



UNITED NATIONS
TRUSTEESHIP
COUNCIL



PROVISIONAL
T/PV.1120
21 June 1960
ENGLISH

Twenty-sixth Session

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ELEVEN HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 21 June 1960, at 3 p.m.

President:

Mr. VITELLI

(Italy)

Examination of annual reports of Administering Authorities on the
administration of Trust Territories: Ruanda-Urundi [3a] (continued)

Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories
in East Africa, 1960: Ruanda-Urundi [5a] (continued)

Examination of the possibility of sending a United Nations observers
group to supervise the elections to be held in June 1960 in
Ruanda-Urundi [12] (continued)

Plans of political reform for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi
[16] (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record,
will appear in provisional mimeographed form under the symbol
T/SR.1120 and will be subject to representatives' corrections.
It will appear in final form in a printed volume.

AGENDA ITEMS 5a, 5a, 12 and 16

EXAMINATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF ADMINISTERING AUTHORITIES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST TERRITORIES: RUANDA-URUNDI (T/1461, 1495, 1536, 1540, 1543; T/L.985, L.992; T/PET.5/L.10 to L.34; T/COM.5/L.26, 27, 29 to 38) (continued);
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO TRUST TERRITORIES IN EAST AFRICA, 1960: RUANDA-URUNDI (T/1538) (continued);
EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING A UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS GROUP TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN JUNE 1960 IN RUANDA-URUNDI (continued);
PLANS OF POLITICAL REFORM FOR THE TRUST TERRITORY OF RUANDA-URUNDI (General Assembly resolution 1419 (XIV)) (continued)

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Reisdorff, Special Representative for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian administration, took a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rwagasana, General Secretary of the Union Nationale Ruandaise, took a place at the Council table.

Political advancement (continued)

Mr. RWAGASANA (General Secretary, Union Nationale Ruandaise)(interpretation from French): On behalf of my political party, the Union Nationale Ruandaise, and of the nationalist parties of Ruanda-Urundi which are struggling for nationalist independence, immediate and unconditional, which have assigned to me the task of being their spokesman in the Trusteeship Council, on which surely depends the future of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, I venture very respectfully to express my sincere gratitude to the Trusteeship Council, which has granted me this hearing designed to inform it adequately on the grave political situation through which my country is now passing.

I also wish to convey the thanks of the populations who aspire to freedom to the members of the Visiting Mission, who enquired into the causes of the bloody disturbances of November 1959; for, while the solutions to our problems envisaged by the Visiting Mission have been systematically and deliberately sabotaged by Belgium, the people themselves are aware that the Mission did the maximum in its power in an attempt to put an end to Belgium's appetite for domination.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

Therefore, on behalf of the great majority of the people of Ruanda-Urundi, it is again my honour to pay tribute to the United Nations, in which this people has placed its full confidence.

You know, Mr. President, that the British authorities of the Protectorate of Uganda and Tanganyika, applying the universal principle of human rights, according to the English character which naturally respects political leaders -- even those in their overseas territories who are opposed to their policy -- have offered to the chiefs of the Union Nationale Ruandaise the hospitality of these territories. Therefore, I have come from Dar es Salaam to set forth the point of view of the nationalist parties of the Territory.

It seems to me important to point out that, a few days before, I succeeded in penetrating Ruanda -- Byumba and Kibungu -- and Urundi -- Muhinga -- where I met various delegates of my party and those of other independent parties who outlined to me in detail the actual situation inside the country, a situation with which I was in fact quite familiar in advance.

What is the political situation in Ruanda-Urundi since the visit of the United Nations Visiting Mission? To put it briefly, it is catastrophic, and I solemnly affirm here that it is leading the country straight to revolutionary war, a war which would cost innumerable human lives.

In this connexion may I be permitted to read a letter dated 8 June 1960 addressed to the Minister of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi by the President of the Ruanda Democratic Assembly, a delegate to the Belgian-Congolese Economic Round Table Conference:

"Honourable sir,

"At the moment when the Belgian Congolese Round Table Conference is coming to an end, I am persuaded that the Belgian Government must ask itself once again a question as to the possibility of achieving national reconciliation of all the Ruandese, even if it were to be upon the essential principles of the reform of the Ruanda State.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

"I presume that you are sufficiently well informed about matters in Ruanda to know that the undersigned was the first leader of the first democratic movement in Ruanda. I was the founder and I am still the President of the democratic party RADER; I was a member of the Special Council, and, at the present time, as you know, I am Ruanda's delegate to the Belgian Congolese Economic Conference.

"I believe that the fact of having been the first leader of the awakening of democratic ideas in Ruanda gives me the right to give you today my opinion regarding the grave political situation in my country, and this, with a certain authority. Your administration can bear witness to the correctness and the unfailing good will that I have always shown in my relations with the Belgian trusteeship authorities. Therefore, you can believe that the opinion which I believe that I must voice will be objective and inspired only by a desire to be of service to my country and to Belgium.

"The political and administrative situation in Ruanda cannot persist without exposing my country to a civil war which will give rise to inextinguishable racial hatred and terrible foreign intervention.

"The first duty of the Belgian Government at the present time is to restore calm in the country and to look for bases of national reconciliation on a number of fundamental principles. It seems to me that, to this end, we must inaugurate a conference in which all parties will take part, no matter what their numerical importance.

"In effect, the principles of the solution envisaged must have support from national consent.

"In my opinion, we cannot achieve this goal except under the conditions which I shall now state.

"I. Elections. When the six members of the Provisional Council at present in Brussels attempt to obtain, with the support of the Administration, elections in the month of June -- that is to say, in three weeks -- it is evident that that can only result in the restoration of peace in Ruanda, but by doing so, it will simply assure the triumph of certain political parties which, because of circumstances, are in a particularly favourable situation not enjoyed by other political parties; they have specially favourable conditions to conduct their propaganda and to intimidate their adversaries.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

"I do not want to pass judgement upon measures which the Administration took following upon the disturbances, but the least that one can say is that, since these measures were taken, fundamental freedoms do not exist in Ruanda for all parties. I do not wish here to plead the cause of the UNAR party, but political freedom for my political adversaries is the guarantee of my own political freedom and the real effectiveness of the elections which are to take place. The elections which will take place during the present month will not be considered as democratic elections. It is particularly regrettable that in such an important matter as this the Belgian Government departs from decisions concurred in by the United Nations delegation. This fact is evidently of such a nature as to affect seriously the authority of the aforementioned elections in Ruanda, and in Africa, all the more so since it was agreed with the United Nations delegation that the communal elections would take place after a round-table conference which was to be held in August. The unilateral derogation of this by the Belgian Government is a matter involving principle. The Government thus is going to incur in Ruanda, and in Africa, reproaches for placing not only certain political parties but even the United Nations face to face with a fait accompli. This is all the more grave because certain parties that are going to profit unduly from this procedure declare that they are republican and thus want to use these elections as an instrument to overthrow the Ruandese monarchy. I solemnly predict that this abnormal procedure -- and, I must say, a procedure of contestable honesty -- will lead Ruanda to civil war and will involve a serious danger of foreign interference.

"The provisional council certainly does not have the necessary juridical competence to take a decision which goes against the agreement reached with the United Nations delegation without the Belgian Parliament having been consulted. In reality such a decision compromises the very statute of the Ruandese State and the international responsibility of Belgium, and this decision is taken by a provisional council that has not even been elected by the Ruandese nation nor established by the authority of the Belgian legislature.

"II. The question of the Mwami. It is quite evident that the Administration cannot depose the Mwami without the consent of the people of Ruanda. With regard to this matter a referendum is necessary, if the Administration wishes to avoid civil war. The referendum should be double: it should deal first with the principle of constitutional monarchy; it should also deal with the person of Kigeli V. Finally, according to the results of this double referendum, we might designate a new Mwami. It would be inconceivable -- and the Ruandese people would never allow it -- that the Administration should assume the right of designating a successor.

"It is highly unfair to refuse to the Mwami the right of explaining and refuting the accusations which have been levelled against him. Therefore, it is unjustifiable to forbid him to go to Brussels when his accusers have been allowed to do so. I suggest that a White Paper be published in which the Administration would set forth its dossier concerning the Mwami, and that the Mwami be allowed to answer the imputations levelled against him.

"Finally, the Mwami has the incontestable right to explain his conduct before public opinion and to explain his present position and his ideas about the modernization and democratization of the institutions in Ruanda. Such a possibility and this right have up to the present time been refused to the Mwami, if not in theory at least in fact.

"In any case, it is not possible, equitable or serious to allow these people elected in the coming elections to dispose arbitrarily of the fate of the monarchy and of the Mwami, when they will simply have been elected under conditions which prevent the monarchist parties from freely conducting a campaign. Such an oblique manoeuvre is not worthy of the Belgian Government, and I would not say that I could blame those who under such conditions might refuse to participate in the elections and might contest their validity.

"III. The regime of the chiefs and sub-chiefs. Before organizing the elections, the Administration must undertake a solemn engagement not to depose any chief or sub-chief because of his political opinions. At the present time the chiefs and sub-chiefs are obliged to support certain political parties; otherwise they would be deposed. Before the elections, the Administration must remain neutral and assure all political parties

(Mr. Rwagasana)

freedom of expression. It is inadmissible that attachment to the monarchy or the person of the Mwami could be considered a sin for a Ruandese civil servant.

"IV. The regime of fundamental freedoms. Everyone knows that since November all assemblies of more than five persons have been forbidden but that in fact this regulation is applied only to certain parties. The Press is no longer free. Ruanda lives under a police regime, I might say. Those who think that this regime is temporarily necessary can nevertheless not seriously pretend that under such a regime one can hold free elections. Before the return to a normal regime, free elections are not even imaginable. Does the Belgian Administration wish to democratize Ruanda by suppressing democratic freedoms?

"V. The problem of the refugees. More than 20,000 persons, all of them Batutsi, have been expelled from their hills and their huts by arsonists. The duty of the Belgian police is to resettle these unfortunate people. Furthermore, there are persons under house arrest. If the Administration cannot do this alone, it is failing to do its duty. Here the problem is more than one of political freedom; it is a problem of racial discrimination. Here the political struggle has degenerated into racial persecution. If Belgium continues to tolerate this, it is headed for an internationalization of the Ruandese drama.

"VI. Need to revise military courts and judgements. Ruanda has had a revolutionary civil war. Grave violence was committed by all factions. Now persecutions have been unilateral, and bands have committed arson, mistreated the Tutsi, violated their women and their children, burned their huts, stolen their livestock and seized their land. You must punish all crimes, or you must take general measures of amnesty. Violence of one should not be more tolerable than the violence of others. But certain crimes continue to be committed, and the Administration and military justice do not punish those crimes. Pacification is inconceivable without a broad amnesty, unless you wish to proceed to a revision of these sentences and judgements.

"VII. Need for executive colleges. In order to ensure impartiality of the Administration, we must inaugurate, with the Resident and with each Administrator, an executive college. At this grave hour the Administration not only should be impartial but must be beyond suspicion, and this must be so before the elections are held. He who writes to you, honourable sir, is an old democrat who has always been on the side of the oppressed. I have been calling for a democratization of the country, but I cannot tolerate that the abuses of one should come to replace the abuses committed by others, and that the Administration, after having been impartial towards some, should now show partiality towards others. I criticized the Administration at the time when it was going along with easy government under an anachronistic regime, but this will not deprive me of the right to criticize this now when another form of government is in force. Democracy is not the realm of the strong. It is the realm of law. Your Administration has allowed a violent revolution to occur against anachronisms which have subsisted and persisted only because of the Administration. And your Administration is now going out violently against people whose principal fault was to believe in the illusions which the Administration tried to get them to believe in. I do not share those illusions. You have the duty of trying to achieve reconciliation. Your Administration has not told the truth and has not rendered justice to those who, time and again, have been the victims of the failure of the Belgian titular power.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

"This reconciliation is still possible, but we must hurry. At a round table conference we must do away with the Council of Royal Drums, which, for the Bahutu, is the symbol of abusive power. We must also represent the Batutsi and the Bahutu in the public civil service, and we must do that by means of university education. We must respect persons and property, we must do away with racial hatred. It is from the upper rank of the Administration that we can do this.

"Reconciliation will soon become possible, but do not come and tell me that you have a right to burn houses, mistreat people and suspend the freedom of assembly and the freedom of the Press, whereas you do not have the right to suppress the Royal Drums and to take other such measures.

"Hear my voice, sir, while there is yet time. The drama in Ruanda is simply a drama for which you are responsible. Today you can still take action and solve the problem, but soon civil war and foreign interference will take the destiny of Ruanda from your hands and will leave you simply in powerless responsibility.

"Yours very truly,

(Signed) P. Bwanakweri."

I now continue my statement. Another document signed by the leaders of UNAR has been sent to the President of the Trusteeship Council and gives additional information on the gravity of the situation. The Council will find from it that the UNAR party, which is persecuted by the Administration, is not alone in deploring the gravity of the situation. Even the RADER party, which is opposed to us, acknowledges that the present situation is intolerable and is leading our country into the worst kind of tribulations.

I shall say now a few words concerning the political atmosphere after the visit of the United Nations Mission. The UNAR petition describes it, but it is necessary to give a few clarifications and to draw the necessary conclusions. To begin with, I would point out to the Trusteeship Council that a few weeks after the Mission's visit Congolese troops stationed in Ruanda were withdrawn and replaced by Belgian troops, which were reinforced shortly before the inspection of the Belgian Minister for National Defence, who came to the Territory at the time when the military colonel announced the communal elections of 27 June 1960.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

A few days after the Minister's passage disturbances broke out between the army and the population on 24 May 1960 in the Byumba territory, in the course of which ten persons were gravely injured, among them one of our political leaders, Mr. J. Kumwami, whose state of health is still far from satisfactory.

Moreover, the Council knows already that the Belgian Government did not take account of the recommendations of the United Nations Visiting Mission either on the subject of the communal elections or on the subject of the convocation of the Brussels round table conference, but that, on the contrary, the communiques and journals published over the signature of the military Resident, B.E.M. Logiest, which propagandize in favour of the Government parties, this time carried on a campaign designed to ridicule the solutions called for by the Visiting Mission and to prove Belgium's omnipotence in the Trust Territory. After that unfortunate campaign of denigration, the Administration convened in Brussels the members of the Special Provisional Council -- a body which constitutes a sort of provisional government imposed upon the Mwami and the people by the military régime -- in order to make political arrangements designed to aggravate tension. This well-known Special Provisional Council, composed of territorial administrators, chiefs and princes belonging to the PARMEHUTU, the APROSCMA and the RADER, and all appointed by the Administration, instead of seeking the necessary solutions engaged in a deplorable political activity and became notorious as the result of its unbridled attacks against UNAR and the Mwami Kigeri V. In agreement with the Minister, who had in fact invited it to do so, it confirmed that the communal elections should take place in a hurry and during the period of military occupation, that there was no question of envisaging any national reconciliation but, rather, a question of asking for the extradition of the political leaders of UNAR who had taken refuge abroad, that the young Mwami Kigeri V was to be considered as challenged by a part of popular opinion, and so on. These, then, were the results of the conversations between the Belgian representatives and the famous Special Provisional Council representing three political parties of Ruanda.

These results were welcomed, on 10 June 1960, by the additional burning of 1,300 huts belonging to Hutu members of the Ruanda National Union in the Territory of Astrida, in the course of which three children lost their lives while the

(Mr. Rwagasana)

intervention of Belgian troops led to a number of injured. These fires left more than 6,000 homeless -- and here I would refer the Council to La Cité of 16 June 1960.

Since the visit of the United Nations Mission more than 15,000 persons have been transported to the concentration camp of Nyamata, and more than 800 members of UNAR have been thrown into prison. All public liberties have been eliminated, and this measure applies solely against UNAR. Never has a political party been persecuted to such a degree, in disregard of the fundamental freedoms and human rights.

(Mr. Rwagasama)

In summary, this is the shape of the political situation in Ruanda-Urundi. And strange as it may seem, in this political atmosphere Belgium has decided to carry out alleged communal elections. Thus, the Administering Authority flouts the elementary rules of democracy. For how can one conceive of elections under a regime of military occupation where a gathering of even five persons is bad? How can it be suggested that these alleged elections could be carried out in a province, Ruanda, which is under military occupation, leaving the province where the political situation is relatively calm, Urundi, and pushing aside systematically the chiefs of the majority party, UNAR, who are in jail, in exile or in the Nyamata Concentration Camp? It should be pointed out that the official figures compiled in Uganda make it clear that 52,720 refugees, all of them UNAR members, are in Uganda and that in addition to 12,000 members in Urundi we have more than 20,000 members in Nyamata.

I likewise wish to point out, in passing, that broad assistance has been vouchsafed that of three parties supported by the Government: PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA and RADER. One striking thing is that not only does Belgium refuse to have the communal elections carried out after the Brussels round-table conference but it is also opposed to the sending of United Nations observer groups to oversee the communal elections of June 1960.

One may well wonder why Belgium is so eager to have these alleged communal elections remain confidential and why it insists on having them carried out under the military occupation of Ruanda, in particular, and in such extreme haste.

So far as we are concerned, since we know the situation, we are also aware that Belgium has adopted this solution on the following grounds:

First, Belgium has entered into an alliance with three political parties -- FARMEHUTU, APROSOMA and RADER -- in order to secure their success, a success which could not be ensured for their benefit if these elections were democratically carried out and supervised by an impartial commission of international observers. These parties feel, quite justly, that they would be totally defeated in this latter case.

Secondly, Belgium simply wants to manufacture pretended representatives of the people who would be utilized in order to checkmate any movement towards

(Mr. Rwagasama)

national independence and who surely would envisage no measure capable of restoring national peace, but would fight against UNAR, refusing any measure of general and unconditional amnesty and strengthening the concentration camp regime of Nyamata.

Thirdly, Belgium wants, at all costs, to eliminate the chiefs of the Nationalist Party, especially those of UNAR, who cannot betray the interests of the people; and Belgium can do so only by securing the operation of a number of elements who have been won over to her cause and to that of the army.

It is through the desire of indirect domination that Belgium has already imposed upon the people a sort of puppet fascist government, to which the Minister has granted powers previously belonging to the Mwami, and that is the Special Provisional Council, whose composition I have already discussed.

Permit me to tell you how astonished I was by the statements of the representative of Belgium, who has coldly described us as assassins and has declared:

"The political platform of the UNAR party is not under attack; no one is imprisoned in Ruanda because of his opinions; there are no exiled leaders. If certain persons have sought refuge outside the Territory that is not because of their political opinions but because of offences under ordinary law." (T/PV.1112, pages 61 and 62)

This Belgian thesis is part of the plot organized in order to eliminate us from the public affairs of our country. I need not over-emphasize this question. I may simply state that by this operation of a genuine anachronistic colonialism Belgium is indulging in illusions, in the illusion that it can maintain us outside our own country in the teeth of the will of the people.

The whole world knows to what extent Belgian justice has greatly failed in its mission, by becoming involved in the Administration's plot, carried out with the assistance of a few white missionaries, in order to suppress UNAR, which is described as communist. It is well known that the Administrators of Ruhengeri and Astrida, in particular, were the owners of this crew and that the judgements which have been handed down were rendered by Belgian administrators who had co-operated in the fires. Small wonder that Belgium now resorts to this thesis in order to cover up these fantastic unilateral convictions, since the

(Mr. Rwagasama)

judges were not only a party themselves but were gravely at fault and guilty themselves.

The whole world knows that those who were convicted were convicted because of our position against the Administration, adopted in the course of the meeting of 13 September 1959 in Kigali. The whole world knows that not only have those guilty of the disturbances been left in impunity but that they have even been recompensed by getting political posts or other advantageous appointments.

But I should like to point this out, in particular. Despite this indescribable justice we are prepared to forget it and we are prepared to engage in an amicable attitude in order to contribute to the political reduction of tension, of which our country stands so greatly in need.

I believe that it is necessary to clarify one point on which Belgium has rested her case in order to checkmate the partisans of immediate independence. That is the problem of the Hutu and the Tutsi. In this connexion I think that the Mission has endeavoured to bring out a number of essential facts, which I shall not press. I wish to declare, however, that the Ruanda National Union is not a party of Bahutu or Batutsi or Batwa, but the Nationalist Party bases itself on the mass of the toiling class which aspires to freedom and rights. The ruling class is an opportunist one. It bases itself on a colonial regime. It endeavours to checkmate the opinion of the people, who demand genuine democracy and who would eliminate the present regime of privileges granted to the stooges of the dominating regime. May I point out that PARMEHUTU now counts out of the total number of 229 sub-chiefs more than 150, the remainder being distributed between RADER and APROSOMA; that out of 44 chiefs, 27 belong to PARMEHUTU, 15 to RADER and 2 belong to UNAR.

But I repeat: We are not fighting against any individual. Yesterday and today alike, we have only denounced, and we continue to denounce, ideas and acts which we consider to be at variance with the higher interests of the nation. We are not persons who will give in to the beguilement of money or privileges. For the happiness of our people we have preferred, and we will continue to prefer, prison and exile to money and privileges such as are granted by the present regime.

(Mr. Rwagasama)

To describe the present political regime of the Trust Territory as democratic constitutes an obvious misnomer. That is why through my voice the majority of the people of this country, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, demand peacefully that the United Nations recognize its sovereignty in designating democratically its own representatives without fear or constraint, putting an end to this regime of favouritism, which has been set up for the benefit of the stooge elements who seek money and position.

The National Union of Ruanda, as well as the leaders of the parties which are demanding immediate independence, have asked me to inform the Trusteeship Council that we shall not go to any round-table conference which would not comprise the proper representatives of all the political parties of Ruanda-Urundi. Any round-table conference which would separate the two provinces would run counter to the first article of the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946, which consecrates the integrity of the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi; and therefore, such a round-table conference cannot validly decide on the political future of the Territory. We know that through this procedure Belgium seeks to foster disunity and regionalism so as to be able to apply the old Roman adage: "divide and conquer".

(Mr. Rwagasana)

Moreover, the National Union of Ruanda has decided not to participate in the elections of June 1960 because:

- a) they remove from office the majority of our members;
- b) they are controlled by the Belgian military authorities;
- c) they remove from office the leaders of the UNAR, all voter qualifications and the conditions of eligibility having been fixed so as to eliminate systematically our party and, in general, the Nationalists;
- d) they make permanent the illegal division of the Trust Territory by removing from office the inter-provincial parties;
- e) they offer no guarantee of impartiality.

It seems to me important also to say a few words with regard to the position of UNAR, on the thesis of the Administration concerning the suppression of feudalism. The National Union of Ruanda condemns and always has condemned, feudalism, colonialism, opportunism, racism and regionalism. Our party works not only for national unity, but for a higher objective, African unity. To that end, it is convinced it must draw its strength from the mass of the people, who have, as a matter of fact, spontaneously followed it. I was struck by certain statements of the second representative of Belgium in which he injected a rather discordant note, speaking of "feudalism" and of "traditionalist Tutsi". I do not know what traditionalist Tutsi he was referring to, because all are at present connected with the RADER, which he himself has described as progressive. May I be permitted to establish a parallel between the platform of UNAR and the platform of the three Administration parties, namely, PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA and RADER:

1. UNAR calls for the elimination of the Belgian and indigenous administrative oligarchy. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration want only the elimination of the indigenous administrative oligarchy.

2. UNAR calls for elections based on universal male and female suffrage. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration call for male suffrage only.

3. UNAR demands that even communal elections should be carried out after the termination of the military occupation of the province of Ruanda, that all political parties be fully associated therein, and that they be supervised by the United Nations. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration demand that these elections be carried out under the control of the Belgian Army during the period of military occupation, that they be supervised by Belgium alone, that the

(Mr. Rwagasana)

United Nations have no part therein, and that the said elections be carried out for the benefit of these three parties alone.

4. UNAR demands that executive councils of the same kind as those established in the Congo should be set up in Usumbura and in each province, bodies which would represent all political parties, to the end of restoring national peace and tranquility. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration reject this solution and demand powers for themselves alone backed up by the Army.

5. UNAR demands that the people of Ruanda-Urundi should freely choose a constitutional regime in an atmosphere of public calm and tranquillity. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration wish to impose upon the people, particularly in Ruanda, a republic.

6. UNAR prefers the elimination of the traditional chiefdoms, based as they are on a system of appointment which favours partisanship and bias. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration desire to strengthen this regime of favouritism,

7. UNAR condemns racism, tribalism and regionalism. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration elevate them to principles.

8. Finally, UNAR demands a dialogue in which every one may take part. PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, RADER and the Administration reject this dialogue and even sabotage it.

Having in mind the political positions which I have just compared point by point, I beg you to judge for yourselves which of the four parties here in question advocates the most democratic solutions, the solutions most in keeping with the interests of the people.

In conclusion, I take the liberty of respectfully presenting to the Council the political demands of the national parties, and in particular those of UNAR. We demand not only that the Council recommend that Belgium scrupulously implement the agreements reached at the time of the Visiting Mission's sojourn in the Trust Territory, but also that it not consecrate the actual state of affairs. We recall that the following are necessary:

1. That the communal and legislative elections take place after the round table, and that they be supervised by a group of United Nations observers;

(Mr. Rwagasana)

2. That a round table in which all political parties would be represented by their genuine representatives and which would include responsible Belgian officials and United Nations observers, be immediately organized for the purpose of putting an end to the present national discord;
3. That the Trusteeship Council discuss the date for immediate national independence of Ruanda-Urundi;
4. That the Council recommend to Belgium that it take immediate measures for a general and unconditional amnesty for persons convicted as a consequence of the disturbances of November 1959, and for the return to their country of all the exiles, particularly the UNAR chiefs now resident in Tanganyika and Uganda;
5. That the Council decide to dispatch immediately a United Nations control mission to the Trust Territory;
6. That the Council recommend, if the Charter permits, the sending of a United Nations international force for the purpose of preventing new bloodshed;
7. That the Council recommend to Belgium that it immediately dissolve the Special Provisional Councils of Ruanda and Urundi, which represent but a part of public opinion.

We believe that these measures would inevitably restore national peace, the peace which the people of Ruanda-Urundi are humbly requesting of the United Nations.

In ending my petition, I take the liberty of repeating, on behalf of UNAR, my sincere thanks to the Visiting Mission of the United Nations which has just proposed to the Trusteeship Council measures capable of ensuring political, social, economic and cultural progress to the peoples of Ruanda-Urundi.

The Trusteeship Council today has grave responsibilities in view of the fact that it is faced with a choice for the independence to be granted to the Trust Territory. Belgium proposes an independence similar to that of the French Cameroons, and we propose an independence similar to that of French Togoland.

Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): The petitioner has just made reference to two States which are independent and which the Security Council, by unanimous vote, has recommended for admission by the General Assembly to membership in the United Nations. This is not the place to discuss the subjective evaluations of the petitioner. In any case, these evaluations should not figure in the record of a meeting of the Trusteeship Council; a petitioner cannot raise questions concerning an independent State.

The PRESIDENT: The remarks just made by the representative of France are quite in order. I would therefore suggest that the remarks which the petitioner has just made in his statement not be recorded in the records of our meeting.

The petitioner may resume his statement.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I apologize, Mr. President, but I was constrained to say that. I apologize again to the representative of France. An embarrassing choice at the present time is before your high Council. I remain at your disposal, and I thank you.

The PRESIDENT: Does any member wish to ask for any further clarification from the petitioner, or to ask any questions?

Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish): I do not want, actually, to put any questions to the petitioner; I wish simply to ask for certain clarifications with regard to the statement he has just made.

On page 5 of his statement the petitioner says that the Administering Authority was in close alliance, even before the elections, with three parties, and that thus the party which he represents was deliberately excluded from the elections. I would like the petitioner to tell me what, in his opinion, are the reasons for this alliance against his party on the part of certain elements in Ruanda-Urundi who, according to him, are allied with the Administration. They are all against his party. Why?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): It is well known that PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA and RADER are parties which from the start have been favoured by the Administration. The Visiting Mission's report itself referred to this.

I did not say that the Administration by an official decree or an official act has excluded our party from the elections. However, they have so arranged things that certain members of the party are excluded by virtue of eligibility requirements, and so forth, which provide for three months of residence, whereas thousands of persons escaped when the disturbances occurred and only returned after a period of about four months or more, and many are still in exile. Thousands of persons are concentrated at Nyamata, and members of UNAR are excluded from the groupement at Usumbura.

Under these conditions, we felt that we should abstain from the elections which are to be held under a regime of occupation. There are no political freedoms in Ruanda. UNAR is not authorized to hold any meetings. It is impossible to hold elections or for us to participate in these elections because we have not even been able to prepare for them.

Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia)(interpretation from Spanish): I would like to put another question to Mr. Rwagasana, who is the Secretary-General of a political party in Ruanda-Urundi. In one part of his statement the petitioner indicated that he is against the Belgian administrative oligarchy and that he is also against the indigenous administration. At the beginning of his statement, he indicated to us that he is in favour of immediate and unconditional independence. Now even accepting the point of view of the petitioner, we would have to know whether his party has enough personnel to take over the administration and also -- and this is very important -- would they be in a position to establish an atmosphere of reconciliation with the other political parties. In terms of time -- I must indicate to the petitioner that in this Council we all desire independence for Trust Territories -- I would ask him how long it would take to obtain sufficient personnel to take over the administration.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): With respect to whether there is sufficient personnel to ensure the national independence of Ruanda-Urundi, there is certainly a sufficient number. Ruanda-Urundi has always been regarded as being politically more advanced than the Congo. If the Congo found political personnel, surely Ruanda-Urundi would find political personnel.

As for the time required to secure independence, I would say that it would just be the time required for organizational purposes. Since our independence should be organized by the United Nations, it is for the United Nations to assess the organizational period required. But let me say one word: as early as possible.

As for national reconciliation, I can assure you, Mr. President, that if Belgium had not sabotaged the Brussels round-table meeting, if all the political parties without exception had been represented in equal numbers at the Brussels round-table meeting, with United Nations and Belgian representatives sitting there as well, we already would have achieved national reconciliation. But it is the impression of our party that Belgium does not want any national reconciliation; Belgium wants no part of it. Belgium utilizes certain persons in order to support the view that tension must continue. The convening of the small round-table meeting shows how far from national reconciliation we find ourselves. But I am sure that if all of us were around the same table, we would find our way to national reconciliation.

May I add this point: even outside the measures that we propose, if Belgium had fully applied the recommendations of the Visiting Mission, we would already have achieved national reconciliation. Unfortunately, Belgium wants no part of that.

Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia)(interpretation from Spanish): Our position, as the petitioner knows, restricts our obligations to those of supervision, and that is why I would say that the desire for reconciliation must be a general desire. We cannot impose this upon the country. It must arise from the Administering Authority, from the political parties and even from UNAR.

I would like to put one final question to the petitioner. In one part of his statement he has given us a very serious bit of information, namely, that there are more than 52,720 refugees as a result of the events which took place and which are well known to all of us. I would like to know where he obtained that information.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I believe that perhaps the figures are actually even higher. I obtained these figures from the Press when I was in the Territory. Even in the Press the figures go as high as 30,000, but when you read 30,000 in the Press, it is sometimes necessary to multiply the figure by two.

Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom): Perhaps an intervention by me at this point might bring some elucidation. However, I hope that when British statistics are produced it is not necessary to double them in order to arrive at the truth. But I would like to ask a question of the petitioner on this point. The figures which I have, which admittedly are not absolutely up to date -- I have already asked for the most up-to-date figures that can be given -- amount to something much smaller. The number of genuine refugees in Uganda amounts to 1,000. This may be a little too low, but at any rate I do not think it goes much above that. But of course there are large numbers of migrant labour people who go into Uganda and even into Tanganyika for work for various reasons. This has been going on for many years. I want to ask the petitioner whether perhaps the figures which he has given do not include some of those people as well and whether this may not be the explanation of the possible discrepancy with respect to these figures. I do not think that this is necessarily an essential point in the views he is putting forward, but I was rather surprised when I heard this high figure. I think that the explanation which I have given may be the correct one, but I would like to ask the petitioner whether he has any comment to make on what I have just said.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I believe these figures were distorted by tendacious newspapers and perhaps, as the representative of the United Kingdom indicated, these 52,000 include workers who are unable to return because of disturbances. The figures were exaggerated, but in any event there are plenty of refugees in Uganda.

Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia)(interpretation from Spanish): The petitioner has indicated that he got these figures from the press, and I do not want to ask him to tell us the names of the newspapers. But he said something about official figures from Uganda. I note that certain migrant workers may have been included in these figures as refugees. I have another question which I think is of some importance, because I am taking into account here the points of view expressed in the question and answer period by the Administration. If my memory serves me right, the Administration has said that there are only 4,000 refugees. According to the statement of the petitioner, all 4,000 are members of the UNAR party.

This judicial and political coincidence lends itself to certain suspicions. I would ask him whether all these refugees are only from his party and no other party.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): In general all the refugees are just from the UNAR party, because during the disturbances there were only four political parties: APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR. The three entered into coalition with the Administration against UNAR. All the refugees were those who were actual members of UNAR or sympathizers of UNAR.

Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia)(interpretation from Spanish): As Secretary-General of the UNAR party, I am sure that the petitioner has direct or indirect contact with his fellow party members. Perhaps the petitioner might tell us whether, of these 4,000 refugees, each one has stood trial or whether they are simply political refugees. I might put it in this way. I would ask him whether the Territory courts have judged each and every one of these 4,000 refugees or whether they have simply been deported for political reasons without ever having stood trial.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): To begin with, I must say that there are more than 4,000. Moreover, there are refugees and there are convicts. All those who were caught either by the police or by other agents of the Administration have been cast into jail, or into a concentration camp, and there is the case, as the Visiting Mission itself saw, of the refugees who actually escaped, who were not caught, who took flight and who are now on foreign territory. That is what I call refugees in this context.

Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia)(interpretation from Spanish): I had thought that my previous question was to be the last question, but the reply leads me to clarify my own question. Have there been some cases among the members of the petitioner's party who have been tried in some court for some offence? I would ask how many of those persons have had occasion to defend themselves in court, whether there was a defendant and a prosecutor and a judge? Here I must point out to the members of the Council that if there were very few cases of persons who have been tried, and many others who have fled the Territory without being tried, then we might indeed make a recommendation for a general amnesty.

I hope that the petitioner understands my question. What I want to know is how many, approximately, of his party have been tried in the courts of the Territory.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): The number that I know of is more than 900 members who were haled before tribunals. In particular, the President of UNAR, Mr. François Rukeba, is in prison. One of the members of the Committee has been condemned to death. Our President, Mr. Rukeba, has been sentenced to six years. Others have been sentenced for up to fifteen or twenty years. There were sentences of fifteen years, twenty years, eight and six years. There are even some who are not members of our party, but simply sympathizers. A student who visited us was immediately gotten hold of and thrown into jail.

Members of the Committee were defended by a lawyer, but the sentences themselves remain confidential because the press has refused to publish these sentences. I have just gone through Paris, where I saw our lawyer, and he told

me that the press had denied him the right to publish the particulars. There are persons, like myself and like the directing committee of UNAR, who are now in Dar es Salaam. I have just submitted a petition to the General Assembly. But while I was on the way to do so, I was advised that they were waiting for me, to arrest me; whereupon I changed my itinerary in midstream and went to Dar es Salaam. Sometimes, in fact, when you have not been judged, they are just lying in wait for you. Once they get hold of you, they immediately manufacture some sort of accusation, and then there you are.

Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France)(interpretation from French): I have a few questions. First of all I must say that I do not intend to embarrass the petitioner. I simply want to shed some light on a few problems, thus contributing to a pacification and reconciliation, which is, I am sure, the object of all members of the Council. The petitioner came as the Secretary-General of the UNAR party. My first question is a very simple one. Does he have any mandate from UNAR to appear here before the Trusteeship Council?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): Unfortunately, the letter of recommendation has perhaps not been distributed to the members. But I have it with me and if the representative of France wants me to read it or wants me to exhibit the signatures, I am at his disposal.

Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France)(interpretation from French): All the petitioner has to do is to reply yes or no. I trust him completely. I put that question because recently, Mr. Reisdorff, the Special Representative, read out a telegram sent by the President of UNAR to the Minister of the Belgian Congo and that telegram sounded somewhat different from what the petitioner has just told us. I will not read the whole telegram. It is already in the record. But here is a sentence from it:

"We are convinced that the Belgian Government, representing Ruanda, will do everything possible to restore calm and tranquillity in Ruanda..." How can the petitioner reconcile the statement in the telegram with the statement which he has made on behalf of his party?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I did not know that there was any other President of UNAR who is not in gaol. I wonder how a President of UNAR who is in gaol could have sent a telegram. The question might have been asked, perhaps, of the representative of Belgium, who exhibited that telegram. He could tell us whether it was François Rukeba, President of UNAR, who actually sent that telegram.

Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): The question is still open, and in the debate the representative of Belgium no doubt will reply if he wishes. For the present moment, I am questioning the petitioner. The petitioner mentioned nationalist parties and said that he spoke on behalf of UNAR and other nationalist parties. To what other nationalist parties, other than UNAR, was he referring?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I have said that before I came here I went to the Buumba region, where I met the President of the National African Union of Ruanda-Urundi, UNARU and the President of the Progressive Union of Urundi. Those are the political parties to which I was referring.

Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): At the beginning of his statement, the petitioner quoted a long letter from an eminent representative of RADER. He said himself that that was a party which was not always in agreement with UNAR, and, in fact, from what we have heard there are certain points in which RADER and UNAR are in agreement, but there are other points on which they are in disagreement. But the petitioner has based himself on this letter from the President of RADER. Now, so far as we know, RADER did participate in the conference at Brussels, but UNAR did not participate, and I would ask the petitioner how he would explain this different stand. Does he not think that his position would have been stronger if he had participated in the Brussels conference?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): As regards the letter of the President of UNAR, I can demonstrate to you that the situation is not that there is a single party comprised of exiles, but that the parties in the country believe that the situation is one which is tending towards civil war. Even the parties within the country are perfectly well aware of the fact that the forthcoming elections will give rise to disturbances and troubles, and they have been begging the Minister not to plunge the country into a political catastrophe.

As regards representation at the Brussels round table conference, we would have agreed to participate, and we would still agree to participate, on the condition that UNAR might send its own representatives. If UNAR had been invited to be present at the Brussels conference, it surely would not have refused. Moreover, this conference was instigated by three parties only, but there are eight political parties in the country. What was done about the others? Why were only three parties invited, and not the others? We realize that this was a political strategem designed for political purposes only in order to demonstrate that they try to do something. The records prove that our suspicions were well founded, and that is why UNAR was not in a position to participate in the round table conference, nor will it be in a position to participate in the elections.

Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French):

I understood that UNAR and the others had been invited to the Brussels conference, but for certain reasons they felt they had to refuse to go. But this is a point of fact to which the representative of Belgium perhaps will refer later.

A problem which was discussed at some length here in the Council was that famous institution of Kalinga. This was considered by part of the population as an instrument of domination rather than as an instrument of tradition. Could the petitioner indicate to us the position of his party with regard to the problem, because it seems that this is one of the difficulties existing between the various parties in Ruanda-Urundi?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): The problem of Kalinga is a persistent problem. Our party does not fail to call for the elimination of an old political institution when that is required. When the whole population, through its political parties, expresses itself in favour of the elimination of Kalinga, UNAR naturally will not stand in the way. When a national flag is established with the consent of all the representatives of the population, so much the better. We shall not champion Kalinga, nor defend the drum. This is really a problem which was fabricated in order to arouse passions. Once all the political parties are unanimous in getting rid of Kalinga, I do not see how UNAR would ever wish to stand in the way. Far from it. This is one national problem which should be discussed at the round table conference.

Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): One last question, and I think it is the most important of all. The representative of Belgium, when he told us about the time-table, said that there would be legislative elections in 1961. Belgium has already agreed that these elections should be observed by the United Nations. Does not the petitioner think that this would be an element for tranquillity and pacification? Does he not think that these elections would reveal the influence in the Territory and that parties would be able to show exactly what their strength is? Therefore, inasmuch as Belgium has not only accepted, but even proposed that solution, does he not think that they are working for a reconciliation and, under those circumstances, does he not think that UNAR should participate in the conference before the organization of the elections?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I must say that so far as United Nations controlled elections are concerned, it was in September 1959, at the opening of the UNAR Congress, that the first demand was made by me in my opening speech, long before such elections were dreamed of. I demanded such elections. Therefore, there can be no question about our advocacy of such elections. Belgium, and I am grateful for this, has accepted United Nations controlled elections. Belgium at one point also accepted having United Nations controlled communal elections.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

But suddenly, during the occupation regime, this stand was reversed: the United Nations is to control only one kind of elections, while the other elections are to take place under a military occupation regime. I believe that even a blindfolded man would have misgivings in the face of such an attitude. In any event, in answer to the representative of France, surely if these anti-democratic communal elections are carried out, they will not produce any people's representatives. The legislative elections, if supervised by the United Nations, will, after all, involve certain safeguards and guarantees, but they should be preceded by a general amnesty and all our members should be released from concentration camps; all our members who have been goaled should be enabled to vote, because otherwise, even if the United Nations were to supervise the elections, our members could not show up at the polling booths.

Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): The municipal elections are one thing, and the legislative elections are another. They are supremely important elections and it is the latter, I believe, that should be observed by the United Nations because they are the elections which will reveal the political setup or political structure in Ruanda-Urundi.

The petitioner has referred to an amnesty. Could he tell us whether his party is ready to condemn violence and ready to participate freely in democratic elections without having recourse to intimidation? We have, of course, no suspicion against this or that party; we simply want the true wishes of the people of Ruanda-Urundi to be made manifest.

Mr. RWAGASANA (Interpretation from French): To say that our party will accept elections without resorting to violence and that it is prepared to condemn violence is actually tantamount to judgement or incrimination, as if we had resorted to violence. That is how I construe the question. However, I can offer assurances to the representative of France that our party, as indicated in the report of the Visiting Mission, has in fact condemned violence and that it is prepared to participate in the elections once they are carried out in an atmosphere of calm, tranquillity and public order, and with safeguards as to impartiality.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

I have emphasized that we are prepared to let bygones be bygones even though we have been checkmated and mistreated and persecuted; we have no rancor and no malice in our hearts. All we want is to bring peace to our country. Quarrels are no longer of interest to us, but it is essential that we should be allowed to meet. We are, however, prevented from meeting with our bretheren, from achieving reconciliation. And that is a point which I should like to emphasize: we are prevented from meeting, we are prevented from having contacts. If contacts were permitted, I can assure the representative of France that we would be swiftly reconciled. Not only that, but we are prepared to enter into compromises which might be regarded as disadvantageous to us. I repeat that, for the peace of our country, we have no wish for animosity between parties. We feel no animosity towards the Administration, in spite of injustices which have been visited upon us.

Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MCORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): I thank the petitioner for his statements. For the moment I have no more questions to put. I believe that it would be interesting to hear comments from the representative of Belgium on the statements of the petitioner.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I should like to extend a word of welcome to Mr. Rwagasana, our petitioner. We in this Council, and in the Fourth Committee, are always glad to have petitioners with us from Trust Territories. It is unfortunate that Mr. Rwagasana comes to us at a time when the situation has taken a turn for the worse in the Territory. We regret it, and we hope that it will be possible to ameliorate the situation quickly.

Mr. Rwagasana has referred to the recommendations, proposals and conclusions of the Visiting Mission in its report. I should like to ask him a very simple and categorical question and I should like to receive a direct and categorical answer. Does Mr. Rwagasana's party accept all the conclusions and recommendations of the Visiting Mission's report? The question is, as I said, very simple and I hope that he will give us a straight and clear answer.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): To the representative of India I would answer as follows. I accept fully, and I wish that Belgium would accept also, but I have some misgivings in that regard. I regret having these misgivings or suspicions because we have already suffered disappointments. After having put out a joint communique with the Visiting Mission, Belgium then went back on that and criticized it publicly in the press. That is why I have misgivings as to whether Belgium will be prepared to accept and to swallow these decisions.

Personally, I repeat, not only do I accept these recommendations, but I congratulate the Visiting Mission of the United Nations. It has done the maximum to assure our security. If I say the maximum, it is because in the situation in which it found itself, it could do no more.

I have read the report rapidly. I think that it presents safeguards and guarantees for our political future which I can well describe as being optimum guarantees. As far as I am concerned, the conclusions of the Visiting Mission, if applied fully -- and I repeat this because I have misgivings in that regard -- would lead us to public and national peace.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I thank the petitioner for his reply. I think that it clears the picture a great deal. Surely the petitioner knows that the Visiting Mission does not seem to think that the Territory's independence should come immediately. The Visiting Mission gives due weight, I think, to the fact that a certain period of preparation will have to take place, certain transitional procedures will have to be gone through, and the Mission seems to suggest that the item with regard to the termination of Trusteeship over this Territory should be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly for 1961; that is to say, the Territory's independence would come about sometime in 1962. The party of Mr. Rwagasana has been known to demand immediate independence. I want to be quite clear in my mind that, on this particular point, his party's viewpoint is not in conflict with the recommendations of the Visiting Mission; that, in fact, what the Mission has suggested -- that there should be this period of a year or a year and a half or two years, that there are certain procedures to smooth out and certain transitional problems -- is acceptable to the Ruanda people.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I have no copy of the report before me, and perhaps I misread or misinterpreted a certain recommendation. I understood, however, that it would be the 1961 Assembly which would deal with this and that the 1961 Assembly is the one which begins next September. Is it September of 1961 or September of 1960? I would like a clarification of this point.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I thought the Visiting Mission said the 1961 Assembly, not the 1960 Assembly. If I am wrong I should like to be corrected by a member of the Visiting Mission. It is my recollection that the item regarding the termination of trusteeship was to be inscribed on the agenda of the 1961 General Assembly.

Mr. SEARS (United States of America) (Chairman of the Visiting Mission): I think I understand the question correctly; the Mission felt that there would be no point in discussing immediate independence, because immediate was a flexible term, through the channel of requesting it to be considered by the General Assembly of this year. We felt that before the General Assembly should be approached on the matter the Territory should be in democratic shape. Therefore from our point of view the question of the termination of trusteeship could not arise until the General Assembly of next year.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I understand what the Mission had recommended, and why it made that particular recommendation. We are not in disagreement; I did not suggest that and I hope such an impression is not forming. I am trying to elicit the view of the petitioner on this matter because his Party, it has been stated here, demands immediate independence in the sense that independence must come tomorrow or in a month or fifty days from now or something of that kind. Obviously there are difficulties in questions of this kind which have to be sorted out; some time is needed to work out the transitional period, and I wanted to hear from Mr. Rwagasana whether, on this particular detail of the matter, his Party's point of view coincides with that of the Visiting Mission or not, because this is one of the main recommendations of the Visiting Mission.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): As regards the question of independence, I regret that there is a slight discrepancy between the point of view of our Party and that of the Visiting Mission as it has now been revealed, whereas I had thought I could support fully all the recommendations of the Visiting Mission on this issue. We base ourselves on recommendations made by the General Assembly which, as is known, at its last session asked Belgium to present at the next session, the session in September of this year, a date for independence and adds that this should be done after consultation with the population concerned. After all, the Round Table Conference in Brussels will have to deal with this question of independence, which will be one of the most important items on its agenda. Consequently, pursuant to the General Assembly's recommendation to Belgium that it should, at the 1960 session, present final and intermediate dates for the attainment of independence, I believe that the Visiting Mission has anticipated the resolutions which might come from the peoples' aspirations. If tomorrow the people pronounced themselves in favour of independence, if all the political parties and all the population demanded independence for January 1961, it would be necessary according to the Mission's recommendation and in spite of the unanimity of the people to wait until September 1961. If I remember correctly, some time ago the representative of Belgium said that all parties were demanding independence. All that is necessary, then, is to fix a date, since the representative of Belgium himself recognizes that all parties agree in demanding independence. All that remains, therefore, is to fix a date in agreement with UNAR and if all the parties agree on fixing 31 December 1960 as the date for independence, why not organize independence at that date?

If the independence of Congo could be organized in six months, and Congo is several times greater than Ruanda-Urundi, why cannot the independence of Ruanda-Urundi be organized in the same length of time? That is the question we want to ask. I therefore feel that in scheduling discussion of independence for the 1961 session the Visiting Mission has perhaps anticipated the possible wishes of all the political parties. I do not know whether it is within the power of this body to leave open the possibility of granting independence earlier, but as far as my party's position is concerned, it is in favour of independence as soon as possible.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I should like to assure Mr. Rwagasana that that is also the position of the Indian delegation, independence as early as possible. I merely raised this question because the petitioner said that his Party agrees with or accepts all the recommendations and conclusions of the Visiting Mission and I was very happy to hear that. I merely wanted to find out whether there was complete agreement on that point of detail. It is true that in a certain resolution of the General Assembly the Administering Authority is called upon to propose, for the consideration of the General Assembly this year, a target date and a time-table for independence. In fact, what the Visiting Mission has done has been to suggest, in its own right and of course after consultation with the Belgian Government, the Administering Authority and the political parties, a tentative time-table which will no doubt be considered in detail by the General Assembly this year. The question of the termination of trusteeship upon the attainment of independence, according to the Visiting Mission, owing to certain procedures which will have to be gone through, will have to be discussed with the General Assembly in 1961. That is why I raised this question. Of course, there is always room for anticipating or advancing the date, and as Mr. Rwagasana himself has stated, the date will have to be considered by the Round Table Conference. We do not yet know how much time these various procedures will take. At any rate, I am very glad to have the answer of the petitioner, which will help us clarify our own thinking on the matter.

I will now go on to another question. The representative of Belgium has told us that in the provisional Council of Ruanda -- he said it several times rather emphatically -- the UNAR is represented by two members, as indeed are the three remaining parties which are also represented on it.

(Mr. Rasgotra. India)

The impression I got from the petitioner's statement today is that the UNAR is not represented. I should like him to throw some light on this question. If there are indeed two representatives of the UNAR on the Provisional Council, how were these representatives selected by the Administering Authority? How were they appointed, and who appointed them? What hand did the party have in nominating or recommending the names of these two representatives?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): This question by the representative of India impels me to be completely sincere, to the point of possible embarrassment. There was no actual representative of UNAR in the special council. This was rather a stratagem, which consisted of dividing UNAR, and I must say quite frankly that that was the game played in the telegram which you saw. There are others that we do not know of, at least not officially. This was a disconcerting revelation for me. There are others who are not on our lists and who designate themselves as UNAR. The people know nothing about them. There are even lists of UNAR electors. These are things which have been attempted for a long time but, fortunately, they have not yet succeeded in dividing our party. All these persons who pretend ought to show themselves in their true colours. There has always been an attempt to impose one chief upon UNAR, who was placed in the Provisional Council, but we did not know anything about him. As we are abroad, it is difficult for us sometimes to be completely up to date with regard to these manoeuvres, which sometimes come to our knowledge rather late. These two members were designated in a clandestine manner. That is why I revealed the communique of the general secretariat of UNAR, in which the party ordered all members of UNAR to withdraw from the special council -- if they are there or might be there. As you see, I even doubted whether they were there, but I wanted to forestall the worst possibility, because we kept hearing that there were UNAR members there that we did not know anything about. When this communique was brought to the knowledge of the population, these persons who pretended to be UNAR representatives went into hiding or disappeared, in order not to be pilloried.

Those are the so-called representatives of UNAR. All this was covered in the telegram. I did not know that the President of UNAR had sent a telegram, the text of which was read out to me. I would be very much astonished if it proved to be authentic. I repeat that the attempts to divide UNAR have not quite succeeded.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): Mr. President, this seems to be a very disconcerting state of affairs, and I would request you to ask the Secretary of the Council to obtain from the petitioner a copy of the executive committee's circular or memorandum that he referred to and to circulate it for the information of members. I should like to see it.

To get this business of the telegram out of the way -- I think this is a question that I should like to put now because in the course of tomorrow we shall all be busy with the preparation of our statements -- I should like to know from the representative of Belgium whether this telegram was indeed sent by the president of UNAR. If this gentleman, the author of the telegram, is the real president of this party and he is in prison, was he given an opportunity to consult his executive committee or other leaders of the party before sending this telegram? Could he throw some light on this matter? There seems to be a good deal of mystery hanging around it.

Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) (interpretation from French): My delegation will reply to all the questions which may be put when the questioning of the petitioner has come to an end. We say this in view of the normal procedure concerning the questioning of petitioners. We have the statement by the petitioner, which included a series of facts concerning which the Belgian Government might feel that it wishes to express its views later. I reserve the right of my delegation on this point. I must assure the representative of India that my delegation will reply to all questions which may be asked by members of the Council when the oral hearing has come to an end.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I shall await that answer.

Now to come to this question of the communal elections, the petitioner has stated that certain agreements were reached among the political parties, the Visiting Mission and the Administering Authority when the Visiting Mission was in the Territory. One of these was that elections would be held after the round-table conference in August. The petitioner then added that some of these agreements were either bypassed or set aside by the Administering Authority. Yesterday my delegation put a question to members of the Visiting Mission,

(Mr. Rasgotra, India)

on this matter. There was only one member here at the time, Mr. Edmonds of New Zealand, and he said the following:

"... I have always felt that the supervision by the United Nations of the national elections was the main point that the Visiting Mission wished to see in its report." (T/PV.1117, page 6)

This implies that the Visiting Mission had not intended or did not envisage United Nations observation at the communal elections.

We want to be absolutely clear about this matter. When these conversations were taking place in the Territory and certain agreements, verbal or otherwise, were reached, was it intended that the communal elections should also be supervised by the United Nations, or was it the Mission's intention that only the elections to the national councils, or probably some subsequent national elections for the whole of the Territory, should be supervised? What is the real position? Mr. Rwagasana seems to think that the agreement or the understanding reached was that even these communal elections which had been advanced should be held under United Nations supervision.

Mr. SEARS (United States of America), Chairman of the Visiting Mission: I should like to reply to that question by the representative of India, because, through no fault of his own, Mr. Rwagasana, who has been living in exile for a long time, may not have as good a chance as some of the other people might of knowing just what has gone on. As a matter of actual fact -- and as usual I stand prepared to be challenged or corrected by my brothers on the Mission -- at no time did the Visiting Mission consider that it was appropriate for it to recommend the participation of United Nations observers in local communal elections. We felt that the whole thing was in dispute and that the position of the United Nations might be seriously damaged if it got mixed up in a local election fight, but at the same time we felt quite strongly from beginning to end that when the supervision should come it should be on a national basis.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I am grateful to the representative of the United States for that clarification.

(Mr. Rasgotra, India)

Now I have another question, and this relates to the sentences imposed upon certain of the leaders of the UNAR. We pressed -- I use that word advisedly -- for information on that count from the representative of Belgium the other day but I am afraid we did not get it. Now the petitioner has told us that some of his party leaders or party members are sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment, some to death, some to five years, some to ten years' imprisonment. I should like to know from him, if he can tell us, how many UNAR leaders have, to his knowledge or to the knowledge of his compatriots, been sentenced by the military court or by other courts in the Territory and whether he can give any further information about the kind of sentences that have been imposed.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): There are the true leaders of the Committee of UNAR, of whom there are five, but other members, of course, are numerous, and I do not know the exact figures involved. The number of members that I know of in that situation is over 900. But that figure has been exceeded now, because 750 were involved at one point. Our President has been sentenced to six years imprisonment, a member of the Directing Committee, Mr. Mbanda, has been sentenced to death. Another one, Mr. Zimulinda of Astrida, was sentenced to fifteen years, and others were sentenced for various periods -- five, six, seven or eight years, as the case may be. There are the five that I can think of offhand.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): Would the petitioner say that the top leadership of the party -- by which I mean members of the Executive Committee of the party, or persons such as the President, the Secretary-General, the Secretary and other eminent leaders of UNAR -- at this stage are either in prison or outside the Territory, or are any of the top leaders of the party inside the Territory at this stage to direct the party's political activities. If there are any such persons in the Territory, could he name them? How many of them are there?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): There is an interim President whom we have appointed for purposes of the administrative organization of the party -- the keeping of records, the sale of cards -- and he is assisted by a committee of three members selected by himself. We do not interfere. That covers the administrative organization. This interim President's name is Rutsindintwarane, and he is charged with administrative organization exclusively. He had no power of decision or discussion without consulting the Executive Committee. All the members of the Executive Committee, six in number, are located outside the Territory except, as I have told the Council, the ones who are in prison, in particular the President. All the rest of us, and our secretariat, are abroad. That is where I have issued all these communiques, and it is from there that I have organized all our activities.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): Mr. Rwagasana also mentioned in his oral presentation a certain official decree which requires a period of residence in the Territory before an individual may present his candidature for the forthcoming communal elections. Can he tell us whether, in the light of this decree, his party will be able to put up the kind of candidate for these communal elections which, in normal circumstances, it would have put forward?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I have not had an occasion to study the entire interim decree, and in any case I have not a copy of it with me, but I cited one condition, namely, the requirement of three months' residence. Other conditions are equally disadvantageous for us. As I said in my statement, our party has decided to abstain from the elections. A copy of the relevant communique has been sent to the Trusteeship Council, and in it we say, inter alia,

"Invites the members of UNAR not to participate in the anti-democratic elections scheduled for 27 June 1960, elections imposed by the military occupation and designed to vitiate the whole process of national independence."

Thus the party and its members are invited not to take part in the elections, and it will not do so except, of course, for the people who are going to be presented to the public as purportedly representing us. UNAR itself will not participate in the elections. Difficulties with regard to the elections were, perhaps, removed in Urundi. There are military authorities and it is necessary to have elections.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): At one point the petitioner said that his party was not allowed to hold meetings in the Territory. I should like an explanation of how that happens. Apart from the fact that leaders of the party are outside the Territory, which is a different matter, there are probably certain people inside the Territory, and presuming that some of these members of UNAR inside the Territory want to hold a political meeting how do they go about it? Do they have to obtain a permit or seek somebody's permission, and is it in that event that permission is denied -- or how does it happen? I should like to understand that position clearly.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): In general a decree of the Military Resident has forbidden meetings of five persons or more. Even the President of RADER has written to the Minister about that. In principle assemblies are forbidden because there is a military occupation, and it is normal that under military occupation all assemblies should be curbed. In practice, when an assembly or a congress is to be held it must take place in a closed or private circle, and authorization has to be requested. It is clear that UNAR, which is in a position of systematic opposition to the Government, certainly will not obtain such authorization with ease. We have to address ourselves, after all, to authorities with which we quarrel from morning till night. The President of RADER himself has written that the restriction struck at certain parties, and clearly he had in mind the UNAR party, among others. Other parties have held assemblies and assistance was granted to them by the Administration. They were given the use of microphones, and so on. But I am not there, and one has to go in order to see.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): Another point is that Mr. Rwagasana said, in the course of his presentation, that soon after the Visiting Mission left the Territory Colonel Logiest issued a communique or a notification of some kind denigrating -- I think that that was the word which Mr. Rwagasana used -- the solutions proposed by the Visiting Mission. Has he seen a copy of that communique and can he furnish us with some evidence of this? What did the communique say and what are the solutions suggested by the Visiting Mission which were derided by the communique?

Mr. RWAKIASAJA (interpretation from French): I have some copies here of the communiqués of the military Resident. One of them was handed to the Visiting Mission. In that communiqué the Resident engaged in overt propaganda, saying that one has to adhere to the PARMEHUTU, the party which strives for the benefit of the people. This is communiqué No. 7, of which the Mission surely received a copy. These are communiqués and publications which engaged in propaganda. I have been unable to secure copies in French, but I have the numbers. Of course, the original language was French, although they were drafted in Kinyarwanda.

There is communiqué No. 12, for example, which slanders and derides the decisions of the Visiting Mission. This communiqué was dated 8 April 1960. The representative of Belgium, perhaps, has a copy in French. It says:

"You have said that the United Nations Mission will release people who are in jail. You have said that the United Nations Mission will put your chiefs back into office and restore their goods to them.

"What has it done? Oh, you believe that all those who have gone abroad will come? Oh, what you have asked for, where is it? Do you think it will come?

"I do not answer all the questions. You will see for yourselves." It is signed: V.M. Logiest.

This is a campaign of denigration, to tell the population that the Visiting Mission of the United Nations can do nothing for it. This is the meaning of this text. In other words, it keeps saying that you are hoping that the Mission will provide you with this and that; it has gone; what have you got out of it? That is the meaning that this communiqué is trying to convey. I have it at hand here; it is No. 12.

Mr. BASCOETRA (India): Mr. President, do you think you could have these documents also circulated, because we would like to see them. Indeed, if they are issued by the military authorities or by the civilian authorities of the Territory, I think they are relevant to any consideration of the situation.

The petitioner said that the Mwami Kigeli V was forbidden, by the Administering Authority, apparently, to go to Brussels in connexion with the

(Mr. Rasgotra, India)

pre-election meeting that was held there in May. This is news to my delegation because no indication of this, if it is true, was given to us at any stage. We should like to seek some more information on this matter. How does the petitioner know that Mwami Kigeli V was forbidden to go to Brussels? Would it be customary in normal circumstances for the Mwami to go to Brussels to attend a meeting of this kind? What other evidence does the petitioner possess in substantiation of this statement?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): To begin with, this information is not mine; it comes from the letter of the chief of RADER to the Minister. It is not my allegation, you see; I have quoted it.

The President of RADER was in Brussels at the Belgian-Congolese round-table conference. That is where the letter was published, where it is said that the Mwami was prevented from going to Brussels to explain himself, why his accusers were allowed to go there. The Belgian Press, as a matter of fact, confirms this clearly. I have here a batch of clippings from the Belgian Press, and all of them make it clear that the Mwami was prevented from going to Belgium in order to present his case. These are clippings, of course, but the allegation comes from the letter of the President of RADER to the Minister, requesting that the Mwami's trip be authorized.

You know that previous to that the Mwami had a passport for going to Belgium, but before he actually went there the authorization was withdrawn. That is the way I am told it happened, that the authorization was suddenly, unexpectedly withdrawn.

I must qualify my statement with regard to this matter because some people may have seen the documents and the facts. I understand that the delegate was sent to Paris to meet me, but apparently he was unable to see me because I got the visa very swiftly, without knowing about it officially; something must have happened. The President of RADER makes the point clearly in his letter.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): The President of RADER is a responsible person. He leads a political party and he was present, I understand, at this meeting in Brussels. Since he has said this, some importance attaches to this matter, and I hope that the representative of Belgium will also comment on this point in due course.

(Mr. Rasgotra, India)

The petitioner mentioned the existence of a certain concentration camp in Nyamata. What kind of a camp is this? What happens there? How many people are concentrated in this camp? What is done to them? Does the petitioner have further information on this point?

This is also a matter on which I should like the Administering Authority to comment upon in due course.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): As far as the concentration camp is concerned, I must say that this place, which is called a refugee camp, is really a den of misery. The members of the Visiting Mission who have seen this place can perhaps give more information than I can. I have not seen it myself. As you know, I live abroad, and the information was furnished to me by members of my party.

According to this information, there are thousands of persons there who are suffering from misery and hunger. That is why we called it a concentration camp, because people are concentrated there, coming from all over the place.

In our last petition, we cited information to the effect that there were several thousand persons taken to Bugesera from Byumba after the departure of the Mission.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

These are the terms which we use. They are different from those the Belgians use. The Belgians call it a refugee camp; we call it a concentration camp. These camps are camps where people are crowded together; so far as we are concerned, this is the same thing as a concentration camp.

Belgian newspapers now indicate that there is some sort of epidemic now in progress there and that the people there are suffering. The Visiting Mission has recommended that these people be permitted to regain possession of their goods and property.

Perhaps this information may suffice to reply to the question of the representative of India.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): The petitioner told us today that attempts are being made in the Territory, with the assistance of certain white missionaries -- these are the words he used -- to drive UNAR underground for the reason, allegedly, that it is a communist organization, a communist party. Now, in the last few days the representative of Belgium and the Special Representative have used a different kind of term; they have described the Tutsi party as the party of the dominating class, the party which suppresses liberty, the party which advocates traditionalism and conservatism. This, therefore, is news to my delegation, and I wish to know whether in the Territory itself this party has indeed been described in the manner in which Mr. Rwagasana says it has been described, whether it has been so described in any of the Territory's journals and newspapers, or in any other manner.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): That is precisely what is so surprising. That shows that they took action without knowing where they were going, whether they were going or coming. Sometimes they called us feudalists, sometimes they called us communists, and sometimes we were called fascists. We have had all possible epithets applied to us that can be imagined. An extraordinary kind of publicity has been disseminated with regard to myself, in fact, to the point where they preached in the churches that I had become a communist. And this continues. They say that whoever touches me will become a communist, will become infected.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

This propaganda against UNAR is being disseminated in all newspapers. Some of the newspapers achieved some sort of record in invention; they said that I had gone to the Conference of the Peoples of Africa in Tunis, and that I had gone there in order to try to get communist weapons. These figments of the imagination are sometimes amusing, but that is how they are describing us. All possible attributes are ascribed to us; we have not escaped one of them, and they are all bad, the worst possible.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): I know that the representative of Bolivia has already touched on this question. I do not insinuate anything. I accept what Mr. Rwagasana said about his party's not subscribing to the use of violence for the attainment of any political objectives. We accept that hypothesis. But going forward on that, may I ask him whether he or his party or his party's executive, in or out of the Territory, would be willing to make matters absolutely clear by issuing a declaration of intentions or of policy to the effect that they do not subscribe to the cult of violence and that they wish to adhere, and that they do in fact adhere, to constitutional methods for the attainment of their political objective, which is, I believe, the independence of the Territory.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): But we have made this declaration. We made it before the events of September last. The declaration against the use of violence was made and it is to be found in the report of the Visiting Mission. The Visiting Mission reports that UNAR had condemned violence, and if you look at the report you will find our declaration referred to there in the text.

After the visit of the United Nations Mission, we went further. We wrote to the Minister informing him that we are prepared to negotiate and sit at the round table as delegates of UNAR, and we did so in the most deferential terms possible. He wrote back to us saying that he had taken note of our statement.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

So therefore, our declaration of intention to the effect that we want no violence is something that we have made time and time again. And I will make it again on behalf of our party here, if you wish. If you wish such a declaration to be sent to you, we can send it, of course. Violence is what we want least of all. We want peace and tranquillity. But of course, on the other side concessions would have to be forthcoming also. We want only one thing, and that is peace, national peace, and I have said so. Whatever contributes to peace we are prepared to do -- everything. If such a declaration is considered by this Council to constitute a contribution to national peace, even though it might perhaps be construed in the sense that we had previously wanted to resort to violence, we are prepared to make such a declaration. We are prepared to do everything that will contribute to national reconciliation, literally everything, provided, of course, that we are not asked to sacrifice our honour, that we are not asked to lower ourselves to measures which would no longer be in keeping with the objectives we seek to achieve.

Mr. RASGOTRA (India): Neither Mr. Rwagasana nor UNAR has to send us a written declaration. The petitioner's statement here I think is good enough for our purposes. It clarifies the situation.

I at no time described UNAR as a party committed to violence. As I said, we do not accept that. But since doubts have been cast on that matter, since it has been alleged that this party is one which revels in organized murder and assassination, and things of that kind, I thought that a clear statement from Mr. Rwagasana on that point would be useful for the Council to have. I am very grateful to him that he has made a very clear and categorical statement. I am also most grateful to him for having answered all my questions.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): After listening to the very interesting statement made by the petitioner, Mr. Rwagasana, my delegation feels compelled to ask a few questions. However, in view of the fact that most of the questions have already been addressed to him by other representatives, my delegation will confine itself to one or two questions.

Mr. Rwagasana stated that a state of tension prevails in the Territory and that it is like a police regime, which I understand is the military regime. He also said that there are no fundamental freedoms and no human rights. Can he tell me whether under the present regime any political party or parties can freely convene and discuss political questions at issue. Perhaps he has already answered this question, but I would like to have confirmation of whether political parties are free to hold meetings.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I have replied to that question. The decree states that it is an exceptional regime that was being set up, but I have used the term military regime because exceptional regime means a military regime. There are troops there and no one denies this fact. Even the French press has said that troops are there so as to intervene in the Congo in case of trouble there. But troops are in Ruanda and they are stationed there supposedly to ensure public order and calm. But this is the exceptional regime; the troops are still there; they have not been recalled.

There are no public meetings. Public meetings are forbidden. There are closed meetings in private homes, but public meetings of more than five persons are forbidden. To have such a meeting, it is necessary to obtain a permit. I have explained the circumstances involved in obtaining a permit. It is necessary to go to the Minister, but the Minister is opposed to UNAR. How is UNAR to get a permit? In his communique he has called us communists. If it is necessary to get a permit from him, you can understand how difficult it would be. Therefore, UNAR just cannot hold meetings. The President of RADER has written and said as much. Of course UNAR has held a congress in a closed meeting, but you will find that other parties have held three, four and five congresses.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): I would like to know whether the general decree about which the petitioner spoke a moment ago applied to Urundi.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): This is a deplorable fact that I must report. We now have a very clear geographical division there. I am surprised and I wonder under what right Belgium has divided the country into two provinces. Ruanda and Urundi are literally divided. Measures are taken in Ruanda which are not implemented in Urundi. Administratively speaking there is a complete division. A decree for Ruanda is not applicable in Urundi. It would seem that in Urundi you can have public meetings. That is why the communal elections will be held in Ruanda under a military regime, but this will not be the case in Urundi where there is no military regime. Thus the two States are completely separated. I would like to know where Belgium ever found any right to divide the Territory into two provinces.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): It seems to me that the Mwami of Ruanda Kigeli V has become more or less a controversial figure, and my delegation would like to be very clear as regards his office and his privileges. I would have asked this question during the questioning period, but owing to the lack of time I did not. Perhaps the petitioner is familiar with the report of the Visiting Mission, which mentions the investiture at Kigali of Mwami Kigeli V on 9 October. According to the statement of the report, when the Mwami was called upon to sign the act of investiture at Kigali on 6 October, in the presence of the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, Kigeli V insisted that the ceremony be conducted in the presence of the Members of the High Council of Ruanda and also that the oath of office be altered to include the promise which he had made to reign as a constitutional Mwami. The ceremony was postponed for three days and the Mwami's wishes were finally complied with. Does the petitioner know the main reasons which motivated the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi to delay the investiture?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I must say that I was there at that moment and I was among the group which was the object of this situation. There was the old oath of office which said that the Mwami should swear loyalty

(Mr. Rwagasana)

to the laws or obedience to the law -- some formula like that. There was some criticism from parties that said the Mwami was a dictator, that he was an absolute monarch and that he wanted to reign as an absolute monarch. The Mwami, fearing that the oath of office might be turned against him afterwards and that he might be criticized as wishing to be an absolute monarch, wanted to have the oath changed.

(Mr. Rwagasana)

The Governor was opposed, supposedly for juridical reasons, because the text did not allow them to supplement the oath of office, and this was the reason for the conflict. A sort of little drama, one might say, occurred. First of all, the Mwami was called up alone. They asked him to sign. He refused. They called him back the next day. He refused. He had to call the Council. The Council went there and, finally, the Council decided to sign. This then was the beginning of the tension. That is how it happened.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): In that case I would like to know whether the petitioner could tell me if the High Council of Ruanda is also the Advisory Council and Executive Council of the Mwami. The point I want to be clear about is whether the High Council of Ruanda is regarded by the Mwami as the Advisory Council or the executive body.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): Yes, this was the object of what I call a little drama. Up to the present time the Mwami has refused to recognize that Council. This has been imposed upon him. The Mwami would not yield and when the disturbances occurred, they dissolved the former council and replaced it by certain persons who had been precipitously nominated. The Mwami was told that he must recognize this High Council and that he had to recognize this Council. He refused to do so. But I believe that the report of this incident must be in the records of the Visiting Mission. The Visiting Mission was there.

I do not know what this Council is and what authorization there was for it. All of a sudden, it was just set up overnight. There is a white administrator and two black assistant administrators. There is one prince, who is close to the Mwami, and there is some other prince; I do not know who it is. Some people like that suddenly are on this High Council. That is my opinion at least. It is a sort of small government trying to run the Council, and the Administration just hands all the power over to this little High Council. I am speaking very frankly.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): My delegation has taken note of the number of people who have been sentenced to imprisonment and those who have been sentenced to death. According to the statement made by the petitioner, all these people belong to the UNAR party. Of course, there are three parties besides his own: PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA and RADER. Since we understand from the report of the Visiting Mission, as well as from other information, that all these people are also responsible for arson and killing and looting, and what not, they might also be responsible for these crimes. Could the petitioner tell me whether any of these people, namely the leaders of these three other parties, have ever been sentenced to imprisonment or whether any punishment has been meted out to them?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): To our knowledge, none of the leaders of the three other political parties and no member of the Executive Committee of the parties is in prison, even though official allegations recognize that the bloody disturbances were organized by the sub-chief Mbonyumutwa. This is marked in the report, of course. That chief in fact is a member of the well-known Provisional Council.

That is why I said that persons who instigated these disturbances were granted preferment or received chieftainship appointments. It is regrettable to see what has been going on in our administration. The fact remains that none of the leaders of the political parties who organized the incendiarism and the **arson** were convicted, let alone sentenced. We should realize one thing. Only the UNAR party was victimized in connexion with that. It was thought that the party could be convicted of feudalism and similar offences, and the authorities sought to break up the party. It was aware that a war was being waged against the party.

The idea was to weaken it, to undermine it, to make it impotent. Since this has not worked, other means are being used. But the party was appallingly victimized and persecuted. There are no other leaders or chiefs of political parties who have been so victimized.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): To go back to the person of the Mwami, Kigali V, my delegation has before it a petition from the Chairman of the UNAR Committee (T/PET.3/L.27). Some accusations have been levelled against the Mwami, and one of them, of course, is very serious. This petition says that the Mwami has been falsely accused by certain people of wanting to go abroad to seek arms with which to kill them. This is a rather serious accusation.

I would like to have some clarification from the petitioner whether the Mwami, as he said, is going to Brussels and whether it would be possible for him to buy arms from Belgium, because this is a rather serious matter. I am wondering whether the petitioner has any comment on this petition which has already been circulated to the Council.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I wonder which petition is being referred to. What is the date, and what is the reference?

The PRESIDENT: May I ask the representative of Burma to indicate the document he mentioned in his question.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): I do not think the petitioner has this petition before him. I am referring to the petition contained in document T/PET.3/L.27, which has already been circulated to all the delegations. I will read from it and I ask the petitioner to listen carefully. The petition reads as follows:

"We protest vigorously against false assertions made in telegram from leaders APROSOMA RADER PARMEHUTU common front falsely accusing Mwami Ruanda of wanting to go abroad to seek arms with which to kill them." Then the petition also goes on to say the following:

"We protest all the more vigorously because the imputation is calumnious insulting defamatory and made to further subversive ends..."

I think it is quite clear what is meant by that statement in the petition. The Mwami has been accused of wanting to go abroad to seek arms with which to kill the members of those parties.

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): These accusations must not only be official accusations. There has been no official accusation so far and no official charge made against the Mwami. But it has been mentioned in the press. In our political atmosphere political passions have become inflamed, and I speak of Usumbura because in Ruanda the press do not have much to say. Even in Brussels it was stated at the conclusion of the round table conference that only unilateral information was supplied. This was one of the conclusions of the round table conference at Brussels. If these accusations are made, they have only been published in the press. Actually, no charge has been levelled against the Mwami. I hardly believe that the Mwami in Brussels could buy weapons from the Belgians. That would be fantastic. Even if such information were published, it would not be accurate. The press, of course, publishes what it wants. The Brussels press said that the Mwami was incriminated and that he had set up a revolutionary tribunal to judge people, and so on. But actually these are not serious charges.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): Towards the end of his oral petition, the petitioner recommended a number of things, and one of them particularly struck my delegation. He said that the Council should decide immediately to send a United Nations control mission to the Territory. As is already known, we sent a Visiting Mission to the Territory and it has returned and reported to us. Could the petitioner tell me what particular kind of mission he has in view for us to recommend to the Council. By a "control mission" does he mean a mission of observers, or what does he mean?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): We have always asked for this since the establishment of trusteeship, but compromise discussions have resulted in a situation where even the report of the Visiting Mission calls for a technical assistance mission to be dispatched. I did not limit myself to this technical assistance mission. I spoke specifically of control. I do not know to what extent the Charter would leave it open to the United Nations to secure political information from such official sources. I do not believe, however, that

the Charter would prevent the United Nations from securing information. As I see it, such a mission would consist of observers who would collect information on behalf of the United Nations in order to ascertain what is happening in our country. If the representative of Burma would look at the appropriate passage, he would see that I said that after the arrival of the Mission disturbances occurred. That is on the first page of my statement. I do not know to what extent information was made available about these disturbances, but they occurred. There were casualties and persons were injured. Others were cast into gaol. I do not know to what extent the Belgian representative informed the United Nations about this, but it has been truly established that disturbances occurred. This indicates that information is lacking here. There is a need for a mission to obtain the information and to control, so that if something occurs the United Nations would be immediately informed. I noted the figures, so that I might be quite accurate. I said that 1,300 huts were burned and that children died in the conflagrations. This information comes from the press, but it is the well informed press which I am quoting, the journal, La Cité, of 16 June.

I was in Paris when these incidents were reported, but I do not know to what extent the Belgian representative informed the Council of the situation and about what had transpired in my country. Information of this kind must be made available to the United Nations, because I know that there is an attempt to conceal what is happening in my country so as not to compromise certain people. That is why I called for a control or information mission so that if these matters which people try to conceal occur, they would be brought to the attention of the United Nations as swiftly as possible.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): In the statement he made, the petitioner compared the political platform of his party and those of the opposing parties. He said that his party, UWAR, is in favour of the granting of universal adult suffrage and that the other parties are opposed to it. Could the petitioner tell us what are the main reasons for the other parties not being in favour of universal adult suffrage?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): I did not say that the other parties are opposed to universal adult suffrage. The other parties are opposed to the womens' vote. We want universal suffrage for men and women; they want to exclude women from the suffrage. That is the difference. As for their reasons, they are the same reasons which impel them to seek elections during the period of military occupation. Some of the reasons escape me, but I have certain apprehensions that these reasons are not reasons of equity. They are perhaps not unrelated to a desire for success. Perhaps they want to reduce the number of electors as much as possible.

We asked that communal elections should take place once the political climate of our country had been established and after the round table when the modalities had been discussed. This could be done as it was done in the Congo, by popular representation, but the other parties do not want that. They want elections during the military occupation. We want women to have the vote, but they do not want that, and for the same reasons. The reasons which impel them to this undue haste also impel them to prevent women from voting.

U Tin MAUNG (Burma): I have one question following on the statement just made by the petitioner. He told us that his party was in favour of universal adult suffrage -- and when I say adult suffrage I mean the inclusion of men and women. Could the petitioner tell us whether there are any active women leaders in the executive committee of his party UNAR?

Mr. RWAGASANA (interpretation from French): At the moment there is no such thing. UNAR has not had time to complete the political organization of the party. After the party had held four or five meetings in five weeks, it was eliminated, swept away, and those engaged in its activities were obliged to hide. There are women who have helped us a very great deal in the organization of the party, but they had to do so clandestinely. That is why we are asking for universal adult suffrage. I asked the General Assembly for it when I was here in September; it is not just a thing of today. This is not the first time I have asked for it, but UNAR has not had time to complete its organization.

The PRESIDENT: The Council will reconvene at 8.30 this evening when we shall continue with the questioning of the petitioner. I have another speaker on my list. Thereafter, if the members are so inclined and we have the time, we shall resume the questioning of the Special Representative in the economic, social and educational fields. Two representatives have indicated their readiness in this connexion.

Finally, we shall have only one meeting tomorrow, in the morning, so that representatives may be enabled to prepare their statements for the general debate. We hope that we shall be able to finish the questioning of the Special Representative, of course, but there will be only one meeting tomorrow, which will be in the morning at 10.30. I hope that this meets with the agreement of the Council.

Mr. HOOD (Australia): We have no wish, of course, to see any interruption in the important topic at present before the Council, but might I ask, for the sake of the convenience of my delegation, when you, sir, might

(Mr. Hood, Australia)

expect the Council to return to the present outstanding consideration of the Territory of New Guinea. We have the Special Representative, who is at the service of the Council and is still waiting in New York -- not that his presence is indispensable from the point of view of the Council, but from the point of view of the convenience of the delegations it is desirable. Might I ask when we should expect to return to this particular item of New Guinea and conclude it?

The report of the Drafting Committee, of course, has been before the Council members for several days and possibly one meeting would be sufficient to dispose of this particular item and at least clear that out of the way.

Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom): I understand very clearly the anxiety of the representative of Australia. At the same time, there is a certain indispensable sort of tenor of the discussion of Ruanda-Urundi and I think that the most urgent thing is to finish the period of questioning. When members have finished, then they could be given some time to prepare their speeches and have the general debate. There will then be a gap, I suppose, between the end of the general debate and the statements by the representative of Belgium and the Special Representative, which it is necessary to have in order to enable the Secretariat to prepare the material for the Drafting Committee; and that, I think, is the most urgent thing of all in front of us at the moment.

Could the Council not be told that the utmost priority will be given to the New Guinea draft, compatible with that necessity, over Ruanda-Urundi? In other words, it will have priority over everything else, including, I imagine, Tanganyika, although that will cause us some inconvenience, but we recognize that Australia has priority because that delegation has been waiting a long time. I hope that the first priority can be given to the discussion of Ruanda-Urundi because, otherwise, we may get into great difficulties.

The PRESIDENT: I think that the representative of the United Kingdom, with his usual lucidity, has stated our case. I was just about to say the same thing because I think that Ruanda-Urundi has a certain priority. As soon as possible we shall take up the report on New Guinea and then, of course, proceed with all the other items. Does that answer the question of the representative of Australia?

Mr. HOOD (Australia): That is exactly what I wanted to elicit from the Chair. If possible, could we be given some indication of the time-table in this matter? Could we reckon perhaps on Thursday, 23 June, or indeed Friday?

The PRESIDENT: The Council Secretary has just said that it could be on Friday afternoon, 24 June.

Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): It might be helpful if, tomorrow or the day after, the Secretariat furnished us with an approximate calendar of our work up to the end of this session on the hypothesis that the session would end on time, namely, 30 June.

As far as the night meeting is concerned, I am not opposed to any night meeting -- I am even prepared for night meetings every evening, if necessary, to enable us to finish on time, but I am a bit surprised at having a meeting tonight when there will be no meeting tomorrow afternoon. There may be reasons external to the Council which justify this schedule, but I am rather astonished that we have to come here tonight and are to be granted a recess tomorrow afternoon.

The PRESIDENT: The purpose of this is to enable representatives to get their work done and dispose of a great deal of the business which we have on our hands. I believe that it is much easier to have the petitioner before us, for instance, this afternoon and tonight and then to reconvene tomorrow morning and to have the whole afternoon for our work.

Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (interpretation from French): Despite the President's argumentation, I cannot say that I am fully convinced, but I shall not oppose the proposal if it is the will of the Council.

The PRESIDENT: Then the Council will meet again at 8.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.