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#### NOTE

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## 2405th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 14 December 1982, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Włodzimierz NATORF (Poland).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2405)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:  
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/15502 and Add.1)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in Cyprus:

#### Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/15502 and Add.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirça (Turkey) took places at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to recall that in the course of consultations, members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Nail Atalay in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Atalay in accordance with rule 39.

*It was so decided.*

3. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 30 November 1982 [S/15502 and Add.1]. Members of the Council also have before them the text of a draft resolution which has been prepared in the course of consultations [S/15523].

4. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 526 (1982)].*

5. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, upon whom I now call.

6. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council, which reflects a deserved honour to you and to your country, and to express my appreciation of the skilful manner in which you have conducted the consultations on the draft resolution just adopted renewing the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another period of six months.

7. It is a source of satisfaction for my Government and for myself that the presidency of this important organ is in the talented and experienced hands of a distinguished representative of a friendly country with which we share excellent relations. I should like also to extend our warm congratulations to Mr. Carlos Ozores Tupaldos of Panama, another country with which Cyprus has the friendliest of relations, on the efficient and impartial manner in which he carried out his duties as President of the Council for the month of November.

8. I thank the members of the Council for giving me this opportunity to address them and to explain once again the tragic situation prevailing in my country as a result of the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of a sizeable part of our territory by the Turkish military forces. We are grateful to the members of the Council for the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP, made necessary by the continuing violation of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus.

9. I wish once again to reiterate our assurance of full and constructive co-operation with the Secretary-

General, who since the assumption of his duties has brilliantly succeeded in displaying his enlightened leadership, his exceptional qualities of statesmanship and his untiring and unwavering dedication to the principles and purposes of the Organization. The Government and people of Cyprus had the opportunity to witness the exceptional skill with which he carried out his difficult duties in Nicosia as the Special Representative of the former Secretary-General. They rely upon his statesmanship, objectivity and dedication to principles for a just solution to our problem in the interest of the people of Cyprus and of peace and security in the volatile area of the Eastern Mediterranean.

10. I should also like to commend the significant contribution made by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Brian Urquhart, and his Secretariat colleagues, Mr. Sherry and Mr. Picco, and to express our warm appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Hugo Gobbi, and his assistants for their efforts to advance the cause of peace in my country.

11. My Government's appreciation goes also to the Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General G. Greindl, and to his officers and men for the efficient and dedicated manner in which they have performed the duties entrusted to them by the Council. In referring to UNFICYP I should be remiss if I were not to express also our warm feelings of gratitude and appreciation to the friendly Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, have made it possible for UNFICYP to continue rendering its most valuable assistance in carrying out its important mission in Cyprus.

12. The members of the Council are fully aware that, seen in its true perspective, the Cyprus crisis is not an intercommunal difference, as the Turkish propaganda machine so often proclaims, but an issue of foreign invasion, continuing occupation and massive violation by Turkey of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Cyprus as a whole. It is a military invasion and occupation of nearly 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic, the inhuman expulsion of 200,000 people—almost one third of the island's total population—from their ancestral homes and lands. Hundreds of persons are missing, and as many are enclaved. And all of this is coupled with the abhorrent and discredited colonialist policy of changing by the use of force the age-old demographic structure of Cyprus and the massive implantation of settlers from the Turkish mainland in the occupied areas, a policy so reminiscent of darker ages of mankind.

13. The renewing of the mandate of UNFICYP is a sad reminder that the problem of the invasion and occupation of a small non-aligned country, a Member of the United Nations, is still continuing. United Nations resolutions—especially resolution 3212 (XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assem-

bly on 1 November 1974 and later unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974), and thus rendered mandatory—remain utterly unimplemented. As a result, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus is still being flagrantly violated. The Turkish occupation troops have not been withdrawn, and not a single refugee has been allowed to return to his home and land.

14. Because of this continuing aggression and occupation, a beautiful, historic and peaceful island situated in the strategic Mediterranean, destined to be a bridge of understanding between the three continents that surround it, Asia, Africa and Europe, continues to be the centre of division and strife and a potential source of wider conflict.

15. A small and proud people that has lived in harmony and peace throughout the centuries and can do so again if left alone without any foreign interference has been uprooted from its ancestral homes and lands and turned into refugees in its own country, segregated against its will by an artificial and enforced barrier.

16. The lofty principle of the non-use of force in international relations enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations is being blatantly and contemptuously violated. The principle of the inviolability of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of States and that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms have been made a mockery by Turkey. The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is no more in that beautiful island; it is suppressed under the yoke of the occupation troops.

17. Segregation so reminiscent of the deplorable system of *apartheid* has been imposed without shame as the policy of the invader in its effort to dissect and annex the occupied part of Cyprus. Division of the territory and segregation of the people, at present the official policy of Turkey, are carried out in Cyprus before the eyes of a bewildered Europe and a world community that has declared repeatedly its condemnation of such policies. How is this made possible, and why the need for another renewal of the mandate of the United Nations peace-keeping force?

18. The answers are simple. Turkey has not complied with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, even those unanimously adopted. The tragedy of Cyprus therefore amply illustrates the plight of the small, non-aligned and militarily weak States, and at the same time poses an agonizing dilemma and a challenge for the United Nations, testing its ability to fulfil its mission and its very usefulness. If the United Nations continues to allow its unanimously adopted resolutions and Security Council decisions to be contemptuously disregarded by the invader, thus failing to uphold the principles of the

Charter in Cyprus and, more particularly, its paramount purpose of maintaining international peace and security, I can say to the Council in all solemnity that the Organization will sustain yet another serious setback and its prestige and very usefulness will be further eroded. The credibility of the United Nations depends on whether the world Organization lives up to its decisions by undertaking effective action when the situation so warrants.

19. If the United Nations, its Members, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, take an effective stand to change this calamitous trend by giving the Council the means for ensuring the implementation of its resolutions, the trend of being at the mercy of bully States will no doubt change, and the world will also do so with it.

20. The Secretary-General, in his forthright report of 7 September 1982 on the work of the Organization to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, underlined this urgent need for change by stating that:

“... resolutions, particularly those unanimously adopted by the Security Council, should serve as a springboard for governmental support and determination and should motivate their policies outside the United Nations.”

21. Regrettably, this is not being done, and today in my country 200,000 human beings, uprooted from their ancestral homes and lands, wake up each morning to see their towns and villages, the familiar sights of mountains and valleys, beckoning them to come back. They hear the mourning of those lands pleading not to be forgotten. These unfortunate people are indeed going through a unique tragedy. They are so close and yet so far away from beloved lands. Their bitterness grows even stronger as they witness the daily results of continuing illegal actions by Turkey to change the demographic character of the occupied area and to destroy the cultural heritage of our people—actions which constitute a crime against humanity recorded in the timeless book of history.

22. The occupied areas of Cyprus are colonized by the importation of settlers and colonists in the furtherance of Ankara's plans to change the demographic structure of Cyprus. These alien settlers are usurping the homes and lands of the expelled indigenous Cyprus population and desecrating what was created by the hard labour of our people. The colonists from Turkey even created a “political party”, and its leader-settler and former Colonel of the Turkish Army, Mr. Ismail Tezer, became a so-called minister in Mr. Denktaş's régime. In a press conference on 22 December 1978, he openly declared that the aims of his “party” are to “achieve the partition of Cyprus and its annexation to Turkey”. On 17 August 1981, he admitted that the settlers came to Cyprus with the approval of Turkey, that they were presented as an “agricultural force”, that almost all of them became citizens of the so-

called Turkish Federated State and that “their purpose was to stay forever in Cyprus”. What lofty aims indeed—and how fraudulent!

23. These actions have been deplored and condemned not only by a series of United Nations resolutions and Non-Aligned Movement declarations but also by the Turkish Cypriots themselves. The Turkish Cypriot leader and former Vice-President of the Republic, Mr. Küçük, wrote in an article in his paper, *Halkın Sesi*, on 24 May 1978 that these settlers “turned this paradise island into hell”.

24. The Council is aware that after the invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 Turkey forcibly segregated our people by an artificial barrier known as the Attila Line and proceeded thereafter to set up in the occupied area a bogus, fictitious and illegal entity, the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which in reality is the puppet of the invader. It is not necessary to remind the Council of its resolution 367 (1975) in response to the aforementioned illegality of Turkey and its instrument in the occupied area. This so-called State—which has no territory or jurisdiction—is recognized by no one except its masters, since it was set up in the occupied territories which are an integral part of the Republic of Cyprus, as emphatically reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 34/30 of 20 November 1979.

25. The six months that have elapsed since the last renewal of UNIFCYP's mandate have been characterized by additional illegal actions, vividly demonstrating Turkey's ruthless determination to consolidate its fruits of aggression and to deal what it considers final blows at the unity of our people, so much cherished by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in an effort to break the historical links which traditionally bind them and which are forged by common country and destiny.

26. Every day new steps are taken against the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus. After the visit last May of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Bülent Ulusu, to the occupied areas of Cyprus—an act which itself constituted a political invasion—Ankara decided to establish a so-called Central Bank and a so-called Development Bank. And a few weeks ago, after the visit to Ankara of Mr. Denktaş's associate Mr. Cagatay, Ankara decided to abolish the Cyprus pound and to introduce the Turkish lira as “legal tender” in all transactions in the areas of the Republic occupied by the Turkish forces.

27. Furthermore, according to the Turkish press, in a few weeks' time the issuing of so-called “title deeds” to the usurpers of the Greek Cypriot properties, especially to the settlers from Turkey, will commence. With these so-called certificates, the usurpers “will be able to rent this property, sell it, mortgage it and distribute it to their children”, as the

Turkish Cypriot press revealed. Mr. Serakinci, a member of Mr. Denktaş's régime, stated, according to *Halkın Sesi* of 1 November 1982, that "regulations calling for property distribution to the Turkish Armed Forces personnel, to the 'TMT' members, and to 'the refugees' too, have been completed".

28. By these actions the Turkish leadership, instead of working for a solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the United Nations resolutions and the agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979 [S/12323, para. 5, and S/13369, para. 51], is striving for the speedy incorporation of the occupied area into the State of Turkey. Instead of tending towards the strengthening of existing common elements that link the people of Cyprus, Turkey is striving to eliminate them.

29. Turkish allegations that these separatist actions and forced segregation are necessary because of the mistreatment of the Turkish Cypriot community at the hands of the Government of the Republic are baseless. They originally were aimed at paving the way for the Turkish invasion and now are used to provide a pretext for the continuation of the Turkish occupation, contrary to the United Nations resolutions. Mr. Hasan Sarica, the leader of DEVIS, the Turkish Cypriot trade union, refuted those allegations effectively when he stated, as published in *Birlik*, Mr. Denktaş's newspaper, on 30 August 1982:

"In the pre-1974 era"—namely, before the Turkish invasion—"the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots worked together in a brotherly manner and the economic position of the Turkish workers was excellent. . . . After 1974 the economic position of the Turkish Cypriot workers substantially deteriorated . . . . In pre-1974 Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots worked together and shared the same economic profits. The conditions of life of the Turkish Cypriots changed after 1974."

30. The economic hardships experienced by the Turkish Cypriot community today are the direct result of the military occupation and the separatist policy of Ankara, and not the actions of the Government of Cyprus to protect through legal means the rights of its citizens who are the legitimate owners of property usurped by the invaders and the settlers transported from Turkey to the occupied areas.

31. The Government of Cyprus, far from imposing what Turkish propaganda calls "an economic embargo", has an obligation to all its citizens, be they Greeks or Turks, to protect what they created by their sweat and their tears and what is rightfully theirs. It is not an aggressive policy or economic attrition to refuse to accept the usurpation of our lands, on which we lived and prospered for centuries.

32. The acute economic problems at present faced by the Turkish Cypriot community can be effectively

solved by the withdrawal of the occupation troops, allowing the people to work amicably as in the past within the framework of a united and indivisible Cyprus.

33. The strict observance by my Government of the rules and norms of international law in its struggle to restore its territorial integrity and ensure the withdrawal of the forces of occupation in accordance with the resolutions of this body cannot in any circumstances be described as an economic embargo except by the perpetrators of the crime of aggression against my country.

34. It is no wonder that Ankara's "economic embargo" propaganda did not convince even the Turkish Cypriots themselves. In the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Kurtulus* of 7 November 1980 it was stated that "the arguments put forward by the Denktaş régime" attributing this misery to the alleged "Greek Cypriot embargo" were not true. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Veziroglu, said, and this was published in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Oncu* of 18/19 May 1981: "Denktaş's National Unity Party régime has tried to load the blame for all their mistakes, exploitations and lack of success onto the Greeks."

35. A more recent article, which appeared in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Yeniduzen* on 21 September last, reads: "To tell the truth, no one can convince us that the embargo is the reason for economic bottlenecks in our area."

36. The Turkish leadership considered it expedient recently to embark on another newly invented allegation about the so-called piling up of arms and military training in the free areas of Cyprus "to attack the Turkish Cypriots". The constant repetition of that allegation is undoubtedly evidence of its lack of truth, and is aimed at misleading world opinion concerning the correlation of military power in the island. What is of greater concern to the Council, however, is the fact that that allegation aims at the creation of pretexts to justify possible future unlawful adventures by Turkey against the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is trying in vain to divert world attention from the fact that there is at present in the occupied area an occupation force of about 35,000 Turkish troops, armed with the most modern weapons, that Turkey is a country with one of the largest standing armies in the world and that it is only 40 miles from Cyprus.

37. The weapons of the Cyprus National Guard are purely defensive and the intentions of my Government are absolutely peaceful. The Cyprus Government believes in a solution of the Cyprus problem by peaceful means and procedures. Indicative of this is the fact that it encourages and strengthens by all means every move that unites the two communities, a policy fiercely opposed by Turkey.

38. This does not mean, however, that the Government of the Republic does not have the sovereign right and also the duty to strengthen the defences of the free areas and protect them against a new advance by the Attila, since they are under continuous threat, bearing in mind the expansionist aims of Turkey, brazenly expressed on 10 July 1980 by Mr. Turan Gunes, who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the time of the invasion, to the effect that "Cyprus is valuable as a right arm for a country interested in its defence or for its expansionist aims". Mr. Gunes went a step further and admitted that:

"Many States to a certain extent, because it suits their interests, want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish community in the island, whereas the actual problem is the security of the 45 million Turks in the motherland."

39. It is no surprise, in the light of the foregoing, that the intercommunal talks failed to yield results in their main and crucial aspects. As the Secretary-General stated in his report last June, "the well-known major substantive elements of the Cyprus problem" have not been resolved [S/15149, para. 57]. Furthermore, except for identifying the negotiating positions of both sides, no progress of any nature was achieved on substantive elements during the past six months. Those substantive elements are clearly defined in the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus, which were the agreed basis of the talks and which remain unimplemented, thus increasing the responsibility of the world community for the solution of this major international problem.

40. The continuing presence of the occupation forces over the past eight years and Turkey's separatist actions and divisive positions constitute the main stumbling-block and an insurmountable obstacle in the free search for a just solution of the Cyprus problem through constructive and meaningful negotiations, as stipulated in United Nations resolutions and the agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979.

41. For our part, we shall continue to exert every effort to achieve a successful outcome. But the success or failure of the negotiations in reality depends on the frame of mind and the aims and objectives of the Turkish Government. Mr. Denktas and his régime are simply the obedient instruments of Turkey in the occupied areas. This has been eloquently revealed by Mr. Denktas himself, who was quoted in an article in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Yeniduzen* of 1 October 1982 as having stated: "Whether I believe it or not, whether I consider it right or not, I do whatever Turkey says." And the Turkish Government is not willing to abandon its partitionist policy and work for a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem and a better future for the people of Cyprus as a whole.

42. The same regrettable and negative attitude is unfortunately demonstrated by the Turkish side on the

purely humanitarian question of missing persons, where the right of the relatives who are in agony to know the fate of their loved ones has not been recognized. This issue was discussed in the Third Committee a few days ago, and a draft resolution<sup>2</sup> was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes. The Cyprus Government hopes that the Turkish side will co-operate in the implementation of this resolution, which can lead to the speedy and effective tracing of and accounting for the missing persons in Cyprus.

43. I wish to conclude by expressing the hope that this body will follow developments in Cyprus vigilantly and continue to recognize its special responsibility towards Cyprus and its people.

44. We are confident that the Council in its wisdom will not fail to take appropriate action as warranted to accelerate the prospects for a just solution in accordance with United Nations resolutions and, particularly, in compliance with the unanimous Security Council decisions on the subject.

45. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

46. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like at the outset, Sir, to extend to you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December and to assure you of the co-operation and assistance of my delegation in the performance of your task. I should also like to thank you and the other members of the Council for having acceded to my request to participate in the debate.

47. On 15 June [2378th meeting], I had the opportunity to express the views of my Government on the problem of Cyprus on the occasion of the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP. I regret that I have to speak again on this long-pending problem. However, the realities are so hard, the injustice so durable and the dangers so present that I feel compelled to address the Council again on this subject. I shall be brief, since the representative of Cyprus has just dealt with the matter extensively and convincingly. I fully share his views.

48. The facts with regard to Cyprus are well known to the members of the Council, and I need not repeat them in detail. Turkey continues to occupy militarily more than 36 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, refusing to comply with the numerous relevant United Nations resolutions and the widely accepted norms of international law. The talks between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have not so far produced any results, although they have been going on for many years. For all practical purposes, the intercommunal dialogue is not being held between the island's two communities, but actually between Nicosia and Ankara, which, as everybody knows, determine the policies of the Turkish

Cypriot community. Thus the talks have only resulted in the prolongation of the occupation of part of the Republic of Cyprus, thereby seriously endangering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic and threatening the security of Greek Cypriots. In the meantime, some 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees have been waiting in vain to return to their homes because of the intransigence of the Turkish side.

49. In these conditions of insecurity and pressure, the two interlocutors in Cyprus have for all practical purposes been dealing mainly with minor or marginal issues on which some progress could be possible—a fact which creates a totally misleading impression of progress. They are also addressing the territorial problem, but only in a superficial way, since the Turkish side consistently avoids going into the substance of this matter, which is a crucial aspect of the whole problem of Cyprus. As regards the Constitution, we bear witness to a systematic effort on the Turkish side to create a State in which 18 per cent of the population, namely, the Turkish Cypriots, will have an equal share of power throughout the entire structure of the State with 80 per cent of the population, namely, the Greek Cypriots.

50. We are not asking that this dialogue be interrupted. The Government of Greece is not the appropriate authority to ask for either the continuation or the ending of the intercommunal dialogue. This is the responsibility of the Government of Cyprus. We should like, however, to stress that it seems to us indeed inconceivable that this dialogue could lead to a just and fair result, since it is being conducted under duress, namely, the pressure of the Turkish military occupation of part of the Republic of Cyprus.

51. Turkey, in order to justify its military presence in the island, has often invoked the need for security of the Turkish Cypriots. To meet this concern, my Government has proposed an enlargement of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, which could guarantee the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority and thereby enable the Turkish occupying forces to withdraw from the island. Only after their withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus would the conditions exist for a free, genuine and fair dialogue between the two communities, that is, a dialogue capable of producing a viable and long-lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

52. In view of the complexity of the situation, my Government has additionally proposed that the problem be re-examined on a new basis by a special committee of the United Nations or by an international conference. It would also welcome initiatives by leading international personalities.

53. Turkey, unfortunately, has taken a flatly negative stand with regard to all these proposals. We urge Turkey to clarify its position.

54. Is Turkey ready to withdraw its army from the Republic of Cyprus so that the intercommunal dialogue can be conducted without pressure? Is Turkey ready to accept the total demilitarization of the Republic? Is Turkey ready to accept unconditionally the implementation of the three basic freedoms of movement, settlement and acquisition of property for all citizens throughout the Republic?

55. Only an unequivocal answer to these questions from the Turkish side will, in our view, enable us to get a clear picture of the situation. But the way the Turkish Government has systematically avoided discussing those issues clearly demonstrates, in our view, how meaningless it is to continue the intercommunal dialogue in its present form.

56. In view of the Turkish attitude, it is perhaps high time to address certain international authorities and to ask them to exert their influence on Turkey in order that it may finally abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Among those authorities, needless to say, the Council is a body that should perhaps play a major role.

57. In concluding, I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his personal commitment to the question of Cyprus and for his tireless and continuous efforts towards finding a solution to this problem. It is the earnest wish of my Government that the Secretary-General continue to offer his valuable personal contribution, in the hope that he will finally be able to find a way out of the present deadlock.

58. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Nail Atalay, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

59. Mr. ATALAY: Mr. President, allow me to convey my appreciation and that of my Government to you and to all the other members of the Council for having invited me to participate in this debate.

60. I have requested to be allowed to participate in the Council's deliberations on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months in order to express the views of the Turkish Cypriot community, which is exclusively represented by the Turkish Federated State of Kibris.

61. I wish also to express my Government's and my own gratitude to the Secretary-General for his outstanding and devoted efforts towards a resolution of the Cyprus conflict, which has been on the agenda of the Council since the Greek Cypriot onslaught in December 1963. We owe appreciation also to the Secretariat and the staff in the field, particularly Mr. Urquhart, Mr. Gobbi, Major-General Greindl, Mr. Sherry, Mr. Holger, Mr. Schittler-Silva and Mr. Picco, and especially the military and civilian



personnel, for the unimpeachable, impartial and competent manner in which they have discharged their important responsibilities.

62. I take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to those countries that have contributed men and funds for UNFICYP, and in particular to Turkey for its whole-hearted contribution to intercommunal peace on the island and to the security and economic development of a Turkish community still under Greek Cypriot embargo.

63. The Council has now adopted resolution 526 (1982), extending the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 June 1983.

64. Despite our irrefutable objections, in the third paragraph of the resolution reference persists to the so-called "Government of Cyprus". As the Council well knows, this is a title that has been unjustifiably appropriated by the Greek Cypriot faction of the bicomunal Government of Cyprus. Legally or politically, there has been no government legitimately representative of Cyprus as a whole since the disruption of the bicomunal partnership Government in 1963. We object to this terminology as utterly misleading, since it reflects neither the legal nor the factual reality of the island. The two national communities of the island have been the constituent elements of the Cyprus dispute since December 1963. This dispute arose from the Greek Cypriot armed attempt to destroy the bicomunal partnership and incorporate Cyprus into Greece. To refer to the Greek Cypriot side of the bicomunal Government of Cyprus as "the Government of Cyprus" runs counter to the Basic Articles of the 1960 Constitution. It tends to give the Greek Cypriot side, at the expense of the Turkish Cypriot people, what the Greek Cypriots have failed since 1963 to acquire by force.

65. Nevertheless, I have been empowered to give consent, on behalf of the Government of the Turkish Cypriot community, to the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 June 1983. We shall, as we have done in the past, continue to co-operate with the Force and help in its success.

66. As I have repeatedly stressed in Council meetings in the past, we continue to hope that the mandate and *modus operandi* of UNFICYP will be revised according to the realities in Cyprus.

67. In paragraph 3 of resolution 526 (1982), the Council "Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices . . .". My Government welcomes and supports that request. We shall continue to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his dedicated mission. As the Council well knows, the intercommunal talks continue on the basis of the Secretary-General's opening statement of 9 August 1980, which is contained in the annex to document S/14100, referring to the high-level agreements of 1977

and 1979 [S/12323, para. 5, and S/13369, para. 51] and the bilateral intercommunity agreements, as well as on the basis of the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper. In paragraph 58 of his report, the Secretary-General states:

"The new phase of the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council, which was initiated at the intercommunal talks in Nicosia on 7 January 1982 with a systematic review of the constitutional aspect, continued at a steady pace during the period covered by the present report. The interlocutors continued to follow the 'evaluation' paper submitted by my Special Representative on 18 November 1981 as a structured substantive method of discussion."

68. I am sure, therefore, that the Council will agree with me that the fifth paragraph and paragraph 2 of the resolution do not accurately reflect the actual basis on which the talks are continuing.

69. In any event, the mere continuation of the intercommunal talks means that progress has begun, as stated by the Secretary-General in paragraph 59 of the same report:

"My Special Representative reports that the atmosphere of the talks has remained co-operative and constructive. The interlocutors have now completed the discussion of almost all the constitutional aspects and are about to embark on an examination of the territorial aspect."

70. The Council and the Secretary-General can rest assured that my Government will do everything to keep open this window of intercommunal talks, which will not be closed by the Turkish Cypriot side. The very fact that the two sides continue negotiating, an active process that has continued without interruption since 1980, is a progressive achievement for which the Secretary-General and his staff are to be commended.

71. As we have witnessed once again today, the issue of missing persons, which the Turkish Cypriots regard as a humanitarian concern, is a political concern for the Greek Cypriots. The issue is still unresolved, at the expense of the afflicted families, simply because the Greek Cypriot side has chosen to politicize it and to exploit it for propaganda purposes.

72. The only entity competent to discuss the issue of missing persons on the island is the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP), an autonomous intercommunal body. It was not established, nor is it governed by the United Nations, but stems solely from the agreement between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. Its autonomous character was acknowledged by the Secretary-General himself in a press release on 10 November 1981. Issued in Nicosia, it states that measures to facilitate

the work of the Committee "could be finalized only by the Committee, which functions autonomously". All the attempts by the Greek side to raise the question of missing persons in forums other than the CMP violate its terms of reference and the agreement that served to create it.

73. Therefore, any statement on the missing persons issue anywhere but in the Committee infringes the CMP's competence and is therefore totally unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community.

74. Available evidence on the so-called missing Greek Cypriots indicates that they in fact perished during the coup staged in Cyprus by Greece on 15 July 1974. The Secretary General of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party, Mr. Ezakias Papaianou, revealed at a public meeting on 28 November, 15 days ago, that during the armed Greek anti-Makarios coup, many Greek Cypriots had been killed by those responsible for the coup, who had even buried some of them alive. This statement appeared in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Haravgi* on 29 November 1982.

75. Evidently the Greek Cypriot side does not want to solve the missing persons issue within the CMP. They have boycotted its meetings and done everything else to undermine and sabotage the CMP. Confidential CMP documents, including its terms of reference, have been disclosed. The Greek Cypriots have taken this humanitarian issue to every forum except the CMP itself.

76. No solution is feasible for this humanitarian problem as long as the Greek Cypriot side continues to exploit it internationally for political propaganda. In my delegation's view, the adoption of the draft resolution before the General Assembly<sup>2</sup> will only encourage more intransigence on the Greek Cypriot side and give it yet another pretext to abuse the issue to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriot side.

77. The one-sided decisions taken by any organization due to the initiative of the Greek Cypriot leadership, without the equal participation of the representatives of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris, are considered null and void by the Turkish Cypriot side.

78. The Turkish Cypriot side reiterates its readiness to work in good faith in accounting for the missing persons in Cyprus, but only within the established terms of reference of the CMP and without outside interference.

79. There are no real difficulties, procedural or otherwise, that prevent the CMP from functioning. The only obstacle in this respect is the continuing boycott of the CMP by the Greek Cypriot side for reasons of domestic politics and international propaganda against the Turkish Cypriot side.

80. It has been alleged here by the Greek Cypriot representative that North Cyprus is being settled by

Turks brought from Turkey [para. 22]. This allegation is false, and is being made by the Greek Cypriot side purely for propaganda purposes and for the purpose of misleading world public opinion into believing that Turkey is colonizing North Cyprus. Those who are guilty of having attempted to colonize Cyprus for decades and of turning the island into a bloodbath in the process can have no reason to blame others for this crime except that of trying to confuse the innocent with the guilty. It is obvious that such devious tactics will deceive nobody and produce no constructive results.

81. It has also been alleged that we are giving title deeds to the Turkish Cypriots in the North [para. 27]. First of all, the aim in the preparation of this law on immovable property is to find a solution to the social and economic problems and difficulties experienced by the Turkish Cypriots who came from the South as refugees as a result of large-scale population movements. In other words, this law is the result of a search for a solution to their humanitarian problems and to improve their living conditions.

82. Under these circumstances, and in order to meet the investment and working capital needs for the repair and maintenance of the immovable properties, as well as to make them productive, persons who have been allocated immovable property according to certain principles are now enabled by law to transfer the possessor rights of such property to others. This adjustment is not aimed at instituting any compulsory confiscation of ownership rights and does not contradict international law and the rules regarding the transfer of ownership.

83. To move now to another issue, the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives have again attempted here today grossly to distort the efforts of my authorities to establish limited banking institutions and the use of the Turkish lira as a currency [para. 26]. These accusations received an adequate reply in my letter of 22 November 1982 to the Secretary-General, circulated in the General Assembly and the Security Council on 24 November as document A/37/643-S/15500. But I should like briefly to refer to the question.

84. The Turkish Federated State of Kibris, in fulfilment of its obligation to develop the economy and improve the people's standard of living, has proposed the establishment of a development bank and a central bank with limited functions—it will not issue currency—in order to implement the State's monetary and credit policy. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot efforts to construe this policy as a move towards a new political status are an unfair attempt to distort the facts.

85. The Greek Cypriots in the South have a development bank from which its Turkish Cypriot part-owners were ejected by force in 1963. It is incon-

ceivable for the Greek Cypriots to attempt to deny the Turkish Cypriot community the benefit of similar institutions. The Greek Cypriot propaganda characterizes the use of the Turkish lira by the Turkish Federated State of Kibris as a step towards a new political status.

86. The Turkish community used the Cyprus pound as legal tender until it was deprived of its use by the Central Bank of Cyprus, which confiscated the deposits in Turkish banks. The Cyprus pound is still legal tender in the Turkish Federated State of Kibris, but was made unavailable by the measures of the Greek Cypriots. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot community was forced to introduce the Turkish lira in the North pending a final solution.

87. The unwarranted protests of the Greek Cypriots are sheer interference in the Turkish Cypriot community's internal affairs. The Greek Cypriot community, with a *per capita* income five times as great as that of the Turkish Cypriot community, protests the Turkish Cypriot efforts to bridge this vast economic disparity. We all know that a viable political solution for Cyprus will depend, *inter alia*, on a meaningful social and economic balance between the two communities.

88. The decision by the Turkish Cypriot community to establish its own central bank, its development bank, and to use the Turkish lira, is an internal affair of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris resulting from prevailing economic conditions. Greek Cypriot allegations to the contrary are baseless.

89. For the last 18 years, UNFICYP's presence between the two communities in the island has been deemed essential. Yet today we see here my Greek Cypriot counterpart and his collaborator, the representative of Greece, trying to pretend that the period from 1963 to 1974 never existed and that, in spite of UNFICYP's 18-year presence in Cyprus, the problem is only eight years old. The wisdom of these demagogic efforts is questionable.

90. The truth is that the Council has been meeting for the last 18 years to extend the mandate of its Force in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot attack against the Turkish Cypriot co-founder in December 1963 started a period of 11 years which was one of the darkest in the modern history of Cyprus. The Secretary-General's reports submitted periodically to this Council bear witness to that 11-year holocaust: they tell of the expulsion of Turkish Cypriots from 103 villages, from all Government services and from State budgets, and the planned Greek and Greek Cypriot objective of exterminating the Turkish Cypriots, the co-founders of the Republic, in order to annex the island to Greece.

91. This intended annexation of Cyprus to Greece, called *enosis*, lies behind the artificial creation of the Cyprus problem, and is the reason why both the Greek and the Greek Cypriot leadership try to keep the issue

alive internationally. It would take me days and days to quote at length from statements made by Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders on *enosis*, and I do not want to take that much of the Council's time. However, a few brief quotations may remind this Council of the gravity of the *enosis* adventure.

92. As far back as 1957, a quarter of a century ago, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Averof, was assuring his critics in the Greek Parliament that he had not abandoned *enosis*, saying that

"The direction towards independence is not a Greek manoeuvre . . . But I ask you: if in order to reach *enosis* one were obliged to make the manoeuvre of temporary independence, would he who had done this deserve criticism?"

93. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, continued his pre-independence *enosis* statements even in the post-Republic period, exposing the true intentions of the Greek Cypriots. During the period from 1960 to 1963 hardly a week passed without a Makarios pro-*enosis* statement. In one such statement, on 15 August 1962, he said that:

"Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by EOKA heroes . . . The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we achieve our goal."

Hence the Christmas 1963 attack against the Turkish Cypriot co-founders of the Republic.

94. Back in Greece, the leader, Mr. George Papandreou, jubilantly told university students at Salonica on 27 October 1964 that:

"All Greek Cypriots are for *enosis*. Cyprus must be made a springboard for the realization in the East of the dreams of Alexander the Great. Cyprus is a small island and cannot by itself materialize such dreams. But the people of Cyprus, united with Greece, will have the opportunity of performing their historic duty in the Near East."

95. This is a summary way of describing the first ten of the 18 years of UNFICYP's presence in Cyprus: ten years of persecution, agony, inhuman treatment, mass murder and abductions, committed by the Greek Cypriot forces collaborating with Greece against the Turkish Cypriot partners in the founding of the Republic of Cyprus. The Council will recall the Secretary-General's periodic reports every time he recommended the extension of UNFICYP's mandate during the period between 1964 and 1974, reports that show clearly what one of the partners in the Republic was doing to the other.

96. As for the last eight years of the 18-year period of UNFICYP's mission, I would have been grateful if my Greek Cypriot counterpart and the represen-

tative of Greece had profited from the record and had done their homework properly when they referred to the post-1974 period. Was it not Archbishop Makarios who, on 19 July 1974, told the Council that the events in Cyprus did not constitute an "internal matter" [1780th meeting, para. 32] because Cyprus was facing an "invasion" by Greece? Indeed, the covert invasion of Cyprus which had been proceeding since Christmas 1963 became overt on 15 July 1974. Archbishop Makarios barely saved his life, and was able to tell the Council on 19 July 1974 that:

"The *coup* did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

"...

"... And the invasion is continuing so long as there are Greek officers in Cyprus.

"...

"... the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The *coup* ... is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks". [Ibid., paras. 18, 23 and 32.]

97. The *coup* engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus on 15 July 1974 constituted a flagrant invasion. The bloodshed was immense. Death visited both Greek and Turkish Cypriots—and this was a description of the situation made by Archbishop Makarios himself to the Council. Under the circumstances, Turkey was obliged to act under the Treaty of Guarantee<sup>1</sup> to stop the bloodshed and to bring peace to the island. Peace has prevailed in the island since the Turkish peace force was stationed there. Thanks to the peace brought to Cyprus by Turkey, we do not come across reports of atrocities, like those which used to run to paragraphs and pages in the Secretary-General's pre-1974 reports.

98. In the peace and security provided by the Turkish peace force, the two communities have held two summit meetings and numerous dialogues, through which many humanitarian problems have been swiftly solved. In the presence of the Secretary-General, they have come up with concrete agreements for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The resumed intercommunal talks have been going on since then. My people firmly believe that those talks are the best means available for the solution of the problem. In this conviction, the Turkish Cypriot side will continue to work in good faith, with all the means at its disposal, to facilitate an agreed solution to the problem. There are always difficulties, and they must be overcome by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots as the two

parties directly involved and destined to coexist in the island. Interference by parties not directly involved will only harden the position of one or the other party either so that it may bargain better in any so-called mediation effort or so that it may exploit such a move as a lever for intransigence.

99. That, briefly, is the history of UNFICYP's 18 years in Cyprus. I will not delve in depth into the economic embargo and other inhuman measures currently being applied by the Greek Cypriot side against the Turkish Cypriot people on the island.

100. On 9 August 1980, in his opening statement at the Cyprus intercommunal talks, the Secretary-General said:

"Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem." [See S/14100, annex.]

That statement is significant in itself, and the two national communities in the island must be encouraged to come to a mutual agreement through intercommunal talks. This delicate balance has involved strenuous efforts, and any attempt or move that upsets it will be detrimental to both national communities in the island. Recently, the frequent statements by Mr. Papandreu, the Greek Prime Minister, that Cyprus is an extension of Hellenism and not the homeland of the two national communities in it, have emphasized the vital need for the Council to support nothing but the agreement reached by the two peoples of the island, as specified by the Secretary-General himself.

101. In conclusion, we must choose between clasped hands and clenched fists. Indeed, benefiting from the security afforded by the Turkish peace force, the two communities have themselves demonstrated that they can clasp hands. The two summit meetings between the leaders of the two communities have laid the foundations of the future settlement of the Cyprus problem.

102. The Council is duty-bound to encourage negotiations in conditions of equality between the two national communities in the island and to restrain all interference that might be exploited by either side to deviate from the course charted in the presence of the Secretary-General. In paragraph 58 of his report, the Secretary-General stresses that the intercommunal talks, in his opinion

"still represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process with the object of achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question".

103. My people cherish the hope that any measure taken by the Council will be aimed at encouraging the two national communities destined to live on the island

to resolve their differences through talks on the basis of the principles and agreements they have concluded between themselves.

104. In the past, the Greek Cypriots and their Greek supporters have run from one international forum to another, using them as vehicles for irrelevant attacks against the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot side. There is little logic in launching a verbal attack against the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey during a discussion on Namibia, or women's rights, or any other issue, while avoiding the issues at the intercommunal talks in Cyprus itself. I hope the standstill of last November and the one that may come next February will be overcome, and that after the elections the Greek Cypriots will be forthcoming at the intercommunal talks table. Intercommunal talks in Cyprus are the proper and best way to seek a solution to the problem of Cyprus.

105. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, upon whom I now call.

106. Mr. KIRÇA (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): Permit me at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. The Polish and Turkish peoples have been bound by strong ties of friendship and respect for many centuries. The concordant moments of our respective histories have always been cherished by the Turkish people as moments of glory in our past. I wish you every success in your task and assure you of the co-operation of my Government. It is with profound appreciation that I shall remember the extremely impartial manner in which you conducted the consultations with the interested parties before today's meeting.

107. It is clear from what I have heard thus far that the Council is meeting once again in connection with the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP, not to hold a constructive debate but, unfortunately, to witness fruitless polemics. That is why, during the talks, Turkey proposed that we should not engage in a debate and let the Council proceed with the necessary formality, without allowing this meeting to be exploited for purposes hardly compatible with the development of the intercommunal talks at Nicosia and without thereby adding to the impressive mass of already existing acrimony. In fact, we consider it essential to safeguard those intercommunal talks, especially at a time when those talks, conducted under the aegis of the Secretary-General, are suffering a setback. Doubtless the Council is not unaware that those in certain circles are doing everything in their power to demonstrate the futility of those talks by claiming in the most fallacious manner, and despite assertions to the contrary by the Secretary-General in his report, that they register no progress, and by laying down conditions which would be tantamount to their complete liquidation.

108. The Turkish Government takes this opportunity to declare yet again that the intercommunal talks offer the best and only realistic way of resolving the question of Cyprus on a just and lasting basis. Any effort aimed at modifying, hampering or halting that process must be resolutely rejected. The Turkish and Greek communities on the island must remain bound to each other in that process of negotiation, because they alone are competent to determine their future and because there is no substitute for those direct and continued talks.

109. The Secretary-General, who continues with perseverance and dedication to pursue his mission of good offices and who remains personally in close touch with the Cypriot problem, declares in paragraph 58 of his latest report:

"The intercommunal talks, in my opinion, still represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process with the object of achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question."

My Government, which fully shares that view of the Secretary-General, is happy to note that it also remains the opinion in all quarters interested in closely following the evolution of the problem.

110. The Turkish Government unreservedly supports the good offices mission of the Secretary-General, which was entrusted to him by the Council. My Government is proud to undertake yet again to say that it will spare no effort to facilitate the Secretary-General's task in that process. Both he and his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Hugo Gobbi, have devoted extremely laudable efforts to helping the talks to progress towards a global solution in Cyprus. Thanks to the introduction of the "evaluation" paper by the Secretary-General in the process of negotiation, the interlocutors were able to embark on a systematic review of the various aspects of the problem. There still remain, particularly in the constitutional field, certain questions not covered by the talks. Turkey hopes that those questions also will be dealt with as soon as possible. Once the two parties have completed a first cycle encompassing all the dimensions of the question of Cyprus, it will then be possible to take stock of the talks in order to determine with precision what still remains to be done. The talks could at that point move forward in the context of the elements contained in the "evaluation" paper, which remains a reasonable basis for discussion. Turkey has every confidence that the Secretary-General and his Special Representative will spare no effort to bring the various views more into line and to ensure a successful outcome.

111. The Turkish Government continues to believe firmly in the validity and effectiveness of the intercommunal talks as the means for arriving at a solution with the aim of a Republic of Cyprus that is indepen-

dent, sovereign, bicomunal, bi-zonal, federative and—should it so decide itself—non-aligned.

112. My Government will continue to give support and encouragement to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to achieve that objective and will resist any move likely to hinder the negotiations.

113. The question of Cyprus will be solved neither by invoking partial or unrealistic recommendations which have been definitively rejected by the Turkish community of Cyprus and Turkey nor by adding others of the same kind to that series, which would undoubtedly suffer the same fate. The need is for time, patience, calm, serious-mindedness, wisdom and political will. That is why the Turkish Government supports the process of intercommunal talks. Wisdom should also make it clear to all that, contrary to certain misrepresentations, the question of Cyprus is not a problem born of a military intervention. In point of fact, the history of the question of Cyprus from the end of 1963 until August 1974 is the history of broken promises, of a *coup d'état* against the Constitution, of violations of international treaties—all of it aimed at subjugating the Turkish community, whose members were deprived of all the rights conferred by bicommunality, besieged in their villages and neighbourhoods, even cut off from water, electricity and food supplies, when they were not driven from their ancestral homes and lands. The history of that painful period was also that of the transformation of the Turkish Cypriot community into a national liberation movement to protect its identity and its rights and to reject Greek domination until its deliverance by Turkey, at its own request, from one last manoeuvre whose sole purpose was to eliminate the problem by attaching the island to Greece.

114. It was thus that the practices of *apartheid* came to an end in Cyprus, precisely thanks to the intervention of Turkey. Attila, who has been spoken of here very often, did not, at least, have the reputation of being a cheater; nor did he have the reputation of failing to react to whatever blows he received.

115. The Turkish community in Cyprus and Turkey have made use of their right of self-defence in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee,<sup>3</sup> not to destroy the Republic of Cyprus but, as stipulated in that Treaty, to recreate the state of affairs provided for in the Basic Articles of the Cypriot Constitution, always on a bicomunal basis, but this time in a truly sound and durable manner which cannot be other than as a federation.

116. In this connection, I should like to recall that experience unfortunately teaches us that international forces have never been able to ensure the full security of populations, which is why, at the request of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, the Turkish armed forces will remain on the territory of the Federated State until the conclusion of a final agreement between all the parties concerned.

117. The representative of Greece has just reconfirmed the eternal view of his Government that the Turkish community in Cyprus cannot and should not have the same powers as the Greek community. I should like to stress that that thesis runs counter to the high-level agreements concluded between the leaders of the two communities [S/12323, para. 5, and S/13369, para. 51]. That thesis is at the root of the evils in Cyprus and should be amended as soon as possible, if we want the parties to arrive at a global, just and durable solution.

118. Let those who complain now of Turkey's intervention cease to dream about what the future may have in store for them. The Turkish Cypriot community will never submit again to Greek domination. Cyprus will not be attached to Greece. That is finished for good.

119. The Turkish community on the island, confident of Turkey's support, is ready, in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee, to negotiate with the Greek community an honest association on a footing of equality which will ensure their happiness and prosperity as respective extensions of two great nations in that very volatile region of the world, in a Republic of Cyprus renewed on the basis of a federal system. If only the Greek and Greek Cypriot side can seize this opportunity—that is the essence of the problem. In doing so it would promote the cause of peace and co-operation on the basis of a balance of mutual, well-founded interests. But, I repeat, whether the Greek and Greek Cypriot side seizes this opportunity in a rational and realistic manner or chooses to remain blinded by a sentimental dream, wedded to its mistaken course, in any event the Turkish community on Cyprus will not fall once again under the Greek yoke, nor will Cyprus become a Greek province. That must be understood and accepted as final.

120. I should also like to reject vigorously as completely unfounded the allegations that Turkey is seeking to change the demographic character of the island.

121. I should like now to offer some comments on certain passages in the Secretary-General's report. It is regrettable to see that the principle of equality of the communities, a constitutional element of the Republic of Cyprus, was not respected in the titles employed to designate the official entities of the two communities. Moreover, the administration of the Greek Cypriot community is designated there as the "Cyprus Government"—a description which that administration is not legitimately or legally entitled to claim.

122. Thus my first remark on the text of the resolution which was just adopted by the Council relates to the reference in the third paragraph to the so-called "Government of Cyprus". For the reasons that I have just explained, the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community are no more than usurpers of the title "Govern-

ment of Cyprus". The Republic of Cyprus was established by virtue of an international treaty. Faithful to its international commitments, Turkey refuses to recognize their right to that title, which, incidentally, does not correspond to the present situation, in which two distinct communities govern, each in its respective zone, as was recognized in the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974 [see S/11398]. In this connection, I should like once again to emphasize what I stated in my letter reproduced in document S/14445 of 15 April 1981. That is why the third paragraph of that resolution remains unacceptable to Turkey.

123. I should like also to inform the Council that the various reservations made and positions adopted by Turkey concerning the text mentioned in the same resolution and in the report of the Secretary-General have in no way changed, but remain valid for the resolution adopted today and for the report of the Secretary-General before us.

124. You will no doubt recall, Mr. President, that in the course of the consultations you were good enough to conduct on the subject, my Government supported the view of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to the effect that the important event that occurred following the concluding of the 1979 high-level agreements [S/13369, para. 51] must be reflected in the text of the resolution.

125. On one hand, the reopening of the intercommunal talks was made possible as a result of the opening statement of the Secretary-General, of 9 August 1980 [see S/14100, annex]. That statement contains additional elements of paramount importance, which in fact now constitute one of the bases for those talks. The Turkish Government does not understand why reference to that statement is avoided. However, my Government reiterates its view that the statement also constitutes one of the bases for these talks.

126. On the other hand, the presentation of the evaluation paper of the Secretary-General constitutes in itself an event of paramount importance which should have been taken into account in the resolution. It is even more disconcerting to find that the resolution just adopted does not contain any encouragement to the two communities along the lines of the report of the Secretary-General.

127. By that resolution, the Council extends the period of the stationing of UNFICYP for a further six months. Since Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, has just informed the Council of the consent of his authorities, the Turkish Government, for its part, gives its agreement to that extension. However, I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the request made by the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, similar to those he has made on several similar occasions in the past in the Council, to the effect that the mandate of UNFICYP, which was

drawn up in 1964, should be reviewed so as to bring it more into line with the prevailing conditions in Cyprus. The Turkish Government fully supports that request.

128. Lastly, I cannot fail to express once again the gratitude of my Government to those States which contribute to UNFICYP in Cyprus and to its Commander and the brave officers, non-commissioned officers and men of that Force, as well as the civilian personnel attached to it.

129. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Cyprus wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I call on him.

130. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Turkey addressed the Council today and spoke with two voices. The two voices heard by the Council were those of Mr. Atalay and of the representative of Turkey. Mr. Atalay was accorded the right to speak as an individual under rule 39 of the rules of procedure. It is indeed regrettable that he took advantage again of the permission given to him and made statements on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, which he does not represent here, since he appears as an individual. What is even more unacceptable is the fact that he spoke also on behalf of a so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, a fictitious entity set up in the occupied areas by Turkey as its puppet. This bogus entity is recognized by no one except by those that set it up, namely, Turkey.

131. Mr. Atalay is my fellow countryman, a member of the Turkish Cypriot community, whose members constitute an inseparable and valued part of our citizenry, sharing a common destiny in a common country and, sadly, suffering from the same invasion and occupation. The statements made by him and the views he expressed in the Council should be placed in their proper perspective and valued accordingly, since the Turkish Cypriot community is at present as much under occupation as other communities in Cyprus.

132. Therefore it is my hope that Mr. Atalay will understand my directing my replies only to the representative of Turkey, since this is the country responsible for the invasion and occupation of our country and on whose behalf, sadly, he really spoke.

133. The fact that I am seated in the Council as the representative of the Republic of Cyprus and that you, Mr. President, twice called on me in my capacity as representative of the Government of Cyprus, is an immediate and silencing reply to the statement of the representative of Turkey that the State and Government of the Republic of Cyprus do not exist.

134. As I said at the last meeting of the Council on the occasion of a renewal of the mandate, this is probably the only case in the history of the United Nations

where the aggressor, having dealt an inhuman military blow to the victim, a small non-aligned State, comes before the Council and brags that the victim is dead [2378th meeting, para. 122].

135. It is futile for Turkey to dispute the legality of the Government of Cyprus, which is exclusively recognized by the United Nations, the non-aligned countries, all international organizations and all international forums as the sole representative of the Republic of Cyprus. It is no wonder, therefore, that the United Nations has over the years given this preposterous Turkish allegation the answer it deserves. It has disregarded it and continues to do so.

136. The representative of Turkey spoke about the onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot community. The allegation of oppression and extermination of this valued community by the Government of Cyprus is pure political propaganda, used by Turkey in the past in order to pave the way for the invasion and occupation of Cyprus and now used to try to justify the continuation of its military presence in the territory of Cyprus, contrary to the relevant United Nations resolutions.

137. What are the facts? For centuries all Cypriots, whether Greeks, Turks, Armenians or Maronites, lived and worked side by side in peace and harmony in mixed villages, proof of their peaceful coexistence and the historical links which were forged between them.

138. It was Ankara's policies of segregation and partition implemented by the extremist elements of the Turkish Cypriot leadership that brought about the artificial barrier between the Greek and Turkish communities.

139. Ample evidence of this is provided by the regular six-monthly reports of Secretary-General U Thant, which demolish the allegation and irrefutably show the falsehood of mistreatment of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Government of Cyprus.

140. Suffice it to list the following excerpts from reports of the Secretary-General, the highest independent authority:

"... the lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation" [S/5764 of 15 June 1964, para. 113],

and

"... the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the lead-

ership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file" [S/6426 of 10 June 1965, para. 106].

141. But the problem of Cyprus is not what happened 15 or 25 years ago. It is what is happening now with the invasion and the continuing occupation of Cyprus, contrary to United Nations resolutions—some of them adopted unanimously—demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces and the return of all the refugees to their ancestral homes and lands. I submit that, as far as the Council is concerned, the problem is one of non-compliance with its mandatory resolutions and of what steps should be taken to make Turkey comply.

142. The Turkish representative spoke about a *coup* staged against the Turkish Cypriot community. With regard to this allegation, I wish to state the following. It was the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, the three Turkish Cypriot Ministers and Members of Parliament who, acting upon instructions from Turkey, withdrew from the Government. They were not expelled. As a matter of fact, for many months after their withdrawal, the agenda of the Council of Ministers was continuously sent to the Vice-President and the three Turkish Cypriot Ministers. Why did they withdraw? The answer is obvious: to destroy the Republic of Cyprus and its Constitution. The Vice-President, Mr. Küçük, answered this question very clearly. He declared: "The Constitution of Cyprus is dead." That appeared in *The New York Times* and *The New York Herald Tribune* of 31 December 1963. He went on to say: "It is out of the question to collaborate any longer with this Government."

143. Where is the *coup*? Where is the expulsion? I submit: nowhere. But here is evidence of the purpose for their withdrawal. I shall quote from the Turkish Cypriot *Bulletin* of 5 January 1964. First, there is this statement made by a former Vice-President of Turkey, Mr. Kemal Satir: "Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey." Secondly, there is the following statement made in June 1964 by Mr. F. C. Erkin, the then Foreign Minister of Turkey: "The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Asiatic coast, to Turkey."

144. The problem of Cyprus is not a dispute between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, nor is it a constitutional or a religious difference. It is an international problem of great dimensions—one of invasion and occupation. If it were an intercommunal difference, as the representative of Turkey alleges, the item would not have been inscribed on the agenda of the two main organs of the United Nations. If it were not an international problem, the Council, the General Assembly, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Commonwealth Heads of Government would not have considered it repeatedly and adopted resolutions and declarations on the subject.



145. It is an international problem and, in the view of a previous Secretary-General, one of the three major international problems in the world.

146. The Turkish representative tried to hide the presence in Cyprus of alien settlers. Originally, the Turkish position was that these people had indeed arrived in Cyprus, having been brought there as seasonal workers in an occupied area where the Turkish Cypriot community was mainly forced to settle and where unemployment figures were staggering, going at times as high as 25 per cent. Indeed, the importation of foreign labour would be a very strange way to fight unemployment.

147. The revelations of Colonel İsmail Tezer of the Turkish Army, to which I referred in my main statement today, speak louder than the attempts of the Turkish representative to conceal the truth.

148. In November 1979 Mr. Ozker Ozkur had this to say to Mr. Gurler, a member of the Denktaş régime, when the latter tried to hide the fact that settlers had been brought to Cyprus:

“Do you think we come from the moon? Do you try to deceive us too by saying things you say to the foreigners? Be a little bit serious when you are talking.”

I address those last words to the representative of Turkey.

149. The actions taken by Turkey to establish a central bank and to introduce the Turkish lira to replace the Cyprus pound are in line with the separatist, divisive policy of Ankara aimed at partitioning the occupied areas and incorporating them in the mainland of Turkey.

150. These illegal economic actions are added to the many political, geographical and social separations which Turkey tries to impose by force on our people—all our people.

151. There is a central bank in each country—whether the system is unitary or federal. The creation of a second central bank is therefore divisive and partitionist. The argument put forth by the Turkish side that this central bank created by Turkey in the occupied areas of Cyprus does not have the main function of issuing money is, to say the least, deceiving and outright fraudulent, because the Turkish lira has simultaneously been introduced in the occupied areas. There is therefore no need whatever to issue currency.

152. Since the invasion of 1974, three banks—namely, Grindley's, Barclays and Charter—have been allowed by the Government of Cyprus to operate in the occupied parts of Cyprus and to serve our people. These banks operate with the approval and under the direction of the Central Bank of Cyprus.

153. The allegation that the Cyprus pound is not available in the occupied area cannot be substantiated. The three British banks operating in the occupied area are, as I stated before, permitted to carry on all banking business in the areas, including, of course, supplying Cyprus currency. Indeed, the two Turkish Cypriot banks or any individual may be supplied with Cyprus currency in the ordinary course of business either from the British banks operating in the occupied area or from the Central Bank of Cyprus.

154. The representative of Turkey spoke of the Treaty of Guarantee,<sup>3</sup> and he alleged that under the Treaty Turkey had the right to intervene. As we have heard before, Turkey intends to stay in Cyprus, in spite of unanimously adopted United Nations resolutions and particularly the mandatory resolutions of the Council. Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee provides that:

“In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, [the guarantor Powers] undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

“In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.”

155. Turkey never complied with that provision because Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July, three days before an agreed meeting of the three guarantor Powers—Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom—was to take place in London. Turkey, as the facts show, did not invade with the sole aim of re-establishing the constitutional order in the island, but rather with the sole aim of destroying the constitutional order of Cyprus itself. It is interesting that to this day Turkey does not accept the 1960 Constitution.

156. More important, however, Turkey, by militarily invading the island, acted contrary to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the use of armed force in the settlement of international disputes. Nor did Turkey have a right to come to the assistance of the Turkish Cypriot community, as it alleges, because the Treaty of Guarantee did not give Turkey the specific duty of protecting a certain community. It was not, for instance, the duty of the Greek Government to protect the Greek Cypriot community; nor was it the duty of Turkey to protect the Turkish Cypriot community.

157. Reference was made to Turkey's good wishes for the talks. Good wishes, however, are not enough. Deeds are needed. The intercommunal talks that commenced after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and were reactivated in August 1980 have to date made no substantive progress whatever. The reason for this

lack of progress is the Turkish intransigence in promoting separatist solutions. The continued presence of 30,000 to 40,000 occupation troops constitutes, as I stated in my speech, an insurmountable obstacle and a stumbling-block to a final, just solution in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

158. Turkey uses the talks to achieve the legitimization of the results of its invasion, namely, the occupation and division of the island and the annexation of the occupied part of the island to the Turkish mainland. Needless to say, we shall not accept the *de facto* situation created by the invasion. We shall, however, continue the talks, and to this end we shall exhaust all options in the search for an agreement with the Turkish Cypriot community on the internal aspect of our problem, as provided for in United Nations resolutions.

159. During the discussion of the issue of missing persons, the Turkish side took the position that there are no missing persons in Cyprus, that they were all killed during the *coup*. There is no doubt that some people not included in the list lost their lives during the *coup*. We would, however, put to Turkey, without any animosity, this question: among those missing there are prisoners of war who were photographed by Turkish journalists in the hands of Turkish troops long after the *coup*. Where are they today? There are cases of people whose names were on the official Turkish lists of prisoners of war, but who have never been released and whose existence has since been denied. There are cases in which the names of people held in concentration camps in occupied Cyprus have appeared on the lists of the International Red Cross, but who have never been released. There are people whose names, after they had been captured, appeared on Turkish Cypriot radio three weeks after the cease-fire, but who are still missing. These are human questions that a large anguished group of our people are putting to the Turkish Government.

160. Before concluding, I feel I must comment on the reference made today, at the last Council meeting on this subject [2378th meeting], and on references made a few days ago during a debate in the Third Committee of the General Assembly on a humanitarian issue, to our late President, Archbishop Makarios. The greatness and world renown of Makarios will live on undiminished and unweakened, notwithstanding any attempts to ensure the contrary. Makarios is a symbol, and was seen as such by his people and by the peoples of the world struggling against colonialism for independence, freedom and justice. False and malicious statements attributed to him by his enemies and regurgitated in the halls of the United Nations

by Turkish representatives for their own base purposes can succeed only in bringing forth more vividly the greatness that was Makarios. These attacks prove the wisdom of a Cypriot saying: only fruit-bearing trees become the targets of stones thrown by passers-by.

161. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Greece, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

162. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): The representative of the Republic of Cyprus, in his thorough and well-substantiated statement, refuted—in our view, convincingly—the allegations made by the representative of Turkey and by Mr. Atalay. I shall limit myself, therefore, to one or two remarks. A reference was made to a statement by the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, which, in our view, amounts to a truism. What Mr. Papandreou said was that Cyprus is an expansion of Hellenism. I think that everybody who has graduated from a high school and has been diligent in his history lessons is well aware that culturally—and I emphasize and repeat, “culturally”—Cyprus is closely connected with Hellenism. That is a historical fact that cannot be denied. It is not a fact to be exploited for political purposes.

163. There was another statement by the representative of Turkey, namely, that Cyprus will never become Greek. I am afraid that the problem in our time is not that Cyprus may become Greek, but that Cyprus must not become Turkish—a process that has, unfortunately, already started in the form of the occupation and in the form of the organization of the occupied territories in Cyprus according to the rules of Turkish law.

164. I shall spare the Council a prolonged debate, since its members are fully aware of all the aspects of the Cyprus problem. Notwithstanding the arguments and the eloquence of the representative of Turkey, the fact remains that 30,000 troops and 300 tanks—Turkish troops and Turkish tanks—are still occupying part of the Republic of Cyprus, and this fact can neither be denied, nor justified, nor explained legally or morally.

*The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.*

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/37/1).*

<sup>2</sup> A/C.3/37/L.58 and Rev.1, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1982 as resolution 37/181.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475, p. 3.

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