرفق 105.

109 - وأفضت تلك الاجتماعات إلى تبديد التوترات ووقف الاشتباكات بين ياكوتومبا ونغومانزيتو (انظر الفقرة 106 أعلاه). ووقّعت الجماعات المسلحة التي شاركت في الاجتماعات على ميثاق عدم اعتداء، والتزمت بدعم عمليات القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ضد تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس والمقاومة من أجل سيادة القانون في بوروندي وجماعات توپروانيهيو (انظر المرفق 54)⁽¹³⁵⁾. وقد حفز وعد بيتاكويرا بالاندماج في جيش الاحتياط تلك الجماعات إلى أن تنتظم في أربعة ألوية تحت القيادة العامة لويليام ياكوتومبا، مع قيادة ماي - ماي ماکاناکي العمليات في أوفيرا، وقيادة قوات "بيلوزي بيشامبوكي" المسلحة العمليات في إيتومبوي، وقيادة قوات الوطنيين للدفاع عن الكونغو التابعة "للجنرال" إيبويلا متيزي العمليات في باراكا، وقيادة ماي - ماي ياكوتومبا العمليات في فيزي⁽¹³⁶⁾.

110 - وقد أغضبت التجمعات في باراكا وأوفيرا مجتمع البانيامولينغي وجماعة توپروانيهيو، اللذين شعرا بالتهديد من التعبئة المحاربة الواسعة النطاق (انظر المرفق 55). وبعد فتور قصير في أعمال العنف، استؤنفت الاشتباكات بين جماعة توپروانيهيو وجماعات ماي - ماي في أوائل أيلول/سبتمبر، في حين استؤنفت الاشتباكات بين المقاومة من أجل سيادة القانون في بوروندي وتحالف ماي - ماي/قوة الدفاع الوطني البوروندية في أواخر أيلول/سبتمبر 2024 (انظر المرفق 56).

جيم - تدهور الحالة الأمنية في مرحلة ما بعد بعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والانتهاكات التي ارتكبتها جماعات وزاليندو

111 - ازدادت الحوادث الأمنية التي ضلعت فيها الجماعات المسلحة والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية منذ فك الارتباط الكامل لبعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في 30 حزيران/يونيه 2024⁽¹³⁷⁾. وأدى عدم قدرة قوات الأمن التابعة للدولة على الانتشار الكامل أو العمل في المناطق التي أخلتها البعثة إلى جعل السكان المدنيين أكثر عرضة للهجمات والانتهاكات من قبل الجماعات المسلحة وقوات الأمن التابعة للدولة، بما في ذلك عمليات النهب والسلب والتحرش والعنف الجنسي والقتل والابتزاز⁽¹³⁸⁾.

112 - وواصلت الجماعات المسلحة في مقاطعة كيفو الجنوبية استغلال أزمة تعبئة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس لإعادة الحشد والتوحيد وبسط السيطرة على أراض جديدة واستغلال الموارد الطبيعية (S/2024/432، الفقرات 175-177). وقد تركت إعادة انتشار وحدات القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية باتجاه إقليم كاليهي الشمالي لمحاربة تحالف نهر الكونغو/حركة 23 مارس وقوة الدفاع الرواندية⁽¹³⁹⁾ فراغا أمنيا سرعان ما ملأته الجماعات المسلحة⁽¹⁴⁰⁾.

(135) المرجع نفسه، وتسجيل فيديو محفوظ لدى الأمانة العامة.

(136) باحثون ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(137) المرجع نفسه.

(138) المرجع نفسه.

(139) مصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر استخباراتية وأمنية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

(140) باحثون، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

113 - وفي إقليم فيزي الجنوبي، تصرف مقاتلو ماي - ماي ياكوتومبا كسلطات أمر واقع في باركا، حيث قاموا باعتقالات تعسفية وأقاموا نقاط تفتيش غير قانونية وفرضوا ضرائب على السكان المدنيين والمنظمات الدولية و/أو الجهات الفاعلة في المجال الإنساني⁽¹⁴¹⁾. وفي المناطق الشمالية من أقاليم كاليهي وكاباري وشابوندا، أججت فصائل الحركة الكونغولية للدفاع عن الشعب والسلامة الوطنية وجماعات ماي - ماي وجماعة ماي - ماي رايا موتومبوكي انعدام الأمن بإقامة نقاط تفتيش غير قانونية، ومهاجمة العاملين في المنظمات غير الحكومية الدولية والوطنية وتعذيب المدنيين واختطافهم وارتكاب أعمال عنف جنسي، وهي أعمال تخضع للجزاءات⁽¹⁴²⁾.

سادسا - التوصيات

114 - يقدم الفريق التوصيات الواردة أدناه:

حكومة جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

(أ) معاقبة الجهات الفاعلة التابعة للقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والجهات الفاعلة السياسية المتعاونة مع القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، بما في ذلك الأفراد المسؤولون عن عمليات نقل الأسلحة والذخيرة (انظر الفقرتين 67 و 72 والفقرات 78-80 أعلاه)؛

حكومات جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا وأنغولا، ومجلس الأمن، وبعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

(ب) كفالة تنفيذ تدابير الإعادة إلى الوطن أو النقل أو الاعتقال الواردة في خطة تحديد القوات الديمقراطية لتحرير رواندا، مع الامتثال الصارم للمعايير القانونية الدولية (انظر الفقرتين 76 و 77 أعلاه)؛

حكومة رواندا

(ج) وقف تعطيل إشارة النظام العالمي لتحديد المواقع لمنع الآثار السلبية على عمليات الطيران المدني والإنساني وعمليات الطيران التابعة للأمم المتحدة في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية (انظر الفقرتين 54 و 55 أعلاه)؛

حكومتا رواندا وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

(د) التحقيق مع الأفراد والشبكات الضالعين في تهريب المعادن من روبايا إلى رواندا وملاحقتهم قضائيا (انظر الفقرتين 57 و 58 أعلاه)؛

(141) المرجع نفسه.

(142) باحثون، وجهات فاعلة في المجال الإنساني، ومصادر من المجتمع المدني ومصادر أمنية ومصادر من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ومصادر الأمم المتحدة.

حكومة أوغندا

(هـ) رصد الأفراد المدرجة أسماؤهم في قائمة الجزاءات في أوغندا وإبلاغ لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار 1533 (2004) بشأن جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية و/أو فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية بما تخلص إليه من نتائج (انظر الفقرتين 91-97 أعلاه)؛

حكومتا أوغندا وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية

(و) تيسير تبادل المعلومات في الوقت المناسب بين قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية والقوات المسلحة لجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية في ما يتعلق بعملية شجاع، والتعاون مع بعثة منظمة الأمم المتحدة لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية لتقليل التأثير على المدنيين إلى أدنى حد ممكن (انظر الفقرات 11-14 أعلاه).

List of annexes

- Annex 1 (para. 8) - Killing and arrest of ADF commanders
- Annex 2 (para. 9) - Movement of ADF camps and commanders
- Annex 3 (para. 12) - UPDF drone crash on 11 August 2024 outside Shujaa operational area raising tensions
- Annex 4 (para. 14) - Expansion of Operation Shujaa in pursuit of fleeing ADF groups
- Annex 5 (para. 18) - ADF's technological advancements
- Annex 6 (paras. 19-22) - Attacks on the civilian population
- Annex 7 (para. 23) - ADF unified command and control
- Annex 8 (para. 26) - Da'esh amplifying claims and propaganda
- Annex 9 (para. 27) - AFC/M23 communique denying rumors of collaboration with ADF
- Annex 10 (para. 30) - FARDC reliance on Wazalendo groups to defend against ADF including deployment of NDC-R of Guidon in Lubero
- Annex 11 (para. 31) - Tensions between local communities and Wazalendo armed groups in Lubero territory
- Annex 12 (para. 34) - AFC communique of 1 August 2024
- Annex 13 (para. 38) - Additional information on the negotiations for the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of the RDF troops, conflicting positions and the Luanda process
- Annex 14 (para. 42) - Forced and voluntary recruitment by AFC/M23
- Annex 15 (para. 42) - AFC/M23 military and paramilitary trainings
- Annex 16 (para. 43) - Military and tactical training, ideology and indoctrination
- Annex 17 (para. 44) - M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Southern Front (southern Masisi territory and Nyiragongo territory)
- Annex 18 (para. 45) - M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Northern Front (Rutshuru and southern Lubero territories)
- Annex 19 (para. 46) - M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Western Front (northern Masisi and Walikale territories)
- Annex 20 (para. 47) - M23 and RDF's area of operations: evolution
- Annex 21 (para. 50) - Illustrations of RDF continued presence and support to M23
- Annex 22 (para. 52) - RDF indiscriminate shelling of Mugunga with 122mm rockets, 3 May 2024
- Annex 23 (para. 53) - Guided anti-tank missile in Mubambiro
- Annex 24 (para. 53) - Guided missile in Kanyamahoro
- Annex 25 (para. 54) - Spoofing and jamming of GPS systems in and around M23/RDF controlled areas
- Annex 26 (para. 54) - Spamming and subsequent crash of a MONUSCO surveillance drone
- Annex 27 (para. 55) - SHORAD system spotted in Karuba
- Annex 28 (para. 56) - Update on mineral traceability
- Annex 29 (para. 57) - Illustrations of documented breaches of mineral traceability
- Annex 30 (para. 58) - AFC/M23 monopoly over coltan production and trade in Rubaya benefitting smuggle to Rwanda
- Annex 31 (para. 59) - AFC/M23 communique on 07 May 2024
- Annex 32 (para. 59) - Selected pictures of ongoing mining in Rubaya in October 2024
- Annex 33 (para. 62) - Mineral transport route from Rubaya to Rwanda
- Annex 34 (para. 63) - Border crossings from Kibumba area into Rwanda
- Annex 35 (para. 63) - Loaded trucks leaving Kibumba parking on 26 September 2024
- Annex 36 (para. 68) - Calls to end support to, and collaboration with armed groups, including the FDLR
- Annex 37 (para. 68) - Note Verbale signed by the Presidency's Chief of Staff to relocate to the DRC six Rwandan nationals tried for genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
- Annex 38 (para. 72) - Seized weapons and ammunition during FARDC operation against FDLR
- Annex 39 (para. 74) - APCLS communique seeking clarification on those responsible for the FARDC attacks on its positions in Rusayo

- Annex 40 (para. 74) - Communiqué of Guidon Shimiray Mwissa following the FARDC mistaken attack on APCLS
- Annex 41 (para. 75) - Examples of FDLR survival strategy
- Annex 42 (para. 76) - Letter of Byiringiro Victor, FDLR “president”, to the Angolan facilitator
- Annex 43 (para. 78) - Meeting between FARDC and VDP Leaders on 27 September 2024
- Annex 44 (para. 79) - Telegram issuing instructions to suspend attacks against the FDLR
- Annex 45 (para. 80) - Additional details on the FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR cooperation, their engagement in fighting, and VDP/Wazalendo recruitment and organization
- Annex 46 (para. 85) - Zaïre/ADCVI Recruits in training at Bini
- Annex 47 (para. 85) - “ADCVI” identification cards delivered to combatants following their training
- Annex 48 (para. 87) - Training of Zaïre/ADCVI and MAPI combatants at the AFC/M23 training center in Tchanzu
- Annex 49 (para. 96) - Former MAPI spokesperson Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, who joined AFC/M23 in Bunagana
- Annex 50 (para. 100) - Illegal taxes levied by CODECO/URDPC
- Annex 51 (para. 102) - Baraka Maki’s illicit economic activities and money laundering
- Annex 52 (para. 104) - Illustrations of clashes between M23/RDF and FARDC at the border between South Kivu and North Kivu, and M23 incursions into Northern Kalehe territory
- Annex 53 (para. 105) - Illustrations of defections to AFC/M23
- Annex 54 (para. 109) - Armed group leaders signing the non-aggression pact in Baraka
- Annex 55 (para. 110) - Communiqués of Twirwaneho
- Annex 56 (para. 110) - Illustrations of clashes between Twirwaneho and Mai-Mai groups, and between RED Tabara and Mai-Mai/FDNB coalition

Disclaimer:

The maps in the annexes were originally produced in color. Details may have been lost due to the requirement to publish maps in greyscale.

Annex 1 (para. 8)**Killing and arrest of ADF commanders****Meurtre et arrestation de commandants de l'ADF**

Several recent escapees from ADF captivity, along with arrested ADF collaborators and captured or surrendered combatants, reported that the latest Shujaa operations inflicted heavy losses on ADF forces and positions, including Seka Baluku's Madina camp. Numerous combatants, as well as hostages and dependents, were killed or injured.

ADF commanders killed

Recently escaped former hostages and former combatants offered insight into the latest developments and reported on the killing of several high-profile commanders.

(1) Baida¹⁴³ alias Mzee Pasta

Baida was confirmed dead¹⁴⁴ by at least eight former hostages, including two eyewitnesses, i.e. two of Baida's former wives.

One of Baida's wives was with him when he passed away, on 14 August.¹⁴⁵ Sources including UN and FARDC were still reporting on Baida's movements up until that date, which makes it plausible that Baida died on or around 14 August.

Several sources confirmed that Baida was killed near Biakato,¹⁴⁶ while he was leading a smaller group of combatants and dependents towards Madina. According to his former wife who was with him, Baida was killed by friendly fire. He had left the group to go on a reconnaissance mission around their position, and left instructions to his men to shoot and kill anyone who approaches them. When Baida returned, he was mistaken by his men to be an enemy combatant and shot. Baida died of his injuries soon thereafter, in the presence of his wife. Another former hostage who was with this group has witnessed Baida's death and gave an identical account of the circumstances of his killing.

According to the wives of Baida, after his death Seka Baluku gave order for Baida's dependents to be moved to Madina.

(2) Amigo

At least four recent escapees confirmed the death of Amigo, who died shortly after Baida. Two of Baida's former wives saw Amigo's body and confirmed his identity.¹⁴⁷ One of these women, who had been abducted by Amigo several years ago, witnessed his death from a fatal head injury caused by an exploding bomb launched by Shujaa forces during an attack. She believes Amigo was over 50 years of age.

The incident occurred as Amigo was leading a group of fighters and Baida's surviving family members to Madina, following orders from Seka Baluku. Baida, who had left earlier with one of his wives, had left his other wives and children at Defender's camp (at this point, Baida's and Tabani's camps had merged; see para. 9 and annex 4). Upon learning of Baida's death, Amigo's group set out for Madina to join the group Baida had been leading at the time of his death. However, they were attacked before linking up with the other group, which was waiting for Amigo's group's arrival. After Amigo's death, the two groups eventually merged, only to be attacked again by Shujaa forces. This second attack scattered the group and allowed several of Baida's wives and dependents to escape. The fate of the remaining members of the traveling group remains unknown.

¹⁴³ Also called Twaburani.

¹⁴⁴ His death was also reported by FARDC and UN sources.

¹⁴⁵ She explained that she recalled this date because she saw it displayed on her phone. She was allowed to have a small phone only to use it as a torch. She also carried Baida's phone with her for safekeeping. After Baida's death, the phones were confiscated from her by the combatants.

¹⁴⁶ UN and FARDC sources.

¹⁴⁷ The same two wives who testified about Baida's death. They were both on the journey heading to Madina when these events occurred, and their testimonies are concordant.

(3) Seka Issa Papasi

Seka Issa Papasi was, according to testimonies of former hostages, including his wife, an operational commander in the camp of Tabani. According to Papasi's former wife, he was reporting to commander Seka Dadi, who was under Seka Umaru.¹⁴⁸ One former hostage identified him as the commander who had abducted her.

Seka Papasi had left the camp of Tabani around Biakato, Mambasa territory in Ituri province, and walked with a group of approximately 50 fighters commanded by "Docta" Kavugo,¹⁴⁹ and some dependents. On the way to Manguredjipa, they were attacked by UPDF, and Seka Papasi was killed.¹⁵⁰ Three of Seka Papasi's wives were already in Manguredjipa, sent ahead by Papasi with the assurance that he was going to join them there later. Papasi told his wife that ADF wanted to expand Islam to Lubero territory, and they wanted that in the future all ADF fighters go there for mandatory prayers, as they were going to establish a famous mosque there.

ADF fighters reported killed by Ugandan authorities, and updates on Meddie Nkalubo and Mulalo

The government of Uganda also informed the Group, in an official communication dated 1 November 2024 and transmitted to the Group on 5 November, that a number of "top ADF terrorists including Muraaro Segujja, Feza, Musa Kamusi, Boaz, Rubangakene, Abu Yassin, Bagdad, Fazul and Mzee Mubindio have been *put out of action*". The Group was yet unable to independently verify this information.

At the end of 2023, UPDF had reported that high-profiled ADF commanders Meddie Nkalubo¹⁵¹ alias Punisher, and Mulalo¹⁵² were killed. At the time, the Group reported that it was unable to confirm their deaths (see S/2023/990, para. 15). Since then, both commanders resurfaced in narratives of ADF activities throughout 2024. Meddie Nkalubo is reportedly very active,¹⁵³ and would be present in the constellation of groups that moved with Musa Baluku northwards into the Epulu reserve, North of the Mambasa–Lolwa–Komanda axis, as acknowledged by the government of Uganda in its communication dated 1 November 2024.

As for Mulalo, while he was reported alive and active in the first part of 2024, several former hostages and combatants interviewed by the Group recently reported that he was killed around April-May 2024. Reports of his activities seized after this date, suggesting that he is in fact "out of action". However, reliable sources close to ADF claimed that he is alive, although he has been severely injured and was evacuated for medical care. The possibility that the news of his death is used as a cover for him evading detection cannot be excluded. The Group can therefore not confirm his killing.

ADF commanders arrested

Toyo Adallah, responsible for resupply in Baluku's Madina camp, was arrested on 7 July 2024. The Ugandan government reported¹⁵⁴ that in fact Toyo surrendered, as he was facing a death sentence by ADF for having committed adultery.¹⁵⁵ At the time of his surrender, Toyo was on mission in Bahaha, Mambasa territory, to pick up supplies for Madina camp.¹⁵⁶ Toyo was taken by UPDF to Uganda, where is currently held.

¹⁴⁸ Several sources confirmed that Tabani, Seka Umaru, and Seka Dadi were together in the camps that merged around July 2024.

¹⁴⁹ Several sources, including FARDC intelligence and former hostages who escaped from the area of Manguredjipa confirmed that a group that joined Abwakasi were under the command of Dr. Kavugo. Dr. Kavugo was with Tabani before, towards Mamove-Biakato. Because of the attacks by Operation Shujaa, they crossed westwards of the RN44 on 18 September – an exchange of fire between Shujaa and Kavugo's group was confirmed by FARDC sources. Dr. Kavugo crossed with a few dependants and reached Abwakasi.

¹⁵⁰ According to Seka Papasi's wife.

¹⁵¹ See S/2023/431, paras. 32 and 38.

¹⁵² See S/2021/560, annex 4.

¹⁵³ Former hostages and former combatants interviewed by the Group, FARDC, UN sources, and intelligence sources.

¹⁵⁴ Official communication by the Government of Uganda, dated 1 November 2024, transmitted to the Group of experts on 5 November 2024.

¹⁵⁵ The fact that he was sought by ADF for having committed adultery was confirmed by former ADF combatants.

¹⁵⁶ Former combatants.

The Group inquired with the Ugandan government about the arrest, on 18 May 2024, of an ADF commander known as Anywari Al Iraq, or AA, an alleged IED expert hailing from the Busia district in Eastern Uganda. The capture of Anywari Al Iraq was reported in Ugandan media¹⁵⁷ and attributed to a successful Shujaa operation, which also led to the seizing of several items, including:

- One sub-machine gun (SMG)
- 45 rounds of ammunition
- Three walkie-talkies
- One propellant charge
- An assortment of improvised explosive device (IED) making materials

The only image of the seized materiel was of an SMG:



Source: UPDF

Images of the captured commander:



Source: UPDF

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-shujaa/operation-shujaa-adf-ied-expert-captured/> (last accessed on 14 November 2024).

The above image was accompanied by the following caption: “The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), in the ongoing operation, codenamed “Operation Shujaa”, today apprehended a commander of the Allied Democratic Forces terrorist group known as Anywari Al Iraq, also referred to as AA”.¹⁵⁸

The government of Uganda did not provide any information about the arrest of this individual. Instead, it informed the Group of the arrest of ADF operatives Yakut Musana and Abdul Rashid Kyoto aka Njovu, without providing any further details.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Official communication by the Government of Uganda, dated 1 November 2024, transmitted to the Group of experts on 5 November 2024.

Annex 2 (para. 9)


Movement of ADF camps and commanders

Mouvement des camps et des commandants de l'ADF

ADF territorial configuration prior to launching Phase IV of Operation Shujaa (May 2024)

Prior to the launching of phase IV of Operation Shujaa on 20 May 2024, ADF groups were operating in the northern part of Beni territory and in the southern Irumu territory of Ituri province, attacking civilians and attempting to avoid contact with security forces. ADF cells were particularly active in the “death triangle” north of Beni and Mavivi, along the RN4 around Oicha, and in the Mbau-Kamango area (S/2024/432, paras. 9-11).

ADF cells were dispersed across five major areas, as illustrated below, with Seka Baluku positioned west of Butani hill; Mzee Meya, Rafiki and Lumisa in the area of Mont Hoyo Reserve; Tabani, Braida (NW of Eringeti) and Defender¹⁶⁰ (around Mayi-Moya, SW of Eirngeti) were separate, although within a day’s walking distance from each other. Abwakasi was further south, moving around in the Mavivi-Oicha-Mangina area.



Map indicating the position of main ADF groups and their area of influence (in green) until May 2024. The area of interest of Operation Shujaa phase 4 is indicated in blue.

Map Data: Google, ©2023 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Map provided with annotations by a confidential source.

¹⁶⁰ See S/2015/19, annexes 4 and 9, and S/2023/990, annex 12.

Impact of Shujaa operations on ADF's territorial configuration (May-July 2024)

Operation Shujaa targeted these camps with both aerial and ground operations.¹⁶¹ Due to the heightened military pressure, ADF groups – weakened and with their positions compromised – were compelled to move. High mobility has always been their survival strategy (S/2023/990, para. 15).¹⁶²

ADF cells began moving along three main axes:¹⁶³

- (1) **Madina camp of Musa Baluku**, absorbing an increased number of dependents and hostages, began moving north, along the Eringeti – Komanda axis into Mambasa territory of Ituri Province, advancing north of Lolwa. Mzee Meya Sebagala's group, called to offer combat support and protection to Madina, began moving from the area north of Eringeti.
- (2) West of the Oicha-Eringeti axis (west of RN4), moving towards Biakato (situated along the RN44) the loose constellation of the cells led by **Braida, Tabani, and Kasibante aka Defender were also in westward movement**. According to former hostages, their camps were at about one day walking distance apart, not too far in case they needed combat support one from the other. Witnesses reported frequent visits and exchanges between these camps.
- (3) Towards the end of May and early June, **Abwakasi** began an aggressive push south-west towards Lubero territory, crossing Bapere sector towards the Bandulu forest area, passing through Kambau and Manguredjipa. Sources indicated that Abwakasi's intention was to drive the attention of Shujaa operation away from Baluku's Madina camp,¹⁶⁴ which was moving north, in the opposite direction. Other witnesses¹⁶⁵ reported an additional intention to scout new territories for ADF in Lubero.


¹⁶¹ FARDC, UN sources, intelligence sources, researchers, former hostages and former ADF combatants.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Former hostages who escaped from Abwakasi's camp near Manguredjipa.



Map depicting the position of main ADF groups and their area of influence (in gray) in July 2024. Map provided with annotations by a confidential source.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Merging into fewer mega-camps since July 2024

As camps were in movement throughout May-June along the three axes (see above), relocating under Shujaa pressure, by July they began converging into a few mega-camps. This was a highly unusual configuration for ADF.

The six camps merged into three mega-camps: (1) Madina of Seka Baluku, (2) the constellation of Tabani-Braida-Defender groups, and (3) Abwakasi's camp in Lubero.

(1) Madina camp, commanded by Seka Baluku

Madina, the main camp led by Seka Baluku, traditionally housed ADF's core leadership and most dependents. Although it has been displaced multiple times in the past, Madina camp only relocated entirely when it was under serious threat. Since May-June, Madina absorbed a lot more civilians from other camps, with former hostages and combatants reporting the presence of over 1,000 individuals, including at least 200 fighters.¹⁶⁶

Mzee Mayor and Lumisa have merged into Madina to offer protection and combat support and were moving along with Baluku.

¹⁶⁶ Confirmed by UN and FARDC sources.

As of July 15, Madina was seen moving north of the RN4 near Lolwa, fleeing a UPDF airstrike, moving into Mambasa territory,¹⁶⁷ with ADF incursions and attacks on civilians reported in the area since July 2024.¹⁶⁸

By the end of August – early September, Baluku’s camp was reported some 30 km north of Lolwa.¹⁶⁹

According to FARDC and former hostages interviewed by the Group, Baluku’s intention was to find refuge in Epulu forest inside the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, a densely forested area with difficult access and without FARDC and UPDF presence, and outside the officially agreed area of Shujaa operations.

(2) Tabani – Braidia – Defender camp, under general command of Seka Umaru

Former hostages and combatants from the camps of Braidia, Tabani and Defender have consistently reported that the three camps have merged by latest July 2024. The commanders decided to merge their camps as each of these camps had been badly affected by the Shujaa attacks, lost many combatants, and were vulnerable to further attacks. Seka Umaru, Baluku’s trusted deputy, was commander of the merged camp, which at the time of the merger was located around Biakato. Due to the large number of dependents in the newly merged camp, former hostages reported that the decision was made, on Baluku’s orders, to move some of the dependents to Madina (mainly wives and children of commanders, and young girls who had to be married). It is during such a voyage towards Madina that Braidia and Amigo were killed, in August (see above annex 1).

Since then, former hostages reported that this merged mega camp was hit at least once by Shujaa operations and changed its location at least once.¹⁷⁰ Since August-September, Defender allegedly moved again with a smaller group of fighters, west of Biakato.¹⁷¹

Small detachments from the Tabani-Braidia-Defender camp traveled to Manguredjipa to join Abwakasi’s group. While some dependents moved towards Madina, three hostages reported overhearing that the combatants accompanying the civilians planned to return from Madina and join Abwakasi in Manguredjipa. At least three recently escaped hostages indicated they were en route to Manguredjipa in a group led by Seka Dadi, who succeeded Braidia after his death. One hostage escaped from Manguredjipa on September 29, confirming that at least part of the group arrived there. FARDC confirmed Seka Dadi’s presence with Abwakasi, as they clashed with this group on 23 September near Manguredjipa.

Hostages from Tabani’s camp also reported that Tabani ordered a group to travel to Manguredjipa, led by commanders Docta Kavugo and Seka Papasi—the latter was killed during the journey, while Docta Kavugo reportedly lost his way.

(3) Abwakasi’s group in Lubero

From July onwards, Abwakasi has been operating in Bapere sector in Lubero territory, where he was joined by other smaller group detachments from the camps of Braidia and Tabani (see above). Alongside Abwakasi, the presence of commanders Chalamanda¹⁷² and Seka Dadi¹⁷³ was reported.¹⁷⁴

Abwakasi’s presence in the area was reported until the time of drafting this report, where he continued exploiting and destabilizing the forested areas west of Manguredjipa, which likely provided essential resources for the group’s survival.

¹⁶⁷ FARDC, intelligence sources, UN sources, researchers, former hostages and combatants.

¹⁶⁸ FARDC, civil society, and UN sources.

¹⁶⁹ Idem.

¹⁷⁰ Former hostages who were present in the camp.

¹⁷¹ Former hostage, and UN source.

¹⁷² S/2021/560, annexes 18 and 20, and S/2023/990, annex 12.

¹⁷³ Commander who replaced Braidia.

¹⁷⁴ FARDC, security sources, UN sources, former hostages and combatants.



Map depicting the area of operations of the Abwakasi cell in Bapere sector, Lubero territory, highlighted in red.
Map provided and annotated by a confidential source.

Map Data: Google, ©2023 **Landsat/Copernicus**, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Territorial configuration in October-November 2024

The territorial configuration did not change significantly since July-September. Hostages who recently escaped from the various camps continued reporting the same general locations. In early November, the ADF groups north of Lolwa – Baluku’s enlarged group – were conducting incursions including further east of Komanda, along the Komanda-Luna axis, impacting the area inhabited by the Ngiti, and clashing with the FRPI group defending the territory.¹⁷⁵ This suggests that ADF sub-groups continue scouting new territories to establish camps, restore supply networks, and evade Shujaa operations.

ADF presence continued being reported west of Biakato. Abwakasi’s group was still in the Bapere sector in Lubero territory, including along the border Mambasa territory. In the recent weeks, there has been a temporary lull in attacks against civilians.

The Ugandan government reported to the Group that, as on 1 November 2024, ADF was “separated into two major groups, due to the heightened military pressure”, without this having impacted the group’s command structure:

- One group is headed northwards into Epulu Game Reserve, north of the Komanda-Lolwa-Mambasa road. The “top ADF commanders in this area include Musa Baluku, Hood Lukwago, Mzee Mayor Sebagala and Meddie Nkablubo, among others.”
- The second group is headed westwards into Tshopo Province, west of the Mambasa-Biakato-Beni-Butembo “highways”. The “top ADF commanders in this area are Abu Waquas [Abwakasi, n.n.], Chalamanda, Sheikh Hadad and Mzee Jamal.”

The Ugandan government further stressed in its letter that the “Joint Forces continued to monitor these movements and maintain pursuit in order to neutralize them and consolidate achievements”.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ UN and FARDC sources.

¹⁷⁶ Letter dated 1 November 2024 by the Ugandan government in response to the inquiries of the Group.

Annex 3 (para. 12)

UPDF drone crash on 11 August 2024 outside Shujaa operational area raising tensions

Crash d'un drone de l'UPDF le 11 août 2024 à l'extérieur de la zone opérationnelle de Shujaa provoquant des tensions

On the evening of 11 August 2024, a military drone with Ugandan flag markings crashed on a hill in Bwisabuni village, Djugu territory, about 10 kilometers southeast of Bunia. FARDC retrieved the drone, claiming that the flight recorder and some other technical parts were allegedly taken by local armed elements who first discovered the wreckage.¹⁷⁷

Pictures of the wreckage received from UN source:



Images of the wreckage taken at the crash site on 11 August 2024. Provided by military expert source.

Based on the images of the wreckage and reports written by military experts, that the Group obtained confidential copies of, the drone was identified as the **HERMES 900 Starliner, manufactured by ELBIT SYSTEM**.¹⁷⁸

The drone has an endurance of over 30 hours and can fly at a maximum altitude of 30,000 feet (9,100 meters). Its main mission includes reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications relay. The cost of this drone ranges between \$6.8 million and \$8.8 million.¹⁷⁹

Technical Specifications:

- Wingspan: 15 meters
- Weight: 970 kg
- Payload capacity: 300 kg
- Payload options: Electro-optical/infrared sensors, synthetic aperture radar, communications, electronic intelligence, electronic warfare, hyperspectral sensors.

¹⁷⁷ FARDC sources

¹⁷⁸ <https://aviationsmilitaires.net/v3/kb/aircraft/show/2716/elbit-hermes>

¹⁷⁹ Military expert sources citing the specialized journal *Jane's*.

The HERMES 900 is a medium-sized, multi-payload drone with medium altitude and long endurance, succeeding the HERMES 450 series—one of the most widely used military drones globally. It is configured for tactical, operational, or strategic observation missions.



Source: AviationsMilitaires.net¹⁸⁰

Example image of a HERMES 900

A source with access to FARDC and UPDF high command, with direct knowledge of the matter, reported that UPDF acknowledged ownership of the drone, and that the crash sparked significant frustration from FARDC officials. The source claimed that UPDF's explanation for the drone's presence, claiming it was intended for operations in Komanda, was vague and inconsistent. The fact that the drone crashed at night raised further concerns about its intended mission. The FARDC expressed strong discontent with the UPDF's lack of advance notification, emphasizing that UPDF should follow the example set by MONUSCO, which consistently informs FARDC prior to launching drones in Congolese airspace. FARDC intelligence sources claimed that the UPDF surveillance drone violated Congolese airspace in an area not covered by the Shujaa Operation. Several high ranking FARDC officers voiced their suspicion that the drone has been conducting reconnaissance in Djugu territory due to ongoing security issues near Lake Albert, claiming previous sightings of a similar drone flying over Congolese airspace in the area of Tchomia. This could not be confirmed by the Group.

This incident has highlighted ongoing issues regarding coordination and communication between the two forces.

Despite unofficially claiming a serious breach of Congolese airspace represented by the incident, the Group is unaware of any official complaint filed by the Congolese authorities with the Government of Uganda.

¹⁸⁰ https://aviationsmilitaires.net/media/thumbnails/1920/pictures/800px-Hermes_900.jpg.webp

Annex 4 (para. 14)**Expansion of Operation Shujaa in pursuit of fleeing ADF groups****L'extension de l'opération Shujaa à la poursuite des groupes d'ADF en fuite**


The fourth phase of Operation Shujaa began in November 2023 (S/2024/432, annexes 1 and 2). While it was initially slow and unsuccessful, it was relaunched on 20 May 2024, when it finally gained momentum, prompted by a shift in strategy to address the ADF's increased mobility and expanding presence. While earlier phases were confined to regions near the Uganda-DRC border and RN4, the latest phase expanded west of RN4, covering critical areas near the border of North Kivu and Ituri provinces. This new reach aimed to target prominent ADF leaders and groups, including Abwakasi, Braida, Defender, Tabani and Mzee Meya. Madina, the ADF's headquarters, remained outside Shujaa's boundaries – mainly due to DRC's concerns about a deeper Ugandan military presence in Ituri (see para. 14). Despite this exclusion, the intensified pressure from Shujaa operations has pushed the ADF to relocate its groups further north and south-west (see paras. 15-18, and above).¹⁸¹ This new territorial configuration suggests ADF's intention to regroup in areas outside the official Shujaa zone, north of Ituri river (Baluku) and western-Lubero (Abwakasi).

In response to the ADF's geographical shifts from June to August 2024, the operational boundaries of Shujaa have extended unofficially, on an ad hoc basis. Ground and air operations forced ADF units to spread across new locations, using major routes like Mambasa-Komanda (RN4) and Mambasa-Mangina (RN44) for mobility. A UPDF base was established in Manguredjipa in mid-July, to launch operations targeting the newly relocated Abwakasi group, and regular operations were conducted east and west of RN44 near Biakato, targeting the Tabani-Braida-Defender group constellation.¹⁸²

A comparison of the two maps below illustrates the ad-hoc extension of Shujaa's area of operations, from May-June onwards, in response to ADF's mobility. The maps also illustrate that Baluku's Madina camp remained outside the officially designated area of operations.

¹⁸¹ FARDC, intelligence sources, UN sources, and researchers.


¹⁸² Idem.



Map 1: depicting in light blue, the Shujaa Operation's officially agreed area of intervention, during the period from November 2023 to June 2024

Map Data: Google, ©2023 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Map 2: depicting, in light blue, the Shujaa Operation's officially agreed area of intervention, and in dark blue the ad hoc extensions in pursuit of the Abwakasi and Tabani-Braida-Defender groups, during the period from June to August 2024

Map Data: Google, ©2023 **Landsat/Copernicus**, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Maps provided and annotated by confidential source

Tensions and negotiations continued, even at the time of writing, regarding the extension of Shujaa's area of operations north of Ituri river, to pursue Baluku's relocated Madina camp. Confidential security sources reported that discussions were advancing, and that President Tshisekedi's visit to Uganda on 30 October 2024, on the invitation of President Museveni, also included discussions about the extension of Shujaa.

At the time of writing, the Group did not yet have official confirmation on the outcome of these negotiations. In its letter addressed to the Group on 1 November 2024, the Government of Uganda noted that "Uganda continues to engage the DRC on the designation of new areas of joint operations in relation to the [ADF] group's location and movements."

Annex 5 (para. 18)**ADF's technological advancements****Avancées technologiques de l'ADF**

Although ADF were significantly affected by Shujaa attacks, they have found ways of compensating for their diminished capacities operations through reliance on technology.

Use of drones

Accounts from detained ADF collaborators, captured and surrendered combatants, and former hostages confirm that each ADF camp was equipped with small drones,¹⁸³ primarily used for surveillance to scout new locations and targets, and to avoid threats.¹⁸⁴ Drones were reported by eyewitnesses in the camps of Baluku, Tabani, Braida, Abwakasi, and Defender. Baluku and Braida had at least four drones each.¹⁸⁵ At least eight drones were supplied from Kampala, with support from Da'esh.¹⁸⁶

Fabrication of drone-born IEDs

On 11 August 2024, ADF carried out an attempted drone-born IED attack on an FARDC position in Malyajama, approximately 30 km northwest of Beni. However, the device failed to detonate.



Images of the improvised IED dropped by the drone, received from security sources

According to several sources, Da'esh, who supplied at least eight drones to ADF, also assisted ADF with the know-how to construct the drone-borne bomb.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ Quadcopter surveillance drones.

¹⁸⁴ Intelligence sources, FARDC, UN, researchers, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

¹⁸⁵ Former hostages and former combatants from Baluku and Braida's camps.

¹⁸⁶ Two former combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.


¹⁸⁷ Two former combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.

Sources confirmed that Meddie Nkalubo alias Punisher (S/2023/431, para. 38) constructed the drone-borne IED and had carried out at least one successful test before the failed bomb attempt on FARDC.¹⁸⁸

Although the ADF does not yet appear to have fully perfected the technology, the development of drone-borne IEDs poses a significant new threat in the theater of operations. According to accounts from former hostages and ex-combatants, these devices were intended for use against FARDC forces. Additionally, the same sources reported the ongoing fabrication of IEDs in each camp, indicating that threat from both conventional and drone-borne IEDs remains elevated, as the group continues to enhance its capabilities.¹⁸⁹

Use of computers and satellite communications

ADF also used satellite communications to evade possible detection through usage of cellphone data. Witnesses reported the use of ‘Starlink’,¹⁹⁰ a satellite-based internet system enabled by a small satellite dish.¹⁹¹ Eyewitnesses – former hostages and former combatants – described the equipment as consisting of a small rectangular plate and a compact box, closely matching the specifications of a Starlink device (see image below).



Example image of a portable STARLINK device¹⁹²
Source: STARLINK

The availability of Starlink likely enhanced communication between camp commanders and with their networks outside the DRC, particularly ISCAP (see annex 8 above). Former ADF combatants indicated that Seka Baluku, Mzee Pierro, and Punisher (Meddie Nkalubo) used such a device, indicating that Madina camp was equipped with at least one such device. One former combatant who knew Meddie Nkalubo reported that the latter obtained a Starlink device approximately 9 months ago.¹⁹³

Former hostages and combatants also referred to the commanders in each camp using laptops, solar batteries, walkie-talkies (“Motorolas”) and cell phones.

¹⁸⁸ Ex-combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.

¹⁸⁹ Researchers, intelligence sources, FARDC, UN sources, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

¹⁹⁰ Researchers, intelligence sources, FARDC, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

¹⁹¹ <https://www.starlink.com/specifications>

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Using as reference November 2024.

Annex 6 (paras. 19-22)**Attacks on the civilian population****Attaques contre la population civile**

Despite the relative success of Operation Shujaa in eliminating key ADF commanders and dismantling some camps, ADF attacks on civilians have continued and even intensified. ADF adopted a survival-oriented approach, relying on opportunistic ambushes or attacks on roads, small villages and farmers (S/2023/990, para. 15), for looting, kidnapping, revenge, and fulfilling the jihadist aim of killing ‘kafir’ (non-Muslim infidels).

Between 1 June and 5 November 2024, MONUSCO documented over 650 civilian deaths¹⁹⁴ across at least 124 ADF-attributed incidents.¹⁹⁵ The violence affected the broader Beni region, northwestern Lubero (primarily the Bapere sector) in North Kivu, and southern Ituri, particularly in Mambasa and Irumu territories.

June 2024 marked the deadliest month on record for ADF-perpetrated civilian killings, with over 200 deaths reported across Beni, Lubero, and southern Ituri.¹⁹⁶ The area around Cantine locality¹⁹⁷ west of Beni and the area of Manguredjipa were especially hard-hit (see below), prompting significant population displacement.¹⁹⁸

Massacres by Abwakasi’s group in Beni and Lubero territories since June 2024

Between 3 and 12 June, Abwakasi’s group attacked at least 10 localities, killing over 150 civilians as it was advancing westwards through Beni territory, moving away from the Shuja operations. During all these attacks, Abwakasi’s group also looted property, burned houses and destroyed vehicles and health centers.¹⁹⁹ In particular:

- On 3 June, Abwakasi’s group crossed the RN44 road and attacked Ngwaba village, killing three civilians.
- On the same day, the group advanced further south-west towards Mashao (or Masau) village, where it killed at least 18 civilians.
- On 5 June, the group attacked the villages of Kabwiki²⁰⁰ and Keme, where at least eight civilians were killed.
- On 7 June, Abwakasi’s group advanced further, attacking Masala (10 km southwest of Cantine) and two other nearby settlements.²⁰¹ ADF erected roadblocks along the main road connecting the three localities, pretended to be Wazalendo armed elements to gain the trust of the locals, and then proceeded to kill civilians trapped between the roadblocks. Women and children accompanying ADF fighters also participated in the attack. DRC authorities and local sources reported having found 41 bodies in the aftermath of the attack, in the village of Masala and in the neighboring villages of Mahihi and Keme.²⁰²
- On 9 June, Abwakasi’s group raided the village of Makusa, killing at least four civilians.
- On 10 and 11 June, they attacked two other localities, Pandose and Masango, killing at least four civilians.
- On 12 June, they massacred over 40 civilians in Mayikengo village.²⁰³

¹⁹⁴ Of which 190 documented in Ituri, in the territories of Mambasa and Irumu), and 462 in North Kivu, including Lubero and Beni territories, and Butembo. This figure includes only verified incidents, so the actual number is likely significantly higher. Another international organization operating in the area documented over 700 killings.

¹⁹⁵ Of these, 68 incidents were recorded in Mambasa and Irumu territories of Ituri, and 56 in Lubero and Beni territories, as well as the area of Butembo.

¹⁹⁶ Humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, UN and intelligence sources.

¹⁹⁷ Cantine is an important agricultural and mining zone in the Grand Nord, a region that has not been impacted by ADF activities in the recent years.

¹⁹⁸ Humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, UN and intelligence sources.

¹⁹⁹ UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, security and intelligence sources, researchers.

²⁰⁰ Also referred to as Kabweke.


²⁰¹ UN, security, intelligence sources, and researchers.

²⁰² FADRC, humanitarian and UN sources. See also <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/death-toll-rises-41-attack-eastern-congo-villages-2024-06-09/>.

²⁰³ See also <https://www.faapa.info/en/deadly-rebel-attack-in-eastern-dr-congo-claims-30-lives/>.

As the Abwakasi group advanced into the Bapere sector of Lubero territory, near the border between Beni and Lubero, reports of deadly attacks on civilians began emerging from 13 June onward:

- On 18 June, an unconfirmed number of civilians were killed at Mabiti village, while Da'esh claimed that 11 Christians were beheaded.²⁰⁴
- The following day, at least 10 civilians were killed in a village 5km further from south of Mabiti, with Da'esh claiming to have killed 20 individuals.²⁰⁵
- On 21 June, ADF attacked Kyanganda, in northern Lubero territory, killing at least 14 civilians and burning civilian houses.²⁰⁶ Photographs depict the bodies of at least 10 people lying on the side of the road, their arms bound behind their backs, with apparent gunshot wounds to their heads.²⁰⁷ Da'esh claimed that at least 40 civilians were killed during this attack,²⁰⁸ but the Group of Experts could not confirm this number.²⁰⁹



Map depicting the movements of Abwakasi's group from Beni territory towards Lubero and the villages it attacked along the way, from 3 to 18 June. UN source

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Landsat/Copernicus, © 2024 Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 2 September 2021

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Between end of July and early August, ADF (Abwakasi's group) continued its operations in western Lubero, focusing on Njiapanda and Manguredjipa. Since early June 2024, Abwakasi's group killed at least 361 individuals,²¹⁰ with the majority of incidents being claimed by Da'esh (see below annex 8).

Various sources confirmed that this sequence of attacks was perpetrated by the group led by Abwakasi, accompanied by commander Chalamanda.²¹¹ Once the group arrived in the area of Manguredjipa, it settled around Bandulu forest and continued sporadic attacks on civilians and engaged in clashes with FARDC and armed groups (see para. 30).

²⁰⁴ UN, civil society and intelligence sources. The claim published by Da'esh is reproduced in annex 2 of this report.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ UN, civil society and intelligence sources.

²⁰⁷ Images received from intelligence source, on file with the Secretariat.

²⁰⁸ Claim published by Da'esh, reproduced in annex 2 of this report.

²⁰⁹ On 29 June, Da'esh published an album of nine photos depicting victims and the aftermath of the attack on Kyanganda, perpetrated on 21 June. The publication is on file with the Secretariat.

²¹⁰ Documented by the UN.

²¹¹ Former hostages and combatants, UN source, FARDC sources, Ugandan government.

The attacks perpetrated by Abwakasi's group were distinguished by the extreme brutality of the killings. Occasionally they also employed an atypical *modus operandi*. For example, during the attacks in the first half of June, including in Masala on 7 June, ADF relied more extensively than usual on firearms.²¹² Some combatants disguised themselves as a Wazalendo armed group that came to combat ADF, while others reportedly wore previously stolen FARDC uniforms. During the attacks on Masala and Mayikengo, Abwakasi's group cut off the roads leading into the villages, asked the village chief to gather all the locals and opened fire on the civilians. Women and children who came along with Abwakasi's group also participated in the killings.²¹³ The increased use of firearms during these attacks was probably due to a recent restock in supplies – notably, the ammunition used was traced back to FARDC supplies stolen in late May by another ADF attack against FARDC military trucks.²¹⁴

The attacks recorded are in line with ADF's established strategy of retaliating against civilians in response to military operations against the group (S/2024/432, para. 9). However, Abwakasi's attacks most likely served as a tactic to divert attention away from other ADF bases that were threatened, such as Madina (S/2024/432, para. 11) allowing Baluku greater freedom of movement. During this same period, significantly less attacks were recorded in Irumu, where Baluku's group was moving north towards Lolwa.²¹⁵

In addition, the absence of FARDC in the affected areas may also have contributed to the elevated death toll, as ADF encountered no resistance on its path.

Attacks by other ADF groups in north-western Beni territory

While Abwakasi was leading the push into Lubero, the constellation of Braida-Tabani-Defender groups were active west of the RN4 road (northwest of Beni), heading towards and eventually crossing west of Biakato (see above annex 2).

Braida's group was responsible for most of the violent attacks perpetrated by ADF in the north-western part of Beni territory, involving killings and kidnappings, notably in the Mamove – Beu Manyama area in the first half of August 2024.²¹⁶ Braida's group was notably responsible for the killing of civilians in the villages of Bayeti and Mukoni, as well as other nearby villages, on 9 and 10 August, respectively.²¹⁷ More than 20 civilians were reported killed during these attacks.²¹⁸

From mid-August to September, this group was continuously being tracked and attacked by Shujaa. After the death of Braida in mid-August (see annex 1), the group was temporarily scattered but continued operating in the north-western area of Beni.²¹⁹

Attacks in Mambasa and Irumu territories in Ituri

The main camp of Seka Baluku, moving north into Mambasa, kept a relatively low profile. According to testimonies, it suffered severe losses and was suffering a shortage of supplies. In addition, its movement was burdened by the very high number of civilian dependents travelling along (see above annex 2).

Generally, this group has focused on conducting attacks to resupply, with a pattern of looting health centers and abducting medical staff – likely to treat the group's ailing members.²²⁰

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ UN, civil society, intelligence and confidential sources.

²¹⁴ UN sources.

²¹⁵ Idem

²¹⁶ UN sources, FARDC, intelligence sources, former hostages and combatants.

²¹⁷ UN and humanitarian sources.

²¹⁸ Idem.

²¹⁹ UN sources, former hostages who escaped from this group.

²²⁰ UN sources, FARDC, former hostages and former combatants.

Annex 7 (para. 23)**ADF unified command and control****Commandement et contrôle unifiés de l'ADF**

While ADF sub-groups functioned with a degree of decentralization, they continued to depend on a centralized command and control framework. Former hostages and former combatants confirmed that Baluku was still the decision-maker, deciding on major operations, receiving reports from other commanders, deciding on punishments, distributing resources, including hostages. These sources mentioned that although some smaller operations or attacks may not have required prior authorization by Baluku, he had to be informed of everything. Every commander was sending photographs of the results of their operations – evidence of killings, of pillaged goods and hostages taken – to Baluku.

ADF core leadership

Baluku designated Seka Umaru as his successor, in the event of his death. Mzee Pierro, based in Madina, was Baluku's deputy in charge of operations. Mzee Kayira, another senior commander based in Madina, was in charge of ADF logistics and finance. All other commanders reported to them or directly to Baluku.²²¹

The Group found no evidence to suggest that Abwakasi's group has achieved independence from Seka Baluku. Recent interviews with former ADF combatants and former hostages suggest that Abwakasi relocated to the Bapere Sector with Baluku's consent.

The Ugandan government reported to the Group that, as on 1 November 2024, ADF was "separated into two (02) major groups, due to the heightened military pressure", without this having impacted the group's command structure.

²²¹ Former combatants, former hostages, intelligence sources, UN sources, FARDC, researchers.

Annex 8 (para. 26)**Da'esh amplifying claims and propaganda****Da'esh amplifie ses revendications et sa propagande***Sharp increase in Da'esh claims for attacks suggesting improved collaboration*

The sharp rise in ADF attacks since June 2024 was accompanied by a corresponding increase in claims by Da'esh through its Central Africa Province (ISCAP).²²² Between 2 June and 29 June, Da'esh issued 32 claims, followed by an additional 79 claims from July through October 2024. This brings the total to 111 claims made between June and October, including special editions and regular reports in Da'esh's weekly *an-Nabā'* editorial (see below).

Given that MONUSCO recorded at least 124 ADF-attributed incidents between 1 June and 5 November 2024 (see annex 6 above), not including clashes with FARDC and armed groups, of which MONUSCO documented at least 19 during the same period. Da'esh's publications cover approximately 89% of these documented incidents.²²³

Additionally, the time taken by Da'esh to claim responsibility for ADF attacks has also decreased, from several days to sometimes 24 hours after the attacks. At times several attacks were claimed for the same day, from various locations in the DRC (see below list of claims), suggesting that communication about attacks by various ADF groups operating in Ituri and in North Kivu was centralized.

The above trends suggest a closer collaboration between Da'esh and ADF.

List of claims for ADF attacks published by Da'esh since June 2024

<i>Date</i>	<i>Translated text of the claim</i>
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted a vehicle of infidel Christians along the road between the villages of Tchabi and Kamango in the Beni area last Thursday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 Christians, one of whom was a member of the Congolese army."
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian that was on a motorcycle near the village of Kainama in the Beni area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in this death and the burning of the motorcycle."
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner along the Kainama village road in the Beni area yesterday, and executed him."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Mangina in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mashua in the Beni area, killing upwards of 19 Christians while others fled, then they attacked in the same village positions of a local allied militia to the Congolese army with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, then the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses and captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions."
June 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Sesa in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
June 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Kabwiki in the Beni area, killing 8 Christians and causing others to flee, and then the mujahideen captured some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions."

²²² Intelligence and security sources, researchers.

²²³ In comparison, analytical data available for the month of January 2023 from an intelligence source shows that only 5% of ADF attacks documented were claimed by Da'esh. According to another comparative analysis conducted by a confidential security source, covering the period from January 2023 to end of May 2024, there has been a steady increase in claims since December 2023, reaching a new peak by May 2024.

June 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them."
June 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Masala in the Beni area, killing more than 60 Christians, and took an officer and a soldier from the Congolese army as prisoner and killed them with automatic weapons, and the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses and trading centers, and captured some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions."
June 10, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a Christian village north of the town of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, killing 3 Christians with automatic weapons, and capturing some of their possessions, and burning down a number of their houses before returning to their positions safely."
June 10, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Makusa in the Beni area yesterday, killing 7 of them with automatic weapons, in addition to burning down a number of their houses and 3 motorcycles, and then they returned to their positions safely."
June 11, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 Christians prisoner near the village of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them."
June 12, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Malya in the Ituri area, killing 10 Christians while causing others to flee, and the mujahideen burned down a number of their houses and captured some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 12, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Mabanga and 4 other villages in its environs in the Beni area with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and the mujahideen burned down a number of houses and captured some of their possessions."
June 14, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Masungu in the Beni area the day before yesterday, capturing and killing 6 Christians while others fled."
June 14, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mikengo in the Beni area the day before yesterday, killing more than 45 Christians while others fled, and the mujahideen captured some of their possessions and burned down a number of their houses and trading centers, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 16, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Lumbo Lumbo in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed him."
June 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabaeti in the Lubero area of eastern Congo yesterday, killing 11 Christians and capturing some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Asefu in the Lubero area, killing more than 20 Christians, in addition to burning down a number of houses and trading centers and capturing some of their possessions, and then they returned to their positions safely."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Asefu in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of 2 elements and the capture and execution of 2 others."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Bamandi in the Ituri area, taking 18 Christians prisoner and killing 4 others with automatic weapons, the mujahideen also captured some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol allied to the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Najiapanda in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of several of them."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Najiapanda in the Lubero area, targeting them with automatic weapons, resulting in the the killing of two elements."
June 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Samboko in the Ituri are last Wednesday with automatic weapons, resulting in the wounding of many of them while the rest fled, and the mujahideen burned down the barracks and then returned safely to their positions."
June 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Kyanganda in the Lubero area yesterday, killing upwards of 40 Christians and two elements of an allied militia to the Congolese army, and the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian homes and trading centers, and captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions."
June 24, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Ofai in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
June 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday, and executed them."

June 26, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a number of infidel Christians that were traveling on motorcycles between Butembo and Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday, targeting them with automatic weapons, causing them to flee and the burning of 4 motorcycles."
June 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the town of Kiri and a number of villages surrounding it in the Lubero area yesterday, killing more than 35 Christians, among them elements from an allied militia to the Congolese army, and the mujahideen burned down more than 30 Christian homes, 7 trading centers, and 3 motorcycles, and captured some of their possessions, and then safely returned to their positions."
June 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured one infidel Christian in the village of Idohu in the Ituri area, and executed him."
June 29, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Kambau in the Lubero area yesterday, and killed 10 Christians, and burned down a number of houses and trading centers, and they captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions."
June 29, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Kambau in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of a number of them and others fled, and they [the mujahideen] burned down the barracks."
July 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Masenge in the Lubero area yesterday, clashing with an allied militia to the Congolese army with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and wounding of others, while others fled, and they [the mujahideen] burned down their positions, then the mujahideen attacked the Christians in the village, killing one, and capturing another, and burned down some of their possessions."
July 9, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentration of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bayanga in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and others fleeing."
July 11, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a foot patrol of the Congolese army and an allied militia in the village of Masenge in the Lubero area, where they detonated an IED upon them and targeted them with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of upwards of 15 soldiers, while 2 soldiers were taken prisoner and others fled. The mujahideen then captured a rifle and ammunition and then returned safely to their positions."
July 11, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army and an allied militia in the village of Biambi in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 elements and wounding of two others."
July 13, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted two infidel Christians in the village of Mukundi in the Beni area last Saturday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths."
July 15, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a soldier and the wounding of two others while others fled, and the mujahideen captured weapons and equipment and then attacked the village, capturing and killing 3 Christians. Additionally, they clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army that was trying to enter [the village] with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 3 of them, and then the mujahideen returned safely to their positions."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Idohu in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian that was riding a motorcycle along the road between the villages of Ndimu and Idohu in the Ituri area yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him and burning his bike."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabya in the Lubero area, capturing and executing 5 Christians."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Kyanganda in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and then the mujahideen burned down several Christian houses."
July 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Mayba in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing, and the capture of equipment and burned the concentrations. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village and captured and executed 19 Christians and burned down a number of houses and trading centers. And then they returned to their positions safely."
July 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted elements of the Congolese army and Christians that were on motorcycles near the village of Mahala in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths and the burning of their motorcycles and the capture of a rifle."
July 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 2 infidel Christians near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region, executing them."

July 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 6 infidel Christians near the village of Otombere in the Ituri region, executing them."
July 23, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint patrol of the Crusader Ugandan and Congolese armies near the village of Muhuyo in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of a number of them."
July 24, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Ombole in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of at least 15 Christians and the burning of a number of houses and trading centers and motorcycles. Then the mujahideen attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the same village with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing and the capture of equipment and the burning of their bases."
July 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Beu-manyama in the Ituri area yesterday, capturing and executing more than 30 Christians, in addition to burning down a number of houses and motorcycles before returning to their positions safely."
July 26, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region the day before yesterday, and executed them."
July 26, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Ombole in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed them."
July 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the villages of Mangumbu, Mweya, and Nzakya in the Beni area last Wednesday, killing upwards of 24 Christians."
July 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabunda in the Lubero area yesterday, killing 7 Christians while others fled, and the mujahideen burned down a number of houses, trading centers, and motorcycles, and then returned safely to their positions."
July 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a local militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and the capture of his rifle, while others fled, then the mujahideen attacked the barracks with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, while they captured equipment and burned down the barracks."
July 29, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of a local militia allied to the Congolese army that was trying to advance on the mujahideen's positions near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 8 elements and the others fleeing, and the capture of a rifle."
July 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan army that was trying to advance on the mujahideen's positions near the village of Mukasili in the Ituri area last Thursday with medium and light weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of more than 15 elements and the fleeing of the rest and the capture of various equipment."
July 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabino in the Lubero area, killing 11 Christians and capturing 2 others, capturing some of their positions, and then they returned to their positions safely."
July 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 12 Christians near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday, executing them, and capturing some of their positions, and then returning to their positions safely."
Aug 1, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 2 infidel Christians near the village of Idohu in the Ituri area, killing them."
Aug 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies near the village of Mambi in the Beni area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a soldier and the wounding of others."
Aug 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Minamaymbu in the Lubero area, capturing and killing 10 Christians and returning to their positions safely."
Aug 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army and a local allied militia near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of 6 elements while others fled, and the capture of equipment."
Aug 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked positions of a local militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and the mujahideen burned down positions and captured two rifles and equipment."
Aug. 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Etembu in the Lubero area yesterday, capturing and killing 4 Christians."
Aug 8, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday, capturing and killing 4 Christians."
Aug 8, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 Christians prisoner near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed them."

Aug 9, 2024	An Naba 455: “Additionally, an exclusive source told Al Naba that soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 Christians prisoner and executed them on July 30 in the village of Mwayna in the Lubero area.”
Aug 10, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of a local militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Mbalimbanguwa in the Tshopo area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 3 elements (of the militia), while others fled, and the capture of a rifle. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians inside the village, killing two among them with automatic weapons, causing others to flee. The mujahideen then burned down more than 50 houses before returning to their positions safely.”
Aug 12, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Biakato in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and they captured a rifle and equipment.”
Aug 15, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with automatic weapons with a foot patrol of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army that was trying to advance towards the Mujahideen’s positions near the village of Isange in the Lubero area, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 7 elements and others fleeing, and the capture of two rifles and equipment.” Also 5 photos released
Aug 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army along the road between Mambasa and Komanda in the Ituri area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing and the capture of a mortar and ammunition.”
Aug 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 5 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndimu in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them.”
Aug 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of one of them and others fleeing, then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village, also causing them to flee, and they then burned down more than 150 homes.”
Aug 18, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of a militia allied to the Congolese army near the village of Ndimu in the Ituri region last Thursday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of 3 elements and the wounding of others.”
Aug. 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bahaha in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the fleeing of the rest. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village, killing 7 among them with automatic weapons, then burning down a church, government institutions, and more than 50 homes and 15 motorcycles, and then they returned to their positions safely.” One photo published in An Naba 458
Aug 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Bududia in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, killing upwards of 11 Christians, capturing some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions.”
Aug. 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Pumuzika in the Tshopo area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the wounding of others and they captured two rifles and equipment.”
Aug 29, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 10 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Bududia in the Lubero area yesterday, and executed them.”
Aug 30, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Makuru in the Lubero area yesterday, killing upwards of 8 Christians and the capture of 3 others, in addition to burning down more than 10 houses and then they returned safely to their positions.”
Sept 6, 2024	An Naba 459: (Only relevant section translated): “And in the Ituri region, an exclusive source told Al Naba that soldiers of the Caliphate on Sept 2, attacked the village of Bandikila between the towns of Mambasa and Komanda, taking 25 Christians prisoner, and executing 3 among them.” One photo also released showing the dead bodies of two of the hostages.
September 7, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prison near the village of Idoho in the Ituri region, and subsequently executed them.”
September 13, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Ngereza in the Ituri area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a Christian.”
September 13, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Isange in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, killing 5 Christians.”
Sept 13, 2024	An-Naba 460: “An exclusive source told Al Naba that on Aug. 29, 2024, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies near the village of Katiran in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, killing one while others fled.” One photo also released
September 19, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner in the village of Bandembese in the Ituri area yesterday, killing him.”

September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday, killing 5 Christians."
September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Mididi in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and others fleeing, then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village and killed 3 of them, and then burned down a number of their houses and trading centers."
September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a patrol of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Mangurijiba in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and others fleeing, the capture of a rifle and equipment."
Sept. 23, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of Crusader Congolese army in the village of Tolitoli in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the wounding of others and the burning of the concentrations, additionally the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses in the village." 7 photos released
Sept. 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted several infidel Christians that were on a motorbike near the village of Mahala in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a Christian and the wounding of two others and others fleeing, and the burning of motorcycles."
Sept. 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Mambelenga in the Ituri region, executing them with automatic weapons."
Sept. 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian near the village of Tolitoli in Ituri the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him. Then the mujahideen attacked a barracks of the Congolese army in the village with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing."
Sept 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies that were attempting to advance on the mujahideen's positions near the village of Mangurujiba in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 4 soldiers from the Ugandan army and one from the Congolese army and the wounding of others, while the rest fled and they [the mujahideen] captured weapons and equipment."
Sept. 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted two elements from the Congolese militia near the village of Lolwa in the Iruri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths."
Sept. 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
Sept. 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Bilulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and the wounding of others while others fled and they [the mujahideen] captured rifles and equipment. Then, the mujahideen attacked Christians inside the village, killing 14 among them and capturing 5 others and capturing some of their possessions, then they returned safely to their positions."
Oct. 1, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted members of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, killing one." Photo released in An-Naba' 463, Oct 4, 2024
Oct. 1, 2024	Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian on a motorcycle along the road near Mambelenga in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him and burning his motorcycle." Photo released in An-Naba' 463, Oct 4, 2024
October 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Otombere in the ituri region the day before yesterday, killing 3 Christians and burning down 3 houses."
October 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 15 Christians prisoner near the village of Abitinku in the Ituri region the day before yesterday, and executed them."
October 12, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
October 15, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an officer in the Crusader Ugandan intelligence and two Christians in the village of Munguna in the Bugiri area the day before yesterday with pistol shots, resulting in their deaths."
October 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 soldiers and the others fleeing."
October 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Mambelenga in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
Oct 24, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted elements of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Monge in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, killing one."

Oct 24, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took one infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Mungamba in the Ituri area, killing him."
Oct 26, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
Oct 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Sesa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed them."
Oct 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Bandimbese in Ituri, and executed them."
Oct 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Bandimbese in Ituri, and executed them."

Claims and translations received from confidential researcher

Enhanced propaganda through Da'esh editorials and weekly reports

The increased interest from Da'esh in ADF activities was also reflected by the increase in coverage dedicated to DRC in newsletters and special edition publications. Few examples from June 2024:

In the 21 June 2024 edition of the weekly digital newsletter *an-Nabā'* (#448) contained a three-page special editorial as well as an infographic regarding the "Jihad in the Congo". On the "Operations by the Soldiers of the Caliphate in the Congo over 70 days," Da'esh reported that between 10 April and 19 June 2024, ADF conducted 82 operations, killing and wounding over 470 individuals.²²⁴

The editorial expressed Da'esh's ideological justification for ongoing violence in its Central Africa Province. It presented its actions as part of a religious duty to wage war against non-Muslims ("Christians") in the region. The text criticized what it perceived as Western media bias, asserting that violence against African Christians receives less attention than incidents affecting Western Christians. It attributed this disparity to racial discrimination and claims that this neglect helps obscure Da'esh expansion in Africa, while downplaying the difficulties faced by international forces in combating the group's activities.

Da'esh criticized the Congolese government for seeking external military support, including from Uganda and United Nations forces, which it claims have failed to protect Christian communities from violence. Additionally, the text argues that the Islamic State continues to expand and establish control, despite attempts by regional governments and international actors to suppress them: "The Christians and their allies are still warning each other about the soldiers of Islam exploiting any vacuum that results from the fighting between Congolese forces and militias in eastern Congo, as every enemy they fight is easier for them to combat than the Islamic State imposing control over the region. The alliance between the Congolese government and the Ugandan and Rwandan forces, despite their long history of hostility, is only an example of this."²²⁵

The message reiterated the group's commitment to continue violent operations, including raids and attacks, as part of their ultimate goal of establishing Islamic governance in the region. It suggests that only conversion to Islam or paying the jizyah (a tax imposed on non-Muslims) will bring security to local populations. The passage concludes with a threat that, without submission, the violence will persist, framing this path as divinely sanctioned.

To enhance the spread of propaganda for ADF, *Serah-al-Khilafah'*, a media unit aligned with Da'esh, produced an animated video based on the *an-Nabā'* (#448) report about ADF's operations in eastern DRC.²²⁶

The 27 June 2024 edition of *an-Nabā'* included "exclusive" reports on ISCPAP activities the week prior. It highlighted attacks "on Christian villages and the killing of Christians" in Lubero and Ituri in the DRC, stating that "over 70 Christians were killed and captured, including elements from Congolese army and militias, in continuous attacks by soldiers of the Caliphate in Eastern Congo". In addition to providing details about the attacks, it also featured photographs of burning houses after attacks on Kianganda in Lubero, and Bamandi in Ituri.²²⁷

²²⁴ Full text of the newsletter on file with the Secretariat.

²²⁵ Text and translation by SITE Intelligence Group.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Full text of the newsletter on file with the Secretariat.

Annex 9 (para. 27)

AFC/M23 communique denying allegations of collaboration with ADF

Communiqué de l'AFC/M23 démentant les rumeurs de collaboration avec l'ADF

On August 25, 2024, an AFC communiqué - later deemed fake by AFC - claimed that a non-aggression and collaboration pact had been established between 'ADF Nalu' and AFC/M23. According to this alleged agreement, ADF would cease attacks on civilians and focus solely on FARDC and Wazalendo forces, facilitating M23's advance. In return for financial and military support, ADF would receive 70% of Beni's cacao revenues for ten years, contingent on M23 securing control of the area. Below is a copy of the communiqué deemed fake by AFC/M23:



Published on [AFC's X account](#)

Annex 10 (para. 30)

FARDC reliance on Wazalendo groups to defend against ADF including deployment of NDC-R of Guidon in Lubero**Les FARDC s'appuient sur des groupes Wazalendo pour se défendre contre les ADF y compris le déploiement du NDC-R de Guidon dans le Lubero**

NDC-R Guidon forces have deployed in the Bapere sector of Lubero territory, claiming their presence aims to protect civilians from ADF attacks.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
LES VOLONTAIRES POUR LA DEFENSE DE LA PATRIE
RESEAU DES PATRIOTES RESISTANTS CONGOLAIS
NDUMA POUR LA DEFENSE DU CONGO RENOVE
COORDINATION

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N°031/RPRC/GSM DU 27 JUILLET 2024

Dénunciation d'un plan diabolique contre les patriotes résistants dans le LUBERO

Prenant en témoin l'opinion nationale et internationale, sur ce qui se passe dans le secteur de BAPERRE en territoire de LUBERO contre les VDP, les gens doivent retenir ce qui suit :

1. Depuis bientôt trois mois, les ADF/MTN voudraient faire expansion dans LUBERO, TSHOPO et WALIKALE via le secteur de BAPERRE, malheureusement, avec l'appui de certains fils du coin ;
2. C'est grâce à la puissance de feu des patriotes résistants du NDC-Rénové, sous conduite du Lt Gen Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA Comd des VDP, que ces terroristes et leurs alliés n'ont pas abouti à leur mission. Plus de 12 enfants ont été libéré de mains de l'ennemi et 5 terroristes ADF/MTN capturés. Après leur audition, beaucoup de choses ont été révélées sur le plan de l'ennemi et les noms de leurs collaborateurs ;
3. Dans notre communiqué de presse n°030/RPRC/GSM du 27 juillet 2024, nous avons informé le public sur l'existence d'un groupe de gens, originaires du secteur de BAPERRE qui collaborent avec les ADF/MTN afin de leur faciliter l'expansion dans le LUBERO, TSHOPO et WALIKALE. Le réseau est vaste et certains noms ont été cité ;
4. Depuis un temps, ces collaborateurs des ADF/MTN se sont distingués par des sorties médiatiques de diabolisation des patriotes résistants VDP du NDC-Rénové qui constituent un sérieux blocage à la réalisation de leur plan d'expansion ;
5. Voulant éliminer physiquement notre Comd. Des opérations dans la zone, dans la nuit du mardi 13 au mercredi 14 Août 2024, le même groupe de jeunes (collaborateurs des ADF/MTN) qui avait tué deux éléments FARDC et fuir avec leurs armes a organisé un raid dans l'habitation du Col AROBASE, deux patriotes ont perdu la vie, parmi eux un membre de famille élargie du Lt Gén. Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA.

Le NDC-Rénové dénonce avec la toute dernière énergie cet autre cas d'attaque contre ses combattants par les collaborateurs des terroristes ADF/MTN, ceci ne doit pas rester impunis car les auteurs (matériels et moraux) sont très bien connus.

A la justice de diligenter des enquêtes, afin de punir les auteurs de ces actes ignobles.

Le NDC-Rénové réaffirme sa détermination de poursuivre sa mission de défendre l'intégrité du territoire national et faire échec à l'agression étrangère sous toutes ses formes.

Ne Jamais trahir le Congo

La patrie ou la mort.

Fait à PINGA, Le 14 Août 2024
 POUR LE RESEAU DES PATRIOTES RESISTANTS CONGOLAIS
Ms Marcellin SHIMIRAY MWISSA
 Porte-Parole

Document provided by confidential civil society source.

Many armed groups were encouraged by FARDC to deploy in the region, to fill the security void due to the absence of FARDC deployments, including due to a significant number of troops having been sent to Petit Nord, to fight against M23/RDF. For example, on 12 June 2024, as ADF was advancing towards the locality of Kambau (Lubero territory), the FARDC sector chief responsible for the area requested urgent reinforcements, deploring that the ADF were advancing

towards the locality and there were no security forces present in the area, besides a few elements of “general” Mayani’s UPLC.²²⁸



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO



PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU

TERRITOIRE DE LUBERO

SECTEUR DES BAPERE

De : CHEF SECTEUR DES BAPERE

A : AT. LUBERO

RPT : - GROUPO/GOMA

- CONS PRINC INTERIEUR & SECURIT/GOMA
- COMD REGIMENT FARDC/RWENDA
- CPTER-LUBERO

TEXTE ET SIGNATURE N°5072/1/Rte/SEC-BAP/2024

HVS & VS SIGNALER PRESENCE ADF EN TERR LUBERO LOC MAGOGO (-) HIER 11/06/2024 ENEMI AVOIR TRANVERSER RIV. BIENA ET SE SITUE A CE MOMENT A 1H30 DU VILLAGE MOKELE SECTEUR DE BAPERE(-) VOIR CARTE EN ANNEXE (-) ICI PAS DE FORCES POUR LE CONTRER(-) SAUF QUELQUES ELEMENTS DE L'UPLC GEN MAYANI(-) SOLLICITONS RENFORT URGENT FARDC POUR PARRER AU PIRE ET CONTENIR AVANCER ENEMI VERS AGGLOMERATIONS OU DEPLACES DE GUERRE SE TROUVENT CONCENTRER (-) A KAMBAU POUR LE MOMENT ON COMPTE DEJA + DE 5000 PERSONNERS VENANT DE TOUTES DIRECTIONS(-) CE DEPLACES COMPOSER FEMMES ENFANTS ET VIEILLARDS AVOIR BESOIN DE L'ASSISTANCE URGENTE(-) SUIS PRESENTEMENT SUR PLACE SUIVRE DE PRES SITUATION (-) PLUS RIEN A VOS ORDRE(-) (-)



FAIT A KAMBAU, le 12/06/2024


LE CHEF DE SECTEUR DES BAPERE

MACAIRE SIVIKUNULA MWENDIWA

Document received from confidential security source


²²⁸ Confidential telegram dated 12 June 2024, issued in Kambau. Copy of the telegram is on file with the Secretariat.

Further evidence of the presence of armed groups in Lubero territory with the acquiescence of local authorities and FARDC:




Document received from confidential civil society source

Evidence of “VDP” deployment in the area of Butembo under the pretext of fighting ADF:




Document received from confidential civil society source

Document informing of the intent to establish a new “VDP” position in the Valse Vunkutu Chefferie



Republique Démocratique du Congo
PATRIOTES WAZALENDO VICTIMES DES MASSACRES
« PA.VI.M. »
 LOI N° 23/14 Col. 14 du 03 Juin 2023 / Art. 65, 66, 67 et Art. 64 alinéas 1er et 2 de la Constitution
RESERVE ARMEE POUR LA DEFENSE (R.A.D.) DE LA
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO



N° 02 /MINDEF/NK/RDC/PAVIM/PRES/NSG/2024

Transmis copie pour information à (aux) :

- Chef de la Chefferie /Secteur de V.A.L.E.S.S. VUNKUTU
- Commandant FARDC en place ;
- Commandant P.N.C en place ;
- Chef de Poste de l'ANR en place ;
- ✓ Président de la Société Civile en place
- Chef Coutumier où sera érigée la position.

Objet : Information sur l'ouverture d'une position des volontaires pour la défense de la patrie V.D.P en sigle


Monsieur le Chef de village,
Localité/agglomération


Nous, patriotes Victimes des Massacres en sigle PA.VI.M, nous avons l'honneur de venir auprès de votre personnalité pour vous présenter l'objet ci – haut émergé ;

En effet dans le cadre de contribuer à la pacification et la stabilisation de la R.D.C en général, plus particulièrement la patrie EST, dans la (province du Nord – Kivu et ITURI....), nous vous informons qu'en date du...../...../20.....nous allons procéder à l'implantation d'une nouvelle position àqui renfermera des jeunes volontaires pour la défense de la patrie et la liste de ces militaires (WAZALENDO) vous sera remise pour éviter toute dérapage dans la Communauté.


Tout en vous souhaitant une bonne lecture Monsieur, nous vous réitérons notre ferme détermination de barre la route à tous les ennemies et ainsi que ses collaborateurs.

Veuillez agréer Monsieur l'expression de nos sentiments patriotiques.

Pour le Mouvement PA.VI.M,
 Fait à Butembo, le 3.../10/2024

NGABO SHAHANZWA Guy
 Président



Document received from confidential civil society source



Document received from confidential civil society source

Annex 11 (para. 31)**Tensions between local communities and Wazalendo armed groups in Lubero territory****Tensions entre les communautés locales et les groupes armés du Wazalendo dans le territoire de Lubero**

The deployment of Wazalendo armed groups in North Kivu and Ituri under the pretext of fighting against ADF – notably of NDC-R of Guidon in Lubero (see annex 10 above) - has generated tensions with local communities. Local leaders have grown increasingly frustrated, urging the withdrawal of these armed groups, citing their ineffectiveness against ADF and M23 threats, and the exploitation of the local population.

Tensions have been further fueled by incidents such as an armed raid on 24 July 2024 on the Bodhodhea mining site, attributed to NDC-R Guidon, and an alleged attack on local NDC-R Commander Arobaz on 14 August 2024. These events have led to heightened calls for an increased FARDC presence.

On 17 August 2024, the *Conseil de la Jeunesse Bhele/Piri* in the Bapere Sector issued a communiqué (see copy of the communiqué below) addressing earlier statements from the NDC-R faction led by Guidon, including one dated 27 July 2024 (see Annex 10 above).


The communiqué demanded the departure of all Wazalendo groups from the Bapere Sector, particularly along the Butembo-Manguredjipa axis, accusing them of collaborating with the ADF. Additionally, it accused Vianney Misinge Arobaz of the NDC-R of pillaging the local population and committing acts of torture.

The communiqué outlined several demands:

- Immediate withdrawal of Arobaz and his allies from the Bapere Sector, citing their lack of positive contributions.
- An end to intimidation of *groupement* chiefs and traditional leaders (*gardiens de coutume*).
- A cessation of the arbitrary imprisonment of local youth defending the population against the ADF/MTN.
- An end to extortion, including the collection of monthly taxes from displaced civilians.
- Avoid spreading tribal hatred between the Bhele/Piri and Nyanga communities.
- Avoid spreading false claims concerning efforts to track ADF attackers and to liberate hostages.

The communiqué also accused the NDC-R spokesperson, Marcelin Senkuku N’Kuba, of disseminating misinformation through public statements. It firmly denied allegations that local youth had attacked NDC-R positions on 13 and 14 August 2024.

See copy of the Bapere Youth council communiqué below:



Document received from confidential civil society source

Annex 12 (para. 34)

AFC communiqué of 1 August 2024

Communiqué de l'AFC du 1er août 2024



OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 1st, 2024

1. The Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/M23 has followed the latest developments aimed at achieving peace within the framework of the Luanda process. The AFC/M23 wishes to congratulate all the actors for their endless work towards a peaceful resolution of the multifaceted crisis in the East Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
2. The AFC/M23 hereby emphasise that it is not automatically bound by the conclusions of meetings to which it has not attended. The AFC/M23 notes that the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government have become accustomed to using the various truces and cessations of hostilities to reorganise themselves and continue ethnic cleansing, attacking the martyred population and our forces as their defenders.
3. Nevertheless, the AFC/M23 wishes to remind everyone that, as of March 7th, 2023, it declared a unilateral ceasefire to give a chance to find a peaceful solution to the crisis within the framework of regional processes. Since then, the AFC/M23 has only been responding to the attacks by the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government, within the grounds of legitimate self-defence and to protect threatened civilian populations. The AFC/M23 is therefore ready to respond positively to a change in the posture of the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government.
4. The AFC/M23 reiterates that the only way to achieve a peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict is through direct political dialogue with the Kinshasa Government, which addresses the root causes of the recurring conflicts in the Eastern DRC. The Regional Peace Processes offer an ideal framework that must be utilised without any delay to prevent further suffering for our populations.

Bunagana, August 1st, 2024.



For Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)

Lawrence KANYUKA
Communication Focal-Point



Document received from confidential AFC/M23 source

Annex 13 (para. 38)

Additional information on the negotiations for the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of the RDF troops, conflicting positions and the Luanda process**Informations complémentaires sur les négociations pour la neutralisation des FDLR et le désengagement des troupes RDF, les positions conflictuelles et le processus de Luanda**

- In its last report ([S/2024/432](#), annex 30), the Group provided the details of a first ministerial meeting on the security and peace situation in eastern DRC held in Luanda on 21 March 2024. During that meeting, participants proposed concrete commitments to the heads of state of the DRC and Rwanda, amongst others:
 - cessation of hostilities, including a supervised ceasefire, accompanied by a process of disengagement of forces (point 2);
 - the DRC delegation committed to present a plan to neutralize the FDLR accompanied by a program of action (point 3);
 - following the implementation of this plan to neutralize the FDLR, the Rwandan delegation committed to review the measures and arrangement adopted to ensure its defence and security (point 4).
- During the same meeting, Rwanda and the DRC also voiced dissents over the cessation of hostilities. For the DRC delegation, the disengagement of forces (point 2) implied the withdrawal of RDF from the DRC territory. For the Rwandan delegation, however, the cessation of hostilities implied a supervised ceasefire between FARDC and the M23, followed by a process of disengagement of forces.
- Since the March 2024 meeting, amid continued military operations by both FARDC and RDF, negotiations continued, aiming at resolving the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda, under the facilitation of the Angolan mediator. The operationalization of the FDLR neutralization plan and the elaboration of a plan for the disengagement of forces were at the heart of the negotiations.
- On 30 July 2024, following a second ministerial meeting in Luanda, the Angolan presidency announced a new cease-fire due to start on 4 August, and agreed upon by the Rwandan and Congolese governments under the aegis of the Angolan mediator (see also [S/2024/432](#), annexes 20-21). Another outcome of that ministerial meeting in Luanda was the engagement of Rwanda and the DRC to further elaborate the above-mentioned FDLR neutralization plan, and plan for the forces' disengagement. The Angolan mediator provided a document (titled "Harmonisation of the DRC's proposed plan and Republic of Rwanda's response to the Neutralisation of the FDLR on Congolese territory") in which the DRC's "Plan for the neutralization of the FDLR"²²⁹ and related observations by Rwanda were harmonized. The Facilitator's harmonization document attempted to (i) bridge the view points of the DRC and Rwanda; (ii) generate a consensual perspective on the plan, program of action, and process of the neutralization of the FDLR; (iii) assist Rwanda and the DRC in coming up with concrete and clear strategies for the neutralization of the FDLR; (iv) and sustain the dialogue process under the leadership and mediation of the Angolan Presidency. The Facilitator's document served as the working document for next negotiations (see below).

Facilitator's harmonization document – main elements (non-exhaustive list):

- Elements relative to differing positions between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, and recommendations, as elaborated in the Facilitator's harmonization document:²³⁰
 - "While both governments agree and are committed to the neutralization of the FDLR, they do not share the same views on the levels of threat posed by the FDLR to both nations' security and the FDLR's ongoing destructive capacity on both countries' good and harmonious relationships";

²²⁹ Submitted by the DRC government to the Facilitator on 26 April 2024.

²³⁰ Non-exhaustive.

- “The plan for the neutralization of the FDLR as presented by the DRC Government does not include a clear action plan with chronogram of timelines and clear lines of responsibility for such neutralization”; this “creates the uncertainties that are underlying sources of tensions, violence in Eastern DRC, and continuous deterioration of the relationships and trust between the DRC and Rwanda”;
 - “The primary goal of neutralizing the FDLR is an important first step towards improving the worsening security environment in Eastern DRC”.
- Bridging the viewpoints of the DRC and Republic of Rwanda as elaborated in the Facilitator’s harmonization document:²³¹
 - Both the DRC and Rwanda “share the determination to neutralize the FDLR”;
 - “Both the DRC and Rwanda agree that the FDLR is a shared source of destabilization of both nations, as well as the regular recurrence of violence and conflict in Eastern DRC”;
 - Assistance towards concrete steps for neutralizing the FDLR as elaborated in the Facilitator’s harmonization document²³²:
 - The DRC Government ought to take leadership and ownership as the primary responsible entity on the neutralization of the FDLR and its affiliates – including FOCA, CNRD and RUD-Urunana – from its territory in Eastern DRC. These efforts include:
 - (a) Lead in the organization and establishment of a Joint Task Force to locate FDLR elements and affiliates;
 - (b) Scrutinize and process all FDLR members and linked groups in secured cantonments, including disarmament and neutralizing of the military chain of command and networks of FDLR and affiliates;
 - (c) Under the mediation of the Facilitator, reach an immediate cessation of hostilities agreement in Eastern DRC, including the repatriation of the FDLR from the DRC;
 - (d) Under the supervision of the Facilitator, the DRC and Rwanda commit to providing a joint framework with Partner support drawing from the existing ad-hoc verification mechanism for monitoring and verification of the implementation of neutralizing the FDLR and its affiliates;
 - (e) The governments of the DRC and Rwanda commit to neutralizing the FDLR and its affiliates, networks and military chains of command in good faith and with goodwill, in accordance with the 2013 Nairobi Declaration;
 - (f) The governments of the DRC and Rwanda are further committed, with the cooperation of partners, to speedily embark on the neutralization of FDLR and strengthening confidence-building measures as the conditions for restoring good relations;
 - The Republic of Rwanda will support the efforts to neutralize the FDLR in a secondary capacity in the aforementioned tasks.
- At the July ministerial meeting, Rwanda, the DRC and Angola instructed their intelligence experts²³³ to meet on 7 August 2024 to further elaborate the Facilitator’s proposal on the neutralization of the FDLR, but also to elaborate a plan for the disengagement of forces on the ground. The report of the intelligence experts (“Plan harmonisée pour la neutralization des FDLR et le disengagement des forces (levée des mesures defensives du Rwanda)”) would then serve as the basis for discussions during the ministerial meeting planned in August (see below). The intelligence officers from the DRC, Rwanda and Angola did convene in Luanda from 7 to 9 August to negotiate a proposal to be discussed at the third ministerial meeting late August 2024.

²³¹ Non-exhaustive.

²³² Non-exhaustive.

²³³ Major-General Christian Ndaywel Okura (DRC), Ambassador Matias Bertino Matondo (Angola) and Brigadier-General Jean Paul Nyirubutama (Rwanda).

- The third ministerial meeting on 20-21 August 2024 concluded without reaching an agreement.
- The intelligence officers met again in Rubavu, Rwanda, and on 31 August 2024 agreed on the harmonization plan.

Intelligence experts' harmonization plan – main elements (non-exhaustive list):

- The plan proposed by the intelligence experts is subdivided into 6 objectives/goals, i.e. (i) analysis of the level of threat of the FDLR; (ii) neutralization of the FDLR; (iii) disengagement of the forces/lifting of defensive measures put in place by Rwanda; (iv) evaluation; (v) DDR process; and (vi) building trust and a climate of calm.
 - For each of these objectives/goals, the plan foresees (i) a series of activities and actions; (ii) a timeframe; (iii) the entity/entities and/or individuals in charge; and (iv) the supervisor(s).
 - The plan foresees that the disengagement of the Rwandan forces and lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda starts after the start of execution of the targeted actions against the FDLR.
 - The plan also foresees that the execution of the disengagement of the Rwandan forces and lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda would cover a specific time-period.
- At the fourth ministerial meeting in Luanda on 14 September 2024, the DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Thérèse Wagner, rejected the harmonization plan for the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces (lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures) submitted by the intelligence experts. Diplomatic, intelligence, FARDC and UN sources reported that the proposed timeline – which did not foresee that the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of RDF troops would take place simultaneously – was one of the main reasons for rejecting the proposal. On the other hand, it must be underlined that the operations against the FDLR late September 2024 (see paras. 67-80) were carried out – albeit without major successes – while RDF were still massively deployed on the DRC territory.
 - On 24 September 2024, at the UN General Assembly in New York, the President of Angola Joao Lourenco declared that “in order to consolidate the gains made, a proposal for a peace agreement has been put on the table by the Republic of Angola, involving the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda, the terms of which are being discussed by the parties at ministerial level, with the prospect of them reaching an understanding with each other that will justify the convocation of a summit meeting to seal the signing of the definitive peace agreement (...)”.²³⁴ The following day, President Tshisekedi demanded “the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan troops (...)” and stated that “while recent diplomatic initiatives, such as the Luanda talks, are encouraging, they must not obscure the urgency of this essential action”.²³⁵ President Tshisekedi thus implicitly rejected the conditionality of RDF withdrawal in light of FDLR neutralization. In his statement at the General Assembly, Rwandan Ambassador Ernest Rwamucyo did not address the conflict in the DRC or the Luanda process.²³⁶
 - On 12 October 2024, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the DRC and Rwanda met again in Luanda. They agreed to resume expert consultations scheduled to take place in Luanda on 30 October 2024, to elaborate a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a harmonized plan to neutralize FDLR (see paras. 76-77).
 - The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the FDLR neutralization plan, approved at expert level in Luanda on 31 October, foresees identifying the positioning of FDLR and their equipment, followed by information sharing to identify FDLR and its “dissident groups” (Phase 1), before moving to neutralization operations and targeted actions against FDLR (Phase 2), bypassing any explicit steps for sensitization of combatants and voluntary surrender. The demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of FDLR combatants is foreseen only in Phase 4 of the CONOPS. This CONOPS approved at expert level was to be discussed late November 2024 at the fifth ministerial meeting.

²³⁴ [ao_en.pdf \(un.org\)](#)

²³⁵ [cd_fr.pdf \(un.org\)](#)

²³⁶ [FINAL-RWANDA NATIONAL STATEMENT FOR UNGA 79.pdf](#)

Annex 14 (para. 42)**Forced and voluntary recruitment by AFC/M23****Recrutement forcé et volontaire par le AFC/M23**

In its final report (S/2024/432, paras. 37, 100-108, and annex 65), the Group documented a consolidation of M23's military capacity through extensive recruitment efforts, including of children, across North Kivu, Uganda, and Rwanda. During the current reporting period, recruitment efforts in AFC/M23-controlled territories continued, particularly in newly conquered areas such as Rubaya, the broader Masisi territory, Kanyabayonga, as well as in South Kivu and Ituri. Thousands of new recruits were enrolled in military training from April to October 2024 (see annex below).

The Group collected additional evidence of AFC/M23 recruitment abroad, notably in refugee camps in Rwanda (S/2024/432, para. 103).²³⁷ For example, a surrendered M23 combatant who had been forcefully recruited in April 2024, reported that he knew twelve young men recruited from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda who attended the military training in Tchanzu between May-August 2024 (see annex 15).

AFC/M23 recruited thousands of civilians using the following methods:²³⁸ (i) abduction and forced recruitment (see below); (ii) deceptive financial promises and/or promises for work; (iii) voluntary recruitments through systematically organized awareness-raising campaigns through local leaders, public meetings in newly conquered areas (see example below in 'Recruitment in Rubaya') and radio-transmissions.²³⁹

The Group obtained new evidence of systematic, and often forced, recruitments in the territories conquered by AFC/M23. Several surrendered or captured ex-M23 combatants reported that they had been abducted by AFC/M23. Others reported that they had been enlisted by local chiefs after AFC/M23 compelled these local chiefs to select men from their respective localities for recruitment. This systematic increase in AFC/M23 recruitment efforts has also been confirmed by community leaders, civil society sources, humanitarian actors, UN sources and individuals close to M23.

The following cases documented by the Group are illustrative of the well-organized, systematic, and often coerced recruitment:

- Several former M23 combatants interviewed by the Group reported that most of the recruits trained in Tchanzu had been abducted by AFC/M23 prior to their forced enrollment in military training. Others were enticed by M23 with deceptive financial promises (see also S/2024/432, para. 101). All M23 combatants interviewed by the Group reported that they had never been paid. AFC/M23 declared to new recruits and trainees that they would be paid for service only after the "liberation" of the DRC.

Recruitment in Rubaya

- In early May 2024, shortly after AFC/M23 took control of Rubaya, the AFC/M23 leadership instructed the town manager of Rubaya to enlist at least 10 young men from each street for AFC/M23. The town manager, in turn, requested each neighborhood chief ("Nyumbakumi") to identify 10 recruits from their area. While some civilians volunteered, many were coerced or felt they had no choice, fearing reprisals against themselves and their families. The following day, the neighborhood chiefs, accompanied by M23 combatants, gathered the new recruits and brought them to Rubaya's stadium, where they were presented to the crowd. The recruits were informed they would be fighting to 'retake' the country. One young man, recruited that day, reported that a total of 180 men were enlisted that day.²⁴⁰ The recruits were then loaded into two trucks and transported to Tchanzu via Mushaki, Kitchanga, Mulimbi and Rutshuru, where all 180 recruits were enrolled in training (see annex below).

²³⁷ M23 combatants, UN sources, sources close to AFC/M23 and intelligence sources.

²³⁸ M23 combatants, UN sources, sources close to AFC/M23, intelligence sources, civil society, and researchers.

²³⁹ AFC/M23 launched a new radio transmitting from Bunagana on 3 June 2024.

²⁴⁰ Other sources refer to 300 recruits.

The presence of 180 recruits from Rubaya was confirmed by M23 combatants who completed their training in September 2024 (see annex below), together with recruits that arrived from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda. Additional recruitment drives, including forced recruitment and abductions, were reported in Rubaya in July and August 2024.²⁴¹

Video of recruitment in Rubaya

The Group also received a 12-minute video footage²⁴² of the public gathering at the stadium in Rubaya in early May (referred to by several former recruits interviewed by the Group – see above). The video depicts a massive crowd being animated by sanctioned individual “general” Bernard Byamungu (CDi.038 and S/2024/432, para. 41) who requested recruits to step forward, to join the army in order to “fight for self-defense”, and to participate in “politico-military training”.

Below: screenshots from the video of the gathering at Rubaya stadium, depicting “General” Bernard Byamungu speaking to the crowd, the new recruits paraded before the crowd, then loaded onto trucks that transported them for training in Tchanzu.



Screenshot from video depicting “General” Bernard Byamungu addressing the crowd at Rubaya stadium.
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member

Below: English translation of “General” Byamungu’s speech in the video²⁴³ (original in Swahili)

“General” Byamungu: Is it possible to achieve development without peace?

Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: So, we must start with peace, and then we can think about development. Now, I want to ask all of you something important for our security, our peace, and our progress. To achieve this, we need everyone’s effort, don’t we?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: How many of you want us to advance all the way to Kinshasa?

Audience: All of us!

“General” Byamungu: Are you all ready?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Thank you. So, young people, how many of you are still strong and ready to join the army, in self-defense, or in a political-military framework, so we can combine our efforts and help the AFC movement advance?

²⁴¹ UN sources, former AFC/M23 recruits, security sources.

²⁴² Video provided by an armed group combatant.

²⁴³ Unofficial translation by the Group.

Where are you? Raise your hands!

(Several hands go up)

“General” Byamungu: Are you all ready?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready to join the army?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready for self-defense?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready for the political-military framework?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: My brothers, together with our combined efforts, we can go very far. Do you understand me?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: I’m only asking for 10 young people who can show they’re ready to join the army. Don’t you want to? Or do you want us to stay in insecurity?

Audience: No!

“General” Byamungu: Where are the young people ready to join the army?

(One by one, people start stepping forward)

“General” Byamungu: Come, line up here.

(Several young people come forward and line up)

“General” Byamungu: Welcome, welcome, my brothers. Unity is strength. Come, my brothers, so we can free our country, to liberate our country from the hands of the invaders. Tshisekedi has turned the country into his own farm, so welcome, my brothers. Unity is the strength that will free the country. Keep coming, my brothers. I want to tell you one more thing, my brothers, I have a question. Is the destruction of the road from Goma to Rubaya because of Paul Kagame?

Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: Going hungry here, being beaten, being forced to pay taxes—is this also Kagame’s fault?

Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: It’s due to the poor governance of Mr. Tshisekedi. And young women who want to join, come forward too. I can see there is great joy in your hearts.

-

Unidentified officer *(speaking as the trucks with the recruits are driving away)*:

You can see the young people are happy to go for training and later come back to protect us. The vehicles are no longer enough to hold them all.



Screenshot from video depicting recruits lining up before the crowd at Rubaya stadium
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member



Screenshot from video depicting recruits lining up after the meeting at Rubaya stadium
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member



Screenshot from video depicting recruits loaded into trucks in Rubaya, taken for training in Tchanzu
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member

Forced recruitment from Tchengerero

- In April 2024, AFC/M23 arrested 22 civilians in Tchengerero and brought them to an AFC/M23 position in Runyoni, where they were subjected to forced heavy labor for several days. Thereafter, a truck belonging to AFC/M23 brought the 22 civilians to a detention facility in Rutshuru. After one week of detention, they were brought to a training center in Rutshuru, and trained by AFC/M23.

Abduction from the Banyabwisha community in Tongo

- In May 2024, 6 men from the Banyabwisha community were abducted by M23 combatants in Tongo. M23 combatants accused the Banyabwisha of being FDLR combatants and obliged them to get on motorcycles that brought them to Tchanzu for training. The abducted Banyabwisha reported that they had no choice as they would have been killed if they refused to join AFC/M23.

Annex 15 (para. 42)**AFC/M23 military and paramilitary trainings****Entraînements militaires et paramilitaires du AFC/M23**

M23 and AFC increased recruitment and training efforts for both civil-administrative cadres – including police,²⁴⁴ intelligence services, and political leaders – and combatants, the former to ensure the administration of the localities under AFC/M23 control (S/2024/432, annex 5), and the latter to consolidate military capacity in view of extending territorial control.²⁴⁵

New AFC/M23 recruits were trained primarily at the movement's main military base in Tchanzu, but also in other AFC/M23 training centers and bases, including in Rutshuru (Birere neighbourhood), Bwito, Bwiza, Kiwanja and Nyongera. Imagery clearly shows a significant expansion of the Tchanzu training facility (see below). M23 combatants also received refresher courses in Rutshuru. Refresher courses were often organized prior to a planned military operation.

Recently surrendered and captured M23 combatants reported that “Colonel” Léon Kanyamibwa still commanded military training in Thanzu (S/2024/432, para. 39) and was seconded by “Colonel” Moïse Byinshi and “Captain” Ernest Sebagenzi. M23 combatants consistently reported the presence of Congolese, UPDF and RDF training officers in Tchanzu. Many AFC/M23 leaders were present during, or visited, the training bases, including Sultani Makenga, Imani Nzenze, Bahati Erasto, Lawrence Kanyuka, Gacheri Erasto, Bahati Erasto, Ernest Sebagenzi, Willy Ngoma, “Colonel” Moïse Byinshi, and Mirindi.²⁴⁶

The Group documented the following information regarding several trainings and closing ceremonies in AFC/M23 military bases and training centers:

- From 6 to 21 April 2024, a leadership training took place in Nyongera, north-east of Kiwanja.²⁴⁷ M23 combatants reported that there were about 700 trainees from different countries. The courses focused on training future AFC/M23 leaders (“cadres”) and was called “Dignity Intake 004”. The promotion of these future M23 cadres was presented as “the foundation to restore the dignity of all Congolese and the DRC”. Trainees were provided with theoretical and practical courses.
- On 1 July 2024, a new training started in Nyongera for around 500 new recruits.
- From 7 to 18 April 2024, another military training took place in Tchanzu. The training encompassed training of intelligence leaders, self-defense and military training. M23 combatants reported that about 400 trainees were present. Both theoretical and practical courses were provided, including “handling weaponry”, “infractions”, “information management”, “M23 ideology”.
- On 2 October 2024, a closing ceremony was held in Tchanzu²⁴⁸ for 300 young M23 officers. Among the 300 officers trained, 20 originated from the Zaïre and MAPI armed groups in Ituri. The training of officers lasted 5 months. Three trainees died during the training.
- Between 25 September and 31 October 2024, at least 3,000 recruits completed their 5-months training in Tchanzu. On 31 October 2024, an additional 2,500 recruits were still in the process of being trained by AFC/M23. Amongst the latter 2,500 recruits, 600 came from the Zaïre armed group in Ituri. This was also confirmed by one high-profile

²⁴⁴ From May 2024 onwards, new recruits wearing PNC-like uniforms were spotted in Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Bunagana.

²⁴⁵ M23 combatants, sources close to M23, civil society, community leaders, eyewitnesses, UN sources and sources close to AFC/M23 leadership.

²⁴⁶ Ex-M23 combatants, sources close to M23 and UN sources.

²⁴⁷ -1.141638° - 29.437617°

²⁴⁸ -1.334472° - 29.531933°

- Zaire insider, a Zaire combatant that participated in the training, surrendered and captured M23 combatants, and intelligence sources.
- M23 combatants who completed their training in September 2024 reported that trainees in Tchanzu were divided into “regiments” of 250 recruits each. Among one of the regiments trained there were 180 recruits who had been recruited in Rubaya (see annex 14 above) together with recruits that arrived from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda.
 - The training encompassed several theoretical courses, including on “military rules”, “weapons management”, the “art of war” and “ideology”. After the theoretical introduction, new recruits received practical training, including on “war tactics”, “engagement rules” and “bush tactics”. Sultani Makenga attended at least one of the pass-out ceremonies of the two first “regiments”, in early September 2024.
 - Refresher courses were organized amongst others in Rutshuru, quartier Birere.



Screenshots of videos showing military training in Nyongera on 23 September (picture 1) and 10 September 2024 (picture 2) received from confidential security source

Annex 16 (para. 43)

AFC/M23 military and tactical training, ideology and indoctrination**Formation militaire et tactique, idéologie et endoctrinement de l'AFC/M23**

An increasing number of M23 combatants described the focus, during training, on theoretical courses including ideological persuasion, intelligence gathering, recruitment tactics and history of the DRC. Groups of recruits, amongst others a group of 25 recruits from South Kivu, received only theoretical courses and were thereafter redeployed to their areas of origin and tasked to provide intelligence from these localities and persuade local armed groups and individuals to join AFC/M23.

The Group obtained a copy of a notebook with handwritten notes taken by a trainee, listing the theoretical courses and the names of the trainers during a training provided in April in Nyongera:

1. Elements of Congo history (« Elements d'histoire du Congo ») by “professor” A. Kimanuka and “Colonel” Ernest Sebagenzi
2. DRC administrative organization: DRC institutions, democracy support commissions and security concept, constituent elements and human resources (« Organization administrative de la RDC: les institutions de la RDC, les commissions d'appui à la démocratie et notion de sécurité, éléments constitutifs et ressources humaines ») by “professor” Jeanot Munkeke
3. History of the Twirwaneho struggle (« Histoire de lutte des Twirwaneho») by “professor” John Mbananayo
4. Mobilization: mobilization techniques, mobilization channels, target analysis, mobilization stages/processes, quality of frameworks, types of communication, mass mobilization, communication and awareness-raising, organization and mobilization, commitment and participation, monitoring and evaluation. (« Mobilisation: techniques de mobilisation, canaux de mobilisation, analyse des cibles, étapes/processus de mobilisation, qualité des cadres, formes de communication, mobilisation des masses, communication et sensibilisation, organisation et mobilisation, engagement et participation, suivi et évaluation ») by Freddy Ngirabakunzi and Pascal Iradukunda
5. Weapons: AKM/SMG (« Silaha AKM/SMG ») by “Colonel” Kanyamibwa
6. Patriotism and Congolese identity (« Patriotisme et identité congolaise») by “professor” Babu Amaini
7. History of M23/ARC (« Histoire du M23/ARC ») by “professor” Munyaneza Bosco
8. Political philosophy of the AFC/M23/ARC revolution (« Philosophie politique de la révolution AFC/M23/ARC») by “professor” Benjamin Mbonimpa
9. The role of women and youth in the revolution (« Le rôle de la femme et la jeunesse dans la révolution ») by « Major » Claudine
10. War principles: tactics, training & battle drills (« Notion sur la guerre: tactique, formation & exercices de combat) by “Colonel” Kanyamibwa
11. The elements of leadership and revolutionary principles (« Les éléments du leadership et les principes révolutionnaires) by “professor” Désiré Rwigema Rukomera
12. The 8 pillars to reach any goal (« Les 8 piliers pour atteindre n'importe quel objectif », by “professor” Pascal Kasentre Uzamukunda

Annex 17 (para. 44)**M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Southern Front (southern Masisi territory and Nyiragongo territory)****Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le Front Sud (sud des territoires de Masisi et territoire de Nyiragongo)**

Since the Group's last report, the area around Goma, from Sake through Kibumba remained tense and was marked by (i) shelling by both FARDC and M23/RDF, (ii) continued M23/RDF threats to South Kivu (see para. 104), and (iii) major AFC/M23 territorial advances, as illustrated by the events below.

Sake area and southern Masisi territory – non-exhaustive list

- On 30 April 2024, M23 took control of the mining sites of Rubaya in southern Masisi territory, one of the world's largest coltan mines (see also paras. 56-66)
- On 3 May 2024, RDF shelling impacted four different locations within IDP settlements²⁴⁹ located in the Mugunga neighborhood of Goma, along the RN2 road between Goma and Sake, causing civilian casualties.²⁵⁰ Details of the RDF shelling and preceding FARDC shelling are provided in annex 22.
- On 30 May 2024, M23 and RDF launched mortar attacks on FARDC and SAMIDIRC positions in Mubambiro. One SAMIDIRC soldier was killed, 13 injured and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) were destroyed, as also confirmed in a communiqué issued by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the following day (see communiqué below).
- On 18 June 2024, two M23/RDF projectiles landed in Mubambiro and triggered SAMIDIRC response, which started shelling towards M23/RDF positions in the hills overlooking Sake area.
- On 25 June 2024, M23/RDF mortar attacks on SAMIDIRC positions resulted in two SAMIDIRC soldiers killed, 20 injured and some material damage, as also confirmed in a communiqué issued by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the following day (see communiqué below). The Group notes that prior to M23/RDF retaliation, SAMIDIRC had initiated artillery fire towards M23/RDF positions southwest of Sake, and reportedly fired 135 projectiles.
- On 27 June 2024, there were other artillery exchanges around Sake. On that same day, M23/RDF took control of Remeka, south-west from Sake and Ngungu, in southern Masisi territory and close to the South Kivu border.
- On 15 July 2024, M23/RDF²⁵¹ artillery shelling has hit the town of Bweremana, resulting in civilian casualties.
- On 3-4 September 2024, after almost two months of relative calm, clashes in the southern front close to South Kivu resumed, when Wazalendo armed groups together with FDLR launched attacks to recapture Ndumba hill (12 kilometers southwest of Sake) from M23/RDF. Ndumba hill remained under M23/RDF control, however.
- One week later, the Wazalendo/FDLR coalition supported by FARDC artillery succeeded to recapture Ndumba hill. Reports refer to artillery shelling by both sides.
- On 14 and 18 October 2024, M23/RDF and FARDC exchanged fire around Sake.

²⁴⁹ Lushagala, Zone 14, 8 ième CEPAC and CBCA Rego. The Group did investigations in Lushagala and 8ième CEPAC IDP camps.

²⁵⁰ The Group did not (yet) obtain access to the sixth unexploded shell.

²⁵¹ The Group recalls that in its final report, it established the de facto control and direction of RDF over M23 operations ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 40-45).

Kibumba area – non-exhaustive list

- On 15 June 2024, after almost three months of relative calm in the Kibumba area, north of Goma, hostilities resumed when an anti-tank missile hit a joint defensive position of FARDC and the private military company Congo Protection (S/2023/990, paras. 47-51) in Kanyamahoro, few kilometers south of Kibumba. Two FARDC soldiers and one Congo Protection staff were killed on the spot, while a second Congo Protection staff died in the aftermath of the event.²⁵² Several other FARDC and Congo Protection staff were wounded. Further details are provided in annex 23.
- On 24 June 2024, M23/RDF fired three mortars towards FARDC positions on Kanyabuki hill, west of Kanyamahoro.
- The period under review was characterized by continuous reports of M23 and RDF reinforcements in the Kibumba area (see also annex 17-18).



Statement on AFC/M23 attacks on SAMIDRC Camp in Sake on 31 May 2024, received from confidential SADC source.

²⁵² Security and FARDC sources, confidential reports and eyewitness accounts.



the sandf

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA STATEMENT

DATE: Wednesday, 26 June 2024

EMBARGO: For Immediate use

SUBJECT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE CONFIRMS THE MORTAR ATTACK ON ONE OF OUR BASES IN SAKE, IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), confirms the mortar attack on one of our bases in Sake, in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 25 June 2024, which resulted in two fatalities and twenty injured. Four members who were critically injured have been hospitalized, whilst the rest who suffered minor injuries are expected to be discharged soon.

Families of the two members who lost their lives have been informed and all procedures to bring their mortal remains are in process. The names of the deceased will be communicated in due course.

ENDS.

Issued by: South African National Defence Force
(Defence Headquarters)

Enquiries: Sphiwe Dlamini
(Head of Communication)

Statement on mortar attacks on SAMIDRC on 25 June 2024, received from confidential SADC source.

Annex 18 (para. 45)

M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Northern Front (Rutshuru and southern Lubero territories)

Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le front nord (territoires de Rutshuru et du sud de Lubero)

Southern Lubero – non-exhaustive list

- In its last report, the Group reported that “the risk of M23 and RDF taking Kanyabayonga, entering Lubero territory and pushing further south along the Sake-Minova road remained high” (S/2024/432, para. 34).
- On 27 June 2024, M23/RDF launched attacks from various fronts²⁵³ and captured the strategic town of Kanyabayonga, Rutshuru territory, where FARDC had retreated to, with most of its military supplies, when RDF and M23 took control of Rwindi in March 2024 (S/2024/432, annex 29). After intense fighting, FARDC troops commanded by General-Major Chico Tshitabwe (S/2024/432, para. 80) and supported by the FDLR and Wazalendo armed groups withdrew northwards from Kanyabayonga leaving behind important weapon and ammunition stockpiles which were subsequently seized by M23 combatants.²⁵⁴
- Following the capture of Kanyabayonga, M23/RDF moved further north towards the southern parts of Lubero territory and took control of Kirumba, Kaseghe and surrounding areas on 30 June 2024. In only three days, M23/RDF conquered a stretch of 50 kilometers along the Kanyabayonga-Kaseghe road. In the meantime, FARDC controlled the RN2 axis until south Matembe, and relocated its headquarters to Lubero center. FARDC reinforcements were sent from Beni territory to Lubero center. Following M23/RDF take-over of Kanyabayonga, Wazalendo armed groups (in particular FPP-AP) and FDLR also withdrew to their traditional areas of influence in south-west and west Lubero territory. In early July, additional FARDC reinforcements arrived from Goma, Kisangani and Kananga.
- In early July 2024, AFC/M23 officially installed mayors (“bourgemestres”) in Kanyabayonga (on 7 July) and two newly conquered locations in southern Lubero (Kirumba on 3 July and Kaina on 5 July). AFC/M23 also organized meetings in Kanyabayonga aiming at sensitizing the local population for the AFC/M23 cause, further installing its parallel administration and encouraging new recruitments.
- M23/RDF operations in southern Lubero resumed on 19 August 2024 when it sought to strengthen its position in the south-western area of Lake Edward, in particular in Kamandi-Lac (east of Kirumba) where FARDC naval forces were still based. If taken, Kamandi-Lac would provide M23 increased access to Lake Edward. While FARDC maintained their control over Kamandi-Lac, on 26 August 2024 M23/RDF took control of Kivuvo, east of Kirumba and along the route leading to Kamandi-Lac.
- On 3 November 2024, M23/RDF took control of Kamandi-gîte in the vicinity of Kamandi-Lac. Civil society sources reported that the M23 occupied the primary school “Vowisha”, where it installed its political bureau after having destroyed various classrooms.²⁵⁵

Rutshuru territory – non-exhaustive list

- From 2-4 August 2024, M23/RDF took control of several localities in north-eastern Rutshuru territory. On 2 August, it conquered Kiseкуро. On 3 August, it took Nyamilima and continued towards Ishasha, the border post between Uganda and the DRC, that it conquered on 4 August. AFC/M23 soon began installing a parallel administration in these newly conquered localities. The Group notes that FARDC had already withdrawn from that area several months earlier, thus this territorial expansion did not involve armed confrontations. However, other state actors – police (PNC) and intelligence (ANR) – still present at the Ishasha border post in early August, were compelled to flee to Uganda following M23's take-over of the area.

²⁵³ Notably from Layi Layi near Kimaka (15 km SW Kanyabayonga), Butalongola (10km S of Kanyabayonga) as well as from Rwindi. UN, FARDC and civil society sources. Confidential document.

²⁵⁴ FARDC and security sources. Sources close to M23 and RDF.

²⁵⁵ Images on file with the Group

- On 7 August 2024, M23/RDF also conquered the port of Nyakakoma on the shores of Lake Edward, forcing the FARDC naval forces to flee.
- On 2 September 2024, following clashes between M23/RDF and Wazalendo/FDLR, M23 took control of Butare in Tongo area.
- Mid-September 2024, M23/RDF took control of Mashango, east of Kitchanga, known to be a CMC-FDP stronghold. One week later, M23/RDF took control of Marangara, east of Tongo, a known FDLR and CMC-FDP stronghold.


Annex 19 (para. 46)**M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Western Front (northern Masisi and Walikale territories)****Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le front occidental (territoires du nord de Masisi et de Walikale)**

- On 10 July 2024, M23/RDF took control of Nyange, 26 kilometers north-west of Kitchanga, resulting in large population displacements. M23/RDF also made advances towards Bibwe, Bweru and Lwama, north-west of Kitchanga, in July 2024.
- Between 19 and 25 August, M23/RDF took control of Lukopfu (8 kilometers south-east of Masisi center), Karambi (15 kilometers southwest of Masisi center), Kaniro (11 kilometers southwest of Masisi center) and Kisuma bridge (10 kilometers southwest of Masisi center). Wazalendo armed groups repelled several M23/RDF attacks.
- On 20 October 2024, M23/RDF took control over Kalembe on the border between Masisi and Walikale territories. However, the Wazalendo (NDC-R Guidon and APCLS) pushed M23/RDF back on 21 October.
- On 23 October 2024, M23/RDF conquered Kalembe again and maintained its control over Kalembe.
- On 26-27 October 2024, after several days of intense clashes with the Wazalendo-FDLR-FARDC coalition, M23/RDF made significant advances on the Kalembe-Mpeti axis in Walikale, and took control of several localities including Malemo, Minjenje, Mpeti, Katobi. The series of clashes between M23/RDF and the Wazalendo/FARDC coalition triggered important population displacements towards Mutongo, and directly threatened Pinga. FARDC immediately sent reinforcements to Pinga. Multiple sources reported the important presence of RDF troops on the ground (see annexes 19 and 21).
- On 23 October 2024, M23/RDF conquered Kahira, 19 kilometers north-east of Masisi center, thus putting pressure on Masisi center, believed to be another M23 target.




Map reflecting the positions in **July 2024**, received from confidential source

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Image Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 1 January 2021
 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



- Evolution of M23 and RDF's area of operations from **November 2022** to **November 2024**:



Maps received from confidential source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 21 (para. 50)**Illustrations of RDF continued presence and support to M23****Illustration de la présence et soutien continus des RDF au M23**

- **Regarding the presence of RDF soldiers on DRC territory, see also:**
 - [S/2022/967](#), paras. 47-51 and annexes 29-32.
 - [S/2023/431](#), paras. 54-61 and annexes 28-35.
 - [S/2023/990](#), paras. 29-30 and annex 17.
 - [S/2024/432](#), paras. 34, 40-45, 46-54, and annexes 22, 27, 28, 29 and 42.

The Group continued to obtain evidence – authenticated photographs, drone footage, video recordings, testimony and intelligence – confirming systematic border incursions by RDF and presence in Petit Nord. During the period under review, RDF positioned itself at the frontlines, operated high-tech weaponry, and directly engaged in combat (see also [S/2024/432](#), para. 40).

Former AFC/M23 recruits interviewed by the Group in Goma and in Beni all confirmed the presence of RDF soldiers, referring to them as the “Friendly Force”. They explained that this English term was generically used by everyone when referring to them. The former recruits were consistent in their description of them as highly trained and disciplined Rwandan special forces who were there to train and support M23, and that regular M23 soldiers were not allowed to interact with them. The “Friendly Force” soldiers moved around in military trucks, were equipped with full and high-tech military gear, and mostly led special military operations.

The following cases are illustrative of the systematic, well-organized, presence of RDF in support to AFC/M23. The list below is non-exhaustive, as the Group has additional files – imagery and documents – with evidence of RDF presence in other locations and on additional dates. Annexes 52-55 provides details of RDF handling of high-tech weaponry in Karuba (Masisi territory), Sake area, and Kanyamahoro (Nyiragongo territory).

- **RDF soldiers’ presence in Kiwanja and Nyongera**

Imagery from 21 May, 8 and 11 June 2024, 22 July, and 2 August 2024, showed soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and uniforms similar to standard RDF-issued equipment sitting in the back of trucks and vehicles. Security and intelligence sources, as well as civil society sources and eyewitnesses identified the uniformed men as RDF soldiers.



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 21 May 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 8 June 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshots of video recorded in Kiwanja on 11 June 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 22 July 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 2 August 2024 received from confidential source

Imagery of 11 August 2024 shows RDF troop transports in Nyongera, north-east of Kiwanja. The presence of RDF in and around Nyongera, including at AFC/M23 training camp (annex 15) has been confirmed by eyewitnesses, civil society sources and intelligence sources.



Screenshot of video received from confidential source

- **RDF soldiers' presence in and around Kalembe**

- Late October 2024, M23 and RDF made significant advances on the Kalembe-Mpeti axis, and seized new localities in Walikale territory. Multiple sources – including eyewitnesses, intelligence sources, sources close to M23 and RDF, civil society sources and FDLR/Wazalendo combatants – reported the concentrated presence of RDF soldiers in the area. While the Wazalendo and FDLR were able to push back the M23/RDF from Kalembe on 21 October 2023, sources reported that M23 took back control two days later, when RDF reinforcements had arrived (see annexes 17-19).

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Kitchanga**

- Multiple sources reported that RDF had a key position in Kitchanga, in the Kahe neighbourhood, on the Nyangutu hill. According to information obtained by the Group, Brigadier-General Déo Rusanganya, present in Kitchanga, was commanding the RDF in the area.²⁵⁶

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Kibumba and Buhumba**

From June to early November 2024, civil society sources, local authorities, AFC/M23 sources, eyewitnesses and intelligence sources reported the continuous and repeated movements and presence of RDF soldiers in and around Kibumba and Buhumba. RDF troops and RDF vehicles arrived from the Rwandan side of the border and entered the DRC through Kabuhunga, south of Kibumba, and other border crossings in Kibumba/Buhumba, as was also previously reported [S/2024/432](#), annex 28). RDF troops entering through Kabuhunga and other border crossings in Kibumba/Buhumba reinforced troops, including in Kanyamahoro, passing through Katale, Rutshuru territory.

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Rumangabo**

Aerial footage shot on 2 September 2024 shows a column of soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment, marching from Rumangabo towards the north, in the direction of Rutshuru town. Civil society, eyewitnesses and security sources reported the presence of RDF in and around Rumangabo.



Screenshot of video recorded in Rumangabo on 2 September 2024 received from confidential source

²⁵⁶ M23 combatants and security sources.

Annex 22 (para. 52)**RDF indiscriminate shelling of Mugunga with 122mm rockets, 3 May 2024****Bombardement aveugle de Mugunga par les RDF avec des roquettes de 122 mm, 3 mai 2024**

In the morning of 3 May 2024, shelling with six rockets fired from the hills behind Sake impacted four different locations within IDP settlements²⁵⁷ located in the Mugunga neighborhood of Goma, situated along the RN2 road between Goma and Sake. Five out of six shells exploded in and around the IDP camps without causing civilian casualties.²⁵⁸ Only the explosion at the “8^{ème} CEPAC” IDP settlement caused heavy casualties and material damage to civilian infrastructure.²⁵⁹

The shelling resulted in at least 17 civilians killed²⁶⁰ and 35 injured, the majority of them women and children.²⁶¹ The DRC Government announced a final death toll of 35 civilians. The Group was unable to corroborate this number, as there are no official records or reliable testimonies to account for the 35 victims. The official memorial ceremony and the burial of 35 individuals took place on 15 May 2024, among suspicions voiced that the DRC government inflated the number of victims and that the 35 coffins presented were not in fact all victims of the bombing. The Group noted that two names appeared twice on the crosses accompanying the coffins, with different dates of death. This may point to irregularities in the process of accounting for the victims, and the number put forward by the Government remains unverified.

122 mm rockets fired by RDF

The Group confirmed that the explosions were caused by 122 mm rockets (see below for details on the 122 mm rockets remnants recovered at Lushagala IDP camp). The Mugunga neighbourhood had already been shelled with 122 mm rockets in February and April 2024, as documented in the Group’s final report (S/2024/432, annex 42).

The 122 mm rockets were fired from military positions near Karuba in Masisi territory, from the hills overlooking Sake, north-west from Mugunga, an area controlled exclusively by RDF and M23 at the time of the incident (see below for details on the M23/RDF identified firing positions and estimated locations of impact below).²⁶²

The Group established that the portable single tube 122 mm rocket launchers (“Grad-P”) were operated by RDF soldiers.²⁶³ Multiple elements support this conclusion. *Firstly*, the presence of RDF at the military positions north-west of Mugunga prior to and at the time of the incident was confirmed (S/2024/432, annexes 39 and 42). *Secondly*, RDF possessed man-portable single-tube rocket launchers and 122 mm rockets (S/2024/432, annex 42). *Thirdly*, the presence of a 122 mm rocket launcher at RDF positions northwest of Sake and near Karuba was documented earlier. It was also documented that RDF had used 122 mm rocket launchers in previous months during operations supporting M23 (S/2024/432, annexes 39 and 42). *Fourthly*, the use of 122 mm rockets requires significant military expertise and extensive dedicated training.²⁶⁴ While RDF has the technical ability and expertise to use 122 mm rockets, it is doubtful that M23 possesses sufficient expertise to handle alone this weapon system, despite having benefited from military training (S/2024/432, paras. 35-39).²⁶⁵ *Fifthly*, 24 hours prior to the attack, an individual close to RDF and M23 alerted the Group that RDF planned to attack Mugunga and Kibati. After the attack, RDF commanders acknowledged to the source that RDF had conducted the attack. *Sixth*, the Group was informed that following the attack, RDF leadership in Kigali instructed the RDF units (belonging to the 93th and 109th battalions) deployed on the ground to avoid targeting IDP camps.

²⁵⁷ Lushagala, Zone 14, 8 ième CEPAC and CBCA Rego. The Group did investigations in Lushagala and 8ième CEPAC IDP camps.

²⁵⁸ The Group did not (yet) obtain access to the sixth unexploded shell.

²⁵⁹ Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, intelligence and security sources. Group’s visit of Mugunga IDP sites on 25 June 2024.

²⁶⁰ Nine deaths confirmed by medical sources; eight by community leaders and researchers.

²⁶¹ Medical, UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers and community leaders.

²⁶² Based on analysis of the trajectory of the incoming rockets and information provided by eyewitnesses, security, military and intelligence sources, community leaders, UN sources and confidential documents.

²⁶³ Security and intelligence sources, sources close to RDF and M23.

²⁶⁴ Military experts, security and UN sources.

²⁶⁵ M23 ex-combatants, UN and intelligence sources. Confidential reports.

While the US and DRC Governments attributed the attack to the RDF and M23,²⁶⁶ M23 and AFC leaders, as well as the Rwandan government, denied responsibility for the Mugunga attack (see the AFC communiqué on the Mugunga attack below).²⁶⁷

FARDC positions close to IDP settlements

Between 9 and 10 am on 3 May, prior to the RDF shelling of the IDP settlements in Mugunga, the FARDC had fired rockets towards RDF and M23 military positions on the Ngumba and Vunano hills in the area of Mushaki and Karuba, north-west of Sake.²⁶⁸ Despite repeated warnings by humanitarian actors and MONUSCO against the positioning of artillery near or in populated areas (S/2024/432, para. 97),²⁶⁹ FARDC units commanded by General Papi Lupembe (see also para. 70) fired shells from two separate multi-barrel-rocket launchers mounted on trucks, from two distinct artillery positions²⁷⁰ located close to the IDP settlements impacted by the shelling (see details on the FARDC artillery positions under the heading below “*FARDC artillery positions near IDP settlements*”).²⁷¹ One FARDC artillery position was located at the Mugunga cemetery (Cimetière ‘Chemin du ciel’), at less than 500 m from the impact location of the RDF that killed civilians at the “8^{ème} CEPAC” IDP site.²⁷² Another artillery position was identified at approximately two kilometers north-east of the Lushagala IDP settlement (see map below).²⁷³

The Mugunga shelling was likely a retaliatory action aimed at neutralizing the FARDC artillery positions, in response to FARDC/FDNB artillery firing.²⁷⁴ While the impact on the IDP settlement was likely due to a targeting error, it does not exclude an element of planning by RDF with acceptance of significant collateral damage, as explained below.

122 mm rockets as area-weapons are inherently indiscriminate

A portable single tube 122 mm rocket launcher (“Grad-P”) is a type of artillery rocket system designed for area saturation rather than pinpoint accuracy. These rockets lack precision-guided technology, meaning they are typically fired in volleys that cover a broad area, rather than being aimed at specific targets with high accuracy. They are therefore highly effective against troop concentrations, enemy positions, or defensive lines. This area-effect capability inherently makes them “indiscriminate” when used near civilian populations, as the rockets impact within a broad zone rather than a specific target. Moreover, 122 mm rockets have an extensive fragmentation effect, intended to increase the weapon’s lethality and impact, causing damage not only from the explosion itself but also from the pieces of metal and other materials that fly outward, posing significant risks to personnel, equipment, and structures within the vicinity of the blast. This feature makes 122 mm rockets particularly dangerous in densely populated areas, as the fragments can injure or kill individuals far from the actual impact point of the explosion.²⁷⁵

In conclusion, 122mm rockets are by design area-effect weapons unsuitable for precise targeting. They cannot be accurately directed at a specific military target, rendering them indiscriminate when used in populated areas.

For this reason, under international humanitarian law the use of 122mm rockets in urban or civilian-dense environments is deemed as indiscriminate, as they are likely to cause unintended harm to civilians and infrastructure.

²⁶⁶ Press Statement of US Department of State and communiqué of the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also SADC communiqué.

²⁶⁷ Messages sent by M23 officers, Bertrand Bisimwa on X and press release of the Republic of Rwanda.

²⁶⁸ Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, intelligence and security sources.

²⁶⁹ Humanitarian and UN sources. Group of Expert meetings with FARDC, SAMIDRC and security sources.

²⁷⁰ FARDC and security sources, IDP camp leaders.

²⁷¹ Ibid. UN sources. Group’s visit of Mugunga IDP sites on 25 June 2024.

²⁷² Group visit of Mugunga IDP camps on 25 June 2024, eyewitnesses, and confidential reports.

²⁷³ I.e. at Nzulo and at approximately 2km east of the Lushagala IDP camp. Confidential and UN sources.

²⁷⁴ Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, security and intelligence sources, confidential reports. The Group notes that it had been informed on the RDF planned operation to attack Mugunga and Kibati (see above).

²⁷⁵ Military expert sources.

FARDC artillery positions near IDP settlements

FARDC artillery nearby civilian settlements pose great risks for civilians due to predictable retaliatory attacks by the opposing side (see also [S/2024/432](#), paras. 97-98).

After the 3 May attack, humanitarian actors and IDP camp leaders renewed their appeal to cease the use of explosive weapons near populated areas. In the immediate aftermath of the shelling, the angered IDP population of Mugunga demonstrated against the FARDC, demanding them to remove artillery from the vicinity of the IDP settlements. The demonstration was also followed by explicit calls addressed to Military Governor Cirimwami to prevent the presence of artillery and of armed FARDC and Wazalendo near and within the IDP settlements.²⁷⁶ FARDC artillery located near the IDP settlements have been removed following the 3 May incident, but IDPs reported to the Group that mobile artillery positions were occasionally still placed too close to the civilian settlements.²⁷⁷

122 mm rockets remnants recovered at Lushagala IDP camp:

The Group collected imagery recorded on 3 May 2024 at Lushagala and CEPAC IDP camps showing remnants of 122 mm rockets. Security, military, and UN sources, as well as ammunition experts, assessed that the employed weapon system was a Grad-P Complex (GPC) 122 mm tripod-mounted single barrel portable launcher. This weapon system was already documented by the Group. This system has a range of 25 to 30 kilometers.

See image below depicting the remnants of the 122 mm rocket:



Screenshots from video received on 3 May 2024 filmed by eyewitnesses in Lushagala IDP camp


²⁷⁶ Interviews with IDPs and community leaders in Mugunga.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.



Pictures received from confidential civil society and UN sources

- RDF firing positions and estimated locations of impact:



Maps and schematic overviews received from confidential sources

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, ©2024 Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Military, security, UN and intelligence sources identified the following positions as possible firing positions, all within the area controlled by RDF and M23:

- RDF ridgeline position north of Karuba; 1°33'31.36"S / 28°59'27.93"E where presence of 122mm rockets was documented ([S/2024/432](#), annex 42)
- Point 1800: 1°34'14" S / 29°01'34" E; or 1°34'45.51"S / 29° 2'10.00"E
- Kimoka: 1°33'07" S / 29°03'08" E
- Point 2120: 1°33'0.34" S / 29°02'21"

- AFC communiqué on the Mugunga attack:



COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL DU 3 MAI 2024

Les crimes perpétrés ce vendredi matin à Goma par les troupes de Tshisekedi ne resteront pas impunis.

1. L'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) condamne fermement toutes les attaques contre des civils et des infrastructures civiles, surtout le bombardement de la ville et des camps de déplacés de guerre, qui a tué et blessé plusieurs congolais à Mugunga, dans la ville de Goma ce vendredi 3 mai 2024.
2. L'AFC rappelle que les attaques contre des civils et des infrastructures civiles sont interdites par le droit international humanitaire et de ce fait condamnées et punissables par la loi.
3. Il est à noter que chaque fois que l'offensive des forces négatives du régime de Kinshasa essuie un revers cuisant face à nos forces sur le champ de bataille, elles tournent leurs canons contre les populations civiles. C'est le cas notamment à Kibumba, Kibirizi, Mweso, Karuba, Mushaki, Kirorigrwe ainsi que dans plusieurs autres entités. Et cette tactique est devenue une habitude.
4. L'AFC met en garde le régime de Monsieur Tshisekedi contre tout agissement criminel envers les civils et s'engage à défendre la population contre toute autre menace terroriste à l'avenir de la part du régime de TSHISEKEDI.
5. L'AFC demande instamment au régime de Kinshasa de démilitariser toute la ville de Goma comme le réclame la population meurtrie depuis plusieurs mois par les actions criminelles de la coalition des forces négatives du régime de Kinshasa.
6. Le positionnement de l'artillerie lourde au milieu des populations civiles et dans les camps des déplacés est un crime de guerre qui vise à se servir de la population civile comme bouclier humain. Ces armes doivent être délocalisées afin de mettre la population hors de tout danger.
7. L'AFC demande à la population de la ville de Goma de rester mobiliser pour mettre fin aux actions criminelles de régime décadent de Monsieur Tshisekedi qui sera bientôt mis aux arrêts et traduit devant des juridictions compétentes pour répondre de ses exactions contre des innocents.

Fait à Bunagana, le 3 mai 2024

Pour l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)



Lawrence KANYUKA
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Document received from confidential M23 sources

- FARDC artillery positions on 3 May relative to shelling impact locations:



Schematic overview received from confidential UN source
 Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 23 (para. 53)

Guided anti-tank missile in Mubambiro

Missile guidé à Mubambiro

- On 10 June 2024, an armoured vehicle belonging to the Malawi contingent of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) was hit in Mubambiro. Whereas FARDC and SADC positions in Mubambiro had been repeatedly hit by mortar fire in preceding months (S/2024/432, annex 40), excerpts from video footage of the shelling, both in flight and on impact, show that this time SAMIDRC was hit by an anti-tank guided missile.
- The imagery below shows the location of the SAMIDRC camp and hit SAMIDIRC armoured vehicle (picture 1), and the explosion of the guided missile (picture 2):



Image received from confidential UN source
 Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

- The imagery below shows the remnants of the missile recovered in Mubambiro proving the wire-guided capability. See also annex x below for additional information on this type of missiles.



Image received from confidential UN source

Annex 24 (para. 53)

Guided missile in Kanyamahoro

Missile guidé à Kanyamahoro

- On 15 June 2024, after almost three months of relative calm in the Kibumba area, north of Goma, hostilities resumed when another anti-tank missile hit a joint defensive position of FARDC and the private military company Congo Protection (S/2023/990, paras. 47-51) in Kanyamahoro, few kilometers south of Kibumba. Two FARDC soldiers and one Congo Protection staff were killed on the spot, while a second Congo Protection staff died in the aftermath of the event.²⁷⁸ Several other FARDC and Congo Protection staff were wounded.
- Imagery showing the location of the FARDC-Congo protection position and the location of the explosion of the guided missile:



Image received from confidential UN source
Map Data: Google, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, Imagery Date: 5 August 2019

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

²⁷⁸ PMC and FARDC sources, confidential reports and eyewitness accounts.


- Imagery of the remnants of the missiles recovered in Mubambiro proving the wire-guided capability





Imagery received from UN and confidential security sources

- Schematic overview of the Spike-Extended Range (ER) guided missiles:



Source: [The most advanced anti-tank complex "Spike" \(topwar.ru\)](https://topwar.ru)

The Group notes that: (1) this weapon system is new (markings show manufacture in 2021) and expensive; (2) the transport of this system, as well as its storage, is complicated and sensitive; (3) the supply of this weapon system is reserved for states; and (4) the use of the missile system requires extensive training. It is therefore highly unlikely that (i) local armed groups or the FDLR possess and/or use this type of weapon system, or (ii) that M23 could have handled this system without external support.

Several M23 combatants reported that sanctioned individual Bernard Byamungu ([CDi.038](#)) was responsible for the anti-tank missiles in the areas around Sake ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 36 and 41).

The Group is working on tracing the origin of these missiles.

Annex 25 (para. 54)**Spoofing and jamming of GPS systems in and around M23/RDF controlled areas****Espionnage et brouillage des systèmes GPS dans les zones contrôlées par le M23 et RDF et aux alentours**

Since late May 2024, while operating in and around M23/RDF controlled areas, the Global Positioning Systems (GPS) of different types of assets –UN military and civilian aircraft, MONUSCO surveillance drone, FARDC surveillance drones, humanitarian and commercial aircrafts, and different types of GPS devices – were impacted by jamming and spoofing attacks.²⁷⁹

Spoofing attacks result in the GPS receiver computing erroneous location or time; jamming attacks overpower GPS signals so that a GPS receiver can no longer operate. Jamming and spoofing can therefore be used to interfere with, and counteract, potential military attacks (for example by armed drones or attack helicopters) or aerial observations (for example by surveillance drones or aircraft).

The Group notes that jamming and spoofing carry significant risks as systems heavily dependent on GPS systems, including civilian and humanitarian aircrafts, may suddenly lose navigation capabilities and/or deviate from their intended course. According to information received by the Group, on several occasions since late May 2024, pilots of non-military aircraft were compelled to take manual control after suffering spoofing and jamming attacks while flying in the affected areas.

Spoofing and jamming attacks have been documented in areas around Goma, Kibumba, Sake, Kitchanga, Kanyabayonga and Bukavu (see map below).²⁸⁰ The attack around Kanyabayonga was first documented early July 2024,²⁸¹ few days after M23 captured the town.

Jamming and spoofing systems operated from DRC and Rwandan territories

Three jamming and spoofing systems responsible for the signal interference described above were identified by location. One spoofing system was positioned on a hill in Gisenyi, in Rwanda, less than three kilometers from the DRC border.²⁸² Another system was detected at 500 meters from Kamembe airport in Rwanda, east of Bukavu, DRC.²⁸³ A third system was detected in Kanyabayonga, on DRC territory.²⁸⁴ Sources close to RDF and M23 informed the Group that RDF and M23 were at the origin of the jamming and spoofing.

The Group found no evidence of spoofing and jamming systems deployed by the FARDC, SAMIDRC, FDNB or private military companies.²⁸⁵

²⁷⁹ Eyewitnesses, intelligence, security and military sources, imagery on file with the Group.

²⁸⁰ Eyewitnesses, intelligence, security and military sources, confidential document and imagery on file with the Group.

²⁸¹ Eyewitness and imagery on file with the Group.


²⁸² 1°40'20.7"S 29°16'32.2"E (-1.672647° 29.275780°). Confirmed also by Military, security and UN sources

²⁸³ -2.473400° 28.906008°;

²⁸⁴ -0.682558° 29.182317°

²⁸⁵ Interviews with SAMIDRC, PMC, FARDC, military and intelligence sources. Confidential report.

- Map showing the areas affected by jamming and spoofing



Map received from UN source. Red circles indicate areas affected by signal interference

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 1 January 2021

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 26 (para. 54)

Jamming and subsequent crash of a MONUSCO surveillance drone

Brouillage et crash d'un drone de surveillance de la MONUSCO

On 29 October 2024, MONUSCO lost contact with one surveillance drone that was conducting a reconnaissance mission in the area of Mpeti and Pinga, Walikale territory. While flying over Mpeti, the GPS system was affected by a jamming attack. The drone crashed close to Kikuvo, 15 kilometers from Kirumba, southwest of Lake Edward.


Picture of the crashed surveillance drone:



Picture published and shared on social media channels on 29 October 2024, provided by confidential source

Map showing the itinerary of the surveillance drone from the moment the system was jammed. The drone drifted from Mpeti/Pinga, where the GPS system was jammed and hacked, until it crashed the near Kivuvo:

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

 **Lawrence KANYUKA** ✓
@LawrenceKanyuka

Nous appelons la MONUSCO à cesser l'utilisation de ses drones et à mettre fin à sa collaboration avec les forces condamnées par les Nations Unies pour génocide et crimes contre l'humanité. Ces forces coalisées du régime de Kinshasa ont volé plus de 50 vaches, tué deux gardiens et blessé deux autres ce mardi 29/10/2024 aux environs de 1h00 à Karongi Kwa Koki. Elle doit, au contraire, s'engager en faveur d'une résolution pacifique du conflit en cours. La non-assistance à personne en danger est condamnable.

8:19 AM · 29 oct. 2024 · **7 127** vues

116/168

Annex 27 (para. 55)**SHORAD system spotted in Karuba****Système SHORAD repéré a Karuba**

The SHORAD system was spotted on 25 October, in Karuba (1°34'21.18" S – 28°59'28.14" E), 6 kilometers west from Sake. The soldiers operating the SHORAD system are equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment (picture 3). Analysis of the imagery shows that the SHORAD system has characteristics virtually identical to the Norinco Type 92 Yitian TL-6 ([S/2024/432](#), annex 33).



Screenshots of video received from confidential security source

The Group notes that, even if it was confirmed that the SHORAD system and/or the vehicle were of Chinese manufacture, this does not mean that the material was transferred in violation of the sanctions regime. Rather, if confirmed, it would imply that the materiel was diverted from its intended legal end-use

The Group sent a request for information to the Government of Rwanda on 29 October 2024 regarding the diversion of military materiel from its intended legal and end-user and/or end-use, including with regards to the SHORAD system.

Since the Group's last report, intelligence, civil society and security sources reported the observation of other SHORAD systems in (1) Kamulima (-1.142574° 29.443923°) in April 2024; (2) Kahunga (-1.108805° 29.393574°) in May 2024 (see also [S/2024/432](#), annex 23); and (3) Kitchanga (-1.247193° 29.057567°) in May 2024; and (4) Rubaya (-1.543651° 28.873837°) in May 2024. The three systems that were present on the ground as reported earlier ([S/2024/432](#), annex 34) have thus been mobile.

On 15 November 2024, at least 3 SHORAD systems were present in Petit Nord, namely in Kibumba (1), Kitchanga (1) and Karuba (1).

Annex 28 (para. 56)

Update on mineral traceability

Mise à jour sur la traçabilité minière

AFC/M23 takeover of mining areas in Rubaya spurred concerns among downstream industry actors on the risks of minerals from the eastern part of the DRC fueling the ongoing conflict.

On 8 May 2024, the former DRC Ministry of Mines issued an official communiqué, accusing M23 of levying illegal taxes on coltan and cassiterite traded to Rwanda. The communiqué also claimed that traders associated with M23 were transporting untaxed minerals from Rubaya to Mushaki, and then on to Rwanda, passing through M23-controlled territory.

On 17 May 2024, the president of the North Kivu mining chamber, Ms. Yvette Mwanza, announced that members of the chamber would stop sourcing minerals from all of Masisi territory, turning to those extracted in Walikale and Lubero territories instead, to avoid financing M23 occupation of Rubaya.²⁸⁶ From May to September 2024, production recorded by the North Kivu mining division dropped to 10.7 tons from mining sites in Walikale,²⁸⁷ whereas during the same time AFC/M23 produced at least 150 tons per month in Rubaya.

Responsible Minerals Initiative suspension of ITSCI

On 5 July 2024, the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) (S/2024/432, paras. 141, 147 and 148 and annex 87) suspended ITSCI as a recognized upstream system in the DRC until at least January 2026.²⁸⁸ According to the RMI communiqué, this decision resulted from a series of shortcomings relating to traceability in the DRC, which remained unaddressed by ITSCI. RMI criticized ITSCI for not providing sufficient responses to questions about risk management of conflict escalation impacting mineral trade in the DRC and Rwanda, which would not serve its mission of supporting regulatory compliance and responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAs).

Consequently, RMI's members and smelters in the Great Lakes Region that rely exclusively on ITSCI's due diligence certification, did no longer meet the requirements to qualify for RMI's Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (RMAP).

The Group notes that the majority of economic actors mostly rely on ITSCI's certification to meet their due diligence obligations; they do not conduct independent quality controls to comply with the globally accepted international standards.²⁸⁹

On 8 July 2024, the United States issued a statement of concern about the illicit trade and exploitation of certain minerals - including artisanal and semi-industrially mined gold and tantalum - contributing to the ongoing conflict. The statement also pointed out that "minerals directly or indirectly benefit armed groups and move out of the country through Rwanda and to Uganda before moving to major refining and processing countries". The statement pointed at "flawed industry-managed traceability initiatives on the ground in the DRC and Rwanda" among the risks of contamination of the mineral supply chain with minerals ineligible for trade.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁶ <https://www.radiookapi.net/2024/05/17/actualite/societe/des-entreprises-boycottent-les-minerais-provenant-des-zones-occupees>.

²⁸⁷ North Kivu Mining Division. Production was of 4237kg in May, 2230 kg in June, 2162kg in July and 2078kg in August.

²⁸⁸ The statement can be consulted at <https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/news/rmi-update-on-itSCI-recognition-and-great-lakes-region-due-diligence/>.

²⁸⁹ OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

²⁹⁰ <https://www.state.gov/statement-of-concern-related-to-certain-minerals-supply-chains-from-rwanda-and-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-contributing-to-the-ongoing-conflict/>.

ITSCI press release of 8 May 2024



PRESS RELEASE
May 2024

Suspension of ITSCI activities in Masisi territory following the presence of non-state armed group M23 in Rubaya town

On Tuesday 30th April, the security situation deteriorated in North Kivu, DRC, with the M23 non-state armed group taking control over new areas, including the trading town of Rubaya.

This led to immediate halt to ITSCI activities and immediate evacuation of the area by ITSCI teams and state services. So far, there is no major impact reported on the security in Masisi town and Goma town.

Following the resumption of ITSCI activities in Masisi announced in April, all stakeholders, including provincial authorities, state services, companies, and civil society continued to implement risk mitigation measures, with ongoing support from ITSCI. This progressed well until the M23 arrived in Rubaya town and its surrounding area.

Working in high risk and conflicted areas present unique challenges, as shown in the situation in North Kivu which continues to evolve rapidly. Our OECD-aligned programme adapts to the reality on the ground while the safety of our staff is a topmost priority.

We continue to monitor the security situation very closely in communication with local authorities and security forces. Actions in recent weeks led by authorities, state services, and security forces, with support from ITSCI, have shown positive commitment and examples of multi-stakeholder approach to risk mitigation. This work will continue as soon as the situation allows.

For more information, please contact:

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comms@itsci.org

Press release also available on [ITSCI website](https://www.itsci.org)

Ministry of Mines official communiqué of 8 May 2024



MINISTÈRE DES MINES

*La Ministre***COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL**

Les périmètres de l'ancien Permis d'Exploitation 4731, retiré par l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 00222/CAB/MINES/01/2023 du 14 juin 2023, sont désormais dans le domaine de l'Etat.

Une exploitation minière artisanale illicite continuait à se réaliser sur des sites miniers dans ces périmètres par les populations locales et les autochtones de Rubaya et ses environs. Les minerais extraits de ces sites, acheminés à Goma, n'étaient pas vendus parce que non tagués par le système de traçabilité à cause de leur origine illicite.

Pour contourner cette difficulté, les vendeurs de ces minerais prenaient une autre trajectoire Rubaya – Mushake (où le M23 avait, pour besoin de la cause, érigé un grand entrepôt) et de Mushake vers le Rwanda ou l'Ouganda pour traitement et exportation. Curieusement ces mêmes minerais, issus de l'exploitation illicite avec ses effets collatéraux une fois au Rwanda ou ailleurs, sont tagués et vendus normalement à l'international comme si dans ces pays il existait des blanchisseries des minerais de sang.

Informée de cette situation, la Ministre des Mines de la République Démocratique du Congo a autorisé à une Coopérative minière de la place de s'installer sur les sites exploités artisanalement dans les périmètres de l'ancien PE 4731, afin de fédérer tous les exploitants artisanaux présents avec l'assistance et sous l'encadrement du SAEMAPE et de la Division des Mines du Nord-Kivu, en vue rétablir la traçabilité des flux des matières et canaliser toute la production dans le circuit officiel de commercialisation avec l'aide des entités de traitement régulièrement agréées et ce, en attendant les dispositions spécifiques à prendre sur ce gisement.

Une fois au courant de cette démarche, le Rwanda via son préposé le M23, a intensifié des attaques contre Rubaya, aujourd'hui sous le contrôle de l'armée rwandaise.

Aussitôt établi dans cet espace, le M23 y a tenu une grande réunion avec tous les creuseurs et négociants, les autorisant à poursuivre l'exploitation artisanale. Ils achètent les minerais produits, les entreposent dans leurs grands dépôts de Mushake avant de les acheminer au Rwanda.

A cet effet, ils instaurent une taxe unique de 3.000\$/Tonne de Coltan et 2.000\$/Tonne de cassitérite et le paiement se fait à Kigali après-vente. Par ailleurs, ils ont saisi tous les minerais destinés aux comptoirs congolais et les ont orientés vers Rwanda.

Les informations en ma possession renseignent que le M23 a intensifié l'exploitation minière, y compris par les femmes enceintes et les enfants dans les sites miniers de Rubaya. Le Rwanda a opté pour une stratégie de diversion consistant à sursoir à l'exportation des produits miniers, de peur d'enregistrer une hausse des statistiques d'exportation à la suite de l'occupation de Rubaya. Les minerais exploités sont donc entreposés pour leur exportation ultérieure.



(Suite)

Nonobstant cette manœuvre de diversion, il appert que les minerais de la filière des 3T exportés par le Rwanda proviennent de la fraude, de la contrebande, de l'exploitation illicite et des crimes perpétrés dans la partie Est de la République agressive par le Rwanda et le M23 et leurs attaques suivent la Direction des sites miniers. Le Rwanda exporte les minerais de sang, en violation des toutes les dispositions internationales et régionales en la matière.


Aussi, le Ministère des Mines de la RDC voudrait-il rappeler que le processus de la création de la CIRGL a été lancé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, dans le contexte des conflits armés dans la Région des Grands Lacs africains. Le Conseil de Sécurité avait alors reconnu la gravité de la situation en RDC et l'a même qualifiée de **menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationales et pour la Région**.

Le Ministère des Mines RDC attend de ses partenaires – Les Nations Unies et la CIRGL notamment – une affirmation sans ambages de l'engagement de tous les acteurs, y compris les consommateurs finaux des produits miniers, pour un approvisionnement sain et responsable en substances minérales et, partant, qu'un embargo soit décrété à l'encontre du Rwanda.

Cette option a l'avantage de freiner le financement des conflits par les minerais ; restaurer la confiance des parties prenantes ; protéger les intérêts économiques légitimes de l'Etat ; atténuer les violations des droits de l'homme par les groupes armés ainsi que les armées étrangères et rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 08 MAY 2024

Antoinette N'SAMBA KALAMABAYI



Annex 29 (para. 57)

Illustrations of documented breaches of mineral traceability**Illustrations de violations documentées de la traçabilité des minéraux**

Illicit trading has been reported by the Group since at least 2012, highlighting ongoing challenges in ensuring traceability,²⁹¹ and suggesting that efforts to improve supply chain transparency have been insufficient and/or ineffective. Yet, no previous violation reached the magnitude of the current 150 tons of coltan smuggled monthly from Rubaya to Rwanda.

The cases presented below provide specific examples of illicit trading of tin, tantalum, and tungsten (3Ts) minerals documented by the Group since 2013, excluding cases involving gold. The case studies reveal breaches in traceability across different years, from smuggling, illegal mining, and cross-site smuggling to the illegal sale of mineral tags.

Common issues that persist to this day, based on the case studies listed below:

- **Patterns of illicit mineral trading**, whereby minerals are traded illegally across borders, like the smuggling of coltan from the DRC to Rwanda (case 1) or cross-site smuggling (case 4).
- **Oversight issues**, whereby authorities or corporations knowingly or unknowingly allowed traceability violations. For example, illegal tagging by companies or falsifying origins with tags on the black market (cases 2 and 3).
- **Failures in traceability systems**: where the established traceability systems (like ITSCI tags) were manipulated, falsified, or ignored (cases 3 and 4).
- **Armed group involvement**: armed groups controlling mining areas or supply chains, such as Raia Mutomboki (case 2) or APCLS and PARECO groups (case 4).

1. **CIMIEX, AD Trade International and Union Mines smuggling of white coltan from the DRC to Rwanda (2013-2014)**

- **Summary**: The Group reported on two companies based in Rwanda involved in the smuggling of white coltan from the DRC to Rwanda, under false origins (as if it was of Rwandan origin). Although the cooperation of the Rwandan authorities and a local smelter allowed to detect the fraud, the case reveals cross-border smuggling weaknesses in the system.²⁹²
- **Documented violations**:
 - In December 2013, “CIMIEX is purported to have supplied 10 tons of ‘white coltan’ to AD Trade International (exporter).” To determine whether the minerals had been smuggled from the DRC, the Government of Rwanda had compared them to samples from the mining sites that had been “fingerprinted” as part of Rwanda’s traceability efforts. The Government of Rwanda told the Group that, for the CIMIEX minerals, the field (mine) samples and the consignment (suspect) samples did “not appear to be plausibly similar”.²⁹³ This thus implies that the white coltan sold by CIMIEX was smuggled from the DRC.
 - In December 2013, “Union Mines provided 1.8 tons of ‘white coltan’ to Phoenix Metals (exporter/comptoir)”. Phoenix Metals’ own testing showed that the consignment sample contained two types of coltan. The company’s test found that 80 per cent of the sample was made up of black coltan of the kind mined in Rwanda and that 20 per

²⁹¹ S/2024/432, paras. 138 and 145-147; S/2023/990, paras. 59-62; S/2023/431, paras 91-97; S/2022/479, para 78, annex 46; S/2021/560, paras 67, 69; S/2020/1283, paras. 42-44; S/2020/482, paras. 102-107; S/2019/469, paras. 149-164; S/2018/531, paras. 136-146; S/2017/1091, paras. 46-47; S/2016/466, para. 119; S/2015/19, paras. 114, 119, 158, 164, 165, 168, 170.

²⁹² S/2015/19, paras 174-177.

²⁹³ S/2015/19, para. 175.

cent was made up of white coltan, which was not found in Rwanda; yet it was available in the DRC.²⁹⁴ Phoenix Metals told the Group that it had not purchased the minerals because of doubts about their origin.²⁹⁵

2. Illegal mining by armed groups and sale of mineral tags in Rwanda (2014-2015)

- **Summary:** The case documented in 2015 reveals illegal mining and trade practices with the involvement of an armed group (Raia Mutomboki, operating in South Kivu). Cassiterite and other 3T minerals originating from South Kivu were smuggled to Rwanda.²⁹⁶ According to the Group, mineral tags were misused and sold on the black market, with the complicity of Rwandan companies and tagging agents of the Geology and Mines Department of the Rwandan Ministry of Mines, who signed the mine site logbooks.²⁹⁷
- **Documented violations:**
 - From November 2014 to May 2015, 126,228.5 kg of cassiterite sourced from areas under Raia Mutomboki control had flown to Kavumu airport, near Bukavu.
 - In 2015, the Group reported that cassiterite and other 3T minerals originating from Lulingu and other areas of South Kivu Province were transported across Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River to Rwanda. The Group also documented an attempt to smuggle 77 bags with a total of 4,425 kg of coltan during the night of 2-3 March 2015, using the Bukavu road to the Ruzizi River, downplayed by the FARDC intervention.²⁹⁸
 - In June, July and August 2015, the Group documented the sale of 12 mineral tracing tags and associated paperwork on the black market by three Rwandan companies: RF&GM, Africa Multibusiness Line and Société minière du Kanama (SOMIKA). The documentation included tags, copies of mine site logbooks, ministerial orders attributing mineral research licenses to the three companies and administrative documents allowing employees to transport the minerals.²⁹⁹

3. Illegal tagging of minerals from non-certified sources (2017)

- **Summary:** The documented cases reveal issues of illegal tagging (through sale of tags on black market) of non-certified minerals originating from North Kivu, as well as the contamination of the supply chain due to armed group activity.³⁰⁰ Illegal mining of tin, tungsten, and tantalum continued, including in protected areas in the DRC such as the Virunga National Park, revealing lack/failure of oversight and traceability.
- **Documented violations:**
 - The Group reported that in the trading centre of Ndjingala, in Mubi and Walikale town (Walikale territory, North Kivu), tags were sold on the black market, allowing minerals sourced from the non-validated site of Bisie (see [S/2014/42](#), para. 206, annexes 79 and 83) and Mpafu/Nyakoba to permeate the legal chain of custody. Tags could be purchased for about \$3 per 50 kg bag of minerals, or \$500 per 10 tons.³⁰¹

²⁹⁴ [S/2015/19](#), para. 176.

²⁹⁵ [S/2015/19](#), annex 49.

²⁹⁶ [S/2015/797](#), para 53-59.

²⁹⁷ [S/2015/797](#), para. 60.

²⁹⁸ [S/2015/797](#), para 57-58.

²⁹⁹ [S/2015/797](#), para 59 and annexes 13 to 15.

³⁰⁰ [S/2017/672](#), para. 77-86 and 93-98.

³⁰¹ [S/2017/672](#), para. 77-86.

- The Group documented that tagging of minerals from the mining sites of Rubonga in Masisi territory and Kalay Boeing in Walikale territory continued. This was the case after ITRI Ltd suspended these sites due to the proven presence of armed groups there.³⁰²

4. Cross-site mineral smuggling (2019-2024)

- **Summary:** The documented cases reveal patterns of cross-site smuggling of coltan in Masisi and Rubaya, illicit tagging practices, armed group involvement, and intentional misrepresentation of the origin of minerals manipulating the loopholes of the ITSCI tagging system.³⁰³
- **Documented violations:**
 - Throughout 2019 and early 2020, coltan produced at Kamatale site in Masisi territory were transported untagged to Ngungu, Masisi territory, where the coltan was tagged in a depot belonging to the Société aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (SAKIMA SA). Also, between January and October 2019 minerals extracted under the control of APCLS, Nyatura FDDH and Nyatura Matata armed groups were tagged in Ngungu as local production. Minerals tagged in Ngungu were then sold to the Coopérative des artisanaux miniers du Congo (CDMC).
 - The Group reported extensive cross-site smuggling of coltan from the PE4731 exploited by the Société Minière de Bisunzu SARL (SMB) in Rubaya to adjacent validated but non-productive sites in the PE76, again through Ngungu.³⁰⁴ Most of the smuggling was orchestrated by COOPERAMMA, then under the executive leadership of Shamamba Enoch. The smuggling was financed by the then COOPERAMMA “president” Robert Habinshuti Seninga.³⁰⁵
 - In 2023 and early 2024, Rubaya area was occupied by PARECO armed group. This resulted in minerals extracted in Rubaya being ineligible for trade. Yet minerals continued to be extracted and smuggled untagged.³⁰⁶ Despite consecutive suspensions, ITSCI continued to tag Rubaya minerals from the PE76 permit, claiming that only PE4731 was under armed group control, and ignoring several accounts of cross-site smuggling from PE4731 to PE76.³⁰⁷ UN sources and the Group estimated that in 2023, 400 tons of coltan from PE4731 in Rubaya were smuggled into the legal supply chain through PE76.³⁰⁸ In 2024, the Group reported on 36 tons of untaged coltan extracted in Rubaya while the tagging system was suspended at that time, and thus not eligible for trade.³⁰⁹

³⁰² S/2017/672, para. 93-98.

³⁰³ S/2020/482, paras 97, 99.

³⁰⁴ S/2020/482, paras 102, 103; S/2021/560, paras 67, 69.

³⁰⁵ S/2022/479, para 78, annex 46; S/2021/560, paras 67, 69.

³⁰⁶ S/2024/432, para. 141 and annex 83.

³⁰⁷ S/2023/431, paras 91-97; S/2023/990, paras. 59-62; S/2024/432, paras. 138 and 145-147.

³⁰⁸ Unpublished UN report.

³⁰⁹ S/2024/432, para. 141 and annex 83.

Annex 30 (para. 58)

AFC/M23 monopoly over coltan production and trade in Rubaya directly benefitting smuggle to Rwanda

Le monopole de l'AFC/M23 sur la production et le commerce du coltan à Rubaya profite directement à la contrebande vers le Rwanda

Although AFC/M23-approved traders had little profit margin per kilo of coltan purchased, they still benefitted from their trade monopoly and the high volumes of minerals sold.

According to economic actors, civil society representatives, and officials from the DRC's Ministry of Mines and security services, AFC/M23's decision to launch an attack and seize control of Rubaya in late April 2024 was primarily motivated by a strategic need to monopolize the only viable route for mineral evacuation. This move would ensure that AFC/M23 maintained exclusive control over this critical supply chain. Furthermore, these sources reported that AFC/M23 sought to make Rwanda the sole transit market for these minerals, thereby securing a continuous flow of coltan from Rubaya to Rwanda.³¹⁰

³¹⁰ Economic actors, civil society, DRC Ministry of Mines, security sources.

Annex 31 (para. 59)

AFC/M23 communique on 07 May 2024

Communiqué AFC/M23 du 07 mai 2024



Le Coordonnateur

DÉCISION N°001/COORDO/AFC/2024 PORTANT INTERDICTION D'IMMIXTION DES MEMBRES, CADRES ET PERSONNEL POLITIQUE ET MILITAIRE DE L'ALLIANCE FLEUVE CONGO DANS L'EXPLOITATION ET LA COMMERCIALISATION DES SUBSTANCES MINÉRALES IDENTIFIÉES DANS LES TERRITOIRES LIBÉRÉS

Le Coordonnateur de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC),

- Vu la Constitution telle que modifiée et complétée à ce jour par la Loi N°11/002 du 20 janvier 2011 en son article 64 alinéa premier ;
- Vu l'Acte Constitutif de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), spécialement en son article 3 alinéa 3 ;
- Vu le procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil de l'AFC du 15/12/2023 portant désignation du Coordonnateur de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo ;
- Considérant les conclusions de l'Atelier de Consolidation des Actes fondateurs du Conseil de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo du 20/12/2023 ;
- Considérant que l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) mène une révolution constitutionnelle (Article 64, alinéa premier) conforme aux lois en vigueur en République Démocratique du Congo, et aux conventions internationales notamment celles relatives à la protection des droits de l'homme ;
- Considérant les conclusions de la réunion du Conseil de l'Alliance du 28 mars 2024 relative au maintien de la discipline de corps pendant la lutte de libération jusqu'à la victoire finale par la conquête de tout le territoire national dans ses neuf (9) frontières constitutionnelles ;
- Considérant que la lutte de libération n'a pas pour objectif la recherche du gain personnel ni l'enrichissement illicite mais elle tient principalement à : (1) créer un État de droit et rétablir la normalité démocratique en République Démocratique du Congo ; (2) lutter contre toutes les antivaleurs ainsi que toute sorte de prédation et (3) favoriser le vivre-ensemble entre congolais ;



- Dans le souci d'imprimer **dorénavant** le changement pour lequel l'on se bat contre l'**arbitraire** et de prévenir tout abus pouvant affecter négativement les activités économiques ;
- Considérant la nécessité pour les opérateurs économiques de poursuivre normalement leurs activités dans le strict respect de la loi ;
- Vu l'urgence et la nécessité ;
- Le **Coordonnateur Militaire** entendu dans ses avis et considérations ;

DECIDE :

Article 1^{er} : Il est strictement interdit à tous les membres, cadres et personnel politique de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) ainsi qu'à tous les officiers et éléments de l'Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise (ARC), **de s'immiscer et/ou d'être mêlés, de quelle que manière que ce soit, dans les activités d'exploitation et de commercialisation de toutes les substances minérales identifiées dans les territoires libérés.**

Article 2 : Les opérateurs économiques remplissant toutes les conditions exigées par la législation et la réglementation en vigueur, sont encouragés, à poursuivre leurs activités normalement dans le strict respect de la loi.

Article 3 : **Tout accès des enfants mineurs aux sites d'exploitation minière sur les territoires libérés est strictement interdit.**

Article 4 : Les différents organes de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution de la présente décision qui sort ses effets à la date de sa signature.


Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO



Rutshuru, le 07 mai 2024

E-mail: alliancefleuverdc@gmail.com, Tél : +254 71 682 4304, www.alliancefleuvecongo.org



2

Annex 32 (para. 59)

Selected pictures of ongoing mining in Rubaya in October 2024

Images des opérations minières à Rubaya en octobre 2024



Images provided by confidential Rubaya dwellers

Annex 33 (para. 62)

Mineral transport route from Rubaya to Rwanda

Route de transport des minerais de Rubaya au Rwanda

The map below highlights the transit route (blue) of minerals from Rubaya mining area (in red) through Rubaya, Bihambwe, Mushaki and Kirolirwe in Masisi territory, as well as through Kitshanga, Kizimba, Bishusha, Mulimbi, Tongo and Kalengera in Rutshuru territory, Kibumba, Kasizi and Buhumba in Nyiragongo territory, and Kabuhanga in Rwanda.

Itinerary of AFC/M23 mineral convoys from Rubaya to Rwanda



October 2024 Group of Experts elaboration on Openstreetmap™ base map

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 34 (para. 63)

Border crossings from Kibumba area into Rwanda

Postes de frontière entre Kibumba et le Rwanda

The following satellite pictures show the border crossing points from Kibumba (Kasizi and Buhumba), DRC, to Rwanda, used for the trafficking of minerals.

Crossing point 1 from Kasizi (DRC) to Kabuhanga (Rwanda)



Planet™ satellite image on 05 October 2024, annotated by the Group of Experts

The highlighted area points to the road on the DRC side which was widened to allow for heavy truck traffic to Rwanda.

On a Google Earth image dating from July 2023 (see below), this road is smaller and not suitable for truck transit.

Eyewitnesses reported that works were engaged by AFC/M23 to make this road crossing to Rwanda suitable for truck traffic. The works were completed by September 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations




Maps Data: Google, ©2024 **Airbus**, CNES/Airbus, Imagery Date: 1 November 2024. Image of the Kasizi – Kabuhanga border crossing in July 2023. The road highlighted in the image above does not appear on this image. Eyewitnesses confirmed that in 2023 the road was only suitable for pedestrian and motorbike traffic.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 35 (para. 63)**Loaded trucks leaving Kibumba parking on 26 September 2024****Camions chargés en train de quitter le parking de Kibumba le 26 septembre 2024**

Planet™ satellite image taken on 26 September 2024 of Kibumba market, showing heavy duty trucks at the loading area of the parking lot in Kibumba. This picture corroborates eyewitnesses accounts of minerals being regularly offloaded at the exact same location from vehicles coming from Rubaya, and then loaded onto heavy duty trucks that trafficked the minerals across the border to Rwanda.



Planet™ satellite image on 26 September 2024, annotated by the Group of Experts

Annex 36 (para. 68)**Calls to end support to, and collaboration with armed groups, including the FDLR****Appels à mettre fin au soutien et à la collaboration avec les groupes armés, y compris les FDLR*****Security Council Press Statement on Democratic Republic of Congo***

In its press statement issued on 25 October 2024, available [online](#), the members of the Security Council “called on both parties to fully cooperate with Angola in order to speed up the finalization and implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of foreign forces. They urged the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to engage in the process in good faith and to seize the opportunity to conclude a lasting, peaceful solution to the protracted conflict in the region.”

The members of the Security Council also “reiterated their condemnation of all armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including M23, ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) and FDLR. They further condemned foreign military support provided to M23 and any other armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They demanded the cessation of such support and the immediate withdrawal of any such external party from the Democratic Republic of the Congo territory. They also condemned support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the FDLR and demanded the cessation of such support.”

African Union Communiqué of the 1222nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 15 July 2024, on the role of mediation and reconciliation in conflict resolution in eastern DRC.

In its communiqué, available [online](#), the African Union expressed “grave concern over the increasing intensity of M23 attacks, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which have worsened the security insecurity and the suffering of civilian in the eastern DRC”, and demanded these armed groups, including the FDLR, “to immediately and unconditionally cease their attacks and reiterates the call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all armed groups, from the eastern DRC, in line with the Communiqué of the Mini-Summit of Luanda of 23 November 2022.”

US Government Press Statement on the violation of the Ceasefire in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

In a statement issued on 8 November 2024, the US reiterated its “longstanding call on the Government of DRC to stop collaboration with the US and UN-sanctioned Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group, and take immediate steps to demobilize it.”

Violation of the Ceasefire in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

PRESS STATEMENT

MATTHEW MILLER, DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON

NOVEMBER 8, 2024

The United States is gravely concerned by the ceasefire violations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since October 20 by the Rwandan-backed, U.S.- and UN-sanctioned M23 armed group. M23 must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from its positions in Walikale territory, North Kivu Province. We reiterate our longstanding call for Rwanda to immediately withdraw all Rwanda Defense Force personnel and equipment from the DRC, including its surface-to-air missile systems, and to cease GPS disruptions. We also reiterate our longstanding call on the Government of DRC to stop collaboration with the U.S.- and UN-sanctioned Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group and take immediate steps to demobilize it.

The Luanda Process led by Angolan President João Lourenço has made important progress, including the operationalization of the Angola-led Reinforced Verification Mechanism, the technical-expert-level agreement on a plan for the FDLR armed group, and the disengagement of uninvited foreign forces from the DRC. We call on all parties to abide by their commitments under the Luanda Process. All states should respect each other's sovereignty, protect all civilians, and hold those responsible for human rights abuses accountable.



Source: US Government, available [online](#)

Statements issued by the Government of France

- In February 2024, France called on all armed groups to end the violence, and explicitly condemned the FARDC's collaboration with the FDLR, stating that "in accordance with their commitments, the armed forces of the DRC must cease all collaboration with the FDLR, the militia movement that committed the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994."
- More recently, on 25 October 2024, France reiterated its full support for the Luanda process to find a lasting solution to the conflict and called on the parties to implement without delay the commitments made within this framework, referring to the DRC's engagement to neutralize the FDLR and thus cease its collaboration with this sanctioned armed group.

République démocratique du Congo – du pays (20 février 2024)

Partager   

La France est très préoccupée par la situation dans l'Est du Congo, dans le Nord Kivu et en particulier autour de Goma et de Saké. Les atteintes à l'intégrité territoriale de la RDC et la situation des populations civiles sont inadmissibles. La France condamne la poursuite des offensives du M23 avec le soutien du Rwanda, et la présence des forces rwandaises sur le territoire congolais.

Le M23 doit cesser le combat immédiatement, et se retirer de toutes les zones qu'il occupe, conformément aux décisions prises dans le cadre du processus de Luanda. Nous appelons le Rwanda à cesser tout soutien au M23 et à se retirer du territoire congolais. La France appelle l'ensemble des groupes armés à mettre un terme aux violences. Conformément à leurs engagements, les forces armées de RDC doivent cesser toute collaboration avec les FDLR, mouvement issu des milices ayant commis le génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994.

La France réitère son plein soutien aux processus régionaux de médiation pour trouver une solution négociée au conflit.






Source: French government. Statement available [online](#)

République Démocratique du Congo - Reprise des combats à l'Est du pays (25 octobre 2024)

Partager   

La France condamne la poursuite des offensives du M23. Le cessez le feu en cours, négocié dans le cadre du processus de Luanda, doit être strictement respecté. La France réitère son plein soutien au processus de Luanda pour trouver une solution durable au conflit. Elle appelle les parties à mettre en œuvre sans tarder les engagements pris dans ce cadre.

La France réaffirme son attachement à l'intégrité territoriale et à la souveraineté de la RDC. Alors que la crise actuelle entraîne de graves conséquences humanitaires, la France appelle l'ensemble des groupes armés à mettre un terme aux violences pour permettre aux opérations onusiennes et aux organisations humanitaires de mener à bien leurs activités. La protection des populations civiles et la réponse à leurs immenses besoins en dépendent.

République démocratique du Congo	
	Présentation de la République démocratique du Congo
	Relations bilatérales
	Événements
	République Démocratique du Congo combats à l'Est du pays (25.10.24)
	Grands Lacs - La France salue le cessez le feu RDC (31.07.24)

Source: French government. Statement available [online](#)

Annex 37 (para. 68)

Note Verbale signed by the Presidency's Chief of Staff to relocate to the DRC six Rwandan nationals tried for genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Note Verbale signée par le chef de cabinet de la Présidence pour relocaliser en RDC six nationaux rwandais jugés pour génocide par le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda



Document provided to the Group by confidential source

Annex 38 (para. 72)**Seized weapons and ammunition during FARDC operation against FDLR****Armes et munitions saisies lors de l'opération FARDC contre les FDLR**

During the operations against the FDLR on 23-24 September at Chove, Kimoka, Lupango and Mubambiro, and inadvertently against APCLS on 25-26 September 2024 in Rusayo, the FARDC recovered the following weaponry, that the Group was able to inspect in Goma:

- 22 assault rifles
- RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher
- RP-46 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG)
- 5,4259 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39 mm, 7.63 x 39 mm, 7.62 x 54R mm)
- 30 mm HE Round IO-30 (VOG-17) for Automatic Grenade Launcher AGS-17
- 40 x 46mm M406 type LV grenades
- OGV-7V 40mm
- (OG-7B) grenades
- 40 mm Ogi-7MA High Explosive Fragmentation Rocket
- 40 mm PG-9P propellant charge
- 40 mm Rocket propelling charge
- PG-9 propellant charge

Some of the seized materiel was produced recently, i.e. in 2020, 2021 and 2022.

The Group conducted investigations on the possible origin of this weaponry, and sent official communications to various governments, requesting information relevant to the identification and tracing of this weaponry.

Following tracing requests sent to the Republic of Bulgaria, the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria provided the following information:


- It confirmed that the OG-7V 40 mm rocket (**#1 below**) and 40 mm rocket propellant charge (**#2 below**) were of Bulgarian production, exported in 2022 to the DRC Ministry of Defense, following notification to the UN Security Council Committee.
- It confirmed that the PG-9P propellant charges (**#3 below**) are of Bulgarian production, part of a set PG 9V with serial number 2-18-(11). The entire produced quantity was exported in 2018 to the Ministry of Defence of Rwanda as importer and end-user.
- It confirmed that the entire produced quantity (10,000 pieces) of 40mm Ogi-7MA High Explosive Fragmentation Rockets with serial number 10-03-22 (**#4 below**) was exported in 2022 to the DRC Ministry of Defense following notification to the UN Security Council Committee. The FARDC were the agreed end-user.

The Group is working on tracing the origins of the seized weapons and ammunition, to elucidate how FDLR and APCLS obtained the equipment.

#1 -OG-7V 40 mm rocket




#2 - 40 mm rocket propellant charges:



#3 - PG-9P propellant charges



#4- 40 mm OGi-7MA rockets:




Photos taken by the Group


Annex 39 (para. 74)

APCLS communiqué seeking clarification on those responsible for the FARDC attacks on its positions in Rusayo

Communiqué de l'APCLS demandant des éclaircissements sur les responsables des attaques des FARDC contre ses positions à Rusayo




REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
Alliance du Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain
« APCLS en sigle »
E-mail : apclsalliance@gmail.com , Site : www.apclsikarabu.org
Tel : +243 (0) 811713135, 814893355,



COMMUNIQUE N°021/CAB-GEN/APCLS/SEPT/2024.

Alliance du Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain, APCLS en sigle, informe que :


1. C'est avec regret qu'avons appris, ce 26^{Sept} 2024 à 4h30 qu'une de nos positions de RUSAYO a été attaquée par les éléments du General PAPY, Commandant 11^{ème} Brigade des FARDC.
2. L'APCLS déplore les dégâts collatéraux dont matériels et humains causés par cette attaque et demande que la justice soit faite.
3. L'APCLS demande d'éclaircir l'origine de l'ordre de cette attaque sur nos positions surtout que nous sommes en défensive contre l'ennemi qui vise la ville de Goma comme cible à conquérir.
4. L'APCLS se réserve le droit de répliquer à toutes éventuelles provocations anti patriotiques d'où qu'elles viennent .




Fait à Nyabiondo, le 26 Septembre 2024

Pour l'APCLS

Gen. **BUINGO KARAIRI** janvier


Comd en Chef et Président de l'APCLS



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Document provided to the Group by a confidential member of the APCLS armed group

Annex 40 (para. 74)

Communiqué of Guidon Shimiray Mwissa following the FARDC mistaken attack on APCLS

Communiqué de Guidon Shimiray Mwissa à la suite de l'attaque erronée des FARDC contre l'APCLS

Lt.-General Guidon condemned the FARDC's attack on the APCLS in Rusayo, emphasizing that the FARDC and VDP shared a mission to defend the integrity of the national territory. He called on all Congolese to unite against the perceived aggression by M23 and RDF, warning that this division risked the fragmentation of the country. He urged the VDP to uphold patriotic discipline and avoid actions that might aid the enemy, while also encouraging the FARDC to demonstrate professionalism in recognition of the VDP's commitment to national defense.



Document provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources

Annex 41 (para. 75)**Examples of FDLR survival strategy****Exemples de la stratégie de survie des FDLR**

- **FDLR embedded within VDP/Wazalendo units**

Fearing new FARDC operations against FDLR leadership and bases, FDLR and Wazalendo groups jointly reinforced their defenses. Their main strategy was to embed FDLR combatants within VDP/Wazalendo units active in Rutshuru, Masisi and Nyiragongo territories, and claim that FDLR had vanished. This phenomenon was not new. Since the consolidation of the Wazalendo coalition, key FDLR commanders were re-affected to command existing or newly created VDP/Wazalendo groups, such as commander Defender to FDDP, and Kambuzi to APCLS ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 66 and 112, annexes 60 and 67).³¹¹

FDLR combatants captured during the 23-24 September operations reported that they were instructed to identify as members of other Wazalendo armed groups. The Group of experts also witnessed an exchange over the phone between a 17-year-old captured FDLR combatant and FDLR commander Fidel Sebangenzi, ([S/2024/432](#), para. 72 and annex 51) during which Sebangenzi instructed the minor to deny his FDLR membership.

- **FDLR CRAP unit providing close protection to FDLR leadership**

“Major-General” Omega, alongside 79 other FDLR commanders, mobilized FDLR’s special unit, CRAP, for their close protection ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 75-77).³¹²

- **The FDLR leadership relocated to safer areas³¹³**

- **FDLR patrols**

FDLR also organized discreet patrols in Rusayo and Sake areas to safeguard their dependents in various IDP camps around Goma.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Wazalendo and FDLR commanders and combatants, FARDC sources and researchers.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ FDLR and Wazalendo sources, UN sources.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

Annex 42 (para. 76)

Letter of Byiringiro Victor, FDLR “president”, to the Angolan facilitator

Lettre de Byiringiro Victor, “président” des FDLR, au facilitateur angolais



BUREAU DU PRESIDENT / IBIRO BYA PEREZIDA / OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

*Le 22 Octobre 2024
No 021/001/020*

A Son Excellence le Président João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço
Président de la République d'Angola et Médiateur entre la RDC
et le Rwanda
Luanda
ANGOLA

CPI :

A Son Excellence:
- Mr le Président des USA
- Mr le Président de la Fédération de Russie
- Mr le Président de la France
- Mr le Premier Ministre du Royaume Uni
- Mr le Président de la RDC
- Mr le Président du Rwanda
- Mme la Présidente de la République Unie de Tanzanie
- Mr le Président du Burundi
- Mr le Président de la République Sud Africaine
- Mr le Secrétaire Général de l'ONU
- Mr le Secrétaire Général de l'UA
- Mr le Secrétaire Général de la SADC

OBJET : Contribution des FDLR pour ramener la paix dans la Région.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle, saluent votre choix par l'Union Africaine comme Médiateur entre la République Démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda en guerre. Elles comptent sur votre sagesse et votre engagement pour aider la Région des Grands Lacs Africains à retrouver une paix durable.

A titre de rappel, les FDLR sont une Organisation politico-militaire créée en 2000 par nécessité de légitime défense des réfugiés hutu rwandais abandonnés à leur triste sort menacés d'extermination par l'armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-INKOTANYI) au pouvoir à Kigali, et qui les pourchasse encore depuis la destruction sauvage de leurs camps à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo en 1996.

Dès leur création, les FDLR militent pour que les conditions politiques, sociales, économiques et surtout sécuritaires rassurent tous les rwandais et favorisent le retour des réfugiés dans leur pays dans la dignité. C'est pour cette raison qu'elles n'ont cessé d'appeler le régime de Kigali au dialogue avec l'opposition en vue de résoudre pacifiquement le problème rwandais et, ainsi, contribuer au retour d'une paix durable dans la Région.

Dans cette optique, les FDLR ont entrepris plusieurs initiatives dont le désarmement et le cantonnement volontaires de leurs combattants à KAMINA en 2001, le désarmement et le cantonnement volontaires de leurs combattants à KANYABAYONGA, à WALUNGU et à KISANGANI en 2014 devant la Communauté Internationale sous le parrainage de la SADC.

Malheureusement la bonne volonté des FDLR de s'inscrire dans la logique de la paix a toujours buté sur un mur de préjugés insensés et d'incompréhension érigé à la faveur du régime de Kigali qui refuse mordicus le dialogue avec son opposition.

Les FDLR estiment que le problème rwandais est d'essence politique et prônent la voie de négociations à la place des armes pour le résoudre.

C'est pourquoi elles ont l'insigne honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir user de votre position et de votre influence dans la Région pour amener le régime de Kigali à dialoguer avec son opposition afin de ramener une paix durable dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains en général et à l'Est de la RDC en particulier.

Espérant une bonne compréhension à notre doléance, nous vous prions d'agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Président, l'expression de notre haute considération.

BYIRINGIRO Victor

Lieutenant Général



Président ai des FDLR.

Document received from confidential VDP sources

Annex 43 (para. 78)**Meeting between FARDC and VDP Leaders on 27 September 2024****Réunion organisée entre les FARDC et les Commandants VDP le 27 septembre 2024**

To repair strained relations with the VDP/Wazalendo, the North Kivu military authorities - including Governor Cirimwami, General Fall Sikabwe and General Dieugentil Alengbia Nzembe - met with VDP leaders, including representatives from APCLS, on 27 September. The military authorities expressed regret over the recent attacks on FDLR and APCLS, referring to them as an “incident” and acknowledging the losses suffered by these groups. They emphasized the successful Wazalendo-FARDC cooperation and reiterated that M23/RDF was their only common enemy. VDP leaders vowed renewed trust and cooperation. FARDC commanders and VDP leaders reported that military authorities discreetly requested the VDP/Wazalendo to reassure FDLR that it was still considered as their ally.

According to VDP and Wazalendo sources, during the meeting VDP leaders requested the FARDC to release arrested combatants, rehabilitate occupied positions, provide financial and logistical assistance for the funerals of the killed combatants and for the medical care for the wounded combatants.

In a video, the FARDC Spokesperson General Guillaume Ndjike states that the meeting served to “remove equivocation in relation to the incidents that happened”. Referring to the operations against FDLR and APCLS, he confirmed that it was indeed only ‘an incident’ reassuring the population that relations between the Wazalendo and the FARDC were progressing very well, and that they were all facing only one enemy, the M23/RDF.

In another video filmed during the meeting, one of the VDP leaders stated the following: “we did not separate ourselves from the FARDC, the FARDC are our parents, it is an incident which took place and we have just been received by the general Fall who received us well and who says to us that we have only one enemy which is the M23. We ask the population to be calm as the problem which there was between the parent and the child has just been decanted.”



Picture of the audience at the meeting
Picture provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources



Picture of the FARDC Spokesperson General Ndjike (on the far right) with several VDP Commanders
Picture provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources

Annex 44 (para. 79)**Cable issuing instructions to suspend attacks against the FDLR****Télégramme donnant des instructions pour suspendre les attaques contre les FDLR**

The cable was signed on 3 October 2024 by FARDC Colonel Jean-Claude Ndambo Mandjumba, commander of the 23e Brigade. However, FARDC sources reported that the cable was issued upon instruction of General Dieugentil Alengbia, Commander of the 34th Military Region in North Kivu.

Au Comd 3409 REGT


TELEGRAMME

URGENT

GROUPE - DATE - HEURE
01 16 30 8 oct 24

DE : COMD 23BDE RR
POUR : U (TOUTES) 23BDE RR & 3409 REGT
INFO : CHEF EMFT & COMD OPS N-S-K
COMD 34RGN MIL & COMD TAFOC NK
SEC : N° *0112* / *128* / EM 23BDE RR/S3-OPS/24

REF 00 N°089/TAFOK NK/J35/2024 RELATIF (-) TRAQUE FDLR (-)
VOUS SIGNALE (-) SUR ORDRE VERBAL COMD 34RGN MIL (-) APRES
REUNION C.C.C.O DU 27 SEP 24 (-) DES RECEPTION PRESENT MSG
(-) POURSUITE TRAQUE CONTRE FDLR ET VDP ETRE SUSPENDU
JUSQU'A NOUVEL ORDRE (-) PAR AILLEURS (-) VOUS INSTR (-)
GARDER VOS POSN EN DEF FERME (-) ETRE PRET EN TOUTES
EVENTUALITES (-) EN OUTRE (-) RESTAURER BONNE
COLLABORATION AVEC TOUTES UNITES AMIES (-) EVITER
PROVOCATION DE TIR (-) AVEC VDP ET AUTRES (-) INTERDICTION
FORMELLE (-) DEPLACEMENT MIL DEVOIR SE FAIRE EN BINOME (-)
TRINOME ET SECTION (-) FAIRE LARGE DIFFUSION AUX MIL SOUS
VOS ORDRES (-) SANCTIONS SEVERES ETRE RESERVER AUX
RECALCITRANTS (-) *ACK (-)*


NDAMBO MANDJUMBA JEAN-CLAUDE
COL DEM
COMD 23BDE RR & COMD AXE OPS RUSAYO PNVI

Document provided by confidential FARDC source

Annex 45 (para. 80)**Additional details on the FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR cooperation, their engagement in fighting, and VDP/Wazalendo recruitment and organization****Informations complémentaires sur la coopération FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR, leur engagement dans les combats, ainsi que le recrutement et l'organisation de VDP/Wazalendo***Examples of FDLR and VDP/Wazalendo operations during the period of the ceasefire:*

While initially FARDC and RDF temporarily upheld the 4 August ceasefire (paras. 35-37), their proxies, AFC/M23 and Wazalendo with FDLR soon resumed clashes. The list below provides some illustrations of clashes between FDLR/Wazalendo/VDP and AFC/M23 in Rutshuru, Masisi, Nyiragongo and Walikale territories. This list is non-exhaustive.

- On 19 August, in Katwa and Kikuvo, north-east of Kanyabayonga, Rutshuru territory, AFC/M23 clashed with Mai-Mai Yira, reportedly resulting in two AFC/M23 being killed and in one Mai-Mai injury. AFC/M23 took control of the village the following day, despite the ceasefire.
- On 21 August, in Misinga, close to Mweso, Masisi territory, AFC/M23 clashed with APCLS, NDC-R/Guidon, CMC-FDP and FDLR-FOCA combatants. Three M23 combatants and one CMC-FDP combatant were killed in combat, and two civilians were injured.
- On 15 September 2024, in Kasasa, near Kikuku, Rutshuru territory, M23 combatants clashed with the CMC-FPAP combatants. This resulted in one M23 combatant being killed and one CMC-FPAP being injured.
- On 23 September 2024, in Nyangue, Masisi territory, M23 combatants clashed with CMC-FDP and APCLS combatants. Seven civilians were killed during the clashes.
- On 24 September in Kaliba, M23 combatants clashed with CMC-FPAP combatants. This resulted in one CMC-FPAP combatant being wounded.
- On 26 September 2024 in Bigogwe, AFC/M23 clashed with CMC-FDP combatants.
- Annexes 17- 19 provide additional illustrations of clashes including VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR combatants. The Group notes that RDF troops provided support to M23 in several operations against the VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR, as detailed in annexes 17-27.

Additional elements on FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo cooperation:

The Government of the DRC continued to systematically use North Kivu armed groups, including the sanctioned FDLR, to fight M23 and RDF (S/2024/432, paras. 60-80). The office of the Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Peter Cirimwami, coordinated the operations (paras. 67 and 71; S/2024/432, para. 63).

Colonel Sekololo, acting on behalf of General Cirimwami, was responsible for the transfer of resources, weapons, ammunition, and uniforms to the VDP/Wazalendo. For example, early August 2024, ammunition and other military equipment were delivered to APCLS in Loashi and Nyabioto, Masisi territory.³¹⁵ An FDLR combatant also confirmed regular food deliveries to FDLR positions around Sake.

Additional elements on the VDP command, recruitment and training, with FDLR involvement:

VDP command and control remained unchanged (S/2024/432, para. 61). VDP leaders also took advantage of the relative calm after the 4 August ceasefire to recruit and train combatants, to compensate for their losses suffered in combat against the AFC/M23 and RDF. Former and active combatants, including new recruits, told the Group that they decided to join VDP/Wazalendo ranks to escape forced AFC/M23 recruitment, to avoid being killed by AFC/M23, and to defend the territorial integrity of the DRC.

³¹⁵ VDP, civil society, FARDC sources and local authorities.

FDLR instructors provided military training to CMC-FDP and APCLS elements around Rusayo and Shove. The training focused on combat technics, refreshing courses, human rights and international humanitarian law.

Newly recruited combatants were trained in Rusinga, Mushwago, Rwankuba, Nyabitega, Kiseguro and Nyamilima under the command of “Colonel” Manirakiza Julien Ngurinzira and “Colonel” Mashango. In Bukombo groupement, since June 2024, “Colonel Innocent Ukwishatse” was the main trainer to CMC-FDP combatants.

PARECO-FF leadership informed the Group of the creation of a new VDP coalition, known as the *Coalition des Mouvements des patriotes pour la défense de la Nation* (CMPDN). This new coalition envisaged a united armed movement with a centralised command for all VDP members. At the time of drafting, none of the major armed groups - such as APCLS, CMC-FDP or NDC-R - had joined the new coalition.

Annex 46 (para. 85)

Zaïre/ADCVI Recruits in training at Bini

Recrues Zaïre/ADCVI en formation a Bini







Screenshots from video footage depicting the military training in Bini, provided by a confidential armed group source

Annex 47 (para. 85)**“ADCVI” identification cards delivered to combatants following their training****Carte d’identité “ADCVI” délivrée aux combattants après leur formation**

Note the following details on the documents depicted below:

- Name of the armed group: “Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l’Ituri”
- Issue date: 4 July 2024.
- Order number (n° d’ordre): this card indicates number 0945, indicating that there were at a minimum 945 cards already issued by 4 July 2024.
- The individual, Michel Ndjaza Ivara, was the “Responsable provincial de ADCVI”.
- The address, ‘Telega’, is an IDP camp. The individual admitted living in the Telega IDP camp and being an internally displaced person. His “carte d’assistance humanitaire” below is proof of this status. The individual also admitted being the president of the youth in Telega IDP camp, ensuring the defense of the camp in case of an attack. This corroborates reporting and testimonies about presence of armed combatants inside IDP settlements, and ongoing recruitment in these IDP settlements.
- The card demonstrates a high level of organization within the “ADCVI” group.
- The individual was a former member of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC).





Pictures taken by GoE of documentation seized by FARDC from ACDVI combatant

Annex 48 (para. 87)**Training of Zaïre/ADCVI and MAPI combatants at the AFC/M23 training center in Tchanzu****Formation des combatants de Zaïre/ADCVI et de MAPI dans le camp AFC/M23 a Tchanzu**

AFC/M23 intensified efforts to recruit combatants from Ituri Province. The Group received credible testimonies on various networks targeting new recruits, as well as former UPC combatants.³¹⁶

Sources reported that Zaïre leaders, including Logo Marine, remained actively involved in the recruitment networks to reinforce the ranks of the AFC/M23 ([S/2024/432](#), para. 152). The new recruits transited through Uganda, and entered AFC/M23-controlled territory at Bunagana. From there, they were taken to Tchanzu.³¹⁷

Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, the former spokesperson of MAPI, pledged allegiance to the AFC/M23 and went to Bunagana, taking at least 100 MAPI combatants with him. In July-August 2024, he was seen in Bunagana, from where he had sent videos to his network, acknowledging his defection to AFC/M23. He also attended training in Tchanzu. Recently, Bahati returned to Ituri to recruit for AFC/M23.

By October 2024, over 1,000 combatants from Ituri have completed training in Tchanzu. Few of these combatants joined AFC/M23 in combat in North Kivu, while others either returned to Ituri to train combatants locally, or remained on stand-by in Uganda.

³¹⁶ Zaïre insider, FARDC, UN, and intelligence sources.

Annex 49 (para. 96)

Former MAPI spokesperson Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, who joined AFC/M23 in Bunagana

Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, ancien porte-parole de MAPI qui a rejoint le AFC/M23 a Bunagana



Le porte-parole de la milice MAPI/
ZAÏRE qui opère en Ituri s'est
rendu officiellement à l'AFC-M23
à partir de Bunagana.

La collaboration entre AFC-M23/
UDPF/CODECO /ZAÏRE continue
de s'élargir.

08:18

Photo circulating on Ituri-based social media groups, provided by confidential armed group source

Annex 50 (para. 100)**Illegal taxes levied by CODECO/URDPC****Taxation illégale par CODECO/URDPC**

As of 1 October 2024, CODECO/URDPC leadership in Nyangarayi issued a series of taxes on civilians and businesses in the 13 groupements in the Banyali Kilo sector of Djugu territory under its control.³¹⁸

Shop owners were imposed a weekly fee of \$17.54, while artisanal mining sites owners had to pay between \$35 to \$73.68 per week. Additionally, the local population was subjected to a daily tax of \$0.35 per capita (males only),³¹⁹ which, based on the 5,455 male residents of Nyangarayi area alone, yielded an estimated \$1,900 daily to CODECO.³²⁰ The CODECO commander collecting these payments was known as “Colonel” “50 Cent”. Commander “50 cent” also imposed ad hoc contributions of 100,000Fc (\$35) to each village under the pretext of “extraordinary contributions” (*salongo*).

From June to October 2024, CODECO/URDPC took over several mining sites in Banyali Kilo groupement of Djugu territory, which were previously controlled by Zaïre commander Pharaon Fidele Babala (S/2023/990, annex 47 and 50), including the site of Lodjo. During that time, the mining cooperative belonging to a well-known Bunia based businessman active in the public works sector, paid money to CODECO/URDPC to protect its assets and operations in Lodjo.

Proof of tax payment to CODECO/URDPC commander “50 Cent” in Nyangarayi, on 1 October 2024

Picture provided to the Group by confidential civil society sources

³¹⁸ Residents of Banyali Kilo villages, civil society, researchers.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Population estimated by Medair in September 2023, <https://ehtools.org/uploads/brochures/1358.pdf>.

Annex 51 (para. 102)

Baraka Maki's illicit economic activities and money laundering**Activités économiques illégales de Baraka Maki et son blanchiment d'argent**

Baraka Maki was the richest and more influent of all Zaïre/ADCVI commanders, especially after the setback of Pharaon Fidele Babala (S/2023/990, annex 47 and 50), who lost control of Lodjo mining area to CODECO/URDPC in June 2024.³²¹

Baraka operated 4 to 6 mechanical excavators ("pokle") for the mining of gold on the Lalo site on the Shari river in Mambisa chefferie. Mining continued to yield 5 kg of gold weekly to Baraka (S/2024/432, paras. 167–170), valued at \$405,000 (\$1.6 million monthly) at current prices.³²²

Map of the Lalo mining site exploited by Baraka Maki

Map Data: Google, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 1 November 2024.

Map annotated by the Group

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Baraka Maki also continued to receive monthly payments averaging \$2,000 from at least five mining cooperatives active in Djugu territory, or \$10,000 per month, to protect their mining activities.

He also imposed illegal taxation of \$3.5 per week to two hundred small business owners in Mabanga area, yielding \$2,900 monthly, and controlled payments of \$0.07 per each transit at 50 illegal checkpoints in Djugu territory, averaging \$57,000 per month.³²³ Illegal taxation generated an estimated monthly cash flow of \$70,000.

Baraka Maki laundered the proceedings of illegal taxation through the purchase of real estate and commercial activities in Mabanga, Iga Barrière, and Bunia.³²⁴

³²¹ Residents of villages in Mambisa chefferie, civil society, Inspection generale des mines, researchers, MONUSCO, judiciary and intelligence sources.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Journalists, civil society, MONUSCO, Bunia residents, judiciary and intelligence sources.

Annex 52 (para. 104)**Illustrations of clashes between M23/RDF and FARDC at the border between South Kivu and North Kivu, and M23 incursions into Northern Kalehe territory****Illustrations des affrontements entre le M23/RDF et les FARDC à la frontière entre le Sud-Kivu et le Nord-Kivu, et des incursions du M23 dans le territoire des Kalehe.**

During the period under review, shelling originating from M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory towards the border with South Kivu, as well as M23/RDF territorial advancements towards the northern territories of South Kivu, impacted security in the area. To prevent AFC/M23 territorial advancements towards South Kivu, FARDC reinforced its positions in the northern part of Kalehe territory.

- Late April and early May 2024, frequent detonations of heavy artillery in and around Minova, in South Kivu, caused panic among the populations ([S/2024/432](#), para. 32 and annex 62).
- On 27-28 April 2024, M23/RDF advances towards Bitonga, west of Minova, led to displacements of the civilian population.
- On 7 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling towards Buhavu chiefdom, near Minova in Kalehe territory, South Kivu, resulted in eight civilians being killed and five wounded.
- On 13 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling originating from Ndumba hill, Masisi territory, resulted in at least five bombs impacting Buhavu chiefdom, near Minova in Kalehe territory, South Kivu. This resulted in three civilians being killed and several others being wounded. The shelling also led to displacements of the civilian population.
- On 22-23 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling towards Minova resulted in civilians being wounded. The shelling also caused panic amongst the civilian population. The shelling, as well as clashes between the FARDC/Wazalendo and M23 resulted in civilians fleeing to Minova.
- After several weeks of relative calm, clashes between M23/RDF and FARDC in the vicinity of the South Kivu border resumed late June. FARDC and M23 both engaged in artillery shelling which impacted northern parts of Kalehe territory. On 26 June, FARDC from its positions in Lumbishi, Kalehe territory, shelled M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory. M23/RDF returned fire. Two days later, FARDC shelled M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory, and M23/RDF shelled Minova, triggering new civilian displacements. Shelling by M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory and FARDC positioned in Minova, Kalehe territory, continued until the start of the humanitarian truce on 4 July 2024.
- Despite the ceasefire, on 29 August FARDC positioned in Lumbishi and M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory, close to the North Kivu-South Kivu border, resumed shelling.
- On 12 September 2024, FARDC positioned in Minova and M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory, close to the North Kivu-South Kivu border, exchanged fire. Regular shelling continued until late September 2024.

The Group also documented sporadic M23/RDF incursions into Kalehe territory in South Kivu, such as in Lumbishi in late May 2024. For example, on 24 May, M23 combatants arrived in Lumbishi, south-west of Minova. After attacking FARDC and Wazalendo positions on the Lumbishi-Shange axis, north-east of Numbi, they retreated to Masisi territory, North Kivu.

Annex 53 (para. 105)**Illustrations of defections to AFC/M23****Illustrations de défections à l'AFC/M23**

In July 2024, fifty Mai Mai Kirikicho combatants defected to AFC/M23 following a meeting with AFC/M23 representatives in Ziralo, Kalehe.³²⁵ Eyewitnesses and sources close to Kirikicho reported that the defectors regularly travelled between Ziralo and Kalehe territory and Ngungu, Masisi territory, to meet with Bernard Byamungu and other M23 commanders. The Group notes that Mai-Mai leader “General Kirikicho”, a close relative of Bernard Byamungu, did not adhere to AFC/M23.³²⁶ At time of drafting, his group was still an ally of the Government ([S/2024/432](#), annex 99).

AFC/M23 also intensified mobilization in Shabunda territory. In late May 2024, 25 cadres of Raia Mutomboki factions were picked up by Rwandan vehicles at the Ruzizi border and transported to Rutshuru for training in ideological persuasion and intelligence gathering. After four weeks of training, these recruits were sent back to northern South Kivu to promote the AFC/M23 cause among local armed groups and collect intelligence.³²⁷

One Raia Mutomboki cadre interviewed by the Group reported that he had first been contacted by AFC/M23 in March 2024. Two months later, he was again contacted by AFC/M23 and requested to select 25 individuals close to armed groups active in Shabunda, Kabare, Kalehe and Walungu territories. The interviewee recruited 20 young men and 5 young women. He reported to have seen Makenga, Bernard Byamungu and Bertrand Bisimwa during the training in Rutshuru.

³²⁵ Researchers, UN, security sources, sources close to M23 and AFC, documents on file with Secretariat.

³²⁶ Researchers, civil society and Mai-Mai sources.

³²⁷ Eyewitnesses, security sources, researchers, RM cadre.

Annex 54 (para. 109)

Armed group leaders signing the non-aggression pact in Baraka

Signature du pacte de non-agression par les chefs de groupes armés à Baraka



Photograph of several armed group leaders present at the meeting in Baraka
Photograph received from a armed group combatant (confidential source), annotated by the source



Photograph of Justin Bitakwira (left) and Ebuela Kibekila (right), also known as Mutetezi, at the meeting in Baraka
Photograph received from a confidential armed group combatant



Photograph of sanctioned individual William Yakutumba reading the communiqué signed by armed group leaders at the meeting in Baraka

Photo received by the Group from a confidential armed group combatant

Speech of Yakutumba, 30 July 2024, transcribed by the Group of Experts:

French transcript [English translation below]:

“Tous les congolais ont droit à la paix et la sécurité tant au niveau national qu’internationale. Vu l’article 63 de la Constitution de la RDC qui stipule que tout congolais a le droit et le devoir sacré de défendre le pays et son intégrité territoriale face à une menace et une agression extérieure. Etant donné que l’union fait la force, mais cette union doit être basée sur l’amour, la confiance et la concorde pour le bien-être de tous les congolais. Le patriotisme, en tant qu’esprit qui anime les nationalistes pour défendre d’abord la patrie jusqu’au sacrifice suprême. Etant donné qu’on a plus à gagner en étant uni qu’en étant divisé, et que se faire mutuellement la guerre ne nous profite en rien. Bien au contraire cela nous fragilise et nous fait reculer de beaucoup de siècles pour la promotion de la paix et l’art du développement. S’inscrivant dans les démarches du chef de l’état, commandant suprême des FARDC, PNC et garant de la nation. Consistant à rétablir la paix et la sécurité à l’est de la RDC, nous, patriotes d’un mouvement engagé dans un processus de paix gracieux, CNPCC, FABB, FPDC, CPRC, PDC, FPDCC, MPRC, AFPDC, MPDAC, FAL, Groupe autochtone pygmée, CNPR, FPL, MPDC (...) FPDPC, MDP, Groupe des jeunes dans les Hauts Plateaux (...) déclarons la fin des incompréhensions et des hostilités entre nous ainsi que tout acte de violence entre nous signataires du présent acte de non-agression. Nous nous engageons à ne jamais pactiser avec l’ennemi de notre pays, notamment les RED Tabara, Twirwaneho et RDF/M23/AFC. Ni de près, ni de loin, au contraire, nous nous engageons à leur bloquer la route au côté des FARDC. Et a tout agresseur et auteur de troubles de la paix au Sud Kivu, et en particulier la RDC en générale. A cet effet, nous jurons devant Dieu et le peuple congolais, que chacun de nous s’engage à respecter cet acte de non-agression entre signataire. Fait a Baraka, le 30 juillet 2024. »

English translation:

“All Congolese have the right to peace and security, both nationally and internationally. In view of article 63 of the DRC Constitution, which stipulates that every Congolese has the sacred right and duty to defend the country and its territorial integrity in the face of external threat and aggression. Unity is strength, but this union must be based on love, trust and harmony, for the well-being of all Congolese. Patriotism, as the spirit that drives nationalists to defend their homeland first and foremost, to the point of supreme sacrifice. Given that we have more to gain by being united than by being divided, and that waging war on each other benefits us in no way. On the contrary, it weakens us and sets us back many centuries in the promotion of peace and the art of development. In keeping with the approach of the Head of State, supreme commander of the FARDC, PNC and guarantor of the nation. Consistent with restoring peace and security in eastern DRC, we, patriots of a movement engaged in a gracious peace process, CNPCC, FABB, FPDC, CPRC, PDC, FPDCC, MPRC, AFPDC, MPDAC, FAL, Groupe autochtone pygmée, CNPR, FPL, MPDC (...) FPDPC, MDP, Groupe des jeunes dans les Hauts Plateaux (...) declare the end of misunderstandings and hostilities between us, as well as all acts of violence between us signatories of the present act of non-aggression. We pledge never to pact with the enemy of our country, in particular the RED Tabara, Twirwaneho and RDF/M23/AFC. Neither near nor far, on the contrary, we pledge to block their path alongside the FARDC. And to all aggressors and perpetrators of disturbances of the peace in South Kivu, and the DRC in general. To this end, we swear before God and the Congolese people, that each of us undertakes to respect this act of non-aggression between signatories. Signed in Baraka, July 30, 2024.

Annex 55 (para. 110)

Communiqués of Twirwaneho

Communiqués des Twirwaneho

Communiqué of 8 September 2024



MESSAGE D'ALERTE SUR L'IMMINENCE DES ATTAQUES MAI-MAI ET ALLIÉS CONTRE LES VILLAGES BANYAMULENGE DE MINEMBWE

1. Le groupe d'autodéfense civile Twirwaneho tient à lancer un alerte sur d'intenses mouvements des groupes armés soutenus par l'Etat, dont les MAI-MAI (Wazalendo) et alliés, aux alentours de Minembwe.
2. Ces forces coalisées impliquées depuis 2017 dans la campagne de nettoyage des Banyamulenge ont érigé leur base opérationnelle à Bikarakara, une localité à portée de tirs des villages périphériques de Minembwe où ils se préparent pour lancer une offensive de grande envergure contre les civils dont la plupart sont des déplacés internes.
3. Cette énième mobilisation qui intervient après plus de dix mois d'une accalmie relative s'inscrit dans la lignée du plan élaboré à Baraka, lors d'un colloque qui a réuni en juillet dernier, les différents chefs MAI-MAI sous la direction de Bitakwira Justin, élu d'Uvira. A cette occasion, La population Banyamulenge a été désigné comme l'ennemi commun contre lequel tous les MAI-MAI du Sud-Kivu (Babembe, Bafuliru et Banyindu) doivent orienter leurs assauts meurtriers;
4. Des informations crédibles font état de l'approvisionnement de ces forces coalisées en logistiques militaires par la 34e brigade d'intervention rapide des FARDC basée à Minembwe. Le S2 de ladite brigade, le Major Donat ressortissant de la communauté Babembe, étant chargé de l'exécution de cette mission;
5. Il sied de rappeler que les localités peuplées par les Banyamulenge autour de Minembwe centre restent les seules entités des Hauts-Plateaux de Fizi qui échappent encore au contrôle des MAI-MAI; d'autres villages éloignés ayant été ravagés par ces bourreaux, sous le regard complice des FARDC;
6. Twirwaneho qui s'attend à ce que ces forces coalisées passent à l'action à tout moment, demande au gouvernement d'exercer un contrôle strict de ses réservistes wazalendo anti-Banyamulenge dans cette contrée et à prendre des mesures rigoureuses pour empêcher ces attaques;
7. Twirwaneho réitère son engagement à protéger les civils d'éventuels massacres et adhère sans réserve au principe d'autodéfense civile contre toute force représentant une menace existentielle pour la communauté Banyamulenge, comme pour d'autres communautés vivant dans les Hauts-Plateaux de Fizi, Mwenga et Uvira.

Fait à Minembwe, Ce 07/09/2024

Kamasa Ndakize Welcome

Coordinateur

Communiqué available on Twirwaneho's [X account](#)

- In this communiqué of 8 September 2024, Twirwaneho warns of intense movements by state-backed armed groups, including Mai-Mai (Wazalendo) and allies, around Minembwe. Twirwaneho reports that these coalition forces have been involved in the Banyamulenge cleansing campaign since 2017, and that they have set up their operational base in Bikarakara, near Minembwe, where they are preparing to launch a large-scale offensive against civilians.
- According to Twirwaneho, this mobilization is in line with the plan drawn up in Baraka in July 2024 by Justin Bitakwira and various Mai-Mai chiefs. Twirwaneho denounces that on this occasion, the Banyamulenge population was designated as the common enemy against which all Mai-Mai in South Kivu must direct their murderous assaults. Twirwaneho also reports that the 34th FARDC rapid intervention brigade based in Minembwe is supplying these coalition forces with military logistics. According to the statement, Twirwaneho expects the coalition forces to move into action at any moment.

Communiqué of 17 August 2024

- Several weeks earlier, Twirwaneho had issued another communiqué denouncing the persecution and threat of genocide against the Banyamulenge population of Minembwe by the FARDC's 34th reaction brigade. The communiqué listed numerous acts of serious human rights violations which it described as “genocidal” against the Banyamulenge civilians of Minembwe, by FARDC units. Through this communiqué, Twirwaneho launched an urgent appeal to the DRC government, and asks the government to distance itself from the commander of the 34th brigade.



Alerte concernant la persécution et la menace de génocide contre la population de Banyamulenge de Minembwe Par la 34^{ème} Brigade de réaction rapide des FARDC.

1. Le groupe d'autodéfense civile Twirwaneho tient à alerter l'opinion, tant nationale qu'internationale, que depuis la semaine du 17 juin 2024, la 34^{ème} Brigade d'intervention rapide des FARDC dirigée par le Colonel Lwambo Jean-Pierre, fait peser une menace de génocide contre les Banyamulenge, dans le centre de Minembwe et ses environs,

2. La première alerte a été donnée par les chefs coutumiers et les opérateurs économiques contre lesquels des actes de maltraitance, de tracasserie, d'arrestation arbitraires et de pillages des biens et marchandises sont orientés de manière particulière;

3. En effet, du 20 juin au 15 août 2024, il a été recensé un nombre d'actes de violations graves de droits humains à caractère génocidaire contre les civils Banyamulenge de Minembwe, par les unités FARDC, qui y sont pourtant affectées pour sécuriser la population et ses biens. Les principaux actes de persécution de la population recensés dans le haut plateau de Minembwe au cours de la période ci-haut mentionnée sont repris comme suit:

- Le 20 Juin: arrestation d'une femme, Mme Murorwa Chantal accusée faussement de disposer des effets militaires, et ce dans le but de créer la Psychose au sein de la population de Minembwe;
- Le 29 Juin : une embuscade a été tendue par les hommes du colonel Lwambo J. Pierre qui ont dépouillé les paysans venant de leurs champs, perturbant ainsi les travaux champêtres,
- Le 30 Juillet : les usagers du marché local de Minembwe ont été terrorisés par des militaires qui se sont livrés à des pillages, ont roué de coups les civils et ont fait usage d'armes à feu. Le même jour, les

les activités commerciales à Minembwe, l'élimination physique des personnes (Banyamulenge) sur les quelles il dispose des informations fiables et l'arrestation de tous les chefs de village et autres leaders de la communauté Banyamulenge. Il a promis à ses visiteurs que dans si peu de jour il va exécuter (tuer) un policier et un motar qu'il n'a pas précisé l'identité. Le commandant de la 34^{ème} brigade de réaction rapide basée à Minembwe s'est présenté à ses visiteurs comme un « génocidaire » que Minembwe devra pouvoir découvrir incessamment, tout en précisant qu'il est doté des moyens de l'Etat pour mener à bien sa mission, y compris des armes lourdes dont la détonation pourra provoquer des avortements des femmes enceintes,

6. Twirwaneho met en garde le Col. Lwambo J. Pierre contre toute attaque contre les civils contre lesquels il ne cache pas sa haine et ses sentiments discriminatoires à base ethnique. Twirwaneho est prêt à répondre à toute tentative de génocide annoncé par le Col Lwambo et promet qu'il n'attendra pas qu'un nouveau massacre soit perpétré sur le sol de Minembwe avant d'agir;

7. Twirwaneho lance pour la énième fois un appel urgent au gouvernement congolais. Il demande instamment que ce dernier se démarque clairement du criminel Colonel LWAMBO J. Pierre et le condamne publiquement et sans équivoque. Il est impératif d'agir avant qu'il ne soit trop tard.

8. Le Groupe d'Autodéfense Civile Twirwaneho réitère son engagement à protéger les civils d'éventuels massacres et adhère sans réserve au principe d'autodéfense civile contre toute force représentant une menace existentielle pour la communauté Banyamulenge et d'autres communautés qui exercent les activités économiques à Minembwe.

Fait à Minembwe, ce 17/08/2024

Welcome Ndakize Kamasasa
Coordinateur

Excerpts of the communiqué available on Twirwaneho's [X account](#)

Annex 56 (para. 110)**Illustrations of clashes between Twirwaneho and Mai-Mai groups, and between RED Tabara and Mai-Mai/FDNB coalition****Illustrations d'affrontements entre les groupes Twirwaneho et Mai-Mai, et entre RED Tabara et la coalition Mai-Mai/FDNB**

- Clashes involving Twirwaneho
 - On 22 June 2024, Twirwaneho combatants clashed with Mai-Mai combatants in Bibangwa and Bijojo, Bafulero chefferie, Uvira territory.
 - On 13 July 2024, Mai-Mai combatants clashed with Twirwaneho combatants in Kigoma groupement, Uvira territory.
 - Late August-early September 2024, clashes between Mai-Mai groups and Twirwaneho resumed. On 30 August, Twirwaneho clashed with Mai-Mai combatants in Mutunda, south-east of Minembwe. During clashes, at least seven civilians were injured. Thereupon, combatants of Mai-Mai Yakutumba set up a new camp in Rugezi, 25 kilometers south-east of Minembwe and close to one of Twirwaneho's camps, in Kabingo.
 - Mid-September 2024, Twirwaneho launched several attacks against the FARDC around Minembwe.
 - On 23 October 2024, FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants attacked positions of Twirwaneho and RED Tabara in Kipupu, Itombwe sector, Mwenga territory. Several civilians were killed and wounded during the fighting.
- Clashes involving RED Tabara
 - On 23 September 2024, FDNB troops, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and CNRD combatants jointly attacked RED Tabara positions in Kipombo and Kipupu, Mwenga territory. Two days later, RED Tabara issued a communiqué, reporting intense fighting between its combatants and the FDNB and its allies. According to RED Tabara, FDNB suffered heavy casualties, with 20 FDNB soldiers killed and many others injured (see below). The Group could not confirm this claim.
 - Five days later, on 25 September 2024, new fighting broke out in Ruhangarika, Itombwe sector, between RED Tabara and FDNB and allied armed groups. Several FDNB and Mai-Mai combatants were reportedly killed and wounded during the clashes.
 - On 20 October 2024, RED Tabara combatants clashed with FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants in Kipombo, Itombwe sector. Several FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba were reportedly killed. These clashes triggered operations of FDNB and allies against RED Tabara positions in Hewa Bora forest in Fizi territory and in Itombwe, Mwenga territory. On 26 October 2024, RED Tabara issued a new communiqué (see below) claiming that 45 FDNB and allies were killed during fighting. UN sources reported that details provided in the RED Tabara communiqué, such as the reported number of FDNB killed, were incorrect.
 - On 23 October 2024, FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants attacked positions of Twirwaneho and RED Tabara in Kipupu, Itombwe sector, Mwenga territory. Several civilians were killed and wounded during the fighting.
 - On 24 October 2024, RED Tabara combatants attacked Mai-Mai Yakutumba positions close to Tubangwa, north-west of Minembwe. Several Mai-Mai combatants as well as RED Tabara combatants were killed.

Sources: Researchers, Mai-Mai source, sources close to Twirwaneho and UN sources.

Republika y'Uburundi
Umuhari Uharanira Iteka n'Itekane
(RED-TABARA)



République du Burundi
Résistance pour un Etat de Droit
(RED-TABARA)

PRESS RELEASE

There has been intense fighting for several days between RED-Tabara fighters and the Burundi National Defence Forces (FDB), and its allies, including the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Wazalendo Yakutumba and other armed groups.

These violent clashes are taking place in the localities of Kipombo and Kipupu in the Itombwe groupement. It is clear that the FDLR from Kirembwe are the most combative, unlike the Burundian FDB soldiers, who show no motivation to fight and seem to have left the initiative to the FDLR. The FDB suffered heavy casualties, losing more than twenty soldiers and countless of others injured.

This deplorable situation should be a wake-up call to the Burundian army, and a reminder that its soldiers are the children of our motherland who have sworn an oath to defend the nation, and that they must not be used to shield a regime that kills, pillages and starves the people.

September 25, 2024

For the RED-TABARA

Patrick NAHIMANA
Military Spokesperson

Email : red.tabara@gmail.com

"... un régime de droit, pour que l'homme ne soit pas contraint, en suprême recours, à la révolte contre la tyrannie et l'oppression" (Préambule de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme)

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Communiqué available on RED Tabara's [X account](#)

Republika y'Uburundi
Umuhari Uharanira Iteka n'Itekane
(RED-TABARA)



République du Burundi
Résistance pour un Etat de Droit
(RED-TABARA)

PRESS RELEASE

For a week and a half, violent fighting has pitted the RED-Tabara Movement against the Burundian army (FDNB) supported by Mayi Mayi groups, in the Itombwe area, more precisely in the localities of Kaberukwa, Ngumiyano and Ibaciro. Forty-five (45) Burundian soldiers and their allies lost their lives, including the deputy commander of the FDNB operational contingent deployed in South Kivu with headquarters in Minembwe, Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Nyandwi from Camp Mabanda. Thirty-two seriously injured Burundian soldiers were evacuated to Bujumbura to the place commonly known as Guantanamo.

RED-Tabara deplores once again having to fight compatriots who are victims of the same fascist regime of the CNDD-FDD. We remind the Burundian army that it has the choice to refuse to serve one of the worst barbaric regime of our time.

RED-Tabara's resistance will not weaken as long as the CNDD-FDD regime does not agree to sit at the table for sincere and inclusive negotiations to define the conditions for organizing democratic, free, inclusive and transparent elections with all political parties.

October 26, 2024

For the RED-TABARA

Patrick NAHIMANA
Military Spokesperson

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"... un régime de droit, pour que l'homme ne soit pas contraint, en suprême recours, à la révolte contre la tyrannie et l'oppression" (Préambule de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme)

Communiqué available on RED Tabara's [X account](#)