



## 安全理事会

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## 2024年6月21日至10月20日期间安全理事会第1701(2006)号决议的执行情况

### 秘书长的报告

#### 一. 导言

1. 本报告全面评估了自2024年7月12日发表上一次报告(S/2024/548)以来安全理事会第1701(2006)号决议的执行情况。在本报告所述期间，真主党和黎巴嫩境内其他非国家武装团体与以色列国防军屡次违反停止敌对行动的规定，违反第1701(2006)号决议，越过蓝线的交火急剧升级，导致局势不断恶化，与安全理事会第1701(2006)号决议所设想的情况相去甚远。9月23日，以色列国防军发起北方之箭行动，并于10月1日开始在蓝线以北采取地面行动，标志着冲突进入新阶段。包括贝鲁特在内的黎巴嫩全境遭到以色列猛烈轰炸，造成大量人员伤亡、流离失所和毁坏。真主党进一步加强对以色列境内的攻击，也造成人员伤亡和民用基础设施的损坏。敌对行动的急剧升级突出表明立即恢复停止敌对行动的紧迫性以及黎巴嫩与以色列实现永久停火方面取得进展的长期必要性。

#### 二. 第1701(2006)号决议的执行情况

##### A. 联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队行动区局势

2. 6月21日至9月22日，联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队(联黎部队)记录了自行动区内从蓝线以北向以南发射的2531道射弹弹道轨迹、从蓝线以南向以北的3332道轨迹，以及以色列国防军的276次空袭。同一期间，联黎部队15次观察到从利塔尼河以北——联黎部队行动区外——向以色列和被以色列占领的叙利亚戈兰发射的216道轨迹。9月23日至10月20日，联黎部队观察到自行动区内从蓝线以北向以南发射的2316道轨迹，从以南向以北的15481道轨迹，以及以色列国防军的942次空袭。同一个28天期间，联黎部队65次观察到从利塔尼河以北发射的共378道射弹弹道轨迹。每道轨迹可代表多个射弹。几乎所有记录的轨迹




都是火箭、迫击炮和炮弹。联黎部队的雷达无法观察到某些类型的射弹，如空对地导弹、坦克炮弹、便携式反坦克导弹或从轻武器发射的射弹。联黎部队无法核实在本报告所述期间据报影响到黎巴嫩其他地方的大量袭击。

3. 10月15日，联黎部队观察到1 279道轨迹，这是2023年10月8日以来单日的最高数量。其中71道轨迹是从蓝线以北向以南，1 208道是从以南向以北。9月23日前的最高峰是8月25日，当时真主党声称为了回应Fuad Shukr指挥官被杀发起“Arba'in行动日”(见第7和第8段)，从北向南有146道轨迹，从南向北119道轨迹。

图一

2024年6月至10月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队每周观察到的射弹轨迹



来源：联黎部队。

4. 真主党声称对使用火箭、导弹、大炮和无人机对以色列北部和被以色列占领的叙利亚戈兰的目标发动的多起事件负责。10月1日后，真主党和以色列国防军还在联黎部队行动区(蓝线以北)内发生冲突。10月13日，真主党声称开展了38次行动，这是2023年10月8日以来单日的最高次数。

5. 在整个报告所述期间，以色列国防军对真主党指挥官进行了袭击，包括在住宅楼内。7月3日，在本报告所述期间，以色列国防军无人机袭击提尔(西区)一个居民区，杀死几名真主党指挥官。Mohammad Neameh Nasser 是其中第一个被打死的。

6. 7月27日，在迈季代勒舍姆斯(位于被以色列占领的叙利亚戈兰)，12名儿童被打死，数十人受伤。以色列外交部长伊斯雷尔·卡茨在7月29日给安全理事会主席的信中称，“2024年7月27日，真主党从黎巴嫩向以色列境内发射多枚火箭，目标是迈季代勒舍姆斯德鲁兹村的平民。这次袭击导致12名正在踢足球

的无辜儿童和青少年被杀害，另有约 30 名平民受伤。真主党称它“与这一事件没有任何关系”。虽然联黎部队无法核实事件发生的先后顺序，因为弹着点在其责任区之外，但联黎部队确实观察到一枚射弹的轨迹。据评估，这是一枚 122 毫米火箭弹，在当天所述时间越过蓝线，发射点在沙巴阿农场地区，计算弹着点距迈季代勒舍姆斯足球场 836 米。

7. 7 月 30 日，以色列国防军在贝鲁特人口稠密的南郊的空袭中打死真主党指挥官 Fuad Shukr。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在 7 月 31 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/78/977-S/2024/587)中称，“2024 年 7 月 30 日 19 时 30 分，以色列以贝鲁特南郊 Harat Hurayk 地区 Bahman 医院附近一栋住宅楼为袭击目标，造成了重大破坏。5 名平民丧生，其中包括 1 名妇女和 2 名儿童，另有至少 75 名平民受伤。”8 月 1 日，真主党总书记哈桑·纳斯鲁拉誓言复仇。

8. 8 月 25 日，联黎部队记录了以色列国防军的 85 次空袭，主要是在西区。以色列国防军随后称，他们对真主党目标进行了“先发制人”的空袭。此后不久，真主党向以色列境内发射数百枚火箭弹和无人机，声称这是对 Shukr 先生被杀的回应。

9. 9 月 17 日和 18 日，主要由真主党使用的数千个寻呼机和手提式无线电台同时爆炸，造成至少 40 人死亡，其中包括两名儿童，另有超过 3 400 人受伤，其中包括伊朗驻黎巴嫩大使。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在 9 月 19 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/367-S/2024/685)中称，这一“大规模网络攻击……针对南部、纳巴提亚、黎巴嫩山、贝鲁特和贝卡等人口稠密的大型地区……成千上万不同年龄段的人……是对国际人道法和人权的公然违反，应被定为战争罪”。

10. 9 月 20 日，真主党指挥官 Ibrahim Aqil 在以色列国防军对贝鲁特南郊人口稠密区的空袭中丧生。黎巴嫩公共卫生部称，空袭导致两栋住宅楼倒塌，造成 55 人死亡，其中包括妇女和儿童，超过 66 人受伤。同一天，真主党导弹袭击海法附近。卡茨先生在 9 月 23 日给安全理事会主席的信中说，“真主党对海法地区进行了大规模无差别攻击”。

11. 9 月 23 日，以色列国防军发起“北方之箭行动”，对黎巴嫩全境、特别是联黎部队行动区进行数百次空袭。以色列国防军声称击中 1 300 多个真主党目标。黎巴嫩公共卫生部表示，当天至少有 558 人被杀，其中包括 50 名儿童和 94 名妇女。袭击还造成大规模流离失所，民用基础设施广泛受损。

12. 以色列国防军继续对黎巴嫩全境进行猛烈轰炸，一直持续到 10 月 20 日。受袭地区包括联黎部队行动区、人口稠密的城市中心，如贝鲁特南郊、巴尔贝克、Nabatiyeh、西顿，以及整个 Biqa'，造成进一步的流离失所和伤亡。

13. 9 月 27 日，以色列国防军称，在对位于贝鲁特 Dahieh 腹地住宅楼地下的“真主党恐怖组织中央总部”袭击时，炸死了真主党总书记哈桑·纳斯鲁拉以及包括真主党南方阵线指挥官 Ali Karaki 在内的几名真主党指挥官。爆炸夷平了至少四栋住宅楼，造成至少 38 人死亡，其中包括伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队指挥官阿巴

斯·尼尔福鲁尚，另有数十人受伤或失踪。9月28日，真主党证实纳斯鲁拉先生死亡。

14. 9月28日，以色列国防军表示“针对真主党埋在 Dahieh 六栋民用建筑下的导弹储存设施发动了袭击”。在当天对贝鲁特南郊的另一次袭击中，以色列国防军声称打死了真主党执行委员会副主席 Nabil Qaouk。黎巴嫩卫生部称，9月29日，西顿有72人在空袭中丧生，他们全是平民。10月3日，以色列国防军袭击据称是真主党在贝鲁特南郊的“中央情报总部”，打死真主党执行委员会主席 Hashem Safieddine 和其他几人。以色列10月3日袭击了贝鲁特中部，包括位于 Bashurah 的伊斯兰卫生局，并于10月10日袭击 Nuwayri 和 Ra's al-Nab'，造成数十人死亡，数百人受伤。10月14日，以色列袭击 Zagharta 区的 Aytu，来自黎巴嫩南部的23名流离失所者丧生，其中包括12名妇女和2名儿童。10月16日，以色列袭击 Nabatiyah 市政大楼，造成包括市长在内的16人死亡，53人受伤。以色列国防军称，10月20日，它在黎巴嫩各地对与真主党有关联的金融机构 Al-Qard al-Hassan 协会的分支机构进行了袭击。

15. 黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在10月15日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/538-S/2024/749)中称：“以色列空袭造成的毁坏规模令人震惊。空袭直接穿过住宅楼，留下几十米深的弹坑。这表明他们使用的是具有巨大穿透力的贫铀弹。”

16. 9月30日，以色列国防军敦促联黎部队撤离其位于蓝线5公里以内除 Naqurah 总部之外的29个阵地，并于10月1日宣布已开始“根据精确情报，对黎巴嫩南部的真主党恐怖分子目标和基础设施进行有限、局部和有针对性的地面袭击。这些目标位于靠近边界的村庄，对以色列北部的以色列社区构成直接威胁”。黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在10月2日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/79/396-S/2024/715)中称，“2024年10月1日夜间开始了先期突袭。以色列在黎巴嫩南部边境集结了军队、坦克纵队和装甲车。”

17. 联黎部队观察到以色列国防军于10月1日在 Arab al-Luwayzah 和 Udaysah 附近以及10月2日在 Kfar Kila 附近(均在东区)越过蓝线北侧。以色列国防军随后与真主党在宾特朱拜勒、Marun al-Ra's、Yarun(均在西区)附近交火。10月7日，联黎部队观察到 Labunnah(西区)附近发生冲突。10月8日，联黎部队观察到以色列国防军在迈斯杰贝勒(东区)附近越过蓝线，随后与真主党发生冲突。在 Ramiyah(西区)和沙巴阿(东区)附近观察到进一步侵入。截至10月20日，在 Ayta al-Sha'b、Marwahin、Ramiyah(均在西区)以及 Markaba、Udaysah(均在东区)等地观察到冲突。联黎部队还观察到以色列国防军海军舰艇在黎巴嫩领水附近，9月23日后数次向 Labunnah 附近的行动区开火。

18. 9月23日后，联黎部队行动区的居民区和民用基础设施愈发受到空袭的影响，导致许多居民区和村庄无法居住。Ayta al-Sha'b、Hanawiye、Ma'rub(均在西区)以及希亚姆、迈尔杰尤(均在东区)的电力和水基础设施遭到破坏。据报，以色列国防军的袭击导致联黎部队行动区至少14名医务工作者死亡，医疗设施、救护车和民防中心遭到破坏。据报，在本报告所述期间，对民防中心的袭击导

致 35 人死亡 10 月 5 日，迈尔杰尤、宾特朱拜勒的医院关闭，只剩下黎巴嫩南部提卜宁的一家医院在运作。以色列国防军发表声明，建议黎巴嫩南部至少 67 个村庄的居民搬至 Awali 河以北(行动区以外)。以色列国防军还警告人们不要在 Awali 河以南的黎巴嫩领水内使用船只。以色列国防军在黎巴嫩各地发出 110 多份迁离通知。

19. 黎巴嫩常驻联合国代表团临时代办在 9 月 5 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(A/78/1000-S/2024/657)中指出，“自 2023 年 10 月 8 日以来，在发射的越过蓝线的炮弹中，超过 75% 的弹道始于蓝线以南，即以色列一侧……以色列的轰炸已造成……南部村庄超过 111 000 名居民流离失所。3 000 多个住房单元被摧毁，另有约 32 000 个住房单元受损。”

20. 据报，从黎巴嫩发动的袭击造成以色列平民伤亡。受影响最严重的人口中心位于蓝线附近，包括 Manara、Qiryat Shmona、Shtula。9 月 23 日后，海法、太巴列、特拉维夫也受到影响。卡茨先生在 10 月 10 日给安全理事会主席的信中称，“真主党向以色列社区发射了 13 000 多枚炮弹、1 500 枚反坦克导弹和数百架轰炸无人机，迫使 63 000 多人撤离家园。这场强加给以色列的战争迄今已造成 51 人伤亡，372 多人受伤[……]一年后，2024 年 10 月 1 日，以色列国防军在黎巴嫩南部发起了一次有针对性的有限袭击行动，目标是拆除沿蓝线的真主党军事资产和基础设施。”他还称，“已消灭了数百名恐怖分子，包括真主党的高级指挥系统和拉德万的指挥官和特工。真主党在黎巴嫩的 700 多个恐怖资产，如隧道、武器、导弹和发射器——全都埋设在平民区的中心——已被发现和摧毁。”


21. 截至 10 月 20 日，以色列当局报告称，自 2023 年 10 月 8 日以来，真主党在蓝线以南发动的袭击造成以色列国防军 30 人死亡，自 2024 年 10 月 1 日以来，在蓝线以北的袭击造成以色列国防军 16 人死亡。

22. 在以色列袭击联黎部队行动区后，黎巴嫩武装部队至少有 7 人死亡，资产和基础设施受到破坏。

23. 以色列国防军继续每天进入黎巴嫩领空，违反第 1701 (2006) 号决议，侵犯黎巴嫩主权。6 月 21 日至 9 月 22 日，联黎部队记录到以色列国防军侵犯领空 1 892 次，飞越时间共计 7 251 小时。9 月 23 日至 10 月 20 日，联黎部队记录到以色列国防军侵犯领空 1 293 次，飞越时间共计 7 450 小时。在侵犯领空事件中，无人机约占 57%，战斗机占 42%，直升机和不明航空器占 1%。10 月 17 日观察到侵犯领空 70 次，这是单日次数最多的一天。

图二


2024 年 6 月至 10 月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队观察到的以色列国防军侵犯黎巴嫩领空情况



来源：联黎部队。

图三

2024 年 6 月至 10 月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队每周观察到的以色列国防军空袭情况



来源：联黎部队。

24. 据报，真主党增加了对以色列境内目标使用攻击性无人机。然而，联黎部队无法核实这些报告。最致命的一次袭击发生在 10 月 13 日，在海法以南的 Binyamina，4 名以色列国防军人员被打死，数十人受伤。真主党还声称至少六


次向以色列国防军战斗机和一架直升机发射地对空导弹。7月25日，联黎部队观察到一枚地对空导弹从布尔吉卡拉维亚(西区)附近射向以色列国防军战斗机。

25. 直到9月22日，尽管蓝线两侧发生交火，联黎部队仍保持明显的存在和高速的行动节奏。从9月23日起，为确保部队人员的安全和安保，维和人员长时间呆在掩体中。从9月23日起，特别是从10月1日起，联黎部队开展授权活动的行动自由(见附件一)\*受到严格限制，这阻碍了机动行动以及联黎部队的监测和报告能力。在9月23日前，发生了几起剥夺行动自由的事件，黎巴嫩武装部队通过与有关个人对话帮助解决了这些事件。

26. 6月21日至9月22日，联黎部队平均每月开展13 671次业务活动，包括5 221次车辆巡逻。联黎部队16%的执勤巡逻至少有一名女性维和人员参加。在可开展的活动中，联黎部队与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调开展的行动平均占16.8%，而上一个报告所述期间为18.6%(见S/2024/548，第25段)。这包括每月平均2 179次车辆巡逻和547次反火箭发射巡逻。此外，联黎部队维持8个常设检查站，包括在进入行动区的主要通道上。6月21日至10月20日，联黎部队独立或与黎巴嫩武装部队密切协调，30次发现未经许可的武器，大多是废弃的移动火箭发射平台和火箭。已将发现的所有此类武器通报黎巴嫩武装部队。徒步巡逻、临时检查站、市场徒步巡视、空中行动仍然暂停，但在离蓝线足够远的地区进行了次数有限的徒步巡逻。9月23日至10月20日，联黎部队仅进行了94次车辆巡逻。

图四

2024年6月至10月联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队的业务活动



来源：联黎部队。

\* 仅以来件所用语文分发。

27. 由于持续交火以及未爆弹药和战争遗留物对地面的污染，联黎部队无法系统监测所有地区，包括有兴趣的地点。

28. 联黎部队就联黎部队人员、资产或房地受到的影响启动了 18 项技术调查。已完成 9 项调查。与各方分享了已完成调查的结果。9 月 23 日后启动了 7 项调查。

29. 根据侧重于向黎巴嫩武装部队和黎巴嫩武装部队海军提供支持的战略对话进程，6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日，联黎部队与黎巴嫩武装部队地面部队进行了 149 次联合训练演习和活动，与海军部队进行了 110 次。

30. 联黎部队海上特遣队继续支持海上封锁行动，6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日共拦截 2 265 艘船。联黎部队移交检查的全部 431 艘船都获得黎巴嫩武装部队的放行。黎巴嫩武装部队海军在联黎部队海上特遣队的支持下，继续逐步承担海上封锁行动的指挥职能。10 月 17 日，一架来历不明的无人机在黎巴嫩南部沿海靠近一艘海上特遣队船只。按照既定程序，该船使用了电子对抗措施，无人机随后坠毁爆炸。

## B. 安全和联络安排

31. 6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日，联黎部队在靠近蓝线地区协助开展了 1 220 次民事和人道主义活动，包括 9 月 23 日后的 383 次活动。联黎部队向以色列国防军通报了黎巴嫩红十字会开展的 575 次救援和恢复行动以及 251 次黎巴嫩民防行动，包括扑灭山火。联黎部队就黎巴嫩武装部队的安全和安保问题与以色列国防军联络 320 次，包括在 9 月 23 日后联络 283 次。

32. 联黎部队就联黎部队的保护，包括车队、巡逻、技术调查、医疗后送以及固定阵地，与各方进行了 1 019 次联络。联黎部队 79 次要求以色列国防军停止向联黎部队阵地附近以及黎巴嫩观察员小组或特派团文职人员在提尔的住所开火。6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日，联黎部队为大约 119 名面临紧迫威胁的平民提供了住所。

33. 尽管联黎部队随时准备应各方要求召开会议，但没有举行三方会议。以色列同意 2008 年提出的在特拉维夫设立联黎部队联络处的提议，然而，该提议仍有待落实。

34. 联黎部队批准了 7 个速效项目，其中 2 个是支持危机应对工作，包括支持境内流离失所者。

35. 联黎部队继续支持执行安全理事会关于妇女与和平与安全的第 1325 (2000) 号决议，包括在 9 月 23 日前对 2 837 名联黎部队军事和文职人员，其中包括 202 名妇女，进行性别平等主流化培训。

## C. 解除武装团体的武装

36. 在解除黎巴嫩境内武装团体的武装方面没有取得任何进展。如上所述，真主党和其他非国家武装团体继续展示其军事能力，包括从黎巴嫩向以色列发动

袭击。真主党和其他团体违反第 1701(2006)号决议，在国家控制之外保有武器，这继续制约了国家对其领土充分行使主权和权力的能力。

37. 真主党总书记哈桑·纳斯鲁拉 7 月 10 日表示，“如果达成加沙停火协议[……]我们的阵线将停止开火”。7 月 17 日，他说，“如果侵略停止[……]将由国家进行谈判”。8 月 1 日，他说，“在 Dahieh 发生的事情是一次侵略，而不仅仅是一次暗杀[……]我们已经进入一个不同的新阶段。是否升级取决于敌人的行为和反应。”8 月 6 日，他还说，“10 个月来，我们设定了一个上限[……]即使他们杀害平民，我们也以军队为目标[……]以色列选择了与黎巴嫩的这种升级。”

38. 在 10 月 8 日公布的统计数据中，真主党声称自 2023 年 10 月 8 日以来对以色列采取了 3 194 次军事行动。8 月 16 日，真主党公布了地下隧道装满武器和武装人员的视频。8 月 25 日，真主党首次从 Bika‘地区发射一架无人机，并于 9 月 25 日首次向特拉维夫摩萨德总部附近发射一枚弹道导弹。

39. 以色列常驻联合国代表在 8 月 25 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2024/630)中指出，“真主党策划于今天上午对以色列发动袭击清楚表明，黎巴嫩南部存在非法武器[……]这种情况凸显迫切需要使利塔尼河以南地区非军事化，并实现真主党和在黎巴嫩南部活动的其他武装民兵的解除武装。”(见第 8 段)。

40. 9 月 16 日，以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡宣布，“更新战争目标，将北部居民安全返回家园包含在内”。以色列国防部长约阿夫·加兰特当天也表示，“由于真主党继续与哈马斯‘捆绑’在一起，拒绝结束冲突，达成协议的可能性正在消失”。在以色列 9 月 20 日的袭击后(见第 10 段)，加兰特先生说，“我们的敌人没有藏身之处——甚至连贝鲁特的 Dahieh 也没有”。

41. 9 月 19 日，纳斯鲁拉先生说，“任何军事升级、杀戮或暗杀，甚至全面战争都不能使北部居民回归”。9 月 22 日，真主党副书记卡西姆说，真主党已进入对以色列的“无限期清算战”。

42. 卡茨先生在 9 月 23 日给安全理事会主席的信中说，“以色列上周在贝鲁特对真主党领导人采取行动，挫败他们渗透加利利地区并对以色列进行恐怖袭击的计划，类似于哈马斯 10 月 7 日进行的恐怖袭击……以色列被迫采取自卫措施……以色列已事先警告真主党用于军事目的的建筑物和地区附近的黎巴嫩平民，并建议他们立即撤离危险地带”(见第 11 段)。

43. 9 月 23 日，内塔尼亚胡先生在向黎巴嫩人民发出的视频讲话中称，“以色列的战争不是与你们开战。而是与真主党开战”。9 月 24 日，他表示，“谁的客厅里有导弹，谁的车库里有火箭，谁就不再有家”。

44. 9 月 30 日，卡西姆先生在纳斯鲁拉死后的首次公开讲话中说，“赛义德·哈桑·纳斯鲁拉指引的道路仍在继续”。此前在 9 月 28 日，以色列国防军称，“无论谁接替哈桑·纳斯鲁拉，他都是我们针对的目标”。

45. 伊朗伊斯兰共和国常驻联合国代表在 10 月 1 日给安全理事会主席和秘书长的同文信(S/2024/713)中指出，“伊朗对以色列政权的军事和安全目标进行了一

系列导弹攻击……是……回应……2024年9月17日在黎巴嫩引爆寻呼机，蓄意滥杀滥伤平民，致使伊朗驻黎巴嫩大使受伤；2024年9月27日在贝鲁特暗杀黎巴嫩真主党总书记和伊朗高级军事顾问阿巴斯·尼尔福鲁尚将军。”

46. 截至9月28日，真主党宣布自2023年10月8日以来已有502名真主党成员被杀。真主党随后停止发布死亡通知。黎巴嫩境内的其他非国家武装团体承认至少有89人死亡。哈马斯的伊兹丁卡萨姆旅、Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyah的al-Fajr部队、黎巴嫩抵抗旅声称对本报告所述期间对以色列北部的袭击负责，而阿迈勒运动、叙利亚社会民族主义党、巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织的圣城旅承认死者中有其成员。8月21日，阿克萨烈士旅的一名领导人在对西顿的袭击中被杀，这是以色列对黎巴嫩境内法塔赫武装派别的首次袭击。9月30日，以色列国防军在2006年以来对贝鲁特市中心的首次袭击中打了解放巴勒斯坦人民阵线的三名成员。10月1日，以色列国防军声称在贝鲁特的一次空袭中打死了伊斯兰革命卫队伊玛目侯赛因师指挥官 Al-Faqar Hanawi。

47. 9月30日，哈马斯宣布其在黎巴嫩的领导人法塔赫·谢里夫·阿布·阿明与其家人在提尔附近的 El-Buss 营地被杀。他自2024年3月以来一直在联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处(近东救济工程处)休无薪行政假。当时正在对他与哈马斯可能有联系的指控进行调查。10月1日，以色列国防军首次袭击西顿附近的 Ein El Hilweh，造成3人死亡。10月5日，以色列国防军在其最北端的空袭中，在黎巴嫩北部的黎波里附近的 Beddawi 营地打死了哈马斯伊兹丁卡萨姆旅指挥官 Saeed Atallah 及其家人。对贝鲁特南郊的猛烈轰炸促使附近 Sabra 和 Chatila 难民营大批人逃离。

48. 由于武装行为体的继续存在，Ein El Hilweh 的四所近东救济工程处学校仍然无法进入。

49. 黎巴嫩武装部队以恐怖主义罪名逮捕了6人，据称他们都与达伊沙有关联。

#### D. 武器禁运和边境管制

50. 关于向非国家武装行为体转让武器的指控仍在继续，仍然令人严重关切。如果得到证实，此类转让行为将构成严重违反第 1701 (2006)号决议的行为(见附件二)。\*\* 联合国认真对待有关武器转让的指控，但无法独立证实这些指控。

51. 以色列空军9月26日称，“鉴于我们现已削弱真主党的能力，我们将防范从伊朗转让武器的任何可能性。”以色列国防军9月28日宣布，“我们不允许载有作战装备的敌对航班降落[……]贝鲁特机场是一个民用机场，必须作为民用机场予以维护”。贝鲁特国际机场的控制塔随后遭到黑客攻击，向一架飞来的伊朗民用飞机发出禁止降落的警告。黎巴嫩看守公共工程和交通部长 Ali Hamieh 随后指示拉菲克·哈里里国际机场通知伊朗飞机不要进入黎巴嫩领空。

\*\* 仅以案件所用语文分发。

52. 9月26日，以色列国防军称，“以色列空军战斗机打击了叙利亚-黎巴嫩边境沿线真主党用来从叙利亚向黎巴嫩境内的真主党运送武器的基础设施”。以色列国防军随后于10月3日声称，真主党利用 Masna‘民用过境点走私武器，并于10月4日轰炸了通往过境点的道路。

53. 继续有报告称真主党在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国境内参与军事活动。

## E. 地雷和集束炸弹

54. 交火继续造成未爆弹药污染，对蓝线两侧的平民以及联合国和人道主义工作人员构成威胁。尽管排雷活动仍然暂停，但联黎部队排雷人员在联黎部队阵地受到影响后，处理了10次未爆弹药。为加强联黎部队的弹药管理，进行了163次销毁，共销毁9 246公斤过期弹药。联合国地雷行动司为115名军事和文职人员举办了7次爆炸物风险认识课程。

## F. 边界划定

55. 黎巴嫩与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国之间边界的划定和标界工作没有取得任何进展。在沙巴阿农场地区问题上也没有进展。阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和以色列尚未对2007年10月30日秘书长关于第1701(2006)号决议执行情况的报告中提出的沙巴阿农场地区临时定义(S/2007/641)作出回应。

## G. 政治和体制稳定

56. 9月25日，美国和法国发出联合呼吁，并得到澳大利亚、加拿大、德国、意大利、日本、卡塔尔、沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和欧洲联盟的赞同，要求“立即在巴以边境停火21天，以达成符合安全理事会第1701(2006)号决议的外交解决提供外交空间，并执行安全理事会关于加沙停火的第2735(2024)号决议”。这一联合呼吁没有得到响应。

57. 9月28日，黎巴嫩看守总理纳纳吉布·米卡提在看守内阁特别会议上说，“我们重申对国际合法性和国际法的承诺，我们要求停火和执行第1701(2006)号决议。”他呼吁黎巴嫩人民“摒弃政治分歧、不同立场和不同选择，在维护、保护和加强国家的问题上走到一起。”自2022年10月31日总统职位空缺以来，隶属于自由爱国运动的部长们首次出席了内阁会议。

58. 9月29日，米卡提先生说：“无论战争持续多久，我们最终将回到安全理事会第1701(2006)号决议。我们可以不必流血，去执行协议。”同一天，卡茨先生表示，“我们拒绝与真主党达成和解的提议，我们不会同意停火。达成协议的唯一途径是将真主党转移到利塔尼河以北并解除其武装。”

59. 在本报告所述期间，联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员与黎巴嫩和以色列的所有相关行为体以及区域内的对话者进行了密集接触，强调必须立即恢复停止敌对行动以及通过外交解决办法执行第1701(2006)号决议。

60. 纳斯鲁拉先生死后，黎巴嫩武装部队于9月29日呼吁“公民维护国家团结，不要在我国历史上这一危险而微妙的阶段卷入可能影响国内和平的行动”。10

月 8 日，黎巴嫩武装部队表示，它“随时准备根据政治当局的决定，在现有能力范围内保卫国土”。

61. 看守内阁启动了国家和国家以下各级紧急行动中心，以应对正在发生的人道主义危机。公共卫生部指示受影响地区的医院推迟处理非紧急病例。9 月 23 日后，学校和教育机构关闭，1 000 多所学校和公共建筑改造成流离失所者的集体收容所。

62. 截至 10 月 20 日，黎巴嫩公共卫生部表示，自 2023 年 10 月 8 日以来，超过 2 467 人丧生，其中包括 150 名儿童和 270 名妇女，11 569 人受伤。2024 年 9 月 23 日至 10 月 20 日，超过 1 860 人丧生。黎巴嫩政府估计，120 多万人流离失所，民用基础设施等遭到广泛破坏。世界卫生组织核实，黎巴嫩医疗设施遭到 46 次袭击，造成 95 名卫生工作者和患者死亡，77 人受伤。由于以色列轰炸造成的破坏，黎巴嫩各地的 5 间医院和 100 个初级保健中心和诊所被关闭，另有 5 间一医院部分疏散。空袭造成 28 个供水设施受损，影响到至少 344 000 人的用水。10 月 16 日，在流离失所者中确认了一例霍乱病例。

63. 作为对政府主导的应对行动的补充，联合国、会员国和非政府合作伙伴调集了食物、水和基本物资分发给流离失所者。10 月 1 日，启动黎巴嫩紧急呼吁，呼吁在 12 月前筹集 4.257 亿美元援助 100 万人。截至 10 月 20 日，该呼吁已筹到 15.1% 的资金，达 6 440 万美元。

64. 国内和国际上为打破总统选举僵局所作的努力仍在继续，尚未成功。9 月 30 日，米卡提先生在与议会议长纳比·贝里会晤后表示，“一旦真主党与以色列之间的冲突实现停火，黎巴嫩将举行议会会议选举新总统”。在本报告所述期间，议会没有开会。

65. 8 月 14 日，看守内阁批准征募 1 500 名黎巴嫩武装部队人员部署在黎巴嫩南部(见附件三)。\*\*\*

66. 9 月 23 日，看守内阁批准 2025 年国家预算草案，尚待议会审查。自国际货币基金组织与黎巴嫩签署工作人员级别协议(见 [S/2022/556](#)，第 50 段)两年半以来，董事会级别协议的大多数先决行动仍未完成。

67. 对 2020 年 8 月 4 日贝鲁特港口爆炸案的司法调查、对 2021 年 10 月 14 日致命的 Tayyunah 冲突案中 68 人的起诉(见 [S/2021/953](#)，第 57 段)、对 2021 年 2 月 4 日杀害 Lokman Slim 的调查(见 [S/2021/240](#)，第 46 段)均无进展。

68. 9 月，前中央银行行长 Riad Salameh 被捕，他被控贪污、盗窃公共资金、伪造以及资产非法增加。

69. 黎巴嫩全国妇女委员会在三个省与地方当局和民间社会举行了磋商，以支持制定黎巴嫩关于安全理事会第 1325(2000)号决议的第二个国家行动计划。此外，

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\*\*\* 仅以来件所用语文分发。

黎巴嫩武装部队在联合国促进性别平等和增强妇女权能署(妇女署)的支持下，为女兵举办了一系列能力建设讲习班。

70. 截至 9 月 30 日，联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)在黎巴嫩登记了 779 621 名难民和寻求庇护者，其中包括 768 353 名叙利亚难民和 11 268 名其他国籍的难民和寻求庇护者。自 2015 年以来，黎巴嫩政府暂停了难民署对叙利亚难民的新登记，因此，难民的实际人数不详。黎巴嫩政府估计，黎巴嫩境内有 150 万叙利亚难民。2024 年迄今，难民署已查明 485 起驱逐出境事件，至少有 4 800 名叙利亚国民在检查站遭到突袭和逮捕，另有 19 起驱逐出境事件涉及 878 名叙利亚国民，他们是在海路转移未果后被驱逐的。由于黎巴嫩境内的叙利亚难民危机尚未解决，加上地方当局实施限制性行政措施，保护空间缩小，包括驱回风险增加，人们日益感到沮丧。据报，至少有 34 名叙利亚人，包括儿童和妇女，在以色列 8 月 17 日对 Nabatiyeh 的袭击和 9 月 26 日对 Biqa' 北部 Yunin 的袭击中丧生。自 9 月 23 日以来，至少有 276 000 名黎巴嫩和叙利亚籍人经陆路逃往阿拉伯叙利亚共和国。

### 三. 安保和安全措施

71. 利塔尼河以北和以南的指定官员继续进行协调，确保黎巴嫩境内所有联合国人员的安全和安保。8 月 1 日，批准了至 12 月 31 日的临时家庭限制措施，并批准本国工作人员及其家属搬离利塔尼河以北高风险地区。9 月 23 日，利塔尼河以南的指定官员要求国际文职人员并建议除方案关键人员外的所有本国工作人员暂时从利塔尼河以南转移到以北。同时建议留在行动区的本国工作人员需要时前往最近的联合国阵地避难。留在利塔尼河以南的对方案至关重要的联黎部队国际文职人员和黎巴嫩观察员小组人员迁往纳古拉的联黎部队总部。10 月 1 日，批准减少来自黎巴嫩的方案关键工作人员的足迹，包括从利塔尼河以南迁往以北的人员。9 月 2 日，一名联黎部队承包商在纳古拉附近被打死。9 月 23 日，难民署一名当地征聘工作人员及其一名符合条件的受扶养人和一名难民署承包商分别在以色列对 Biqa' 和提尔的空袭中丧生。

72. 联黎部队继续坚守阵地，包括蓝线沿线的所有阵地，同时调整安保和安全措施，包括军事应急计划和部队保护措施，以减少在蓝线附近阵地的足迹。9 月 23 日后，联黎部队优先考虑后勤行动，为其阵地提供补给。

73. 6 月 21 日至 10 月 20 日，联黎部队记录了至少 50 起影响联合国阵地和车辆的事件。8 名维和人员受伤。8 月 18 日，在 Duhayrah(西区)附近，3 名维和人员在其车辆附近遭到空袭受伤。7 月 27 日和 8 月 13 日，联黎部队巡逻车在萨尔达(东区)附近遭到枪击。8 月 10 日，在 Hanin(西区)附近，附近发生的一起爆炸损坏了联黎部队的两辆车。6 月 25 日，联黎部队 3 名承包商的汽车在 Ramiyah 附近遭到枪击。

74. 10 月 1 日至 20 日，联黎部队阵地多次遭到直接射击，5 名维和人员受伤。10 月 2 日，以色列国防军紧邻 Marun al-R'as 附近的联黎部队阵地修建了一个集

结阵地，并在该地点部署坦克。以色列国防军在联合国阵地上空开火，并在附近进行控制爆破拆除，破坏了周边堡垒。在联合国提出正式抗议后，以色列国防军几天后撤离该阵地。10月8日，以色列国防军士兵向先前举行三方会议的纳古拉角联黎部队阵地开火，造成物质损失，并向 Labunnah 阵地开火，造成周边监控摄像头失灵。10月10日，以色列国防军从 Labunnah 联黎部队阵地防护墙的一个缺口开火，击中维和人员藏身的掩体，损坏了车辆和通信系统。观察到一架无人机在阵地内飞行。10月10日，以色列国防军的一辆坦克向联黎部队纳古拉总部的一座瞭望塔开火，打伤两名维和人员。10月11日，纳古拉总部一座瞭望塔附近发生两起爆炸，两名维和人员受伤。10月11日至12日夜间，纳古拉总部的一名维和人员被流弹击中，造成轻伤。10月13日，两辆以色列国防军坦克摧毁了联黎部队 Ramiyah 阵地的正门，强行进入该房地，在联黎部队抗议后才离开。此后不久，以色列国防军在阵地附近发射烟雾弹，造成 15 名维和人员皮肤发炎和(或)胃肠道反应。10月16日，以色列国防军的一辆坦克向 Kfar Kila 附近联黎部队阵地的一座瞭望塔开火，损坏瞭望塔并摧毁两个摄像头。10月20日，以色列国防军的一辆推土机摧毁了联黎部队 Marwahin 阵地的一座瞭望塔和周边围栏。联黎部队和和平行动部就这些事态发展向以色列当局提出抗议，强调各方有责任确保联合国人员和房地的安全和安保。

75. 特遣队的轮调在 10 月份暂停。自 9 月 28 日以来，联黎部队海上特遣队在贝鲁特与纳古拉之间接送部分联黎部队人员。

76. 2022 年 12 月 14 日在 Mazra'at al-Aqibiyah 附近对联黎部队的致命袭击案的下次庭审定于 2025 年 2 月 12 日举行，原定日期为 2024 年 6 月 7 日。关于 2018 年 8 月 4 日在迈季代勒尊(西区)发生的事件，联合国尚未获悉有将施害者绳之以法的任何刑事诉讼。军事检察官指示黎巴嫩武装部队扩大对 2021 年 12 月 22 日在 Shaqra、2022 年 1 月 4 日在宾特朱拜勒、2022 年 1 月 25 日在 Ramiyah 侵害联黎部队维和人员行为的调查。

#### 四. 联合国驻黎巴嫩临时部队的部署情况

77. 截至 10 月 20 日，联黎部队有来自 50 个部队派遣国的 10 048 名军事人员，其中包括 857 名妇女(8.5%)，以及 787 名文职人员(241 名国际工作人员、546 名本国工作人员)，其中包括 253 名妇女(32%)。联黎部队海上特遣队由 5 艘船只组成，有 548 名特派团军事人员，其中包括 45 名妇女(8.6%)。此外，来自联合国停战监督组织的 49 名军事观察员，其中包括 10 名妇女(20.4%)，在联黎部队的行动指挥与控制下为黎巴嫩观察员小组服务。最高级别的女军官为中校，最高级别的女文职人员为 D-2 职等。

78. 联黎部队根据安全理事会第 2539 (2020)号决议，继续实施全面规划和业绩评估系统，并评估联黎部队资源的持续相关性(见 S/2020/473)。

79. 联黎部队继续在黎巴嫩和以色列受到广泛的错误信息和虚假信息攻击，这些信息涉及联黎部队的任务、活动和执行第 1701(2006)号决议的能力。对此，

联黎部队发表声明、进行访谈并组织媒体面对面访问和虚拟访问，以澄清其任务和活动。

80. 联黎部队对各单位执行以行动促维和承诺和安全理事会第 2436 (2018)号决议的后勤、培训和行动准备情况进行了十三次评价。没有发现不足之处。

## 五. 行为和纪律

81. 6月1日至9月30日，联黎部队记录了7起可能的失当行为指控，其中包括1起性剥削和性虐待指控。联合国黎巴嫩问题特别协调员办事处没有收到指控报告。各特派团仍然致力于严格遵守联合国对性剥削和性虐待以及性骚扰的零容忍政策。向联黎部队7名文职人员和2 808名军事人员提供了联合国行为标准的上岗培训和提高认识培训。此外，394名文职工作人员接受了防止性剥削和性虐待以及防止性骚扰的培训。

## 六. 意见

82. 自越过蓝线交火开始一年以来，黎巴嫩和以色列一再违反停止敌对行动的规定，违背第 1701 (2006)号决议，处于全面冲突的边缘，有可能使该区域陷入灾难。必须不惜一切代价地避免这种情况。

83. 在蓝线两边，已有太多人丧生。许多人受伤。一百多万人流离失所。村庄和生计被毁。发射的每一枚火箭和导弹、投下的每一枚炸弹、开展的每一次地面行动，都使双方进一步远离第 1701 (2006)号决议提出的愿景以及双方平民安全回返的必要条件。我对蓝线两侧平民的安全表示严重关切，并强烈谴责杀害平民事件。

84. 我再次敦促所有相关行为体悬崖勒马。应当不遗余力地避免更大范围的冲突。局势降级和达成政治解决办法仍有可能，这是唯一可行的前进方向。我呼吁整个国际社会发挥影响力，以免为时过晚。恢复停止敌对行动的政治谈判解决方案必须立足于双方全面执行第 1701(2006)号决议。黎巴嫩问题特别协调员和联黎部队特派团团长兼部队指挥官继续为此开展工作。与此同时，联合国旗帜继续沿着蓝线飘扬。联黎部队仍然能够根据安全理事会赋予的任务，支持各方执行第 1701 (2006)号决议。

85. 不断升级的暴力事件，包括以色列对黎巴嫩人口稠密地区(包括贝鲁特)的密集空中轰炸，以及以色列国防军跨越蓝线的陆地入侵，是黎巴嫩一代人以来经历的最致命的暴力，造成了人道主义危机，妇女和女童受到的影响尤为严重，民用基础设施遭到广泛破坏。联合国大家庭也有三名成员丧生，数名联合国维和人员受伤。我敦促所有相关行为体充分遵守国际人道法规定的义务，包括攻击中和针对攻击影响的区分、相称和预防原则，并通过有效的人道主义通知机制等方式，为人道主义援助的快速、无阻碍通行以及人道主义工作者的行动提供便利，以减轻人道主义行为体和受援者面临的风险。必须确保保护平民，包

括妇女、儿童、记者、医务工作者和其他应急响应者，以及民用基础设施。平民，包括儿童、记者和医务工作者，绝不应成为攻击目标。我呼吁捐助者确保黎巴嫩紧急呼吁获得充足资金。

86. 真主党和其他非国家武装团体 2023 年 10 月 8 日以来继续每天发动袭击，这表明，在利塔尼河和蓝线之间地区有组织在国家权力之外拥有武器，破坏了黎巴嫩国家的主权和安全，违反了第 1701(2006)和 1559(2004)号决议。我再次呼吁黎巴嫩政府为全面执行《塔伊夫协议》以及第 1559 (2004)和 1680 (2006)号决议的有关规定提供便利，这些规定要求解除黎巴嫩境内所有武装团体的武装，并将黎巴嫩政府的控制权扩展到黎巴嫩全境。我再次呼吁处理第 1701(2006)号决议的未决问题和国防战略问题。全国对话早先的决定，特别是关于解除非黎巴嫩团体武装、拆除解放巴勒斯坦人民阵线-总指挥部派和“法塔赫起义”组织的基地的决定，必须得到执行，这一点仍很重要。

87. 第 1701 (2006)号决议要求各方尊重蓝线以及黎巴嫩在其国际公认边界内的领土完整、主权和政治独立。以色列国防军在黎巴嫩领土上的行动以及真主党和黎巴嫩境内其他非国家武装团体对以色列的袭击公然违反了第 1701 (2006)号决议。我再次谴责以色列侵犯黎巴嫩主权的一切行为，并再次促请以色列政府停止一切飞越黎巴嫩领土的行为。我还谴责真主党和来自黎巴嫩的其他非国家武装团体侵犯以色列主权的任何行为。

88. 我强烈谴责在联黎部队阵地或其附近的任何武装活动，并回顾所有危及维和人员安全和安保的行为都被视为违反国际法。不得将联黎部队维和人员作为攻击目标。对他们的攻击违反了国际法，包括国际人道主义法，并可能构成战争罪。所有行为体还必须确保联黎部队的行动自由。联黎部队按照授权开展业务活动的的能力比以往任何时候都更加重要。

89. 对于袭击联黎部队的施害者，包括 2022 年 12 月 14 日在阿吉比耶附近杀害 1 名维和人员、打伤另外 3 名维和人员的施害者，必须追究其责任。在帮助防止今后发生此类事件，包括帮助消除关于联黎部队任务的错误信息和虚假信息方面，东道国政府的作用仍然至关重要。我关切地注意到，黎巴嫩武装部队尽管没有越过蓝线交火，却有人员死亡。我欢迎黎巴嫩看守政府决定批准增募 1 500 名黎巴嫩武装部队士兵，这是朝着将国家权力扩展到黎巴嫩全境迈出的重要一步。加强黎巴嫩武装部队在利塔尼河以南以及海上的存在和能力是第 1701 (2006)号决议的核心内容。我感谢会员国提供支持，帮助维持黎巴嫩武装部队，并呼吁捐助者提供与其全面执行第 1701(2006)号决议的承诺相称的物质和财政支持。

90. 随着政治僵局接近两年，我敦促黎巴嫩政治领导人采取果断措施，选出一位能够代表和维护全体黎巴嫩人民利益的总统，并确保国家机构充分发挥职能，以应对该国紧迫的政治和安全挑战。

91. 我感到遗憾的是，在根据第 1701(2006)号决议第 10 段解决沙巴阿农场问题方面没有取得任何进展。我再次促请以色列和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国对秘书长 2007 年 10 月 30 日报告(S/2007/641)中提出的沙巴阿农场的临时定义作出回应。

92. 以色列国防军继续占领 Ghajar 北部和蓝线以北毗邻地区，这违反了第 1701 (2006)号决议，必须停止。我再次敦促以色列当局履行第 1701(2006)号决议规定的义务，撤出蓝线北侧的盖杰尔北部和毗邻地区。我注意到，黎巴嫩政府欢迎联黎部队 2011 年关于为以色列国防军撤出被占地区提供便利的提议，但以色列政府尚未作出回应。

93. 我呼吁黎巴嫩政府按照 2012 年《巴卜达声明》，遵守该国的不卷入政策，并呼吁黎巴嫩所有各方和国民不再介入叙利亚冲突和该区域其他冲突。我对真主党与以色列之间冲突区域化的风险深感关切。我谴责一切违反第 1701 (2006)号决议、让战斗人员和作战物资越过黎巴嫩与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国边界或该区域其他地方的行为。

94. 我仍然感到关切的是，长期和严重的资金短缺将危及近东救济工程处在整个地区提供稳定方面的关键作用。我呼吁捐助者增加财政支助，确保工程处继续向黎巴嫩境内和其他地方的所有巴勒斯坦难民提供基本服务和支助。对工程处中立性的独立审查认为，工程处的中立性框架比同类实体更加健全，并且正在尽一切努力落实审查提出的建议。

95. 我承认，黎巴嫩因在境内收容大量难民而面临巨大挑战。黎巴嫩人民几十年来对大批难民的热情好客值得称赞，但我呼吁广大国际社会努力找到可持续的解决方案，满足难民的需求，减轻黎巴嫩的过重负担。对难民及其收容社区日益增长的需求作出强有力、团结一致和资金充足的反应仍然至关重要，同样重要的是，应始终如一地适用法律和程序保障，包括不推回原则，以确保保护空间不进一步缩小。当前的安全风险和解决黎巴嫩境内普遍存在的流离失所问题所面临的挑战，进一步加剧了寻找可持续解决方案的紧迫性，包括寻求让希望重返家园的叙利亚难民能够安全和有尊严地返回家园。

96. 2020 年 8 月 4 日贝鲁特港口爆炸事件已过去四年多，我再次呼吁黎巴嫩当局继续进行公正、彻底和透明的调查。

97. 我向所有受到持续敌对行动影响的人表示慰问。我衷心感谢所有向联黎部队和黎巴嫩观察员小组提供军事人员和装备的国家。我尤其要赞扬前线维和人员在最严峻的安全条件和后勤限制下坚守阵地的英勇行为。我感谢黎巴嫩问题特别协调员雅尼娜·亨尼斯-普拉斯哈特、联黎部队特派团团长兼部队指挥官阿罗尔多·拉萨罗·萨恩斯中将，以及在这一困难时期保持团结的部队派遣国和联合国国家工作队所有成员，感谢他们在极端困难的情况下继续致力于和平与稳定。

## 附件一

**Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 June to 20 October 2024**

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, were fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigations, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. In the reporting period, UNIFIL continued its operations until 22 September, despite the daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, which affected patrols and UNIFIL positions, in particular those close to the Blue Line. Operations in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces continued, where possible.
3. These included a focus on counter-rocket-launching patrols, including in the surroundings of UNIFIL positions, and Blue Line armoured vehicle patrols. Some foot patrols and market walks resumed where security conditions allowed until 22 September, while temporary checkpoints and air operations remained suspended throughout the reporting period.
4. From 21 June to 22 September, UNIFIL conducted an average of 5,221 monthly vehicle patrols during the day and at night. Of these, an average of 2,179 vehicle patrols were conducted each month along the Blue Line. In addition, the Force conducted an average of 1,027 inspection activities each month, which included the operation of permanent checkpoints and the conduct of counter-rocket-launching patrols each month. Between 23 September and 20 October, only 94 patrols were completed.
5. From 23 September to 20 October, normal operational and logistical activities outside positions were only possible for a total of 53 hours and limited to certain parts of the area of operations. The prolonged periods of time that UNIFIL peacekeepers spent in shelter following notifications from the Israel Defense Forces, stated by the latter to be necessary for the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel, further significantly impeded mandated activities. Between 8 and 10 October, for instance, some positions were in shelter for a continuous 42 hours.
6. From 21 June to 22 September, UNIFIL was subject to direct attacks on several occasions. Four such attacks occurred close to Sarda in Sector East. On one occasion, a contractor was injured by incoming fire and evacuated to a civilian hospital outside of the area of operations.
7. As noted in the report, following the launch by the Israel Defense Forces of Operation Northern Arrows on 23 September, UNIFIL movement all but ceased. Furthermore, with ground operations north of the Blue Line in the area of operations from 1 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel and infrastructure were on occasion situated directly next to United Nations positions, and such positions were damaged as a result of exchanges of fire between the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah.
8. Prior to 23 September, the mission continuously coordinated with the Lebanese Armed Forces with respect to its freedom of movement and unrestricted access to its

entire area of operations. However, the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object to some patrol routes proposed by UNIFIL to expand the Force's presence outside main routes and municipal centres, on the grounds that they were either private roads or areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL consistently followed up on reported incidents of restrictions of movement with the Lebanese authorities. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the Force continued to experience restrictions, as detailed below. Notably, since the start of Israeli ground operations on 1 October, the limited movements that UNIFIL has undertaken in the area of operations have on a few occasions been impeded by the Israel Defense Forces as well as by damage and attacks on United Nations positions.

### **Access to all locations of interest**

9. Owing to the security situation, during the reporting period, UNIFIL was not able to systematically monitor locations of interest, including Green Without Borders sites. Many of these sites were destroyed or damaged by the Israel Defense Forces.

### **Freedom of movement incidents**

10. On 22 June, approximately 20 individuals stopped two UNIFIL patrol vehicles in the vicinity of Kawtariyat al Ruzz (outside the area of operations) about 6 km from the Tyre-Sidon highway. The individuals searched the vehicles and personnel and seized eight mobile phones, three watches, a pair of earphones, maps and an internal driving order. After 40 minutes, another individual arrived and asked the peacekeepers to make a U-turn. Shortly thereafter, the peacekeepers returned to a nearby UNIFIL position without completing their planned activities. UNIFIL followed up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

11. On 28 June, 10 individuals with a scooter blocked a UNIFIL patrol from entering the urban area of Suwwanan in the vicinity of Majdal Silm (Sector East). The peacekeepers turned back without completing their planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL liaised with the local municipal authorities, which said that some young men had stopped the patrol from entering the village late at night without the Lebanese Armed Forces. The mayor further stated that this incident had occurred without any aggressive behaviour.

12. On 6 July, eight individuals with two cars stopped a UNIFIL patrol that was returning from a joint activity with the Lebanese Armed Forces in the vicinity of Burj al-Muluk (Sector East). The individuals waved knives, seized a United Nations flag and attempted to puncture one of the vehicles' tires. Peacekeepers remained in their vehicles until a man persuaded the individuals to leave. The patrol then drove to a nearby UNIFIL position. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

13. On 12 July, 8 to 10 individuals with three scooters and two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-west of Burj al Qibli (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and reached the location 30 minutes later. The patrol resumed its planned itinerary.

14. On 12 July, a UNIFIL convoy unintentionally impeded the movement of a private vehicle while making a U-turn on the coastal road, south-east of Tyre (Sector West). The private vehicle followed the convoy in an aggressive manner and hit one of the UNIFIL vehicles. The left mirror was damaged and the front bumper scratched. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed about the incident. The local mayor informed UNIFIL that he had contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces at the time of the

incident and the situation was resolved, noting that UNIFIL was patrolling without the Lebanese Armed Forces.

15. On 13 July, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by a vehicle north-east of Yatar (Sector West). A few minutes afterwards, an additional vehicle and three motorcycles arrived and blocked the patrol at the rear. Five minutes later, 5 to 10 additional vehicles and scooters gathered at the scene, with a total of around 20 individuals surrounding the patrol, 1 hitting the patrol vehicles. Two of the individuals then drove with the patrol out of the area, warning it not to return. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. The local mayor stated that the youths had acted independently. In response, the municipality issued a public notice instructing residents to leave such matters to the Lebanese Armed Forces or the municipal police if necessary.

16. On 14 July, UNIFIL peacekeepers on a joint patrol with the Lebanese Armed Forces observed a rocket launching platform in the vicinity of Dayr Mimas (Sector East). Shortly thereafter, approximately 20 individuals, one vehicle and several scooters arrived at the location and acted aggressively, damaging the UNIFIL vehicles slightly. The UNIFIL patrol left while a Lebanese Armed Forces explosive ordnance disposal team remained at the site.

17. On 15 July, a UNIFIL team (four hospital personnel with an ambulance) diverted from the main road by mistake was stopped by approximately 10 individuals in the southern suburbs of Beirut (outside the area of operations). The individuals checked the documentation and cell phones of the medical personnel, directed them to an office and told them to wait. Two hours later, they were accompanied by a Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle to a Lebanese Armed Forces intelligence office and questioned for about two hours. Subsequently, the medical staff were brought back to the highway and continued their movement to Naqurah (Sector West). No aggressive behaviour was observed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

18. On 21 July, a UNIFIL patrol stopped north-west of Khirbat Silm (Sector East) due to a vehicle malfunction. Ten individuals reached the patrol and when, 15 minutes later, a UNIFIL quick reaction team arrived at the location, they prevented it from recovering the vehicle. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and, after 50 minutes, a Lebanese Armed Forces patrol arrived and facilitated the recovery of the vehicle by the quick reaction team. The patrol continued its planned itinerary. No injury to any personnel or damage was reported.

19. On 22 July, a UNIFIL patrol had to stop near Qusayr (Sector East) due to a mechanical failure and, shortly thereafter, approximately 20 individuals arrived, warned the peacekeepers to leave immediately and burned tyres. When the UNIFIL quick reaction team arrived 50 minutes later and the convoy began moving towards a nearby UNIFIL position, the individuals again blocked the road with cars and scooters. At one point, approximately 20 individuals were observed, some using radios and others with handguns. Arriving at the UNIFIL position, the last UNIFIL vehicles were once again blocked by individuals for a few minutes. Two UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained minor injuries. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

20. On 27 July, a UNIFIL patrol's vehicle was hit by gunshots south-west of Sarda. The point of origin of the shots could not be confirmed, but the mission's assessment is that they were fired by the Israel Defense Forces from south of the Blue Line. The vehicle was hit ten times and suffered from a flat tyre, rendering it immobile. The UNIFIL recovery team moved the damaged vehicle to a nearby UNIFIL position. No injury to UNIFIL peacekeepers was reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, and a formal protest letter was sent to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL has also launched an internal investigation into the incident.

21. On 29 July, an individual, without providing an explanation, told a UNIFIL patrol that it could not continue on a specific road in the vicinity of Rashayya al-Fukhkhari (Sector East). The individual did not act aggressively. The patrol reversed and reached the UNIFIL position to which it was travelling. There was no impact on patrolling activities, as peacekeepers had already finished their operational duties. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL followed up with the local mayor, who denounced the behaviour and reiterated the municipality's good relations with the mission.

22. On 2 August, two individuals on a scooter stopped a UNIFIL logistical movement near Dayr Siryan (Sector East) and damaged the camera of one of the vehicles before leaving. The patrol continued its planned movement and there was no injury to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL contacted the mayor of Dayr Siryan, who stated that he was unaware of the incident and that it was an isolated act, not directed by any parties or authorities. He emphasized his commitment to maintaining positive relations with UNIFIL. The Lebanese Armed Forces were also informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

23. On 7 August, two individuals on scooters encircled a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Ayn Ba'al (Sector West) and threw a shoe at one of the vehicles. At the same time, one of the vehicle's rear windows was smashed; peacekeepers were not able to confirm how the window was broken. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel, and the convoy was able to continue its planned itinerary. The local deputy mayor stated to UNIFIL that he was unaware of the incident and added that the village population is friendly towards UNIFIL. However, he explained that if the patrol went into narrow streets or took the valley road without the Lebanese Armed Forces, it would be stopped by villagers.

24. On 8 August, five individuals with three vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol from the front and back, impeding its movement in the vicinity of Aynata (Sector West). The individuals did not act aggressively and were not carrying weapons. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, reached the location shortly thereafter and assisted the patrol in moving away from the area. The patrol interrupted its planned activities and returned to its UNIFIL position. UNIFIL followed up with the mayor of Aynata, who expressed his concern, as UNIFIL has repeatedly been stopped in this neighbourhood where the local community is very suspicious. In addition, the mayor said that he would put up road signs indicating the main road for UNIFIL patrols.

25. On 10 August, a UNIFIL patrol reported an explosion approximately 60 m from its vehicles close to Hanin (Sector West), both of which were damaged. The patrol was able to return to its UNIFIL position. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. At the moment of the strike, no warning or recommendation to seek shelter had been received by UNIFIL. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

26. On 11 August, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was blocked by a vehicle parked in the middle of the road, along with nine unarmed men, south-east of Kafr Hammam (Sector East). The patrol's language assistant interacted with the individuals, but tension increased and the patrol was asked to leave. A few minutes later, the Observer Group Lebanon patrol returned to its base. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

27. On 13 August, UNIFIL peacekeepers south-west of Sarda heard nine machine gun shots, two hitting the back and the right side of the last patrol vehicle. The impacts were not noted until the activity was completed and the patrol reached its destination. The UNIFIL patrol was moving from north to south along the Blue Line, which was on the west side of the convoy. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. The

Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

28. On 18 August, UNIFIL peacekeepers on administrative duty reported an air strike in close proximity to their UNIFIL vehicle. All three peacekeepers suffered injuries and the vehicle was damaged. At the moment of the strike, no warning or recommendation to seek shelter had been received by UNIFIL.

29. On 19 August, two individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Kafr Hammam and told peacekeepers that they could not continue on that specific road. The patrol observed bushes and branches further along the road, obstructing movement, and turned around. The patrol continued patrolling, making a detour. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

30. On 30 August, three individuals in civilian clothes with two motorcycles stopped a UNIFIL patrol near 'Aytit (Sector West) and aggressively requested the patrol to turn back. One individual told the peacekeepers to remain in the vehicles while making a phone call. A UNIFIL vehicle was hit with a machete-like knife, causing scratches and damage to one side mirror. Five or six more individuals reached the location and, to avoid further tension, the patrol moved back approximately 1 km and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and accompanied the patrol out of the area, and it returned to its UNIFIL position. The local mayor condemned the attack and attributed it as an individual incident, noting that two police officers were deployed rapidly to the site. The mayor also recommended that UNIFIL patrols be conducted with the Lebanese Armed Forces to prevent such incidents.

31. On 2 September, UNIFIL peacekeepers on a patrol reported five gunshots close to their patrol near Sarda (Sector East). Stones that ricocheted after being hit by the bullets bounced and impacted the patrol vehicles, although the vehicles were not directly struck by gunshots. The patrol was able to continue its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

32. On 3 September, a convoy of two UNIFIL vehicles, followed by three UNIFIL civilian contractors in three unmarked civilian cars, was hit by gun fire in the vicinity of Sarda (Sector East) while moving from north to south along the Blue Line, with the Blue Line on the west side of the convoy. One of the contractors was injured by an impact on his upper body and several impacts on the right side of his vehicle were noted. The convoy reached its final destination and the UNIFIL contractor was evacuated to a civilian hospital outside the area of operations.

33. On 9 September, approximately 30 individuals blocked the road in front of a joint Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL patrol near Majdal Zun (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces engaged with the individuals and urged the UNIFIL peacekeepers to change their itinerary. The patrol moved to another location and subsequently decided to continue in the opposite direction. No aggressive behaviour was noted during the incident.

34. On 10 September, two individuals with a scooter and a vehicle stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Qalawiyah (Sector West) and asked peacekeepers to turn back. The patrol moved and waited for the Lebanese Armed Forces, which had been informed. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived 20 minutes later together with an individual on a scooter who previously had taken a photo of the patrol. The patrol assessed the situation with the Lebanese Armed Forces and continued its movement, using an alternative route.

35. On 13 September, approximately 10 unarmed individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Bra'shit (Sector West) and asked peacekeepers to turn back. The individuals threatened the peacekeepers and stole three cell phones, one base station radio, one tablet, one camera, one global navigation satellite system and one antenna. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, reached the location after 50 minutes, and accompanied the patrol to a nearby Lebanese Armed Forces position before moving to a UNIFIL position. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

36. On 14 September, six individuals with five scooters blocked a UNIFIL patrol, north-west of Rashaf (Sector West). The individuals behaved aggressively, and one threw a rock at the patrol vehicle, without hitting it. The patrol turned around, but was once again blocked. Peacekeepers were able to take an alternative road towards Haddatha (Sector West) and requested assistance from the Lebanese Armed Forces. After 15 minutes, the patrol decided to continue to a nearby UNIFIL position on its own. This is the third denial of freedom in Rashaf during 2024.

37. On 17 September, a UNIFIL ambulance conducted a medical evacuation from Naqurah to Beirut when, on the outskirts of Tyre, an angry crowd of 20 to 30 individuals, some carrying small iron rods and screwdrivers, stopped and vandalized the ambulance by throwing stones at the windows and attempted to forcibly open the doors. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene and intervened. The ambulance continued its movement to a nearby medical facility and waited for the Lebanese Armed Forces to facilitate its movement to a UNIFIL position. The incident occurred in the context of widespread panic following the explosion of communication devices in Lebanon.

38. On 17 September, several individuals gathered with ambulances, vehicles and scooters on the road in Tibnin (Sector West), blocking a UNIFIL convoy's movement. When the convoy tried to leave the area, some individuals started acting aggressively, throwing stones. With the help of some other individuals, the convoy left the area and reached a nearby UNIFIL position. The incident occurred in the context of widespread panic following the explosion of communication devices in Lebanon.

39. On 17 September, military observers from Observer Group Lebanon observed a UNIFIL ambulance being hit by an angry crowd on the coastal road, north-west of Burj al Qibli. A man approached the Observer Group Lebanon vehicle, which was stuck in traffic close to the ambulance and shouted while punching the windows. Two other individuals hit the car and attempted to open the doors and smash the windows. Some others in the crowd intervened and helped the Observer Group Lebanon personnel turn their vehicle and drive back towards UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah. No damage or casualties were reported. The incident occurred in the context of widespread panic following the explosion of communication devices in Lebanon.

40. On 18 September, 30 to 40 individuals exhibiting aggressive behaviour stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Burj al Qibli. The individuals surrounded the patrol and smashed the vehicles' windows and side mirrors, and slashed and deflated the vehicles' tires. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The vehicles were towed to a UNIFIL position, accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The event occurred in the context of widespread panic caused by the second wave of explosions of communication devices across the country.

41. On 19 September, three individuals made hand gestures, telling a UNIFIL patrol to turn back in the vicinity of Qulaylah (Sector West). The patrol that was conducted together with the Lebanese Armed Forces stopped. The Lebanese Armed Forces

talked to the individuals and it was agreed that the patrol would turn back on the same road, not finalizing the planned route.

42. On 21 September, three individuals, identifying themselves as Hizbullah members, stopped a UNIFIL patrol north-east of Mukhayyam a-Qasimiyah (outside the area of operations) and took communication devices. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and arrived at the location after 30 minutes, and shortly thereafter the UNIFIL patrol returned to its position. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned.

43. On 27 September, approximately 30 male individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Juwayya (Sector West) and aggressively asked peacekeepers to turn around. The patrol observed a vehicle carrying heavy military equipment and another bus carrying approximately 20 women in the vicinity. The patrol turned around and continued the patrol on an amended itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

44. On 11 October, Israel Defense Forces soldiers in three vehicles stopped a critical UNIFIL logistical convoy near Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces stated that the movement had been declared unsafe due to the ongoing operations, and the UNIFIL convoy moved to a nearby UNIFIL position. Later the same day, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped the same UNIFIL convoy once again near Mays al-Jabal. The convoy returned without finishing the movement as planned. UNIFIL protested the incident. The Israel Defense Forces characterized events as “preventive measures to ensure the safety and well-being of UNIFIL forces in the jurisdiction”.

45. On 18 October, while carrying out road clearing to enable access to a nearby UNIFIL position in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported several impacts in the area, and an Israeli tank shell impacted approximately 20 m from the UNIFIL explosive ordnance team. UNIFIL peacekeepers were not able to continue the scheduled work and returned to their UNIFIL position.

#### **Impact on United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon positions and personnel**

46. From 21 June to 30 September, UNIFIL positions and assets were impacted on at least 21 occasions, including four impacts characterized as restrictions of freedom of movement. UNIFIL continued to protest to Lebanese authorities where non-State armed groups were seen to be operating in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. From 1 October and the start of the Israel Defense Forces ground operation until 20 October, UNIFIL positions were directly or indirectly affected on at least 19 occasions, as detailed below. In addition, on 18 October, the impact of an explosion recorded approximately 20 m from UNIFIL peacekeepers conducting explosive ordnance disposal work restricted their freedom of movement.

47. On 2 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers in a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West) reported that two Israel Defense Forces tanks were circling their position. One moved to the front gate and pointed its barrel towards the UNIFIL position before leaving the location. Later the same day, several gunshots and two tank shots were fired towards the UNIFIL position from the vicinity of vehicles belonging to the Israel Defense Forces parked in the area. No injury or damage was reported. The following day, three Israel Defense Forces tanks oriented their turrets towards the position, and 40 minutes later, while stationed behind the UNIFIL position, one of the tanks fired a round over the position. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. No injury or damage was reported.

48. On 2 October, a shell impacted in a UNIFIL position, south-west of Udaysah (Sector East), and exploded within the premises while peacekeepers were in bunkers. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel, but several walls and vehicles were damaged. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

49. On 2 October, several gunshots and two tank shots were fired towards a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra's from the vicinity of Israel Defense Forces vehicles. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. No injury or damage was reported.

50. On the night between 6 and 7 October, on two occasions there was small arms and tank fire from a south-to-north direction. This damaged a wall and the structure of a UNIFIL position south-west of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West). UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

51. On 7 October, the Israel Defense Forces conducted two controlled demolitions close to a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra's. The two explosions caused damage to the UNIFIL position, including the collapse of several bastion walls. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

52. On 7 October, a UNIFIL vehicle inside a UNIFIL position south-east of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) was hit and caught fire. UNIFIL sent a "stop fire" request to the Israel Defense Forces, and peacekeepers were able to extinguish the fire.

53. On 8 October, two Israeli soldiers fired directly at and destroyed a perimeter security camera at a UNIFIL position south-west of Alma al-Sha'b. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

54. On 8 October, the building that until October 2023 housed the tripartite meetings south of Naqurah (Sector West) was hit by small arms fire from a nearby Israel Defense Forces position. Three spotlights and a radio relay station were damaged. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

55. On 10 October, an Israel Defense Forces tank was observed pointing a laser towards an observation post in the UNIFIL headquarters Green Hill camp, south-west of Naqurah. Shortly thereafter, the post was directly hit by a tank shell and two UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained injuries. UNIFIL protested the incident. In official statements, the Israel Defense Forces said that they had "instructed the [United Nations] forces in the area to remain in protected spaces", following which they opened fire.

56. On 10 October, a UNIFIL position south-west of Alma al-Sha'b was directly targeted by small arms fire through a breach in the perimeter wall, caused earlier by adjacent Israel Defense Forces groundworks. Vehicles, communication equipment and the entrance of the bunker where all the peacekeepers were sheltering at the moment of the incident were damaged. In addition, a drone flew into the UNIFIL position and descended at the entrance of the bunker. The following day, at the same UNIFIL position, an Israel Defense Forces excavator repeatedly hit the perimeter T-wall, destroying three sections. After UNIFIL personnel addressed the Israel Defense Forces soldiers, they asserted that the damage to the wall was not intentional and subsequently stopped the activity. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

57. On 11 October, two UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained injuries due to indirect explosions near UNIFIL headquarters, north-west of Naqurah. One of the peacekeepers was injured by shrapnel and evacuated to a hospital in Tyre for medical treatment. An internal investigation is ongoing to determine the circumstances of the incident.

58. On 11 October, in UNIFIL headquarters south-west of Naqurah, a UNIFIL peacekeeper was hit by a bullet. The peacekeeper, who had spent a prolonged period in shelter, had stepped out briefly and was hit while wearing his protective equipment. The peacekeeper received medical attention at the UNIFIL headquarters hospital, and

a bullet was removed from his chest. The source of the fire is currently unknown. An investigation is ongoing to determine how the peacekeeper was injured.


59. On 13 October, Israel Defense Forces excavators were observed opening a path between a UNIFIL position south-east of Ramiyah (Sector West) and an Israel Defense Forces position south of the Blue Line. The following night, two Israel Defense Forces tanks forced the entry gate and proceeded into the UNIFIL position. UNIFIL contacted the Israel Defense Forces and after 45 minutes the tanks left the position. One hour later, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported several smoke grenades fired approximately 100 m north of the position, engulfing the camp and causing skin irritation and gastrointestinal reactions to 15 peacekeepers. UNIFIL protested the incident. The Israel Defense Forces asserted that the tanks had reversed into the UNIFIL position amid intense firing during a casualty evacuation procedure, and when fire stopped and the injured soldiers were evacuated, the tanks left the position. The Israel Defense Forces further stated that the smoke grenades had been fired to cover the evacuation.

60. On 14 October, two vehicles, a road and accommodation buildings in the UNIFIL headquarters Green Hill camp sustained damage due to an impact inside the camp. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel.

61. On 16 October, an Israel Defense Forces tank fired a shot towards a watchtower located in a UNIFIL position east of Dayr Amis (Sector East). Two security cameras, walls, a ceiling and a door were damaged. Shrapnel was also found inside the camp. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

62. On 20 October, peacekeepers in a UNIFIL position in the vicinity of Marwahin (Sector West) observed engineering work conducted by the Israel Defense Forces adjacent to their UNIFIL position. During the works, a UNIFIL watchtower and the position's perimeter fence were destroyed. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

Figure  
**Incidents of restriction of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon freedom of movement and impacts on the mission's positions and personnel, 21 June to 20 October 2024**



Source: UNIFIL.

## Annex II

### Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 21 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), according to which all States shall take the measures necessary to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

2. It is stipulated in paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply of arms and related material of all types to any entity or individual in Lebanon.

3. In a letter dated 23 September addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated that “Iran is the mastermind behind Hezbollah’s relentless aggression against Israel since October 8th. Iran guides, trains, and arms Hizbullah and its proxies”.

4. In identical letters dated 1 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/712](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “in Lebanon, Iran supplied Hizbullah with 150,000 rockets, anti-tank missiles and explosive unmanned aerial vehicles, breaching Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)”.

5. In identical letters dated 8 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/721](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated: “During a press briefing in New York on 25 September, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, in response to a question about the supply of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, acknowledged that ‘Iran has always said that its supports Hezbollah in its just cause to defend Lebanon against the atrocities of Israel and against its occupation’, hence openly admitted the violation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) by Iran. This Iranian support has been translated by Hezbollah into relentless rockets, drones, [uncrewed aerial vehicles] and anti-tank missiles being used during attacks against Israeli communities since 8 October 2023. Most recently, such attacks were conducted on 6 October 2024, when a barrage of rockets from Lebanon was aimed towards the coastal city of Haifa and the city of Tiberias, where a number of people were wounded, including one severely. Later on, on 7 October, rockets were launched by Hezbollah also towards the metropolitan area of Tel Aviv, on top of the ongoing attacks towards the northern communities of Israel. [...] Against this backdrop I wish to recall once again that Israel has the right to take all necessary measures to protect itself and its citizens against the ongoing acts of hostilities by the axis of evil led by Iran”.

6. In response, in identical letters dated 17 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/755](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations wrote that “Iran’s support for resistance groups is entirely legitimate under international law. The resistance groups are engaged in a lawful struggle against Israel’s brutal occupation and relentless aggression”.

7. In a letter dated 10 October to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated: “Hezbollah is still working to enhance its military capabilities and amass new and sophisticated weaponry with support from Iran [...]”

The group continues to use the crossings between Syria and Lebanon to smuggle arms from Iran, including through the Masnaa international border crossing [...] Iran funds, trains, arms, and directs its proxies to carry out terror attacks against Israel. Even now, Iran attempts to smuggle arms to Hezbollah, breaching the arms embargo of resolution 1701 (2006) through land and air”.

8. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

## Annex III

### Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#). It urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, and all State security institutions, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection and naval capacity.

2. In identical letters dated 9 January 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/78/712-S/2024/36](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: "The Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)], so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)". Subsequently, on 29 February, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated that to implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), the army would need allied countries to help with everything from "fuel to equipment to means of transportation to the barracks and even to weapons – everything the army needs".

3. Donor coordination efforts in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces accelerated over the reporting period. Several meetings of the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, which was launched on 1 March in Rome, were held, including in London on 5 August and in Paris on 23 September. The meetings were attended by representatives of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lebanon, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Spain, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL. Complementary efforts have been replicated at the country level through a Beirut-based operational donor working group. The Office of the Special Coordinator and UNIFIL, which participate in both coordination mechanisms, have likewise increased efforts to define a common strategy for joint engagement with the Lebanese Armed Forces and donors to enable the meaningful and timely deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and to coordinate and align efforts with national priorities.

4. Following the approval by the caretaker Cabinet on 14 August for the enlistment of 1,500 soldiers in the Lebanese Armed Forces (see para. 65 of the report), efforts by members of the Military Technical Committee to support the equipment and capabilities development of the 1,500 soldiers commenced. To this end, pooled funding from Germany (\$4 million), Canada (\$0.813 million) and Denmark (\$1.5 million) was used to provide the new recruits with basic equipment and essential items. Other donors, including France, Italy and the United Kingdom, focused on the provision of basic training. The United States provided 186 military vehicles and France provided 20 armoured vehicles to be deployed to South Lebanon. Members of the Military Technical Committee dispatched on 7 June to Beirut a first cargo with

first aid and medicines, followed by two additional shipments on 11 and 25 July. In July, Qatar donated \$20 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces to support the livelihoods of soldiers.

5. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

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