



# Security Council

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## Letter dated 5 June 2024 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2693 (2023) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2693 (2023) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2693 (2023), the final report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 2 May 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 31 May 2024.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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## Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2693 (2023)

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## *Summary*

Regional dynamics had an impact on the activities of armed groups in the Central African Republic, and were particularly influenced by conflicts in neighbouring countries. In particular, the spillover effect of the conflict in the Sudan has significantly affected the situation in the Central African Republic and the humanitarian situation in the prefectures of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto.

Armed group activities in the Central African Republic have increased, complicating the security landscape. Various armed groups, including the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique, the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique, both under the banner of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement, and the sanctioned armed group the Lord's Resistance Army, have been active, leading to increased insecurity for civilians and humanitarian workers.

The present report provides details of some of this activity in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures during the review period. It notes the presence of Sudanese conflict parties crossing into Central African Republic territory, with confirmed reports of Sudanese Armed Forces air raids in and around border areas. The Rapid Support Forces of the Sudan have recruited from among armed groups in the Central African Republic and move between the two countries easily through a long-standing network. The strategic importance of Am Dafok as a key logistical hub is emphasized, with its role in the supply chain for the Rapid Support Forces and other armed actors highlighted.

The humanitarian situation in Vakaga Prefecture was marked by an influx of Sudanese refugees. Concerns that armed elements have infiltrated the Korsi refugee site in Birao led to heightened tensions between local communities and refugees. Trade routes remained disrupted by the conflict in the Sudan, further complicating food security and the delivery of aid. In the south-east, the armed group Azande Ani Kpi Gbe, which emerged in 2023, perpetrated violations of human rights, including forced recruitment, use of child soldiers and attacks based on religious and ethnic grounds.

There have been frequent armed clashes between Azande Ani Kpi Gbe and the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique, both having also been involved in various violent incidents and human rights violations.

The report also highlights problems associated with parallel or fast-track programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

## I. Background

### A. Mandate and travel

1. On 27 July 2023, the Security Council adopted resolution [2693 \(2023\)](#), by which it extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze, with exemptions, in the Central African Republic. The Council also mandated the Panel of Experts to continue to assist the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic. The Panel was tasked, inter alia, with collecting information on the implementation of sanctions measures (arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban), as well as on individuals and entities that may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 20 to 22 of resolution [2399 \(2018\)](#) and extended by paragraph 5 of resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#).

2. On 3 August 2023, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution [2693 \(2023\)](#), the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs nominated five individuals, with expertise in armed groups, arms, finance and natural resources, humanitarian affairs, and regional issues, to serve on the Panel. On 26 December, the Committee approved the nomination of four of the five proposed expert candidates. Three incumbent Panel members were selected in January 2024 (regional issues, arms, and humanitarian affairs). A new armed groups expert joined the Panel in January. The Panel does not yet have a finance and natural resources expert.

3. In its resolution [2693 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel to provide, after discussion with the Committee, a final report no later than 15 June 2024. The period for travel, investigations and report-writing was two and a half months. The Panel opened different lines of investigation and has included in the present report cases that it was able to verify within the limited time period.

### B. Cooperation

4. During the first quarter of 2024, the Panel travelled on one occasion to the Central African Republic, visiting the capital, Bangui, as well as Birao (Vakaga Prefecture), Bouar (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture) and Obo (Haut-Mbomou Prefecture). A planned visit to Chad in March was postponed until May. The Panel exchanged information with other United Nations panels and groups of experts, in particular the panels on Libya, the Sudan and South Sudan. The Panel thanks the Government of the Central African Republic and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for their continued logistical support and substantive collaboration.

### C. Methodology

5. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of 22 December 2006 (see [S/2006/997](#), annex). While it aims to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose those or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel withholds identifying information. The Panel corroborated findings by triangulating information with independent and reliable sources.

6. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and strove to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report in relation to which those parties may be cited.

## II. Implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the Luanda road map

### A. Challenges in implementing the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the Luanda road map

7. In its final report of May 2023, the Panel recalled that a strategic review hosted by the Government on 4 June 2022 (see [S/2022/527](#), para. 18) had concluded that the Luanda road map and the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic would be “pooled into one joint peace process”. Despite this initiative, there were consistent reports from civil society leaders concerning a lack of clarity in the relationship between the two peace processes.<sup>1</sup>

8. MINUSCA relaunched the initiative to support meetings of the prefectural implementation committees (comités de mise en œuvre préfectoraux) in 2023. At the start of 2024, some committee meetings and awareness-raising activities resumed to explain the Luanda road map for peace.

9. However, representatives of the armed group signatories of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, such as Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R), the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) and the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), have largely been absent from the meetings of the prefectural implementation committees. These groups are still part of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC) and are engaged in open hostilities against the Government of the Central African Republic. Furthermore, since April 2023, several armed group signatories of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation have proclaimed their official dissolution and/or transformed themselves into political parties,<sup>2</sup> and some have done so after splitting internally. These groups include Séléka rénovée pour la paix et la justice, the Révolution et justice Belanga faction, the FPRC branch led by the sanctioned individual Abdoulaye Hissène (CFi.012),<sup>3</sup> the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain led by Jean Rock Sobi<sup>4</sup> and the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) led by Hassan Adramane.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to confidential sources, one of the reasons for the lack of clarity could be attributed to the fact that, while the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation is a public document readily available, this is not the case for the Luanda road map for peace, apart from some technical timelines and dashboards that have been updated periodically.

<sup>2</sup> Andolu Ajansi, “Centrafrique: dissolution de cinq groupes armés”, 30 April 2023. Available at [www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/centrafrique-dissolution-de-cinq-groupes-arm%C3%A9s/2885383](http://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/centrafrique-dissolution-de-cinq-groupes-arm%C3%A9s/2885383).

<sup>3</sup> Abdoulaye Hissène broke away from the mainstream FPRC led by Nouredine Adam in 2022 and became close to the Government of the Central African Republic. In September 2023, Hissène was arrested and accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity because of a warrant from the Special Criminal Court. See [S/2019/930](#), annex 2.10; and *Le Temps*, “Abdoulaye Hissène, un ancien chef rebelle, inculpé de crimes contre l’humanité en Centrafrique”, 8 September 2023, available at [www.letemps.ch/monde/abdoulaye-hissene-un-ancien-chef-rebelle-inculpe-de-crimes-contre-l-humanite-en-centrafrique](http://www.letemps.ch/monde/abdoulaye-hissene-un-ancien-chef-rebelle-inculpe-de-crimes-contre-l-humanite-en-centrafrique).

<sup>4</sup> Its original leader, Martin Koutamadji, also known as Abdoulaye Miskine (CFi.013), was arrested in Chad in November 2019 and has since been in custody in N’Djamena.

<sup>5</sup> The leader of MPC, Mahamat Al-Khatim, announced on 3 November 2023 that the movement was leaving CPC. He is said to have reached an agreement with the Government of the Central African Republic that would see him return to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation. However, he has remained in Chad to date, most likely concerned about the prospect of being arrested should he return to the Central African Republic. See RFI, “Centrafrique: le groupe armé MPC annonce quitter la coalition rebelle CPC”, 3 November 2023, available at [www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231103-centrafrique-le-groupe-arm%C3%A9-mpc-annonce-quitter-la-coalition-rebelle-cpc](http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231103-centrafrique-le-groupe-arm%C3%A9-mpc-annonce-quitter-la-coalition-rebelle-cpc). He was arrested in N’Djamena on 11 April 2024.

10. The splintering of these groups effectively means that while some factions of a particular group have expressed their recommitment to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, others have remained outside the Agreement, as reported in earlier reports of the Panel (see [S/2022/527](#), para. 18).<sup>6</sup>

## **B. Coalition des patriotes pour le changement members sentenced in absentia in September 2023**

11. The Luanda joint road map for peace of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, signed in September 2021,<sup>7</sup> sought to revive the peace process and fast-track the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation. On 21 September 2023, five CPC members and political opposition leaders were sentenced in absentia by the Court of Appeal in Bangui.<sup>8</sup>

12. The sanctioned individuals François Bozizé (CFi.001), Ali Darassa (CFi.015) and Nourredine Adam (CFi.002), as well as the non-sanctioned individuals Mahamat Al-Khatim and Sembé Bobbo, were all sentenced in absentia to forced labour for life on counts of conspiracy against the State and sedition for their active role in CPC.

## **C. Non-continuation of payments to armed group leaders in N'Djamena**

13. As cited in the Panel's final report of May 2023 (see [S/2023/360](#), paras. 40–42), the Luanda road map provided for allowances to be paid to armed group leaders exiled in N'Djamena, including those potentially in violation of the sanctions measures. The exiled leaders were Sembé Bobbo (3R), Mahamat Al-Khatim (MPC), Igor Lamaka (anti-balaka Ngaïssona wing),<sup>9</sup> Maxime Mokom,<sup>10</sup> François Bozizé, Bernard Bonda (Bozizé's director of cabinet, anti-balaka Mokom wing), as well as the CPC spokesperson Abakar Sabone<sup>11</sup> and Ousmanou Mohamadou<sup>12</sup> (UPC, even though the group had not committed to the Luanda road map).<sup>13</sup>

14. As also cited in the report of May 2023 (*ibid.*, paras. 33–39), the payments agreed with the armed group signatories under the Luanda road map have been blocked by the national security agency of Chad. The Panel is investigating the matter and will provide more information to the Committee in future reports.<sup>14</sup> Exiled armed group leaders were to receive funds according to figures set out in annex 3 to the present report.<sup>15</sup> The recipients themselves have stated that the payment was being held up by the Chadian national security agency.<sup>16</sup> In April 2024, all of the opposition leadership of the Central African Republic armed groups based in Chad appeared to be under pressure from the Government. Mahamat Al-Khatim and Abakar Sabone were arrested, and Sembé Bobbo appears to have fled to Mondo. Others are also

<sup>6</sup> See annex 1: three CPC communiqués (two signed by Ali Darassa and one by François Bozizé).

<sup>7</sup> The accord was signed by armed group members that had left the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.

<sup>8</sup> See annex 2: court document dated 11 September 2023.

<sup>9</sup> See also [S/2020/662](#), annex 2.15.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, annex 6.2.

<sup>11</sup> See also [S/2021/569](#), para. 140.

<sup>12</sup> Confidential United Nations report, August 2023.

<sup>13</sup> Both FPRC and UPC leaders refused to participate in the Angola-led peace talks although UPC does have a representative in N'Djamena. See [S/2023/360](#), paras. 35 and 36.

<sup>14</sup> The Panel has written to the bank in question to trace the origin of these allowances, which were potentially in violation of the asset freeze in the case of François Bozizé.

<sup>15</sup> See annex 3: payments received by and owed to CPC leaders exiled in N'Djamena.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with exiled armed group leaders, April 2024.

looking to leave N’Djamena. At the same time, the relationships with Fulani armed groups in the Central African Republic are crucial to facilitate transhumance movement of cattle herds from Chad into the Central African Republic.<sup>17</sup>

15. Maxime Mokom was one of the first notable arrests in Chad.<sup>18</sup> Most recently, Mahamat Al-Khatim and Abakar Sabone were also arrested by the national security agency of Chad on 11 April 2024. Chadian security forces called the two armed group leaders to a meeting and sent a car to pick them up. They were accustomed to attending these meetings within the context of the Luanda peace plan payments and, in fact, had been promised the resumption of some form of payment for them to pay for the Eid celebrations. However, on this occasion they were arrested at the meeting in the national security agency building.<sup>19</sup> At the time of writing, both men were still being detained.

### III. Regional dynamics

#### A. Spillover from the conflict in the Sudan

##### Security situation in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures

16. The Panel had previously reported on the initial meeting between Hassan Bouba and the Sudanese opposition group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in December 2022 (see S/2023/360, paras. 60 and 61). Since August 2023, there have been confirmed reports of RSF as well as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) crossing into Central African Republic territory, and reports of SAF air raids in and around Umm Dafog in the Sudan in September 2023.<sup>20</sup> The RSF presence in and around Am Dafok in the Central African Republic and Umm Dafog continues to constitute a security threat to civilians and an impediment to humanitarian activities in the area. Increased insecurity along the border has been linked to a documented RSF presence at least since the conflict in the Sudan broke out in April 2023.<sup>21</sup> MINUSCA returned to the Am Dafok border towards the end of 2023, after a notable absence since June 2023.<sup>22</sup>

17. During the reporting period, there was an increase in the presence of armed groups in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures, leading to insecurity for civilians and humanitarian workers. Several armed groups have been particularly active in the two prefectures in the first quarter of 2024, with CPC, FPRC, UPC and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA, CFe.002)<sup>23</sup> the most prominent. Armed groups attacked the national Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA) and Russian instructors directly in Ndah and Sikikédé, and the rest of their operations appear to have been focused around mining activities, occasional violence and disruption of road traffic. Roadblocks or checkpoints have been a persistent complaint from locals in the period under review, roughly since the end of the rainy season in October 2023. On 29 December, three armed elements fired at a MINUSCA patrol near the Central African Republic border at Am Dafok. They were arrested and handed over to the

<sup>17</sup> Meetings with international researchers, January 2024.

<sup>18</sup> International Criminal Court, “Situation in Central African Republic II: Maxime Jeoffroy Eli Mokom Gawaka surrendered to the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes”, press release, 14 March 2022. Available at [www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-central-african-republic-ii-maxime-jeoffroy-eli-mokom-gawaka-surrendered-icc-crimes](http://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-central-african-republic-ii-maxime-jeoffroy-eli-mokom-gawaka-surrendered-icc-crimes).

<sup>19</sup> Confidential source, April 2024.

<sup>20</sup> Confidential United Nations report, August 2023.

<sup>21</sup> Confidential report, March 2024.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Confidential United Nations reports, March 2024; and telephone meetings with community leaders in Vakaga Prefecture, April 2024.



country's internal forces. The three elements were identified as members of RSF, bearing the tripartite logo on their uniforms.<sup>24</sup>

18. The high level of armed group activity in Vakaga Prefecture in early 2024 can be attributed to the greater concentration of diverse armed actors around the Am Dafok area as a result of the spillover effects of the conflict in the Sudan. This is due in part to the importance of Am Dafok as a key supply line for RSF. The Panel heard from multiple sources regarding the importance of Am Dafok for the recruitment of armed actors by RSF. Despite the proximity of three major Central African Republic armed groups (UPC, FPRC and other CPC members), there have been no reports of clashes or fighting taking place among them. At the operational level, there is also clearly an effort towards a "no-harm policy" among groups belonging to CPC, as well as rather opportunistic collaboration, with the principle that each group retains specific areas of operation and/or influence. CPC members, including FPRC, all systematically claim and/or reaffirm, through their discourse, their membership in the coalition.<sup>25</sup> Coordination between various armed groups could further bolster their capacity, significantly complicate the tenuous security dynamics of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures and present a considerable threat to the Government.

19. Since the closure of the FACA military base of the tripartite force in Am Dafok in May 2023, there has been a limited State presence, creating a vacuum for arms and armed groups to circulate freely between the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan.

20. Habib Hareka, a prominent figure within RSF for many years, has re-emerged as a key actor involved in transborder activities between the Central African Republic and the Sudan for recruitment among armed groups in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures. On 18 August 2023, he established connections with a concentration of forces in Kufrah, Libya.<sup>26</sup>

## B. Recruitment

21. Opposition armed groups from the Central African Republic have been reported to have actively recruited for, and sent members of their own groups to fight in, the Sudan under RSF. FPRC was already involved in the Sudan as early as August 2023, with reports of its leader, Noureddine Adam, injured in fighting in Nyala. As of March, FPRC/CPC forces are still able to cross between the Sudan and the Central African Republic at will and use Sudanese territory to launch attacks in Vakaga Prefecture in places such as Am Dafok, Tissi, Sikikédé and Ndah. RSF support for FPRC/CPC on the ground in Vakaga Prefecture and FPRC involvement in the Sudanese conflict create a complicated dynamic for FACA, since in 2023 RSF claimed to have thwarted a plan to overthrow the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, and claims to be working actively with the country's Government (see [S/2023/360](#), para. 62).

22. Other key links between Central African Republic-based actors and RSF local leadership in South Darfur include the sanctioned individual Ali Darassa of UPC, "Hamidti" and Habib Hareka of RSF, as well as Yahya Ishaq, who recruited from key sites in the Central African Republic. These main recruitment areas are Am Dafok,

<sup>24</sup> See annex 4, photo of the badge of RSF elements arrested by MINUSCA in Am Dafok, 29 December 2023.

<sup>25</sup> See various statements from UPC, FPRC, 3R and anti-balaka during the reporting period.

<sup>26</sup> See annex 5: Habib Hareka recruitment from Libya.

Sam Ouandja, the Ndah mining site and Haute-Kotto Prefecture, with a final destination of Nyala.<sup>27</sup>

### C. Humanitarian situation in Vakaga Prefecture

23. Since August 2023, the intensity of the conflict between SAF and RSF shifted from Khartoum to Darfur when RSF launched a large-scale military campaign to take full control of the region and successfully captured the SAF headquarters in Nyala on 26 October (see S/2024/65, para. 5). On 14 December, SAF conducted air strikes on RSF military positions in Nyala.<sup>28</sup> This led to a new wave of Sudanese refugees fleeing into the Central African Republic.

24. By 27 March 2024, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had registered 10,668 Sudanese refugees (4,657 households) at the Korsi refugee site in Birao, northern Vakaga Prefecture. In the first three weeks of March, civilians fleeing from the Sudan were received at the Korsi site at a rate of 565 new arrivals per week.

25. In January, UNHCR reported that 88 per cent of Sudanese refugees fleeing across the border into the Central African Republic were women and children.<sup>29</sup> UNHCR documented cases of sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated against women and girls at the Korsi site.<sup>30</sup> In one week alone in March, there were 12 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in the Korsi refugee camp, including 2 cases of rape, 2 of forced marriage, 3 of denial of resources, 4 of physical violence and 1 of psychological violence.

26. In Birao, in March, the Panel received reports that there had been increasing tensions between the local community and refugees at the Korsi site.<sup>31</sup> On more than one occasion, FACA elements patrolling the area had intervened to prevent or break up physical fighting between people. Tension was due in part to local inhabitants feeling a rising sense of insecurity, fearing that unknown armed elements, believed to be SAF or RSF fighters, had infiltrated and were hiding among civilians at the Korsi site.<sup>32</sup>

27. The Panel has opened lines of investigation into incidents of killings of civilians in the vicinity of the Korsi site and allegations of armed elements hiding in the camp, and intends to provide more information to the Committee in future reports.

28. The war in the Sudan has disrupted the important trade and transportation route between the Central African Republic and Darfur through the border at Am Dafok. Consequently, the populations in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures have become more food-insecure over the past year, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance has become slower and more expensive.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with international experts working in the area.

<sup>28</sup> Sudan War Monitor, “Warplanes unleash brutal assault on Nyala”, 30 December 2023. Available at <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/warplanes-unleash-brutal-assault>.

<sup>29</sup> UNHCR external update No. 42, Sudan situation, 26 December 2023–3 January 2024. Available at <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/105941>.

<sup>30</sup> UNHCR external update, Central African Republic-Sudan situation, 21–27 March 2024. Available at <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/107610>.

<sup>31</sup> Meetings with MINUCSA and humanitarian workers, March 2024.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

## D. Chad

### Chadian concern with southern opposition spilling over into the Central African Republic

29. The Government of Chad monitors the activities of Chadian opposition groups operating in southern Chad (see S/2023/360, paras. 51–54), including the “Force armée dynamique des révolutionnaires du sud du Tchad”<sup>33</sup> and the Mouvement pour la paix, la reconstruction et le développement (MPRD) of Djedouboum Sadoum.<sup>34</sup> MPRD is a politico-military group that refused to sign the Doha Agreement for Peace and the Participation of the Political-Military Movements in the Inclusive National and Sovereign Dialogue of August 2022 as part of the Chadian peace process.<sup>35</sup> Chadian armed forces have since reinforced their positions in and around Sido, Chad, to prevent people from joining Chadian opposition groups in the Central African Republic.

30. Chadian representatives informed the Panel that the various opposition groups in the Central African Republic lacked sufficient unity to foster a concerted military effort against the Chadian authorities. However, some Chadian authorities were closely observing the Chadian opposition coalition in the Central African Republic, the Conseil démocratique républicain, which circulated a video and communiqué in early April 2024 announcing that it was preparing opposition protests in Chad.<sup>36</sup>

31. Other Chadian opposition groups such as the armed group Rassemblement populaire pour la justice et égalité au Tchad (RPJET) are still present in Vakaga Prefecture. Although different sources place RPJET as moving between Vakaga Prefecture and the Sudan, they have not communicated any additional information regarding the armed group’s activities or intentions.<sup>37</sup> There was not much follow-up after RPJET leaders sent a letter on 19 April 2023 to the Prefect of Vakaga requesting authorization to settle in Am Dafok to “secure” the prefecture, along with a request for support from the Government of the Central African Republic in the form of military equipment to overthrow the Government of Chad.<sup>38</sup> According to local sources, RPJET had initially extended support to Hamidti and RSF in Khartoum with an expectation of future support in Chad.<sup>39</sup> The Panel is further investigating reports of the presence of Chadian armed groups or elements in the Central African Republic, namely in Vakaga and Haute-Kotto Prefectures, and a possible affiliation (if not presence) in Ouham-Pendé and Ouham Prefectures.

## E. South Sudan

32. The situation in the south-east of the Central African Republic compounds insecurity in the entire eastern flank of the country, characterized by cross-border dynamics in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan, affecting the prefectures of Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran, Haute-Kotto, Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou in the Central African Republic.

<sup>33</sup> Deutsche Welle, “Le pouvoir tchadien de nouveau menacé depuis le sud du pays”, 24 January 2023. Available at [www.dw.com/fr/le-pouvoir-tchadien-de-nouveau-menac%C3%A9-depuis-le-sud/a-64495244](https://www.dw.com/fr/le-pouvoir-tchadien-de-nouveau-menac%C3%A9-depuis-le-sud/a-64495244).

<sup>34</sup> Meetings with community leaders and confidential sources in Paoua, 7–10 February 2023.

<sup>35</sup> Tchad Infos, “Tchad: voice les mouvements qui n’ont pas signé l’accord de paix de Doha”, 8 August 2022. Available at <https://tchadinfos.com/tchad-voici-les-mouvements-qui-nont-pas-signe-laccord-de-paix-de-doha>.

<sup>36</sup> Conseil démocratique républicain, “Déclaration du président du CDR”, YouTube, 26 March 2024. Available at <https://youtu.be/GLYmpV8wuk0?si=26Ce57EsEVHIRElp>.

<sup>37</sup> Meeting with community sources in Birao, April 2023.

<sup>38</sup> Confidential United Nations sources, September 2023.

<sup>39</sup> Meeting with confidential sources, Birao, June 2023.

33. In November 2023, the Central African Republic and South Sudan agreed to implement a cross-border security strategy as part of strengthening regional security cooperation. The two countries plan, inter alia, to establish joint security patrols. The Panel intends to follow the implementation of the cross-border security strategy and will provide more information to the Committee in future reports.<sup>40</sup>

### **Border meetings between the Central African Republic and South Sudan**

34. The Panel has received reports of several cross-border meetings in Source Yubu<sup>41</sup> organized by South Sudanese groups to discuss the situation in Haut-Mbomou with Zandé leaders. Notably, on 9 August 2023, a cross-border meeting was organized by Major General James Nando (see S/2021/87, annex 3.12)<sup>42</sup> and the District Commissioner of Tambura, Colonel Mabengue.<sup>43</sup> From Bambouti four local leaders attended: a youth leader, a representative of the Organisation des femmes centrafricaines, the head of the village chiefs from Bambouti, and the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) commander. They all agreed to reopen the border between the Central African Republic and South Sudan, guarantee free circulation and ban the holding of weapons by civilians. Thereafter, some people returned to the Central African Republic after having fled Bambouti and taken refuge in South Sudan.<sup>44</sup>

35. The Panel had reported in the past on the trading relationships between UPC and Dinka tribes in South Sudan, including exchanges of livestock for food and military supplies, highlighting the complex regional dynamics affecting the security and humanitarian situation in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture. While the AAKG group emerged in March 2023, cooperation between Zandé groups in the Central African Republic and South Sudan is not new.

36. In December 2020, in his report on the situation in South Sudan (see S/2020/1180, para. 28), the Secretary-General noted the alleged mobilization of Zandé young people to fight former Séléka inside the Central African Republic territory, stating that Zandé young people were reported to have been hired by a businessman from the Central African Republic, with backing from Major General James Nando, the former commander of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition who had defected to the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) in March 2020. He also noted that the appointment of Lieutenant General Alfred Futiyo as Governor of Western Equatoria State had continued to generate discomfort among some Zandé political and military elites, while some Zandé politicians had attempted to rally for the formation of an independent administrative area in Tambura.<sup>45,46</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Sudan Tribune, "South Sudan, CAR agree to implement border security pact", 2 November 2023. Available at <https://sudantribune.com/article278954>.

<sup>41</sup> In the Central African Republic, the town is known as Source Yubu, and in South Sudan it is called RiiYubu. It is a small trading town of about 1,000 inhabitants 5 km east of Bambouti.

<sup>42</sup> On 8 March 2023, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland sanctioned Major General James Nando, commander of SSPDF, which had perpetrated sexual and gender-based violence in Tambura County, Western Equatoria State, South Sudan (see [www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-sanctions-against-global-violators-of-womens-rights](http://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-sanctions-against-global-violators-of-womens-rights)). On 20 June 2023, the United States of America also designated Major General Nando for involvement in conflict-related sexual violence in South Sudan (see <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1552>).

<sup>43</sup> Confidential sources in person and telephone correspondence, March 2024.

<sup>44</sup> Video clips sent to the Panel by a confidential source on 9 August 2023.

<sup>45</sup> Tambura is a county in Western Equatoria State, South Sudan.

<sup>46</sup> From around June 2021, a wave of organized political violence in Tambura County led to the displacement of nearly 80,000 people and the deaths of at least 440 civilians. The origins of the conflict could be traced back to tensions over political representation and land rights between elite members of the Balanda and Avungara clans of the Zandé, playing out through sporadic violence and abuses (see S/2022/359, paras. 49–51).

37. When the armed group UPC was based in Bambouti (between October 2019 and March 2023), it traded with the (mainly Dinka) Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition and SSPDF. The Dinka would bring millet and maize, which UPC would barter for cattle and meat. UPC would raid cattle from the Fulani in the Central African Republic and exchange them for food from the Dinka. The Dinka also provided UPC with ammunition, arms and military uniforms.

38. AAKG informed the Panel on 10 March 2024 of its determination to remove all UPC elements from Mboki and Zemio, having gained control of Bambouti. This border town now serves as a conduit for the movement of South Sudanese Zandé militia members and weapons. Reports also indicate an influx of South Sudanese mercenaries. Local witnesses noted that the most lethal operations launched by AAKG in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture involved ethnic Zandé fighters from South Sudan. Control of Bambouti is pivotal for UPC to connect its forces in the north and south of the Central African Republic via South Sudan, facilitating the transfer of weapons and supplies.

39. Bambouti, serving as the primary entry point for goods from South Sudan to the Central African Republic, holds strategic importance for AAKG as well. It enables direct logistical support from Yambio. Prior to gaining control, AAKG received arms supplies primarily at Nabiapai, a remote trading post in the extreme south-east corner of the Central African Republic bordering both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.<sup>47</sup>

## IV. Central African Republic armed group activities

### A. Coalition des patriotes pour le changement attack on the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic position in Sikikédé

#### Moyenne-Sido

40. On 2 November 2023, CPC elements attacked Moyenne-Sido. The incident left five civilians dead and eight wounded, while six assailants were killed. The Panel received video footage of one of the two attacks that took place in November 2023. The video shows well-equipped armed men with what appear to be new weapons. In the footage, the Panel identified new AKM assault rifles, 7.62 x 39 calibre weapons, wielded by UPC fighters.<sup>48</sup> Additionally, new combat uniforms, harnesses and pristine cartridge belts were observed. Similar weaponry was sighted within cargo shipments destined for RSF, documented in Am Djarass, Chad.<sup>49</sup> UPC received logistical support consisting of weapons, ammunition and combat uniforms from the Sudan in December 2023 via Yahya Ishak,<sup>50</sup> a Chadian national who is close to the UPC leader, Ali Darassa.

41. Yahya Ishak spent much of his life in rebellion, formerly serving as a senior officer with the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement fondamentale of Chad before joining the Séléka and seizing power in Bangui. After the civil war of 2013, he aligned himself with FPRC as a political adviser. With the recent Sudanese crisis, he joined the ranks of RSF as a member of the Central African Republic Katiba.<sup>51</sup> The Central African Republic Katiba is a battalion comprised of combatants in Nyala recruited from the Central African Republic. They were assembled into a single battalion for combat training at the RSF training camp in

<sup>47</sup> Confidential United Nations report, August 2023.

<sup>48</sup> Annex 6: CPC attack in Moyenne-Sido, photographs of weapons and equipment.

<sup>49</sup> See annex 7: arms and ammunition in Am Djarass, Chad.

<sup>50</sup> Confidential sources and in-person meetings, March and April 2024.

<sup>51</sup> Confidential meetings by telephone, April 2024.

Nyala before being deployed to various units within the RSF operational framework. Affiliated with the Misseriya tribe, Ishaq is associated with the opposition faction led by the Bashir Al-Khalil Roma group in the Doha talks. Based in Libya, Al-Khalil is actively engaged in mobilizing Chadian opposition elements located in border regions such as Um Dukhan, Am Dafok and the mining sites in Ndah and Sam Ouandja. He operates through Ishaq, who plays a crucial role in organizing opposition movements in the Central African Republic and Chad. Additionally, Al-Khalil and Ishaq are involved in trading military equipment, including uniforms, boots and ammunition.<sup>52</sup>

### **Coalition des patriotes pour le changement attack on the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic position in Sikikédé**

42. In the early hours of 7 March, armed CPC elements on motorbikes and several armed vehicles attacked FACA forces in Sikikédé, Vakaga Prefecture. The Panel received confirmation from multiple sources that the attack was conducted by FPRC/CPC elements. Corroborating sources indicated that among the FPRC/CPC forces were elements from the Sudan, presumably RSF and/or militia men recruited from the Sudan. The Panel was unable to confirm whether these were indeed RSF elements or other militia men and is further investigating these claims.

43. The attack on 7 March was repelled by FACA forces and Russian instructors. Corroborating sources reported that more than 20 armed elements were killed on the CPC side and five soldiers on the FACA side. The Government of the Central African Republic stated that more than 40 armed group elements were killed, while five FACA soldiers succumbed during the fighting. In its communiqué, the Government also explicitly mentioned the sanctioned individual Nourredine Adam as well as Arda Hakouma (see S/2019/930, para. 57) as leaders of CPC in the north-east of the Central African Republic. Prior to the attack on 7 March, various sources had cited collaboration between FPRC/CPC elements and RSF, with FPRC elements providing support to RSF in the Sudan and FPRC receiving support from RSF for conducting operations in the Central African Republic.

44. In a video shared with the Panel that was published on 6 March, a day before the attack in Sikikédé, the person speaking was identified as Aboubakar Sidiki, spokesperson of FPRC. Sidiki is with Haddo Adam Bachar, currently an emissary to Nourredine Adam and former lieutenant to Abdoulaye Hissène; Haddo Adam Bachar recruited combatants from the Sudan for the Sikikédé attack on 7 March. Mahamat Salleh is also in the video.<sup>53,54</sup> In the video, Sidiki states that the group conducting the attack is CPC and that it intends to “liberate the people of the Central African Republic”.

45. Central African Republic military and security forces in Birao have faced operational difficulties ranging from the absence of equipment to basic means of subsistence and amenities. The Panel learned that a little over half the personnel deployed at the FACA base in Birao had left over the course of a year of deployment owing to difficult conditions on the ground.<sup>55</sup>

46. The current security situation in Birao does not make it possible to move freely beyond 5 to 10 km outside the town without a military escort. This was observed by the Panel during its visit in March, owing to both the absence of practicable roads during the rainy season and the presence of armed elements.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> See annex 8: screenshot from a video of FPRC/CPC elements, 6 March 2024.

<sup>54</sup> For Mahamat Salleh’s activities in 2023, including the kidnapping of two French *Paris Match* journalists in January 2023 by FPRC/CPC, see S/2023/360, paras. 9, 75–77 and 152–162 and annex 32.

<sup>55</sup> Confidential FACA personnel and community sources in Birao, March 2024.

## **B. Parti pour le rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine**

47. On 31 January, armed elements attacked a FACA position in Manou, 5 km west of Gordil in Vakaga Prefecture, near the Mandjan mining site. The assault was repelled by Central African Republic armed forces and allies. Two days later, the FACA command announced that Mohamed Ali, known as B13, military leader of the Parti pour le rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine (PRNC), who led the attack, had been killed during the fighting.<sup>56</sup> While there are contradictory versions about the circumstances that led to the death of B13, the Panel obtained confirmation from various sources, including his family members, that he had been killed. The Panel is investigating the new configuration of PRNC leadership following the death of B13. Sources report that Ahmat Dibanne took command of the group immediately following the demise of B13.<sup>57</sup>

## **C. Continued fighting between the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture**

48. Throughout 2023 and into 2024, there were frequent armed clashes between the UPC faction led locally by Ahmad Petit, who is loyal to Ali Darassa, and AAKG, led by various group commanders, including “General Leman”.

49. Both UPC and AAKG have committed humanitarian law and human rights violations, including the targeting of civilians, abduction, forced displacement, forced recruitment, ethnic- or religious-based attacks and using children in armed conflict. These armed groups have also obstructed humanitarian assistance.

50. During the reporting period, violent incidents took place on the main road from Zemio, via Maboussou, Mboki and Obo, to Bambouti on the border with South Sudan, as described below.

### **Human rights violations by the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture**

51. At the end of 2022, UPC in Bambouti intensified its violent and illegal taxation of traders and residents moving to and from South Sudan and along the Bambouti-Obo axis.<sup>58</sup> The armed group was based in the old gendarmerie compound under the command of Ahmad Petit.<sup>59</sup>

52. UPC had a “tax collection” checkpoint near the health centre and, in addition, UPC elements would move around and demand “taxes” at random locations, including from people who had already paid at the checkpoint. Merchandise was taxed multiple times, disproportionately higher than the value of the items.<sup>60</sup>

53. The Panel heard several accounts of killings, rape and pillaging by UPC from 2022 to 2024, in and around Bambouti.<sup>61</sup>

54. The mayor of Bambouti, Anne-Marie Siokani, resides in Obo for security reasons.<sup>62</sup> There was no civilian Central African Republic governing authority and no

<sup>56</sup> See annex 9: FACA communiqué on the death of Mohamad Ali, alias B13, dated 2 February 2024.

<sup>57</sup> Confidential sources: community leaders and armed group members, March 2024.

<sup>58</sup> Meetings with local authorities, NGO staff and community members, Obo, 8–12 March 2024.

<sup>59</sup> Confidential sources, Obo, March 2024.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Meetings with local authorities, NGO staff and community members, Obo, 8–12 March 2024.

<sup>62</sup> In November 2020, the mayor had been brutalized and detained by UPC following an armed clash between UPC and South Sudanese armed militia. See Journal de Bangui, “RCA-Bambouti: le maire de la ville pris en otage par les éléments de l’UPC”, 23 November 2023, available at [www.journaldebangui.com/rca-bambouti-le-maire-de-la-ville-pris-en-otage-par-les-elements-de-lupc](http://www.journaldebangui.com/rca-bambouti-le-maire-de-la-ville-pris-en-otage-par-les-elements-de-lupc). The Panel also reported on the incident (see S/2021/87, annex 3.13).

national police or military presence in Bambouti, and the mayor deplored that her town had been abandoned by the State.<sup>63</sup> The medical non-governmental organization (NGO) Alima supplies and maintains staff at the Bambouti health centre. In 2022, the Italian NGO COOPI rehabilitated a school in the town, but there are no organized activities there. The mayor said that numerous residents had left the town owing to insecurity and the lack of services, and she estimated the population in the entire sub-prefecture of Bambouti to be some 300 people.

### **Incident of kidnapping and torture by Ahmad Petit of the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique**

55. In its final report of May 2023 (S/2023/360), the Panel cited an incident in which UPC kidnapped the sister of the mayor of Bambouti, accusing the sister of transferring money to South Sudanese forces to attack UPC in Bambouti (see S/2023/360, annex 10). The Panel collected additional information on the incident, documenting the responsibility of the UPC leader, Ahmad Petit, and four men under his command in human rights violations, including kidnapping and committing acts that amount to torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment and punishment.<sup>64</sup>

### **Human rights violations by Azande Ani Kpi Gbe in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture**

56. Since it emerged in March 2023, the armed group AAKG has stated in various communiqués and through its delegate, Michel Koumboki, that its primary objective is to protect the Zandé community in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture from UPC aggression.<sup>65</sup>

57. The Panel collected testimonies in Obo between 8 and 12 March 2024, as well as information related to forced recruitment, the use of child soldiers and attacks based on religious and ethnic grounds attributed to AAKG, which the Panel intends to further investigate and document.

### **Azande Ani Kpi Gbe violent attacks based on religious and ethnic grounds**

58. The Panel received several accounts of AAKG threatening and aggressing Muslim civilians. It seems that the emergence of AAKG may have marked a shift, or a radicalization of Zandé on religious grounds, targeting a small minority of Zandé who are Muslim.

59. In one incident, on the morning of 4 April 2023, a 22-year-old Zandé Muslim was mobbed by a group of about 20 AAKG members as he was buying fish at a stall about 200 m from the Arab quarter in Obo. Some of the AAKG attackers carried Kalashnikovs, while others had knives or machetes (“coup-coup”). The Zandé Muslim man recognized the group’s leader as “Baloko” and another man as “Abroso”, a motorcycle taxi driver.<sup>66</sup>

60. They stole his money and his mobile phone before someone in the group stabbed him in the thigh. AAKG aggressively reproached him for being Muslim and thus “betraying his community”, and threatened to kill him.

61. AAKG took him to their camp called “Mbokou” by the Ouarra River, 2 km north-east of Obo. There he was beaten and abused until around 4 p.m. the same day, when FACA elements, alerted by Muslim community leaders in Obo, arrived near the camp and AAKG released him. Since the incident, he has been too afraid for his security to leave the Arab quarter and would like to move to Zemio.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Meeting in Obo, 9 March 2024.

<sup>64</sup> See annex 10: incident of kidnapping and torture by Ahmad Petit, UPC.

<sup>65</sup> The Panel considers AAKG to be a non-State armed group bound by international humanitarian law and human rights law.

<sup>66</sup> Interview in Obo, 11 March 2024.

<sup>67</sup> The man is from Zemio and moved to Obo in 2015 to set up a kiosk in the Arab quarter, selling various foodstuffs, clothes and toiletries. He has always been a Muslim, and both his parents are Muslim.



### **Azande Ani Kpi Gbe blocks a United Nations convoy and threatens to kill Muslim civilians**

62. On the morning of 8 March 2024, a MINUSCA convoy, escorted by the Moroccan battalion and transporting a humanitarian team sent to support the field office, was stopped by a group of AAKG around 7 km west of Obo. A yellow, open-air truck carrying civilians and merchandise was travelling at the end of convoy. AAKG, led by “Boloko”, claimed that there were UPC fighters among the civilians and that the food was destined for UPC in Mboki and Zemmio.<sup>68</sup>

63. The Prefect of Haut-Mbomou and the MINUSCA head of office in Obo were immediately called by MINUSCA and arrived to intervene. Despite their mediation efforts, AAKG ordered all the civilians – women, men and children – to get off the truck, then proceeded to unload the merchandise, mainly foodstuffs, to search for weapons. According to passengers with whom the Panel spoke, AAKG also accused the Moroccan battalion of supporting UPC. AAKG group members pointed guns at the Muslim civilians and threatened to kill them.

64. At around 3 p.m., MINUSCA and AAKG reached an agreement whereby AAKG kept all the merchandise while the MINUSCA convoy, including the Muslim passengers and the truck, returned to Obo. Just before the convoy returned to the MINUSCA field office in Obo, the Panel had arrived there. The circumstances around whether the owner of the civilian truck had sought and received permission from MINUSCA to join the convoy were unclear.<sup>69</sup> The Sudanese truck owner, who was himself among the passengers on 8 March, has been operating out of Bangassou for many years. On 10 March, he was admitted to Obo hospital owing to stress. He told the Panel that all he wanted was to return to Bangassou and that he would wait and beg MINUSCA to provide an escort. If he managed to leave, he would never return to Obo.<sup>70</sup>

65. Muslim traders in Obo told the Panel that they could not move beyond a 1 km radius outside Obo and that, although MINUSCA and FACA provided protection for them in the centre of the town, they wanted to leave and move to Bangassou. The traders have requested an escort from MINUSCA to help them leave Obo.<sup>71</sup>

66. The Panel met with Fulani traders in Obo, who said that they assumed that armed groups would not lay down their arms through dialogue or awareness-raising given that these weapons had become a source of livelihood for armed groups.<sup>72</sup> The traders were also concerned to see that UPC and AAKG militia would claim to disarm only if the other side was already disarming.<sup>73</sup>

## **D. Lord’s Resistance Army (Joseph Kony faction)**

### **Civilians escape from the Lord’s Resistance Army, March 2024**

67. The sanctioned armed group LRA, led by the sanctioned individual Joseph Kony (Cfi.009), was disrupted by the ongoing war in the Sudan. The group appears to have left its long-held bases in the disputed area of Kafia Kingi and moved to a mountainous zone in Haute-Kotto Prefecture.<sup>74</sup> This move brought LRA in proximity to towns in the eastern part of the Central African Republic and may have provided an opportunity for some group members, held against their will, to break free from the group.

<sup>68</sup> Meeting with the truck driver and passengers aboard the truck, Obo, 9 and 10 March 2024.

<sup>69</sup> Interviews with MINUSCA officials based in Obo, March 2024.

<sup>70</sup> Meeting, Obo hospital, 10 March 2024.

<sup>71</sup> Confidential sources: Fulani traders group meeting, Obo, March 2024.

<sup>72</sup> Meeting with Fulani community leaders, Obo, March 2024.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> NGO sources, Haute-Kotto Prefecture, March 2024.

68. On 1 March 2024, a young man from the Central African Republic who had left the group arrived in Ouanda Djallé, Vakaga Prefecture. Between 21 and 30 March, five women, including one Congolese and one Ugandan woman, as well as one boy and one girl, reached Sam Ouandja, Haute-Kotto Prefecture, following their escape from LRA. They are in the care of local organizations and humanitarian agencies engaged in family tracing in preparation for possible family reunification.

#### **Defection of combatants from the Lord's Resistance Army**

69. In late March 2024, 14 male LRA defectors arrived in two different communities in the Sam Ouandja locality. The defectors then all joined together and travelled to Yangou-Pendéré, a mining site controlled by an armed group.<sup>75</sup>

70. The defectors declared their intention to demobilize and surrender their weapons to the armed group at Yangou-Pendéré. Eight defectors were armed and six were unarmed. The armed group leader agreed to take the defectors to Sam Ouandja, and they arrived there on motorcycles late on 31 March. The next day, Russian instructors arrested the 14 LRA defectors. They were handcuffed and transferred to an unknown destination.

71. The Panel is investigating the circumstances around the arrest and the situation of the LRA defectors. While local sources claimed that the group of defectors included 12 men and two boys,<sup>76</sup> an online media report indicated that the 14 defectors were all under 18 years and had been taken to Bangui by FACA and Russian instructors.<sup>77</sup>

#### **Attack on a site called “Yemen” in Haute-Kotto Prefecture, 7 April<sup>78</sup>**

72. On 7 April 2024, Russian instructors carried out a coordinated air and ground attack on a location known as “Yemen” around 70 km south-east of Sam Ouandja. UPC/CPC sources confirmed that members of their armed groups had been killed in the attack.<sup>79</sup> The main target may have been Joseph Kony, who had recently been at the site. However, on the day of the attack, Kony had reportedly already returned to his own base some 15–18 km south-east of “Yemen”.<sup>80</sup>

73. “Yemen” was set up by a Sudanese trader named Alico, who manages the cultivation of large cannabis fields near Sam Ouandja. Other traffickers have also established themselves in the area, which has become a market for Fulani pastoralists as well as armed groups, including Chadians, Sudanese, individuals from the Central African Republic and LRA. The area can be reached only by motorcycle or foot.

74. The Panel has earlier reported on collaboration between the Sudanese armed group the Justice and Equality Movement and Fulani fighters from Tulus, South Darfur, in the cultivation and trafficking of cannabis in this area.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>75</sup> The Panel is investigating the nature and leadership of this armed group, based on indications that it may be a Chadian rebel group led by Ahmane Chéhbé and his deputy “Adoum”, allegedly co-located and/or cooperating with FACA elements.

<sup>76</sup> Confidential source, 16 April 2024.

<sup>77</sup> Actu Cameroun, “FACA: les instructeurs russes et les Faca libèrent 14 enfants du groupe terroriste LRA”, 22 April 2024, available at <https://actucameroun.com/2024/04/22/rca-les-instructeurs-russes-et-les-faca-liberent-14-enfants-du-groupe-terroriste-lra>; and NGO sources.

<sup>78</sup> Confidential local sources, 16 and 17 April 2024.

<sup>79</sup> Confidential sources, 19 April 2024.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> See S/2021/87, annex 3.4. In 2023, the Justice and Equality Movement announced that it would fight alongside SAF against RSF in the ongoing armed conflict in the Sudan. See BBC, “Sudan civil war: Darfur’s Jem rebels join army fight against RSF”, 17 November 2023, available at [www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67450204](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67450204).

## V. Transhumance

75. Transhumance is a predominantly Fulani activity with herders moving cattle, sheep and goats across long distances to find suitable grazing areas. While these movements are often synchronized with the seasons and rainfall patterns, conflicts between herders and traders have made this a key dimension of the conflict in the Central African Republic (see [S/2018/1119](#), paras. 105–140).

### A. Ouham and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures: new trends

76. During the transhumance season in 2024,<sup>82</sup> the Central African Republic has recently witnessed an increase in the number of herders migrating into Ouham and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures. A trend observed by local NGOs and community members is that a significant number of herders are reported to have originated from the Niger and Nigeria who are unfamiliar with local customs, languages and established conflict resolution mechanisms. While there are numerous incidents, one of note during the reporting period – at Nzakoundou – demonstrates the potential for local transhumance-related incidents to take on larger dimensions.

### B. Nzakoundou village incident<sup>83</sup>

77. The first incident took place on 21 December 2023 in the village of Nzakoundou (32 km from Ndim along the Paoua axis). Community leaders were reported to have been regularly engaging in cattle rustling with the help of FACA units based in Pougol. The cattle were often not possible to find afterwards, and the price of looting them was shared among the members of the network. During the thefts, however, the community members associated with the cattle rustling raped women, including young girls, the last victim being a 12-year-old girl, in December 2023. In retaliation, the armed group 3R attacked the village on 21 December. During the attack, FACA soldiers fled their post inside the village and some 23 civilians were killed by 3R elements, and many houses burned. After a detailed investigation, the FACA commander sacked the FACA personnel who were stationed at Nzakoundou, and the Pougol unit of FACA is to be tried before a military tribunal. The Panel intends to provide more information to the Committee.

## VI. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement

### A. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration: armed group elements' fast-track integration and use as proxies

78. In its final report of May 2023 ([S/2023/360](#), paras. 115–124), the Panel reported on multiple cases of ongoing use of demobilized ex-combatants as proxies for the national security and defence forces and their fast-track integration into FACA in large numbers. During the reporting period (from January to April 2024), the Panel has been unable to obtain a comprehensive update on the present recruitment and

<sup>82</sup> Interview with an expert on transhumance, April 2024.

<sup>83</sup> Community leaders working on conflict mediation in transhumance conflicts.

integration process. It was, however, able to gather information about one case of parallel demobilization in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture.

## **B. Parallel demobilization (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic and Armed Forces of the Central African Republic/Russian instructors)**

79. The Panel met the Prefect of Haut-Mbomou and the local FACA commander in Obo on 9 March 2024. They both maintained that the mission of the Russian instructors arriving in Obo would be to reinforce FACA in its attempts to control AAKG armed activities in the towns of Obo and Zemio. This then developed into an AAKG disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme that commenced at the end of March, the same time as an ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme with UPC Guenderou elements in the area, which is currently delayed. The ex-combatants within the ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme expressed their frustration over the lack of progress on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The visit of their former leader, Guenderou, in February 2024 was received without much support. He stated that only 31 out of 64 properly disarmed elements<sup>84</sup> had received training and that even those had received limited support.<sup>85</sup>

80. Although AAKG and FACA/Russian instructors may both share the objective of countering UPC, starting one disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process while another is stalled is adding to the tension in the area. During the Panel's visit in March, Russian instructors in Obo were also involved in negotiations leading to the release of a Muslim woman who had been kidnapped during an attack by AAKG on the village of Kere (85 km south-west of Obo) on 19 February 2023 and had since been held by members of the AAKG group.

81. The Panel was informed of the start of training sessions by Russian instructors on the handling of weapons for the benefit of AAKG elements, with the participation of 120 elements.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, it should be noted that on 26 March a MINUSCA vehicle heading towards the area where these training sessions were taking place was forced by FACA to make a U-turn, without explanation. FACA elements working with the Russian instructors were not under the command of the local FACA commander.

82. The scenario of the integration of AAKG elements as auxiliaries in the ranks of FACA appears to have overtaken the ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives taking place in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture. The Panel continues to investigate the training objectives of AAKG.

### **Two Lord's Resistance Army factions demobilize and are repatriated to Uganda**

83. On 21 July, 14 August and 28 September 2023, three groups of two factions of LRA that had been operating in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture were repatriated to Uganda after undergoing a disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement process.<sup>87</sup> Representatives of the Governments of the Central African

<sup>84</sup> United Nations staff meetings, March 2024.

<sup>85</sup> Meetings with community members, Obo, March 2024.

<sup>86</sup> The Panel heard that weapons training sessions would take place every morning at the Obo Catholic school.

<sup>87</sup> Central African Republic and MINUSCA, joint press release, 28 September 2023. Available at <https://minusca.unmissions.org/derni%C3%A8re-phase-de-rapatriement-volontaire-d%E2%80%99ex-combattants-de-la-lra-et-leurs-d%C3%A9pendants-vers-l>.

Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Uganda had met in Entebbe, Uganda, to sign a quadripartite agreement for the process to proceed.<sup>88</sup>

84. The two LRA factions concerned were splinter groups from the Joseph Kony-led LRA. The first group comprised 14 ex-LRA combatants, including its leader, “Doctor” Achaye, and was airlifted to Uganda on 22 July.<sup>89</sup> In 2016, the Panel documented the structure of the splinter group led by “Doctor” Achaye and reported that the group had been responsible for some of the most violent attacks against civilians at the time, along the Central African Republic-Democratic Republic of the Congo border between Zemio and Obo.<sup>90</sup> In recent years, the group had been based near Zemio.

85. Members of the second group of LRA ex-combatants from the so-called Owila faction,<sup>91</sup> based near Mboki, differed on whether to demobilize. On 14 August 2023, a first part of the group was repatriated, and on 28 September the remainder of the group, including the faction leader, Owila, was also flown to Uganda, having agreed to undergo disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement. The Minister of State responsible for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement and for monitoring the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, Jean Willybiro-Sako, had coordinated the process on behalf of the Government of the Central African Republic.<sup>92</sup>

86. Between July and September 2023, women associated with the two LRA factions were interviewed to obtain their informed and voluntary consent to be repatriated to Uganda together with their children and the ex-combatants.<sup>93</sup> The Panel heard that the process had been challenging, given that LRA has been responsible for systematic and widespread human rights violations, in particular the abduction of women, girls and boys and the perpetration of sexual violence, including systematic rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage and forced pregnancy.<sup>94</sup>

## VII. Arms

### A. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

87. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has encountered significant difficulties in the identification, registration and monitoring of recovered weapons. Many United Nations officials have communicated the problem of oversight and potential recirculation of such weapons to armed factions, thereby perpetuating ongoing conflicts.<sup>95</sup> Instances of interference have been recorded. One incident

<sup>88</sup> Time News, “The Entebbe Quadripartite Agreement – a success in the repatriation of ex-LRA combatants – Congo Independent”, 19 February 2024. Available at <https://time.news/the-entebbe-quadripartite-agreement-a-success-in-the-repatriation-of-ex-lra-combatants-congo-independent>.

<sup>89</sup> See coverage of the first group received at Entebbe airport, published by the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs of Uganda, 22 July 2023. Available at [www.modva.go.ug/uncategorized/reintegrate-and-settle-in-your-communities-rt-hon-prime-minister-nabbanja-tells-ex-lra-combatants](http://www.modva.go.ug/uncategorized/reintegrate-and-settle-in-your-communities-rt-hon-prime-minister-nabbanja-tells-ex-lra-combatants).

<sup>90</sup> See S/2016/694, paras. 65 and 66; and S/2016/1032, para. 180 and annex 5.6.

<sup>91</sup> Meeting with NGO worker involved in the process, 19 April 2024.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> International humanitarian law and international human rights law oblige States to ensure that repatriation is voluntary and based on the informed consent of the individuals, considering their specific circumstances and family situations. The Convention on the Rights of the Child establishes that the best interests of the child must be the primary consideration in all actions concerning children, including in repatriation processes.

<sup>94</sup> The systematic and widespread human rights violations perpetrated have been thoroughly documented over many years, including in the trial and sentencing of Dominic Ongwen by the International Criminal Court in February 2021. See [www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen](http://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen).

<sup>95</sup> Interviews with United Nations and NGO personnel, March 2024.

occurred in Bouar on 6 December 2023, where Russian instructors disrupted a MINUSCA-led weapons recovery operation.

88. A weapons collection ceremony was organized in Ngaïdo, within the Doaka Kourssou municipality of Bouar. The event saw the voluntary surrender of weaponry by eight former combatants. During the ceremony, Russian instructors intervened, ordering the detention of the former combatants and the seizure of all surrendered weapons. One of the disarmed former combatants, Kpare Valentin, has not been seen since.<sup>96,97</sup> The Panel is investigating the circumstances.

## B. Drone activities

89. On 10 December 2023, from 2.45 a.m. to 3 a.m., six waves of explosions were heard at the Russian instructor base in Kaga Bandoro, Nana-Grébizi Prefecture. Seven people were injured and three Russian instructors were killed. Noise from the explosions was heard and vibrations felt in the MINUSCA camp at Kaga Bandoro.

90. The attack against the Russian instructors in the region appears to have been perpetrated by armed groups in response to an incident that had occurred three days earlier. On 7 December 2023, in Kaga Bandoro, FACA and Russian instructors launched an attack against UPC armed elements at the Bara mining site (67 km north-west of Batangafo), in which 12 UPC fighters were reportedly killed and 30 apprehended. The whereabouts of the apprehended fighters are unknown. General Khalité, General Al-Khatim's<sup>98</sup> father-in-law, was also reportedly killed in the same attack. The attack took place while the Government of the Central African Republic was in negotiations for a peaceful settlement with Mahamat Al-Khatim of MPC.

91. Since the end of 2023 and into 2024, multiple flights of drones have been recorded over various positions of MINUSCA, FACA and Russian instructors. On 17 November 2023, in Birao, Vakaga Prefecture, MINUSCA reported that two unidentified drones had been seen flying over Birao airport (10 km south-west of the town of Birao). The flights of an unidentified drone over Birao airport had previously been reported on 19 October and 23 October 2023. It should also be noted that the commander of the MINUSCA temporary operating base in Gordil was informed on 14 September 2023 by the FACA platoon commander in Gordil of the presence of two drones: the first flying over the FACA checkpoint, and the second flying over the Telecel telephone communication tower in order to disable communication capabilities and prevent the calling of support or reinforcements if an attack were to be carried out.

92. Similarly, since the beginning of 2024, there have been repeated sightings of unidentified drones flying over the FACA base in Ndélé. Specifically, sightings occurred on 31 December 2023, 9 and 10 January 2024 and 7 February 2024. This is despite the drone flight ban imposed by the Government of the Central African Republic on 3 February 2023, following the alleged drone attack in Ndélé (see [S/2023/360](#), paras. 107–112).

93. In the meantime, the drone flight ban of February 2023 continues to be in effect and applies to MINUSCA, which is required to obtain prior authorization from the Ministry of Defence of the Central African Republic to operate drones that are critical to its mandate and in accordance with status-of-forces agreement.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Confidential sources and interviews during the Panel's visit to Bouar, March 2024.

<sup>97</sup> See annex 11: photograph of Kpare Valentin.

<sup>98</sup> Confidential meetings in Bangui, March 2024.

<sup>99</sup> See annex 12: airport police entry forms of three American nationals deported from the Central African Republic on 7 January 2024, on the same day as their entry.

## C. Explosive devices

94. In 2023, MINUSCA documented a total of eight incidents involving improvised explosive devices,<sup>100</sup> signalling an elevated level of security threat across the region. Furthermore, two separate aerial attacks were reported in Ndélé on 21 January 2023 and in Kaga Bandoro on 10 December 2023, emphasizing the ongoing challenges in upholding stability. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that five of these incidents were linked to the camps of Russian instructors.<sup>101</sup> It is important to highlight that most of the recorded improvised explosive device incidents occurred in the western part of the Central African Republic, with five directly affecting Russian instructor camps or their vicinity.<sup>102</sup> On 3 January 2023,<sup>103</sup> in Carnot, Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture, a homemade grenade-type improvised explosive device, launched from outside, exploded in the camp of Russian instructors, with no casualties reported. On 10 February 2023, in Bambari, Ouaka Prefecture, at about 2 a.m., an anti-personnel improvised explosive device, with steel ball fragmentation, was reportedly thrown inside the Russian instructors' camp and exploded in a tree without causing any casualties. On 3 April 2023, in Kabo, Ouham-Fafa Prefecture, at approximately 7 p.m., there was a reported explosion of a motorcycle intentionally parked at the back of the Russian instructors' camp, injuring two FACA members at the neighbouring checkpoint. On 19 September 2023, in Beloko, Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, at about 7 p.m., an improvised charge reportedly detonated in the Beloko customs post building that was under construction, with no casualties reported.<sup>104</sup>

95. Two serious incidents involving improvised explosive devices took place on 27 October 2023 and 11 January 2024. On 27 October, at around 9.30 a.m. in a café in Baoro, Nana-Mambéré Prefecture (46 km south-east of Bouar), a device suddenly exploded, causing injuries to seven civilians. Five of the seven were in a serious condition and evacuated to Baoro health centre for medical care.<sup>105</sup>

96. On 11 January, a significant explosion was reported to the Panel. It involved a loudspeaker at a mobile phone kiosk, resulting in three fatalities in the village of Wantiguera, 6 km from Bouar.<sup>106,107</sup> The Panel visited Bouar in March and the incident is still under investigation. Internal security forces on the scene reported three dead bodies, which they promptly transported to the Bouar health district.

97. Although there is much focus on the use of improvised explosive devices, the real concern of note is the high number of incidents related to explosive remnants of war recorded in the Central African Republic. In 2023, a total of 53 incidents involving explosive remnants of war took place, resulting in 36 casualties. As of the beginning of 2024, 14 incidents had been recorded, resulting in 14 casualties.<sup>108</sup> Given the number of victims of explosive remnants of war, it is important to continue monitoring this problem.

98. In 2023, there were seven incidents involving improvised explosive devices, resulting in 52 victims. Conversely, in 2024, only one incident involving improvised

<sup>100</sup> Confidential interviews, March 2024.

<sup>101</sup> The occurrence of five incidents specifically targeting Russian instructor camps is noteworthy, as it suggests that armed groups are strategically diversifying their attack methods to inflict greater losses on Russian instructors compared with FACA.

<sup>102</sup> Confidential sources, April 2024.

<sup>103</sup> This count, starting at the beginning of 2023, enables the Panel to understand the frequency of incidents, the modus operandi and the impact on human losses.

<sup>104</sup> Confidential sources, March 2024.

<sup>105</sup> Confidential sources, Baoro, 15 February 2023.

<sup>106</sup> Confidential sources, Bouar, 16 February 2023.

<sup>107</sup> See annex 13: Wantiguera explosion incident.

<sup>108</sup> Confidential sources, March 2024.

explosive devices has been recorded to date. Additionally, in 2023, there were 13 incidents involving anti-vehicle mines, resulting in 68 victims. To date in 2024, one incident involving anti-vehicle mines has been recorded, resulting in eight victims.<sup>109</sup>

## VIII. Sanctions measures

### Travel ban and asset freeze violations

#### *Ali Kony in Uganda*

99. In July 2023, the sanctioned individual Ali Kony (Cfi.010) travelled to Gulu, northern Uganda. According to the newspaper *The EastAfrican*, Kony and his family had been repatriated from South Sudan with support from the Embassy of Uganda in Juba.<sup>110</sup>

100. In Uganda, Ali Kony gave several interviews to the press. In one interview, he said that he had defected from LRA in the disputed enclave of Kafia Kingi in July 2021 and had travelled to Songo in South Darfur State, Sudan.<sup>111</sup> In another interview, he explained that he had left LRA because of disagreements with his father, Joseph Kony, and further claimed that on multiple occasions his father had imprisoned and tortured Medina Akulu (Ali Kony's mother, and Joseph Kony's third wife), as Ali Kony believed that his mother had wanted to escape.<sup>112</sup> When Ali Kony arrived in Uganda in July 2023, he was accompanied by his mother, his wife and his three children.

101. On 25 August 2023, Ali Kony and his family were received by the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, in Entebbe.<sup>113</sup>

102. The Panel is not aware of any request for exemptions to the travel ban for the sanctioned individual Ali Kony. His travel in the Sudan and South Sudan constitutes a violation of the travel ban.<sup>114</sup> While his birthplace is unknown to the Panel, if Ali Kony was born in northern Uganda, then he has a right to return there and his entry into Uganda would not constitute a violation of the travel ban.

## IX. Recommendations

103. The Panel makes the following recommendations:

### To all stakeholders:

(a) Encourage increased regional cooperation in the revitalization of the Central African Republic peace process (Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and Luanda road map) to address security challenges;

<sup>109</sup> Confidential sources, April 2024.

<sup>110</sup> *The EastAfrican*, "Kony family appeals to Museveni to fulfil pledge". 5 December 2023. Available at [www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kony-family-appeals-to-museveni-to-fulfil-pledge-4454888](http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kony-family-appeals-to-museveni-to-fulfil-pledge-4454888).

<sup>111</sup> Uganda Radio Network, "Kony's son explains why he parted ways with his father", 4 September 2023. Available at <https://ugandaradionetwork.com/s/konys-son-explains-why-he-parted-way-with-father>.

<sup>112</sup> *The Independent*, "Why LRA leader, son parted ways", 31 August 2023. Available at [www.independent.co.ug/why-lra-leader-son-parted-ways](http://www.independent.co.ug/why-lra-leader-son-parted-ways).

<sup>113</sup> State House of Uganda, "President Museveni meets Joseph Kony family, pledges support", 25 August 2023. Available at <https://statehouse.go.ug/president-museveni-meets-joseph-kony-family-pledges-support>.

<sup>114</sup> See annex 14: Ali Kony in Uganda.



(b) Encourage increased MINUSCA monitoring in Vakaga and Haut-Mbomou Prefectures to protect civilians, refugees and local governance;

(c) Improve coordination between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and strengthen coordination and transparency to prevent parallel programmes and build lasting peace;

**To the Government of the Central African Republic:**

(d) Investigate and ensure accountability for humanitarian law and human rights violations committed by the armed groups UPC and AAKG in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, including violations perpetrated by the UPC leader Ahmad Petit, under the command of the sanctioned individual Ali Darassa;

(e) Encourage FACA to secure safeguarding, systematic control, efficient management, thorough traceability and strict accountability of weapons, ammunition and military equipment recovered following military operations;

(f) Encourage the Central African Republic authorities to counteract the surge in arms trafficking from neighbouring countries, particularly given the current conflict situation in the Sudan, as well as the infiltration of foreign fighters into the Central African Republic, which poses a significant long-term threat to the region;

**To all Member States:**

(g) Encourage compliance with the Security Council sanctions regime concerning the Central African Republic, including the implementation of a travel ban and asset freeze for sanctioned individuals, by preventing sanctioned individuals from entering or transferring through their territory.

## **Annex 1**

### **Three CPC press releases**

Two communiqués signed by Ali Darassa (Cfi.015), founder and leader of UPC and Chief of Staff of the CPC, one dated 24 March and a second dated 14 April 2024.

In the first communiqué Darassa declares that he disassociates himself from the exiled CPC leaders in Ndjamena (accusing some of them of being egotistical and more concerned with the non-payment of their funds under the Luanda road map than the general situation facing the nation).

In the second communiqué dated 14 April, Darassa notes the recent rise in violent and intercommunal and religious conflict, and the challenges of humanitarian access. The communiqué notes among other things, exactions by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe against muslim civilians in Obo.

The CPC later communicated that Darassa had been misled as to the exact content of the communique signed by Darassa on 24 March . Darassa's 14 April statement denounces what he calls the abuses of the CAR government and its allies, including ethnic and religious divisions and targeting, along the same line as François Bozizé's (Cfi.001) communique from 4th April 2024.

The timing of Bozizé's communique, coming on the 4 of April, following Darassa's 24 March communiqué, indicates an attempt to re-affirm the unity of the CPC and standing together against the actions of the CAR government.

COALITION DES PATRIOTES  
POUR LE CHANGEMENT

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COORDINATION GENERALE

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COORDINATION MILITAIRE

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ETAT MAJOR GENERAL

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N°025/ CPC /CG /CM/EMG/PM.024



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité – Dignité – Travail

### Communiqué de Presse

La Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) par la voix de son Chef d'Etat-major, le Général d'Armée **Ali Darassa Mahamat** vient par le biais de ce communiqué informé l'opinion nationale et internationale ce qui suit. Face aux déclarations concernant le non versement des fonds alloués à certains leaders de la Coalition des patriotes pour le Changement exilés, installés au Tchad et bénéficiant de la couverture de l'Angola au nom des accords de la conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL) dans le cadre de la feuille de route de Luanda signé en septembre 2021. Le Chef d'Etat-major de la CPC en la personne du Général d'armée Ali Darassa Mahamat présent sur le sol Centrafricain se désengage des leaders de la CPC en exils : qui au lieu de se concentrer sur la situation alarmante que traverse les filles et fils de la nation, continue de faire passer leur intérêt égoïste sur l'intérêt général.

Pour cela le Chef d'état-major de la CPC demande à tous les fils et filles soucieux de voir et de vivre le changement dans notre très chère patrie de se joindre à ces actions pour l'assaut final destiné à rétablir l'ordre constitutionnel, la justice sociale et le développement de notre pays. Aussi il tient à remercier la population pour son soutien morale indéfectible et l'exhorte au calme. Quelqu'un disait je cite, « celui qui veut servir ne gaspillera pas une seule seconde pour son confort personnel ».

Fait à Batangafo, le 24 mars 2024

**Le Coordonnateur-militaire Chef  
d'Etat-major Général de la CPC**



Général  
ALI DARASSA MARAMAT

Général d'Armée ALI Darassa Mahamat

COALITION DES PATRIOTES

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POUR LE CHANGEMENT

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COORDINATION GENERALE

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COORDINATION MILITAIRE

ETAT MAJOR GENERAL

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N° 029/ CPC /CG /CM/SP.024



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

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Unité – Dignité – Travail

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### COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

La coalition des patriotes pour le changement CPC, par la voie de son Chef d'Etat Major, le général d'armée Ali Darassa Mahamat viens par le présent communiqué édifier, clarifier et rassurer l'opinion nationale et internationale sur la crise politico-militaire centrafricaine.

En effet, depuis plusieurs mois la coordination militaire a le regret de constater la montée en puissance des violences armées, des conflits intercommunautaires agriculteurs -éleveurs et plusieurs autres formes de violences qui entrave la libre circulation des personnes et des biens et qui fragilise la cohésion sociale et le vivre ensemble des communautés sur tout l'étendue du territoire Centrafricain.

Nous constatons les manœuvres dangereuses et de plus en plus généralisées de sabordement des efforts de réconciliation et de cohésion menés par la CPC au sein des communautés chrétienne, musulmane et dans notre pays. Nous constatons aussi la restriction des mouvements des ONG nationales et internationales sur tout l'étendue du territoire dû à l'insécurité grandissante.

Par ailleurs, le coordonnateur militaire chef d'état major de la CPC, attire l'attention du gouvernement centrafricain et de la communauté internationale sur les exactions barbares commises ces derniers mois contre les populations civiles musulmanes a Obo par la milice tribale Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé ,les massacres d'une dizaines de personnes a Bohong par un groupe de milicien armés non identifié, et les massacres dans les chantiers minier aux alentours de Kouki par les mercenaires russes de Wagner.

La coordination militaire dénonce et condamne avec la plus grande fermeté ces actes ignobles et barbares.

Le coordinateur militaire et chef d'état major général de la CPC demande au gouvernement centrafricain, à la communauté internationale et à la Minusca de prendre leurs responsabilités face à ces actes horribles qui peuvent compromettre sérieusement le retour définitif de la paix en République centrafricaine.

En outre, concernant les conflits agriculteurs -éleveurs, le coordonnateur militaire chef d'état major de la CPC le général d'armée Ali Darassa Mahamat exhorte les deux parties à œuvrer pour la cohésion sociale et de privilégier le dialogue tout en respectant les règles relatives à la transhumance, mais aussi de régler à l'amiable les différends auprès des autorités locales et traditionnelles pour préserver le vivre ensemble et la cohésion sociale entre les communautés locales.

Le Coordonnateur Militaire, Chef d'Etat major de la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC), le General d'Armée Ali Darassa Mahamat, tiens à informer l'opinion nationale et internationale que désormais toutes les zones occupé par la Coalition des patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) sont accessibles en toute sécurité à tous les Centrafricains (Éleveurs, Agriculteurs, commerçants) et à toutes les organisations humanitaires internationales et nationales (ONG), et la Minusca.

Par conséquent, Il est demandé impérativement à tous les officiers généraux, supérieurs, et sous-officiers en charge de la sécurité dans ces zones de faciliter la libre circulation et respecter la déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme de 1948 et la charte africaine des droits et des peuples, adoptées le 27 juin 1981 à Nairobi, qui sont d'ailleurs le socle juridique de notre combat.

Dans la condition des opérations et en toute circonstance, observant stricte du droit international humanitaire, qui règlemente de conflits armées, internationaux ou internes et dont je rappelle ici les principes impératifs absolu dans toutes les unités et pour tous les combattants de la coalition CPC :

➤ Le Principe d'humanité.

Le Principe de la non-distinction,

Le Principe de précaution,

➤ Le Principe de proportionnalité,

➤ Le Principe d'interdiction des maux superflus et des souffrances inutiles.

Le Coordonnateur militaire Chef d'état major de la coalition CPC, le général d'armée Ali Darassa Mahamat, demande a toute la population centrafricaine et aux organisations humanitaires internationales et nationales de vaquer librement a leurs occupations et aux ONG de continuer à venir en aide aux personnes vulnérables dans la zone sous contrôle de la CPC. Mais surtout de ne pas céder a la panique, puisque les vaillants soldats s'engagent a garantir leurs sécurité.


La Coordination militaire de la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) saisit l'occasion de demander aux compatriotes des communautés musulmane et chrétienne de garder leur calme face à ces manœuvres de division, et les rassure qu'il n'y aura plus de guerre ethnique en Centrafrique. La CPC reste et demeure la garante de la désormais unité nationale et de la cohésion sociale du peuple centrafricain.

Le coordonnateur militaire chef d'état major de la CPC, le général d'armée Ali Darassa Mahamat soucieux des souffrances de la population centrafricaine, de l'unité nationale, de la cohésion sociale et de la réconciliation nationale, reste ouvert à toute solution pouvant ramener définitivement la Paix et la sécurité en République Centrafricaine.

Vive la CPC pour que vive l'unité nationale

Fait à Bangassou 14/04/2024

Le Coordonnateur militaire Chef d'état major de la CPC



Le général d'armée Ali Darassa Mahamat

COALITION DES PATRIOTES  
POUR LE CHANGEMENT  
\*\*\*\*\*  
COORDINATION GENERALE



REPUBLIQUE  
CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité – Dignité – Travail  
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N°001/24/CPC/CG/CM/PM

**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE**  
**du Coordonnateur général**

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La Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) a pris la mesure, avec consternation, des manœuvres dangereuses et de plus en plus généralisées de sabordement des efforts de réconciliation et de cohésion menés par la CPC au sein des communautés chrétienne, musulmane et peule dans notre pays depuis les **Accords de Kamba-Kota** de décembre 2020.

Elle tient à porter à l'attention de la communauté centrafricaine et internationale les faits, résultats des manœuvres du pouvoir **MCU** et de ces alliés russes, pour déchirer le fragile tissu du vivre ensemble entre les communautés centrafricaines et saper la recherche de la paix.

Il y a quelque jours nous avons appris le déploiement des mercenaires de **Wagner** à Obo et l'appuis qu'ils ont amené au groupe tribal rebelle des « **Azandé Ani Pki Gbè** ». Au lieu de servir de force d'interposition, de conciliation et de sécurité de l'ensemble des communautés habitant la région, les alliés du pouvoir de **TOUADERA** sont allés avec l'intention d'encourager, d'armer et de former ce groupe rebelle pour la poursuite de combat contre les populations musulmanes. Ce qui pourrait embraser la région toute entière dans les prochain jours.

Cette démarche est dans la droite ligne de la mission affectée aux milices **Wagners** et aux **Wagners noirs** du ministre de l'élevage **Hassan BOUBA**; celle de simuler les combattants de la CPC et de provoquer des attaques dans certaines zones contre des éleveurs peuls ou contre des paysans agriculteurs non musulman.

Déjà le **1 Aout 2023 à Ndelé**, dans le village **Diki**, des populations civiles et le chef du village furent exécutés. Et à l'époque, le gouvernement s'était précipité pour pointer du doigt la CPC afin de brouiller la compréhension de la réalité.

Tout récemment, le samedi **30 mars 2024 à Pougol**, dans la Préfecture de **Paoua**, des individus armés « non identifiés » ont attaqué un campement peul, tuant 2 éleveurs et blessant 1 autre.

Le **02 avril 2024**, nous apprenons encore que des hommes armés « non identifiés » ont attaqué un campement d'éleveurs dans les environs de **Bohong** faisant 3 éleveurs tués dont un enfant blessés, 2 homme et 1 femme, plusieurs bétails emportés et un cheval tué .

L'objectif recherché par ces **Wagners noirs** et les milices à la solde du pouvoir est de susciter des représailles de la par des éleveurs afin de déclencher un conflit interethnique éleveurs peuls musulmans et paysans non musulman.

Ces attaques deviennent si récurrentes, qu'il ne nous est pas permis de laisser continuer cette manœuvre utilisée par le pouvoir de **TOUADERA**, décidé à conserver le pouvoir par tous les moyens, mais Incapable de réconcilier les fils et filles du pays. **TOUADERA** et ses alliés préfèrent créer le chaos pour fragiliser l'unité créée par et autour de la **CPC** dans sa lutte de libération du peuple centrafricain.

La Coordination générale de la **CPC** dénonce la politique de terre brûlée que veut imposer **TOUADERA** et ses alliés **Wagners** dans le pays. C'est le sort que les mercenaires **Wagners** et leurs supplétifs les **FACA** ont réservé aux artisans miniers, commerçants et leurs familles aux environs de **Kouki**.

En effet, le **9 mars**, avec une violence inimaginable les mercenaires de **Wagner** et leurs supplétifs les **FACA** ont massacré dans les sites miniers de **Kotabara** et **Zaranga** plus d'une soixantaine de civils, hommes, femmes et enfants sans discernement. Juste pour leur assurer l'exclusivité des sites miniers de la zone, comme ils le font sur tout le territoire.


La **CPC** prend la Communauté nationale et internationale à témoin pour toutes les conséquences qui pourraient découler des agissements des alliés du pouvoir **MCU**.

La Coordination générale de la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (**CPC**) saisit l'occasion de demander aux compatriotes des communautés musulmane, chrétienne et peule de garder leur calme face à ces manœuvres de division, et les rassure qu'il n'y aura plus de guerre ethnique en Centrafrique. La **CPC** reste et demeure la garante de la désormais unité nationale et de la cohésion sociale du peuple centrafricain.

**Vive la CPC pour que vive l'unité nationale.**

Fait à Bissau, le 4 Avril 2024

Le Coordinateur général




**Général François BOZIZÉ YANGOUVONDA**



## Annex 2

## Court documents for CPC members sentenced in absentia



Cour d'Appel de Bangui, confirmant l'ordonnance de renvoi devant la Cour Criminelle ;

Vu le Réquisitoire de Contumace de Monsieur le Procureur Général près la Cour d'Appel de Bangui en date du 24 Février 2023 ;

Attendu que les accusés qui devront être régulièrement placés sous mandat de dépôt et gardés prison jusqu'à leur jugement, ne l'y sont pas, et sont considérés en état d'évasion ;

Qu'ils sont tenus de se présenter dans un nouveau délai de dix (10) jours, faute de quoi, ils seront déclarés rebelles à la Loi et suspendus en conséquence de l'exercice de leurs droits de citoyen ; que cette position justifie à leur encontre les dispositions de la Loi en matière de contumace ;

PAR CES MOTIFS :

Ordonnons la procédure de contumace pour l'examen de l'affaire suivie contre les accusés :

François BOZIZE YANGOUVODA, TEYA Jean Eudes, BOZANGA Simon Serge, Ali DARASSA, ALKATIM MAHAMAT, BOZIZE Jean Francis, NOURREDINE ADAM, MOKOM Maxime, SABONE Abakar, GBENENGAINA Teddy, BOZIZE Aimé Vincent, WAPOUNABA Vincent de Paul, GARBA ALI, BANGUI Fulbert, KALITE Abdoulaye Amar, SALLET Zabadi, MARBET Benoît, OUSMAN Kelly, NAMANDJA Hans, NINGATOLOUM Armand, IBRAHIM Arsène, BEOROFEI Sylvain, Ludovic LAMAKA-BOUTOUNGARA, Général BOBO (Chef de 3 R) et BACHAR FADOU ;

- 1) Disons en conséquence que les accusés disposent d'un délai de dix (10) jours pour se présenter sous peine :
  - D'être déclarés rebelles à la Loi ;
  - D'être suspendu de l'exercice de leurs droits de citoyen ;
  - De voir leurs biens séquestrés pendant la contumace, et toute action en justice leur sera interdite pendant le même temps ;
- 2) Ordonnons à toute personne d'indiquer le lieu où se trouve les accusés ;
- 3) Ordonnons que la présente ordonnance, dans un délai de huit (8) jours, sera insérée dans l'un des journaux de la place de Bangui, et affichée à la porte de domicile des accusés, à celle de la Mairie de leur Commune et celle de l'auditoire de la Cour Criminelle.

Fait à Bangui, le 11 SEPT 2023

LE PREMIER PRÉSIDENT,



Thierry Joachim PESSIRE

**Annex 3****Payments received by and owed to CPC leaders exiled in N'Djamena**

*Confidential source. Extract of a document submitted to the government of Chad by the CPC exiled as part of their claim for the per diem due to them.*

The sums for François Bozizé and Igor Lamaka received were not disclosed by the drafters of the document.

Noms et prénoms	Montants Affectés	Montants Perçus	Soldes
Gal François Bozizé Yangouvonda	800 000 000 Frs CFA		
Gal Ahmat Mahamat	500 000 000 Frs CFA	213 000 000 Frs CFA	287 300 000 Frs CFA
Gal Abdoul Kader Oumar	500 000 000 Frs CFA	163 000 000 Frs CFA	337 000 000 Frs CFA
Ministre Abakar Sabone	220 000 000 Frs CFA	95 000 000 Frs CFA	125 000 000 Frs CFA
Coordonnateur Mahamat Ousmane	278 000 000 Frs CFA	63 000 000 Frs CFA	215 000 000 Frs CFA
Ministre Bernard Bonda	110 000 000 Frs CFA	57 000 000 Frs CFA	53 000 000 Frs CFA
Ministre Maxime Mokom	270 000 000 Frs CFA		

NB : Les montants respectifs sont révélés par la libération des 1/100 donnés à chaque leader dès la conclusion de l'accord de retrait du territoire centrafricain par les leaders.

**Annex 4**

**Photo of the badge of two of the three RSF elements arrested in Am Dafok, CAR on 29 December 2023**



**Annex 5**

**Habib Hareka recruitment from Libya**

Photographs showing combatants recruited by Habib Harika, video taken in KOFRA Libya, combatants in the photos were reportedly heading to El Fasher, North Darfur. Source: Video shared by RSF on Social Media.



Annex 6

CPC attack, Moyenne Sido, 2 November 2023. Source: Video shared by UPC in social media















Annex 7


Arms and ammunition in Om Djarass, Chad. Source: Sudan PM communique n 058 on 28 March 2024



**Annex 8****Screenshot of CPC/FPRC elements, from a 6 March video 2024**


The screenshot shows Aboubakar Sidiki, spokesperson of the FPRC, Haddo Adam Bachar, and Mahamat Salleh in a video concerning CPC/FPRC attacks on Sikikede, 7 March 2024.

Immediately to the left of Sidiki is Haddo Adam Bachar, currently an emissary to Nourredine Adam and former lieutenant to Abdoulaye Hissene; Haddo recruited combatants from Sudan for the Sikikede attack on 7 March. To the left of Haddo is Mahamat Salleh.



## Annex 9

## FACA communiqué on the killing of PRNC's Mohamed Ali AKA B13



## Annex 10

### Incident of kidnapping and torture by Ahmad Petit, UPC

The Panel collected additional testimonies regarding an incident of a kidnapping of the sister of the Mayor of Bambouti, reported in the Panel's final report 2023 (S/2023/360, Annex 10).

These additional testimonies document the responsibility for human rights violations, including kidnapping and committing acts that amount to torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment, by UPC leader **Ahmad Petit**, and the four following armed group members under his command: **Bobiri (deputy of Ahmad Petit), Aliko, Abacar, and Morgan**. The Panel believes Ahmad Petit is under the direct command of **Ali Darasa (Cfi.015)**.

On 26 January 2023, at around 21h, a group of UPC elements led personally by Ahmad Petit (AP), forced their way into the house of NN (48-year-old woman) house near the main road in Bambouti where she was sleeping with her niece and 9 children.

AP dragged NN along the floor and shouted to know "where the money was" (see note on money below). He began whipping NN with branches till she bled. AP threatened to kill NN and took her on foot to the nearby Gendarmerie compound that the UPC used as their base. There, AP continued beating NN. Four other men were called and continued beating her. This went on till about 2 am. AP then ordered his men to unchain NN. One of her shoulders had been knocked out of joint. The UPC elements chained one of NN's feet to a tree in the courtyard of the base. There she remained for 8 days. She did not get any water to wash, and she urinated and defecated there. It was cold at night, and she did not have a blanket.

By the morning of 27 January, the word had spread in Bambouti that NN was being held at the UPC base. Family and other community members approached the base to try and help and brought food and water for NN. They were chased away. NN did not eat for 8 days. UPC elements would sit around the base, right next to where NN was chained. Occasionally they gave her some tea.

Around 1 February, AP travelled to Mboki, and left his deputy, "Bobiri", in charge. The other UPC elements present were "Aliko" (with rasta dreadlocks), "Abacar" and "Morgan". Before leaving, AP instructed his elements that they were permitted to release NN for a ransom of 2 million CFA (≈3.250 USD). NN's family managed to raise 800,000 CFA (≈1,300 USD), and she was released on 4 February.

#### Background on the money

These violations by the UPC seemed to have been triggered by a piece of information given to Ahmad Petit on or around 26 January 2023, by a male NGO staff based in Obo while the latter was on a short work mission in Bambouti. The NGO staff had allegedly approached Ahmad Petit at the UPC base in Bambouti and told him that NN had transferred a sum of 5,800 USD to members of the Azande community in South Sudan to recruit South Sudanese forces to attack the UPC base in Bambouti. The Panel was not able to verify this. The NGO staff is no longer works in Obo.

This NGO staff member and NN had lived together in Obo for about one year (they were not legally married and had no children together). After the NGO staff had physically abused her, and a while before this kidnapping incident, NN had broken off their relationship and moved to Bambouti. The Panel heard from several sources that the NGO staff had been offended and upset when NN had ended their relationship.

The Panel further heard that at the end of January NN's sister (the Mayor of Bambouti) had indeed sendt US\$ 5, from Obo to NN via the driver of an NGO. The money was allegedly accompanied by a note saying it should be delivered to a South Sudanese female trader called "Mahadi", who in turn received it on 24 January 2023. "Mahdi" had sent a sum of CFA with a courier to Bangui to be exchanged into US dollars and brought back to her in Bambouti. The Panel heard that due to the lack of banks and the difficulty in safe transportation, it is quite common for traders and others to engage intermediaries carry larger sums of cash between towns (including taking cash to Bangui to have it exchanged into US dollars and brought back to the owner.) *Compiled from interviews conducted in Obo, March 2024.*

**Annex 11**

**Photo of Kpare Valentin (raised hand) during DDR process before he disappeared. Source: DDR Minusca**






**Annex 12****Airport police forms of three Americans nationals deported from CAR on 7 January 2024**

In early 2024, two American companies, Precision Integrated Programm and TEKEVER, were contracted by MINUSCA to conduct orbital drone flights following the termination of the contract with the Israeli company ADS. The orbital drone flight system is utilized for 'Over The Hill' reconnaissance missions, low-intensity conflicts, urban warfare operations, and any close-range ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) missions.

Six drones belonging to the same company were confiscated at Mpoko airport by the Central African authorities in the same period, and seven drone operators from the same company expelled and banned from entering the Central African Republic. However, following the prohibition of drone flights and the confiscation of drones from the American company, along with the expulsion of seven drone operators from the same company, a significant portion of MINUSCA's capacity to monitor and gather necessary ground information remains severely limited.

 AEROPORT INTERNATIONAL BANGUI M'POKO 

**FICHE POLICE**

Date *03/1/22* Vol n°/ *AT*  
Date/ Flight n°  
Nom *BURAI*  
Surname  
Prénoms *Justin Arin*  
Given Name  
Date et Lieu de Naissance *26/NOV/1987*  
Date and place of birth  
Nationalité *Amer. Canne*  
Nationality  
Allant à/Venant de *CISA*  
Airport of embarkation/disembarkation  
Profession *Affaire. ste*  
occupation  
Adresse en RCA.....  
Address in CAR  
Numéro du Passeport *674209598*  
Passport number  
Date et Lieu de délivrance *15/07/2021*  
Date and Place of Issue  
Motif du Voyage *Retour*  
Purpose of travelling  
Durée du Séjour.....  
How long the stay

Réservé à l'Administration / For official use only	
Visa N°.....	Durée.....
Délivré à .....	le.....
Par.....	
Quitus.....	

Signature  
*P-O NIG...*

AEROPORT INTERNATIONAL BANGUI M'POKO  
**FICHE POLICE**

Date 07.04.24 Vol n° AF  
Date/ Flight n°  
Nom Broue  
Surname  
Prénoms JOHN  
Given Name  
Date et Lieu de Naissance 24.10.77  
Date and place of birth  
Nationalité Américaine  
Nationality  
Allant à/Venant de Paris  
Airport of embarkation/disembarkation  
Profession UN  
Occupation  
Adresse en RCA.....  
Address in CAR  
Numéro du Passeport 655064295  
Passport number  
Date et Lieu de délivrance 18.11.20  
Date and Place of Issue  
Motif du Voyage.....  
Purpose of travelling  
Durée du Séjour.....  
How long the stay

Réservé à l'Administration / For official use only  
Visa N°..... Durée.....  
Délivré à..... le.....  
Par.....  
Quitus.....

Signature

AEROPORT INTERN

AEROPORT INTERNATIONAL BANGUI M'POKO  
**FICHE POLICE**

Date 07/10/2017 Vol n° AF  
Date/ Flight n°  
Nom HINES JR  
Surname  
Prénoms Joseph Fouuoth  
Given Name  
Date et Lieu de Naissance 12/oct/1987  
Date and place of birth  
Nationalité Americaine  
Nationality  
Allant à/Venant de USA  
Airport of embarkation/disembarkation  
Profession Affairiste  
occupation  
Adresse en RCA 5  
Adress in CAR  
Numéro du Passeport 563466088  
Passport number  
Date et Lieu de délivrance 28/08/2017  
Date and Place of Issue  
Motif du Voyage Retour  
Purpose of travelling  
Durée du Séjour /  
How long the stay

Réservé à l'Administration / For official use only	
Visa N°	Durée
Délivré à	le
Par	
Quitus	

Signature  
P.O. XIC

## Annex 13

### Ali Kony (CFI-010) in Uganda

Sanctioned individual Ali Kony (Cfi010) is a son of sanctioned individual Joseh Kony (Cfi.009), and the brother of sanctioned individual Salim Kony (Cfi.011).

#### Uganda

In July 2023 Ali Kony (Cfi010) travelled to Uganda with the intention of resettling there. In the months that followed, Ali Kony, gave interviews to the press and was also received by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.



*From left: Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni (in a white shirt and dark trousers) and next to him, Ali Kony (in khaki shirt and khaki trousers) with other members of the dedlegation family members with at State House, Entebbe, Uganda, 25 August 2023 (Ugandan government website: <https://statehouse.go.ug/president-museveni-meets-joseph-kony-family-pledges-support/>)*

#### Sudan

In an interview with Ugandan Radio Network on 31 August 2023, published on 4 September 2023, Ali Kony says that he left Kafia Kingi and crossed into Sudan on 6 July 2021, and arrived in the village of Songo, South Darfur, Sudan. In subtitles of the video interview is spelled “Shungu” and which in the Panel’s view refers to Songo, just north of Kafia Kingi.




Screenshot of a video interview of Ali Kony by Ugandan Radio Network, 4 September 2023: <https://ugandaradionetwork.com/s/konys-son-explains-why-he-parted-way-with-father/>

The Panel has reported earlier on LRA presence and activities in Kafia Kingi and Songo, see: S/2016/1032, para 183-184.

**South Sudan**

According to the weekly newspaper, the East African, Ali Kony and his family had been repatriated from South Sudan with support from the Ugandan Embassy in Juba.



Screenshot from online The East African 5 December 2023: <https://www.theeastafrikan.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kony-family-appeals-to-museveni-to-fulfil-pledge-4454888>).