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TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

FORTIETH MEETING OF THE THIRD PART OF THE SECOND SESSION

(Extracted from the Sound Track)

Lake Success, New York

Thursday, 29 April 1948, at 11:00 a.m.

President: Mr. Francis B. SAYRE (United States of America)

The PRESIDENT: I declare the sixty-seventh meeting of the Trusteeship Council open.

Yesterday, the members of the Trusteeship Council may remember that we were discussing the question of the protection of the City of Jerusalem and its inhabitants, with respect to the Resolution of the General Assembly dated 26 April 1948. We were specifically discussing the suggestion made by the French delegation concerning the establishment of an international police force with a view to ensuring peace and order in the City of Jerusalem. We shall be very interested, particularly in that discussion, in hearing the views of the Arab Higher Committee and of the Jewish Agency, as well as of the mandatory power.

I now open the meeting to such questions as any of the members care to raise and, I hope, the observations of the three which I have just mentioned.

Mr. FLETCHER-COOKE (United Kingdom): I should like to make some general remarks, which fall into two categories. First of all, the United Kingdom delegation have, during the past day or two, been giving very careful consideration to the French proposal for an international volunteer police force for Jerusalem. However, my Government feels that we should bring to the notice of the Trusteeship Council, at an early stage in order to insure that this question is considered in an atmosphere of reality, certain general considerations which we feel they ought to have in mind.

In the first place, conditions in Palestine, generally, and in Jerusalem, in particular, have been deteriorating very rapidly during the past few days. The administration has practically come to the end of its effective powers, and there are in Jerusalem now only some twenty-three British officers -- and I am not, of course, referring

to the rank and file of the police, but most of the British officers have left Jerusalem.

As regards the specific proposal for an international volunteer police force, I have been asked to make two main points. The first point is that if this force is to be at all effective, it must be a well-trained, well-disciplined force, which can carry out and is accustomed to carrying out the peculiarly difficult police duties which the Security problem in Jerusalem provides. A mere conglomeration of individuals, untrained, speaking different languages, with no particular experience of conditions in Jerusalem, or in the middle east generally, would be a very difficult body to deal with and their task would be extremely difficult.

Secondly, even if it were possible, in the short time at our disposal, to assemble and collect such a force, the question still remains as to how they are to be transported to Palestine. At the present time, the administration and the military, who are withdrawing from Palestine, are finding considerable difficulties, and my latest information is that Lydda Airport, the chief airport, is only operating during daylight hours, and then only under conditions of extreme difficulty. While, therefore, the United Kingdom delegation welcomed, as they have done in previous statements, the French proposal and will do all that they can to facilitate its coming into force, at the same time, I have been asked to bring to the notice of the members of the Trusteeship Council these very real difficulties and to emphasize them once again.

If I may, I should now like to turn to a brief statement of the information, in very general terms, which is available here in the United Kingdom delegation, which is likely to have some bearing on the setting up of the proposed police force. First of all, under present arrangements, the police force in Jerusalem is not separated from the Palestine police force as a whole. Those police who serve in Palestine are members of the Palestine Police Force, and there is no specific Jerusalem police force with a specific commission of police. Thus, it is very difficult to give detailed information as to the circumstances of those police who serve in Jerusalem, because such information is not separately available. As members of the Trusteeship Council may be aware, in 1947-1948 the Palestine Police Force, as a whole, cost approximately seven million pounds. The outgoing administration has made provision for the maintenance of the police force for Palestine as a whole for the months of April, and half of May -- that is until 15 May, and the provision for expenditure on police is estimated at approximately one million pounds.

I should like to recapitulate -- although we have conveyed this information to the Secretariat -- his Majesty's Government's attitude, as regards certain specific points arising out of any proposal for an international police force for Jerusalem. The first relates to the Chief of Police. I am aware that there is a proposal that this should be considered in closed session. However, I feel that I should tell the Trusteeship Council now that his Majesty's Government are not prepared to suggest any United Kingdom candidate for the post of Chief of Police. If any volunteers from the present Palestine Police Force wish to come forward, having severed their connection with the public service of the United Kingdom either as candidates for the post of Chief of Police or for

any other of the senior post, his Majesty's Government will not stand in their way, but they are not disposed to make any recommendations. If, whoever was responsible for making this appointment wished to consider particular names, that is to say names of those who had volunteered for this service, his Majesty's Government would make available for their consideration the past records of service of any such volunteers.

As regards the second point, rank and file, with respect to the constables, his Majesty's Government have no objection to any individuals in the Palestine Police Force volunteering after they have again severed their connection with the force and taken their pensions, gratuities, and so on. On 17 April -- perhaps I should say that even earlier this year, it was anticipated that some five hundred British police constables and non-commissioned officers, and possibly some inspectors, and possibly some officers would have been available and for an international police force/would have volunteered for such a force. The number has been gradually dwindling owing to the fact that no specific offers of employment were made to them. On 17 April information was received that there were fifty volunteers available, mainly young and inexperienced constables, with a few/junior non-commissioned officers. No inspectors and no officers have volunteered. Moreover, of the fifty who had volunteered, many of them have local connections, which might not have made them wholly suitable for employment in an international force. But I must now go further and tell the Trusteeship Council that the latest information received from Jerusalem is that there are no volunteers available; that is to say, the time that has passed since 17 April, and no firm offers of employment have been made, and most of these men looking to the future have had to make other arrangements.

So far as my information is concerned, there are now no volunteers available from the Palestine police force for any international volunteer force that may be set up.

As regards the next point -- arms, accommodations, and equipment -- the arms, accommodation and equipment of the Palestine police force are the property of the Government of Palestine and not of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government has, of course, a considerable amount of military stores in Palestine which have been paid for by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom and which, as part of the withdrawal plan, are now being withdrawn; but the arms and equipment -- and they are very extensive -- which belong to the Palestine police force are the assets of the Government of Palestine, and it was always the intention of His Majesty's Government to turn those over to any appropriate authority working under the auspices of the United Nations who was competent to take them over.

I think, therefore, that I can safely say that if an international volunteer police force is formed, there will be adequate supplies of arms, equipment, transport, ammunition; and, subject to the fact that most, or quite a considerable amount, of the accommodations in Jerusalem occupied by the police are in requisitioned or rented buildings, there would be no reason why any incoming police should not take over and use the same buildings.

Turning now to the question of cost, at an earlier stage the Government of Palestine was asked what it regarded as the minimum number of non-Palestinian police that would be required to maintain order in Jerusalem. It is true that the specific circumstances in which they might be required to perform this task were not clearly defined; that is to say, it was not clear whether they were merely going to confine themselves to police duties in a state of calm existing in Palestine, or whether they would carry out

their duties in a state practically amounting to civil war. But the answer received from the Government of Palestine was that a minimum of one thousand non-Palestinians would be required. It was also estimated that the cost per month to maintain these one thousand -- and I presume that the cost was based on existing rates of pay -- would be some forty thousand pounds for their salaries and general maintenance. In addition, a sum of approximately five thousand pounds a month would be required to maintain and replace, where necessary, those items of arms, ammunition, equipment and accommodation which, as I have already explained, would be there in the first instance as part of the assets of the Government of Palestine. But they would require a sum of approximately five thousand pounds per month to maintain them in appropriate order and to purchase additional ammunition and so on.

That works out at a cost of something over half a million pounds a year to maintain one thousand non-Palestinian personnel in such a force. The Trusteeship Council might also wish to take note of the fact that in recent weeks the Government of Palestine has organized three hundred Jews and three hundred Arabs as a Jewish and Arab municipal police force in Jerusalem. I have a figure here, I think, of the cost of this force. The mixed force of three hundred Arabs and three hundred Jews would cost approximately twelve thousand pounds per mensem.

The members of the Trusteeship Council will undoubtedly wish to have before them two items of information that I regret I cannot present. One is the actual structure of the Palestine police force, the latest structure showing the numbers in each category: officers, superintendents, assistant superintendents, temporary constables, and so on.

These are all set out in the draft estimates for 1948-1949; that is, for the two months -- April and May -- to which I have already referred, and the only copy of this document, which I received recently from Jerusalem and which is a draft galley-proof of the estimates, has been sent to the Secretariat of the United Nations. I should therefore suggest that if the members of the Trusteeship Council wish to see this document, it might be possible to ask the Secretariat to circulate the relevant pages. It is a document, of course, setting out the total expenditure contemplated on all the departments, but the relevant pages relating to the police will show the rates of pay and the actual numbers in each category.

The second lot of information -- which I am afraid is not available to me, but is available, I hope, to the Secretariat -- concerns the quantities and types of arms and stores handed over to the municipal police forces, not only to the municipal police forces in Jerusalem, to which I have already referred, but to those municipal Jewish and Arab police forces which have been set up elsewhere in Palestine.

Similarly, the arrangements contemplated for handing over to an appropriate United Nations organization, and similarly complete information relating to the arms, vehicles, buildings and equipment of the Palestine police force -- all this information has been conveyed by the Government of Palestine to the advance Secretariat party which was recently -- and one member who I believe still is -- in Palestine. I do not have copies of that information. The inventory of the Palestine police property must be a very bulky document. I do not know whether the representatives of the Secretariat in Jerusalem have already transmitted it to the Secretariat here. I presume they have, in which case -- again

similarly to the other document -- it might be available, if the members of the Trusteeship Council wished, for circulation.

I shall, of course, be pleased to answer any questions which the members of the Trusteeship Council may wish to put in elaboration of the points to which I have referred, or any other matters as to which I can assist the Trusteeship Council; but, for the moment, I think that is all I have to say.

The PRESIDENT: Sometime, I hope that both Mr. Shertok and Mr. Husseini may comment on this statement.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency for Palestine): I should like to put a question which the representative of the United Kingdom, in his capacity as representative of the mandatory power, might be able to answer. He referred to the very considerable volume of equipment which now forms an asset of the Palestine administration and said that the mandatory power would be prepared to hand over that equipment to an international force, if formed. My question is: What will be the fate of that equipment upon the complete withdrawal of the mandatory authority, if by then no international force is in existence? What will happen to it?

The PRESIDENT: I do not know whether that is a question to which the representative of the United Kingdom would care to reply.

Mr. FLETCHER-COOKE (United Kingdom): I can only say that we have not reached 15 May. The negotiations have been going on with various organs of the United Nations during the past three or four months, in an attempt to get arrangements made as to taking over not only, I may say, the police assets, but of the administration as a whole in Palestine. At this moment, the people in Palestine are equally uncertain as I am as to what exactly will happen. We have always worked on the assumption

and in the hope that before 15 May some appropriate organ of the United Nations would come forth and be in a position to take over these assets. I would, however, like to make this statement: that if no organ of the United Nations, no organization, no international police force, no commission, or no delegate comes forward, the question of the protection of these assets will be a very live one; not only the question of using them to maintain security, but the question of their physical protection, because in the present circumstances in Palestine, naturally enough, stores of arms are regarded as a suitable target for both sides. This is a fact which the Trusteeship Council should bear in mind; that even if it cannot go very far, even if it can only protect the asset of the Palestine police force until such time as it can get people to use them in an appropriate manner, that alone would be a step in the right direction.

Mr. GARREAU (France) (spoke in French)

Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) (spoke in French)

The PRESIDENT: I am sure the Trusteeship Council is most eager and anxious to hear the attitude and the ideas of both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency with respect to the question that the representative of Belgium has just put, namely, as to what would be the attitude of the respective parties to the constitution of such a police force as proposed by the representative of France.

Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq): The question put by the representative of Belgium is of course very relevant, and we have the right to ask both parties to present their case and make their position clearly known. However, I feel that before we can ask both communities to clarify the position we ourselves, as well as the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, ought to be in a position to answer such a question, and indeed, for our own advantage, I feel that at the same time we must have some more information and further details of the plan. It would be only fair if the French delegation, which has presented us with a paper, would be good enough to supply us with more details of their idea.

More specifically, I mean in relation to certain questions which yesterday I took the liberty of calling "les petites choses". For example, where is the international police force to come from, and in what numbers; of what nationality, how will they be trained and under whom - not mentioning any names; who will supply their ammunition, apart from the stores in Palestine referred to by Mr. Fletcher Cook just now; all these small things must be made clear before we can give any answer to the question put by the representative of Belgium. That is my feeling about it, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: I quite understand that before you say "yes" or "no" you would like to know further details. On the other hand, if I correctly understood the thought of the representative of Belgium, it was one of inquiry regarding the general attitude, so as to help us perhaps to formulate and think through such details as you mention.

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Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) (Spoke in French).

Mr. GARREAU (France) (Spoke in French).

The PRESIDENT:

(Here followed a discussion on the subject of the verbatim reports of Trusteeship Council meetings.)

The PRESIDENT: May we then move to the business at hand, as time is passing.

The representatives of Belgium and France have asked whether the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency would comment on their general attitudes with respect to this French proposal. It is not a question that they vote for it or against it had they a chance to vote, but a question of how they regard the proposal, what do they think would be the constructive steps to take, and what is their general attitude towards the underlying idea of the French proposal.

I wonder if Mr. Shertok would like to comment.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): Having been the first to speak up on quite a few occasions, I would, in this particular case, yield the priority to the representative of the Arab Higher Committee.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Committee): As a matter of fact, I was going to make a statement before the representative of the Jewish Agency started his remarks, and I made it, I think, in the meeting the day before yesterday. I made my position quite clear, and although there were stenographers present and I repeated it to you then, but my statement was completely misunderstood.

It is not my business to make any remarks with regard to taking verbatim records, but you must remember that the other day I said that if the two sides agree to a truce within the walls of Jerusalem, then we will send a message to our people at the other end asking them to give orders for a cease-fire. Mr. Shertok, on that occasion, said --

at least, he repeated it -- that I made the suggestion that I was going to give orders from here for a cease-fire. So, in my opinion, all our statements must be taken verbatim.

I will repeat what I said the last time. We object, certainly, to the sending of any foreign troops to our country. Foreign troops in our country have been the cause of all the misfortunes that have happened in Palestine during the last fifty years. No-one in the world but the Arabs have felt the harassing difficulties of foreign troops in Palestine. The Arabs are the ones who are losing their country, as a matter of fact, who have lost, as far as the decision of last fall is concerned, a great part of their country because of the existence in Palestine of foreign troops. We are now in a difficult position in Palestine because of the presence of foreign troops, so we certainly object to foreign troops being sent to Palestine. In my opinion, these troops will not be effective in keeping peace in Palestine unless there is a truce in the whole of Jerusalem, and it is not practicable to have peace in Jerusalem unless there is peace in the whole of Palestine.

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I think I was quite clear on that point, too. I said that, if these troops were being sent against our wishes, we were not going to resist them or to shoot at them, but, at the same time, it is inconceivable that a body of one thousand men could do anything in Jerusalem if there were a battle between the two sides. If the Jews or the Arabs were to attack Jerusalem -- probably with thousands and thousands of their forces -- could a force of one thousand men be considered as safe? If Jerusalem were being besieged, would it be possible that these one thousand men could get provisions and ammunition and whatever else they might want?

I think many difficulties will arise which will make it impossible for the people going to Jerusalem as a police force to accomplish anything of real value with regard to peace in Jerusalem. The Arab Higher Committee, therefore, objects to any foreign troops being sent to Jerusalem.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to ask Mr. Husseini whether he would draw any distinction between "foreign troops", as he has just expressed it, and a constabulary whose duty is to enforce internal, domestic law and order, doing purely domestic police duty. There is a distinction between those two types of forces, and I wonder whether the remarks which Mr. Husseini has just made are applicable to both types; whether he had both types in mind, or just "foreign troops", as he expressed it.

Mr. HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Committee): To us, they are all the same. They are armed people who would be coming to Palestine to execute a certain policy which we do not accept and which we will resist. As a matter of fact, at the present juncture, the sending of international troops, to Jerusalem in particular, means the practical execution of the

partition scheme, which we resist and which we shall always resist. It does not, therefore, matter whether these people would constitute a police force or troops.

We have had bitter experience with these elastic terms. Everyone knows that the mandate was really meant to last a few years; the mandate has continued for thirty years and has ended in the present situation of chaos and disruption. We cannot really rely on any assurance that these troops will not be used for political purposes outside the scope of what is being discussed here for the temporary protection of the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

Mr. SHERICK (Jewish Agency): We definitely agree -- in fact, we consider it vitally necessary -- that a United Nations force be sent to Palestine to undertake the protection of Jerusalem and of the main approaches to Jerusalem. We accepted, in November last, the principle of an international regime for the City of Jerusalem, as had been decided by the General Assembly, and we stand today by that acceptance.

Coming now to the proposal made by the representative of France, I submit that it has to be examined under the following aspects:

First, in what context is it envisaged that the proposal would have to be carried through? Is the context envisaged one of a truce agreed upon by both parties and extending to the Holy City of Jerusalem and to the approaches to it, or is the context one of an absence of truce -- that is to say, of a state of war between the two parties, with the sole exception of the Old City of Jerusalem which, as far as the safety of the population as a whole is concerned, is an insignificant exception, important as it may be for the shrines which are inside the Walled City.

The second aspect is that of time -- how soon will it be possible to get together the force envisaged in the French proposal?

The third aspect is that of size -- whether the number proposed is adequate under this contingency or other contingencies.

I am not entering into the question of funds, which is an obvious consideration, but it is a contingent consideration depending upon the determination of the other factors involved.

I should like to say, with regard to the first aspect, that it is of course the most vital and the primary question. If there is a truce, then the force can be purely nominal. If there is no truce, then it is a totally different question. I should like to use a phrase coined by Mr. Eliash at one of our internal consultations. He said that if the truce is effective, then the force can be symbolic; but if the truce is merely symbolic -- that is to say, applying only to the Old City -- then the force must be effective. I think I could do no better than to use that very apt, cryptic and terse formulation.

In the present circumstances, when there is no agreement as to a truce covering the whole of Jerusalem, it is quite clear that the alternatives are either to bring in an effective force which would be in a position to take charge of all security arrangements and keep the situation firmly and effectively under control, or to leave Jerusalem in a state of a potential and actual battlefield between the Jews and the Arabs -- and not merely between the Jews and the Arabs of Jerusalem itself, but probably also including attempts by Arab forces from outside to invade Jerusalem. Any such attempt, needless to say, will be resisted with the greatest possible stiffness and determination by Jewish armed forces, as the only way under that contingency of saving the Jews of

Jerusalem from complete subjection, from possible extermination and, during the process of the fighting, from the possibility of being starved out by the attacking party.

If the United Nations is resigned to leaving Jerusalem in that state, then the issue must be clearly faced. If, on the other hand, the United Nations refuses even to contemplate such a possibility, then again the issue must be squarely faced and action must be determined accordingly.

We have no objection to a force being formed of volunteers, although I believe it has already been said that that principle may very seriously interfere with its inner cohesion and its capacity for unified action. However, if there is enough time properly to select the volunteers and to wield them together into a unified force, train them and instill into their ranks a team spirit and a feeling of corporate responsibility, there can be no possible objection to the principle as such, but that certainly entails a great deal of time, and the question would then arise: What is to happen in the meantime, in the absence of a truce? That means that either Jerusalem is left prey to anarchy and a "free-for-all", or the contingency must be faced of applying to a power or to a few powers with the request that a contingent or contingents should be provided, to be lent for the time being to whoever may be appointed by the United Nations as the Governor or Administrator of Jerusalem, in order to ensure its safety and protection.

I say this quite frankly and purely objectively. It is not a question of any like or dislike or of any preference. It is, I submit, an inescapable conclusion, if the issue is to be faced.

Theoretically speaking, perhaps the fewer the number of powers, the better, because the more homogeneous and the more uniform the force is, the more effective it will be. But, needless to say, there is a considerable latitude here as to the composition of the force. All I want to stress is that force is essential and, if the catastrophe is to be averted, it is most crucially, urgently necessary.

I should like to add a few words on the question of size. Under such a contingency, the figure envisaged by Mr. Garreau is obviously -- and I think admittedly by him -- inadequate. If it is to be not a mere symbol but an effective force to ensure the peace of Jerusalem, its size must be larger. I would not at this stage take it upon myself to indicate a figure, but it must certainly run into several thousand men and cannot be limited to a mere thousand.

That is the issue, in our estimation, and that is also the definition of our attitude. If an international force of adequate strength is formed -- I mean by that, naturally, a United Nations force, placed under the control of the person or body of persons who would be entrusted by the United Nations with that great, historic task of preserving the peace of Jerusalem -- we, for our part, would be ready to co-operate with it and assume such responsibilities as may be assigned to us as part of the scheme. It goes without saying that no force from outside can be a substitute in all fields for the participation of local people in the normal policing duties of the town -- the regulation of traffic, prosecution of offenders, observance of sanitary regulations, et cetera.

On the other hand, the assumption of control in security matters of Jerusalem by a United Nations armed force would probably mean that the present armed forces engaged in the very hard task of keeping the road open, protecting foot convoys and defending the outlying quarters of Jerusalem could then be dispensed with.

In our estimation, that sums up our attitude of the nature of the problem.

Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium): (Spoke in French)

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Committee): It seems that I did not make my point clear. If such a force were sent against our will, we would not shoot at them, but we would not cooperate because we know that this force would be the beginning of the implementation of partition. And then, it will not stop there. We know for sure that this force of one thousand may become ten thousand in no time. Then we would be again swamped by occupation. We cannot accept that by our own good will.

What we can do is this. If they come against our will, we are not going to resist them but we will not co-operate with them.

Mr. GARREAU (France): (Spoke in French)

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Committee): I desire to thank Mr. Garreau for his sympathetic attitude toward the people of Jerusalem. I happen to be a Jerusalemite myself, and my family are there in great numbers. If one feels the great distress that the people of Jerusalem, whether Jews or Arabs, now find themselves in from the points of view of terror or because of war or because of deprivation or insufficiency of provisions, and so on, he does not do so more than myself. But, after all, war is war. I think that if

M. Garreau of any of you have had the experience my countrymen and myself have had because of the presence of strange or foreign armed men in our country, then you would have seen our position and probably justified our stand with regard to his proposition, which I know that he has put with the best and the most noble of intentions.

In my opinion, I was quite clear on that point; namely, that unless there is a truce all over Palestine, it is practically impossible to have a truce in the municipal area of Palestine. And if there were no truce in the municipal area of Palestine, the presence of one thousand international police could do very little. They will be respected, as I said, by both sides, but I do not believe that the Arabs out of their own will, will come and co-operate because, first of all, they know that this is the first step in the execution of partition. You cannot convince anybody that this is not the first step of the partition scheme. As a matter of fact, the Jewish Agency is claiming that the partition scheme is already in effect there, that it is a reality. Now, just to push that forward, you are asking us to accept an international force going to Jerusalem; that is to say, we have given the final touches to the partition scheme with our own hands.

We say that this we cannot do. I think we are justified if you consider this problem from the principle point of view. We cannot do it. If we do it, I am sorry to say that we cannot execute it.

What we can do to please you is that we will not come into friction with these people. We will try our best to do that, and I think we can succeed. However, I do not think it is practicable to tell the people to accept that, and if I tell you we can do it, I am not telling you the

truth. That is my position.

However, I certainly thank Mr. Gareau very much for his sympathy with respect to the Jerusalem inhabitants. I also wish that the Trusteeship Council consider the whole of Palestine as a holy place -- Convents, Holy Places, churches, and fathers are found all over the place. Nazareth, Tiberias, Haifa, and other places are full of them. I do not see any difference between my own kith and kin who live in Jerusalem and all of my countrymen in the whole of Palestine. Therefore, I do not see the difference between the people of Jerusalem and the other Arabs or Jews of Palestine.

To me they are all the same, and, therefore, just as a token of our appreciation and of our willingness to abide by the United Nations provisions, we say, if you insist on that, that we shall try our best not to bring ourselves in conflict with these people. But you cannot force us by any means to co-operate. The United Kingdom Government during the last thirty years has tried to make us co-operate in one way or another in these things, but we have never co-operated. You may find one person here or one person there who would like to come to serve and to do something of that sort, but this is not the general trend of our national movement. Therefore, I think the Trusteeship Council would be asking me too much in asking me to accept things that I cannot recommend and my people cannot execute.

PRESIDENT: I think that all of the members of the Trusteeship Council have been impressed by the sincerity of the eloquent remarks of the French representative and also by the sincerity of Mr. Husseini.

Mr. FLETCHER-COOKE (United Kingdom): If agreement is not reached on the question of an international volunteer police force for Jerusalem, the position on 15 May, so far as police arrangements are concerned, will be that there will be 300 Jewish municipal policemen and 300 Arab municipal policemen. We do not know yet what progress we shall have made in the interval towards extending the truce from the Old City to the municipal area, but as regards effective security forces, those will be the only ones in existence if no arrangements are made for this volunteer police force.

In those circumstances, might I, with the President's permission, put a question to the representatives of the Arab High Committee and the Jewish Agency, and the question is that, in the absence of arrangements

for this volunteer police force, would the two communities concerned be prepared to give guarantees for the security of the Old City and the Holy Places, and would they take steps to create a joint board in the Old City of the two existing community committees to which reference was made yesterday? As the Trusteeship Council knows, there is an Arab committee and a Jewish committee carrying on to a limited extent the functions previously carried on by the municipal commission, and the United Kingdom Government would like to know, if this proposed volunteer force does not materialize, whether the two parties would be prepared (1) to give those guarantees and (2) to take all possible steps to arrange for the co-operation of these two committees.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI (Arab High Committee): I do not quite grasp the idea of this question.

PRESIDENT: I wonder if Mr. Fletcher-Cooke would repeat the question and perhaps clarify it a little.

Mr. FLETCHER-COOKE (United Kingdom): The position is that, if no arrangements are made for an international volunteer police force by 15 May, the only effective security forces operating to provide any degree of security in Jerusalem thereafter are the 300 Jewish and 300 Arab municipal policemen. That is the framework in which I wish to put these two questions: The first question is: In those circumstances would the Arab High Committee be prepared to give guarantees for the security of the Old City and the Holy Places? The second question is: Would they, assuming that the Jewish Agency takes the same step, be prepared to arrange for the co-operation of the two existing committees which have been attempting to carry on municipal functions?

JAMAL Bey HUSSEINI (Arab High Committee): As far as the City within the walls of Jerusalem is concerned, I think our answer to the first question would be in the affirmative. With regard to the second question, I think this is a matter of detail that I shall have to consult my people about, but I do not see, myself, any difficulty in accepting that. I know that the residents of the Old City of Jerusalem, excepting the Haganah Forces which have been brought in, are all old Palestinian Jews with whom we have always had good social as well as economic connexions. Therefore, I do not see how this would not work. However, things have changed since I left Palestine a few months ago, and so I must ask for instructions on this point.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): Before I attempt an answer, I should like, if I may, to have one point clarified. When Mr. Fletcher-Cooke referred to a possible co-operation or fusion of two separate committees, was that with reference again to the Old City alone or to the whole municipality?

Mr. FLETCHER-COOKE (United Kingdom): That was with reference to the Old City.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): Mr. Fletcher-Cooke has put two questions, and he put them within a certain framework, the framework being that all that will be left will be the 300 municipal policemen on the Jewish side and a similar number on the Arab side. I should like to say, with all respect, that the assumption will hardly be relevant after the withdrawal of British authority. Today, so long as the British authority administers Jerusalem, they regard that force of municipal policemen as a distinctive and separate unit which alone on the Jewish and Arab sides respectively is officially authorized to carry and use arms.

But today it is quite unreal to assume that the Jewish Jerusalem owes its protection and, in fact, survival to the fact that 300 Jews were given equipment by the United Kingdom administration. What Jewish Jerusalem owes its survival today is the operation of the Haganah forces. Now, upon the withdrawal of British authority, all these distinctions will naturally disappear, and the 300 men to whom rifles were issued by the British authorities will form part and parcel of the Jewish armed forces. The Jews internally may decide that it is administratively more convenient to have a separate unit of the municipal police. They may reduce it to 100; they may raise it to 600. They will be completely free to do what they like, and the main factor of security will be such Jewish armed forces as the Jewish community of Jerusalem possesses or may possess through the influx of reinforcements from outside.

Coming to the questions with regard to the Old City, I think that there I have practically nothing to add to what we have already said on this subject. We concluded a certain chapter of the discussion yesterday, and I now await confirmation or otherwise from my people in Palestine. I hope it will be a confirmation, but I assume it will be a confirmation in which certain terms will be indicated, and it is definitely envisaged in the agreement of yesterday under point 4 that the terms must be mutually agreed upon. Am I correct in my statement about point 4?

PRESIDENT: Perhaps, before I answer, Mr. Shertok wishes to complete his statement in reply.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): With regard to the possibility of co-operation between the Jewish and the Arab committees, I personally have very serious doubts whether that would prove feasible under conditions of open warfare throughout the bulk of Jerusalem's area, but

I should not undertake to commit myself on the point before I inquire of Jerusalem and, therefore, I must beg for a notice with regard to that question so that I would give a reply when I have heard from my people in Palestine.

PRESIDENT: Does that answer satisfy Mr. Fletcher-Cooke?

Mr. FLETCHER-COOKE (United Kingdom): The point we were trying to make was that the truce to which agreement was reached yesterday provides merely for a cessation of hostilities, a cessation of violence. It does not provide obviously for actual protection of property and security to persons which is the normal feature of civilized life. We want to make sure that in the Old City, although there is a truce whereby violence has ceased and there is no shooting, in addition arrangements will be made by the local communities as far as possible to insure that property and life are protected.

PRESIDENT: Exactly. And, as I understand the answers, Mr. Hussein has said, "Yes." The answer was, "We will co-operate in setting up the operation of the force which you mentioned." I believe I am correct; am I not, Mr. Hussein?

JAMAL Bey HUSSEINI (Arab High Committee): Within the walls of Jerusalem?

PRESIDENT: Yes.

JAMAL Bey HUSSEINI (Arab High Committee): We will guarantee that no aggression or molestation in any way will be conducted on our side against the Jews within the walls of the City.

PRESIDENT: I understand from Mr. Shertok that he at present lacks the authority to give a definite answer, but that he will communicate with Palestine with the hope that such an arrangement can be effected.

Am I correct, Mr. Shertok?

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): I said that with regard to the first question, the guarantee of refraining from any attack on the Holy Places or on the Old City of Jerusalem. I said that that is covered by the terms of our agreement of yesterday, to which terms I expect now confirmation with more detailed terms connected with the cease-fire or truce arrangement.

With regard to the second question as to whether the two community committees in the Old Jerusalem would be able to co-operate or coalesce, I can give no answer at all before I have heard from my people in Jerusalem.

PRESIDENT: But I understand that Mr. Shertok will communicate with them, and I hope that a favourable reply will be sent back.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): I do not subscribe to the separation that Jamal Bey Hussein has been insisting upon all the time between the Jews in Old Jerusalem and the Jews outside the walls. They are all one community, and, as to the fact that the Jews in Old Jerusalem had been there for a long time, that is perfectly true with regard to many Jews in Jerusalem and, for that matter, all Jews came to Palestine. Some of them have lived there since time immemorial, but many of them came to Palestine sixty years ago, forty years ago, thirty years ago, twenty years ago, ten years ago, five years ago, and yesterday, so that there is no such separation. Therefore, if there is open warfare outside the walls between the Jews and the Arabs, that may make it quite impossible for Jews inside the walls to co-operate with the Arabs. That is a very serious obstacle and should be very clearly understood.

PRESIDENT: Does Mr. Fletcher-Cooke want any further clarification, or does he desire to ask any further questions with respect to this? I still have not answered Mr. Shertok's question, but I should like to avoid it until we can finish this matter.

Mr. FLETCHER-COOKE (United Kingdom): I think that the subject matter that we have been discussing will become clearer when we consider the specific terms of the truce because if, as I understand it now, the specific terms^{which} are likely to be agreed to by both parties cover the

preservation of the Holy Places, apart from merely ceasing firing, then I think it will cover the point.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): That is a most elementary part of any arrangement.

The PRESIDENT: We are all in agreement on that. With regard to the question asked by Mr. Shertok, I think the only reply is in the words of the truce terms -- at least, the general truce agreement which I understood we agreed upon yesterday. If you say now that this is subject to further conditions, I must read the language of Paragraph 4, the actual words of which are that the specific terms of the truce will be elaborated in consultation with the two parties. I think it is clear that the reference is to an elaboration of the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, and not to the imposing of conditions for their acceptance. Now, on the other hand, Mr. Shertok made it clear yesterday that he was not in a position as yet to agree but that he would have to communicate with his people in Palestine, from whom the final word would come.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency): May I give an example, which to me is quite elementary, of what any truce conditions would have to include? Today, the position is that all exits from or entrances to the Old City are guarded and controlled by the Arabs. The position is that the Jewish community inside the walled City is completely cut off from any contact with the Jews outside. That community will not survive one day in a state of complete isolation. It must get its food, it must get its medical supplies, it must be able to send its sick to hospitals outside if necessary. Its working people, if they live there and have their work outside, must be able to proceed to their place of employment. Otherwise, it is not a truce, it is a state of siege and a state of complete strangulation. Therefore, any truce arrangement must include some regulation as to freedom of exit and

and access, and that will be a matter which will have to be elaborated. I should definitely include that as about the most elementary condition of any cease-fire or truce arrangement.

Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq): I am not speaking now about the merits or demerits of the proposal of the French delegation. I understand that we have strayed away from it a little just now and I will make my position clear when we come back to it. There are, however, two points which I should like to raise, arising from the statement made by Mr. Shertok just now. We keep talking of the elementary things and we do not do them. Of course, all of these things are elementary, but our anxiety is to get to a position where we can do something about them. I was struck, and indeed a little surprised, by the statement made by Mr. Shertok just now concerning the three hundred police on the Jewish side inside Jerusalem. There are three hundred Arabs and three hundred Jews in a police force inside Jerusalem. I do not know whether my understanding was correct when I took Mr. Shertok to say that this police force would ultimately be part of Haganah inside the municipal area of Jerusalem and would be used by Haganah when the time came and if there were any necessity. If my understanding is correct, I must say that this is a little surprising. The idea is not to form two armies inside Jerusalem; we might as well proceed to form an Arab army and a Jewish army. The idea is to try to preserve the Holy City, and along that line -- I am sure it is the General Assembly's conception and also the conception of all of us here -- the idea is to form a reasonable police force consisting of equal numbers from both sides to keep order in the Holy City. It is not that we should allow one part of that police force to be absorbed by the army of its own side. I am defending the idea of defending the Holy City, I am not defending the Haganah or the Arab army. I understand that the Haganah has already a very large force inside the municipal boundaries. Of course, it is no use

asking Mr. Shertok how many the Haganah have there, but I understand it is a very big force and surely it does not need three hundred policemen. Would he be prepared to leave out the three hundred Jewish policemen? The Arabs would perhaps be agreeable to leaving out the three hundred Arab policemen and both groups would comprise a police force and not an army.

The second point is the question of what Mr. Shertok called the separation of the Old City from the municipal City. Of course, strictly speaking and indeed practically, he has some right on his side. It is very difficult to separate two sections of a city or a community so sharply. There are however exigencies in war which necessitate that the saving of life and, at the present moment, of the Holy Places, should be given a certain degree of priority. I thought that we had agreed yesterday that if we began by doing something at least about the Old City, considering it as an entity, we could perhaps make a foundation to begin with and at least safeguard the Old City and the Holy Places there. I hope we shall not go back on that position. We have, as I have already stated, made many sacrifices on our side. Jerusalem is a highly strategic position from the military point of view and the Arabs are in greater number in Jerusalem as a whole. The Arabs have really great advantages, but they are ready to forget them in the hope of preserving the Holy City and its property and population. Indeed, they wish to co-operate, as part of the United Nations, in doing something. We have taken, and subject to certain considerations we shall continue to take, a very positive position and we hope our action will be reciprocated on the Jewish side.

The Old City, in my opinion, must be considered as an entity, and let me assure Mr. Shertok that nobody is meditating any slaughter, or any pouncing on the throat of the other side. If that had to happen, there would be nothing to stop it, neither on the Arab side nor on their side. You will probably remember the unfortunate incident of Haifa. We were not

prepared and we could not stop it. In the City of Jerusalem there ought to be good will, or there ought to be a striving towards good will. We are not promising that we shall do the same thing outside Jerusalem, but we are quite sincere in trying to find a basis or a principle according to which both sides can try to preserve the Holy City.

(Here followed a discussion on the time and date of the next meeting)

Mr. GERIG (United States of America): Our discussion this morning has brought out a number of difficult points and has also clarified a number of points and I feel that we could profitably continue the discussion this afternoon.

We should continue to discuss all aspects and issues of this problem. It seems to me very clear now that we, in further considering the details of the French plan, must go on the assumption that a truce of some kind will work out. But on that assumption we still have a good many points. I had a few points which I wanted to raise this morning but it did not seem convenient because of the nature of the trend of the discussion. I should like to put several additional questions to the representative of France in regard to the details of his plan, also on the assumption that there will be a truce.

Of course, if there is not a truce, then we would have to consider again many other and quite different questions.

Therefore, I do not feel that we shall lose time by adjourning until tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT: It has been proposed that the Trusteeship Council meet this afternoon. If there are no objections we shall meet this afternoon at 3:00 p.m.

Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq): I wish to state that I would rather we did not meet this afternoon. There are certain points which we shall have to think over, and there are still the details which are not available to the Trusteeship Council. We are awaiting the details of the plan proposed by the delegation of France. Until we receive these details I cannot give you my position. I hope I would not be asked to put my signature to something about which I do not know and understand.

If the French delegation is given time to formulate the details, and if other representatives are given time to form their opinions, perhaps it would be better to meet tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDENT: There is a difference of opinion as to whether we should meet this afternoon or tomorrow morning. We shall therefore vote on this question.

A vote was taken by show of hands. The result of the vote was four in favour of meeting this afternoon and five in favour of postponing the meeting until tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDENT: The meeting will therefore be held tomorrow morning.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency For Palestine): In that case, may I reply to the representative of Iraq?

The PRESIDENT: Will you limit yourself to four minutes?

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency For Palestine): Yes.

The PRESIDENT: I shall announce in advance that any replies will have to wait until our next meeting tomorrow morning.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency For Palestine): I have first of all two purely factual observations.

The population of Jerusalem today consists of 95,000 Jews and 65,000 non-Jews, being Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs and non-Arab Christians. That is the position. Jews form roughly sixty percent of the City's population. This applies to the whole of Jerusalem, naturally.

My second factual observation is, the three hundred municipal policemen are not inside the old City; they belong to the whole City, on the Jewish as well as on the Arab side.

Coming to the substance of the argument of the representative of Iraq, I must say that we seem to be discussing the problem in two separate contexts. It was the Jewish Agency which advocated here yesterday a truce to extend to the whole of Jerusalem. This conception was opposed by the representative of the Arab Higher Committee. I have not heard the representative of Iraq differ from him.

If there is to be a truce in the whole of Jerusalem, naturally there may be no need at all for any armed force inside the City of Jerusalem as a whole, either on the Jewish side or on the Arab side.

I always refer to the problem of access to the City from outside. That is always a problem. But if the Arab Higher Committee maintains its attitude of opposing any truce for the whole of Jerusalem, then I must envisage a state of war, and then the Jews must make their preparations accordingly. It is then utterly ridiculous to suggest that three hundred men are enough to give protection to the 95,000 Jews of Jerusalem. This is utterly fantastic.

Therefore, let us be clear about what we are discussing: if there is/ or is not a truce in the whole of Jerusalem. If there is not, then there will be war; and if there is war there will be defence on the part of the Jews with all the necessary forces.

The representative of Iraq laid great stress on the preservation and immunity of the Holy Places. I have made it repeatedly clear that, as much as I appreciate the fact that the Wailing Wall is there, it is not enough. We must be in a position to visit it and to worship there. It is inconceivable that a state of things should be created as it is today, namely, that any Christian in Jerusalem, whether he is inside the Old City or outside the Old City, may go to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and worship

there; that any Moslem of Jerusalem may proceed to the Mosque of Omar and worship there; but no Jew can gain access to the Wailing Wall. To call that a truce is a complete distortion of the term. Any truce which contains among its basic terms the preservation of the Holy Places must guarantee freedom and safety of access to men of all religions, to the shrines and Holy Places which these religions respectively hold sacred. That must be quite clear.

The PRESIDENT: The meeting is adjourned and the Trusteeship Council will meet tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock.

The meeting rose.