

Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Chair: Mr. Rakhmetullin (Kazakhstan)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m.

Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/CRP.2 and NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/CRP.2/Rev.1)

1. **The Chair** said that the Secretariat had circulated the draft factual summary of the second session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/CRP.2) on the evening of 31 July. As the Palais des Nations had been closed on 1 August, he had consulted separately with each of the regional groups in order to obtain reactions from as many States as possible despite the condensed meeting schedule. He had then drafted a revised draft factual summary based on the observations of the regional groups and written comments submitted by individual States parties (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/CRP.2/Rev.1), which had been circulated early that morning. He invited the delegations to share their views on the revised text.
2. **Mr. Ruddyard** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, said that the Group welcomed the Chair's effort to draft a factual summary that would command consensus. In the final document adopted by the 19th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had reaffirmed its principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remained its highest priority, as well as on nuclear non-proliferation.
3. The Group reaffirmed multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It emphasized the need for non-proliferation and disarmament efforts to take place in parallel and reiterated that the continued existence of nuclear weapons posed a threat to humanity. The Group also stressed the importance of strengthening the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a balanced and non-discriminatory fashion, as well as the necessity of facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.
4. The Group welcomed the inclusion in the revised draft factual summary of a number of the matters raised in its working papers and statements but regretted the omission of others. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties was the largest grouping of States parties to the Treaty. Therefore, the principled positions put forward in its working papers and statements must be taken into account in order to achieve a balanced summary.
5. First, the Group remained deeply concerned about the continued lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling the nuclear disarmament obligations which they had assumed under article VI of the Treaty; decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.
6. Second, extended nuclear security guarantees and nuclear-weapon sharing arrangements increased the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines, policies and postures of the participating States. Policies of extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing ran counter to the spirit and objectives of the Treaty and threatened its credibility and effectiveness.
7. Third, nuclear disarmament must not be conditional on the geopolitical security environment. Nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments could not be disregarded on the pretext of political and security factors.

8. Fourth, the Group had put forward a number of proposals on transparency and accountability by nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty.
9. Fifth, it was important to call strongly on all nuclear-weapon States to adhere to a policy of no-first-use pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. Sixth, the imposition or maintenance of limitations and restrictions on exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to developing countries for peaceful purposes was inconsistent with the Treaty and a matter of deep concern.
11. Seventh, a clear distinction must be drawn between legal safeguards obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures. Any *ultra vires* attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make such measures legal obligations would jeopardize the integrity and credibility of the Agency.
12. Eighth, The Group reaffirmed paragraph 12 of decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which stressed that supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
13. The Group would continue to urge all States parties to uphold their commitment to the full and non-discriminatory implementation of all Treaty provisions and outcome documents of previous Review Conferences, especially with regard to nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
14. **Ms. Hasan** (Iraq), speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, said that the Group considered nuclear disarmament a priority. It urged the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to speed nuclear disarmament in a verifiable and practical manner, in accordance with their legal obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the unconditional commitments made at successive Review Conferences and the urgent calls of the non-nuclear-weapon States.
15. The revised draft factual summary did not reflect the Group's concerns about the lack of progress on implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including the Group's call for all States parties to increase pressure on Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon party and to place all its nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA safeguards.
16. The summary should also reflect the Group's views on a number of other issues. With respect to IAEA, the Group had stressed the importance of achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards agreement, which, together with the voluntary additional protocol, contributed to the objectives of the safeguards system. The Group had also underscored that IAEA was the competent authority to verify State party compliance with that system, and it had emphasized the Agency's role in promoting access to nuclear technology in peaceful applications as an inalienable right, as well as the importance of ensuring that the technical cooperation of IAEA was not subject to restrictions contrary to its mandate.
17. With respect to measures to further strengthen the review process, the Group had stressed the importance of decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the rules under the mechanisms of the Review Conference. It had also underscored that nuclear-weapon States must demonstrate transparency and accountability, including through the submission of periodic reports detailing

successive, verifiable steps taken to dispose of nuclear weapons effectively and irreversibly.

18. It was essential that the States parties reach consensus on an outcome document, as another failed Review Conference would erode confidence and trust in the global non-proliferation and disarmament system established by the Treaty. With that in mind, the Group urged adoption of the revised draft factual summary (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/CRP.2/Rev.1) as an official document of the second session of the Preparatory Commission.

19. **Mr. Kryvonos** (Ukraine) said that the second sentence of paragraph 27 of the revised draft would be more accurate if the words “by one signatory” were inserted after “violation”. Second, in paragraph 141, the term “armed conflict” was inaccurate and should be replaced by the phrase “aggression against Ukraine”, in accordance the language of General Assembly resolution [ES-11/1](#), and the following sentence should be added: “States parties emphasize the importance of full and effective implementation of General Assembly resolution [78/316](#) on safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant”.

20. **Ms. Crabtree** (Türkiye), thanking the Chair for the inclusion of some of her delegation’s proposals, said that there was one important omission which she wished to share with all of the States parties for the sake of transparency. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, the Group of African States, the Group of Arab States and several individual States, including her own, had underlined the inadmissibility of the repeated threats by Israel to use nuclear weapons. Their concern should be noted in the text in order to accurately reflect the Preparatory Committee’s discussions.

21. **Mr. Ali Ahmad** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that, in the section on disarmament, the revised draft should indicate that the majority of States parties condemned the threats by Israel to use nuclear weapons against Gaza, which was part of a non-nuclear State party. It should also reflect the deep concern of the Middle Eastern States parties regarding the lack of progress on implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and their view that the nuclear-weapon States had particular responsibility for its implementation. The summary should also reflect the regional view that Israel, as the only State in the Middle East that possessed nuclear weapons and had threatened to use them, remained the sole obstacle to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and it should indicate that States parties fully supported United Nations efforts to establish such a zone and called on the United States and Israel to participate in those efforts in good faith, without preconditions.

22. The issues raised in paragraph 110 of the revised draft on the Syrian Arab Republic had no place in the review process, and that paragraph should be struck from the summary. By raising those issues, a handful of States had fuelled mistrust and diverted the discussions from the primary concerns of the States parties: the absence of progress towards disarmament; the violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by some States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO); and the impasse on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

23. **Mr. Damico** (Brazil) said that the Chair’s original draft factual summary had been an excellent reflection of the Preparatory Committee’s discussions, containing important elements on the need for progress while recording the many areas of disagreement in a balanced manner. The revisions, which focused mainly on the neglected disarmament pillar, had undermined the intent of the majority of the delegations to reaffirm the commitments made at previous Review Conferences and, if possible, lay the groundwork for future progress.

24. Many of the revised paragraphs quoted the views of individual nuclear-weapon States verbatim, and entire new paragraphs had been added to reflect the positions of a single State, sometimes even mentioned by name. Meanwhile, crucial elements of the contributions submitted by Brazil had been ignored. The views of some States parties should not carry more weight than those of others.

25. In the interest of time, he would focus on the aspects of the revised draft factual summary which his delegation found most problematic. First, regarding safeguards agreements, the only acceptable basis for language on the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol was the consensus language contained in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and the safeguards resolutions of the IAEA General Conference. The current language catered to the priorities of a small number of States, which was unacceptable.

26. Second, in the revised document, paragraph 80 indicated that, in the view of some States parties, the transfer to non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear material and technology involved in naval nuclear propulsion raised serious questions under the Treaty and posed concerns for the integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. That assertion contradicted the letter and spirit of the Treaty, which recognized the inalienable right of all States parties to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

27. In view of the many problems with the revised text, his delegation strongly encouraged the Chair not to use it as a basis for further work.

28. **Mr. Kondratenkov** (Russian Federation) said that a few revisions would make the text less conflictual and more accurate. All references to facility locations within territorial borders should be deleted, as should paragraph 141, because the physical security of nuclear installations was the competence of States. The Treaty review process should not be used to further political goals that were not directly related to nuclear non-proliferation. Any attempt to do so seriously undermined the process.

29. In paragraph 110, on the Syrian Arab Republic, it should be stated that the IAEA investigation of compliance by that country with its safeguards obligations seriously undermined the safeguards system, given that the Agency's conclusions were not based on proven facts or evidence but on "highly likely" or "very likely" logic. In paragraph 109, on the Islamic Republic of Iran, it should be mentioned that the United States was undermining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The United States was also undermining non-proliferation efforts vis-à-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which should be mentioned in the paragraphs related to that country. His delegation had submitted written comments regarding the root causes of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

30. **Mr. Hassan** (Egypt) said that delegations should have been given the opportunity to discuss the initial draft factual summary in a formal meeting of the Preparatory Committee. The pattern was familiar from past Review Conferences. First, delegations were presented with a draft factual summary that could form a basis for consensus, since it reflected the views of the majority of the States parties, in other words, the non-nuclear-weapon States. Then, under intense pressure from the nuclear-weapon States, the document would be revised before it could go to the floor, and that revised text would contain massive rollbacks of disarmament commitments. Clearly, the assumption was that the Preparatory Committee would not adopt an outcome document, so it did not matter if elements opposed by the majority were added to the draft factual summary. Thus, when the Preparatory Committee finally met to discuss the draft, the non-nuclear-weapon States expressed dissatisfaction with the revised document while the nuclear-weapon States looked on comfortably.

31. In the revised draft before the Preparatory Committee, the paragraphs on nuclear disarmament had once again been diluted. His delegation would have preferred to hear the views of the nuclear-weapon States on those reformulations in an open debate, with the participation of civil society and other stakeholders. Important paragraphs had been reworded to attribute them to only “some States parties” or simply “States parties”, rather than to the States parties as a whole. For example, the phrase “those States parties with the largest nuclear arsenals were encouraged to take special responsibility” in paragraph 9 of the original draft had been revised in paragraph 10 to read “some States parties called upon those States with the largest nuclear arsenals to take special responsibility”. In paragraph 13 of the revised draft, which addressed the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, references to the views of one or two nuclear-weapon States had been inserted, thereby weakening the paragraph and undermining disarmament efforts. In revised paragraph 14, on nuclear rhetoric and the threat of use of nuclear force, the original wording of the first and fourth sentences should be restored so that they continued to apply to all of the States parties instead of “some” or “many”.

32. In revised paragraph 15, on nuclear deterrence, the addition of arguments advanced in favour of such deterrence by nuclear-weapon States was totally unacceptable. Similarly, the new paragraph 18 supplementing the preceding paragraph on nuclear-sharing arrangements was probably unnecessary. If it was retained, the arguments in favour of nuclear sharing should be balanced by counterarguments.

33. Paragraph 21 of the original draft had indicated that the value of no-first-use policies as important confidence-building measures had been noted. In contrast, paragraph 25 of the revised text stated that “some States parties” had noted that value. If the revised wording was retained, the word “noted” should be replaced by stronger language, because the States in question had expressed support for no-first-use policies.

34. Revised paragraph 33 contained language indicating that, in the view of some States parties, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was not an “effective measure” for promoting disarmament. The draft factual summary of the first session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/CRP.3) had avoided such language in the interest of consensus, and the current draft summary should do so as well.

35. While revised paragraph 40 had been improved, further revisions were needed. The sole mandate of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was to develop a verification regime.

36. Regarding revised paragraph 41, there was no consensus on the distinction in the last sentence between conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification. Furthermore, in the view of many States, the knowledge and capabilities required to verify nuclear disarmament already existed.

37. Revised paragraph 42 linked the principle of irreversibility to inconclusive initiatives outside the United Nations and attempted to separate that principle from the principles of transparency and verifiability, thereby sowing confusion as to the States parties’ understanding of the three principles.

38. In the section on non-proliferation, the revised draft retained the formulation “States parties” rather than “some States parties”. For the sake of balance, if the paragraphs on disarmament referred to “some States parties”, those on non-proliferation should do so as well.

39. In revised paragraph 62, States parties with concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards obligations by other States parties were encouraged to request IAEA

“to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate”. IAEA did not have an investigation mandate.

40. With respect to revised paragraphs 72 and 73, on the additional protocol, it was pointless and unwise to depart from agreed language on a controversial issue. Furthermore, given the lack of consensus, paragraph 73 should state that some States parties had welcomed the increase in the number of States implementing additional protocols, rather than simply “States parties”. Perhaps the paragraph should also repeat the language contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, according to which comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied only once nuclear weapons had been completely eliminated.

41. Revised paragraphs 91 and 92 deviated substantially from the crux of paragraph 12 of decision 2 of the 1995 Extension and Review Conference. It was important to reaffirm that any supply arrangements must be accompanied by a comprehensive safeguards agreement and a legally binding obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons.

42. Lastly, if the Chair decided to submit the draft summary as a working paper under his sole authority, he should base the new document on the initial draft summary (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/CRP.2) so that the efforts of the States parties during the course of the session did not go to waste.

43. **Mr. Robinson** (Ireland) said that his delegation commended the Chair’s efforts to consult widely on the revised draft factual summary. Because any outcome document should fully and accurately represent the discussions held during the session, his delegation welcomed the inclusion of additional language on the continuing proliferation crises, as well as substantive language on the illegal seizure by the Russian Federation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine. However, such a full and accurate representation must be balanced across the text and within all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The initial version of the draft summary on the disarmament pillar had achieved that balance, reflecting the views of the majority of States. The revised text did not.

44. Ireland condemned all nuclear threats, implicit or explicit, and irrespective of circumstances. Along with many other States parties, it rejected any characterization of nuclear threats which attempted to legitimize a “responsible versus irresponsible” paradigm in relation to nuclear weapons. It therefore regretted the inclusion of language to that effect in paragraph 14 of the revised draft. With respect to paragraph 9 of the revised draft, the concept of undiminished security had no basis in international law.

45. The complementarity and compatibility of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not been questioned during the discussions. All States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons were also faithful States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of the disarmament architecture.

46. **Mr. Kmentt** (Austria) said that the revised draft final summary contained some improvements, including some proposed by the European Union and by Austria. However, some elements posed significant difficulties for his delegation.

47. Attribution of views to “some States” or “many States” had resulted in an unbalanced representation of the Committee’s discussions because it had been done inconsistently and, in some instances, inaccurately. For example, in the new paragraph 33, on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, points attributed to “some States” had actually been made by only one State. In his opinion, the States parties to that Treaty might be prepared to have their comments regarding complementarity reflected rather minimally.

48. While his delegation welcomed the expansion of the language on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, it still did not reflect the overwhelming concern and sense of urgency expressed by States parties. In paragraph 9, the concepts of “general and complete disarmament”, “peace and stability” and “increased and undiminished security” had not been developed in the context of nuclear disarmament. The paragraph should be recast using agreed language on nuclear disarmament.

49. While the paragraph on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant had been clarified, it still did not reflect the discussion adequately and should state that the safety and security issues were the result of an illegal war of aggression by one State party against another. Paragraph 109, on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, should be strengthened by reflecting the many comments on that subject. In paragraphs 128 and 132, his delegations requested that the words “welcomed” and “welcoming” be replaced by “noted” and “noting”, respectively.

50. **Mr. Shen Jian** (China) said that his delegation appreciated the Chair’s extensive consultations with the delegations. Given the fundamental differences among States parties, it would be difficult to reach a consensus at the current time. However, it should still be possible to achieve a comprehensive, balanced and factual summary of the proceedings.

51. Understandably, the Chair had attempted to reflect the degree of support for various views by attributing them to “some States parties”, “one State party” and so forth. However, that approach could be problematic, because it was very difficult to get the numbers right. For instance, paragraph 21 of the revised draft indicated that one State party had encouraged nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies and to abandon nuclear deterrence policies based on first use of nuclear weapons. In his recollection, many States parties had made similar statements.

52. Some views put forward by China were not reflected in the revised draft. For example, in its statement and working paper on nuclear risk reduction ([NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.30](#)), China had urged a State party to halt the deployment of a global anti-missile defence system, and in its statement and working paper on nuclear submarine cooperation among the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and Australia ([NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.31](#)), it had proposed that safeguards for such cooperation should be discussed through an intergovernmental process. With respect to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, China had consistently advocated a parallel approach to explore effective ways to seek a balanced solution to address the concerns of both parties.

53. **Mr. Balouji** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the use of qualifiers such as “some States” or “many States” in the revised draft showed that no consensus had been reached. His delegation agreed fully with the issues raised by previous speakers. On a general level, the revised draft deviated from agreed language in many sentences. Moreover, it reflected mainly the interests of the Western nuclear-weapon States, and in some instances, it went beyond the mandate of the Preparatory Committee.

54. The primary goal of the document should be to move forward on disarmament, which was the most important pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unfortunately, the revised draft represented a step backwards in that regard and was totally unacceptable.

55. In paragraph 25 of the revised draft, on no-first-use, a sentence indicating support for a treaty on mutual no-first-use had been inserted, contrary to what had

previously been agreed. Paragraphs 19 and 50, contained references to arms control, which had no place in the context of the Treaty. In paragraph 34, his delegation's proposal to include reference to the disarmament aspect of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices had been ignored, and in paragraph 35, the language had been diluted by replacing "urged" with "encouraged", so that nuclear-weapons States were merely encouraged to declare a moratorium on fissile material production. Regarding the paragraphs on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had neither the competence nor the authority to advise the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on technical issues. Regarding the new paragraph 46, it was totally unacceptable for the scope of transparency to be decided by the nuclear-weapon States alone.

56. The views expressed by the Islamic Republic of Iran in its working papers and in specific proposals submitted to the Chair had unjustly been omitted from the text while those of other individual States had been included. For example, his delegation had proposed the insertion of language urging the United States to cease advocating the first use of nuclear weapons, halt the building and modernization of its nuclear arsenal, discontinue the development of new types of low-yield nuclear weapons and end the testing of intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons; calling on the United Kingdom to refrain from increasing its nuclear arsenal, avoid strengthening the role of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine and increase transparency over its nuclear arsenal; and appealing to France to halt the modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, avoid emphasizing the value of nuclear weapons, refrain from extending its nuclear umbrella to European countries, cease advocating the first use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear threats, and stop testing missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It had also proposed language to the effect that the nuclear-weapon States members of NATO should end the deployment of nuclear weapons outside their territories through nuclear-sharing arrangements, and that non-nuclear-weapon States rejected the deployment of nuclear weapons in their territories under any circumstances, as well as the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on their behalf.

57. With respect to the paragraphs of the revised draft on non-proliferation, paragraph 93, on export controls on nuclear-related dual-use items, should be deleted, as it was incompatible with the commitments of the States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and exceeded the scope of the Treaty; and paragraphs 94 and 95 should be moved to the section on peaceful uses. Paragraph 71 contained non-agreed language and should be deleted, and the language in paragraphs 100 to 105 should be harmonized with that of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

58. In regard to paragraph 109, on the Islamic Republic of Iran, there was no precedent for including reference to his country in a consensus document of the States parties. It was unfair to single out the Iranian nuclear programme, which was one of many peaceful nuclear programmes. While some States might have doubts about its peaceful nature, all of the non-nuclear-weapon States considered the nuclear-weapon States to be clearly in breach of their non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, and that view was not mentioned in the document. His delegation rejected the inclusion of a reference to the Iranian nuclear programme in any document to be agreed by the States parties and called for the deletion of paragraph 109.

59. Lastly, the Iranian delegation requested that the following language be added to the section on non-proliferation:

States parties expressed concern about the lack of progress towards implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and reaffirmed the urgent need for their prompt

and full implementation. They expressed serious concern that Israel remained the only country in the Middle East that had not joined the Treaty or declared its intention of doing so and that it continued to operate nuclear facilities without placing them under IAEA safeguards, in violation of the Treaty and Security Council resolution 487 (1981). States parties expressed deep concern that the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel constituted a serious threat to non-nuclear weapon States in the Middle East and to international peace and security. They called on Israel to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and eliminate its nuclear arsenal and deplored the fact that its refusal to do so impeded the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. States parties reiterated that accession to the Treaty by Israel without preconditions or further delay and placement of all its nuclear activities and facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards were essential to realize universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, all States parties were urged to prohibit effectively the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials, facilities, resources or devices and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear field to Israel, so long as it was not a party to the Treaty and had not placed all of its nuclear activities and facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

60. Regarding the section on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, all language on dual-use materials should be compatible with smooth international cooperation on peaceful uses, in accordance with States parties' obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation therefore requested the modification of any language that could be used to justify the imposition of unilateral coercive measures or other restrictions on States parties implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements. It also requested the insertion of the following new paragraph:

States parties emphasized the importance of adherence to the IAEA General Conference decision on prohibition of armed attack or threat of armed attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction. Such attacks or threats of attack must be stopped and condemned.

61. With regard to the section on further strengthening the review process, the paragraphs on the participation of observers should be brought into line with the language in the rules of procedure, which referred to non-governmental organizations, not civil society.

62. Lastly, the Islamic Republic of Iran supported the equal participation of men and women in discussions and activities related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and any other disarmament instrument, but it had strong reservations about reference to a gender perspective. The related paragraphs should be streamlined to omit such references, and they should be placed at end of the document, as the question of equal participation had only arisen during discussions on the review process.

63. **Mr. Nkosi** (South Africa) said that his delegation wished to refute any notion that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was not compatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The former complimented the latter by reinforcing its non-proliferation pillar.

64. In contravention of the moral and legal obligation of States parties to ensure that disarmament commitments made at previous Review Conferences were implemented without further delay, parts of the draft sought to reinterpret, roll back or even abandon those commitments. South Africa regretted the language that sought to legitimize the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and validate the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.

65. **Mr. Espinosa Olivera** (Mexico) said that, if the draft factual summary had been discussed in a formal meeting, the delegations would have had an opportunity to state their views on the various proposed revisions, and more importantly, the Chair would have been able to better gauge the degree of support for many of the paragraphs. The revised text before the Committee was repetitive, somewhat jumbled and at cross purposes with the original intent. Presenting contrasting State party positions could build trust, but only if the views of all States parties and groups were presented in a balanced manner. Unfortunately, the revised document did not do so, with deleterious consequences. Furthermore, a factual summary that emphasized the absence of agreement could also be prejudicial. Seeking balance and agreement in Non-Proliferation Treaty documents was in itself a means of building trust.

66. It was unfortunate that the paragraphs on disarmament of the revised draft had been weakened by inserting references to preconditions. Some of the proposals incorporated seemed to justify nuclear stockpiling. For example, paragraph 9 appeared to roll back commitments made in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (A/RES/S-10/2). Throughout the revised draft, there were references to nuclear deterrence, including the view that nuclear deterrence promoted peace, security and stability. Nuclear deterrence policies were beyond the scope of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and should not be discussed in a Non-Proliferation Treaty document. Furthermore, nuclear deterrence was an unacceptable precondition for progress on nuclear disarmament.

67. Like other delegations, Mexico regretted the insertion of new paragraph 33. It was inaccurate, since the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself recognized the need for complementary agreements on nuclear disarmament, and it reversed progress achieved during the Preparatory Committee's first session. Moreover, discussions on the merit of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons were inappropriate in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

68. The paragraphs on further strengthening the review process had been weakened. Furthermore, paragraph 52, on equal, full and effective participation of both women and men, and paragraph 53, on including non-governmental organizations, research institutes and academic organizations in the review process, were inadequate.

69. Lastly, his delegation agreed that the original text would provide a better basis for consensus or, in the absence thereof, for a working paper submitted by the Chair under his own authority.

70. **Ms. Duncan** (New Zealand) said that the initial draft had achieved a reasonable balance among the pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and among the views expressed in the meetings and working papers of the session. Unfortunately, the revisions altered that balance and gave rise to significant issues for her delegation, as they moved the States parties further away from their objectives for the current review cycle.

71. New Zealand rejected any characterization of nuclear threats which attempted to legitimize a "responsible versus irresponsible" paradigm in relation to nuclear weapons, and regretted the inclusion of language to that effect in paragraph 14 of the revised draft. It also regretted the insertion of a new paragraph indicating that some States parties did not consider that Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to be an "effective measure" contributing to the disarmament goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

72. In the revised document, certain paragraphs, including those on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, were qualified by the sentence "Some States Parties indicated that they did not consider this matter to be

relevant to the review of the Treaty”. A few States should not be allowed to determine what the States parties as a whole considered relevant to the Treaty.

73. Her delegation aligned itself with the comments of the delegation of Ireland regarding possible improvements to make some of the paragraphs on disarmament more balanced.

74. As revised, the draft factual summary could further polarize the States parties. Her delegation therefore wished to join Brazil, Egypt and Mexico in inviting the Chair to revert to his initial draft version, should he decide to issue a working paper under his own authority.

75. **Ms. Schiaffino** (Argentina) said that her delegation stressed the importance of maintaining a balanced approach to the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although her delegation had issues with various aspects of the revised draft, she would focus her remarks on the paragraphs on safeguards. As other delegations had indicated, there should be a clear distinction between legally binding obligations and voluntary measures aimed at facilitating and strengthening the implementation of safeguards and building trust. Some of the paragraphs on safeguards would be improved by returning to the language agreed by the IAEA General Conference.

76. **Mr. Endoni** (Nigeria) said that he wished to echo the comments of the Egyptian delegation. He would not analyse the revised draft factual summary point by point, as most of his delegation’s concerns, including about the inaccurate representation of the status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, had been addressed by other delegations. The initial draft factual summary would have formed a better basis for agreement on an outcome document. All States parties should have been given the opportunity to deliberate on the initial draft on equal basis prior to the introduction of a revised document, which appeared to be pulling the Committee farther away from the goal of consensus. His delegation urged the Chair to ensure that the outcome document reflected the details of the Committee’s work in a comprehensive and balanced manner, taking into account the proposals of all States parties, particularly the non-nuclear weapon States.

77. **Ms. Paumier López** (Cuba) said that her delegation noted the introduction of qualifications such as “some States said” before statements that did not enjoy consensus, presumably to facilitate agreement on the text. However, in attempting to balance the views expressed by the States parties, the Chair had undermined commitments made at previous Review Conferences or in other contexts. Her delegation agreed that the initial draft factual summary had been more balanced and provided a better basis for consensus. It was unfortunate that the Preparatory Committee had not been able to discuss the text in a formal meeting.

78. Some of the new proposals threatened the continuity and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by making disarmament conditional on the security environment, despite commitments to the contrary at previous Review Conferences. That position contravened the spirit of article VI of the Treaty and was opposed by most of the States parties.

79. The new language on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in paragraph 33 was inaccurate and sought to discredit a legal instrument that was part of the global disarmament architecture. Language calling into question that Treaty’s objectives and complementarity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty was unacceptable, all the more so since there was no criticism of other nuclear disarmament initiatives of as-yet unproven worth, such as those noted in paragraph 42 of the revised draft.

80. Cuba rejected attempts to manipulate nuclear safeguards for political purposes, which could endanger the efficacy and credibility of IAEA. Safeguards activities were the sole competence of IAEA. Cuba therefore rejected the decisions involving

safeguards in which the Security Council had played a role and the references to them in the draft summary.

81. Nuclear proliferation concerns should be resolved by political and diplomatic means within the appropriate frameworks. Cuba rejected certain States' selective application of a double standard to compliance with legally binding international instruments on weapons of mass destruction, as exemplified by paragraphs 109 and 110 of the revised draft. States with unfulfilled disarmament obligations were accusing a non-aligned country of shirking its non-proliferation obligations, thereby diverting attention from countries such as Israel, whose nuclear weapons threatened the stability of the Middle East. While all States had a duty to fulfil their IAEA safeguards commitments, Cuba could not support formulations that singled out certain States for issues unrelated to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also could not support attempts to prejudge the peaceful activities of a State party. IAEA alone had the authority and mandate to investigate and rule on the peaceful nature of a country's nuclear programme.

82. Lastly, the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy was not subject to compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. Cuba therefore rejected the language in paragraph 60 of the revised draft, which attempted to restrict access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

83. **The Chair** said that, despite his best efforts, the revised draft factual summary clearly would not enjoy consensus. He would therefore submit a summary as a working paper under his sole authority as Chair of the second session of the Preparatory Committee. Such a document was merely his attempt to summarize the Committee's proceedings as he saw them and could not be considered a consensus text or agreed language. In submitting the working paper, he would be following a traditional practice of the Preparatory Committee, and he trusted that that practice remained acceptable to all States parties.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.