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### Carta de fecha 25 de noviembre de 2024 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos sobre Sudán del Sur establecido en virtud de la resolución 2206 (2015) del Consejo de Seguridad

Los miembros del Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 2206 (2015) del Consejo de Seguridad, cuyo mandato se prorrogó en virtud de la resolución 2731 (2024) del Consejo, tienen el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe provisional, presentado de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 18 de la resolución 2731 (2024).

El informe se presentó el 1 de noviembre de 2024 al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 2206 (2015), que lo examinó el 14 de noviembre del mismo año.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe provisional se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

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## Informe provisional del Grupo de Expertos sobre Sudán del Sur presentado de conformidad con la resolución 2731 (2024)

### *Resumen*

Sudán del Sur es uno de los países con más inseguridad alimentaria del mundo. Casi tres cuartas partes de la población necesita asistencia alimentaria, y la amenaza de hambruna se cierne sobre varias partes del país. El conflicto en el Sudán no solo ha obligado a más de 830.000 personas a buscar refugio en Sudán del Sur, sino que también ha reducido en casi un 70 % los ingresos que el Gobierno de este país obtiene del petróleo.

Los dirigentes de Sudán del Sur han tratado de afrontar y resolver estas crisis interrelacionadas, mientras el proceso político de Yuba se ha visto eclipsado en gran medida por la pugna por el poder, los cargos y el control de unos recursos públicos cada vez más escasos. Actualmente, entre el 7 % y el 12 % de la masa terrestre del país ha quedado anegada como consecuencia de unas inundaciones sin precedentes, lo que ha dificultado aún más la respuesta humanitaria.

El 13 de septiembre de 2024, los dirigentes de Sudán del Sur acordaron prorrogar dos años más el período de transición establecido en el Acuerdo Revitalizado de 2018 para la Solución del Conflicto en la República de Sudán del Sur (el acuerdo de paz). Esta decisión consensuada indica que sigue habiendo espacio para el diálogo político en Yuba, pero también que el acuerdo de paz apenas se ha llevado a la práctica para facilitar la celebración de elecciones libres y limpias y sentar las bases de la siguiente fase de desarrollo del país. En términos más generales, también pone de manifiesto que son pocas las élites de los ámbitos de la política y la seguridad involucradas en el proceso de paz que tendrían mucho que ganar si se acabara con el acuerdo.

Mientras las perspectivas de celebrar unas elecciones democráticas se alejan otros dos años, las élites de Yuba siguen aferradas al poder de nombrar a casi todos los cargos del Gobierno y del sector de la seguridad, así como de decidir a qué se destinan los recursos públicos. El Presidente de Sudán del Sur, Salva Kiir Mayardit, el partido Movimiento de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán (MLPS) y las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur (FDPSS), en particular, han aprovechado eficazmente este control para debilitar a sus oponentes, propiciando las deserciones y reorganizando continuamente casi todas las instituciones del Estado. Cada vez hay menos alternativas para quienes no forman parte de este sistema.

En el estado de Ecuatoria Central, por ejemplo, el Gobierno ha fragmentado eficazmente al Frente de Salvación Nacional favoreciendo varias deserciones destacadas. Sin embargo, esto ha hecho que se intensifique el conflicto con los elementos del grupo que aún siguen operativos y que aumente el pillaje practicado contra la población civil, puesto que, ahora, son varias las facciones que tratan de mantener sus propias operaciones de manera independiente.

La implicación regional sigue siendo clave para que el proceso de paz prospere en Sudán del Sur, y la Iniciativa Tumaini, liderada por Kenya, ha ofrecido cierto grado de esperanza de negociar la paz con varios de los grupos de oposición que siguen existiendo. Sin embargo, los actuales signatarios del acuerdo de paz de 2018 se han opuesto a la creación de nuevos pactos o instituciones por temor a que solo compliquen un proceso de aplicación ya de por sí aquejado de dificultades.

La inestabilidad regional también ha puesto a prueba las fronteras de Sudán del Sur, haciendo necesarias varias intervenciones políticas de alto nivel. En al menos tres de los estados del país, se ha registrado la presencia de numerosos soldados armados de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Uganda, lo que supone un incumplimiento del embargo de armas, al tiempo que algunos miembros de las Fuerzas de Apoyo Rápido del Sudán han cruzado la frontera septentrional de Sudán del Sur.

La mayoría de la población de Sudán del Sur, que lucha por sobrevivir a una grave emergencia humanitaria, sigue sin saber si sus dirigentes sabrán aprovechar los próximos dos años para lograr lo que no consiguieron durante los seis anteriores.

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\* Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial oficial.

## I. Antecedentes

### A. Mandato y viajes

1. En su resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad impuso un régimen de sanciones que se aplicaría a las personas y entidades que contribuyesen al conflicto en Sudán del Sur, y creó un comité de sanciones, el Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#) relativa a Sudán del Sur. El 1 de julio de 2015, el Comité designó a seis personas que serían objeto de sanciones selectivas. Con la aprobación de su resolución [2428 \(2018\)](#), el Consejo impuso un embargo de armas en el territorio de Sudán del Sur y añadió dos personas a la lista de personas designadas. El 30 de mayo de 2024, el Consejo aprobó su resolución [2731 \(2024\)](#), por la que prorrogaba el régimen de sanciones hasta el 31 de mayo de 2025.
2. Mediante su resolución [2731 \(2024\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad también prorrogó hasta el 1 de julio de 2025 el mandato del Grupo de Expertos sobre Sudán del Sur para que pudiera proporcionar información y análisis en apoyo de la labor del Comité, entre otras cosas en lo que respecta a la posible designación de personas y entidades que pudieran estar participando en las actividades descritas en el párrafo 7 de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#).
3. El 10 de septiembre de 2024, el Secretario General, en consulta con el Comité, nombró a los cinco miembros del Grupo de Expertos (véase [S/2024/676](#)).
4. Al haberse retrasado el nombramiento de los miembros del Grupo, estos no pudieron viajar a Sudán del Sur antes de redactar el presente informe en octubre de 2024.

### B. Cooperación con organizaciones internacionales y otras partes interesadas

5. Aunque el Grupo trabaja de forma independiente de los organismos e instituciones de las Naciones Unidas, desea expresar su agradecimiento a la Misión de las Naciones Unidas en Sudán del Sur (UNMISS) y a otros funcionarios de las Naciones Unidas, en particular en Nueva York.
6. Antes de elaborar este informe, el Grupo solicitó reunirse con el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur y con varios Estados Miembros de la región. En el momento de redactarlo, no había recibido respuesta alguna a estas solicitudes. Sin embargo, el Grupo cuenta con amplias redes de contactos tanto en Sudán del Sur como en la región que le han permitido entrevistarse con miembros antiguos y en activo del Gobierno sursudanés, con altos mandos de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur (FDPSS) y de otros componentes del sector de la seguridad, con altos representantes de los grupos de oposición sursudaneses, con miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa Nacional de Transición Revitalizada, con periodistas y organizaciones de la sociedad civil de Sudán del Sur, con empresas que operan en el país, con civiles, y con representantes de grupos armados extranjeros presentes en Sudán del Sur.
7. En el párrafo 17 de su resolución [2731 \(2024\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad puso de relieve la importancia de que el Grupo de Expertos celebrara consultas con los Estados Miembros interesados, las organizaciones internacionales, regionales y subregionales pertinentes y la UNMISS. El Grupo de Expertos tuvo la oportunidad de celebrar extensas consultas con órganos y organismos de las Naciones Unidas en Sudán del Sur y otros lugares. También celebró consultas con la mayoría de los mecanismos de seguridad establecidos en virtud del Acuerdo Revitalizado para la

Solución del Conflicto en la República de Sudán del Sur (el acuerdo de paz), además de con varias instituciones multilaterales operativas en el país.

8. El Grupo envió diez cartas oficiales al Gobierno de Sudán del Sur, a Estados Miembros de la región y a otras personas y entidades, y recibió una respuesta sustantiva antes de redactar este informe. Las respuestas que el Grupo recibió posteriormente figuran en los anexos del presente informe.

### C. Metodología

9. El presente informe se redactó en octubre de 2024 partiendo de las propias investigaciones independientes del Grupo, el cual realizó numerosas entrevistas para recabar información creíble de un amplio abanico de fuentes. El Grupo examinó la documentación facilitada por particulares, entidades comerciales, fuentes confidenciales y el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur. El Grupo ha hecho un esfuerzo deliberado por garantizar que sus informes se nutran de diversas perspectivas sobre el proceso de paz de Sudán del Sur, incluidas las aportadas por múltiples agrupaciones presentes en el Gobierno de Transición de Unidad Nacional Revitalizado y los restantes grupos de la oposición. También se ha basado en su trabajo anterior, en particular en los informes, tanto públicos como confidenciales, ya presentados al Consejo de Seguridad y al Comité.

10. El Grupo de Expertos ha seguido las normas que el Grupo de Trabajo Oficioso del Consejo de Seguridad sobre Cuestiones Generales relativas a las Sanciones recomendó en su informe de diciembre de 2006 (S/2006/997). Ha corroborado la información que figura en el presente informe con ayuda de diversas fuentes independientes, a fin de ajustarse a los criterios probatorios apropiados.

11. El Grupo de Expertos llevó a cabo su investigación con la mayor transparencia posible, a la vez que dio carácter prioritario a la confidencialidad cada vez que fue necesario. Una fuente o documento se califican como confidenciales solo cuando su divulgación podría comprometer la seguridad de la fuente.

## II. Complejos desafíos humanitarios

12. Sudán del Sur sigue sumida en una grave emergencia humanitaria. Dificultades políticas, económicas y de seguridad, que han ido acumulándose durante años, se han sumado a importantes perturbaciones externas para generar crisis complejas y profundamente arraigadas.

### A. Inundaciones sin precedentes

13. Los dirigentes de Sudán del Sur están a punto de declarar una emergencia nacional por las inundaciones generalizadas que han anegado entre el 7 % y el 12 % de la masa terrestre del país, cifra que, en estados como Unidad y Warrap, llega casi al 30 %<sup>1</sup>. Se prevé que, en 2024, unos 3,3 millones de personas repartidas por más de la mitad de los condados del país se verán afectadas por las inundaciones<sup>2</sup>. Miles de

<sup>1</sup> Entrevista con una persona experta en información geoespacial, octubre de 2024. Véase también el Centro de Satélites de las Naciones Unidas, imágenes recogidas entre el 5 y el 9 de octubre de 2024 de las inundaciones en Sudán del Sur, disponibles en [https://unosat.org/static/unosat\\_filesystem/4002/UNOSAT\\_A3\\_Natural\\_Landscape\\_FL20220424SSD\\_05Oct\\_09Oct2024\\_SouthSudan\\_Week24.pdf](https://unosat.org/static/unosat_filesystem/4002/UNOSAT_A3_Natural_Landscape_FL20220424SSD_05Oct_09Oct2024_SouthSudan_Week24.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Plan de preparación y respuesta ante las inundaciones en Sudán del Sur para el período comprendido entre junio y diciembre de 2024, preparado por organizaciones humanitarias en

hectáreas de tierras de cultivo han quedado sumergidas o dañadas por las aguas de crecida, así como cientos de escuelas y puntos de abastecimiento de agua, y decenas de establecimientos de salud<sup>3</sup>. Una persona residente en Yuba, que había vuelto hacía poco de visitar su hogar ancestral en el estado de Yonglei, calificó de “océano” lo que antes era un espeso bosque<sup>4</sup>.

14. Las inundaciones han agravado los efectos de otros problemas humanitarios. Sudán del Sur ha recibido ya a más de 830.000 personas que huyen del conflicto en el Sudán y que vienen a sumarse a los 2,2 millones de personas que ya se encontraban desplazadas dentro de sus fronteras<sup>5</sup>. Muchas de ellas se habían instalado en los estados más castigados por las inundaciones. Más de 8 millones de personas (cerca del 70 % de la población) necesitan ahora asistencia alimentaria<sup>6</sup>, dado que el precio de los alimentos y de los artículos no alimentarios se ha disparado<sup>7</sup>. Gran parte del país sigue registrando niveles de inseguridad alimentaria de “emergencia”, correspondiente a la fase 4 de la Clasificación Integrada de la Seguridad Alimentaria en Fases<sup>8</sup>.

15. Además, en octubre de 2024, aproximadamente el 75 % de las carreteras de Sudán del Sur estaban cortadas o afectadas por inundaciones u otros problemas<sup>9</sup>. Esto ha complicado enormemente la respuesta humanitaria y ha obligado a los agentes humanitarios a depender de transferencias en efectivo<sup>10</sup>, costosas entregas aéreas y campañas de sensibilización y comunicación de escasa repercusión<sup>11</sup>. También ha hecho que la prestación de servicios se centrara en zonas en las que el personal humanitario ya contaba con activos. Algunos expertos locales han advertido de que esto ha creado reservas “aisladas”<sup>12</sup> que pueden acentuar las desigualdades existentes y marginar a otras comunidades<sup>13</sup>.

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consulta con el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur, disponible en <https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/South%20Sudan%20Floods%20Preparedness%20and%20Response%2022%20June%202024.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Véase el anexo 2.

<sup>4</sup> Entrevista con un miembro de la población civil de Sudán del Sur, octubre de 2024.

<sup>5</sup> Organización Internacional para las Migraciones y Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, datos sobre desplazamientos de población desde el Sudán a Sudán del Sur, consultados por última vez el 22 de octubre de 2024, disponibles en <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjojZTMwNTljNWYtYmVhYi00ZGI2LTgwYzAtN2UyNDZmZTRlNjBkIiwidCI6IjE1ODgyNjJkLTlzMitNDNiNC1iZDZlWjJtZTQ5YzhlnjE4NiIsImMiOjBh9&pageName=ReportSection95859b8850a76994e6fb&pageName=ReportSection4f5adec6c9d67015bc74>.

<sup>6</sup> Red de Sistemas de Alerta Temprana contra la Hambruna (FEWS NET), “Food Assistance Outlook Brief, August 2024”, disponible en <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-08/FEWSNET-FAOB-August%202024.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Reach, “Joint Market Monitoring Initiative”, septiembre de 2024, disponible en [https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH\\_SSD\\_Factsheet\\_JMMI\\_September-2024.pdf](https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH_SSD_Factsheet_JMMI_September-2024.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Famine Early Warning System Network, “Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remain widespread as flooding expands”, septiembre de 2024, disponible en <https://www.fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/september-2024>.

<sup>9</sup> Véase, por ejemplo, el mapa de limitaciones de acceso de Sudán del Sur de Logistics Cluster, disponible en [www.logcluster.org/es/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024](http://www.logcluster.org/es/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024).

<sup>10</sup> Se trata de programas que ofrecen a las personas o comunidades dinero en efectivo, en lugar de alimentos u otros bienes y servicios.

<sup>11</sup> Entrevistas con siete agentes humanitarios y analistas locales, octubre de 2024.

<sup>12</sup> Entrevista con una persona experta en infraestructuras locales, octubre de 2024. Véase también el anexo 3.

<sup>13</sup> Entrevistas con una persona experta en infraestructuras locales y un cargo del Gobierno del estado de Unidad, octubre de 2024.

16. Las inundaciones, que han desencadenado el desplazamiento de personas y ganado, también han estado asociadas a fuertes tensiones intercomunitarias y a casos de violencia subnacional, también en los estados de Warrap, Yonglei, Ecuatoria Central y Alto Nilo<sup>14</sup>. Los expertos han advertido de que estos problemas podrían no ser pasajeros, dado que quizás ya no se puedan recuperar los modelos de vida anteriores en algunas zonas en las que los ciclos de siembra y cosecha se han visto alterados de forma permanente<sup>15</sup>.

## **B. Agravamiento de las consecuencias por la falta de planificación y de defensas contra las inundaciones**

17. Las inundaciones más recientes han sido una consecuencia, cada vez más fácil de pronosticar, del cambio climático en la región. La cuenca hidrográfica del río Nilo y los humedales de Sudd en Sudán del Sur están conectados a tres sistemas hidrológicos convergentes: los afluentes occidentales del Nilo, las salidas del lago Victoria y las escorrentías de las tierras altas de Etiopía. En 2024, el aumento interanual de las precipitaciones en África Oriental, sumado a las ya saturadas llanuras aluviales de Sudán del Sur, ha provocado inundaciones de una magnitud que apenas cuenta con precedentes históricos<sup>16</sup>.

18. Sin embargo, según diversos expertos, la magnitud y las repercusiones de las inundaciones en Sudán del Sur también pueden atribuirse al efecto acumulado durante muchos años de los escasos preparativos realizados por el Gobierno y las deficiencias de gran parte de sus infraestructuras de mitigación y prevención de inundaciones<sup>17</sup>. Por ejemplo, varios de ellos afirman que es preocupante que los limitados sistemas de diques hayan generado “falsas esperanzas” en algunas comunidades que, justo por ello, han permanecido en zonas propensas a las inundaciones de los estados de Yonglei y Unidad<sup>18</sup>. En varios de estos lugares, el agua no tardó en desbordar los diques construidos a mano, lo que desencadenó importantes desplazamientos<sup>19</sup>.

19. De manera similar, las autoridades gubernamentales han impulsado un proyecto de dragado muy politizado con el que se pretende abrir poco a poco los afluentes del Nilo en el estado de Unidad, a pesar de las críticas de ecologistas y expertos

<sup>14</sup> Según informes recientes, también existe un riesgo de “exposición significativa” a la violencia de género en el 80 % de los condados de Sudán del Sur, habiendo aumentado las denuncias de violencia sexual un 168 % en el segundo trimestre de 2024 en comparación con el mismo período de 2023. Véanse grupo temático de protección del ACNUR, “South Sudan: Protection Monitoring Spotlight, July - August 2024”, 25 de septiembre de 2024, disponible en <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-protection-monitoring-spotlight-july-august-2024>; UNMISS, “Brief on violence affecting civilians, April - June 2024”, disponible en [https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly\\_brief\\_on\\_violence\\_affecting\\_civilian\\_s\\_april\\_-\\_june\\_2024\\_0.pdf](https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilian_s_april_-_june_2024_0.pdf); y Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, “South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, September 2024”, disponible en <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024>.

<sup>15</sup> Entrevistas con agentes humanitarios, climatólogos y representantes comunitarios, octubre de 2024.

<sup>16</sup> Informes sobre las tendencias meteorológicas en Sudán del Sur que obran en poder del Grupo.

<sup>17</sup> Entrevistas con 19 especialistas en climatología, cargos del Gobierno, organismos humanitarios y representantes de las comunidades locales, octubre de 2024.

<sup>18</sup> Entrevistas con personal humanitario, analistas locales y una persona experta en infraestructuras, octubre de 2024.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* Información corroborada mediante informes de personas que ejercían de observadoras locales, septiembre a octubre de 2024, y fotografías examinadas por el Grupo.



técnicos<sup>20</sup>. Varios expertos locales comentaron al Grupo que, en su opinión, este proyecto había tenido un impacto limitado o “nulo” hasta la fecha<sup>21</sup>. Otros le dijeron que varios proyectos de construcción de carreteras y puentes puestos en marcha en todo el país habían bloqueado o alterado el paso del agua, y que los poderosos contratistas encargados de construir esas carreteras habían hecho caso omiso de los estudios de viabilidad sobre el diseño de estas y su resiliencia ante las inundaciones, lo que había ocasionado destrucción y desplazamientos<sup>22</sup>.

20. La desviación y el uso indebido de los escasos recursos públicos de Sudán del Sur también han debilitado la capacidad del país para mitigar y afrontar las inundaciones. Por ejemplo, en septiembre de 2022, el Gobierno destinó un total de aproximadamente 26,7 millones de dólares a un programa nacional de respuesta a inundaciones<sup>23</sup>, suma con la cual contrató a 25 empresas de Sudán del Sur<sup>24</sup> para que proporcionaran suministros, como sorgo y mosquiteros, por un valor de unos 20 millones de dólares<sup>25</sup>. Sin embargo, pocos de estos recursos terminaron llegando a las víctimas de las inundaciones, y, presuntamente, se robaron varias toneladas de ayuda alimentaria<sup>26</sup>. Muchas de las empresas contratadas tenían poca o ninguna experiencia gestionando los aspectos logísticos de las respuestas de emergencia, y varios proveedores nunca recibieron el pago del Gobierno<sup>27</sup>.

21. En julio de 2024, el Gobierno aprobó un plan de respuesta de emergencia ante inundaciones por un monto de 76 millones de dólares<sup>28</sup>. Sin embargo, en octubre de 2024, estos fondos continuaban sin haberse liberado, ya que las graves interrupciones de las exportaciones de petróleo del país seguían lastrando las finanzas públicas<sup>29</sup>.

22. Ante la caída en picado de los ingresos públicos y los drásticos recortes aplicados a la financiación de la labor humanitaria, el Gobierno también ha intentado gravar cada vez más los suministros humanitarios<sup>30</sup>. En 2024, las dificultades del acceso humanitario, como los ataques contra el personal y los bienes humanitarios, las restricciones a la circulación y otras trabas burocráticas, aumentaron un 15 % con

<sup>20</sup> Entrevistas con una persona experta en infraestructuras y otra encargada de coordinar la respuesta internacional, octubre de 2024. Véanse también los anexos 4 y 5.

<sup>21</sup> Entrevistas con un ecologista local y tres analistas locales en el estado de Unidad, octubre de 2024.

<sup>22</sup> Entrevista con una persona experta en infraestructuras que participaba en la elaboración de estudios de viabilidad de carreteras, octubre de 2024. Esta información fue corroborada por mensajes publicados en medios sociales, fotografías y videos grabados por representantes comunitarios en los estados de Bahr el-Ghazal Occidental, Bahr el-Ghazal Septentrional y Lagos. Véase también, por ejemplo, Eye Radio, “ARC commits to resolving Wau road blockage after heavy rainfall”, 24 de mayo de 2024, disponible en [www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/](http://www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/). Véase también S/2024/343.

<sup>23</sup> Eye Radio, “Govt allocates \$16.7m to flood-affected populations”, 10 de septiembre de 2022, disponible en [www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/](http://www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/); y declaración de la Oficina del Presidente, 30 de noviembre de 2022.

<sup>24</sup> Eye Radio, “Govt allocates \$16.7m”.

<sup>25</sup> Number One Citizen, “Government procures food for vulnerable flood victims”, 2 de noviembre de 2022. Véase también [www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/](http://www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/).

<sup>26</sup> Informes de observadores internacionales, febrero de 2023. Véanse también Sudans Post, “Ex-humanitarian minister Peter Mayen denies walking away with flood victims’ emergency funds”, 27 de noviembre de 2022.

<sup>27</sup> Entrevista con una persona contratada por el Gobierno, octubre de 2022.

<sup>28</sup> Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, exposición informativa ante el Consejo de Seguridad sobre Sudán del Sur, 14 de agosto de 2024.

<sup>29</sup> Entrevistas con una persona encargada de coordinar la respuesta internacional y con un alto cargo del Gobierno implicado en la respuesta ante las inundaciones, octubre de 2024.

<sup>30</sup> *Wall Street Journal*, “South Sudan’s Economic Crisis Is So Bad It’s Taxing Its Only Lifeline”, 8 de octubre de 2024.

respecto a 2023<sup>31</sup>. Además, las transferencias en efectivo, que en 2024 están valoradas en más de 76 millones de dólares, han llegado a perder sistemáticamente hasta la mitad de su valor, dado que el tipo de cambio oficial que los organismos humanitarios están obligados a utilizar se ha apartado drásticamente del tipo de cambio extraoficial que utilizan la mayoría de las personas y empresas para sus transacciones<sup>32</sup>.

### III. Fragmentado panorama político y de seguridad

23. El 13 de septiembre de 2024, los dirigentes de Sudán del Sur acordaron ampliar en dos años el período de transición fijado en el acuerdo de paz de 2018, con lo que las primeras elecciones del país quedaron aplazadas hasta diciembre de 2026. Esta decisión se tomó después de que el comité permanente de alto nivel, encargado de supervisar el cumplimiento del acuerdo de paz, realizara una evaluación en la que constató que solo se había aplicado el 17 % de sus disposiciones, quedando “pendiente” el 57 % del acuerdo<sup>33</sup>. A medida que se acercaba la fecha de los comicios, su aplazamiento se hacía cada vez más probable, ya que solo se habían iniciado los preparativos más elementales. El Asesor de Seguridad Nacional del Presidente subrayó que la prórroga permitiría al Gobierno terminar el censo, registrar a los partidos políticos y reforzar los procesos constitucionales<sup>34</sup>.

24. El panorama político y de seguridad de Sudán del Sur se ha ido fragmentando cada vez más a medida que se prolongaba el período de gobernanza de transición. Las estructuras de poder de dicho período están muy centralizadas, lo que ha otorgado a los principales signatarios del acuerdo de paz, en especial al Presidente de Sudán del Sur, Salva Kiir Mayardit, el control de casi todos los cargos políticos y de seguridad del país, incluidos los adscritos al Parlamento y a las instituciones subnacionales. Según se ha ido dilatando el período de transición, muchos opositores se han ido desgastando o se han visto obligados a abandonar su postura original para intentar incorporarse a los partidos dominantes del sistema. El partido Movimiento de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán (MLPS) del Presidente y las FDPSS han encontrado en esta situación un terreno abonado para debilitar a sus rivales políticos y militares propiciando las deserciones, al tiempo que reorganizaban los cargos de mayor responsabilidad del sector de la seguridad<sup>35</sup>.

#### A. La fragmentación del Frente de Salvación Nacional ha desestabilizado Ecuatoria Central

25. En la región de Ecuatoria, el Gobierno ha seguido animando con éxito a los combatientes y comandantes de alto rango del Frente de Salvación Nacional (FSN) a

<sup>31</sup> Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, “South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (September 2024)”, 11 de octubre de 2024, disponible en [www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024).

<sup>32</sup> Entrevistas con tres especialistas de programas de transferencia en efectivo, septiembre a octubre de 2024. Véase también Grupo de Trabajo sobre Transferencias en Efectivo, “Cash and Voucher Dashboard”, enero a agosto de 2024, disponible en <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiMzhhMzkyZWItMDFjZi00OTgyLTgzYWYtMjEjYyNDhjNTdmMTE3IiwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRiLTU0NGYtNGY2MCIiZGNjLTVIYTQxNmU2ZGM3MCIiImMiOj9>.

<sup>33</sup> Informe de 10 de septiembre de 2024 del Comité Permanente de Alto Nivel, que obra en poder del Grupo.

<sup>34</sup> The East African, “South Sudan delays polls to 2026, extends transitional government”, 14 de septiembre de 2024.

<sup>35</sup> Véanse los anexos 6 y 7.

abandonar a Thomas Cirillo, líder de este grupo. Esto no solo ha fragmentado y debilitado al FSN, sino que, además, ha permitido al Gobierno utilizar a los nuevos desertores aliados como fuerzas asociadas para localizar a los miembros restantes del Frente de Salvación Nacional. Con ello, el Gobierno reproduce la estrategia que ha utilizado eficazmente en otras partes del país, como en los estados de Alto Nilo y Unidad<sup>36</sup>. Sin embargo, al igual que en estos otros casos, esta campaña también ha deteriorado considerablemente la situación de la seguridad local.

26. El FSN tiene cada vez más dificultades logísticas y de recursos, por lo que al Gobierno le resulta más fácil animar a sus comandantes a desertar<sup>37</sup>. A varios se les ha seducido prometiéndoles una plaza remunerada en la policía o en las FDPSS, y algunos desertores del FSN ya se han incorporado a unidades de estas últimas en los condados de Mundri Este y Morobo<sup>38</sup>.

27. Por otra parte, según ciertas informaciones, una parte sustancial de los fondos asignados a la ejecución del acuerdo de paz se desvió al Ministerio de Asuntos del Gabinete y se ha utilizado para promover las deserciones del FSN<sup>39</sup>. Por ejemplo, tras ser convocado por el Parlamento, el Ministro de Asuntos del Gabinete, Martin Elia Lomuro, confirmó que se habían retirado irregularmente 1.050.000 dólares para facilitar la “implantación de la paz” con los comandantes del FSN en abril de 2024<sup>40</sup>.

28. Las dos deserciones más destacadas de los últimos tiempos han sido las de Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong, que ahora actúa como fuerza asociada aliada de las FDPSS, y John Latio Kenyi Loburong, que ahora lidera su propio grupo, las Fuerzas Unidas de Salvación Nacional (FUSN)<sup>41</sup>. Según los documentos que ha examinado el Grupo, ambas deserciones fueron negociadas por las más altas instancias gubernamentales, incluidas la Presidencia y el Ministerio de Asuntos del Gabinete<sup>42</sup>.

29. El Gobierno ha intentado utilizar cada vez más a algunos de estos desertores como fuerzas asociadas contra los restantes miembros del FSN. En otros casos, se han atacado mutuamente. Por ejemplo, parece que las fuerzas comandadas por Kenyi “Warrior” operan al margen de las estructuras oficiales de las FDPSS, pero se les ha encomendado la tarea de combatir a los elementos de las FUSN y del FSN presentes en los alrededores de Lainya, en el estado de Ecuatoria Central<sup>43</sup>.

30. En un incidente ocurrido el 9 de octubre de 2024, al menos 24 personas, entre ellas 19 civiles, murieron y varias resultaron heridas en Wonduruba, en el estado de Ecuatoria Central, como consecuencia de los enfrentamientos que mantuvieron las FDPSS, en alianza con las fuerzas comandadas por Kenyi “Warrior”, y efectivos de

<sup>36</sup> En S/2024/343, S/2023/294, S/2022/884 y S/2022/359 se recogen otros ejemplos destacados de esta estrategia.

<sup>37</sup> Véase el anexo 8. Entrevistas con Thomas Cirillo, septiembre y octubre de 2024.

<sup>38</sup> Entrevistas con civiles y fuentes confidenciales locales, septiembre y octubre de 2024.

<sup>39</sup> Véanse los anexos 9 a 12. Entrevistas con cuatro representantes de la sociedad civil y analistas locales, octubre de 2024. Véanse también Eye Radio, “Dr. Lomuro admits to diverting peace funds to special projects”, 7 de junio de 2024; y Sudans Post, “Lomuro claims he was quoted ‘out of context’ on \$10 million peace funds”, 10 de junio de 2024.

<sup>40</sup> Véanse los anexos 9 a 12. Véase también Eye Radio, “Dr Lomuro admits diverting peace fund”.

<sup>41</sup> Véanse los anexos 13 a 16.

<sup>42</sup> Entrevistas con cinco representantes de la sociedad civil, octubre de 2024. Véanse también los anexos 13 a 16.

<sup>43</sup> Entrevistas con representantes de comunidades locales, septiembre y octubre de 2024. Véase también el anexo 16.

las FUSN comandados por Loburong<sup>44</sup>. Esos choques suscitaron la condena de comunidades locales, grupos de la sociedad civil y el Gobierno del estado<sup>45</sup>.

31. También se ha registrado un importante aumento de los secuestros y las extorsiones en algunas zonas del estado de Ecuatoria Central, incluidos los condados de Yuba, Morobo y Yei<sup>46</sup>. Muchos grupos escindidos de escasos recursos han atacado a civiles y trabajadores humanitarios, lo que ha llevado a suspender algunas operaciones humanitarias en la zona.

32. El Grupo se entrevistó con siete personas que habían estado secuestradas un máximo de cuatro días y que aseguraban que integrantes del FSN habían exigido miles de dólares a sus empleadores a cambio de su liberación<sup>47</sup>. También denunciaron que unidades locales de las FDPSS detenían y recluían arbitrariamente a civiles sospechosos de simpatizar con el FSN, y exigían hasta 200.000 libras sursudanesas (65 dólares) por dejarlos en libertad<sup>48</sup>.

33. Pese a haber perdido a varios comandantes, el FSN de Thomas Cirillo ha subsistido y repuesto sus filas practicando secuestros y reclutamientos<sup>49</sup>, al tiempo que otros grupos armados locales se han adherido a sus siglas<sup>50</sup>.

34. El Gobierno ha respondido a estos movimientos intensificando sus operaciones militares en la zona con un mayor despliegue de desertores y fuerzas<sup>51</sup>. Además, se ha sustituido a varios comisionados civiles de condados locales por nuevos oficiales con experiencia militar<sup>52</sup>, y también se han consolidado bajo el mando del comandante de las FDPSS en Yei, recientemente ascendido, las operaciones militares llevadas a cabo por las FDPSS en el sur del estado de Ecuatoria Central<sup>53</sup>. Asimismo, se ha

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* Información corroborada mediante informes de observadores y supervisores sobre el terreno, que obran en poder del Grupo. Véanse también los anexos 18 y 21 a 23. Véase también UNMISS, “UNMISS alarmed by violent attacks in Juba County, calls for investigation and accountability”, 11 de octubre de 2024, disponible en <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-alarmed-violent-attacks-juba-county-calls-investigation-and-accountability>.

<sup>45</sup> Véanse los anexos 17 a 20.

<sup>46</sup> Informes de supervisores en el estado de Ecuatoria Central, mayo y septiembre de 2024, que obran en poder del Grupo. Entrevistas con tres representantes de la sociedad civil y de organizaciones humanitarias, septiembre y octubre de 2024. Véase también UNMISS, “Brief on violence affecting civilians”.

<sup>47</sup> Entrevistas con siete personas secuestradas y una persona que representaba a la comunidad local, octubre de 2024.

<sup>48</sup> Entrevistas con familiares de civiles secuestrados y líderes comunitarios, octubre de 2024.

<sup>49</sup> Véanse los anexos 24 y 25. Entrevistas con Thomas Cirillo y una persona que representaba a la sociedad civil, octubre de 2024; y UNMISS, “UNMISS gravely concerned by rising abductions in Greater Yei, calls for collective action”, 2 de agosto de 2024. Véase también video publicado por el FSN, disponible en [www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA); y Comisión Mixta de Vigilancia y Evaluación Reconstituida, “Quarterly report on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1 July to 30 September 2024”, disponible en <https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports/254-rjmec-quarterly-report-on-the-status-of-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-from-1st-july-to-30th-september-2024/file>.

<sup>50</sup> Entrevistas con representantes de la sociedad civil, octubre de 2024. Información corroborada con informes comunitarios independientes, revisados por el Grupo, de junio a septiembre de 2024, además de con informes de supervisores internacionales, que obran en poder del Grupo.

<sup>51</sup> Informes de observadores internacionales, marzo de 2024, que obran en poder del Grupo. Entrevistas con tres representantes de la sociedad civil y Thomas Cirillo, octubre de 2024.

<sup>52</sup> Informes de observadores locales, agosto de 2024, que obran en poder del Grupo. Entrevistas con una persona que ejercía de analista local y otra que representaba a la sociedad civil, octubre de 2024. Véase también The Dawn, “Governor Wani urge newly appointed county commissioners to improve security”, 7 de agosto de 2024.

<sup>53</sup> Entrevistas con una persona que ejercía de analista local y otra que representaba a la sociedad civil, octubre de 2024.

informado al Grupo de que el hecho de que oficiales desertores del FSN se hayan incorporado con una remuneración a unidades de las FDPSS que llevan meses sin cobrar ha aumentado las tensiones y debilitado el mando y el control en algunas partes del ejército<sup>54</sup>.

## **B. Mediación de la Iniciativa Tumaini, liderada por Kenya, con los grupos de la oposición**

35. La fragmentación de los grupos opositores también ha complicado las iniciativas de consolidación de la paz, puesto que, ahora, el cambiante panorama político y de seguridad se sustenta en un número cada vez mayor de acuerdos y procesos que se solapan parcialmente.

36. El 9 de mayo de 2024 se organizaron en Nairobi conversaciones de mediación de alto nivel entre el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur y algunos de los grupos de la oposición que no habían firmado el acuerdo de paz de 2018. Entre los participantes en la Iniciativa Tumaini (que significa ‘esperanza’), cabe destacar al Verdadero Movimiento de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán, dirigido por Pagan Amum; al Frente/Ejército Unido de Sudán del Sur, comandado por Paul Malong Awan, persona sancionada (SSi.008); y al Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, liderado por Stephen Buay. También se invitó a Simon Gatwech, persona sancionada (SSi.002) y miembro de la facción Kit-Gwang del Movimiento/Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán en la Oposición (M/ELPS-O), pero no pudo viajar desde el Sudán para participar en las conversaciones<sup>55</sup>.

37. También asistió a las conversaciones Mario Loku Thomas Jada, que había desertado del FSN para fundar el Consejo del Comando Revolucionario del FSN unos meses antes de que aquellas tuvieran lugar. Los demás miembros de la Alianza de Movimientos de Oposición de Sudán del Sur rehusaron participar, aduciendo problemas de seguridad en Kenya y desconfianza en el proceso. En agosto de 2024, el Mediador Principal de la Iniciativa Tumaini, Lazaro Sumbeiywo, viajó a Roma en un intento infructuoso de persuadir a Thomas Cirillo de que participara en las conversaciones<sup>56</sup>.

38. El 15 de julio de 2024, las partes en la Iniciativa Tumaini suscribieron un documento consensuado en el que se definían seis “protocolos”<sup>57</sup>. Al día siguiente, sin embargo, el Movimiento de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán en la Oposición (MLPS-O) rechazó el documento y se retiró oficialmente de las conversaciones<sup>58</sup>.

39. Al explicar su decisión de retirarse, los responsables del MLPS-O afirmaron que la Iniciativa se había apartado de su propósito inicial de servir como foro de mediación. En su opinión, los planes de convertir la Iniciativa en un acuerdo independiente, en vez de integrarla en el acuerdo de paz de 2018, suponían un “incumplimiento” de este último que “socavaba” su ejecución<sup>59</sup>.

40. Los representantes del MLPS-O se opusieron, por ejemplo, a la propuesta de crear un Consejo Nacional Directivo que funcionara como “garante interno” de un

<sup>54</sup> Entrevistas con tres representantes de la sociedad civil, octubre de 2024. Información corroborada mediante informes de observadores locales de agosto de 2024, que obran en poder del Grupo.

<sup>55</sup> Entrevistas con Simon Gatwech (SSi.002), mayo y junio de 2024.

<sup>56</sup> Entrevistas con Thomas Cirillo, Simon Gatwech (SSi.002) y miembros del equipo de mediación, octubre de 2024.

<sup>57</sup> Véase el anexo 26.

<sup>58</sup> Véase el anexo 27.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

eventual acuerdo suscrito a raíz de la Iniciativa Tumaini<sup>60</sup>. Argumentaron que un organismo de este tipo, cuyas decisiones no estarían sujetas a la aprobación del Gabinete o el Órgano Legislativo de Sudán del Sur, atentaría claramente contra las atribuciones de las instituciones de reparto de poder previstas en el acuerdo de paz de 2018. También objetaron que las nuevas Comisiones de Reforma y Supervisión del Sector de la Seguridad duplicarían las funciones que ya desempeñaban los mecanismos de seguridad constituidos<sup>61</sup>.

41. Estas objeciones reflejan las preocupaciones que, desde ya hace tiempo, tiene el MLPS-O respecto a la supremacía del acuerdo de paz de 2018, que sus líderes defienden como pilar para conseguir un papel en el Gobierno y una parte de los puestos de mando de las fuerzas de seguridad del país, así como para poder incorporar sus fuerzas a un ejército nacional unificado<sup>62</sup>.

42. Otras figuras políticas destacadas de Yuba también manifestaron preocupaciones similares. Según un informe elaborado por el comité permanente de alto nivel que supervisa el cumplimiento del acuerdo de paz de 2018, y entre cuyos integrantes se encuentran el Ministro de Asuntos del Gabinete y el Secretario General del MLPS, Peter Lam Booth, varios de los protocolos entraban en conflicto con el acuerdo de paz, por lo que se pedía a la delegación del Gobierno que se asegurara de que no se constituían nuevos mecanismos o instituciones<sup>63</sup>.

43. Sin embargo, para los partidos de la oposición que participan en la Iniciativa Tumaini, el incumplimiento del acuerdo de 2018, y especialmente de sus reformas en materia de seguridad, demuestra que hacen falta mecanismos de aplicación nuevos y más sólidos<sup>64</sup>. Una persona que ejercía de portavoz de uno de los grupos de la oposición señaló al Grupo de Expertos que, sin nuevos mecanismos, la Iniciativa correría el riesgo de convertirse en otro acuerdo incumplido más. Otra dijo al Grupo de Expertos que, “si se suprimieran los mecanismos de supervisión y aplicación, no firmaría el Consenso Tumaini, sino que volvería al campo”<sup>65</sup>. Paul Malong (SSi.008) recalcó que formular un nuevo acuerdo para después integrarlo en el fallido acuerdo de paz de 2018 solo serviría para desvirtuar la Iniciativa Tumaini<sup>66</sup>.

44. Tras varias rondas de consultas, se propuso una solución de compromiso en virtud de la cual los aspectos no ejecutados del acuerdo de paz de 2018 se añadieron a una matriz de aplicación de la Iniciativa Tumaini, que se está preparando actualmente<sup>67</sup>.

## IV. Cuestiones regionales

### A. Respuesta regional a la ampliación del período de transición

45. Los Estados Miembros y las organizaciones regionales siguen siendo elementos fundamentales para resolver los problemas de Sudán del Sur, como pone de manifiesto el destacado papel de Kenya en la Iniciativa Tumaini. La decisión de

<sup>60</sup> Entrevistas con miembros de la delegación del Gobierno y otras figuras políticas en Yuba, septiembre y octubre de 2024. Véase el anexo 27.

<sup>61</sup> Véase el anexo 27.

<sup>62</sup> Entrevistas con partes involucradas en la Iniciativa Tumaini, octubre de 2024.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* Informe del Comité Permanente de Alto Nivel, 7 de octubre de 2024, examinado por el Grupo.

<sup>64</sup> Entrevistas con partes involucradas en la Iniciativa Tumaini, octubre de 2024.

<sup>65</sup> Entrevista con una parte en la Iniciativa Tumaini, octubre de 2024.

<sup>66</sup> Entrevistas con Paul Malong (SSi.008), octubre de 2024.

<sup>67</sup> Entrevistas con partes involucradas en la Iniciativa Tumaini, octubre de 2024.

ampliar el período de transición y posponer las elecciones dos años más ha suscitado reacciones diversas en la región.

46. En una declaración de la Autoridad Intergubernamental para el Desarrollo (IGAD), el Secretario Ejecutivo acogió con beneplácito la “forma consensuada” en la que se había adoptado la decisión e instó al Gobierno de Transición de Unidad Nacional a hacer todo lo posible para terminar de ejecutar las tareas pendientes del acuerdo de paz con el fin de garantizar que las elecciones se celebraran a su debido tiempo<sup>68</sup>. En esa declaración, el Secretario Ejecutivo señaló que ese era el cuarto aplazamiento de las elecciones y que, por lo tanto, urgía definir un plan de acción concreto.

47. El Presidente de la Comisión de la Unión Africana hizo una declaración similar, tomando nota de la decisión del Gobierno de ampliar el período de transición, al tiempo que pedía medidas concretas para que se cumpliera plenamente el acuerdo de paz<sup>69</sup>.

48. La Misión de la Unión Africana en Sudán del Sur, la IGAD y la UNMISS hicieron una declaración conjunta en la que señalaban que era necesario ampliar el período de transición por segunda vez debido a que “no se habían alcanzado parámetros de referencia cruciales aún pendientes”<sup>70</sup>.

## B. Contactos con los Estados de la región

49. Las autoridades de Sudán del Sur, y, en particular, el Presidente, han proseguido su programa de contactos regionales, entre los que destacan especialmente los relativos al conflicto en el Sudán y la relación de Sudán del Sur con Uganda.

50. Como el Grupo ya ha informado en ocasiones anteriores, el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur sigue participando en las iniciativas destinadas a mediar en el conflicto en el Sudán, por ejemplo, mediante varias reuniones entre el Presidente y Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Presidente del Consejo Soberano del Sudán. Los dos dirigentes hablaron de un plan conjunto para proteger el tránsito de las exportaciones de petróleo de Sudán del Sur y hacer frente a la crisis humanitaria en el Sudán, así como de temas comunes de seguridad, como la delincuencia transfronteriza<sup>71</sup>.

51. De las entrevistas que realizó el Grupo, se desprende que sigue habiendo elementos de las Fuerzas de Apoyo Rápido (FAR) presentes en algunas partes del estado de Bahr el-Ghazal Occidental, y que las relaciones que Yuba mantiene con el Movimiento de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán-Norte<sup>72</sup>, las Fuerzas Armadas

<sup>68</sup> IGAD, “IGAD Executive Secretary’s Statement on the Extension of South Sudan’s Transitional Period and Call for Renewed Efforts in Implementing the Revitalized Peace Agreement”, 23 de septiembre de 2024, disponible en <https://igad.int/igad-executive-secretarys-statement-on-the-extension-of-south-sudans-transitional-period-and-call-for-renewed-efforts-in-implementing-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/>.

<sup>69</sup> Unión Africana, “AUC Chairperson statement regarding the extended political transition in South Sudan”, 21 de septiembre de 2024, disponible en <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240921/chairperson-statement-regarding-extended-political-transition-south-sudan>.

<sup>70</sup> Véase <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/joint-press-release-aumiss-igad-and-unmiss-note-decision-to-extend-transitional-period-of>.

<sup>71</sup> Declaraciones de la Oficina del Presidente que obran en poder del Grupo.

<sup>72</sup> Véanse S/2023/922 y S/2024/343.

Sudanesas (FAS) y las FAR siguen siendo importantes, sobre todo en lo concerniente al tránsito del petróleo sursudanés<sup>73</sup>.

52. Lawrence Korbandy, de Sudán del Sur, un cercano aliado del Presidente, fue nombrado el 26 de marzo de 2024 Enviado Especial de la IGAD para el Sudán, lo cual ha aumentado las esperanzas de que Sudán del Sur desempeñe un papel destacado en la mediación para resolver el conflicto en el Sudán<sup>74</sup>.

53. Los dirigentes de Sudán del Sur también han seguido colaborando con Etiopía, por ejemplo, en la construcción de infraestructuras como carreteras y una ruta alternativa para transportar el petróleo sursudanés hasta Djibouti a través de Etiopía<sup>75</sup>.

## V. Armas

### A. Presencia de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Uganda en territorio sursudanés

54. El Grupo ha documentado una intensa actividad militar de miembros de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Uganda (FDPU) en al menos tres zonas de Sudán del Sur. En todas ellas, al menos parte de dichas fuerzas estaban armadas con equipo militar letal. En el párrafo 4 de su resolución 2428 (2018), cuya renovación más reciente tuvo lugar en la resolución 2731 (2024), el Consejo de Seguridad prohíbe la transferencia de equipo militar letal a territorio sursudanés<sup>76</sup>. En este sentido, la presencia de las FDPU en Sudán del Sur supone una violación del embargo de armas.

55. En dos estados de Ecuatoria que lindan con Uganda, se han registrado varios despliegues que parecen estar relacionados con conflictos locales de demarcación de fronteras.

56. En agosto de 2024, por ejemplo, varios soldados armados de las FDPU detuvieron temporalmente a entre 6 y 12 civiles en el condado de Kajo Keji, en el estado de Ecuatoria Central, a raíz de tensiones locales surgidas por la construcción de una carretera a cuyos contratistas protegían las FDPU. Al parecer, los soldados ugandeses decían que el terreno formaba parte de Uganda<sup>77</sup>. En una declaración posterior, las autoridades locales de Sudán del Sur hicieron una lista de más de 100 aldeas del condado de Kajo Keji que, según afirmaban, eran invadidas regularmente por las fuerzas ugandesas<sup>78</sup>.

<sup>73</sup> Entrevistas con observadores internacionales y locales, cargos del gobierno local, representantes de grupos armados extranjeros presentes en Sudán del Sur, y civiles que habían tenido contacto con las FAR en Sudán del Sur, mayo y octubre de 2024.

<sup>74</sup> IGAD, "IGAD Executive Secretary Announces the Appointment of Hon. Lawrence Korbandy as Special Envoy for Sudan", 26 de marzo de 2024, disponible en <https://igad.int/igad-appoints-hon-lawrence-korbandy-as-special-envoy-for-sudan/>.

<sup>75</sup> Véanse Sudan Tribune, "Ethiopia, South Sudan agree to build alternate oil pipeline route", 7 de julio de 2024; y Eye Radio, "Ethiopia challenges South Sudan to road construction race", 15 de febrero de 2024.

<sup>76</sup> El Grupo ha documentado varias violaciones de este tipo, como las registradas en los documentos S/2020/342, S/2020/1141, S/2019/897 y S/2018/1049.

<sup>77</sup> Entrevistas realizadas por observadores a representantes del gobierno local y de la juventud, revisadas por el Grupo, agosto de 2024. Información corroborada por un video al que tuvo acceso el Grupo. Véase también el anexo 28. Véase también Eye Radio, "Uganda provokes another encroachment in Kajo-Keji", 7 de agosto de 2024.

<sup>78</sup> Véase el anexo 29.



57. También se informó de que, en julio de 2024, unos soldados armados de las FDPU “completamente equipados para el combate”<sup>79</sup> entraron en localidades del estado de Ecuatoria Oriental “en grandes camiones”<sup>80</sup>. Las comunidades locales acusaron a los soldados de realizar patrullas y de hostigar y desplazar a civiles. Algunos representantes de las FDPSS afirmaron que las FDPU habían arrestado a varios de sus soldados<sup>81</sup>. En un incidente ocurrido en julio, entre 11 y 21 ciudadanos sursudaneses del estado de Ecuatoria Oriental fueron abatidos por las fuerzas ugandesas y posteriormente acusados de ser cazadores furtivos<sup>82</sup>.

58. El 28 de septiembre de 2024, el Jefe de las Fuerzas de Defensa de las FDPSS, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), viajó a Uganda para reunirse con su homólogo de las FDPU, el General Muhoozi Kainerugaba<sup>83</sup>. En un comunicado de prensa, las FDPSS señalaron que las partes habían acordado que las “FDPU detendrían nuevas invasiones en los territorios de Sudán del Sur”<sup>84</sup>.

59. Desde el 1 de julio de 2015, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004) está sujeto a una prohibición de viajar, en virtud del régimen de sanciones establecido por la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad. Al no haberse presentado ninguna solicitud de exención con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el párrafo 11 de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#), su viaje supone un incumplimiento de dicha prohibición.

60. De forma paralela a las tensiones transfronterizas registradas en los estados de Ecuatoria, el Grupo también documentó que, en julio y agosto de 2024, se produjeron importantes despliegues de las FDPU en el estado de Bahr el-Ghazal Occidental como parte de operaciones conjuntas con las FDPSS y el Servicio Nacional de Seguridad de Sudán del Sur<sup>85</sup>.

61. El Grupo recabó testimonios de diversas fuentes de la zona, varias de las cuales también hablaron de aeronaves y helicópteros que se habían utilizado para desplegar fuerzas y equipos ugandeses<sup>86</sup>. Estos testimonios fueron parcialmente corroborados por fotografías que el Grupo tuvo la oportunidad de examinar. El Grupo ha identificado al menos una de las aeronaves matriculadas en Uganda, un avión de carga Lockheed L-100 Hercules, que solía operar en la zona en el momento del despliegue<sup>87</sup>.

62. Al parecer, algunas de las operaciones de seguridad conjuntas de Uganda y Sudán del Sur han tenido como objetivo elementos del Ejército de Resistencia del

<sup>79</sup> Eye Radio, “UPDF rounds up Magwi villagers, threatens them to evacuate – official”, 20 de agosto de 2024.

<sup>80</sup> Entrevista con una persona que ejercía de observadora local en el estado de Ecuatoria Oriental, octubre de 2024. Véase también Eye Radio, “Ugandan army reportedly encroaches into South Sudan’s Magwi”, 11 de julio de 2024.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.* Véanse también el anexo 30; y Radio Tamazuj, “South Sudan tells Uganda to free detained soldiers”, 21 de julio de 2024.

<sup>82</sup> Entrevista con una persona que ejercía de observadora local en el estado de Ecuatoria Oriental, octubre de 2024. Información corroborada mediante un informe de observadores internacionales, revisado por el Grupo, agosto de 2024. Véanse también Eye Radio, “Ugandan wildlife rangers allegedly killed 21 S. Sudanese poachers”, 23 de julio de 2024; y Number One Citizen, “Budi murder: Lobong, ministers to face MPs”, 30 de julio de 2024.

<sup>83</sup> Véanse los anexos 31 y 32.

<sup>84</sup> Véase el anexo 31.

<sup>85</sup> Entrevistas con tres personas que ejercían de observadoras locales y una que trabajaba como agente en el sector de la seguridad, octubre de 2024. Véanse también Sudans Post, “Lawmaker says Kiir’s office involved in Ugandan army encroachment”, 2 de septiembre de 2024; y Radio Tamazuj, “Questions over presence of Ugandan soldiers in Raja”, 16 de agosto de 2024.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> Véase el anexo 33.

Señor que actúan en las regiones fronterizas de la República Centroafricana, el Sudán y Sudán del Sur<sup>88</sup>.

63. A raíz de las críticas que el despliegue suscitó entre la población local, así como de la preocupación ante un posible conflicto entre las fuerzas con elementos de las FAR del Sudán que también se habían avistado en la zona, fuentes del sector de la seguridad de Sudán del Sur indicaron que el Servicio Nacional de Seguridad disuadió a las FDPU de establecer una presencia más permanente en dicha zona<sup>89</sup>.

## B. Adquisición de vehículos militares

64. El 13 de agosto de 2024, una empresa privada radicada fuera de Sudán del Sur anunció que había “cerrado un acuerdo para suministrar vehículos al Ejército de Sudán del Sur” destinados a cubrir sus “necesidades operacionales”<sup>90</sup>.

65. Sin embargo, el 19 de agosto de 2024, un portavoz de las FDPSS desmintió esa afirmación<sup>91</sup>. Según confirmaron estas últimas, la empresa se había reunido con la Dirección General de Adquisiciones de las FDPSS, pero solo para hacer una valoración general de las capacidades de dicha empresa. Al desmentir la afirmación, las FDPSS señalaron que seguían “sometidas a un embargo de armas”, lo que sugiere que parte del suministro propuesto de vehículos podría estar sujeto a las disposiciones del embargo de armas establecido en la resolución 2428 (2018) del Consejo de Seguridad, renovado más recientemente en la resolución 2731 (2024). El Grupo ya informó en anteriores ocasiones de la adquisición de vehículos blindados de transporte de personal que infringían el embargo de armas<sup>92</sup>.

66. Aunque el embargo de armas establecido en virtud del párrafo 4 de la resolución 2428 (2018) del Consejo de Seguridad comprende los “vehículos militares”, el párrafo 5 f) contempla exenciones cuando el Comité da su aprobación previa. El párrafo 2 de la resolución 2683 (2023) del Consejo, cuya reafirmación más reciente se encuentra en el párrafo 1 de la resolución 2731 (2024), también permite importar equipo militar “no letal” “destinado exclusivamente a apoyar la aplicación de las disposiciones del acuerdo de paz”, sin que haya que solicitar una exención ni notificarlo al Comité.

67. Al ser preguntada por el Grupo, la empresa respondió de forma constructiva indicando que no había tratado el suministro de ninguna categoría de vehículos comprendida en el embargo de armas y que, en cualquier caso, había “decidido que no debíamos proseguir con ninguna otra discusión de ningún tipo”<sup>93</sup>.

## C. Adquisición de armas por parte de grupos de la oposición

68. El Grupo sigue investigando las gestiones de los grupos de la oposición para adquirir armas contraviniendo el embargo de estas últimas. Entre ellas, cabe citar las

<sup>88</sup> Entrevistas con observadores internacionales y locales y con una persona que trabajaba como agente del sector de la seguridad en el estado de Bahr el-Ghazal Occidental, octubre de 2024. Véase también el mensaje que las FDPU publicaron en los medios sociales el 20 de agosto de 2024, disponible en: [https://x.com/MODVA\\_FDPU/status/1825871279808729213](https://x.com/MODVA_FDPU/status/1825871279808729213).

<sup>89</sup> Entrevistas con dos personas que ejercían de observadoras locales y una que trabajaba como agente en el sector de la seguridad, octubre de 2024.

<sup>90</sup> Declaraciones públicas formuladas por la empresa, que posteriormente fueron revisadas o suprimidas, y que obran en poder del Grupo. Información confirmada también mediante correspondencia con la empresa.

<sup>91</sup> Véase el anexo 34.

<sup>92</sup> Véanse S/2024/343, S/2023/294 y S/2022/359.

<sup>93</sup> Correspondencia del Grupo con la empresa.

gestiones que hicieron Abraham Chol Keech y Peter Biar Ajak, ambos nacionales de Sudán del Sur, acusados en marzo de 2024 en los Estados Unidos de América de conspirar para adquirir armas con la intención de instigar un golpe de Estado en Sudán del Sur<sup>94</sup>. Presuntamente, ambos intentaron adquirir armas diversas, como sistemas portátiles de defensa antiaérea FIM-92 “Stinger”<sup>95</sup> y granadas M-67<sup>96</sup>, y preguntaron por sistemas de armas antitanque FGM-148 Javelin. Según los documentos judiciales, “el acusado solicitó en repetidas ocasiones [...] que se le proporcionaran sistemas de misiles Stinger para neutralizar helicópteros militares sursudaneses<sup>97</sup>. [...] Del mismo modo, el acusado también [afirmó] que necesitaba armas antitanque para neutralizar los entre 13 y 15 tanques que estaban operativos en Sudán del Sur”. Todo ello revela una especial preocupación por las capacidades blindadas y aéreas de las FDPSS.

## VI. Finanzas y recursos naturales

### A. Interrupción continuada de las exportaciones de petróleo

69. El 25 de septiembre de 2024, el Ministro de Finanzas y Planificación de Sudán del Sur, Marial Dongrin Ater, presentó el presupuesto para el ejercicio económico 2024/25 a la Asamblea Legislativa Nacional de Transición de Sudán del Sur<sup>98</sup>. El Ministro señaló que, en febrero de 2024, se había roto el oleoducto que transportaba petróleo de la mezcla Dar de Sudán del Sur a Puerto Sudán (Sudán)<sup>99</sup>. Esto hizo que las exportaciones de crudo de Sudán del Sur descendieran de unos 150.000 barriles diarios a tan solo 45.000. Dada la importancia que las exportaciones de petróleo tienen para la economía del país, el Ministro subrayó que “la interrupción continuada de la producción y exportación de crudo constituye un asunto de seguridad nacional”<sup>100</sup>.

70. El 20 de octubre de 2024, una delegación de funcionarios sursudaneses viajó a Puerto Sudán con el propósito de reunirse con Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Presidente del Consejo Soberano del Sudán, y otros oficiales para tratar la reparación del oleoducto<sup>101</sup>. Los funcionarios sudaneses comunicaron a la delegación sursudanesa visitante que se habían efectuado los preparativos necesarios para reanudar las exportaciones de crudo sursudanés. Según confirmaron al Grupo algunos expertos, aunque era probable que hubieran concluido las reparaciones técnicas, se podría necesitar algo más de tiempo para purgar completamente el oleoducto reparado y volver a alcanzar la plena producción en los yacimientos petrolíferos de Alto Nilo, donde se había desmovilizado a varios subcontratistas<sup>102</sup>.

<sup>94</sup> Véase S/2024/343.

<sup>95</sup> En concreto, cinco sistemas portátiles de defensa antiaérea.

<sup>96</sup> Véase el anexo 35.

<sup>97</sup> Véase [https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA\\_v\\_Keech\\_et\\_al\\_azdce-24-00394\\_0022.0.pdf](https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al_azdce-24-00394_0022.0.pdf).

<sup>98</sup> Discurso sobre el presupuesto para el ejercicio económico 2024/2025, de 25 de septiembre de 2024, que obra en poder del Grupo. El presupuesto se presentó con retraso, ya que el ejercicio económico 2024/25 comenzó el 1 de julio de 2024. En octubre de 2024, aún no se había realizado su segunda lectura.

<sup>99</sup> Véanse S/2023/922 y S/2024/343.

<sup>100</sup> Discurso sobre el presupuesto para el ejercicio económico 2024/2025, de 25 de septiembre de 2024, que obra en poder del Grupo.

<sup>101</sup> Declaración de la Oficina del Presidente de Sudán del Sur.

<sup>102</sup> Entrevistas con oficiales sursudaneses y sudaneses y actores de la industria petrolera de Sudán del Sur, septiembre y octubre de 2024. En octubre de 2024, en el momento de redactar este informe, no se habían reanudado las exportaciones.

71. Sin embargo, hay otro escollo más importante: llegar a un acuerdo político sobre cómo las partes en conflicto en el Sudán se repartirán los ingresos procedentes de las exportaciones de petróleo cuando estas se reanuden<sup>103</sup>. De las entrevistas realizadas por el Grupo, se desprende que las FAS han intentado renegociar las tarifas que Sudán del Sur debe pagar por utilizar el oleoducto y otras infraestructuras petrolíferas, mientras que los representantes de las FAR también han exigido una parte de las exportaciones de petróleo una vez reanudadas<sup>104</sup>.

72. La interrupción continuada de las exportaciones de petróleo procedentes de Sudán del Sur ha llevado al Gobierno a barajar rutas de exportación alternativas, como la construcción de un nuevo oleoducto hasta Djibouti<sup>105</sup>. También se han puesto en marcha iniciativas para diversificar la base de ingresos de Sudán del Sur, en el marco de las cuales los funcionarios gubernamentales, tanto del ámbito nacional como del local, consideran prioritaria la extracción de oro<sup>106</sup>.

## **B. Aumento de la competencia por los ingresos del petróleo en Yuba**

73. La falta de exportaciones de petróleo de la mezcla Dar ha intensificado la competencia por controlar los dos cargamentos<sup>107</sup> de petróleo de la mezcla Nilo que, a lo sumo, el Gobierno aún puede sacar al mercado cada mes<sup>108</sup>. Aunque el precio de estos cargamentos se fija en subastas oficiales, a menudo son los miembros de la Oficina del Presidente quienes deciden a qué empresas se terminan adjudicando<sup>109</sup>.

74. Normalmente, los ingresos derivados de los cargamentos de la mezcla Nilo se han destinado al programa Petróleo por Carreteras, subcontratado principalmente a una empresa controlada por uno de los enviados especiales del Presidente<sup>110</sup>. Sin embargo, algunos diputados del Parlamento de Sudán del Sur y varios Ministerios del Gobierno han instado a que se suspendan estos pagos para dedicarlos a sufragar los sueldos y otros gastos públicos esenciales<sup>111</sup>. Los comerciantes internacionales de productos básicos también han mantenido su práctica de pagar por adelantado los futuros cargamentos de crudo con varios meses de antelación<sup>112</sup>.

75. Al mismo tiempo, el control de los cargamentos de petróleo se ha asignado a diversas empresas sursudanesas que han intentado venderlos en el mercado y quedarse con los beneficios como retribución por los bienes y servicios que han

<sup>103</sup> Véase [S/2023/922](#).

<sup>104</sup> Entrevistas con oficiales sursudaneses y sudaneses y actores de la industria petrolera de Sudán del Sur, septiembre y octubre de 2024. El presupuesto de Sudán del Sur para 2024/25 presupone el pago de unos 52 millones de dólares en tarifas al Sudán.

<sup>105</sup> Entrevistas con cargos del Gobierno y actores de la industria petrolera, octubre de 2024. Véase también Eye Radio, “Sudan makes preparations to export South Sudan crude oil”, 21 de octubre de 2024.

<sup>106</sup> Entrevistas con cargos del Gobierno y la sociedad civil. Véase también Number One Citizen Daily, “Kapoeta gold rush: South Sudan’s silent trade that fuels inequality”, 7 de septiembre de 2024.

<sup>107</sup> Un cargamento de crudo equivale a unos 600.000 barriles.

<sup>108</sup> Entrevistas con personas conocedoras de la industria petrolera de Sudán del Sur, septiembre y octubre de 2024.

<sup>109</sup> Entrevistas con cargos del Gobierno y agentes del sector privado; información corroborada por documentos examinados por el Grupo, septiembre y octubre de 2024.

<sup>110</sup> Véase [S/2024/343](#).

<sup>111</sup> Entrevistas con representantes del sector privado y de la sociedad civil, septiembre y octubre de 2024. Véase también, por ejemplo, Number One Citizen Daily, “MP proposes suspension of Oil for roads project fund”, 5 de septiembre de 2024.

<sup>112</sup> Entrevistas con personas conocedoras de la industria petrolera de Sudán del Sur, septiembre y octubre de 2024.

proporcionado al Gobierno<sup>113</sup>. Una de estas empresas se autodefine como constructora, pero está administrada por dos personas que estuvieron asociadas a una empresa que facilitó la importación de vehículos blindados de transporte de personal en Sudán del Sur<sup>114</sup>. Otra de ellas está administrada por el antiguo Director Ejecutivo de la Oficina del Presidente. Ninguna de las dos empresas figura en la lista de licitadores aprobados para gestionar petróleo de Sudán del Sur, razón por la cual se le revocó posteriormente a la segunda de ellas la adjudicación de un cargamento<sup>115</sup>.

76. Tanto en el artículo 4.8.1.10 del acuerdo de paz de Sudán del Sur como en el artículo 6.2 de la Ley de Gestión de los Ingresos del Petróleo se establece que todos los pagos relacionados con el petróleo deben ingresarse en una cuenta única destinada a tal fin, prohibiéndose a los compradores efectuar pagos directos a empresas privadas a cambio de petróleo del Gobierno<sup>116</sup>.

77. En el presupuesto para 2024/25 de Sudán del Sur, solo se reconocen parcialmente las repercusiones económicas que tiene la reducción de los ingresos procedentes del petróleo<sup>117</sup>. En dicho documento, se prevén unos ingresos públicos totales de 2,6 billones de libras sursudanesas, mientras que el gasto total asciende a 4,1 billones de libras sursudanesas. Esto supone que casi la mitad del gasto previsto quedará sin financiar si no se restablecen plenamente las exportaciones de petróleo. Más de un tercio del presupuesto total se destina a pagar sueldos (incluidos los atrasos), en torno al 70 % de los cuales corresponden al sector de la seguridad. Por otro lado, las instituciones que emplean a las personas involucradas en el proceso de paz siguen teniendo un gran peso en el presupuesto, como demuestra el hecho de que el presupuesto del Parlamento casi triplique el del sector de la salud en su conjunto<sup>118</sup>.

## VII. Conclusión

78. Los dirigentes de Sudán del Sur se enfrentan a varios problemas interrelacionados. Algunos de ellos son autoinfligidos, mientras que otros surgen como consecuencia de importantes perturbaciones externas. Para lograr avances significativos a la hora de ejecutar las reformas necesarias para recuperar la confianza de la población en su Gobierno y, al mismo tiempo, facilitar el socorro humanitario y el desarrollo sostenible, se precisará un apoyo sostenido a escala regional e internacional.

## VII. Recomendaciones

79. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda que el Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#) relativa a Sudán del Sur aliente al Gobierno de Sudán del Sur a que:

a) Haga todo lo posible por facilitar la prestación de asistencia humanitaria eliminando los impedimentos burocráticos, previniendo los ataques contra el personal humanitario y sus bienes, y facilitando la circulación sin trabas por todas las regiones, también a lo largo del río Nilo;

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<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> Véanse [S/2024/343](#) y el anexo 36.

<sup>115</sup> Véase el anexo 36.

<sup>116</sup> Véase también el anexo 37.

<sup>117</sup> Presupuesto para el ejercicio económico 2024/25, presentado al Parlamento el 25 de septiembre de 2024.

<sup>118</sup> Véase también el anexo 38.

b) Haga todo lo posible por asignar todos los recursos necesarios para terminar de capacitar y desplegar a las restantes Fuerzas Unificadas Necesarias, armonizar su estructura de mando y desalentar nuevas deserciones durante el período de transición;

c) Ante la posible reanudación de las exportaciones de petróleo de la mezcla Dar, vuelva a publicar periódicamente los informes de comercialización del petróleo, de conformidad con el capítulo 9 de la Ley de Gestión de los Ingresos del Petróleo del país<sup>119</sup>, así como otros documentos presupuestarios, incluidos los informes trimestrales de gastos.

80. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda que el Comité aliente al Gobierno de Uganda a acogerse a los procedimientos de exención previstos en las resoluciones [2206 \(2015\)](#) y [2428 \(2018\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, cuya prórroga más reciente figura en la resolución [2731 \(2024\)](#), en el caso de que estudie la posibilidad de transferir equipo militar letal al territorio de Sudán del Sur y de que facilite los viajes de personas sujetas a las medidas restrictivas establecidas en dichas resoluciones.

81. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda que el Comité estudie la posibilidad de redactar una nota orientativa para la aplicación del embargo de armas que ofrezca información adicional, también en beneficio del Gobierno de Sudán del Sur y de los posibles proveedores, sobre el término “equipo militar no letal” y la fórmula “destinado exclusivamente a apoyar la aplicación de las disposiciones del acuerdo de paz”, en particular en lo que respecta a los vehículos utilizados por el ejército y la policía.

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<sup>119</sup> Véase el anexo 37.

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**Annex 1: List of abbreviations**

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NASU	National Salvation United Forces
NSS	National Security Service
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

## Annex 2: Partial data on flood-related impacts

The following is representative data of the impact of flooding. It does not capture the full extent of the impacts.

### Reported displacement:<sup>1</sup>

- About 271,000 displaced by floods across South Sudan as of mid-October
- Jonglei – Tens of thousands reported displaced in Pochalla, Ayod, Twic East, Uror, Fangak in September
- Northern Bahr el Ghazal – almost 155,000 people impacted across four counties in September
- More than 6,000 flood-displaced households identified in Unity state in September
- In parts of Upper Nile, figures of flood and conflict displaced people revised to nearly 20,000 in September

### Impact on schools:

- 127 schools reported damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>2</sup>
- In Unity, 65 schools submerged due to floods, affecting 20,214 students<sup>3</sup>

### Impact on health facilities:

- 29 health facilities damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>4</sup>
- 58 health facilities submerged in five counties, and nearly 90 others inaccessible<sup>5</sup>

### Impact on water points:

- 103 water points rendered unusable in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>6</sup>

### Impact on agriculture and farmlands:

- 53,100 farmers and cattle keepers lost crops and livestock in September<sup>7</sup>
- In Mayendit County, Unity State, about 4,275 hectares of farmland submerged as of mid-September<sup>8</sup>
- In Jur River in Western Bahr el Ghazal, more than 150,000 acres of farmland were destroyed<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Floods Snapshot (as of 18 October 2024), available from: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-floods-snapshot-18-october-2024> and UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 4 (As of 18 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-4-18-september-2024>

<sup>4</sup> UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>5</sup> WHO, Severe flooding compounds health crisis in South Sudan, 21 October 2024: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/severe-flooding-compounds-health-crisis-south-sudan>

<sup>6</sup> UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 3 (as of 12 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-3-12-september-2024>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

### Annex 3: Images of flooding at Bentiu IDP camp and Rubkona airfield





Image depicts the airstrip in Rubkona, the UNMISS Internally Displaced Persons camp, and the UNMISS base, all in Unity State, surrounded by water. Image date 28 October 2024.

Source: Planet Labs PBC

**Annex 4: Press statement on waterway dredging, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 8 June 2022**




screening of the project sites there after develop TORs for the conduct of the ESIA and any relevant studies. Following the development of the TORs, a tender for the conduct of the ESIA will be advertised and Environmental Firms or Individual consultants will bid and those vetted and deemed qualified by the ministry will be awarded the contracts to conduct the assessments and studies. They will then submit their reports to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry for review and endorsement. If the report(s) concludes that the projects have no, minimal or severe environmental or social impacts, with recommended mitigation measures in place, then a letter of no Objection will be issued and the project will commence.


Therefore since the above process has not commenced, any dredging of the rivers is illegal.

On the resumption of the Jonglei Canal to drain the Sudd Wetland to mitigate floods, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry will not approve the resumption or completion of the Canal because of the Ecosystems services that Sudd provides to our nation, the region and the world.

Finally rest assured that such projects are not the remit of a single ministry and that's why as a cross-cutting ministry with the mandate of protecting and conserving our environment, no project with such a magnitude without the clearance of the ministry is to be implemented.




## Annex 5: Image of waterways in Unity State




Source: Planet Labs PBC. Image date 28 October 2024

Partial river clearing operations were conducted downstream (north) on the Bahr el Ghazal River, which flows past Bentiu town in Unity State. However, the accumulation of vegetation upstream, near the low-lying bridge, has blocked water flow into the dredged sections of the river.

**Annex 6: Republican orders reshuffling senior SSPDF command positions, October 2024**









REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
The President

RSS/RO/J/13/2024


7<sup>th</sup> October 2024

**TRANSFER OF AN OFFICER FROM THE TIGER DIVISION OF THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) TO THE GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS OF THE SSPDF.**

Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 27(1) of the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act, 2009, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF do hereby **Transfer Maj. Gen. Lual Wek Guem Maroidit from being the Commander of Tiger Division of the SSPDF to the General Head Quarters of the SSPDF.**

*Signed under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba, this Seventh Day of the Month of October in the Year 2024.*

**Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President,  
Commander -In- Chief of the SSPDF,  
Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba.**



**Annex 7: Statement by former Director General of the Internal Security Bureau,  
10 October 2024**

10<sup>th</sup> October, 2024

**Subject: Letter of Appreciation to H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President and C-In-C of SSPDF and all other Organized Forces,  
Republic of South Sudan**

First and foremost, I would like to appreciate H.E. the President for the opportunity and the trust he bestowed upon me during my thirteen (13) years of service as the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB).


Your Excellency, it was an honour to serve under your Comradeship in one of the most sensitive and important institutions in the country. It was through your guidance and directives, that I was able to deliver and achieve some of the assigned tasks within the Service. I have cherished every moment of it.

Secondly, H.E. the President is a mentor and one of the role models who, without his unwavering support, I would not have succeeded in the Service during my tenure.

Despite my little disappointment following my recent appointment to the Gubernatorial position as Governor of Warrap State, its subsequent revocation and the ensuing rumours flying around, I want to assure the public that I am one of those cadres trained, tested, committed and loyal to the Revolution. I will never deviate from the line of the Revolution. One of the basic principles of the cadres of the Revolution is that a cadre is the first to attack and the last to withdraw. We are still at the phase of being attacked as a Revolution and therefore I will be the last to withdraw.

Lastly, allow me to reiterate to your top echelon, my sincere gratitude and steadfastness in supporting your able leadership.

Kind Regards,

 10/10/2024  
**Gen. Akol Koof Kuc,**  
Former DG of ISB and also Former Governor-Designate of Warrap State

## **Annex 8: Partial list of known defections from the National Salvation Front (NAS)**

In May 2023, operational commander John Latio Kenyi Loburong defected from NAS to government.

In February 2024, Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong defected to government.

In May 2024, nine commissioned and non-commissioned NAS officers defected and joined the SSPDF in Yei.<sup>10</sup>

In August 2024, forces under the command of former NAS zonal commander, Emmanuel Salah Juma, deployed under the command of the SSPDF to Dollo Payam in Central Equatoria.<sup>11</sup>

On 9 September, Asiki Samson, a former SPLA-IO and SSNMC commander who later joined NAS, split from NAS and offered to join the SSPDF in Morobo in southern Central Equatoria.<sup>12</sup>


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<sup>10</sup> Reports from field observers in Yei, obtained by the Panel. May 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, NAS officers denounce rebellion, 7 May 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/05/07/nas-officers-denounce-rebellion/>

<sup>11</sup> Field report by international monitors, obtained by the Panel, August 2024. See also, South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 1,500 NAS soldiers join SSPDF in Kudra, Central Equatoria, 17 August 2024: [https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view\\_clip\\_email/779593/56/0](https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view_clip_email/779593/56/0)

<sup>12</sup> Reports from local observers, September 2024. Interview with Thomas Cirillo, October 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, Morobo receives NAS defectors, 25 September 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/09/25/morobo-receives-nas-defectors/>

## Annex 9: Parliamentary summons letter, 29 May 2024



For the purpose of this meeting, the following TNLA's specialized Committees and representatives of relevant institutions and Mechanisms shall be invited:

1. Public Accounts Committee (PAC), (four members)
2. Finance and Planning Committee (FPC), (Four members)
3. Governance Assurance, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (GAME), (four members)
4. National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC), (two Members)
5. National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), (two members)
6. Judicial Reform Committee (JRC), (two members)


The meeting shall take place on:

Date: Monday, 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 2024

Time: 3:00 Pm

Venue: TNLA's Blue Room

Best Regards



**Rt. Hon Oyet Nathaniel Pierino**  
First Deputy Speaker  
TNLA/RSS/Juba



- Cc: Rt. Hon Speaker
- Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Administration and Finance
- Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Welfare
- Cc: Clerk
- Cc: Legal Advisor
- Cc: NCRC, NCAC, JRC
- CC: TNLA's PAC, GAME, Finance and Planning.
- Cc: File

## Annex 10: Summary Report on the payment of \$10 million to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 6 June 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY  
First Deputy Speaker**

Date: 6<sup>th</sup> June 2024

**SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE TNLA LEADERSHIP WITH THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CABINET AFFAIRS AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF SOUTH SUDAN ON THE PAYMENT OF USD 10,000,000 (SSP: 15,322,939,000) TO THE MINISTRY OF CABINET AFFAIRS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIORITY PROVISION OF THE R-ARCSS AND THE ROADMAP SPECIAL PROJECTS**

### INTRODUCTION

1. The TNLA received petition from the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms in late April 2024 regarding controversial payments of USD 10,000,000 allocated to NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc.
2. The TNLA made consultations with relevant institutions including the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Bank of South Sudan etc on the credibility of the petition and the report of payments.
3. The TNLA obtained a letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject: "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects".
4. The letter from the Ministry of Finance and Planning indicated that the fund in question was to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Special Projects of the Roadmap. Attached to the letter was a document of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs outlining allocations to the following beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms:



Page 1 of 5

Email: [nla1stdeputy@speaker@gmail.com](mailto:nla1stdeputy@speaker@gmail.com) | Telephone: +211 (0) 920 085 551

S/No	Institutions	Total amount in USD	Total amount in SSP
1.	National Constitutional Amendment Committee	1,871,340	1,871,340,000
2.	Constitutional Making Process (10% the of budget)	3,583,887.73	3,583,887,725
3.	National Human Right Council	1,052,000	1,052,000,000
4.	Judicial Reform Committee	999,380	999,380,000
5.	2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears	1,000,000	1,000,000,000
6.	Popularization of the Agreement on the Roadmap (R-ARCSS)	945,871.57	945,871,575

#### AUTHORITY AND MANDATE

5. Pursuant to TCRSS, 2011 (as amended), Article 82 (1) (3), and the TNLA Conduct of Business Regulations, 2011 (Amended 2021), Regulations; 8(1)(c)(d), 133, 134 & 135, the TNLA leadership involving relevant Specialized Committees of Public Accounts (PAC), Finance and Economic Planning, Government Assurances, Monitoring and Evaluation (GAME) convened a meeting on 29<sup>th</sup> May 2024 and summoned the Ministers of Cabinet Affairs, Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan to clarify and resolved the matter of payments to the relevant institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanism; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. The representatives of these beneficiary Institutions and mechanisms were also invited.

#### FINDINGS

The outcome of the meeting of the First Summon which was attended by the Ministers of Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, representatives of the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC, and the Second Summon for the Minister of Cabinet affairs which was attended also by representatives of the aforementioned beneficiary institutions and the Minister of Cabinet Affairs were as follows:

- 1) **Confirmation** by the Ministry of Finance and Planning of the letter of the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
- 2) **Confirmation** by the Bank of South Sudan of receipt of the letter from the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to the Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects' SSP Account (General Secretariat) 00269122001036.
- 3) **Confirmation** that, on the 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024, an equivalent of SSP 15,322,939,000 was deposited in SSP Account No. 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939
- 4) **Confirmation that** on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-





- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.2423
- 5) **Confirmation that** on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024 , the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.5358
  - 6) **Confirmation that** on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2024 , the Bank of South Sudan received authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 to transfer the amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No. 00269121269233
  - 7) **Confirmation that** from date 13<sup>th</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawals) occurred on the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs- Special Project Account totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83
  - 8) **Confirmation that** as of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account-00269121269233 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02, roughly equivalent to USD 5,627,281.95
  - 9) **The Minister of Cabinet Affairs stated that:**
    - a. An equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000 was paid to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Accounts on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024.
    - b. The purpose of the fund was for the facilitation of the activities of NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. outlined in the document attached to the payment request Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject; "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
    - c. Payments (withdrawals) from the Account Number 00269122001036, done on dates 16<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024 were made for the following additional projects that **were not** included in the attached documents in (b) above:
      - a) NAS peace implementation (USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.2423)
      - b) Phase II of Security Arrangement under the office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security, Hon. Tut Gatluak Manime (USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.5358)
      - c) The unspecified amount of payment for the **9BR** Special projects
      - d) The Minister of Cabinet Affairs denied knowledge of the several transactions (withdrawals) that occurred on the Account 00269121269233, between dates 13<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
    - d. The attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet communicated to the Ministry of Finance.
    - e. Finally, the Minister confirmed the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Account No. 00269121269233 was SSP 8,879,850,921.02



- 10) **The TNLA observes** that, the fund in question meant to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Roadmap special projects was first deposited in the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-00269122001036 instead of the Ministry's Account 00269212279231 as per the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024. However TNLA cannot fault the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs since currency was changed from USD to SSP.
- 11) **The TNLA also observes** that, two transactions (withdrawals) were carried out by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs on the fund, under the Account- 00269122001036 on date 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024 and 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024.
- 12) **The TNLA further observes** that, the balance of the fund SSP 10,460,570,724.85 was then moved from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Account (General Secretariat)-00269122001036 to the Ministry's Account for Special Projects SSP Account 00269121269233. The fund was already less by at least SSP 4,862,368,276.
- 13) **The TNLA is concerned** of the following:
- Despite the fund amounting to **USD 10,000,000** in its equivalent in **SSP 15,322,939,000** was transferred to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Account on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024 and was to be paid to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc, some of these institutions and mechanisms were either partially paid their money or not at all.
  - The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs introduced payments for additional projects namely; NAS, High Level Committee (Office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security) and the **9BR** Special Projects against the funds meant for NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC, Popularization of the R-ARCSS Roadmap and payment of 2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears and these payments were done in full and as a matter of priority.
  - The Payments in (b) above has deviated from the purpose for which the fund was requested and paid by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in their letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1 contravening the Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011
  - The attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs communicated to the Ministry of Finance has total amount approximated USD 17,000,000 of which payments approximated USD 8,000,000 was expected from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. In light of this discrepancies of total amounts on documents not consistent with total amount of SSP: 15,322,939,000 requested and paid, therefore, the new claims of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs could not have been approved and authorized for payment by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
  - The changes claimed by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs on the attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 which reduced payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. was done without the resolution of the Council of Ministers hence this was unilateral and personal discretion of the Minister of Cabinet Affairs.



- f) In light of the above transactions (withdrawals), there is prima facie case of misappropriation of funds SSP: 15,322,939,000 (USD 10,000,000, @ bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939)

#### RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

In light of the above facts, the TNLA hereby directs the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs as follows:

1. To pay in full, all allocations due to the beneficiary institutions and peace implementation mechanisms as requested by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and paid by the Ministry of Finance.
2. To pay without further delay allocations due to the beneficiary institutions; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC etc.
3. Adhere to the principles of Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011 including ensuring no diversion/misappropriation of funds once approved and paid to the spending agencies by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
4. The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs has no authority to unilaterally divert funds meant for the aforementioned institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms as this contravenes Financial Regulations and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011
5. Decisions to allocate and pay funds to the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms was taken in the Council of Ministers meeting, the TNLA expects any change in the payment affecting the amount due the institutions and Mechanisms should be by a resolution of the Council of Ministers' meeting.
6. The Ministry of Finance and Planning to pay directly every spending agency through official Account rather than through a third party Institution. This shall ensure proper auditing and accountability by spending agencies as per the Constitution and the relevant laws.

Sign.....

Rt. Hon Oyet Nathaniel Pierro  
First Deputy Speaker  
TNLA/RSS/Juba



**Annex 11: Talking points for Deputy Speaker of Parliament, 3 May 2024**

03-May-2024

**Talking Points**

The Ministry of Finance and Planning has done an allocation of USD: 30,000,000.00 to some relevant institutions and Mechanisms as directed by them. The equivalent was allocated in SSP as of which the Ministry of Cabinet received an amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 in equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00

1. On the 02<sup>nd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received Authorization Letter from the Ministry of Finance & Planning to Deposit the amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 to the SSP Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036.
2. On the 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024, an equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00 was deposited in SSP Account No: 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the Bank buying rate of SSP/USD: 1532.2939.
3. On 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 1,050,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415.00 - (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank Official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.2423
4. On 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 2,000,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600.00- (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.5358
5. On 13<sup>th</sup> May 2024., the Bank of South Sudan received another Authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 to transfer the Amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No:00269121269233.
6. From date 13<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawal) occurred at the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs – Special Project Account Totalling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
7. As of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs A/C No: 00269121269233 is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02

Kind Regards

**Annex 12: Authorization of transfer of \$10 million toward ‘Special Projects’ under Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 2 April 2024**

MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING  
1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Finance

REF: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1.

Date: April 2, 2024

Hon. Governor,  
Bank of South Sudan  
RSS-Juba

Subject: Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from account number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects

Dear Hon. Governor,

Reference to the above mentioned subject, we write to authorize the Bank of South Sudan to transfer the sum of USD 10,000,000 (Only Ten Million United States Dollar) from account 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects account below. Being funds required to facilitate the implementation the priority provisions and special projects.

Account Name: Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects  
Bank Name: Bank of South Sudan  
Account Number: 00269212279231

Please accept the assurances of our highest regards.

  
Matual Tap Dieu  
1st Undersecretary of Finance




  
Dheh Mayuol Tong  
Director General of Accounts

- Cc: Hon. Minister of Finance & Planning
- Cc: Hon. Deputy Minister of Finance & Planning
- Cc: Director of Expenditure
- Cc: File.



Annex 13: John Latio Kenyi Loburong's defection, 14 May 2023



Chief of the SSPDF and all other Organized Forces, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Secretary General of High-Level Standing Committee for the implementation of the revitalized Agreement as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor.


5. Appoint Honourable Kawunda John Mogga as the NAS Chief negotiator and the Team Leader of the negotiations with the membership of the following:
  - (i) Major General Pitiya Yoane Suma. CDR Amadi and Dollo Area Command.
  - (ii) Brigadier General Kasbash John Darius-Secretary and CDR for Office Affairs and Dem Records.
  - (iii) Brigadier General Bingo Apolo Valentino-Commissioner Wonduruba Payam.
  - (iv) Brigadier General Alex Lomeling Martin. Coordinator and Finance Officer, Aru, Uganda.
6. Direct all NAS forces to allow unhindered and safe return of refugees from the neighbouring countries, and the internally displaced, to their areas of origin in order for them to engage in livelihood activities to alleviate hunger and poverty without any disturbance.

Issued under my hand and Seal of NAS today the 14<sup>th</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> 2024 in the NAS Headquarters.



Signed [Signature]  
General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

**Annex 14: Roadmap of negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and the Government of South Sudan**





## 1. Introduction

General John Kenyi Latio, commonly known as Kenyi Lo-Burong, of NAS has taken a courageous decision opening talks directly with General Salva Kiir Mayardit, The President of the Republic of South Sudan. The decision came after several months of thought and consultation with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga in the United States of America, both of whom hail from the same constituency.

These thoughts and consultation focused on the untold suffering of the citizens in the war thorn areas specially and South Sudan in general. As a result General Kenyi Loburong and his brothers decided to have dialogue which triggered the government to send a delegation to meet with the delegation of General Kenyi Lo-burong, in Nairobi, Kenya. The objective is to understand the reasons which led to rebellion of General Kenyi Lo-Burong and his forces, their grievances and how to achieve genuine peace.

## 2. Background to the conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the National Salvation Front (NAS).

- 2.1 The current Government-NAS conflict has its roots as early as the 1960s. Everyone knows that the Any-anya-1 war was started by elders and leaders of Equatoria region and especially Poculum heroes like Aggrey Jaden and many others. Most of our elders and leaders joined the Any-anya-1 rebellion and continued struggling until the Addis Ababa agreement was signed of 1972. Thereafter, our people were side-lined and the movement was high jacked by Maulana Abel Allier and General Joseph Lagu Yanga and other Political Parties and Allies. As a result, most of the founders of the Any-anya-1 Movement found themselves out of the military and the government of the then Southern Sudan all together.
- 2.2 This political manipulation which occurred during the integration of the Any-anya-1 Forces was intended to marginalize those who fight and instead dominate the system by others with no compensation done to the war affected areas and to the fighters. A good number of the fighters were recruited as road laborers and forest guards and the heroes were not recognised up to now, especially a leader like Aggrey Jaden Wani.
- 2.3 It was thought that the Arab Policy of divide and rule applied on the leaders of the then Government of South Sudan. But, history repeated itself again as everyone knows that during the SPLA/M struggle, able Men, Women and Youth of the Pöjulu people and other Communities of Greater Equatoria joined only to be mistreated in the movement.



- 2.4 Our people stood firm by supporting the movement physically, politically and militarily making the SPLA/M strong enough and was able to control most of the areas till it gained independence of South Sudan. The Independence of South Sudan created hope that all our people will enjoy the fruits of the struggle. But to our surprise, the contrary became true and the situation became worse than during the Arab regime. The people of greater Equatoria, especially the Pöjulu who are known to be strong and brave politically and militarily, were purposely marginalized as follows:
- (i) Most of our leaders who were leading the movement were undeployed, side-lined, demoted, targeted, manhandled and eliminated by the same SPLM/A system which they fought for and supported wholeheartedly. The intention was to reduce their strength, demoralize and frustrate them so that they do not participate in the governance of the independent South Sudan which they died for.
  - (ii) Our brave men who were in the struggle were then not considered during the integration into the military and the government in the eve of the CPA-2005 simply because they were from certain ethnic background. Most of them were said to be unfit, no unit and were stripped off their ranks just to demoralize them in order to abundant military. This was done in mile-55 by late General Salva Mathok-gendit and as a result most of them find their ways to their villages.
  - (iii) Those who survived the process were intentionally deployed to the far end of South Sudan like Upper Nile, Unity and Bahr-el-Ghazal areas with their departure orders verbally stated as 'mission of no return'. Indeed, three quarters of them, if not all, died. Their orphans and widows are undergoing untold sufferings, left to be taken over by their colleagues.
  - (iv) General Kenyi lo-Burong who was a roaring lion and great fighter controlling Central Equatoria, especially Greater Juba and most parts of Yei, remained unpromoted. Yet, even Former President Bashir knew him very well. Despite all of that, he did not give up and continued to sacrifice himself for the sake of the struggle of the people of South Sudan for independence.
  - (v) General Kenyi lo-Burong was later promoted to the rank of 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt by General Abu John when he was the Governor of Equatoria. He felt unrecognized and discouraged and went to his village. Later, General Ladu Gore convinced him to return and promoted him to the rank of colonel and made him in charge of his forces in Luri. He was attacked in Luri and in his residence in Hai-Tarawa in Juba. Even then, he was captured and then



taken to prison in Yei where he spent years and again demoted to the rank of 1<sup>st</sup> Lt and deployed to Mogiri.

- (vi) Again, he was transferred and deployed to Police, where he was demoted to the rank of warrant officer. All these grievances forced him and those who went through the same treatment to demand justice, equality and freedom through the barrel of gun. So, when Dr. Riek Machar rebelled most of us joined his rebellion with the hope of getting their rights and liberating ourselves from the bad ideology of mischief, marginalization and domination by our fellow countrymen.
  - (vii) In SPLA-IO the same tactics of mischief, marginalization and domination by fellow South Sudanese was even worse. Killing, nepotism, tribalism and disregard of our military commanders by the entire leadership of the SPLM/A-IO was rampant. Logistics were only supplied to Upper Nile and hence Equatorians were left helpless struggling to arm ourselves. They carried assassinations attempts some of which succeeded and that angered us to have our own movement.
  - (viii) In view of the SPLM/A-IO treatment, General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to form his own movement, which he deliberating decided not to disclose its name or declare its commencement. When suddenly General Thomas Cirillo Swaka rebelled and declared his movement on 6<sup>th</sup> March, 2017, he immediately engaged General Kenyi Lo-Burong to be the military wing of his movement, the National Salvation Front (NAS). It was not until 28<sup>th</sup> July, 2017, when General Kenyi Lo-Burong, who had already decided to form his own movement, accepted and announced joining NAS as the military wing.
  - (ix) Unfortunate, General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, who joined us in the bush has a hidden agenda and was not sincere to General Kenyi Lo-Burong. We discovered that he has no sincere political agenda for the welfare of the people of South Sudan and our own concerns. He clearly displays tribalism, nepotism and no care for the issues of the movement.
- 2.5 Therefore, General Kenyi Lo-Burong has taken the decision for genuine and wholistic peace in South Sudan by engaging in direct peace talks with President Salva Kiir Mayardit who he respects as a true SPLM/A separatist leader. It has become clear that there is no future in tribalism, nepotism and marginalization of a people in their own country.
- (i) General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to join our brothers in good heart for peace so that so we together can give a massive support to our President and our elder Dr. Martin



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Elia Lomuro in a move to open a new chapter of peace, reconciliation and development in our country instead of following leaders who are selfish and continue to cause destruction in the country.

- (iii) If general Thomas want to continue with war, he should form his own force but not using us as his tools to achieve his own selfish intension of wanting to gain big position in the government because we are tired of this game. In this regard we hope the government will negotiate with us in good faith so that we create a very strong alliance to defeat Dr. Riek Machar in the upcoming contested general election, in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit.

2.6 You have all witnessed the destruction of properties, loss of lives, displacement of people and the suffering of the civil population in the war affected areas. All these requires social services to be fixed in the country. What does this call for? That calls for honest and genuine peace and security so that the government can speed up the process of reconciliation and development. Hence, for genuine peace and security the NAS under the leadership of the General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand the following:

- (i) Cessation of hostilities, ceasefire, separation and demonization of forces in their areas of control.
- (ii) Integration of our forces into all the Security Sectors i.e., SSPDF, National Security and other Organized Forces. The NAS, under General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand for the confirmation of all ranks of its forces without compromise.
- (iii) The process of integration, disarmament, demotion and demobilization should be handled in a dignified manner to avoid internal dispute between different forces which will be integrated together as one national force.
- (iv) Most importantly, guarantee for the safety of our leadership and forces before, during and after the negotiation period in the town of negotiations to avoid the unnecessary danger.
- (v) Although the peace talks are direct between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and General Kenyi Lo-Burong, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor on the side of the government and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga on the NAS side, we demand the Government of Uganda to be the over-all witness and guarantor as it is in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.



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Elia Lomuro

- (i) Based on our experience, we demand that our forces be integrated, trained and deployed in areas under NAS control until the end of the election period so that we support the democratic elections to defend our interest as well as the interest of the government in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit to defeat the SPLM/A-IO leader Dr. Riek Machar Teny.
- (ii) SPLA-IO battalion under the command of General John Mabie Gar should be relocated from Morobo county, Panyame Payam, because they are committing atrocities against the civilian population in those areas. They continue to loot civilian properties, murder, violently rape women and girls, and occupying civilian homes and social amenities causing displacement of inhabitants of the area to the refugees' camp, scaring returnees and inflicting more suffering to the civilians
- (iii) All deployed SSPDF forces in civilian populated areas and social amenities should be redeployed to their previous designated military garrisons to pave way for returnees and displace persons to come back and secondly for our forces to have free movement in the process of assembling such that they are able to prepare themselves early enough to participate in upcoming general election.
- (iv) The areas are as follows: In Yei County they are Morsak, kejiko, Ombasi, Goja and Tokori. In Lainya County they are Kon-kat, Rejonga, America Anarat and Mongiling. In Morobo county they are Bura, Panyana, Udabi and other parts of Kaju-keji. Also, Mundari, Amadi, Maridi and parts of eastern Juba County.
- (v) Any confiscated property of those who rebelled and those who ran to the refugee's camp should be returned back to their owners without hindrance. This is a very vital step towards reconciliation and healing so that all will gain trust and believe in a meaningful agreement.
- (vi) Representation of NAS political Cadres in all levels of the government: National, State and County levels in order to work for federalism as a means of permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan.
- (vii) Destroyed and targeted business men with fear of losing their lives and freedom of movement should be compensated and those who currently reside outside the country whose licenses were confiscated be returned to them so that they start business afresh in secure environment without any interference.



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- (viii) Government should evacuate **Mundari** and **Dinka Bor** cattle herder in Central Equatorial and take them back to their place to allow quick return of the refugees and displaced persons who are purely farmer to start cultivation in a peaceful environment.
- (ix) We demand the Government to reconsider Wonduruba as a county of its own in order to avoid further political dispute between the citizens of Lainya County and the Bari Community. Rokon should also be given a county of its own so that no one is not kept hostage by others in the so call Juba County because they are all equal citizens of South Sudan. They also deserve the same right like any other citizen of South Sudan so that everybody enjoy equal rights.
- (x) For the duration of the peace talks, the leadership of the NAS should be given the responsibility for their logistics to avoid the challenges being encountered by the current process of cantonment, training and deployment of the R-ARCSS forces.
- (xi) Our fallen comrades who fought tirelessly during the two civil wars deserves to be recognized and honored by including their names in historical statutes, such as Schools, Roads and other monuments, structures and Institutions in consultations with the Pojulu Community leadership.
- (xii) We demand that the Government of South Sudan build a mausoleum in the name of Pojulu people. Further, we demand upgrading of the historic Loka Secondary School into a University and the promised Dr. Samson Kwaje memorial agriculture institute be constructed in a memory of Aggrey Jaden, Dr Samson Kwaje Lukare and my other fallen heroes in Pojulu land.
- (xiii) The President through the Ministry of Humanitarian Affair and SSRRC should bring more Non-governmental Organisations, National NGOs and other organizations to provide services and other life support assistance to the war affected areas including destroyed social amenities. The Government should grant special sponsorship and scholarship for the benefit of those whose education was interrupted by the conflict.
- (xiv) In this regard, the President, through Dr. Marin Elia Lomurö who is our only trustworthy elder, should believe that we shall remain loyal to him and support him for permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan and make sure he becomes more powerful.



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- (xv) The NAS under the leadership of General Kenyi Lo-burong submit these demands for negotiations in good faith and in the spirit of peace. May God bless our President, our country the Republic of South Sudan and our people




**General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)**  
Chairman and Commander-in-chief

**Cc**

- President Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and SG of the HLSC for R-ARCSS implementation.
- Honourable Kawunda John Mogga-NAS Chief Negotiator and Team Leader.
- File

**Annex 15: Negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and President Salva Kiir, 19 May 2023**





basis of the roadmap you sent him. As soon as you make the declaration, as per the copy attached to the roadmap, negotiation will commence.

Further, His Excellency the President has appointed Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, as the Mediator and Guarantor for the peace negotiations between him and you. In due course, a team will be set-up to assist Dr. Lomurö with the negotiation process.


To this end General Kenyi-Loburong, please accept the gratitude of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and of the entire Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for accepting peace and joining the R-TGoNU. We look forward to seeing you and your forces amidst our national security sector and government. Again, thank you for accepting peace and please accept the assurance of our highest consideration.

**Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin**  
Minister for Presidential Affairs,  
R-TGoNU, The Republic of South Sudan.

**Cc:**

- **Salva Kiir Mayardit**-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- **Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö**-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.
- **Bishop Elias Taban**, The Bishop of Presbyterian Church of South Sudan

## Annex 16: Partial Integration List of Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong’s forces into the SSPDF, 2 February 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
The President

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RSS/RD/J/33/2024 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2024

**INTEGRATION OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF FORMER NAS SOLDIERS FROM LAINYA COUNTY OF CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE. INTO VARIOUS RANKS IN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE’S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF).**

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act, 2009 (Amendment) Act, 2022, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF, do hereby integrate and Commission **Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of Former NAS Soldiers from Lainya County of Central Equatoria State, into Various Ranks in the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF)** as hereunder:

S/NO	Rank	Name in Full
1.	Brigadier	Kenned Kenyi Abdu Lopiong
2.	Lt. Colonel	Peter Jima Oliver Loboton
3.	Lt. Colonel	Peter-Lomoro Lotigo Kurispino
4.	Lt. Colonel	Kabash John Dario
5.	Major	Charles Wani Michael
6.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	James Lusuku John Lokule
7.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Joseph Liwa Ely Duku


The President SKM

8.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Kenyl John Martin
9.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Moses Hakim Pasquale
10.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Charles Nicola Julu
11.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Isaac Malish Confucius Luate
12.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Cosmos Alakai Live Martin
13.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Gatwech Guol Garang Long
14.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Charles Lubanga Paskal Lowate
15.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	John Salimba Emmanuel
16.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Angelo Lemi Bullen
17.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	James Kenyl Joseph
18.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Kuch Abut Maker Madoldit
19.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Atem Malong Atem Maluk
20.	R/SM	Peter Lubang Charles
21.	R/SM	Robert Bida Martin Wani
22.	R/SM	Both Nyang Deng Padlet
23.	R/SM	Dominic Bittenson Lawyer
24.	R/SM	Sallah Isaac Mick
25.	R/SM	Kenyl John Emmanuel
26.	R/SM	Stephen Wujugu Stanley
27.	R/SM	Joha Luka Samuel
28.	R/SM	Charles Lujang Mathew
29.	S/M	Morris Malesh Lora Sebit
30.	S/M	Peter Data Justin Davis


SKM

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
The President



## Annex 17: Press statement by the Central Equatoria State Government, 10 October 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION



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OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

For immediate Release

October 10, 2024

**Press Statement on the Tragic Massacre of Youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq).**

On October 09, 2024 the Government of Central Equatoria learnt with shock the horrific massacre of 10 youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam, and 9 others in Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) of Ganji Payam Juba County the victims lost their lives in an absurd act of violence and cowardice targeting innocent civilians on Wednesday night, preliminary reports indicate that the attack took place when armed individuals targeted the youth and shoot at them while others were hacked by machetes and murdered in cold blood.

The Government of Central Equatoria State expresses its deepest sorrow and condemnation over the horrific massacre, this heinous act which occurred is a grave violation of rights and a threat to peace and stability of the people of Central Equatoria and South Sudan as a whole and will not go unabated.



The state government, in collaboration with national authorities and security forces, will work together in conducting investigations to identify those responsible for this barbaric act and hence assure the public that swift and decisive action will be taken to ensure justice and peace will prevail accordingly.

The Central Equatoria State Government under the leadership of the Governor, HE. Gen. Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani, extends its deepest condolences to the families of the victims. Our thoughts and prayers are with the entire people of Wonduruba, Kulipapa (Ganji Payam) and the state at large as it grieves this profound loss, equally the state Government reaffirms its commitment to ensuring a peaceful and secure conditions for all its citizens warranting that violence in any form will not be tolerated.

May the souls of the deceased rest in eternal peace, and may we find strength and unity in this time of sorrow.

**Hon. Gerald Francis,**

Minister of Peacebuilding and Acting Minister of Information and Communication  
Central Equatoria State/Juba

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**Ministries Road, West of State Secretariat – CES**

## Annex 18: Reaction from the Pujulu community in Juba, 14 October 2024



Date: 14-10-2024

**Subject:** Condemnation on the Killings of the Twenty-one (21) and Wounding of Four (4) Innocent Civilians in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Jebel Iraq at Ganyi Payam.

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Pujulu Community is mourning the brutal murdering of over twenty-one (21) innocent civilians and wounding of four (4) in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and road travelers at Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) Ganji Payam in Juba County, in Central Equatoria State and on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 immediately after the returned of Governor from Wonduruba.

During the visit of H. E. Governor Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani and accompanying delegations to Lainya and Wonduruba respectively, Governor has stressed a clear message for durable peace prospect to the citizens and assured them on the President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit efforts in engaging the holdout oppositions through Tumaini peace initiative currently taking place in Nairobi Kenya. Also, H.E. Governor echoed publically to the citizens of Lainya County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam on the general Amnesty declared by our President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit in 2017 in Yei which still holding up to now as way of restoring peace in the State.

H.E. Governor left Wonduruba on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 and immediately on the next day Wednesday on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 Government Forces, from the Ground Unit including Bridger Gen. Kennedy Kenyi Abdu popularly known as "Kenyi Warrior", clashed around Wonduruba Administrative Payam with the holdout rebels groups under John Kenyi Lotio popularly known as "Kenyi Loburong". In the fight Officers belonging to the ground forces at Jebel Iraq were killed in that joint operations. Casualties on the rebel side are unknow to us. As a result of receiving the sad news of their killed officers in those operations on the same date the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 at 02:00 pm, Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa reacted massively by; arresting, torturing and massacring the motorists and travelers from Juba to Lainya and vice-versa killing eleven (11) travelers.

Page 1 of 2

Only four bodies of civilians were recovered through the efforts from Lainya County and Juba County Commissioners and four bodies were handed over to the grieved families but the rest were not found their where-about. Then at 04:00 pm the Ground Unit elements took seven motorcycles of those killed victims each bike carrying three armed officers backed by one Toyota Land Crusher pickup full with armed SSPDF officers moving to Wonduruba very fast via Lainya and the convoy was seen by the civilians in Lainya. Upon their arrivals to Wonduruba at night the same Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa carried out systematic house to house arrests, handcuffed and dragged those unarmed civilians to the road side and all were executed through shootings while others hacked by the machetes on the road side killing ten (10) civilians and wounded four (4) who are under treatment in Yei.

The entire Pojulu Community was outraged and saddened by such barbaric and illegitimate actions committed by the Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa. Totally and Heartily, Pojulu Community everywhere strongly expressed their greatest disappointments over the grossly execution of the unarmed civilians who were massacred in cold blood at Jebel Iraq in Juba County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam.

Therefore, we call our State and national governments to uphold to the constitution and take serious measures to bring the culprits to the book. On the other hand, Pojulu Community leaderships argue everyone to remain calm and not to take law into their own hands as we pursue justice to prevail through the State and National Government to investigate and bring all the culprits to face the law.

Also, Pojulu Community argues the State and national governments to provide security to allow the grieved families to search for the missing bodies in Jebel Iraq for decent burial. Finally, on the behalf of the Pojulu Community we would like to extend our deepest heartbroken sympathies and condolences to the families of those massacred innocent souls and their forcefully departure.

May Almighty God and Our Lord Jesus Christ consoles the entire Pojulu Community and South Sudanese for these un-wanted deaths.



Yours in grief



**Mr. Lole Laila Lole**  
D/Chairman of Pojulu Community  
Juba, South Sudan



**Annex 19: Reaction from the Wonduruba Community Association in Juba, 12 October, 2024**

 **Republic of South Sudan**  
**CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE**  
WONDURUBA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION 

12<sup>th</sup> October 2024

**SUB: CONDEMNATION ON THE KILLING OF TEN (10) INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN WONDURUBA ADMINISTRATIVE PAYAM.**

The people of Wonduruba Community were in celebratory mood when the Governor of Central Equatoria State, H.E Augustino Jadal la Kamilo Wani visited Wonduruba on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 2024.

During the visit, the Governor stressed key peace messages to the people of Wonduruba and the holdout groups to join the peace talks currently in Kenya. The Governor also extended the message of the President Salva Kiir Mayardit regarding amnesty declared in Yei in 2017 which still holds.


In the morning of 9<sup>th</sup> October 2024, an operation was launched against the holdout groups in the area West of Wonduruba as reported by local sources. The wounded resulting from the operation were brought to Wonduruba Primary Health Centre in the afternoon. At the night of the same day, the killing of ten Civilians in the clans of Moje, Woli, Woke and Jondoru with four (4) injured. This killing involved a pastor and medical Officer of Wonduruba Primary Health Centre who treated the wounded soldiers of SSPDF brought to the Health Facility in the afternoon and got killed in his residence at night.

We are truly **saddened** by this barbaric act and **strongly condemn** it and calls on the government to conduct immediate investigation to this incident and bring the perpetrators to face justice.

On the same note, Wonduruba Community calls on all the holdout groups to seize the amnesty declared by the President to announce ceasession of hostilities and the community will stand behind this noble move to bring peace and tranquility in our area.

Lastly, we extend our deepest heartfelt sympathies and condolences to the families of the departed souls.

Yours in grief,


  
Hon. Eng. Juma F. A. Luga  
Chairperson, Wonduruba Community, Juba.

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**Annex 20: Reaction from the Central Equatoria State Youth Union, 10 October, 2024**



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE**  
**YOUTH UNION**  
*United Youth for Sustainable Development*



**CHAIRPERSON**

Date: 10. 10. 2024

**#PRESS RELEASE#**

**CONDEMNATION ON THE KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN JEBEL IRAQ AND WONDURUBA ADMINISTRATIVE AREA PAYAM**

On behalf of *Central Equatoria State Youth* we want to express our profound condemnation of the recent acts of violence that have resulted in the tragic loss of innocent civilian lives killed by cowardice act of terror.


The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is a violation of fundamental Human rights and international Humanitarian Law. Such actions are not only morally reprehensible but also constitute war crimes against humanity under the Geneva Conventions.

The ongoing violence in our state has inflicted unimaginable suffering on countless families, leaving communities shattered and lives forever altered. There is absolutely no justification for attacks that deliberately target innocent individuals, and it is imperative that government should hold accountable those who perpetrate such heinous acts

The protection of civilian lives must be a priority for all parties involved in any conflict. As members of these state, we have a collective responsibility to advocate for peace and to ensure that the voices of the youth and innocent people are heard. We must call for an immediate investigation and the perpetrators must face the full force of law.

Therefore, we call upon our leaders in the state and representative of international community to take a firm stand against the killing of innocent civilians and to advocate for measures that protect human life and promote peace.

##END##



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CES Youth Training Center - Hai Neem, Juba - South Sudan.

### Annex 21: Photographs of victims of killings in Wondoruba, Central Equatoria State

Images widely circulated in South Sudan, and corroborated by representatives from civil society organizations and members of the local Pujulu community. Injuries indicate victims were tied and shot or hacked to death by blunt instruments, including possibly machetes<sup>13</sup>



<sup>13</sup> Interview with a medical professional, October 2024

**Annex 22: Press release by the National Salvation United Forces, 10 October 2024**

**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON  
National Salvation United Forces; Hope General Headquarters  
South Sudan**

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Ref: nasu/osp/02/024

Date: 10/10/2024

***For Immediate Press Release***

In their continuing offensive against the National Salvation United Forces (NASU), which started September 5, 2024, the SSPDF and the allied Militia of Dr. Martin Elias Lomuro on October 7 pulled out from Mile 58 Juba Lainya road to attack our bases in wonduruba and Lainya counties for the 4<sup>th</sup> time in row. On the same day they proceeded to open a base at Logoko, in logwerle boma close to our locations.

At around 4 pm while the Governor of Central Equatoria State was addressing the people in Wonduruba centre, the hungry SSPDF and their militia rolled out and attack us at our base. Our gallant forces fought back in defense and forced them to retreat to their base in Logoko leaving behind one dead and several others injured. Wednesday October 8, 2024 early morning they again attack us. This time our forces fought hitting hard, killing 7 at the spot, over ran their newly established base, and burn down 1 land cruiser vehicle which was rushing reinforcement to the besiege forces. Finally the force was defeated and the remnants flee to Wonduruba town in panic. Five of them died in hospital meaning a total 13 traitors have been eliminated while none was killed or injured on our side.

At around 10 pm, 3 motor bikes, a fighter tank, and truck arrived wonduruba centre from Lainya town to collect those who are injured. They decided to launch a revenge attacks on innocent civilian who had gathered to mourn a dead family member. The mourners were rounded up and the youth were picked, some were collected from their rooms while sleeping tied up and were either shot or hacked by machetes. 10 innocent youth were killed in cold blood, with reasons that they are either related to General Kenyi Loburong or a member of his clan. If John Kenyi is a rebel, then his family members are all rebels as well?

This is what the Mathiang Anyoor fighters are encouraged to do by the clan government in J1 after defeat. Kenyi Warrior is implementing this strategy in

Wonduruba and Lainya counties because earlier he called our command and told us that he has been instructed by CDF, Dr Martin, Ambrose, and Gen Toy to clear us from these areas in 6 months. Why can't they face us instead of killing the innocent people who they claim to protect.

NASU leadership, urges the people of South Sudan to condemn this heinous crime perpetuated by the failed government in Juba. We call upon the Human right organizations, The Troika, peace monitors to investigate these atrocities done to the innocent people of wonduruba and to call for the release of those who are innocently being detained for simply being people from the area. The NASU forces remains committed to seeking for a durable peace for the well-being of all South Sudanese people.

Thank,

  
Maj Gen. Paul Gideon Subian  
Spokesperson  
NASU

**Annex 23: NAS press release concerning defections, 13 October 2024**

**SOUTH SUDAN**  
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People  
**National Salvation Front/ Army**  
**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON**  
**General Headquarters**

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Ref: NAS/OSM/12

13th October, 2024.

**FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE**

The Leadership of National Salvation Front (NAS) is very much appalled by the horrendous mass murder of innocent civilians in Wonduruba Payam, Juba County, Central Equatoria State, by the South Sudan Defense Force (SSPDF) allied militia, commanded by Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (aka Kenyi Warrior) and funded by Cabinet Minister Martin Elia Lomuro.

On 8<sup>th</sup> October, the SSPDF and militia under Brig. Kenyi Warrior massacred ten (10) innocent boys who were arrested while participating in a funeral occasion. This came as a revenge for the defeat of the SSPDF and their militia by forces under Gen. Kenyi John Loburon. The SSPDF out of frustration turned against the innocent civilians as a result executing ten (10) young boys in cold blood.


Following this outrageous massacre, the Leadership of NAS would like therefore to state the following;

- 01- NAS condemns in the strongest terms possible the mass murder and mafia-style cold blood execution of these innocent boys by the SSPDF and their allied militia under the command of Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (Kenyi Warrior).
- 02- NAS holds the commander of SSPDF in Lainya, the militia commander Brig. Kenyi Warrior, the militia funder Dr. Martin Elia and coordinator Mr. John Lomeling Kaunda (an American citizen) as aiders and accomplices of this heinous crime.
- 03- NAS cautions the people of South Sudan on complacency towards the existence of the illegal and unconstitutional tribal regime of Salva Kiir that relishes to loot, displace, rape and kill the people of South Sudan.

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

- 04- The Leadership of NAS appeals to the youth, especially those who are being targeted, to join the ranks of NAS and resist the brutality of the regime and its militia or else form vigilante groups to defend their villages from the marauding SSPDF and the murderous militia.
- 05- NAS calls on civil society and International Human Rights Organization to pursue the case against the murderers of these innocent people and their accomplices to ensure that the criminals are brought to justice
- 06- NAS Leadership appeals to Community members to reject the evil plans by the regime of Salva Kiir and its agents of planting seeds of hatred and disunity among the communities while they continue to rule over weak and divided communities. Community members and Leaders therefore, need to exercise maximum restraint as they work to contain this situation.
- 07- NAS Leadership stands in solidarity with the Pojulu community and the people of Wonduruba, sends its condolences to the families of those who have lost their dears ones and pray that the souls of these innocent boys' rest in Eternal peace.

**Suba Samuel Manase**  
**Spokesperson,**  
**National Salvation Front, NAS**



Email: [samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk)

## Annex 24: Appointment of Commissioners to the NAS Federal Civil Authority, 7 September 2024



### **SOUTH SUDAN**

Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People  
National Salvation Front/Army

**General Headquarters**

Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 7 September 2024

#### **Subject: Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority.**

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(2) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

*Constitutional Order No. 10/07/09//2024*

- (1) Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority, as provided on the list of Compatriots below:

<b>NAMES</b>	<b>PORTFOLIO</b>
1. Mr. Felix Charles Ali Bilal	Commissioner for Federal Governance Affairs
2. Amb. Lado Gubek	Commissioner for International Relations
3. Amb. Daniel Lee	Commissioner for Information, Mass Communication and Cultural Affairs
4. Mr. Turjuman Ramadan	Commissioner for Legal Affairs and Human Rights
5. Mr. Bosco Otim Mario	Commissioner for Finance and Resource Mobilisation
6. Mr. Robert Samson Lugga	Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs
7. Dr Wani Lolik	Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
8. Mrs. Vera Mahdi	Commissioner for Health

**NAS**

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NAMES	PORTFOLIO
9. Dr Lokuowe Gordon	Commissioner for Education, Social Welfare and Gender
10. Dr Peter Pitya	Commissioner for Infrastructure and Physical Planning

These appointments come into effect from 7<sup>th</sup> Day of September 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on these appointments in recognition of your diligence and commitments to work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.



**Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief  
National Salvation Front (NAS).

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**NAS**



**Annex 25: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority, 4 May 2024**



**SOUTH SUDAN**

Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People  
National Salvation Front/Army

**General Headquarters**

Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 14<sup>th</sup> May 2024.

**Subject: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority**

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(1) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

*Constitutional Order No. 07/14/05/2024*

- (1) The appointment of Compatriot **Isaac Ajiba Ochang**, as the Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority.

This appointment comes into effect from 14<sup>th</sup> Day of May 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on this appointment in recognition of your diligence and commitment to the work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.

**Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief  
National Salvation Front (NAS).



**NAS**

facilitation required to ensure that the NIOC performs its functions and duties; and

6.1.14 The NIOC shall provide monthly reports to the NLC, the TNLA and the Tumaini Initiative on the progress in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

6.2 External Guarantors / Observers

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders agree to the formation of the High-Level Panel of Heads of State and Government which shall be composed of Heads of State and Government from the region, and Partners and Friends of South Sudan, whose core roles and responsibilities shall be:

6.2.1 To steward, monitor and oversee the implementation of all measures, processes, and activities specified in the Tumaini Consensus, in liaison with the National Leadership Council;

6.2.2 To receive and consider reports regarding implementation of the Tumaini Consensus from the Tumaini Initiative;

6.2.3 To organize, in coordination with the Tumaini Initiative, high-level visits to South Sudan to assess the progress of the implementation of this and other related protocols from the Tumaini Consensus;

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
 SBR, PER, PJ, NB, GLB, P.A.G., M.A.G., H.A.M., J.A.M., F.A.M., F.A.M., F.A.M.

6.2.4 To review briefs and reports and to engage with the East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union (AU), Troika, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Community of Sant'Egidio, and Friends of South Sudan, as well as other regional and international bodies and partners on the process of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.2.5 To advise and recommend actions to be taken for the proper and timely implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

6.2.6 To convene Quarterly meetings, or on a need basis, between the Tumaini Initiative and the National Leadership Council to appraise the progress of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
 PER, SBR, PJ, NB, GLB, P.A.G., M.A.G., H.A.M., J.A.M., F.A.M., F.A.M.

List of People to Initial the Tumaini Consensus Protocols - 15 July 2024

Name	Representative Organization	Initial
Hon. Amb. Abino Mathon	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, Head of Delegation	A/A
Gen. Pavel Amun Okoth	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman, Real-SPLM	F
Gen. Paul Maling Awon	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan United Front, Army	F
Gen. Stephen Bury Nuteyeng	South Sudan United National Alliance (SSUNA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan People's Movement / Army	SBR
Gen. Mario Loka Thomas Jada	National Salvation Front - Revolutionary Command Council, Chairman and C-in-C	F
Dr Pauline Riak	Academia	PER
Patrick Godi	Youth	P.A.G.
Bridget Nagonoro	Women	N.B.
Geoffrey Lou Duke	Civil Society	GLB
Bishop Moses Deng	Faith Based	F
Sheikh Jarrahethi Khamis	Faith Based	F
Gen. Kari Aguer Kurl	People's Coalition for Civil Action	F
Lt Gen. Lazaro Serebeywo (Rtd)	Chief Mediator	F
Amb. Dr. Mohamed Ali Guyo	Deputy Chief Mediator	F
Amb. Ismail Wain	IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, Co-mediator	F
Paolo Impuglizzo	Community of Sant' Egidio, Co-mediator	PJ
Dr. A. Karie Sing'et	UK, State Department of Foreign Affairs, Principal Secretary	

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
 GLB, PJ, PER, P.A.G., M.A.G., H.A.M., J.A.M., F.A.M., F.A.M.

# Annex 26: Tumaini protocols, 15 July 2024

## HIGH LEVEL MEDIATION "TUMAINI INITIATIVE" FOR SOUTH SUDAN

*Tumaini Initiative*



### TUMAINI CONSENSUS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN

#### PROTOCOLS FOR INITIALING

Nairobi, 15 July 2024

Handwritten signatures and initials including: SBR, G.D., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

#### Preamble

**WHEREAS** H.E General Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President of the Republic of South Sudan requested his brother, H.E Dr. William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya to mediate between the Government and South Sudan Opposition Groups;

**WHEREAS** the Government of the Republic of Kenya accepted to facilitate the mediation of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan through the High-Level Mediation "Tumaini Initiative" for South Sudan that took place in Nairobi, Kenya;

**AWARE** that the Tumaini Consensus resolves the conflict between the Revitalized-Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU), South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) and other opposition groups, to achieve inclusive peace in the Republic of South Sudan, and that the ongoing, pending programs in Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and newly established programs in the Tumaini Consensus, shall provide the framework for peacebuilding and democratization in South Sudan;

**RECALLING and RECOGNISING** previous and current agreements, consensus and understandings to cease violence, pursue peaceful resolutions of conflicts, and the commitments to build a stable, peaceful, united and prosperous South Sudan;

**MINDFUL** of the devastation, distraction and disruption of lives and livelihoods, loss of lives and property, and other damages that have occurred as a result of past and current conflicts and the continued suffering of communities, families and individuals that still suffer the effects of the conflicts and natural calamities;

**ACKNOWLEDGING** the efforts, commitments, and progress made by the leadership, partners, friends and the people of South Sudan to

Handwritten signatures and initials including: SBR, G.D., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

achieve peace, build a better country and secure a future for the coming generations;

**CONSCIOUS** that much still remains to be done in order to heal the wounds of the past, ensure reconciliation, consolidate peace, restore stability, and put in place developmental programs, and strengthen systems of governance to ensure advancement and growth;

**CONVINCED** that consolidation of peace and effective pursuit of growth and advancement of South Sudan is only possible where the diversity of the people in and outside South Sudan, are recognized and brought together in an all-inclusive process of nation-building;

**PERSUADED** that the envisaged reforms, democratic transition, and changes towards a better South Sudan shall be achieved through a comprehensive and all-inclusive Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS;

**MINDFUL** of the importance of confidence and trust-building measures, implementation modalities, and other steps for guaranteeing commitment and realization of peace;

**RECOGNIZING** the importance of gender parity and empowerment in all spaces and committed to promote intergenerational considerations, the Parties commit to ensure representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

**FURTHER COMMITTED** to the Tumaini Initiative, resolution of the conflict, and the consolidation of durable peace in South Sudan; and

**COGNIZANT** that Federal system is a popular demand of the people of South Sudan and the constitution shall be drafted based on Federal arrangements and structures.

Handwritten signatures and initials including: SBR, G.D., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

#### Statement of Purpose

The Tumaini (Hope) Initiative acknowledges that the protracted political conflicts in South Sudan have compromised the wellbeing of the citizens of South Sudan. The future of current and coming generations is bleak if efforts to achieve and protect sustainable peace fail.

Recognizing that past agreements to end conflicts and sustain peace have not registered adequate success, the Tumaini Initiative now presents an opportunity to build consensus among the Parties and Stakeholders.

The aim of this consensus is to attain sustainable peace and democracy by implementing agreed interim programs. The roadmap to sustainable peace in the Republic of South Sudan comprises, *inter alia*, a Permanent Constitution making process with self-executing mechanisms, which addresses root causes of conflicts, and will provide the means for inclusive development and provision of services to all citizens in all corners of South Sudan.

This roadmap comprises several elements:

**First** Trust and Confidence Building measures are required among all Parties and Stakeholders. Some undertakings from previous agreements were not completed because not everyone kept the promise. This Framework presents strong mechanisms for building trust and confidence so as to implement agreed programs and collectively make a Permanent Constitution for South Sudan and secure sustainable peace.

**Second** the urgent need for enhanced civilian protection and support to humanitarian efforts. There are many citizens in need of relief assistance because of floods, droughts, and displacement by violent conflicts. All Parties and Stakeholders have a moral obligation and duty to mobilize resources to address the

Handwritten signatures and initials including: SBR, G.D., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

humanitarian crises and natural calamities.

**Third** the need for establishing an inclusive government and firming the basis for responsibility sharing. Politics of inclusion and sharing responsibilities hold the key to peace building and good governance.

**Fourth** fostering ceasefire, undertaking security arrangements and reforms. The Parties and Stakeholders recognize that the integration of the various armed groups is key to addressing political instability.

**Fifth** implementing economic recovery programs and institutional reforms to manage public resources will be prioritized to realize the dividends of peace and development.

**Sixth** implementing programs for resolving community conflicts and land related disputes to achieve sustainable peace, security and stability.

**Seventh** national healing, truth, and reconciliation programs to be undertaken throughout the country to heal the wounds inflicted by the conflicts among our people in order to restore the broken social fabric.

**Eighth** the Permanent Constitution Making Process as part of this consensus will consider past and present challenges, provide a strong and inclusive foundation for stability, wellbeing of citizens, sustainable development and build a society founded on democratic values, rights and freedoms.

**Ninth** the Tumaini Initiative in coordination with the Parties, Stakeholders and development partners will convene a donor conference to mobilize technical and financial resources for peace building, post-conflict reconstruction of war affected areas from the region and the international community.

The Tumaini Initiative shall guarantee **PERMANENT PEACE, STABILITY, and SHARED PROSPERITY.**

Handwritten signatures and initials including SBR, PM, AM, PAK, PJ, GD, NB, Mwand, P.A.G. and A/A.

**NOW THEREFORE**, we the negotiating Parties and Stakeholders of the Tumaini Initiative convened in Nairobi, Kenya, resolve as follows:

### 1. General Principles

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders agree and commit to the following general principles that shall guide the interpretation and implementation of the commitments under the Tumaini Consensus:

- 1.1 Respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan and its people demonstrated through a people-centered and inclusive Permanent Constitution Making Process;
- 1.2 Enhanced civilian protection and secured access to emergency humanitarian and other assistance particularly to vulnerable population including displaced persons, returnees and refugees;
- 1.3 Commitment to a genuine national healing and reconciliation and the building of enduring trust and confidence in South Sudanese society founded on the principles of justice, equality, human dignity, and the advancement of societal welfare;
- 1.4 Strict adherence to constitutional guarantees for equitable representation of all South Sudanese in public institutions and particularly to achieve representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

Handwritten signatures and initials including SBR, PM, AM, PAK, PJ, GD, NB, Mwand, P.A.G. and A/A.

1.5 Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement for the people of South Sudan, as shall be regulated by law;

1.6 Protection of press freedoms and widening of civic and political space in the country, as shall be regulated by law;

1.7 Strengthen commitment to sustaining cessation of hostilities and permanent ceasefire during the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and beyond;

1.8 Mutual commitment to the Tumaini Consensus, its principles, and structures, including agreement on its guarantors and measures to assure implementation, processes, and timelines;

1.9 Mutual respect and tolerance, respect for opinions, transparency, respect for the rule of law, accountability, the unfettered access to relevant information and commitment to building of consensus;

1.10 Enhance the decentralized system of government during the transitional period and expedite the process of constitution-making to realize the popular demand of the people of South Sudan to establish a federal system of government; and

1.11 Parliament shall enact enabling laws and amend existing laws to be in conformity with the Tumaini Consensus and Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 (as amended).

Handwritten signatures and initials including SBR, PM, AM, PAK, PJ, GD, NB, Mwand, P.A.G. and A/A.

### 2. Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Support

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders reiterate their commitment to creating an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable communities, humanitarian workers and individuals in South Sudan.

The Parties and Stakeholders agree as follows to:

- 2.1 Commit to the facilitation and provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need of such assistance as a result of previous and current conflicts, natural disasters and other factors;
- 2.2 Strengthen the safeguard measures to returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their families, the reinstatement of their properties in accordance with their constitutional rights and applicable legislations, rules and regulations and full reintegration to their communities or residence of their choice;
- 2.3 Establish, continue and enhance Quick Impact Programs and service delivery targeting vulnerable groups affected by conflict and natural disasters including children, orphans, women, widows, persons with special needs, and war-wounded; and
- 2.4 Establish and allocate adequate resources to the Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) and appoint a credible management for the Fund to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

Handwritten signatures and initials including SBR, PM, AM, PAK, PJ, GD, NB, Mwand, P.A.G. and A/A.

**3. Protocol on Trust and Confidence-Building Measures**

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders, as a gesture of their commitment to the Tumaini Initiative, create a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS that will lead to the adoption of a Permanent Constitution for the Republic of South Sudan, agree to the immediate implementation of the following measures after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus:

- 3.1 Release all the political detainees and prisoners of war (POWs) and dismiss all the cases and charges on persons accused as a result of politically motivated factors;
- 3.2 Expedite the repeal of Sections 54, 55 and 57 of the National Security Act 2014 so as to conform with the provisions of the Constitution, R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus before the commencement of the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 3.3 Refrain from arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions;
- 3.4 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee the freedom of movement of political leaders, in and outside South Sudan;
- 3.5 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of association and assembly of all persons in South Sudan, in conformity with the Constitution and the law;

*Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G, A/A*

- 3.6 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of expression of all persons in South Sudan, including freedom of the media, and equal access for all to the State Media;
- 3.7 The Parties and Stakeholders or their representatives in the Tumaini Initiative, shall make a confidence-building visit to Juba, South Sudan to hold joint public forums, to publicize, and to commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.8 The Government leadership or their representatives, shall make a confidence-building visit to Nairobi, Kenya to support and commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.9 The Government shall protect property rights and guarantee security of property and assets of the Government, groups, and individuals in South Sudan, irrespective of their political affiliations;
- 3.10 The Tumaini Initiative to convene a National Leadership retreat inside South Sudan after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus for sensitization and confidence building; and
- 3.11 National Prayers for peace shall be organized and held by the religious leaders after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus in Juba, the States and the Administrative Areas.

*Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G, A/A*

**4. Protocol on Permanent Ceasefire, Security Arrangements and Reforms**

THAT the Parties recommit to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) (2017), and commit to a permanent ceasefire agreement that shall be agreed in the Tumaini Consensus. The Parties commit to the reform and reorganization of the Security Sector in order to create unified professional national forces that include the Armed Opposition Groups.

THAT to achieve unification of forces, all the mechanisms below shall be reconstituted to ensure inclusion of the Armed Opposition Groups. The defections of security elements or forces shall not be allowed during the Transitional Period and all Armed Forces shall remain under their respective command pending their unification. The Officers from Tumaini Parties shall be included in the existing Unified Command.

- 4.1 Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC)
- 4.1.1 A Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC) shall be established to conduct reforms by overseeing, directing and supervising the security sector reform during the Transitional Period;
- 4.1.2 The SSROC shall be headed by a neutral and competent South Sudanese security / military expert who shall be vetted by the National Leadership Council (NLC);
- 4.1.3 The SSROC shall be further composed of the following:

*Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G, A/A*

- 4.1.3.1 Representatives of the Parties and Stakeholders signatory to Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS
- 4.1.3.2 South Sudanese military and security experts
- 4.1.3.3 South Sudanese eminent personalities / academics
- 4.1.3.4 Regional and international experts
- 4.1.4 The Mandate of the SSROC shall be to:

- 4.1.4.1 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of all security forces, organization, screening, training, unification, deployment and provision of logistics in cantonment sites, barracks and movement of forces as per Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) program, including among others;
- 4.1.4.2 Oversee the disarmament and ending of private militias through the JDSB and create political space that promotes peace, national unity, equal opportunity and democratic processes to address underlying issues that drive conflicts;
- 4.1.4.3 Oversee and ensure the deployment of Armed forces across the country and at the borders to maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan;
- 4.1.4.4 Oversee the simultaneous general disarmament, and destruction of the arms collected from civilians using the unified security forces across the country;
- 4.1.4.5 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of forces, organization, screening, training, unification and deployment of all Unified Forces shall be completed within a specified period from the date of signing of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 4.1.4.6 Ensure fair treatment of all the security forces including their remuneration during the training;
- 4.1.4.7 Receive progress reports from mechanisms tasked with security reform processes;
- 4.1.4.8 Report to the National Leadership Council (NLC);

*Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G, A/A*

- 4.1.4.9 Supervise and oversee the screening of unfit personnel by the JDSB, and coordinate with the DDR Commission on their demobilization and reintegration; and
- 4.1.4.10 Direct and supervise the establishment of the Committees for Defense and Security which shall be Chaired by the respective heads of the Defense and Security Mechanisms in the JDSB;
- 4.1.4.11 The Committees of the JDSB shall be as follows:
  - 4.1.4.11.1 Defense/Military;
  - 4.1.4.11.2 Police Service;
  - 4.1.4.11.3 Prison Service;
  - 4.1.4.11.4 Wildlife Service;
  - 4.1.4.11.5 Civil Defense Service [Fire Brigade]; and
  - 4.1.4.11.6 National Security Service.

4.1.5 There shall be established a force to be known as VIP Protection Units whose functions and duties shall be determined by law.

4.2 *Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB)*

4.2.1 The Joint Defense Board (JDB) shall be renamed as the Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) and shall be reconstituted at the level of Chiefs of Defense Forces/Staff, Inspector General of Police and Directors General of National Security Service and all other organized forces to exercise command and control over all forces during the Transitional Period.

4.2.2 The functions of the JDSB shall be to:

4.2.2.1 Recommend to Commanders in Chief, the reconstitution of Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and Joint

*Protocols for Initiating - Transitional Consensus*  
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D, P.S, N.B, SBR, M.H, P.A.G]

- Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) to include representatives of the Armed Opposition Groups;
- 4.2.2.2 Restructure and unify the army and other organized forces in accordance with the provisions of R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus;
- 4.2.2.3 Fast-track general and simultaneous disarmament across the country and destroy the arms collected from the civilians and ensure provision of the state security for all the people in South Sudan;
- 4.2.2.4 Take measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline in the Security Sector; and
- 4.2.2.5 Ensure deployment of Armed Forces across the Country, including at the Borders, to maintain territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.

4.3 *Further Commitments by Parties and Stakeholders on Security Sector Reforms*

4.3.1 Development and implementation of a transformational policy framework to govern the security sector institutions on matters including language, recruitment, retirement and oversight, reorganize and professionalize the security sector;

4.3.2 Incorporation of a general amnesty for persons who rebelled against the Government into the final outcome of the Tumaini Initiative as an avenue for fostering peace and reconciliation;

4.3.3 Taking measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline mechanisms in the Security Sector; and

4.3.4 Taking measures including legislative reforms, to address inter-communal violence, child abduction, movement of cattle, cattle-raiding/ rustling in South Sudan.

*Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*  
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D, P.S, N.B, SBR, M.H, P.A.G]

**5. Protocol on Communal Conflicts, Armed Civilians, and Land Disputes**

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders recognize the importance of advancing sustainable peace, security and stability at local levels, acknowledge the intricate connection between national and local conflicts and insecurity, particularly the prevalence of cattle rustling, child abduction, revenge killings, land-related disputes, climate change-induced conflicts and inter-communal violence, and the prevailing inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms.

The Parties and the Stakeholders agree that the Government, through public participation, shall:

- 5.1 Identify the root causes of communal conflicts and violence and land disputes and provide solutions so as to contribute to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;
- 5.2 Conduct a comprehensive inquiry into land- and natural resources-related conflicts and climate change-induced disputes across South Sudan and make recommendations, including policy and legal actions required to address these disputes effectively;
- 5.3 Formulate policies, laws, and establish institutions for addressing root causes of conflict, communal violence, armed civilian groups, and land disputes, thereby contributing to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

*Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*  
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D, P.S, N.B, SBR, M.H, P.A.G]

5.4 Enhance coordination and implementation of community dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing land issues, local conflicts, peacebuilding, reconciliation, social cohesion and integration whose functions and composition shall be determined by law;

5.5 Undertake research and analysis on social cohesion, values, peacebuilding and conflict management, and make recommendations to the relevant Government agencies;

5.6 Foster partnerships with the relevant state actors, non-state actors, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies on peacebuilding and conflict management;

5.7 Establish early warning and response systems for conflicts and put in place an emergency preparedness and response systems to curb imminent conflicts;

5.8 Promote peaceful co-existence, tolerance, respect and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of life, and encourage appreciation by all ethnic and religious communities for the social, economic, cultural, spiritual and political life of all communities;

5.9 Formulate and implement strategies, plans, educational and training programs to create public awareness and support on the importance of social cohesion, integration, peacebuilding and reconciliation;

*Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*  
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D, P.S, N.B, SBR, M.H, P.A.G]

- 5.10 Facilitate nationwide consultations on the management of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians, in order to disarm them in accordance with the law and human rights principles; and
- 5.11 Establish a mechanism for the operationalization of this protocol.



*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

Handwritten signatures and initials: PER, PM, SBR, F, GLO, Mwand, PAL, PJ, N.B.

**6. Guarantors**

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders shall establish internal and external processes and structures that will have a permanent and consistent role in guaranteeing and taking lead responsibility in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus as provided.

The Parties and Stakeholders have resolved to commit to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus with both internal and external guarantors as detailed below:

**6.1 Internal Guarantors**

6.1.1 The Parties and Stakeholders shall establish the National Leadership Council (NLC) that shall be the national / internal guarantor of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.1.2 The main roles and responsibilities of the NLC shall be to:

- 6.1.2.1 Provide political stewardship and oversight in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 6.1.2.2 Provide strategic leadership and guidance to the Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission, the Governance Oversight Commission, and other public agencies whose mandate is relevant to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 6.1.2.3 Preside over and resolve disputes and conflicts in matters

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

Handwritten signatures and initials: PER, PM, SBR, F, GLO, Mwand, PA, PJ, N.B.

related to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.4 Receive reports from all mechanisms established under the R-ARCSS as amended and the Tumaini Consensus; and
- 6.1.2.5 Coordinate with Tumaini Initiative on implementation of the key elements of this framework and on meeting of the deadlines of scheduled actions.
- 6.1.3 The NLC shall have a Chairperson, in the absence of whom, the Deputy Chairperson shall act;
- 6.1.4 The NLC shall hold regular meetings to deliberate and make decisions, including seeking political consensus, regarding the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 6.1.5 The NLC, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, shall establish measures and systems to carefully track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 6.1.6 Decision-making in the NLC shall be by consensus and, in lieu of that, by two thirds (2/3<sup>rd</sup>) majority;
- 6.1.7 The decisions of the NLC shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature;
- 6.1.8 The NLC shall establish a National Implementation and Oversight Committee (NIOC) composed of members seconded by each party represented at the NLC, nominees of Civil Society Organisations, Faith-Based groups, other Stakeholders, Donors and Partners, and whose mandate shall be to:

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

Handwritten signatures and initials: PER, PM, SBR, F, GLO, Mwand, PAL, PJ, N.B.

- 6.1.8.1 Act as secretariat of the NLC and, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, provide technical and administrative support to the NLC to enable the Council to carry-out its functions and duties;
- 6.1.8.2 Manage the day-to-day coordination of activities in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and
- 6.1.8.3 Establish a system to track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus in coordination with Tumaini Initiative.
- 6.1.9 The NIOC shall have a Head of the Secretariat and a Deputy, whom shall be appointed by the NLC;
- 6.1.10 The NIOC shall establish its structures and transparently and competitively recruit staff to carry out its day to day activities;
- 6.1.11 The NIOC shall be funded by the Government, the Tumaini Initiative and Donors;
- 6.1.12 Funds received for the NIOC shall be deposited into the account of the NIOC and shall be jointly managed by the Head of the Secretariat, Representatives of the Tumaini Initiative and Donors/Partners, who shall be the signatories to the Account;

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

Handwritten signatures and initials: PER, PM, SBR, F, GLO, Mwand, PA, PJ, N.B.

6.1.13 All public institutions and agencies of Government, civil society and faith-based organisations, and other stakeholders shall provide the necessary assistance and

## Annex 27: Withdrawal of SPLM-IO from Tumaini Initiative



### SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (IO) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SPLM/SPLA (IO) FROM THE TUMAINI INITIATIVE

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau met on July 16, 2024 to deliberate on the Protocols of "Tumaini Consensus for Sustainable Peace in South Sudan" that were initialed by the Parties and Stakeholders to the Tumaini Initiative.

The initialed Protocols establish alternative institutions, replacing or running in parallel with those in R-ARCSS besides repeating most provisions in R-ARCSS or existing national laws. The Protocols clearly breach the R-ARCSS and undermine the ongoing peace implementation processes.

The Tumaini Initiative was supposedly a mediation forum. However, in the initialed Protocols, this is not the case. The Initiative has arrogated to itself many roles including being a funder, a supervisor, a coordinator, a convener of a donor conference, a fund manager, a monitor of the implementation, a guarantor and a governing authority. Therefore, the "Tumaini Initiative" undermines the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan.

The proposed Security Sector Reforms/Oversight Commission takes over functions of the following existing mechanisms and institutions of R-ARCSS:

1. Security Supervision Mechanism (SSM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
2. Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
3. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
4. Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB), co-chaired by the Parties to the R-ARCSS and
5. National Transitional Committee (NTC).

The proposed National Leadership Council (NLC) whose decisions "shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature" usurps the powers of:

1. The Presidency.
2. The Council of Ministers.
3. The National Legislature and
4. The National Security Council.

The roles of the guarantors namely; IGAD, AU, CS, UN, EU, Troika, and IGAD Partners Forum, who are seized of the peace process in South Sudan, are muted.

*RMTD*






In light of the above development, the SPLM/SPLA (IO) rejects the initialed Protocols and declares its withdrawal from the Tumaini Initiative as it has deviated from the intended purpose of being an Annex to R-ARCSS and not a stand-alone Agreement.

In conclusion, we would like reiterate our unwavering commitment to inclusive peace and implementation of the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for attaining sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan.

Sign:



Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon,  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/SPLA (IO), and  
First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba

16 July 2024

## Annex 28: UPDF in Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria State

### 1.Excerpts of a video of the detention of South Sudanese men by armed UPDF soldiers in August 2024 in Kajo Keji.


Note: the UPDF soldiers' patches are visible. An SSPDF soldier can be heard in the background reporting the event over the phone to his superior.



**2. Mediation meeting in the presence of the Kajo Keiji county commissioner, David Lisi Christopher, UPDF, Ugandan police and SSPDF officers on 6 September 2024 in Kajo Keiji county in South Sudan.**

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## Annex 29: Statement by Kajo Keji County Commissioner, 29 August 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2024

TO MJ. GENERAL KULANG MAYEN  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SSPDF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
29/8/2024

**AREAS OF KAJO KEJI COUNTY CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN ENCROCHED (GRAPPED) BY UGANDA**

Kajo-Keji is a county in central Equatoria state republic of south Sudan that borders the neighboring Uganda in the districts of moyo, and yumbe.

These districts of Uganda had been engaged in encroachment of land of Kajo-Keji and causing insecurity within the border communities.

Find below the areas graphed and re-named by Uganda

S/No	Payam of origin	Name of area taken	New name given by Uganda	Approximate area in kms
1	<b>Liwolo payam</b>	Sokodo/ tirye	Tire village Kerwa SC	25Kms
2		Kaboro village	Kaboro A&B KSC	26kms
3		Kulasar village	Kulasar village KSC	25 kms
4		Mijale village	Mijale, kerwa sub county	20kms
5		Pingo village	Pingp Kerwa sub county	22kms
6		Rodo village	Rodo kerwa sub county	20kms
7		Merewa village	Merwa KSC	30akm
8		Gorbeleng village	Gorbeleng KSC	30km
9		Mokaden village	Mokaden v11	20kms
10		Guruwa village	Woroworo village	28kms
11		Kolorunga village	Kulurung village	20kms
12		Mapu village	Mapu village KSC	20kms
13		Kopionga village	Kapionga parish KSC	22kms
14		Kolorok village	Uturuko village	22kms
15		Erepunga village	Erepunga KSC	21kms
16		Limu village	Limu parish	21kms
17		Kogwo village	Kogwo village KSC	20kms
18		Longolijo village	Longolijo village KSC	21dkms
19		Wangor village	Wangor village KSC	17kms
20		Alidoro village	Alidoro KSC	15kms
21		Tigawate village	Central mijale village	20kms
22		Matkulu village	Markulu KSC	20kms
23		Aludu village	Centre liku village	15kms
24		Buyi village	Uluga village	20kms
25		Kobe village	Usubira village	15kms
26		Gwuto ko tokoyot	Ura village	22kms

		village		
27		Lema village	Lema KSC	24kms
28		Kukuduk village	Kukuduk KSC	4kms
29		Koburuwa village	Koburuwa KSC	23kms
30		Kilaji village	Kilaji KSC	21kms
31		Kupiya village	Loguteleng village	21kms
32		Sisi village	Sisi KSC	20kms
33		Loduwa village	Midigo Sub county	3kms
34		Dukulya village	Ubetiku village midigo	4kms
35		Biyabe village	Gumbiri village	16kms
36		Lobe village	wombe village	5kms
37		Morsak village	Achilaya villageg	4kms
38		Muluwe village	Sere village	5kms
39		Gwongatulu village	Gwongatulu KSC	23kms
50		Letimekor village	Letimekor KSC	23kms
51		Baranya kuto village	Baranyakuto KSC	22kms
52		Kambala village	Ambala village	24kms
<b>Kangapo 2 payam</b>				
1		Gwere village	Gwere sub county	25kms
2		Masaka village	Masaka GSC	25kms
3		Murerya village	Murerya GSC]	25kms
4		Lunyamiro village	Linyamiro GSC	10kms
5		Morod village	Morodo GSC	15kms
6		Lojili village	Lojili village GSC	12kms
7		Manse village	Manse GSC	10kms
8		Worilowoga village	Worilowoga GSC	8kms
9		Tiwoyo Village	Tiwoyo village GSC	7kms
10		Lere village	Lere village GSC	8kms
11		Ebeya village	Ebeya village GSC	13kms
12		Garamba village	Wakale village]	10kms
13		Monikdisi village	Malanga village	18kms
14		Komba village	Mundusaku village	26kms
15		Majaburo village	Elema east	32kms
16		Gorbeleng village	Kamurope villae	30kms
17		Amerok village	Maru village	16kms
18		Ayumani village	Gobor village	35kms
19		Kolipi village	Elema village	17kms
20		Nyaingamuda village	Fitinabaya village	25kms
21		Lepori village	Lefori sub county	19kms
<b>Kangapo 1 payam</b>				
1		Lojore Village	Lojore afoji Sub county	15kms
2		Koru koria	Koruo village ASC	15kms
3		Loruwondi village	Inigo village	18kms
4		Magorlobong village	Magorlobong village	20kms
5		Waalo village	Wano village	18kms
6		Ludara village	Ludara village	13kms
7		Robojo village	Robojo village	12kms
8		Kimu village	Kimu village	9kms
9		Tor-li village	Tor-li village	15kms
10		Danakorwi village	Danakorwi village	10kms
11		Kiyongo village	Edefia village	20kms
12		Koree village	Eriya village	20kms
13		Masalowa village	Macholoea village	25kms



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER



14		Yakjimiji village	Abaya village	19kms
15		Gworong lolyong village	Moi anzo village	19kms
16		Apoji village	Afoji village	17kms
17		Fudia village	Fudia village	15kms
18		Onyire village	Onyire village	13kms
19		Gwulukuk village	Gwulukuk village	16kms
20		Minje village	Minje village	17kms
21		Kongolo village	Kongolo village	18kms
22		Pasokwi village	Pasokwi village	16kms
23		Itiya village	Itiya village	17kms
24		Eduwa village	Edua village	20kms
25		Moipileya village	Moipi lea village	15kms
26		Lugwakiya village	Lugwakia village	17kms
27		Aripijo village	Aripijo village	18kms
28		Kerepi village	Kerepi/arepi	20kms
29		metutametun	Metu sub county	25kms
30		Longirakoru	Lepo village	18kms
31		Kuruse village	Wuruse village	15kms
32		Suluwa village	Soloa village	18kms
33		Marindi village	Mulango/ moyo hospital	25kms

These are real fact from the land lords of the three payams.



**David Lisi Christopher**  
County Commissioner Kajo-Keji County  
Central Equatoria State Juba

**Annex 30: SSPDF Press Release concerning meeting with UPDF, 2 October 2024**

 **REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES**  
**DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS** 

**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON**



Your Ref: ..... Date: .....

Our Ref: .....

Press Release on the meeting between SSPDF and UPDF Chiefs of Defence Forces

On September 28<sup>th</sup>, 2024, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces travelled to meet with his Ugandan counterpart. The two army chiefs met, held and concluded a very successful meeting. They agreed on immediate implementation of the following points:

1. UPDF stops further encroachment into South Sudan territories. This pause is aimed at giving time to the two governments to find lasting solutions to the recurrent border issues (in other words, allow the High-Levelled Technical Committee, to continue deliberations on Border delimitations and demarcations)
2. Observe & maintain a cordial and harmonious working relationship along the common border.
4. Trade and commerce to continue.
5. SSPDF to deploy additional forces along Juba-Nimule Road to ensure and enhance safety of public road users.
6. SSPDF army chief secured the release of three own servicemen that were arrested and detained by UPDF in July 2024. The army chief had also technically succeeded in securing release of Capt. Machol Majur Madol, from South Sudan National Police Service, Department of Traffic Police, who was arrested in July 2024 by Uganda Revenue Authorities while in possession of a fully loaded pistol.

Signed   
**Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC(ET)** 

Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,  
SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam

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TEL: +211 922 282 534, +211 914 917 786  
Email: lul\_orcd@hotmail.com

**Annex 31: UPDF Press Statement concerning meeting with SSPDF, 28 September 2024**



**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & VETERAN AFFAIRS**  
**UGANDA PEOPLES' DEFENCE FORCES**  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION  
MoDVA Headquarters



Our Ref: UPDF/DDPI/83A  
Your Ref: .....

28 September 2024

**PRESS STATEMENT**

**BILATERAL RELATIONS**

Gen Kainerugaba Discusses Security Cooperation with his South Sudan Counterpart.

The Chief of Defence Forces and Senior Presidential Adviser for Special Operations, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba this afternoon held talks with his South Sudan counterpart Gen Santino Deng Wol.

The meeting at the Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters focused on regional security issues of mutual interest.

The two military leaders acknowledged the longstanding relationship between Uganda and South Sudan, committing to further enhancing military to military relations, that are equally historic.

The meeting was attended by several UPDF leaders including the deputy CDF Lt Gen Sam Okiding, Airforce Commander Lt Gen Charles Okidi, the Deputy Commander Land Forces Maj Gen Francis Takirwa and the Chief of Defence Intelligence and Security Maj Gen James Birungi.

The meeting was also attended by Chiefs of Staff of Services, the 4Division Commander Brig Felix Busizoori and the 5Division Commander Brig Keith Katungyi among others.



The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.




DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC  
INFORMATION  
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)  
Brigadier General  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
VETERAN AFFAIRS  
**DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION**

## Annex 32: Pictures of meeting between UPDF and Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004)


On 28 September 2024, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, travelled to Uganda in violation of the travel ban, one of the restrictive measures established by Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015), most recently extended by resolution 2731 (2024).

The meeting was confirmed by a UPDF press release, issued on 28 September 2024. It is available from: [https://x.com/MODVA\\_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095](https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095)



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
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION  
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)  
Brigadier General  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
VETERAN AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Additional photographs are also available, depicting the two military leaders meeting at the UPDF Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters. See for example: Sudan Tribune, Ugandan army chief meets South Sudanese counterpart in Kampala, 28 September 2024: <https://sudantribune.com/article291467/> see also a video of the event, available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3quUP4eZBac>






### Annex 33: Partial flight-data for flights between Uganda and South Sudan



**Annex 34: SSPDF statement refuting a “vehicles supply deal,” 19 August 2024**




**Annex 35: Final list of military items requested by Peter Biar Ajak**Source: US District court for the district of Arizona<sup>14</sup>

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. AK-47 Rifles (Full Auto)	1,000	\$350.00	\$350,000.00
2. PKM Rifles	300	\$675.00	\$202,500.00
3. RPG-7 launcher	200	\$575.00	\$115,000.00
4. 7.62x39 ammo	2,000,000	\$.17	\$340,000.00
5. 7.62x54 ammo	1,500,000	\$.21	\$315,000.00
6. PG-7 HE round	1000	\$600.00	\$600,000.00
7. PSL Sniper Rifle	70	\$1092.50	\$76,475.00
8. FIM92 Stinger System	10	\$80,000.00	\$800,000.00
9. Satellite phone	20	\$1,200.00	\$24,000.00
10. Handheld Radio	50	\$500.00	\$25,000.00
11. M67 Hand Grenades	500	\$60.00	\$30,000.00
12. PG-7VT/PG-7T AT Round	500	\$800.00	\$400,000.00
13. AN/PVS Monocular	10	\$12,000.00	\$120,000.00
		Subtotal-	\$3,397,975.00
		Transportation-	\$575,000.00
		<b>Total -</b>	<b>\$3,972,975.00</b>

<sup>14</sup> See [https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA\\_v\\_Keech\\_et\\_al\\_\\_azdce-24-00394\\_\\_0022.0.pdf](https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al__azdce-24-00394__0022.0.pdf).



**Annex 36: Allocation of Nile blend cargos, May and September 2024**



# Republic of South Sudan (RSS)



## MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING (MoFP) 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Finance

REF:RSS/MoFP/J/1<sup>st</sup>USF/27/08/2024/05

September 10, 2024

Hon. Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel  
Undersecretary,  
Ministry of Petroleum

Dear Hon. Undersecretary,

**RE: Allocation of One (1) Crude Oil Cargo for the Month of April, 2025 to [REDACTED]**

Greetings and best wishes from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Reference is made to the aforementioned subject. I am writing to respectfully request your office to purpose allocation of **One (1) Crude Oil Cargo** for the month of **April, 2025** to [REDACTED] as directed by the Minister of Finance and Planning.

Let me avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Hon. Garang Majak Bol  
1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary  
Ministry of Finance and Planning



**Copy Furnished:**


- Hon. Minister of Finance and Planning
- File





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM


RSS/MOP/J/O/U/9/24/061

19<sup>th</sup> September 2024



**RE: REVOCATION OF ALLOCATION OF ONE CARGO OF NILE BLEND FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 2025 TO** 

Reference is made to the above-mentioned subject and the letter of the 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 10<sup>th</sup> September 2024 with Ref: No. **RSS/MOFP/J/I<sup>st</sup>USE/27/8/24/05** to Ministry of Petroleum (MoP) pertaining to the allocation of one (1) Cargo of Nile Blend for the Month of **April 2025 to** 

Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan, scrutinizes and ultimately registers potential oil lifting companies through a set of technical requirements, including, but not limited to, checking their presence in both regional and international oil lifting markets, submission of financial statements, approval by the Bank of South Sudan (BSS).  is not registered as one of the oil marketing companies.

Premised on the foregoing, MoP is hereby informing your revered office about the revocation of allocation of one (1) cargo of Nile Blend equivalent to 600,000 bbl due to lack of registration and conflicting schedules.

Please, accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

**Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel**  
Undersecretary  
Ministry of Petroleum



Cc: 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Cc: File

**The Undersecretary**

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J1), Juba- South Sudan  
General Line: +211 915177770 | Email: [undersecretary@mop.gov.ss](mailto:undersecretary@mop.gov.ss) | [www.mop.gov.ss](http://www.mop.gov.ss)

## Annex 37: Legal framework for oil-related payments and transparency

Extracts from the 2012 Petroleum Revenue Management Act

- Councils.
- CHAPTER IX**  
**TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
- 30. Transparency as a Fundamental Principle**
- (1) The management of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, and any related duty of any relevant party, shall be carried out in an open and transparent manner.
  - (2) In the exercise of their functions and competencies, and as provided for in this Bill, the National Legislature, Ministry, Bank of South Sudan and Investment Advisory Committee shall take all necessary measures to ensure free access to public information.
  - (3) Access to public information shall be in accordance with the Right to Information Act 2013.
- 31. Declaration of Confidentiality**
- (1) Information or data may be declared confidential and not to be disclosed to the public if such information:
    - (a) significantly prejudices the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds;
    - (b) jeopardizes the independence of the Investment Advisory Committee, any of its members, or both;
    - (c) prejudices the freedom of discussion within or among the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan, or the Investment Advisory Committee; or
    - (d) may lead to unfair competition, improper gains or advantage for a third party or unfair disadvantage for the parties involved.
  - (2) The declaration of confidentiality shall be made by the Ministry, Bank of South

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- Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee and shall provide:
- (a) a justification based on one or more grounds detailed in subsection (1) of this Section; and
  - (b) the period in which such information shall be declared confidential.
- (3) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this Section, and unless the parties agree to disclose such communication, internal communications within the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall be kept confidential.
  - (4) Any party affected by the disclosure of information on grounds detailed in subsection (1)(d) of this Section may request a declaration of confidentiality of such information to the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee.
  - (5) The Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall issue a decision on the request for declaration of confidentiality under subsection (4) of this Section.
  - (6) In case of denial, the interested party may appeal to the Competent Court within fifteen days from the date in which the decision under subsection (5) of this Section was communicated to him or her.
  - (7) The Minister shall issue regulations on further detail procedures under subsections (4), (5), and (6) of this Section.
  - (8) The justification on the confidentiality of information shall be made available to the public upon request.
  - (9) Upon expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (2) (b) of this Section, and if any grounds on which the declaration of confidentiality was based no longer exists, information shall be disclosed to the public.

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- not financial assets of government and the rate of savings; and
- (f) a list of names of persons holding positions relevant for the operation and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including:
- (i) the Minister;
  - (ii) the director general of accounts of the Ministry;
  - (iii) the chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Investment Advisory Committee;
  - (iv) the Governor;
  - (v) the external investment manager(s), if any; and
  - (vi) the designated signatories that are authorized to request transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.

- (3) The sources of the information described in subsection (2) of this Section, in whatever form, including the reports and statements, shall be annexed to the annual report in unedited form.
- (4) The annual report shall be published by the Ministry within fifteen days of its submission to the National Legislature.

#### 15. Annual Disclosure and Publication of Payments

- (1) Licensees, contractors and sub-contractors shall annually disclose information on all payments, monetary or in kind, made to Government agencies in connection with Petroleum Activities. The Government shall disclose the revenue received in connection with Petroleum Activities without regard to any provisions of confidentiality.
- (2) Any disclosure under this Section shall be reported to an independent entity, selected and appointed for this purpose, and the information shall be published and verified in accordance with the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as prescribed in the regulations.
- (3) Confidentiality sections or other sections in a Petroleum Agreement that prevent

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disclosure of information on any payments made and revenues received in connection with Petroleum Activities conducted in South Sudan shall be void to the extent required for disclosure of such information as set out in subsection (1) of this Section.

- (4) The Ministry shall issue regulations respecting all matters relating to disclosure and publication of information under this Section, including orders to administrative agencies requiring them to provide information relating to payments and revenues.

#### 36. Publication of Information

- (1) The Ministry shall ensure that this Bill and any of its regulations, the Investment Policy, the Investment Guidelines, the operational management agreements provided in Section 8 and 16(7) of this Bill, and the rules and procedures of the Investment Advisory Committee provided in Section 21(i) of this Bill, are readily available to the public not later than thirty days after their respective enactment or adoption.
- (2) Appointment of the Investment Advisory Committee shall be published in the Official Gazette.
- (3) Information required to be made public under this Chapter shall also be published online on the website of the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan and the National Legislature.
- (4) The Ministry shall also make copies of the information available at its headquarters.

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## 32. Records of Petroleum Revenue

- (1) The Ministry shall publish the records of Petroleum Revenue in accordance with Section 6 of this Bill no more than six weeks after the end of each Quarter.
- (2) The records of Petroleum Revenue published under subsection (1) of this Section shall be disaggregated by type of revenue and individual transaction.
- (3) In addition to the records of Petroleum Revenue, the information shall include transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account to the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and the Consolidated Fund, transfers from the Consolidated Fund to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and the balance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.
- (4) The information shall be published simultaneously in the official gazette, the Ministry's website and in at least two national daily newspapers and duly communicated to the National Legislature.

## 33. Quarterly Reports

- (1) The Bank of South Sudan shall present to the Minister and the Investment Advisory Committee quarterly reports on the in- and outflow and the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds during the Quarter and the value of the assets and where the assets are held at the end of the Quarter, no later than by the end of the ensuing month.
- (2) The Bank of South Sudan shall make the quarterly reports publicly available no later than six weeks after the end of the Quarter.
- (3) The Bank of South Sudan shall ensure that in releasing, or allowing access to, such reports, measures are taken to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.

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## 34. Annual Reports

- (1) The Minister shall submit an annual report for the Petroleum Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds to the National Legislature no later than four months after the end of the Financial Year.
- (2) The annual report shall be prepared in such manner that makes it readily adaptable for dissemination to the public and shall contain the following information for the Financial Year for which the report is prepared:
  - (a) a report signed by the Minister describing the Investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, any advice received from the Investment Advisory Committee, and any other matter related to the management of Petroleum Revenue and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds that may be of concern or interest to the National Legislative Assembly;
  - (b) a report signed by the Investment Advisory Committee describing the investment Guidelines and any changes made during the Financial Year, a comparison of the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds against the established benchmark indices of the investments and against the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds for the previous three years, and any other matter relevant for the implementation of the Investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including, but not limited to, an assessment of the internal and external audits and risk management and control systems in place by the Bank of South Sudan;
  - (c) the Auditor General's report, including the audited financial statements with notes of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and any report from the independent auditor;
  - (d) a list of all payments of Petroleum Revenue made to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and payments of Petroleum Revenue by the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities to each applicable Local Government Councils, for the Financial Year;
  - (e) the liabilities of government borrowings in a manner that provides an accurate representation of the past and expected future development of the

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## Annex 38: Budget for the financial year 2024/25


Panel analysis, based on first draft of budget presented to the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 25 September 2024

Official exchange rate SSP/US\$ (Oct 2024)	3,098		
	SSP	US\$ (est.)	
<b>Projected government revenue</b>			<b>% of total revenue</b>
<b>Projected oil revenues</b>			
DPOC	0	0	
GPOC	943,610,579,883	304,587,017	
SPOC	194,823,738,558	62,886,939	
<b>Total oil revenue</b>	<b>1,138,434,318,441</b>	<b>367,473,957</b>	<b>50.43%</b>
<b>Projected non-oil revenue</b>			
Customs duty	552,284,081,279	178,271,169	
Misc taxes and fees	566,920,329,811	182,995,587	
<b>Total non oil revenue</b>	<b>1,119,204,411,090</b>	<b>361,266,756</b>	<b>49.57%</b>
<b>Total projected government revenue</b>	<b>2,257,638,729,531</b>	<b>728,740,713</b>	
<b>Government expenditure</b>			<b>% of total spending</b>
<b>"Mandatory government expenditure"</b>			
Transfers to Sudan for oil pipeline	157,035,230,468	50,689,229	3.76%
Transfers to oil producing states (2%)	22,768,686,369	7,349,479	0.55%
Transfers to oil producing communities (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Transfers to Ministry of Petroleum (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Debt repayment	286,642,748,700	92,525,096	6.87%
National Revenue Authority Retention	54,957,368,080	17,739,628	1.32%
Oil for roads	0	0	0.00%
Other capital projects	493,482,795,275	159,290,767	11.83%
<b>Total "mandatory expenditure"</b>	<b>1,083,192,887,998</b>	<b>349,642,637</b>	<b>25.96%</b>
<b>Salary payments</b>			
Salaries	773,759,678,293	249,761,032	18.55%
Salary arrears	642,316,055,668	207,332,491	15.40%
Foreign mission salary arrears	96,003,600,000	30,988,896	2.30%
<b>Total salary expenditure</b>	<b>1,512,079,333,961</b>	<b>488,082,419</b>	<b>36.24%</b>
<b>Other expenditure</b>			
Operating expenditure	413,329,279,511	133,418,102	26.21%
Transfers to States for State budgets	419,306,834,843	135,347,590	26.59%
Peace budget	93,794,227,620	30,275,735	5.95%
Constituency Fund for MPs	30,000,000,000	9,683,667	1.90%
December 2024 Elections	257,521,457,127	83,125,067	16.33%
Humanitarian and emergency fund	173,660,000,000	56,055,520	11.01%
Various other budget lines	189,336,691,868	61,115,782	12.01%
<b>Total other expenditure</b>	<b>1,576,948,490,969</b>	<b>509,021,463</b>	<b>37.80%</b>
<b>Total all government spending</b>	<b>4,172,220,712,928</b>	<b>1,346,746,518</b>	
<b>Deficit</b>	<b>-1,914,581,983,397</b>	<b>-618,005,805</b>	

Agency spending:

	Salary budget (SSP)	% of total salary budget	Goods and services (SSP)	% of total goods and services	Total budget (SSP)	% of total Ministry spending
<b>Accountability cluster</b>	894,932,810	0.12%	5,848,736,009	1.45%	7,370,156,266	0.39%
<b>Economic Cluster</b>	19,109,574,136	2.47%	49,631,570,445	12.31%	197,443,429,349	10.48%
<i>Of which Ministry of Finance and Planning</i>	1,832,456,166	0.24%	28,331,191,362	7.03%	32,480,160,993	1.72%
<b>Education cluster</b>	84,975,288,417	11.00%	48,077,271,655	11.92%	225,135,744,981	11.95%
<b>Health cluster</b>	5,326,514,447	0.69%	31,156,159,400	7.73%	54,855,922,636	2.91%
<b>Infrastructure cluster</b>	1,595,558,604	0.21%	8,382,367,085	2.08%	13,336,454,811	0.71%
<b>Natural resources cluster</b>	22,406,328,022	2.90%	33,863,145,894	8.40%	351,649,759,145	18.67%
<b>Public administration cluster</b>	75,991,334,896	9.84%	168,546,330,203	41.80%	290,284,083,280	15.41%
<i>Of which Presidential Affairs</i>	2,577,606,960	0.33%	15,594,234,618	3.87%	23,383,834,620	1.24%
<i>Of which Cabinet Affairs</i>	1,465,091,532	0.19%	7,625,921,167	1.89%	16,773,997,323	0.89%
<i>Of which Foreign Affairs</i>	50,377,424,952	6.52%	4,254,097,101	1.05%	55,111,798,592	2.93%
<i>Of which Parliament</i>	10,277,629,488	1.33%	81,444,261,374	20.20%	114,571,166,718	6.08%
<i>Of which Council of States</i>	6,504,809,940	0.84%	25,000,499,165	6.20%	38,371,858,427	2.04%
<b>Security sector</b>	505,880,647,927	65.51%	35,430,397,122	8.79%	599,433,387,770	31.82%
<i>Of which Police</i>	100,406,257,704	13.00%	4,198,497,310	1.04%	158,507,540,170	8.42%
<i>Of which Ministry of Defence</i>	268,614,128,198	34.78%	15,735,791,888	3.90%	288,412,061,028	15.31%
<i>Of which Veterans Affairs</i>	84,588,459,037	10.95%	6,419,463,234	1.59%	91,007,922,271	4.83%
<i>Of which NSS</i>	51,827,888,804	6.71%	6,812,984,565	1.69%	58,737,678,439	3.12%
<b>Rule of law</b>	56,064,967,796	7.26%	22,327,870,875	5.54%	144,039,451,614	7.65%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>772,245,147,055</b>		<b>403,263,848,688</b>		<b>1,883,548,389,852</b>	

Distribution of salary payments:





## Distribution of goods and services spending

