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Nota de la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad

En el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2680 (2023), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) que le presentara un informe final con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones. Por consiguiente, la Presidencia remite adjunto el informe que le envió el Grupo de Expertos (véase el anexo).

Se ruega reciclar

Anexo

Carta de fecha 4 de marzo de 2024 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)

El Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad tiene el honor de transmitir adjunto, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2680 (2023) del Consejo, el informe final sobre su labor.

El informe adjunto se presentó al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) el 2 de febrero de 2024, y el Comité lo examinó el 21 de febrero de 2024.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la
resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad

Apéndice

Carta de fecha 2 de febrero de 2024 dirigida a la Presidencia del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)

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Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud
de la resolución 1874 (2009)

Resumen

Durante el período que abarca el informe, entre julio de 2023 y enero de 2024, las tensiones militares y políticas en la península de Corea siguieron aumentando.

La República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió haciendo caso omiso de las sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad. Siguió desarrollando armas nucleares y produciendo materiales fisibles, aunque su último ensayo nuclear conocido tuvo lugar en septiembre de 2017. Al parecer, el reactor de agua ligera estaba operativo en el polígono de Yongbyon y continuaron las actividades en el polígono de ensayos nucleares de Punggye-ri. Se lanzaron al menos siete misiles balísticos (un misil balístico intercontinental de tres etapas, un posible misil balístico de alcance intermedio y cinco misiles balísticos de corto alcance). Tras dos intentos fallidos, el país logró poner en órbita un satélite de observación militar utilizando tecnología de misiles balísticos. Añadió un "submarino táctico de ataque nuclear" a su arsenal de misiles (un submarino diésel acondicionado). El Grupo de Expertos siguió investigando las transferencias intangibles de tecnología que podrían contravenir las sanciones.

La República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue contraviniendo las sanciones marítimas. El Grupo examinó información en el sentido de que el país seguía importando productos refinados derivados del petróleo en contravención de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. El presente informe contiene un resumen de los métodos mediante los cuales el país y sus facilitadores siguen eludiendo las sanciones en la zona marítima utilizando combinaciones de métodos de ofuscación.

El comercio sigue recuperándose. El volumen del comercio global registrado en 2023 superó el total correspondiente a 2022, y estuvo acompañado de la reaparición de una gran variedad de bienes de consumo extranjeros, algunos de los cuales podrían clasificarse como artículos de lujo.

El Grupo está investigando informes de Estados Miembros sobre suministros de armas y municiones convencionales por parte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en contravención de las sanciones.

El Grupo está investigando 58 presuntos ciberataques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea contra empresas relacionadas con la criptomoneda entre 2017 y 2023, valorados en unos 3.000 millones de dólares que, al parecer, ayudarán a financiar el desarrollo de armas de destrucción masiva del país. Al parecer, grupos de piratas informáticos subordinados a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento siguieron llevando a cabo un gran número de ciberataques. Entre las tendencias observadas figura el ataque contra compañías de defensa y cadenas de suministro y el creciente uso compartido de infraestructuras y herramientas.

El Grupo investigó denuncias sobre numerosos nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trabajaban en el extranjero y percibían ingresos en contravención de las sanciones, en particular en los sectores de la tecnología de la información, la restauración, la medicina y la construcción.

La República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue accediendo al sistema financiero internacional y realizando operaciones financieras ilícitas en violación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. El Grupo investigó casos de instituciones financieras y representantes del país que presuntamente operaban en el extranjero, empresas conjuntas y entidades cooperativas, y de tráfico ilícito de fauna y flora silvestres.

El Grupo señaló que no cabía duda de que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas y su aplicación habían tenido un efecto no deseado en la situación humanitaria y en algunos aspectos de las operaciones de ayuda, aunque su papel relativo seguía siendo imposible de disociar de muchos otros factores. La mayoría de los observadores continuaron considerando que la situación humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea seguía deteriorándose. Los agentes humanitarios informaron de una serie de obstáculos a la hora de prestar asistencia dentro del país.

El Grupo señala que el contenido del informe refleja las contribuciones de los Estados Miembros y de otras fuentes y acogerá con mucho agrado que se le siga prestando apoyo en este sentido.

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* Las denominaciones, incluidos los nombres geográficos, empleadas en el presente informe y la forma en que aparecen presentados los datos, como las citas, los mapas y la bibliografía, no entrañan, de parte de las Naciones Unidas, juicio alguno sobre el nombre o la condición jurídica de ninguno de los países, territorios, ciudades o zonas citados o de sus autoridades, ni respecto del trazado de sus fronteras o límites, y no cuentan necesariamente con la aprobación o aceptación oficial de las Naciones Unidas.

** Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial oficial.

I. Introducción

1. En el párrafo 2 de su resolución 2680 (2023), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) que presentara al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) un informe final con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones. A no ser que se indique otra cosa, la información que figura en el presente informe se refiere al período que abarca del 29 de julio de 2023 al 26 de enero de 2024[1].

II. Actividades relacionadas con el programa nuclear y el programa de misiles balísticos

Programa nuclear

2. La República Popular Democrática de Corea prosiguió las actividades relacionadas con el desarrollo de armas nucleares y la producción de material nuclear fisible en violación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, aunque no se ha detectado ningún ensayo nuclear desde septiembre de 2017.

Desarrollo de armas nucleares tácticas: Misiles de crucero

3. Siguiendo una pauta establecida tras el octavo Congreso del Partido de los Trabajadores, celebrado en enero de 2021, la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha realizado múltiples pruebas de sistemas vectores nucleares utilizando tecnologías de misiles balísticos durante el período que abarca el informe (véanse los párrs. 20 y 21).

4. Según se informa, el 2 de septiembre el país lanzó dos misiles de crucero como "simulacro de ataque nuclear táctico"[2]. El desarrollo de misiles de crucero desde 2021, así como la exhibición de la supuesta arma nuclear táctica Hwasan-31 en marzo de 2023, ponen de manifiesto los esfuerzos del país por desarrollar un programa de armas nucleares tácticas[3]. Un Estado Miembro declaró que los retos técnicos en lo que respecta a los materiales y la fabricación de un motor de turboventilador [para un misil de crucero] indicaban que era muy probable que se contara con ayuda externa[4].

Polígono de Yongbyon

Reactor de agua ligera

5. El Director General del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (OIEA) declaró el 22 de noviembre que desde mediados de octubre de 2023, se había observado una fuerte salida de agua del sistema de refrigeración del reactor de agua ligera. Estas observaciones coinciden con la puesta en marcha del reactor de agua ligera. Declaró además, el 21 de diciembre, que las observaciones recientes indicaban que esta descarga era de agua tibia ... la descarga de agua tibia indicaba que el reactor había alcanzado un nivel crítico (véase el anexo 1).

6. El Grupo corroboró esta observación. A principios de octubre se empezó a ver una gran descarga de agua cerca del río Kuryong y, desde mediados de octubre, se ha observado una descarga de agua constante. El Grupo ha visto al menos dos puntos de descarga (en el norte y el sur). La reciente descarga constante de agua se detectó en

[1] Todas las tachaduras de texto del presente informe se señalan con recuadros negros o se pixelan para que no se pueda identificar físicamente a las personas.
[2] Rodong Shinmun, 3 de septiembre de 2023.
[3] S/2023/656, párrs. 3 y 4 y anexo 1.
[4] S/2022/132, párrs. 26 a 28 y anexo 28-5.

el punto sur, mientras que, desde julio de 2022, en el punto norte, a menudo se han observado rastros de efluentes en el río Kuryong[5]. Un Estado Miembro consideró que las descargas constantes de agua indicarían que el reactor funcionaba con regularidad.

7. El Director General del OIEA también declaró que el reactor de agua ligera, como cualquier reactor nuclear... podía producir plutonio en su combustible irradiado. Un Estado Miembro estimó que era probable que las operaciones iniciales del reactor de agua ligera fueran esporádicas y otro Estado Miembro estimó que la República Popular Democrática de Corea no tenía ni la experiencia ni los materiales para validar su reactor y quizás tuvieran que hacer frente a fallos habituales". Dada la capacidad potencial del reactor para producir materiales nucleares fisibles adicionales y tritio, que podrían utilizarse para armas nucleares avanzadas, el Grupo se mantiene atento a las actividades pertinentes y al estado operativo del reactor.

8. Varias actividades de construcción continuaron alrededor del reactor de agua ligera y la construcción intensiva de edificios en la zona del extremo sur del reactor ha continuado desde principios de 2023. Sin embargo, se desconoce la finalidad de los edificios (véase el anexo 2).

Figura I
Descarga de agua del reactor de agua ligera



Fuente: Planet Labs, 17 de diciembre de 2023.

Central nuclear experimental de Yongbyon (5 MW(e))

9. El Grupo siguió observando la descarga de agua de refrigeración del reactor, salvo por interrupciones intermitentes entre mediados de septiembre y mediados de octubre, lo que indica que el reactor estuvo apagado durante ese período[6]. También se observaron varias actividades vehiculares cerca del reactor. En diciembre y enero se observó una posible fuga de vapor de la sala de turbinas situada junto al edificio del reactor (véase el anexo 3).

[5] El Grupo informó anteriormente de las descargas intermitentes de agua desde el punto norte (S/2023/171, párr. 8 y anexo 3, y S/2023/656, párr. 6 y anexo 3).

[6] La parada estuvo posiblemente relacionada con el mantenimiento del reactor.

Laboratorio de radioquímica

10. El Grupo observó humo en la chimenea de la central térmica a finales de julio. Debido a las emisiones intermitentes, esto parece estar relacionado con el tratamiento de desechos o las actividades de mantenimiento. El Grupo observó excavaciones a pequeña escala y probables cajas adyacentes al presunto almacén nuclear (finales de junio), así como trabajos de construcción de carreteras y zanjas entre el edificio y la instalación de reprocesamiento vecina (octubre y noviembre). Las imágenes de satélite no mostraron cambios significativos en otro presunto depósito de desechos nucleares que se excavó en marzo, situado al noreste del laboratorio (véase el anexo 4)[7].

Planta de fabricación de varillas de combustible nuclear de Yongbyon

11. El OIEA informó el 22 de noviembre de que había indicios de operaciones en curso de la instalación de enriquecimiento por centrifugación y su anexo[8]. El Grupo también observó, en ocasiones, algunos posibles indicios cerca de los edificios. Durante el período que abarca el informe, el Grupo no observó humo procedente del edificio de producción de dióxido de uranio, lo que indica que en ese edificio no se estaba llevando a cabo la conversión de concentrado de uranio en dióxido de uranio[9]. Un Estado Miembro consideró que se habían almacenado los materiales necesarios y que la renovación no habría afectado al programa de enriquecimiento de uranio (véase el anexo 5).

Mina de uranio y planta de concentración de uranio de Pyongsan

12. Un Estado Miembro estimó que la República Popular Democrática de Corea obtenía suficiente mineral de uranio para apoyar su programa de armas nucleares, pero que necesitaría ampliar su capacidad de extracción de uranio para sostener un programa de energía nuclear. Las imágenes por satélite muestran la continua expansión de las pilas de residuos en una de las minas de uranio y de los desechos sólidos en el depósito de decantación de residuos, lo que indica que la planta está operativa. Se han observado actividades habituales de los vagones en la planta (véase el anexo 6).

Polígono de ensayos de Punggye-ri

13. Las imágenes de satélite captadas entre julio y diciembre mostraban actividades menores en el polígono. En diciembre y enero, se observaron huellas de vehículos alrededor de la zona administrativa y el centro de mando (véase el anexo 7).

Otros emplazamientos

14. El Grupo sigue vigilando las actividades en las inmediaciones de Kangson y la zona de Yongdoktong (véase el anexo 8).

Misiles balísticos

15. La República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió desacatando las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad con el lanzamiento de misiles balísticos (véase el anexo 9) y cohetes portadores de satélites, la puesta en funcionamiento de un presunto submarino lanzamisiles balísticos y la divulgación de estos eventos (véase el anexo 10) y la estandarización de la fabricación de misiles balísticos.

[7] Conocida también como “Old Waste Site”. Véase también S/2023/656, párr. 8 y anexo 5-1.

[8] Véase www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-22-november-2023.

[9] S/2023/656, anexo 6-2.

16. Basándose en observaciones e información de varios Estados Miembros, el Grupo estima que la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha desarrollado su programa de misiles balísticos en los siguientes ámbitos:

a) Eficacia, es decir, fiabilidad, maniobrabilidad y precisión sin reducir el alcance;

b Lanzamientos en frío, es decir, la expulsión de un misil de un tubo al tiempo que se protege su tobera o sus toberas (véanse los anexos 11 y 12);

c) Explosiones en la atmósfera (posiblemente), es decir, la detonación sobre el suelo a una altitud calculada;

d) Fabricación de transportador-erector-lanzador;

e) Capacidad de supervivencia, sustentada por una variedad de plataformas, dispersión geográfica y movilidad;

f) Preparación, dadas las numerosas referencias de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a “maniobras” y al almacenamiento de misiles.

17. La República Popular Democrática de Corea ha desplegado un arsenal de misiles balísticos de corto alcance (MBCA)[10] cada vez más creíble. Sus MBCA de propergol sólido exhibieron un vuelo aerodinámico a altitudes más bajas y maniobras en vuelo[11] mientras entraban en producción en serie.

18. Estos acontecimientos se produjeron tras una exhibición de armamentos y un desfile militar en Pyongyang (véase el anexo 10). Siguen el “plan quinquenal para el desarrollo de la ciencia y el sistema de armas” expuesto por Kim Jong Un en enero de 2021 en el octavo Congreso del Partido de los Trabajadores[12].


19. Además de los misiles balísticos intercontinentales, la República Popular Democrática de Corea declaró que los MBCAs que lanzó, así como el nuevo “submarino táctico de ataque nuclear”, podrían servir como sistemas vectores de ojivas nucleares, haciendo recaer sobre el adversario la responsabilidad de distinguir, y posiblemente confundir, un misil balístico táctico convencional de uno con carga nuclear. El 30 de agosto se dispararon dos MBCAs Hwasong-11Na (Hwasong-11B, KN-24) en una aparente maniobra de ataque nuclear táctico, lo que pone de relieve esta cuestión (véase el anexo 13). Estos hechos sugieren que el país depende de la ambigüedad de las cabezas nucleares para aumentar su capacidad de disuasión.

[10] El Grupo utiliza las siguientes denominaciones: misiles balísticos de corto alcance (MBCA), misiles balísticos de mediano alcance/misiles balísticos de alcance intermedio (MBAI), misiles balísticos intercontinentales y misiles balísticos submarinos. Otras denominaciones conocidas de sistemas de misiles siguen a la principal denominación entre paréntesis, por ejemplo, “Hwasong-11Ga (Hwasong-11A, KN-23)”.

[11] El misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-18 también siguió una trayectoria irregular que podría contrarrestar los primeros cálculos de su destino el 12 de julio, cuando siguió una trayectoria de alcance máximo antes de remontar en una trayectoria elevada.

[12] S/2021/211, párr. 17.

Figura II
Acontecimientos recientes en la República Popular Democrática de Corea relacionados con el uso de tecnología de misiles balísticos



Fuente: el Grupo.

Lanzamientos de misiles y pruebas de motores

20. La República Popular Democrática de Corea realizó un tercer lanzamiento de un misil balístico intercontinental de tres etapas Hwasong-18 en 2023, el 18 de diciembre, en una trayectoria elevada para evitar que las etapas cayeran en aguas de Estados vecinos. Esto demostró su velocidad de combustión sostenida y su posible alcance. Un Estado Miembro informó de que el misil alcanzó un máximo de 6.000 km antes de aterrizar a 1.000 km del punto de lanzamiento, en el mar al este de la península de Corea. El Grupo identificó el lugar de lanzamiento (véanse los anexos 11 y 12). La elección de este emplazamiento puede deberse a la preocupación de que el transportador-erector-lanzador solo pueda circular por una infraestructura viaria ya probada, posiblemente reforzada, en una zona que se considere apta para dar cabida a vehículos de apoyo. El lanzamiento, realizado bajo la autoridad de la Oficina General de Misiles[13], fue una demostración de la relativa movilidad[14] del Hwasong-18 (los misiles balísticos intercontinentales de propelente líquido están circunscritos al aeropuerto internacional de Sunan), su superficie nivelada, su infraestructura de repostaje y almacenamiento, su fiabilidad y su dominio de la separación de etapas. Algunos expertos externos estimaron que el misil medía hasta 23,5 metros de largo y pesaba entre 54 y 61 toneladas, y sugirieron que su aparentemente rápido desarrollo

[13] S/2023/656, párr. 16 y anexo 1.
[14] *Ibid.*, párr. 14.

se debía a la reproducción de algunas características y tecnologías de misiles extranjeros, en particular relacionadas con los lanzamientos en frío[15].

Figura III
Lanzamiento del misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-18, 18 de diciembre de 2023



Fuente: Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Figura IV
Ubicaciones de los lanzamientos del misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-18, 20 km al noreste de Pyongyang




Fuente: Maxar, con anotaciones del Grupo.

21. La República Popular Democrática de Corea lanzó MBCAs el 30 de agosto, el 13 de septiembre y el 17 de diciembre, y posiblemente un misil balístico de alcance intermedio de propergol sólido el 14 de enero (véase el anexo 23).

[15] Véanse el anexo 12 y www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf.

Figura V
Misiles balísticos lanzados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea



Abreviaciones: MBAI, misil balístico de alcance intermedio; MBCA, de corto alcance.

Fuente: el Grupo.

Satélite militar de observación

22. Tras dos lanzamientos fallidos, el 31 de mayo y el 24 de agosto de 2023 (véase el anexo 14), la recién rebautizada Administración Nacional de Tecnología Aeroespacial (anteriormente, Administración Nacional de Desarrollo Aeroespacial) consiguió, poner en órbita sincrónica, el 21 de noviembre, un satélite militar de observación (véase el anexo 15). Antes del lanzamiento del 24 de agosto, la República Popular Democrática de Corea advirtió a la Guardia Costera del Japón, al coordinador de NAVAREA, de la zona de la caída prevista del vehículo de lanzamiento Chollima-1, pero no a la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) [16], a la

[16] Había avisado previamente a la OMI del primer lanzamiento, que tuvo lugar el 30 de mayo de 2023 (véase S/2023/656, párrafo 21).

Organización de Aviación Civil Internacional o a la Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones.

23. El Grupo ha investigado y espera la conclusión de las investigaciones del Gobierno de la República de Corea sobre los restos recuperados del primer lanzamiento fallido.

24. Los datos públicos[17] más recientes muestran que el 26 de enero el satélite Malligyong-1 se encontraba todavía en una órbita estable de 512 km x 488 km. Al 26 de enero, la República Popular Democrática de Corea no había registrado el satélite en la Oficina de Asuntos del Espacio Ultraterrestre de las Naciones Unidas. Kim Jong Un anunció planes para lanzar otros tres satélites en 2024 (véase el anexo 15).

25. El programa espacial de la República Popular Democrática de Corea se inspira en su programa de misiles balísticos, como se ha mostrado en anteriores informes del Grupo[18], y ha demostrado en este caso mediante el uso de propulsión analógica: la primera etapa del cohete portador espacial Chollima-1 del 21 de noviembre estaba propulsada por un motor de doble cámara a combustible líquido similar al RD-250[19] (un motor de tipo "Paektusan" en la clasificación de la República Popular Democrática de Corea), en una combinación de dos motores y cuatro toberas, similar a la primera etapa de un misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-17. La presencia destacada en el lanzamiento de dos figuras clave del programa balístico de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Kim Jong Sik (KPe.066), vicedirector del Departamento de Industria de Municiones (KPe.028)[20], y Chang Chang Ha (KPe.037), jefe de la Oficina General de Misiles, también apunta a un fuerte cruce entre los programas (véase el párr. 30). En cambio, la República Popular Democrática de Corea indicó que Malligyong-1 respaldaría la supuesta capacidad de sus misiles balísticos intercontinentales[21].

[17] Véase www.space-track.org.


[18] Véase, por ejemplo, S/2013/337.

[19] Véase el anexo 16; S/2021/211, párr. 17; y S/2018/171, párrs. 13 y 14.

[20] El Grupo informó sobre la participación del Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones en el proyecto Unha-3 (véase S/2013/337, párr. 37).

[21] Se necesitaría una trayectoria de "energía mínima", con sus condiciones de reentrada en la atmósfera, para comprobarla.

Figura VI
Lanzamiento del Chollima-1 de 21 de noviembre de 2023: el escape de cuatro toberas del motor de combustible líquido en el punto de mira



Fuente: Korean Central Television y Korean Central News Agency.

Figura VII
Cartel oficial del Malligyong-1 sobrevolando los misiles balísticos intercontinentales Hwasong-17 y Hwasong-18.



Fuente: Korean Central News Agency (traducción no oficial: “un ojo que puede ver desde la distancia, un puño fuerte que puede derribar a cualquiera”).

Puesta en servicio de submarinos con misiles balísticos

26. El 6 de septiembre la República Popular Democrática de Corea puso en servicio un submarino rediseñado del astillero Sinpo (conocido también como Pongdae), el Hero Kim Kun Ok 841 (conocido también como 841), derivado de un submarino de la clase Romeo al que se añadió una sección en el centro para alojar diez misiles de lanzamiento vertical. Es el segundo submarino del país diseñado para disparar misiles balísticos, después del Yongung 8.24, visto por primera vez en 2014[22]. Kim Jong Un asistió al acto y denominó el 841 “submarino nuclear táctico”, en referencia a su dotación complementaria de misiles, en lugar de a su propulsión, que es diésel estándar (véase el anexo 17).

[22] S/2012/150, párr. 40.

27. Las capacidades marítimas del 841 aún no se han comprobado mediante pruebas en el mar, y su capacidad para llevar a cabo y resistir el lanzamiento de un misil balístico, bajo el agua o sobre la superficie, sigue siendo hipotética.

28. Kim Jong Un anunció que la República Popular Democrática de Corea tenía la intención de reacondicionar de forma similar toda su flota de submarinos de clase Romeo, convirtiéndolos en otras tantas plataformas de lanzamiento de misiles móviles, como transportadores-erectores-lanzadores, lo que complicaría aún más el rastreo de los puntos de lanzamiento de misiles balísticos. El 841, y los jactanciosos anuncios sobre mejoras de la flota[23] y un programa de submarinos "nucleares" a largo plazo, parecen destinados a mejorar la percepción de las capacidades del país.

Otros acontecimientos relacionados con la tecnología de misiles balísticos

29. Kim Jong Un visitó fábricas dedicadas a la producción de misiles balísticos en agosto y enero. Pidió que se aumentara la producción de transportadores-erectores-lanzadores y de misiles (véanse los anexos 18 a 21). La capacidad de producción de transportadores-erectores-lanzadores del país había mejorado visiblemente (véase el anexo 18). Se podían ver grandes cantidades de carcasas de misiles balísticos de corto alcance de la serie Hwasong-11.

Actividades de los funcionarios clave

30. El Grupo observó la presencia de Ri Pyong Chul (KPi.076), Kim Jong Sik (KPi.066) y Chang Chang Ha (KPi.037) en la Federación de Rusia entre el 13 y el 17 de septiembre como parte de la delegación de Kim Jong Un. Según se informó, Cho Chun Ryong (KPi.038) también formaba parte de la delegación. El Grupo preguntó a la Federación de Rusia sobre este caso de incumplimiento de las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad y está esperando su respuesta.

[23] Sólo dos astilleros son adecuados para la tarea. Un Estado Miembro calcula que tomaría más de 30 años para completarse.

Cuadro 1

Presencia en actos públicos de funcionarios implicados en el programa de misiles balísticos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

	Ri Pyong Chol KPi.076	Pak Jong Chon	Cho Chun Ryong KPi.038	Kim Jong Sik KPi.066	Chang Chang Ha KPi.037
Weaponry Exhibition 26 July 2023	●				
Military parade main stand 27 July 2023	●				
Tour of weapons factories 3 to 12 August 2023		●	●	●	
Tour of naval facilities 3 September 2023			●		
Hero Kim Jung Hok submarine launch 6 September 2023	●	●			
Official visit to the Russian Federation 13 to 16 September 2023	●	●	●	●	●
Chollima-1 SLV launch 21 November 2023				●	●
Visits to the NATA General Control Center 22/24 November 2023				●	
ICBM launch (Hwasong-18) 19 December 2023				●	●
Inspection of TEL factories 5 to 10 January 2024			●	●	●

Abreviaciones: ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile; NATA, National Aerospace Technology Administration; SLV, satellite launch vehicle; TEL, tractor erector launcher.

Fuente: Korean Central News Agency, Agence France-Presse y Federación de Rusia, 24 informes analizados por el Grupo.

Nota: Pak Jong Chon, ex jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército Popular de Corea, fue elegido en diciembre Vicepresidente de la Comisión Militar Central del Partido de los Trabajadores, cargo que ya había ocupado anteriormente.

Adquisiciones

31. El Grupo recibió información de dos Estados Miembros según la cual Choe Chol Min[24], nacional de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, de quien se informó que era representante de la Segunda Academia de Ciencias Naturales (KPe.018), junto con su esposa Choe Un Jong[25], estaban implicados en la adquisición de materiales utilizados en la producción de misiles balísticos en nombre de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Al parecer, el Sr. Choe Chol Min había participado en intentos de compra de equipos de medición inercial, entre otras actividades en 2023. Según se

[24] Choe, Chol Min (최철민); fecha de nacimiento: 3 de abril de 1978; pasaporte núm. 108410050 (fecha de vencimiento: 19 de octubre de 2023).

[25] Choe, Un Jong, también conocida como Ch'oe, U'n-cho'ng; fecha de nacimiento: 10 de mayo de 1978; y pasaportes núms. 108410051 y 654110020 (fecha de vencimiento: 21 de enero de 2019).

informa, las actividades de su esposa incluyeron la coordinación, con asociados de la Segunda Academia de Ciencias Naturales, de al menos un pedido de rodamientos de bolas de doble uso[26]. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

32. El Grupo considera que la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha aumentado su autosuficiencia en la fabricación de equipos y componentes para la producción de misiles balísticos. Expertos externos señalan, en particular, que el país puede moldear carcasas en grandes cantidades y que puede haber alcanzado una fase de fabricación de piezas metálicas complejas para misiles, incluidos impulsores para turbobombas. La República Popular Democrática de Corea es capaz de fabricar fuselajes de misiles y transportadores-erectores-lanzadores (véanse los anexos 18 a 21), gracias también a la maquinaria de conformación por estirado (véase el anexo 19) y posiblemente a los medios de soldadura con gas inerte de tungsteno de alta especialización, como ha señalado un Estado Miembro.

33. El Grupo considera poco probable que la República Popular Democrática de Corea pueda fabricar fibra de carbono de alta calidad[27]. Sin embargo, la fibra de carbono común de grado inferior podría satisfacer la mayoría de las necesidades del país para su actual arsenal de misiles balísticos. Un Estado Miembro afirmó que la República Popular Democrática de Corea probablemente seguiría necesitando importar acero y aluminio especiales.

34. Un Estado Miembro informó al Grupo de que, en 2022, agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea trataron de adquirir en el extranjero polvo de aluminio y aleaciones metálicas para su programa de misiles balísticos, y que, en 2023, la Segunda Academia de Ciencias Naturales (KPe.018) trató de importar varias toneladas de AlMg6, una aleación de aluminio y magnesio, así como planchas de acero inoxidable.

35. En vista del éxito de los lanzamientos de los misiles balísticos intercontinentales Hwasong-18 y de la puesta en funcionamiento de sus más recientes misiles balísticos de corto alcance, la República Popular Democrática de Corea requerirá grandes volúmenes de materiales propulsores sólidos, así como conocimientos técnicos relacionados especialmente con la mezcla, la fundición y el fraguado de propulsores sólidos. No está claro si fabricaría grandes cantidades de polvo de aluminio de alta calidad y perclorato de aluminio, ni cómo y dónde lo haría, aunque se sabe que se han realizado actividades conexas en el amplio complejo industrial de Hamhung[28]. Es probable que siga dependiendo de compras en el extranjero para adquirir el aglutinante polibutadieno terminado en hidroxilo.

36. Es posible que la República Popular Democrática de Corea se centre cada vez más en la precisión de sus misiles balísticos, especialmente de su arsenal de menor alcance, lo que, en combinación con los objetivos de producir un gran número de MBCAs, impulsará la necesidad de disponer de giroscopios, acelerómetros, equipos completos de medición inercial y electrónica de alta calidad adquiridos en el extranjero.

37. El Grupo ha elaborado un esquema de algunos artículos críticos que la República Popular Democrática de Corea necesita para su programa de misiles balísticos, ya sean de fabricación nacional o importados (véase la figura VIII).

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[26] Véase http://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1539 y www.state.gov/designation-of-two-dprk-individuals-supporting-the-dprks-unlawful-weapons-of-mass-destruction-and-missile-programs.


[27] Este material puede utilizarse en carcasas de motores y fuselajes. El mercado de este material se concentra entre los fabricantes conocidos y su precio ha subido mucho en los últimos tiempos, lo que dificulta aún más su adquisición.

[28] S/2019/691, anexo 32.

Figura VIII

Sinopsis de los artículos críticos que necesita la República Popular Democrática de Corea para su programa de misiles balísticos

In bold: identified target of DPRK international procurement between 2018 and 2023.



Abreviaciones: CNC, computer numerical control; EMP, electromagnetic pulse; GNSS, Global Navigation Satellite System; HMX, high melting explosive (also known as octogen); HTPB, hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene; MMH, monomethylhydrazine; RDX, research department explosive (also known as hexogen); SAFF, safing, arming, fuzing and firing; SP, solid-propellant; UDMH, unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine.

[1] El James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies estima que la República Popular Democrática de Corea utiliza procesos de conformación por estirado para moldear los fuselajes metálicos de la gama de MBCAs Hwasong-11/KN23 y del "cohete de gran tamaño de 600 mm"/KN25.

[2] En las visitas de Kim Jong Un, en el fondo, pueden verse herramientas de control numérico por computadora, en particular en la fábrica de tractores de Kanggye y en la fábrica de maquinaria Thaesong, que cuenta con una máquina con una de control numérico por computadora de 5 ejes que, según el James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, es de fabricación extranjera.

Notas: Véase también S/2014/253. Se sabe también que la República Popular Democrática de Corea procura el conocimiento formal y tácito asociado al uso de esos artículos/máquinas.

Fuente: el Grupo; S/2014/253; consultas con grupos de reflexión y Estados Miembros; advertencia emitida por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América en 2020 sobre la adquisición de misiles balísticos por la República Popular Democrática de Corea; los casos de adquisiciones en la figura están en S/2019/691, párr. 80 y anexo 32; S/2020/151, anexo 66; S/2020/840, anexo 6; S/2021/777, párr. 21; y S/2022/132, párrs. 26, 29 y 30.

Recomendaciones

38. **El Grupo recomienda actualizar la designación de la Administración Nacional de Desarrollo Aeroespacial (KPe.029) para reflejar su nuevo nombre: Administración Nacional de Tecnología Aeroespacial.**

39. **El Grupo recomienda la designación, de conformidad con el párrafo 27 de la resolución 2094 (2013) y el párrafo 43 de la resolución 2270 (2016), de la Oficina General de Misiles de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.**

40. **El Grupo recomienda que los Estados Miembros prosigan sus investigaciones sobre las actividades de Choe Chol Min y Choe Un Jong y, si se justifica, apliquen las disposiciones de los párrafos 13 y 14 de la resolución 2270 (2016) del Consejo de Seguridad, según proceda.**

41. **El Grupo alienta a los Estados Miembros a que redoblen sus esfuerzos para impedir el suministro de artículos prohibidos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea y a que tengan en cuenta la información de la figura VIII al hacer el seguimiento de las transacciones que podrían entrar en el ámbito de aplicación de la disposición general del párrafo 27 de la resolución 2270 (2016) del Consejo de Seguridad.**

Transferencia intangible de tecnología y actividades de las universidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

42. El Grupo sigue investigando las transferencias intangibles de tecnología en los ámbitos de actividad abarcados en el párrafo 11 de la resolución 2321 (2016) del Consejo de Seguridad.

43. Kim Jong Un visitó en septiembre la Universidad Federal del Lejano Oriente en Vladivostok (Federación de Rusia) (véase el anexo 24). A las preguntas del Grupo, la Federación de Rusia respondió que no hay intercambios académicos entre la Universidad Federal del Lejano Oriente y las instituciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y que los únicos estudiantes son hijos de funcionarios consulares que estudian humanidades (véase el anexo 25).

44. Los medios de comunicación de la República Popular Democrática de Corea anunciaron que la Universidad de Ingeniería Mecánica de Pyongyang y la Universidad Interamericana de México habían firmado un acuerdo de amistad y cooperación en México en septiembre (véase el anexo 26). A la pregunta del Grupo, la Universidad respondió que había cancelado el acuerdo en diciembre (véase el anexo 27).

45. En relación con el caso de un investigador de la República Popular Democrática de Corea empleado por un instituto de investigación en Suecia desde 2020[29], las autoridades suecas de migración notificaron al Grupo que el investigador había salido de Suecia (anexo 28).


[29] S/2023/656, párrafo 26 y anexo 26.

III. Sanciones sectoriales y marítimas

Suministro de petróleo refinado[30]

46. A finales de diciembre, dos Estados Miembros habían notificado oficialmente al Comité de un 48 % del volumen máximo anual permitido para 2023, que es de 500.000 barriles de productos refinados del petróleo (véase la figura IX).

Figura IX
Entregas de productos refinados del petróleo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea notificadas oficialmente al Comité, enero a diciembre (número de barriles)



Fuente: el Grupo y www.un.org/securitycouncil/es/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum.

47. Cincuenta y cinco Estados Miembros se dirigieron por escrito al Comité el 21 de noviembre solicitando que se tomaran medidas por haberse infringido el límite máximo de entregas de petróleo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Según el informe, los petroleros registrados en la República Popular Democrática de Corea realizaron 87 entregas de productos refinados del petróleo en los puertos de Nampo (la mayoría de ellos), Hungnam, Chonjin y Songnim entre el 1 de enero y el 15 de septiembre de 2023. Los Estados Miembros estimaban que, en caso de haber estado completamente cargados (el 90 % de su capacidad de peso muerto), los buques implicados habrían entregado 1.523.381 barriles de productos refinados del petróleo antes del 15 de septiembre. Si hubiesen cargado el 60 % de su capacidad de peso muerto, se habrían entregado 1.015.588 barriles de productos refinados del petróleo antes del 15 de septiembre (véase el anexo 29). Dos miembros del Comité no

[30] La información que figura en esta sección y los anexos que la acompañan, incluida información relacionada con los buques, como el pabellón y la propiedad, es pertinente a partir de noviembre o de la fecha en que la información se haya facilitado al Grupo. Es posible que no refleje las actualizaciones del Sistema mundial integrado de información marítima de la OMI ni de otras bases de datos marítimas, que pueden contener información retroactiva introducida posteriormente.

estuvieron de acuerdo con la propuesta de que el Comité tomara medidas, alegando que las conclusiones del informe carecían de pruebas sólidas (véase el anexo 30).

48. De conformidad con la carta, el Grupo examinó el análisis de los Estados Miembros (véase el anexo 31). El Grupo señala también que actualmente no puede distinguir entre entregas lícitas de productos refinados del petróleo notificadas al Comité y entregas ilícitas. Es posible que algunas de las 87 entregas registradas en esa carta hayan sido comunicadas al Comité.

Actividades marítimas ilícitas

49. La República Popular Democrática de Corea y sus facilitadores siguen utilizando una combinación de métodos de ofuscación para eludir las sanciones. El uso de embarcaciones costeras más pequeñas no numeradas por la OMI para transferir cargamentos de petróleo entre petroleros ha aumentado considerablemente la dificultad de rastrear e identificar la cadena de suministro de petróleo de buque a buque.

50. Los petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguen pasando petróleo refinado de contrabando (véase el anexo 29). En las bases de datos marítimas también consta que algunos de esos petroleros están navegando más al sur que en años anteriores. Por ejemplo, el Grupo siguió al petrolero designado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea *Chon Ma San* (OMI: 8660313), que navegaba como Chong Du San, en tránsito hacia el sur a través del mar de China oriental casi una vez al mes entre marzo y octubre, algo poco habitual para los petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, antes de que se perdiera la transmisión del sistema de identificación automática en el estrecho de Taiwán (véase el anexo 32). Dada la documentación anterior del Grupo sobre las actividades del *Chon Ma San* de transferencias de buque a buque, es muy probable que el buque estuviera navegando para cargar petróleo ilícito. Se informó de que el *Chon Ma San* entregó cargamentos de petróleo en el puerto de Nampo en cuatro ocasiones en 2023 (véase el anexo 29).

51. Según un Estado Miembro, entre abril y septiembre de 2023, los petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que transitaban hacia el sur, en su mayoría en el estrecho de Taiwán (véase el cuadro 2, resaltado en amarillo), lo hacían con una frecuencia cada vez mayor, de cuatro a cinco veces al mes en lugar de entre ninguno y cinco tránsitos al mes, como en los seis meses anteriores. El Grupo considera que esto podría indicar un cambio en las pautas comerciales de los petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que viajan más lejos para recibir cargamentos de petróleo, dado el número cada vez menor de antiguos buques de entrega directa en el extranjero[31] de una flota mayor que la que el Grupo informó por primera vez en 2020[32]. *Unica* (OMI: 8514306) y *New Konk* (OMI: 9036387), los dos buques de entrega directa en el extranjero que han seguido apoyando las operaciones de aprovisionamiento ilícito de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, han sido declarados no operativos por un Estado Miembro durante un período en el segundo y el tercer trimestre de 2023, posiblemente debido a problemas de motor.

[31] Este término se utiliza para describir a los petroleros no pertenecientes a la República Popular Democrática de Corea que entregaban petróleo refinado en los puertos del país antes de la pandemia de COVID-19.

[32] S/2020/151, párrs. 10 a 27.

Cuadro 2

Buques petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en tránsito al sur de 32N, 1 de abril al 15 de septiembre

DPRK tankers south of 32N					
April	**May**	**June**	**July**	**August**	**September**
CHON MA SAN	CHIL BO SAN	CHIL BO SAN	CHOL BONG SAN 1	WO SHUN	RON PHUNG
UN HUNG 8	HAI JUN (ASABONG)	CHON MA SAN	NAM DAE BONG	SIN PHYONG 2	AN SAN 1
WO SHUN	SONG WON	CHOL BONG SAN 1	UN HUNG 8 (YUN HONG 8)	CHOL BONG SAN 1	CHIL BO SAN
CHOL BONG SAN 1	CHON MA SAN		WO SHUN	SAM MA	UN HUNG 8 (YUN HONG 8)
CHIL BO SAN	SIN PHYONG 11			RON PHUNG	
HAI JUN (ASABONG)				SIN PYONG 5	

Fuente: Estado Miembro.


52. Tanto *Unica* como *New Konk* han seguido circulando con identificadores falsificados, sobre los que se informó anteriormente. En el anexo 33 se describen otros buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que utilizaban identificadores falsificados o identificadores anteriores.

53. Además de seguir importando ilícitamente petróleo refinado, la República Popular Democrática de Corea también ha seguido importando otros artículos ilícitos por vía marítima. El Grupo ha seguido investigando la exportación marítima de carbón originario de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase S/2023/656, párrs. 72 a 74) y otras mercancías. La República Popular Democrática de Corea ha seguido mejorando su flota mediante la adquisición de más buques extranjeros, cuya venta al país (como buques usados y nuevos) está prohibida.

Aguas afectadas


54. Las zonas de transferencia ilícita de buque a buque en 2023 se mantuvieron en general constantes como en 2022 (véanse las figuras IX y X), con una concentración de actividad en el segundo trimestre de 2023 en la zona de la bahía de Corea. La mayoría de las transferencias de buque a buque se siguen realizando en aguas territoriales. Las transferencias entre buques en 2023 se han concentrado en menor medida en la zona de embalse del mar del Occidental, y en mayor medida más al sur.

Figura X
Zonas de transferencia ilícita de buque a buque de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 2023



Fuente: Estado Miembro.

Figura XI
Zonas de transferencia ilícita de buque a buque de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 2022



Fuente: Estado Miembro.

Métodos de evasión de las sanciones marítimas

55. A lo largo de los años, el Grupo ha observado la evolución de diversas técnicas de evasión utilizadas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea y sus facilitadores para evadir las sanciones.

56. El conocimiento y el seguimiento de esos indicadores, junto con un enfoque basado en los riesgos, contribuirían al cumplimiento y a la lucha contra la evasión de las sanciones. A continuación se describen los principales métodos de evasión observados por el Grupo en sus investigaciones a lo largo del tiempo.

Manipulación de identificadores y del sistema de identificación automática

57. El Grupo sigue observando buques sospechosos que transmiten identificadores falsificados o incoherentes en el sistema de identificación automática y que comunican destinos falsos. Buques sospechosos de comerciar con mercancías restringidas o prohibidas, y que presentan lagunas en la transmisión del sistema de identificación automática, siguen navegando por aguas en las que suelen producirse actividades ilícitas entre buques. Estos indicadores pueden dar pie a que las partes pertinentes de los sectores público y privado investiguen más a fondo los buques que abanderan, fletan, operan, aseguran, clasifican o financian.

58. Según las plataformas comerciales de bases de datos marítimas, pocos buques no pertenecientes a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, si es que hay alguno, parecen transmitir señales del sistema de identificación automática en aguas del país. Se ha observado que los buques sospechosos dejan de emitir sus señales del sistema de identificación automática mientras navegan hacia la República Popular Democrática de Corea y vuelven a transmitirlas una vez de vuelta en aguas no pertenecientes a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. A fin de ocultar la conexión con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, los cómplices también falsifican la documentación de envío para ocultar el origen o el destino de la carga.

Manipulación de la ubicación

59. Los cómplices han manipulado la localización de sus buques utilizando diversas técnicas cada vez más sofisticadas de suplantación de señales. La suplantación de señales de buques observada por el Grupo consistía en utilizar la identidad de otro buque para transmitir datos de posición falsos con el fin de aparecer en otra ubicación. Más recientemente, los buques sospechosos han utilizado una forma más sofisticada de manipulación de la localización mediante la geofalsificación de sus posiciones, transmitiendo intencionadamente señales falsas del Sistema Mundial de Navegación por Satélite, que hacen que un buque transmita información incorrecta sobre la hora y la ubicación, aparentando así estar en otra ubicación.

Otras medidas para evitar la detección

60. Los buques sospechosos realizan trasbordos de buque a buque en alta mar en la oscuridad (al amanecer o al anochecer) para evitar ser detectados fácilmente. También se sabe que estos buques realizan transferencias de buque a buque durante periodos más cortos, dejan de emitir señales del sistema de identificación automática durante las transferencias, utilizan palabras en clave o bloquean las señales del sistema de identificación automática para encubrir sus actividades.

Falseamiento de la identidad de las embarcaciones

61. Más allá de la manipulación de la identidad digital de un buque, el Grupo ha documentado varios casos de falseamiento complejo de la identidad de las embarcaciones que, en esencia, implican una técnica de intercambio de identidades por la que un buque “limpio”, es decir, que no tiene registro previo de haber realizado actividades sancionadas, cede su identidad digital a un buque “sucio” para que este último pueda seguir evadiendo las sanciones. Para ello, el buque “limpio” se somete a una alteración física y se hace pasar por un buque de nueva construcción para obtener un número IMO distinto con un pretexto falso, navegando así como un buque

diferente. Deja su perfil original del sistema de identificación automática vacante en las bases de datos marítimas para que los buques “sucios” lo adopten.

62. Esta elaborada técnica se utilizó para liberar identidades blanqueadas de antiguos buques de entrega directa que ya no podían navegar con sus identificadores asignados. Dado que esos perfiles vacantes del sistema de identificación automática ya no están vinculados al buque físico real, más de un buque puede utilizar el mismo perfil digital del sistema de identificación automática, lo que complica aún más la identificación del buque.

Camuflaje de buques

63. Sin tener que recurrir a un complejo y laborioso camuflaje de buques, muchos buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y buques sospechosos modifican su aspecto físico, lo que va desde pintar identificadores diferentes sobre los nombres de los buques y los números IMO hasta cambiar la combinación de colores de los buques para que parezcan diferentes.

Cargueros reconfigurados

64. Se sabe que la República Popular Democrática de Corea camufla el tipo de buque reconfigurando ilegalmente algunos de sus cargueros para transportar productos petrolíferos. Estas transferencias de buque a buque entre un carguero y un petrolero se identificarían erróneamente como toma de combustible en lugar de transporte de carga de petróleo (véase el anexo 34).

Abanderamiento

65. Los buques de pabellón extranjero que realizan actividades sancionables han sido registrados como falsamente abanderados (véase el párr. 67) o han enarbolado físicamente un pabellón sin la debida autorización. En otros casos, estos buques han seguido utilizando el pabellón de un país tras ser dados de baja en el registro de buques. También se ha sabido de buques sospechosos que han cambiado de registro de pabellón en rápida sucesión (“*flag-hopping*”) o que han aprovechado la situación de registro provisional del pabellón para llevar a cabo actividades ilícitas.

66. Se sospecha que los buques de interés que enarbolan un pabellón desconocido y realizan actividades comerciales ilícitas están bajo el control de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. En varios casos, estos buques han enarbolado el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, pero su condición de abanderamiento solo se actualizó en una fecha bastante posterior.

Registro fraudulento de buques/registros de buques

67. Entidades, supuestamente autorizadas por la autoridad marítima de un país, han expedido certificaciones fraudulentas de registro de buques. En otros casos, los buques han enarbolado el pabellón de un Estado en el que no existía ningún registro internacional.

Documentación falsificada

68. A fin de ocultar el vínculo con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, los cómplices falsifican la documentación de embarque para encubrir la identidad del buque o encubrir el origen o destino de su carga. La falsificación de documentación abarca desde el uso de documentos totalmente falsificados hasta la falsificación parcial de la documentación o el simple uso de documentación de embarque antigua.

Transbordo de petróleo refinado en etapas múltiples

69. Para complicar las investigaciones sobre la cadena de suministro de petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, los cargamentos de petróleo se transbordan en etapas múltiples utilizando diferentes buques. A fin de hacer más difícil rastrear su cadena de custodia, en algún momento de estos transbordos también se utilizan buques no numerados por la OMI.

Propietarios, operadores y administradores

70. Los agentes cómplices siguen engañando y utilizando compañías navieras, servicios de registro de empresas, entidades y particulares de múltiples jurisdicciones para facilitar las actividades ilícitas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

71. Continúa el uso de empresas pantalla y sociedades ficticias[33], la estratificación de compañías y el uso de múltiples intermediarios.

72. Se ha sabido que los agentes cómplices no presentan a la OMI información actualizada sobre el propietario y la administración. Otras características son las estructuras complejas de propiedad y administración, el uso de empresas pantalla y sociedades ficticias, y la participación de múltiples intermediarios sin vínculos con el propietario real.

73. Es habitual el uso de proveedores de servicios de secretaría corporativa o de agentes registrados como puntos de contacto. En los registros de alta, son recurrentes los correos electrónicos diferentes y listados que parecen ser desechables (no localizables) o listados al correo personal de un empleado.

74. Al rastrear el historial de propiedad y administración de los buques sospechosos, algunos muestran relaciones comerciales, vínculos o direcciones compartidas de secretaría corporativa entre sus propietarios o administradores históricos y actuales. En varios casos, los anteriores administradores tienen vínculos con redes de transporte marítimo relacionadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

75. En algunos casos, las compañías de administración de los buques administran o han administrado otros buques con perfiles de riesgo similares. Los propietarios registrados de los buques pueden estar constituidos en diversas jurisdicciones, pero suelen indicar direcciones operativas en Asia.

76. El cambio de la propiedad registrada de los buques suele producirse antes de que se lleven a cabo las actividades sancionadas.

Adquisición de buques

77. La República Popular Democrática de Corea ha seguido adquiriendo buques, en su mayoría cargueros. El país y sus facilitadores han utilizado las prácticas comerciales de compraventa de buques, que incluyen el uso de intermediarios, corredores y la venta posterior adicional, para ocultar su presencia. El Grupo subraya la importancia de la información facilitada por las jurisdicciones en las que estos buques obtuvieron su último pabellón o en las que residían sus propietarios, antes de que la propiedad fuera transferida a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.


[33] Véanse www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/FATF-Egmont-Concealment-beneficial-ownership.pdf (págs.58 a 60) y www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/FATF-Egmont-Concealment-beneficial-ownership.pdf.

Estadísticas comerciales y cuestiones aduaneras

Análisis de las estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

78. Los datos disponibles[34, 35] muestran que en 2023, el volumen comercial global registrado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea superó el total de 2022, mientras que el volumen comercial de los tres primeros trimestres del año alcanzó cerca del 51 % del volumen comercial total de 2019 (véase la figura XII). El volumen comercial del tercer trimestre de 2023 fue el 76 % del volumen comercial del mismo periodo de 2019, y el 18 6% del de 2022.

Figura XII
Comercio registrado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 2019-2023
(En millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos)




Fuente: Trade Map del Centro de Comercio Internacional, consultado el 1 de enero de 2024.

[34] Las estadísticas comerciales globales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea disponibles al 1 de enero de 2024 abarcan el periodo hasta septiembre de 2023. Estas estadísticas seguirán cambiando a medida que más Estados Miembros comuniquen sus actividades comerciales con la República Popular Democrática de Corea a las plataformas de estadísticas comerciales pertinentes, como el Trade Map del Centro de Comercio Internacional.

[35] El Grupo toma nota de los casos en las cifras comerciales publicadas de códigos de país erróneos (véase el párr. 83).

Figura XIII
Estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, enero a septiembre (mensuales)
(En millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos)



Fuente: Trade Map del Centro de Comercio Internacional, consultado el 1 de enero de 2024.

79. El 98 % del comercio de la República Popular Democrática de Corea fue con China durante los nueve primeros meses de 2023[36]. Según se informa, el comercio con la Federación de Rusia aumentó en otoño de 2023[37] hasta los 28 millones de dólares[38, 39, 40].

80. Las estadísticas no incluyen los bienes importados y exportados ilícitamente por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, como el petróleo refinado, el carbón, entre otros (párrs. 47 y 48).

Seguimiento de las prohibiciones sectoriales

81. El Grupo siguió supervisando las exportaciones e importaciones prohibidas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[41], Los códigos del Sistema Armonizado utilizados a tal efecto figuran en el anexo 38. La información abarca el período comprendido entre abril y septiembre.

[36] En los tres primeros trimestres de 2023, el volumen comercial global de la República Popular Democrática de Corea fue de 1.660 millones de dólares, el volumen comercial con China alcanzó los 1.630 millones de dólares (véase www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korean-trade-with-china-doubles-in-2023-to-highest-since-pandemic).

[37] La Federación de Rusia dejó de publicar sus datos comerciales oficiales en abril de 2022, por lo que el Grupo solicitó la información pertinente a la Federación de Rusia.

[38] Véase www.nknews.org/2023/11/russian-delegation-departs-pyongyang-after-meeting-north-korean-prime-minister.

[39] Véase http://beyondparallel.csis.org/dramatic-increase-in-dprk-russia-border-rail-traffic-after-kim-putin-summit.

[40] S/2023/171, párr. 123, y S/2023/656, párr. 96.

[41] Para consultar las respuestas de los Estados Miembros correspondientes al período del informe anterior, véase el anexo 35.

82. Sobre la base de los registros del Centro de Comercio Internacional de datos comerciales nacionales, algunas mercancías parecían corresponder a categorías sujetas a sanciones. El Grupo preguntó a los 18 Estados Miembros pertinentes acerca de sus operaciones con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluso de los detalles de cualquier solicitud de despacho de aduana rechazada, inspecciones de carga o incautación de mercancías (véase el anexo 36). Cinco de estos Estados Miembros respondieron[42]. Para la investigación del Grupo sobre presuntas importaciones de camiones y tractores, véase el anexo 37.

83. La mayoría de los Estados Miembros que respondieron indicaron que no había actividad comercial registrada con la República Popular Democrática de Corea y que las estadísticas comerciales se debían principalmente al uso erróneo de los códigos de país durante el proceso de declaración en aduana (véase el anexo 39). Un Estado Miembro declaró que los bienes en cuestión estaban exentos por razones humanitarias (véase el anexo 40, OC.359).

Recomendaciones

84. **El Grupo pone de relieve sus recomendaciones anteriores de que:**

a) La Organización Internacional de Normalización y los Estados Miembros tomen medidas adecuadas, incluidas actividades de divulgación dirigidas a las autoridades aduaneras respectivas, para evitar el uso erróneo de los códigos de país;

b) Los Estados Miembros racionalicen sus listas de control de exportaciones e importaciones utilizando como material de apoyo la lista no oficiosa del Grupo de productos básicos prohibidos (véase el anexo 38);

c) Las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros utilicen la lista mencionada para informar a los agentes comerciales de sus respectivas jurisdicciones y para que los utilicen con fines de diligencia debida, especialmente cuando se trate de productos básicos de ese tipo en las proximidades de jurisdicciones sujetas a sanciones;

d) En lo que respecta a los Estados Miembros que necesitan ayuda para comprender y aplicar la prohibición sectorial, que el Comité considere la posibilidad de realizar una labor de información.

Aplicación de la prohibición relativa a los artículos de lujo

85. El aumento del comercio exterior en 2023 (véanse los párrs. 78 y 79) facilitó la reaparición en la República Popular Democrática de Corea de una variedad cada vez mayor de productos extranjeros, algunos de los cuales podrían clasificarse como de lujo (véase la figura XIV).

86. Las estadísticas comerciales de los asociados del país correspondientes a los tres primeros trimestres de 2023[43] (véase el párr. 78) reflejan el aumento de los volúmenes de bienes de consumo importados con los códigos SA 42, 52, 57, 61, 64, 90, 91 y 92 – estos grupos de productos pueden incluir artículos que pueden clasificarse como artículos de lujo[44]. Se sospecha que las zonas de almacenamiento regionales son uno de los canales para esas importaciones[45]. Un grupo de reflexión

[42] Según las estadísticas de que se dispone, 30 Estados Miembros informaron de actividades comerciales con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 18 de los cuales habían incluido el comercio con el país de mercancías de código SA restringido.

[43] Trade Map del Centro de Comercio Internacional.

[44] Véase www.nknews.org/pro y anexo 91.

[45] Véase, por ejemplo, www.nknews.org/pro.

estimó que las importaciones de artículos de lujo de la República Popular Democrática de Corea habían alcanzado los 40,64 millones de dólares en el primer semestre de 2023[46].

Figura XIV
Un mostrador de “artículos de lujo” en la tienda Golden Plaza de Pyongyang, verano de 2023



Fuente: el Grupo.

87. El Grupo vigiló la aparición en la República Popular Democrática de Corea de cantidades considerables de nuevos vehículos de motor extranjeros (véase la figura XV). Un vehículo utilitario deportivo Mercedes-Benz Maybach GLS 600 aparentemente nuevo y un sedán Maybach S650 utilizados por Kim Jong Un y altos funcionarios fueron vistos en noviembre y diciembre, y otro Maybach fue visto por primera vez en la misma época[47]. En noviembre se vieron un vehículo utilitario deportivo Lexus LX (lanzado al mercado en 2022) y dos furgonetas Ford Transit (fabricadas después de 2021)[48]. Nuevos vehículos de lujo, entre otros, de las marcas Mercedes Benz y Lexus, fueron fotografiados en Pyongyang en diciembre[49] (véase el anexo 41). El Grupo solicitó información a los agentes pertinentes.

88. Toyota respondió que el vehículo de la imagen parece ser un Lexus LX600 o un Lexus LX500d (véase la figura XV.D), fabricado después de diciembre de 2021 en el Japón (véase el anexo 43).

[46] Véase http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/contents_view.htm?lang=e&menu_cate=northkorea&id=&board_seq=447742&page=1&board_code=.
[47] Véase www.nknews.org/2023/11/kim-jong-un-appears-to-import-luxury-maybach-lexus-suvs-despite-sanctions.
[48] Véase www.nknews.org/2023/12/kim-jong-un-appears-with-new-ford-vans-in-rare-endorsement-of-american-brand.
[49] Véase www.nknews.org/2023/12/kim-jong-un-appears-to-reward-top-officials-with-luxury-mercedes-cars.

Figura XV
Imágenes de vehículos aparentemente nuevos, noviembre y diciembre

A.




B.



C.



D.



E.



F.



G.



Fuente: Korean Central Television, Korean Central News Agency, NK News y https://m.posts.careerengine.us/p/658d2cc9311dd31682755e0f, con anotaciones de fuentes originales de medios de comunicación.

89. El Grupo investigó un informe publicado en diciembre[50] sobre un presunto intento de pasar de contrabando un vehículo Lexus (por valor de 10 millones de yenes japoneses) a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a través de un tercer país. El concesionario afirmó que el destino final del vehículo era otro tercer país. En respuesta a la solicitud del Grupo, el Japón declaró que “es difícil... proporcionar cualquier información relativa a este caso porque facilitar dicha información podría entorpecer la futura investigación de la Policía” (véase el anexo 42).

90. El Grupo investigó informaciones aparecidas en los medios de comunicación con fotografías de altos funcionarios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea utilizando artículos de marcas de lujo[51], como un bolso Dior (véase la figura XVI). Christian Dior Couture respondió que el bolso “podría ser el bolso “Sac Lady Dior Large cuir de veau cannage ultramatte noir” que se vendió por primera vez en febrero de 2019 (véase el anexo 44) y señaló que no podía confirmar la autenticidad. El Grupo sigue investigando posibles redes de suministro ilegal de artículos de lujo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

[50] Véase https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASRD74HPKRD7OXIE001.html., consultado el 2 de febrero de 2024.

[51] Véase www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230917000117 y www.nknews.org/2023/09/north-koreas-foreign-minister-totes-10k-ostrich-leather-gucci-bag-in-russia.

Figura XVI
Un miembro de la delegación de la República Popular Democrática de Corea con un bolso presuntamente fabricado por Dior, septiembre de 2023



Fuente: Korean Central News Agency y www.thepost.co.nz/a/world-news/350078343/kims-bag-ladies-privileged-set, con anotaciones de fuentes originales de medios de comunicación.

Recomendaciones

91. **El Grupo, teniendo en cuenta el reciente aumento de los transbordos de artículos de lujo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a través de terceros países, recomienda a los Estados Miembros que insten a las entidades que participan en la exportación de artículos de lujo y de marca a que aumenten la vigilancia cuando organicen envíos a la región y a través de zonas de almacenamiento.**

92. **El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que animen a los exportadores de artículos de lujo a incluir una disposición contractual que prohíba el reenvío de mercancías a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.**

93. **El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros consideren la posibilidad de actualizar sus listas de control de las exportaciones para que reflejen sus listas de artículos de lujo prohibidos de forma coherente con los objetivos de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) y 2321 (2016), sin caer en ampliaciones innecesarias a fin de no restringir el suministro de bienes no prohibidos a la población civil ni provocar efectos humanitarios negativos.**

IV. Embargos, personas y entidades designadas y trabajadores en el extranjero

Embargos

Global Communications (Glocom)

94. El Grupo ha investigado a Glocom desde 2017[52]. Un Estado Miembro reafirmó que Glocom seguía vendiendo equipos de telecomunicaciones militares fabricados en la República Popular Democrática de Corea y designó a varios nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea asociados[53]. Al 26 de enero, el sitio web comercial de Glocom (https://glocom-corp.com) seguía operativo. Según informaciones aparecidas en los medios de comunicación[54], la empresa Privacy Protect Business Development, basada en los Estados Unidos, había registrado previamente el dominio[55]. El Grupo todavía no ha recibido respuesta.

Presuntos casos relacionados con armas y material conexo de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

Caso 1

95. El Grupo sigue examinando el caso de Ashot Mkrtychev, ciudadano eslovaco[56]. A las preguntas del Grupo, las autoridades eslovacas respondieron que “no disponen de ninguna información adicional que les permita aclarar mejor las alegaciones... tras la inclusión [de Mkrtychev] en la lista de sanciones de la Oficina de Control de Activos Extranjeros, la cuenta bancaria... fue cancelada... la cuenta tenía un saldo cero y estaba bloqueada para cualquier transacción” (véase el anexo 45).

96. El Grupo toma nota de un comunicado de prensa de un Estado Miembro en el sentido de que el Sr. Mkrtychev[57] supuestamente ocupa puestos clave en tres entidades, entre ellas Versor S.R.O., con sede en Eslovaquia, vinculada a una red de evasión de sanciones que presuntamente apoya transacciones de armas entre la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la Federación de Rusia. El Grupo todavía no ha recibido respuesta de varios Estados Miembros. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Caso 2

97. El Grupo no recibió ninguna información nueva en relación con informes anteriores de Estados Miembros y medios de comunicación sobre presuntas transferencias de armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a la Federación de Rusia por ferrocarril[58].

Caso 3

98. Al parecer, las fuerzas ucranianas utilizaron sistemas de lanzamiento múltiple de cohetes procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea contra las


[52] S/2017/150, párrs. 77,79 y 85.
[53] Véase www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=374121&page=1.
[54] Véase www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-linked-firm-offering-expanded-range-of-radio-hardware-online.
[55] S/2022/132, párr. 137.
[56] S/2023/656, párrs. 91 y 92.
[57] Véase https:///home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1697.
[58] Para la acusación de 2022 de un alto funcionario de un Estado Miembro de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea exportaba municiones a la Federación de Rusia en vagones de ferrocarril, el desmentido de la Federación de Rusia y las conclusiones preliminares de la investigación del Grupo, véanse S/2023/171, párr. 122, y S/2023/656, párr. 96.

fuerzas rusas a finales de junio y julio[59]. El personal militar ucraniano afirmó que los cohetes fueron “incautados” de un barco por un país “amigo” antes de ser entregados a Ucrania, mientras que, posteriormente, un funcionario del Ministerio de Defensa de Ucrania comentó que los cohetes habían sido tomados de las fuerzas rusas (véase el anexo 46). El Grupo todavía no ha recibido respuesta de Ucrania.

Caso 4

99. El 6 de octubre, un Estado Miembro facilitó al Grupo imágenes de satélite de dos buques de pabellón ruso, *Angara* (OMI: 9179842) y *Maria* (anteriormente conocido como *Lev Yashin*) (OMI: 8517839), que transportaban contenedores desde el puerto de Rajin[60] de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a Dunay, un puerto marítimo en el Lejano Oriente ruso, entre el 7 de septiembre y el 1 de octubre (véase el anexo 47). Aunque estas imágenes no revelan el contenido de los contenedores, el Estado Miembro informó de que los contenedores fueron transportados por ferrocarril a un supuesto depósito de municiones en el suroeste de la Federación de Rusia, cerca de Tikhoretsk, unas 180 millas (290 km) de la frontera ucraniana (véase la figura XVII).

Figura XVII
Rutas de transferencia de municiones a la Federación de Rusia



Fuente: Estado Miembro, con anotaciones del Grupo.

[59] Véase www.ft.com/content/96e1f526-ae3d-4cff-bc37-8f9dd7d5975f.
[60] El puerto de Rajin también se conoce como Najin.

100. El 13 de octubre, un alto funcionario de un Estado Miembro declaró: “Nuestra información indica que, en las últimas semanas, la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha entregado a Rusia más de 1.000 contenedores de equipo militar y municiones”[61].

101. El 9 de enero, un segundo Estado Miembro proporcionó más mapas e imágenes que ilustraban la transferencia continua de materiales entre la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la Federación de Rusia entre septiembre y diciembre (véase el anexo 48). El Estado Miembro señaló que, aunque se desconocía el contenido de los contenedores, en publicaciones de militares rusos en los medios sociales se había afirmado la presencia en Ucrania de municiones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[62].

102. El 11 de noviembre, un representante del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la Federación de Rusia negó las acusaciones de los Estados Unidos sobre la importación de armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 49).

103. Según la información disponible, al menos cuatro buques de bandera rusa (*Angara, Maria, Lady R y Maia-1*) fueron observados en imágenes de satélite transportando contenedores entre la Federación de Rusia y la República Popular Democrática de Corea entre finales de agosto y diciembre (véase el cuadro 3). Es posible que al menos otro buque haya estado implicado.

Cuadro 3
Resumen de las características de los buques

Nombre del buque	*Número IMO*	*Tipo*	*Longitud y ancho*	*Señal SIA*
Angara	9179842	Carga rodada	126,850 m x 20 m	Ninguna desde el 10 de agosto (frente a Korsakov)
Maria (anteriormente Lev Yashin)	8517839	Carga general	113 m x 18,9 m	Ninguna desde el 13 de septiembre (frente a Vladivostok)
Lady R	9161003	Carga rodada	121,66 m x 18,7 m	Ninguna del 2 de octubre (frente a Vostochny) al 8 de noviembre (frente a Vladivostok)
Maia 1	9358010	Carga general	138 m x 21 m	Ninguna desde el 24 de octubre (frente a Vostochny)

Fuente: Windward

104. El Grupo espera respuesta a varias preguntas.

105. Los resultados de las investigaciones del Grupo están centrados principalmente en las actividades relacionadas con el *Angara* entre el 1 de agosto y el 30 de noviembre, que se basan en imágenes de satélites comerciales. Para información sobre los movimientos del *Angara*, véase el anexo 50.

[61] Véase https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4254660-white-house-north-korea-provided-russia-military-equipment-munitions.

[62] Varios Estados Miembros, grupos de reflexión y medios de comunicación también informaron sobre esta cuestión. Véase, por ejemplo, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/report-orient-express-north-koreas-clandestine-supply-route-russia, www.nknews.org/pro/major-russian-container-port-tied-to-alleged-north-korea-weapons-trade-imagery y https://beyondparallel.csis.org/activity-at-najin-points-to-continued-dprk-russia-arms-transfers.

106. De conformidad con las bases de datos marítimas, el actual propietario registrado del *Angara* es M Leasing LLC (NIT: 9701173086). En la actualidad, el *Angara* está administrado y operado por: Marine Trans Shipping LLC (NIT: 3025037914) (véase el anexo 51)[63].

107. Según las bases de datos marítimas comerciales, el *Angara* llegó al puerto de Korsakov aproximadamente el 5 de agosto, y su sistema SIA dejó de transmitir su posición el 10 de agosto. Al 26 de enero de 2024 no había reanudado la transmisión (véase el anexo 51).

Escalas del Angara en el puerto de Dunay (bahía de Konyushkov)

108. Según la información que figura en el anexo 47, el 21 de agosto se inició una secuencia de viajes de ida y vuelta entre Dunay y el puerto de Rajin, en la República Popular Democrática de Corea: el *Angara* zarpó de Dunay con unos 250 contenedores de 20 pies y los entregó en Rajin el 25 de agosto. El *Angara* regresó vacío a Dunay el 28 de agosto. El anexo 50 muestra que el puerto era la bahía de Konyushkov, al sur de Dunay (véase la figura XVIII), un puerto utilizado por la marina rusa (véase el anexo 52). La información que figura en el anexo 50 muestras que el *Angara* realizó visitas adicionales a la bahía de Konyushkov y Rajin.

Figura XVIII
Ubicación de Dunay y la bahía de Konyushkov



Fuente: Google Earth Pro, consultado el 6 de agosto de 2024.

[63] *Angara*, M Leasing LLC y Marine Trans Shipping LLC han sido designadas por un Estado Miembro. Un segundo Estado Miembro también ha designado a M Leasing LLC (véase el anexo 51). Algunas fuentes indican que el *Angara* ha transportado armas anteriormente (véase el anexo 51).

Escalas del *Angara* en el puerto de Rajin

109. El puerto tiene tres muelles (figura XIX): el muelle norte (muelle 1) es utilizado por buques que descargan contenedores; el muelle central (muelle 2) sirve para cargar contenedores, y el muelle sur (muelle 3) se utiliza para cargamentos de carbón procedentes de la Federación de Rusia. Una línea de ferrocarril conecta el puerto con Tumangang, en la frontera rusa, 54 km al norte.

Figura XIX
Puerto de Rajin



Fuente: Google Earth Pro, consultado el 6 de enero de 2024.

110. El puerto de Rajin y la línea ferroviaria a Tumangang se modernizaron como parte del proyecto portuario y ferroviario Rajin-Khasan (2008-2013) ejecutado por la Federación de Rusia y la República Popular Democrática de Corea para la exportación de carbón[64]. En el párrafo 16 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad se establece una exención para el transbordo de carbón procedente de la Federación de Rusia a otros países a través del proyecto portuario y ferroviario.

111. Según la información proporcionada por los Estados Miembros (véase el anexo 47), el 11 de septiembre, el *Angara* cargó 300 contenedores en Rajin. Las imágenes disponibles muestran al *Angara* en la bahía de Konyushkov el 12 de septiembre cargado con contenedores y el 14 de septiembre en gran parte descargado (véase el anexo 51). Pese a la pausa en la cobertura entre esas fechas, el Grupo opina que es casi seguro que el *Angara* permaneció allí sobre la base de los cálculos de la velocidad del *Angara* (véase el anexo 51), aunque el Grupo no puede descartar la posibilidad de que entre el 12 y el 14 de septiembre el *Angara* descargara el cargamento en un puerto ruso o en otro lugar cercano.

112. El *Angara* realizó varias visitas a Rajin durante el período que se examina. Además de las visitas registradas por los Estados Miembros en los anexos 47 y 48, una secuencia de imágenes parece mostrar al *Angara* cargando contenedores en la bahía de Konyushkov el 28 de septiembre y descargándolos en el muelle 1 del puerto de Rajin el 2 de octubre (véase el anexo 53).

113. Otra secuencia muestra al *Angara* descargando contenedores en el muelle 1 del puerto de Rajin los días 21 y 22 de octubre, cargando contenedores en el muelle 2

[64] Véase www.railwaygazette.com/infrastructure/north-korea-rail-link-completed/38707.article.


el 23 de octubre y luego descargando y cargando contenedores en la bahía de Konyushkov los días 27, 28 y 29 de octubre (véase el anexo 53).

114. Además del *Angara*, el *Maria* (véanse el cuadro 3 y los anexos 47 y 48) también transportó contenedores marítimos de 20 pies entre el puerto de Rajin y la bahía de Konyushkov durante el período que se examina. Por ejemplo, el *Maria* cargó contenedores en el muelle 2 del puerto de Rajin y los descargó en la bahía de Konyushkov entre el 10 y el 16 de octubre (véase el anexo 54).

115. El Grupo señala que, aunque los contenedores marítimos no suelen transportarse por la red ferroviaria de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, los medios de comunicación informaron de que "los característicos trenes de carga que transportan contenedores marítimos de diversos colores han aparecido por lo menos en cinco lugares distintos del puerto de Rason... desde septiembre"[65].

116. El Grupo analizó las posibles rutas de transporte de contenedores hacia el puerto de Rajin y desde este. Un análisis limitado de las imágenes disponibles muestra que, en comparación con el período anterior, en septiembre empezó a aumentar el tráfico de vagones que transportaban contenedores, cuya parte superior normalmente aparecía en colores en las imágenes, entre el puerto de Rajin y la estación de Rajin al norte (véase la figura XX).

Figura XX
Líneas de ferrocarril cercanas al puerto de Rajin y a la estación de Rajin



Fuente: Google Earth, consultado el 6 de enero de 2024, con anotaciones del Grupo.
Nota: la línea de ferrocarril que va hacia el norte desde el puerto, a través de un túnel, hasta Tumangang se muestra en rojo y la línea que conecta la estación con destinos más al sur aparece en verde. Obsérvese la ubicación de posibles entradas a sitios subterráneos en la zona general del túnel.

[65] Véase www.nknews.org/pro/north-korean-trains-in-alleged-russia-arms-deal-pass-through-key-weapons-hub.

117. A unos 2,5 km al norte de la estación de Rajin, la línea ferroviaria entra en un túnel bajo una montaña (cuya cima ronda los 520 m) y sale a unos 3,8 km por el lado norte de la montaña. Las imágenes de satélite de esta montaña muestran múltiples entradas en forma de L en el lado sur que conducen probablemente a sitios subterráneos (véase la figura XXI y el anexo 55). La existencia de probables sitios subterráneos en forma de L podría indicar que esta zona podría ser de importancia estratégica para la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo sigue investigando.

118. El Grupo espera la respuesta de la Federación de Rusia a sus preguntas.

119. El Grupo ha establecido que, sobre la base del examen de las imágenes de satélite en fechas específicas, el *Angara* cargó y descargó contenedores de 20 pies en la bahía de Konyushkov y el puerto de Rajin. El *Maria* cargó contenedores en Rajin que se descargaron en la bahía de Konyushkov. Estas observaciones constituyen pruebas claras de la transferencia de bienes y materiales entre la Federación de Rusia y la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

120. Los contenedores se transportaban hacia un puerto utilizado por la armada rusa y desde este. Por el momento, el Grupo no puede determinar el contenido de los contenedores. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Caso 5

121. Según un Estado Miembro, un nacional ruso, Pavel Pavlovich Shevelin [66] negoció en Damasco con funcionarios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluido Rim Yong Hyok, descrito como representante de Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID, KPe.001) en la República Árabe Siria [67] en 2022 para facilitar transferencias de armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a la Federación de Rusia, y esta red seguía activa en octubre de 2023. Al parecer, otro nacional ruso, Valeriy Yevgenyevich Chekalov [68], también participó en esta actividad. Se sabía que el Sr. Shevelin y el Sr. Chekalov habían estado afiliados al Grupo Wagner [69]. La Federación de Rusia ha solicitado al Grupo que facilite información más detallada, habida cuenta de que "dicha información es necesaria para llevar a cabo una investigación exhaustiva, aclarar todas las circunstancias, identificar a los sospechosos y organizar un juicio si se determinan motivos suficientes". La República Árabe Siria aún no ha respondido a las preguntas del Grupo. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Caso 6

122. Según informes del Estado y de los medios de comunicación, los militantes de Hamás pueden haber utilizado armas procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea [70] (véase el anexo 56). La República Popular Democrática de Corea ha calificado tales afirmaciones de "rumor infundado y falso" [71]. A las preguntas del Grupo, Israel respondió que los sistemas de armamentos incluían cohetes F-7 procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y que Hamás tenía decenas de sistemas Phoenix de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Israel facilitó las especificaciones técnicas de los sistemas de armas antitanque de la

[66] Fecha de nacimiento: 10 de octubre de 1989; número de pasaporte: 8617230995.
[67] S/2019/171, párr. 92.
[68] Fecha de nacimiento: 10 de enero de 1976; se informa de que la persona falleció.
[69] Véase www.state.gov/imposing-additional-sanctions-on-those-supporting-russias-war-against-ukraine.
[70] Véase www.nknews.org/2023/10/apparent-north-korean-weapons-used-by-hamas-but-dprk-denies.
[71] Véase http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/aa4df265dc7ce03ee512204d1071fd47.kcmsf.

República Popular Democrática de Corea en poder de Hamás (véase el anexo 57). El Grupo también se dirigió por escrito al Estado de Palestina.

Caso 7

123. Los medios de comunicación rusos informaron de que durante su visita oficial a la Federación de Rusia, el 17 de septiembre, Kim Jong Un recibió los regalos del gobernador de Primorskiy krai, Oleg Kozhemyako, entre ellos un conjunto de chalecos antibalas para operaciones de ataque, cinco drones kamikaze, un dron de reconocimiento tipo aeronave Geranium-25 con función de despegue vertical y sistemas de control de drones. Los medios de comunicación también informaron de que Kim Jong Un y el presidente de la Federación de Rusia, Vladimir Putin, intercambiaron rifles[72] como obsequios, y que Kim Jong Un recibió una espada del Ministro de Defensa de la Federación de Rusia, Sergei Shoigu[73]. El Grupo espera la respuesta de la Federación de Rusia a sus preguntas.

Caso 8

124. El Grupo sigue investigando a una compañía de Myanmar, Royal Shune Lei Co. Ltd.[74]. Según un Estado Miembro, una delegación de KOMID de la República Popular Democrática de Corea viajó a Myanmar en octubre de 2022 para facilitar las negociaciones sobre kits de guía de bombas aéreas por valor de millones de dólares con Royal Shune Lei, una entidad de adquisiciones para las fuerzas militares. El Grupo espera una respuesta de Myanmar a sus preguntas.

Caso 9

125. El Grupo sigue investigando la presunta cooperación militar entre Malí y la República Popular Democrática de Corea[75]. Según se informa, An Se Ho, un diplomático destinado en la embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en Guinea[76], actuó como intermediario en un proyecto para construir una fábrica de municiones en Malí en colaboración con un representante de KOMID. Un representante de KOMID visitó Malí en varias ocasiones a finales de 2023 para hablar sobre el proyecto. El Grupo espera las respuestas de Malí y de Guinea a sus preguntas.

Caso 10

126. El Grupo toma nota de la información de los medios de comunicación, según la cual la República Popular Democrática de Corea suministró municiones, proyectiles y cohetes a la Federación de Rusia[77] (véase el anexo 58). El Grupo espera una respuesta de la Federación de Rusia a sus preguntas.

Caso 11

127. El Grupo tomó nota de un informe de la Compañía pública de radiodifusión de Ucrania sobre presuntos restos de misiles de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que se dice que se encontraron en la ciudad de Kharkiv el 2 de enero de 2024[78].

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[72] Véase https://tass.com/politics/1674937.
[73] Véase https://ria.ru/20230919/mech-1897211414.html.
[74] S/2023/171, párr. 124.
[75] S/2023/656, párr. 97.
[76] En coreano 안세호, fecha de nacimiento: 15 de junio de 1976; número de pasaporte: 572110043 (PD).
[77] Véase https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/11/12/north-korea-supplies-russia-with-full-range-of-artillery-ammo-including-gun-and-mortar-shells-rockets.
[78] Véase https://suspilne.media/655506-shoza-na-raketi-z-paradiv-u-pivnicnij-korei-cim-raketa-akou-vdarili-po-harkovu-2-sicna-vidriznaetsa-vid-iskanderu.

128. El Grupo está investigando la información recibida de expertos externos sobre los restos[79]. En respuesta a la consulta del Grupo, Ucrania envió un informe que el Grupo está examinando.

Oficina General de Reconocimiento (KPe.031)[80]

129. El Grupo siguió vigilando e investigando los ciberataques atribuidos a agentes de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea subordinados a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento[81], incluidos Kimsuky, Lazarus Group, Andariel y BlueNoroff[82]. Las principales tareas de estos agentes de ciberamenazas son obtener información de valor para la República Popular Democrática de Corea y generar ingresos ilícitos (véanse los párrs. 180 a 190) para el país. Las metodologías de ataque del país siguen incluyendo la suplantación de identidad dirigida (*spearphishing*), la explotación de vulnerabilidades, la ingeniería social y los abrevaderos (*watering holes*). El Grupo ha detectado varias tendencias en la actividad cibernética maliciosa de la República Popular Democrática de Corea durante 2023, además de los ataques en curso al sector de criptomonedas (véanse los párrs. 188 y 190). En el anexo 59 figura una recopilación de los informes pertinentes sobre ciberseguridad.

Objetivos de la base industrial de defensa

130. El Lazarus Group siguió dirigiendo ataques contra compañías del sector de defensa en todo el mundo (véase la figura XXI). Mediante las intrusiones, los ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea obtienen propiedad intelectual u otro tipo de información, como diseños y planos, que pueden utilizarse para impulsar los programas de armas de destrucción masiva y balísticos del país y venderse para seguir generando ingresos para los programas de armas del país.

[79] Véase el estudio in situ de Conflict Armament Research en https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/3a4e9d713f59426d9d1ea3881abecbf3.


[80] En esta sección, el Grupo adopta un enfoque temático para explicar las principales tendencias de las actividades cibernéticas maliciosas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, a diferencia de los informes anteriores, en los que se enumeraban los casos denunciados por agentes de ciberamenazas. En los anexos 59, 94 y 95 figura una lista de casos.

[81] Según un Estado Miembro, el 90 % de la actividad cibernética maliciosa de la República Popular Democrática de Corea es atribuible a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento. En diciembre de 2023, un Estado Miembro sancionó a Ri Chang Ho, Director de la Oficina General de Reconocimiento. En 2023, el Grupo recomendó la designación de Ri Chang Ho (véase S/2023/171, párrs. 136 y 170). Véase también www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=374538&page=1.

[82] Los nombres utilizados en esta sección para los agentes de ciberamenazas y sus campañas son ampliamente utilizados en el sector de la ciberseguridad.

Figura XXI

Ataques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea dirigidos contra empresas de defensa de los que se ha informado, noviembre de 2022 a enero de 2023




Fuente: www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/microsoft-digital-defense-report-2023.

131. El Lazarus Group comprometió una compañía aeroespacial española [83] obteniendo acceso inicial a la red de la compañía en 2022 a través de una campaña de *spearphishing* en la que los agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea se hicieron pasar por reclutadores en LinkedIn y convencieron al destinatario para que ejecutara programas maliciosos, bajo la forma de una prueba, como parte de un proceso de contratación fraudulento (véase la figura XXII). Según se informó, el Lazarus Group atacó con métodos similares a compañías aeroespaciales en el Reino de los Países Bajos en octubre de 2021 y a una compañía de defensa en Polonia en febrero de 2023[84].

[83] Véase www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company y www.sentinelone.com/labs/comrades-in-arms-north-korea-compromises-sanctioned-russian-missile-engineering-company.

[84] Véanse www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2023/papers/Lazarus-campaigns-and-backdoors-in-2022-2023.pdf y S/2021/211, párr. 126 y nota 107.

Figura XXII
Supuesta intrusión de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en una compañía aeroespacial española



Fuente: www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company.

132. En un informe publicado en octubre de 2023[85] se identificó una campaña en curso del Lazarus Group dirigida a ingenieros nucleares y la industria de defensa, incluidos fabricantes de sistemas de radar, vehículos aéreos no tripulados, vehículos militares, buques, armamentos y compañías marítimas. Al parecer, el Lazarus Group obtuvo acceso a los sistemas manipulando a solicitantes de empleo en medios sociales, como Telegram y WhatsApp, a fin de que abrieran aplicaciones maliciosas para acceder a entrevistas de trabajo falsas.

133. Según se informa, hackers de la República Popular Democrática de Corea instalaron una puerta trasera y robaron datos, incluidos planos de componentes de satélites, de la compañía rusa Sputnix OOO en 2022[86]. A las preguntas del Grupo, la Federación de Rusia respondió: “Se requiere más información para examinar debidamente los presuntos ciberataques de ciberagentes maliciosos basados en la República Popular Democrática de Corea”. Los grupos de ciberagentes ScarCruft y Lazarus Group de la República Popular Democrática de Corea comprometieron el servidor de correo electrónico y la red interna de NPO Mashinostroyenia[87, 88] en intrusiones separadas, probablemente entre finales de 2021 y mayo de 2022. La Federación de Rusia respondió: “No se han encontrado pruebas de ciberataques a la infraestructura informática interna de la organización rusa NPO Mashinostroyenia por parte de un agente de ciberamenazas vinculado a [RGB (KPe.031)] de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, designado por las Naciones Unidas, Lazarus Group, Scarcruft o Kimsuky”.

134. Los agentes de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea llevaron a cabo múltiples intentos de piratería dirigidos a constructores navales de la República de Corea en agosto y septiembre a fin de robar información que pudiera utilizarse para reforzar el poder militar naval de la República Popular Democrática

[85] Véase https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q3-2023/110752.
[86] Véase http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2023/09/07/2023090701108.html.
[87] Véase https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/comrades-in-arms-north-korea-compromises-sanctioned-russian-missile-engineering-company.
[88] НПО МАШИНОСТРОЕНИЕ.

de Corea[89]. Al parecer, los atacantes intentaron acceder a los sistemas de las compañías haciéndose pasar por proveedores de mantenimiento de tecnología de la información o mediante acciones de *spearphishing* (véase el anexo 61). Andariel atacó varias empresas de telecomunicaciones, instituciones de investigación, universidades y compañías del sector de la tecnología de la información, defensa y finanzas de la República de Corea y robó 1,2 TB de información, incluidos datos sensibles sobre los sistemas de armas láser tierra-aire[90] (véanse el párr. 187 y el anexo 62).

Ataques a la cadena de suministro

135. En 2023, varias empresas de ciberseguridad informaron de ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que habían desplegado ataques a la cadena de suministro, dirigidos a empresas como proveedores de software, para obtener acceso a múltiples redes en sectores de interés mediante una intrusión[91]. Los agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea utilizaron múltiples vectores de ataque, incluso *spearphishing*, el "envenenamiento" de repositorios públicos de código abierto y la manipulación de perfiles en plataformas de sectores específicos[92]. Dos Estados Miembros emitieron un advertencia conjunta de ciberseguridad titulado "Ciberagentes vinculados al Estado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea dirigen ataques contra la cadena de suministro de software"[93].

136. En julio, el proveedor de software como servicio JumpCloud se vio comprometido por agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea asociados con robos de criptomoneda[94], probablemente a través de una sofisticada campaña de *spearphishing* (véase la figura XXIII)[95]; según una empresa de cadena de bloques, este ataque puede haber dado lugar al menos a dos robos de criptomoneda de la República Popular Democrática de Corea por un valor combinado de 147,5 millones de dólares (véase el anexo 95).

[89] Véanse el anexo 61 y https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231121006800315?section=national/national.

[90] Véanse www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-aligned-tag-71-spoofs-financial-institutions, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/12/103_364423.html, www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231204049700004, https://boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=124405 y https://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2023/12/05/2023120501179.html.

[91] Véase S/2023/656, párr. 113, sobre el compromiso de la cadena de suministro 3CX en marzo de 2023.


[92] Véase https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/how-north-korea-is-compromising-supply-chains-df1532b29a49.

[93] Para la advertencia conjunta de ciberseguridad de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y del Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte de 23 de noviembre de 2023, véase el anexo 60.

[94] UNC4899, que, según se informa, se solapa con Lazarus Group y Kimsuky.

[95] Véase www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-supply-chain.

Figura XXIII
Diagrama de un supuesto ataque a JumpCloud



Fuente: www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-supply-chain.

137. El Lazarus Group y Andariel aprovecharon una vulnerabilidad de la ejecución de código a distancia (CVE-2023-42793) que afectaba al servidor JetBrains TeamCity, una aplicación utilizada para el desarrollo de software[96, 97]. Aunque, al parecer, los dos grupos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea estaban aprovechando la misma vulnerabilidad, utilizaron diferentes conjuntos de herramientas y técnicas tras el éxito del ataque.


138. El Lazarus Group llevó a cabo un ataque a la cadena de suministro que implicaba una variante maliciosa de una aplicación desarrollada por CyberLink Corp., en la que se insertaba código malicioso en un instalador de aplicaciones legítimo de CyberLink, alojado en la infraestructura legítima de CyberLink y firmado mediante un certificado legítimo de CyberLink, comprometiendo más de 100 dispositivos en múltiples jurisdicciones[98].

139. En lo que respecta a los repositorios de códigos, Una compañía de ciberseguridad puso al descubierto una campaña de la cadena de suministro del Lazarus Group ejecutada mediante la introducción de decenas de paquetes maliciosos Python en un repositorio de software Python de código abierto, que sirvió como punto de distribución de programas maliciosos[99]. Al parecer, los paquetes imitaban herramientas populares de Python de código abierto mediante *typosquatting*[100] o pretendían ofrecer nuevas herramientas con la funcionalidad deseada junto con componentes maliciosos ocultos. Varios informes en 2023[101] señalaban de forma

[96] Véase www.sonarsource.com/blog/teamcity-vulnerability.
[97] Véase www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability.
[98] Véase www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/11/22/diamond-sleet-supply-chain-compromise-distributes-a-modified-cyberlink-installer.
[99] Véase www.reversinglabs.com/blog/vmconnect-supply-chain-campaign-continues y www.reversinglabs.com/blog/vmconnect-malicious-pypi-packages-imitate-popular-open-source-modules.
[100] Al dar a los paquetes maliciosos nombres, descripciones y funciones muy parecidos a los de los paquetes legítimos de código abierto, los atacantes esperan que los programadores instalen inadvertidamente el paquete malicioso.
[101] Véanse https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/f5YE12w3x3wad5EO0EB53Q,https://blog.phylum.io/junes-sophisticated-npm-attack-attributed-to-north-korea, https://blog.phylum.io/crypto-themed-npm-packages-found-delivering-stealthy-malware, https://blog.phylum.io/update-to-novembers-crypto-

similar que el Lazarus Group probablemente había publicado múltiples paquetes maliciosos en un repositorio para el lenguaje de programación JavaScript, administrador de paquetes npm (véanse los anexos 59, 94 y 95). En otro informe[102] se puso al descubierto una campaña en la que agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea se hacían pasar por empleadores para atraer a programadores informáticos, muchos de ellos vinculados al sector de criptomonedas, para que instalaran programas maliciosos alojados en un repositorio de GitHub a través de un proceso de entrevistas de trabajo (véanse la figura XXIV y el párr. 132).

Figura XXIV
Supuesta cadena de ataques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea dirigidos a programadores informáticos



Fuente: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters.

Infraestructura y herramientas compartidas


140. Una compañía de ciberseguridad informó[103] de un creciente solapamiento entre los grupos de ciberamenazas subordinados a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento, que cada vez colaboran más y comparten infraestructuras para llevar a cabo operaciones conjuntas (véase la figura XXV). La compañía señala que “este enfoque flexible de la distribución de funciones hace que sea difícil para los defensores rastrear, atribuir y frustrar las actividades maliciosas, al tiempo que hace posible que este adversario, ahora colaborativo, se mueva sigilosamente con mayor rapidez y adaptabilidad”.

themed-npm-attack y https://github.blog/2023-07-18-security-alert-social-engineering-campaign-targets-technology-industry-employees/#domains.

[102] Véase https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/how-north-korea-is-compromising-supply-chains-df1532b29a49.

[103] https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023.

Figura XXV
Supuesta estructura evaluada de los ciberprogramas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea



Fuente: www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023.

141. Una compañía de ciberseguridad descubrió que la infraestructura utilizada en un ataque de ScarCruft contra la compañía de misiles rusa NPO Mashinostroyenia (véase el párr. 133) también había sido utilizada por otros ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluido Kimsuky [104]. Al parecer, los agentes de Andariel utilizaron en 2023 determinadas infraestructuras para la sustracción de materiales de investigación y desarrollo farmacéutico y de armamento;

[104] Véase www.sentinelone.com/labs/comrades-in-arms-north-korea-compromises-sanctioned-russian-missile-engineering-company.

esta misma infraestructura fue utilizada por Kimsuky en 2020 para el espionaje nuclear y médico relacionado con la enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19)[105].

Métodos e infraestructura de desarrollo de programas maliciosos

142. Los ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea también utilizan herramientas de código abierto y desarrollan programas maliciosos, incluidos troyanos de acceso a distancia (RATs), con tecnologías poco comunes como QtFramework, PowerBasic y DLang. Algunos ejemplos son:

a) El Lazarus Group ha empleado al menos tres nuevas familias de programas maliciosos basadas en DLang, incluyendo dos RATs, uno de los cuales utilizaba bots y canales de Telegram para el mando y el control[106]. Según se informa, el Lazarus Group ha utilizado estas familias de programas maliciosos para atacar a empresas globales, como compañías manufactureras, agrícolas y de seguridad física. La compañía consideró que era probable que el uso de Telegram evadiera la detección empleando servicios legítimos como canal de comunicaciones de mando y control.

b) El Lazarus Group utiliza cada vez más herramientas y marcos de código abierto en la fase inicial de acceso de sus ataques, mientras que antes recurría a implantes personalizados[107]. Este cambio hace posible que los atacantes eviten ser identificados y que no se activen alertas tempranas[108].

Ataques dirigidos a países vecinos

143. Algunas compañías de ciberseguridad y varios Estados Miembros han observado que agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea dirigen ataques contra organismos gubernamentales, compañías y particulares de China y la Federación de Rusia (véanse también los párrafos 133 y 141). Por ejemplo:

a) En el primer semestre de 2023, el Lazarus Group ocupó el séptimo lugar en ataques dirigidos a China, centrándose en particular en los sectores gubernamental y financiero, y controló el 6 % de las direcciones IP chinas y el 9 % de los servidores de mando y control chinos[109]. Kimsuky ocupó el noveno lugar en ataques dirigidos a China, centrándose en los sectores del Gobierno, los medios de comunicación, la educación y las finanzas, y controló el 3 % de las direcciones IP chinas y el 4 % de los servidores de mando y control chinos;

b) El Lazarus Group está “muy activo en la Federación de Rusia” y “todavía [tiene] acceso a varios sistemas rusos”[110].

Aplicaciones móviles

144. Kimsuky sigue creando aplicaciones móviles Android maliciosas disfrazadas de aplicaciones Android legítimas, entre ellas un popular servicio de comercio electrónico, complemento de seguridad Google Authenticator, un programa antivirus y una aplicación de servicios de pago, con el fin de robar información de los dispositivos infectados[111]. Las aplicaciones falsas tienen, al parecer, el mismo icono, características y tamaño que las aplicaciones legítimas. Es probable que las

[105] Véase www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023.
[106] Véase https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lazarus_new_rats_dlang_and_telegram.
[107] Véase https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lazarus-collectionrat.
[108] Véase https://therecord.media/lazarus-new-malware-manageengine-open-source.
[109] Véase https://ti.qianxin.com/uploads/2023/07/20/fcd50f2540db9ca6fb91b192c0fe2a4c.pdf.
[110] Véase https://rt-solar.ru/events/news/3851.
[111] Véase https://www.nis.go.kr:4016/resources/synap/skin/doc.html?fn=NIS_FILE_1698304158145 y https://medium.com/s2wblog/fastviewer-variant-merged-with-fastspy-and-disguised-as-a-legitimate-mobile-application-f3004588f95c.

aplicaciones maliciosas se distribuyeran mediante *spearphishing* o la suplantación de identidad por SMS (*smishing*) (para más información, véase el anexo 59.1).

Inteligencia artificial

145. Según una compañía cibernética, Kimsuky ha mostrado interés en utilizar inteligencia artificial generativa, incluidos grandes modelos lingüísticos, potencialmente para codificar o redactar correos electrónicos de phishing. Se ha observado a Kimsuky utilizando ChatGPT. Un Estado Miembro informó[112] de que se ha observado a ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea intentando utilizar modelos de inteligencia artificial para ayudar a acelerar la escritura de programas maliciosos y encontrar sistemas que explotar.

Ataque contra un miembro del Grupo de Expertos

146. Ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, probablemente Kimsuky, habrían sido los responsables de atacar la dirección de correo electrónico privada de un miembro del Grupo mediante ataques persistentes de *spearphishing* (véase la figura XXVI)[113, 114]. El Grupo reitera su opinión de que tales ataques contra el Grupo y el Comité equivalen a una evasión de las sanciones[115].

[112] Véase https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231019000600315?input=tw.


[113] Véanse también S/2020/151, párrs. 117 y 118, y S/2018/171, párr. 5.


[114] Véase https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231121006800315?section=national/national. Véase también S/2023/656, anexo 63.

[115] S/2020/151, párr. 117.

Figura XXVI

Selección de mensajes de *spearphishing* recibidos por un miembro del Grupo de Expertos





Fuente: El Grupo.

Mansudae Art Studio (KPe.050)[116]

147. El Grupo está investigando dos museos de un tercer país que organizaron exposiciones de artistas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en septiembre y octubre. Entre los artistas participantes, al menos dos habían estado anteriormente asociados con el Mansudae Art Studio.

Trabajadores en el extranjero

148. El Grupo continuó las investigaciones sobre los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea obtienen ingresos en el extranjero ("trabajadores en el extranjero"), en contravención del párrafo 8 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad.

149. Según un Estado Miembro, más de 100.000 trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguen trabajando en el extranjero generando ingresos para la República Popular Democrática de Corea, ubicados en unos 40 países y trabajando en diversos ámbitos, como confecciones, construcción, medicina,

[116] Conocido también como Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies.

tecnología de la información y servicio alimentarios. Un segundo Estado Miembro estimó que los trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero distintos de los de trabajadores de tecnología de la información generan ingresos anuales de unos 500 millones de dólares. Según el primer Estado Miembro, estos trabajadores son enviados inicialmente con visados de estudiante o turista; algunos utilizan nacionalidades y documentos de identidad falsos. Según los informes, la gran mayoría trabaja en dos países. El Estado Miembro afirmó que, una vez que se reabra la frontera, se espera que la República Popular Democrática de Corea envíe al extranjero a un gran número de trabajadores adicionales y ha firmado contratos para enviar al extranjero a 400.000 trabajadores.

150. Dada la reapertura parcial de la frontera con la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2023, el Grupo se ha comunicado por escrito con varios Estados Miembros en relación con sus esfuerzos por repatriar a los trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, así como sobre cuestiones conexas, como la inspección de todos los cargamentos. Un Estado Miembro informó de la repatriación, en febrero de 2023, de seis trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que habían sido encontrados escondidos en la bodega de un buque pesquero; los trabajadores no figuraban en la documentación pertinente. Para la respuesta de la Federación de Rusia, véase el anexo 74. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Trabajadores de tecnología de la información

151. Según algunos Estados Miembros, grupos de reflexión y compañías de ciberseguridad, trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguen operando en el extranjero, generando importantes ingresos para el país[117]. Dos Estados Miembros publicaron información adicional sobre los indicadores de alerta de posibles actividades de trabajadores de tecnología de la información y las medidas de diligencia debida que podían adoptar las empresas (véase el anexo 63). Al mismo tiempo, un Estado Miembro también se apoderó de 17 dominios web[118] utilizados por trabajadores de tecnología de la información para "defraudar ... a empresas, evadir sanciones y financiar el desarrollo del programa de armamentos del Gobierno de la República Popular Democrática de Corea"; los trabajadores de tecnología de la información "canalizaban" sus ingresos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a través de servicios de pago en línea y cuentas bancarias en terceros países[119]. Según un Estado Miembro, los agentes de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea también generan ingresos mediante trabajos de tecnología de la información.

152. Un Estado Miembro informó de que los trabajadores de tecnología de la información en el extranjero ganan entre 15.000 y 60.000 dólares al mes, mientras que un antiguo trabajador de tecnología de la información[120] informó de que se espera que todos los trabajadores de tecnología de la información ganen al menos 100.000 dólares al año, a menudo manteniendo cada uno varios puestos a tiempo completo a más largo plazo[121] complementados con trabajos independientes. A los trabajadores

[117] Según un antiguo trabajador de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, estos trabajadores utilizan una identidad de falsa de estudiante para obtener visados.

[118] Los trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea diseñaron los dominios para que parecieran los de compañías de servicios de tecnología de la información legítimas basadas en los Estados Unidos.

[119] Véase www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-action-disrupt-illicit-revenue-generation.

[120] Véase www.reuters.com/technology/north-koreans-use-fake-names-scripts-land-remote-it-work-cash-2023-11-21.

[121] De seis meses a varios años.

de tecnología de la información solo se les permite quedarse con un pequeño porcentaje de sus ganancias, según antiguos trabajadores de tecnología de la información[122]. El resto se lo queda su agencia de envío y en muchos casos se utiliza para comprar artículos para la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Un antiguo trabajador de tecnología de la información estimó que había 3.000 trabajadores de tecnología de la información en el extranjero y 1.000 en la República Popular Democrática de Corea[123]. Según un segundo Estado Miembro, este último grupo se encuentra principalmente en Rason, Pyongyang y Shinuiju, pero depende de sus homólogos en el extranjero para establecer cuentas, obtener infraestructura y blanquear sus ganancias. Según estos datos, se calcula que los trabajadores de tecnología de la información generan anualmente entre 250 y 600 millones de dólares para la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

153. El Grupo ha recopilado información sobre tácticas, técnicas y procedimientos recientes de los trabajadores de tecnología de la información (véase el anexo 64).

Trabajadores de restaurantes

154. Según un Estado Miembro, la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue operando restaurantes al menos en cinco países. Al parecer, estos restaurantes generan anualmente 700 millones de dólares en ingresos para la República Popular Democrática de Corea, contratan a trabajadores de ese país, blanquean dinero para el país y a menudo son operados por agentes de la Oficina General de Reconocimiento (KPe.028).

País núm. 1

155. El Grupo recibió información de múltiples fuentes sobre varias decenas de restaurantes que empleaban a trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en China en 2023 (anexos 65, 66 y 69)[124]. Las imágenes de los medios sociales indican que estos restaurantes toman medidas para ocultar sus vínculos con la República Popular Democrática de Corea. A la pregunta del Grupo, China respondió: “China siempre ha aplicado seriamente las disposiciones pertinentes de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas relativas a los trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero. Los permisos de trabajo de los trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en China han expirado todos antes del plazo establecido en la resolución pertinente del Consejo de Seguridad” (véase el anexo 40, OC.385). El Grupo observa que también se utilizan medidas similares en otro Estado Miembro.

País núm. 2

156. La información facilitada por los Estados Miembros y la obtenida por el Grupo indicaba que nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea seguían trabajando en cuatro restaurantes de la República Democrática Popular Lao (véase el cuadro 4). Las fotografías muestran que dos restaurantes (véase el cuadro 4, núms. 1 y 4) utilizan el logotipo del restaurante Sindat BBQ; ambos se han cambiado recientemente de nombre. El restaurante Paektu Hanna (cuadro 4, núm. 2) también

[122] Según un antiguo trabajador de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, el sueldo es una comisión porcentual de los ingresos: los que menos ganan se quedan con el 10 %, mientras que los que más ganan pueden quedarse con el 30 %.

[123] Véase www.reuters.com/technology/north-koreans-use-fake-names-scripts-land-remote-it-work-cash-2023-11-21.

[124] Según la información facilitada por los Estados Miembros en respuesta a la investigación del Grupo Especial, estos restaurantes sirven principalmente cocina norcoreana, aunque algunos también sirven otros tipos de cocina asiática.

parece haber cambiado su logotipo [125]. La República Democrática Popular Lao informó al Grupo en marzo de 2023 de que el restaurante Paektu Hanna era “ahora totalmente propiedad de un ciudadano laosiano y está administrado por este de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos de la República Democrática Popular Lao”[126]. El restaurante Tokyo Sushi & Teppanyaki (véase el cuadro 4, núm. 3) se conocía anteriormente como restaurante Kumkangsan y operaba en otro lugar de Vientián.

Cuadro 4
Restaurantes laosianos en los que, según se informa, nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea seguían trabajando

No.	Location	Restaurant names (Former names)	Address and Coordinates	Information about DPRK workers (As of mid-2023)
1	Vientiane	Sindat BBQ Restaurant (That Luang Pyongyang Restaurant)	XJFJ+9X5, Nongbone Road, Vientiane (17°57'58.3"N 102°37'41.5"E)	At least three DPRK nationals working.
2	Vientiane	Paektu Hanna Restaurant (Paektu Hanna Restaurant of the same name)	Vientiane, Lao PDR (17°57'58.3"N 102°37'41.5"E)	At least six DPRK nationals working. One said that she was from Pyongyang.
3	Vientiane	Tokyo Sushi & Teppanyaki (Kumkangsan Restaurant, Pyongyang Friendship Restaurant)	Landmark Mekong Riverside Hotel WJV8+FRR, Thatkhao Village, Sisattanak District, Vientiane (17°56'38.0"N 102°37'01.8"E)	At least three DPRK nationals working.
4	Vang Vieng	Sindat BBQ Restaurant (Sindat BBQ 2) (Vang Vieng Pyongyang Restaurant)	Vang Vieng (18°55'08.5"N 102°26'55.6"E)	At least two DPRK national working.

Fuente: El Grupo y un Estado Miembro.

157. Según otro Estado Miembro, el nacional de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Kim Son Ho participaba en la administración del restaurante Kumkangsan [127] y del restaurante Big Sister Won’s en Vientián y del restaurante Koryo en Luang Prabang entre 2019 y 2021 (véase el párr. 176). El Grupo aguarda una respuesta de la República Democrática Popular Lao a sus recientes preguntas. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

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158. El Grupo examinó un conjunto no exhaustivo de registros judiciales de la Federación de Rusia entre el 1 de enero de 2021 y el 15 de octubre de 2023, e identificó aproximadamente 250 casos judiciales [128] en los que al menos 20 empleadores rusos contrataron ilegalmente a trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véanse los anexos 75 y 75.1). Según los registros, en al menos cuatro casos, los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea recibieron

[125] S/2022/132, párr. 174 y anexo 82.
[126] S/2023/656, párr. 124.
[127] 금강산식당.
[128] Los casos incluían cargos en virtud del Código de Infracciones Administrativas, el Código Civil, el Código Penal y la Ley Federal sobre el Estatuto Jurídico de los Ciudadanos Extranjeros de la Federación de Rusia.

permisos de trabajo después del 22 de diciembre de 2019[129]. Algunos casos se referían a muertes de trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en obras de construcción. En la mayoría de los casos, se multó al empleador con 125.000 rublos (1.400 dólares) o al trabajador de la República Popular Democrática de Corea con 2.000 rublos (23 dólares), por infringir la ley. Una compañía respondió que no empleaba a ciudadanos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y que se había anulado el procedimiento judicial[130]. El Grupo espera respuestas adicionales a sus preguntas de la Federación de Rusia y de las otras compañías (véase el anexo 79).

159. Según un Estado Miembro, se ha visto a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea trabajando en cuatro restaurantes de la Federación de Rusia (véase el anexo 70). En los registros de empresas de la Federación de Rusia figuran nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea como propietarios o en puestos de gestión en algunos de estos restaurantes, lo que indica que se trata de empresas conjuntas/entidades cooperativas prohibidas (véanse el párr. 171 y el anexo 79). La Federación de Rusia respondió que un restaurante fue liquidado, dos compañías eran propiedad de un ciudadano ruso y una cafetería había sido establecida por un ciudadano ruso. “Desde diciembre de 2019 hasta la actualidad, todas las entidades mencionadas no han celebrado acuerdos laborales con ciudadanos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, no han solicitado permisos de trabajo para ciudadanos norcoreanos y no han solicitado ninguna forma de empresa conjunta. No hay información sobre los ingresos obtenidos por norcoreanos de las actividades de esas entidades” (véase el anexo 71).

160. En lo que respecta a la investigación del Grupo sobre presuntos casos de empleo de trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea por parte de unas 120 empresas conjuntas de la Federación de Rusia y la República Popular Democrática de Corea y compañías de la República Popular Democrática de Corea registradas en la Federación de Rusia, véase el párrafo 171.

Trabajadores de la construcción

161. Según un informe de los medios de comunicación[131] y la información obtenida por el Grupo, al menos 58 nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea trabajaban en una compañía de construcción de la República Popular Democrática de Corea con sede en Jabarovsk “First Construction Company (제 1 건설회사)” en 2022. La Federación de Rusia respondió que la compañía no estaba registrada en el país y declaró que “no hay datos sobre la emisión por parte de esta organización de contratos con contratistas rusos para el suministro de trabajadores migrantes procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, ni sobre la apertura de cuentas en bancos rusos. No se expidieron permisos de trabajo a ciudadanos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea para actividades laborales en [la compañía]” (véase el anexo 73).

[129] El 22 de diciembre de 2019 era la fecha límite para que los Estados Miembros repatriaran a los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que obtuvieran ingresos en sus jurisdicciones, de conformidad con la resolución 2397 (2017); se prohibió a los Estados Miembros conceder permisos de trabajo para nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en sus jurisdicciones en relación con la admisión en sus territorios después del 11 de septiembre de 2017, de conformidad con la resolución 2375 (2017).

[130] Véase el anexo 75; al menos en un caso, parece que las actuaciones se anularon por razones de procedimiento.

[131] Véase www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/workershealth-09202023163056.html y el anexo 72.

Recomendaciones

162. **El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que se mantengan vigilantes para comprobar la gestión y la propiedad de las compañías que emplean a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y los posibles esfuerzos de ofuscación.**

163. **El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que establezcan controles de inmigración adecuados, en particular para garantizar que los estudiantes y turistas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea no obtengan ingresos y no superen la duración autorizada de estancia, de conformidad con las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.**

164. **El Grupo recomienda que, a medida que la República Popular Democrática de Corea siga abriendo sus fronteras, los Estados Miembros garanticen la aplicación de las resoluciones pertinentes relativas a los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que obtienen ingresos.**

V. Finanzas

165. El Grupo estima que la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue accediendo al sistema financiero internacional y realizando operaciones financieras ilícitas en violación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

Representantes de bancos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero

166. El Grupo investigó información procedente de varios Estados Miembros sobre 30 representantes de instituciones financieras de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que operaban en tres países, entre ellos Jo Chol Song (KPi.058), Ri Chun Song (KPi.075) y Kim Mun Chol (KPi.060)[132]. Ellos supuestamente representan a 17 bancos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, entre ellos Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047), Korea United Development Bank (KPe.033), Koryo Credit Development Bank (también conocido como Daesong Credit Development Bank, KPe.049), Korea Daesong Bank (KPe.035) y Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KPe.025); algunos banqueros representan a varios bancos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Un país negó la presencia de dichos representantes (véanse los anexos 76 y 77).

167. El Grupo investigó la información procedente de múltiples Estados Miembros relativa a So Myong, representante de Foreign Trade Bank[133], ubicado en Vladivostok. El Sr. So y el Sr. Choi Chon Gon, ciudadano ruso[134], son copropietarios de Epsilon Limited Trade Development, al parecer una empresa conjunta de la Federación de Rusia y la República Popular Democrática de Corea (párr. 171 y anexos 76, 78 y 79). Según un Estado Miembro, Epsilon Limited Trade Development podría ser una empresa pantalla de Foreign Trade Bank[135] Las bases de datos comerciales muestran que la empresa estaba en liquidación el 10 de noviembre de 2023. Al parecer, el Sr. So facilitó transferencias financieras en nombre de bancos y entidades de comercio de armas designados de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluida la Segunda

[132] S/2018/171, párr. 162, y anexo 43.

[133] Conocido también como Semyon Semyonovich; fecha de nacimiento: 2 de marzo de 1978; pasaporte núm. 927320285; NIT de la Federación de Rusia: 254342019464.

[134] Número de cédula de identidad de la Federación de Rusia: 650114643613; S/2021/211, párr. 152 y anexo 89, y S/2023/656, párr. 137.

[135] La Federación de Rusia informó al Grupo en 2019 de que el Foreign Trade Bank había cesado sus operaciones en el país en 2016.

Academia de Ciencias Naturales (KPe.018). Un Estado Miembro designó al Sr. So en junio[136] y un segundo Estado Miembro lo designó en noviembre[137]. La Federación de Rusia devolvió la carta del Grupo afirmando que la información se basaba en sanciones unilaterales que estaban fuera del ámbito de las decisiones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad (véase el anexo 80).

Acceso al sistema financiero internacional

168. El Grupo prosiguió las investigaciones sobre la compañía Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company (Chinyong IT)[138], una compañía de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que, según un Estado Miembro, está subordinada al Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares (KPe.054)[139]. Según el mismo Estado Miembro, Chinyong IT realizó transacciones por valor de más de 50 millones de dólares entre 2017 y 2022 y mantenía decenas de cuentas bancarias en China y la Federación de Rusia para blanquear ingresos ilícitos adquiridos por trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 81). Al parecer, las cuentas pueden estar a nombre de apoderados ajenos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a los que los trabajadores de tecnología de la información de ese país pagan por utilizarlas. Según el mismo Estado Miembro, la compañía china Shenyang GoldenPack Technic Development Co., Ltd. (Shenyang GoldenPack) también blanqueó dinero en nombre de Chinyong IT, realizando transacciones por valor de más de 28 millones de dólares entre 2020 y 2022 para los equipos de Chinyong IT de trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea ubicados en la Federación de Rusia y en la República Democrática Popular Lao, utilizando cuentas bancarias chinas (véase el anexo 82). El Grupo ha identificado otras empresas relacionadas con Shenyang GoldenPack que podrían estar vinculadas a esta actividad (véase el anexo 83). China respondió que “sobre la base de una investigación exhaustiva realizada en relación con la información proporcionada por el Grupo, no encontró pruebas de que las cuentas bancarias pertinentes violaran las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad relativas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea”. La Federación de Rusia respondió que no había encontrado la mayoría de las cuentas ni ninguna prueba que vinculara las cuentas con Chinyong IT (véase el anexo 84). La República Democrática Popular Lao y Shenyang GoldenPack aún no han respondido.

169. El Grupo siguió investigando el Departamento 53 de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (también conocido como Oficina 53), que, según un Estado Miembro, está subordinado al Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares (KPe.054). Se ha informado de que el Departamento 53 ha utilizado cuentas bancarias en China para remitir los ingresos al control del cuartel general del Departamento 53, incluidos fondos obtenidos a través del trabajo con las fuerzas armadas de un tercer país (anexo 85). China respondió “China llevó a cabo una investigación exhaustiva sobre la base de la información proporcionada por el Grupo y no encontró pruebas de que las cuentas bancarias en cuestión violaran las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas relativas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea...” (anexo 40, OC.167).

[136] Véase www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373848&page=1.

[137] Véase https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938.

[138] Conocido también como Jinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company; véase S/2023/656, párrs. 119 a 121 y anexos 69 y 70.

[139] Conocido también como el Ministerio de Defensa y el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional.

Empresas conjuntas, entidades cooperativas y actividades comerciales ilícitas

Empresas conjuntas y entidades cooperativas

170. El Grupo investigó la información de un Estado Miembro, según la cual Green Pine Associated Corporation (KPe.010) pretendía formar una empresa conjunta de tecnología de la información en 2022 con la empresa china Yantai Jinmin Industry and Trade Company (véase el anexo 86), y que el ciudadano chino Zhang Jiashan[140] ayudaba a Green Pine a acceder a servicios bancarios en 2022. China respondió que no había pruebas de que Yantai Jinmin Industry and Trade Company..., así como Li Zhenyu y Zhang Jiashan, hubieran participado en actividades en China que violaran las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad relativas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea" (anexo 40, OC.169).

171. El Grupo investigó los registros de empresas de la Federación de Rusia de 81 empresas que podrían ser empresas conjuntas o entidades cooperativas entre la Federación de Rusia y la República Popular Democrática de Corea, todas ellas propiedad o dirigidas total o parcialmente por nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, así como 42 entidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea registradas en la Federación de Rusia. El Grupo investigó si estas empresas empleaban a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que percibían ingresos. Según los registros de empresas de la Federación de Rusia, en 2023 todas estas empresas estaban en funcionamiento. Tres de ellas parecían estar registradas en propiedades diplomáticas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, y dos parecían haber licitado y ganado anteriormente contratos de suministro con organismos estatales rusos. Según un Estado Miembro, 24 de estas compañías emplean también a un total de más de 5.900 trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véanse los anexos 79 y 87). El Grupo es consciente de la posición legalista de la Federación de Rusia (véase S/2019/171, anexo 74) de que "las compañías que tienen como fundador único a un ciudadano de la República Popular Democrática de Corea... se registran estrictamente como compañías de responsabilidad limitada rusas... convirtiéndolas en personas jurídicas rusas" a las que la Federación de Rusia no considera sujetas al párrafo 18 de la resolución 2375 (2017). En enero de 2024, la Federación de Rusia contestó que "se constató que 82 entidades jurídicas... no operaban realmente" y que "según la legislación civil de la Federación de Rusia, las compañías de responsabilidad limitada no son empresas conjuntas ni organizaciones cooperativas" y, por tanto, no están sujetas a las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad (las respuestas sobre compañías específicas figuran en los anexos 79 y 87). Una persona respondió que era nacional de la República de Corea, no de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

Korean National Insurance Company (KPe.048)

172. El Grupo siguió investigando a Korean National Insurance Company y a sus empresas pantalla o subordinadas Rainbow Intermediaries, Samhae Insurance Corporation y Polestar Insurance Company[141]. Según los informes, los representantes de Korean National Insurance Company operan en el extranjero, en particular en Nigeria, el Pakistán y la Federación de Rusia, a menudo bajo cobertura diplomática en embajadas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véanse el cuadro 5 y el anexo 88). La Federación de Rusia y el Pakistán respondieron que no habían encontrado pruebas de que las personas fueran representantes de Korean National Insurance Company; Nigeria no ha respondido.

[140] Núm. de identificación: 210602196209032030.
[141] S/2023/665, párr. 136.

Cuadro 5
Información sobre presuntos representantes y asociados de Korean National Insurance Company

Name	Suspected Position	Location
Choe Myong Chol	KNIC Representative	Pakistan
Jon Hyon Chol	KNIC Representative	Pakistan
Kim Yong Jin	KNIC Representative	Nigeria
Sin Jun Chol	KNIC Representative	Russian Federation
Mun Mi Hwa	PIC Associate	Likely Nigeria

Abreviaciones: KNIC, Korean National Insurance Company; PIC, Polestar Insurance Company.

Fuente: Estados Miembros y el Grupo.

173. Según un Estado Miembro, el dinero recibido a través de las actividades de reaseguro de estas compañías, como contratos de reaseguro y solución de reclamaciones, se desvía a los programas de armas de destrucción masiva de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Según dos Estados Miembros, varias compañías y particulares se han asociado con Korean National Insurance Company o le han ayudado intencionadamente a desarrollar oportunidades comerciales, con el propósito de recaudar dinero o de facilitar transferencias de fondos, —incluso mediante transacciones de criptomoneda— al control de la sede de la compañía o en su nombre (cuadro 6 y anexo 89). Al parecer, Korean National Insurance Company y sus empresas pantalla o subordinadas han utilizado muchas de estas empresas como intermediarias para recibir o enviar pagos en su nombre, explícitamente con el fin de eludir las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas.

Cuadro 6
Información sobre los facilitadores de Korean National Insurance Company

Company	Reported information on engagement with KNIC
Fountain Court Partners (Nigeria)	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022
Premium Broking House (Lebanon)	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022
Integ Partners (Nigeria)	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022
BK & Associes (Côte d'Ivoire)	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022
Millbank Insurance Brokers, Ltd. (Nigeria)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022
QuickLink Insurance Brokers Ltd. (Nigeria)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022
Universal Insurance Plc (Nigeria)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022
Sechuwariis Development Foundation (Nigeria)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022
Somitel Ventures Enterprise (Nigeria)	Facilitates KNIC's activities in Africa, including through cryptocurrency transactions on KNIC's behalf, as of 2023
New Elements Holdings Co. Ltd (China)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022
Li Xianzhu (Chinese national)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022, utilizing Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) Ltd account number 718823353750
Fairicc Survey & Loss Adjusting Co., Ltd. (China)	Established a relationship with Samhae Insurance Company in 2019
Kaztec Engineering (Nigeria)	Contracted with Samhae Insurance Company for vessel insurance between 2019 and 2020

Abbreviation: KNIC, Korean National Insurance Company.

Fuente: Estados Miembros, información de los medios de comunicación[142] y el Grupo[143].

174. China respondió que "no hay pruebas de que New Elements Holdings Co. Ltd. esté implicada en actividades que violen las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. Debido a la información incompleta, no se pudo verificar la situación de Li Xianzhu" (véase el anexo 40, OC.181). BK & Associates respondió que había representado a Korean National Insurance Company en los tribunales en relación con el cobro de una deuda de 570.000 euros, obtuvo una sentencia a favor de Korean National Insurance Company en marzo de 2019 y continuó con los esfuerzos para ejecutar la sentencia y


[142] Véase www.nknews.org/pro/nigerian-firm-wades-into-murky-legal-waters-with-north-korean-insurance-policy.
[143] En relación con Fairicc Survey & Loss Adjusting Co., Ltd, véase el anexo 90.

cobrar un porcentaje de la reclamación, que se pagó a Korean National Insurance Company. El Grupo espera respuestas de las demás compañías que figuran en el cuadro 6, así como de otras decenas de compañías con las que Korean National Insurance Company y sus compañías pantalla o subordinadas habrían establecido o intentado establecer relaciones; la mayoría no ha respondido [144]. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Nam Chol Ung

175. El Grupo está investigando la información facilitada por un Estado Miembro en relación con Nam Chol Ung [145] (남철웅, véase la figura XXVII) presuntamente representante de la Oficina General de Reconocimiento (KPe.031) que ha participado en múltiples actividades en el extranjero que contravienen las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad por lo menos desde 2013, incluida la propiedad o explotación de compañías, centros turísticos, restaurantes y un complejo deportivo en la República Democrática Popular Lao y Tailandia, y puede acceder al sistema financiero internacional a través de cuentas bancarias a nombre de esas entidades. Al parecer, el Sr. Nam se encuentra en Dalian (China) desde finales de 2022. Según se informa, en 2023, falsificó contratos comerciales para importar artículos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, a través de Dalian, incluido un envío de lubricante para Sobaeksu United Corporation (supuestamente subordinada al Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones (KPe.028)) [146] (véase el anexo 91). China respondió que “no se ha encontrado ninguna información sobre la participación de Nam Chol Ung en actividades en contravención de las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad en China...” (véase el anexo 40, OC.357). La República Democrática Popular Lao, Tailandia y la mayoría de las compañías aún no han respondido. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Figura XXVII
Nam Chol Ung



Fuente: Estado Miembro.

[144] Una compañía transmitió información relativa a una reclamación de reaseguro facultativo contra incendios presentada por Korean National Insurance Company en 2015 para una instalación farmacéutica de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, en particular sobre la posibilidad de que la compañía hubiese facilitado información inexacta sobre la instalación al anunciar el contrato de reaseguro.

[145] Fecha de nacimiento: 23 de febrero de 1969; Pasaporte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea número 108320231 (fecha de vencimiento: agosto de 2023). Laos informó previamente al Grupo de que Nam salió de Laos en septiembre de 2019, y había estado asociado con la Embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en Laos.

[146] Véase S/2020/840 anexo 46, S/2020/151, párr. 126 y anexo 30; S/2019/691, anexo 13; S/2017/150, párrs. 158 y159 y anexo 14.

Kim Song Ho

176. El Grupo está investigando a Kim Song Ho[147] (김성호), funcionario de la República Popular Democrática de Corea quien, según múltiples Estados Miembros, ha participado en actividades en el extranjero que contravienen las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas desde al menos 2019, incluyendo la operación de restaurantes (véase el párr. 157) y transacciones de productos básicos con compañías laosianas y chinas (véase el anexo 92). Según los informes, Kim Song Ho estuvo afincado en Laos al menos entre 2019 y 2021. El Grupo espera las respuestas de la compañía china y de la República Democrática Popular Lao. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Choe Song Ryong

177. El Grupo está investigando a Choe Song Ryong[148] (최성룡, conocido también como Cui Chenglong), ciudadano de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, quien, según se informa, está basado en Beijing. Según un Estado Miembro, Choe Song Ryong está vinculado a Ri Chol Nam[149], Kim Chol Sok[150] y a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento (KPe.031) y, al parecer, ha participado en actividades prohibidas, como la explotación de empresas conjuntas, el empleo de nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en restaurantes de China y posiblemente en actividades comerciales prohibidas[151] en las que estarían implicadas las compañías chinas Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd y Beijing Green Valley Tianchi International Trade Co Ltd (véase el anexo 93). China respondió “Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd fue revocada por el departamento chino de supervisión del mercado ya en enero de 2018. No hay constancia de que Choe Song Ryong o Cui Chenglong fueran accionistas o altos ejecutivos de las compañías registradas en Beijing” (véase el anexo 40, OC.358).

Otras actividades financieras prohibidas

178. El Grupo está investigando informes según los cuales la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha seguido participando en el tráfico ilícito de fauna y flora silvestres para generar ingresos ilícitos. Yun Kil, diplomático de la Embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en Sudáfrica[152], presuntamente intentó traficar con cuernos de rinoceronte por valor de 65 millones de dólares en 2022. Sudáfrica aún no ha respondido. Según otro informe [153], dos nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, entre ellos el presunto funcionario de inteligencia Yi Kang Dae, habrían financiado o participado de alguna otra forma, al menos en dos ocasiones, en noviembre de 2022 y febrero de 2023, en operaciones destinadas a pasar de contrabando cuernos de rinoceronte y colmillos de elefante de Botswana a Mozambique, a través de Sudáfrica y Zimbabwe, con la participación de ciudadanos de Malawi, donde se cargaron en un barco para su entrega a un tercer país. Sudáfrica y Botswana respondieron que no habían detectado constancia ni

[147] Números de pasaporte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea 108132627 (vencimiento: marzo de 2023) y 927220146 (vencimiento: abril de 2022).

[148] Fecha de nacimiento: 16 de abril de 1967; Números de pasaporte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea 108230480 y 836135707.

[149] S/2023/171, párrs. 155 a 158 y anexos 26, 85 y 88.

[150] S/2022/132, párrs. 162 a 165, y S/2023/171, párrs. 147 y 148.

[151] Incluida la posible importación de carbón y tierras raras procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

[152] Véase https://pyongyangpapers.com/investigations/black-market-rhino-horn-help-boost-dprk-weapons-program.

[153] Véase www.weekendpost.co.bw/38322/news/north-korea-diplomats-in-suspected-illegal-ivory-trade.

información pertinente sobre esta actividad. Mozambique, Zimbabwe y Malawi aún no han respondido.

179. El Grupo investigó información facilitada por un Estado Miembro, según la cual un funcionario de Chinson General Corporation [154] de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y un funcionario de la embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en Nigeria viajaron al Níger en 2022 para recoger cientos de miles de dólares en efectivo y llevar esos fondos de vuelta a Nigeria, probablemente utilizando credenciales diplomáticas para evitar el escrutinio y las inspecciones de equipaje, tal como se exige en el párrafo 18 de la resolución 2270 (2016) y el párrafo 13 de la resolución 2321 (2016). El Grupo señala la importancia de adoptar medidas adecuadas para impedir la transferencia ilegal de grandes cantidades de efectivo por nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Nigeria y el Níger aún no han respondido a las preguntas del Grupo.

Generación ilícita de ingresos mediante ciberactividades

180. Durante el período sobre el que se informa, agentes de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguieron atacando al sector de activos virtuales para eludir las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas y generar ingresos. Según un Estado Miembro, las actividades cibernéticas maliciosas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea generan aproximadamente el 50 % de sus ingresos en divisas y se utilizan para financiar sus programas de armamentos [155]. Un segundo Estado Miembro informó de que el 40 % de los programas de armas de destrucción masiva de la República Popular Democrática de Corea se financian por medios cibernéticos ilícitos.

181. Sobre la base de informes del sector y de los medios de comunicación e información facilitada por empresas del sector privado y Estados Miembros, el Grupo está investigando 17 robos de criptodivisas cometidos en 2023, de los que la República Popular Democrática de Corea podría ser responsable, por valor de más de 750 millones de dólares (véase el anexo 94). El Grupo sigue investigando un total de 58 presuntos ciberataques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea contra compañías relacionadas con criptomonedas entre 2017 y 2023, por valor de unos 3.000 millones de dólares (véase el anexo 95). Una empresa informática calificó a la República Popular Democrática de Corea como “el ciberladrón más prolífico del mundo” [156].

182. Los ciberagentes maliciosos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea emplearon los siguientes patrones para robar fondos de compañías relacionadas con el sector de criptomonedas (véase el anexo 96):

- Vectores de ataque
    - Señuelos de *phishing*
    - Ingeniería social
    - Códigos/protocolos débiles y errores humanos
    - Terceros (cadena de suministro)

[154] Al parecer, se ha vinculado a Chinson General Corporation a trabajadores médicos que obtuvieron ingresos en el extranjero después del 22 de diciembre de 2019 (véase https://pyongyangpapers.com/investigations/dprk-hospitals-linked-to-malpractice-in-nigeria).


[155] Véase www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-earns-half-its-foreign-currency-income-hacks-cyberattacks-biden-official-3697701.

[156] Véase www.trmlabs.com/post/north-korean-hackers-stole-600-million-in-crypto-in-2023.

- Blanqueo de criptomonedas (*layering*)
  - Robo de múltiples activos
  - Cientos o miles de direcciones intermediarias
  - Uso de la red de bitcóin
  - Intercambio de activos a través de bolsas descentralizadas y centralizadas
  - Uso creciente del salto de cadenas
  - Puentes (véase la figura XXVIII)
  - Servicios de intercambio instantáneo
  - Mezcladores y protocolos de privacidad
  - Circular a través de múltiples cadenas, incluyendo tokens poco comunes
  - Rapidez para evitar la congelación de fondos
  - Una mayor dependencia de servicios basados en los países vecinos (Federación de Rusia y China).
- Reintegro (integración)
  - Afinidad por cadena de bloques TRON y criptomonedas estables, especialmente Tether (USDT)
  - Fuerte dependencia de terceros como blanqueadores y brókers extrabursátiles (grandes volúmenes, direcciones de alto valor)[157]
  - Credenciales compradas y cuentas comprometidas
  - Menos dependencia de las bolsas centralizadas

[157] S/2023/656, párr. 142. Una compañía de tecnología de cadenas de bloques informó al Grupo en octubre de 2023 de que Wu Huihui y Cheng Hung Man, corredores extrabursátiles, todavía seguían convirtiendo activamente una gran parte de los fondos en criptomoneda robados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea en dinero fiat.

Figura XXVIII
Supuesta utilización de puentes por el Lazarus Group en 2023



Abbreviation: OFAC, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Fuente: www.elliptic.co/resources/state-of-cross-chain-crime-2023.


183. Un servicio de criptomoneda informó de la incautación de transferencias de criptomoneda vinculadas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea por valor de aproximadamente 5,8 millones de dólares a finales de 2023, después de lo cual la actividad vinculada a la República Popular Democrática de Corea en la plataforma disminuyó apreciablemente. En el anexo 97 figuran las direcciones pertinentes de cartera, correo electrónico y protocolo Internet asociadas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Un segundo servicio informó de un "rápido aumento" de las actividades cibernéticas con la participación de agentes afiliados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2023 y bloqueó más de 1.600 direcciones de criptomoneda asociadas. Una compañía de ciberseguridad explicó al Grupo que cuando los servicios y protocolos adoptan medidas, como la congelación de fondos, los agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea cambian rápidamente a otro servicio.

ScarCruft (APT 37)

184. ScarCruft[158] aprovechó una vulnerabilidad del programa informático WinRAR (CVE-2023-38831) para lanzar su primer ataque detectado contra el sector de criptomonedas[159]. Al parecer, ScarCruft utilizaba una carga maliciosa disfrazada de captura de pantalla de monedero de criptomoneda para entregar una carga útil (véase la figura XXIX). Una vez extraídos y ejecutados los archivos ZIP maliciosos, el programa malicioso puede permitir que los autores de la amenaza retiren dinero de las cuentas de las víctimas [160].

[158] Históricamente subordinado al Ministerio de Seguridad del Estado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.
[159] Véase https://paper.seebug.org/3033.
[160] Véase www.group-ib.com/blog/cve-2023-38831-winrar-zero-day.

Figura XXIX
Supuesta captura de pantalla del archivo malicioso ScarCruft



Fuente: https://paper.seebug.org/3033.

Kimsuky (APT 43)

185. Los agentes de Kimsuky obtuvieron criptomonedas a través de la minería, la prestación de servicios semilegítimos y de operaciones de ciberdelincuencia como estafas, robos, fraudes, extracción maliciosa de criptomoneda (*cryptojacking*) y campañas de extorsión para ofuscar sus transacciones y financiar operaciones de espionaje —incluida la compra de hardware, infraestructura operacional y servicios de alquiler de hash y minería en la nube— para blanquear la criptomoneda robada (véase la figura XXX)[161]. Según se informa, Kimsuky ha realizado ataques de *cryptojacking* contra "cientos, si no miles" de víctimas. Se ha observado a Kimsuky mientras minaba Monero (XMR), probablemente recibiendo pagos en otras monedas, como Ethereum (ETH).


186. Según un organismo encargado de hacer cumplir la ley de un Estado Miembro, en 2023 agentes de Kimsuky robaron información de correo electrónico y otras cuentas de 1.468 personas, entre ellas decenas de funcionarios públicos. Al parecer, Kimsuky intentó robar activos virtuales de 19 de las víctimas utilizando credenciales de cuentas robadas y realizó actividades de minería de criptomonedas en los servidores tomados a través de esta campaña[162]. En noviembre, otros dos Estados Miembros designaron a Kimsuky (véase el anexo 98)[163].

[161] Véase www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt43-north-korea-cybercrime-espionage, www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023, www.chainalysis.com/blog/kimsuky-south-korea-sanctions-june-2023.

[162] Véase https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231121006800315?section=national/national; S/2023/656, anexo 63.

[163] Véase https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/pressit_000001_00026.html.

Figura XXX
Supuestas operaciones de ciberdelincuencia de Kimsuky


Dear B,

We would like to inform you that your Bitcoin payment for $120.00 has been added into your Namecheap account. You can now use the account balance to purchase or renew products on Namecheap.com.


Username : BRoyal1990
Transaction Id : 82073030
Transaction Ref: GKRwiyWiTTUXreqpvxNv4A
Amount : $120.00

You can find more information about this transaction on our Add Funds History page located at https://manage.www.namecheap.com/myaccount/reports/funds-report.asp.

If you have any questions, please contact our support at http://www.namecheap.com/support

Thank you.

Namecheap.com Support



Fuente: www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt43-north-korea-cybercrime-espionage.

Andariel

187. Andariel se infiltró en sitios web de instituciones financieras y robó 360.000 dólares en bitcóins mediante ataques de programas maliciosos secuestradores (*ransomware*) contra tres compañías (véase también el párr. 134)[164]. Se cree que algunos de estos fondos se introdujeron en la República Popular Democrática de Corea mediante su conversión en dinero fiat a través de bolsas de criptomoneda de


[164] Véanse www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-aligned-tag-71-spoofs-financial-institutions, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/12/103_364423.html, www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231204049700004, https://boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=124405, https://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2023/12/05/2023120501179.html.

terceros países y un facilitador, se transfirieron a una cuenta bancaria en un tercer país y se retiraron en un banco cercano a la frontera entre China y la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Andariel utilizó campañas de *ransomware* para financiar otras actividades maliciosas, especialmente operaciones de ciberespionaje, a lo largo de 2022[165].

Criptomoneda y sector financiero

188. El Lazarus Group y BlueNoroff desplegando campañas de *phishing* en múltiples plataformas dirigidas a trabajadores del sector de las criptomonedas, incluidos ingenieros de tecnología de cadenas de bloques y otros programadores, para obtener acceso a las redes de las compañías para ataques posteriores (véase la figura XXXI y anexo 99). Los agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea están desplegando múltiples y complejas fases de ataque con diversas técnicas de evasión defensiva, iniciando el contacto y alojando el programa malicioso en diversas plataformas[166].

Figura XXXI
Supuestos ataques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea



Fuente: https://twitter.com/KSeznec/status/1717542794942660771

189. Los agentes de BlueNoroff usurpaban las direcciones electrónicas de las instituciones financieras y empresas de capital riesgo del Japón, Vietnam y los Estados Unidos para engañar a las posibles víctimas y hacerlas abrir contenidos maliciosos o facilitar sus credenciales de acceso (véase el anexo 100)[167].

Programas maliciosos secuestradores (Ransomware)

190. Agentes del Lazarus Group colaboraron con una compañía de la República de Corea para distribuir programas maliciosos secuestradores y recaudaron aproximadamente 2,6 millones de dólares en costes de recuperación de más de 700 víctimas. Según se informó, parte de los ingresos se transfirieron a una cartera de criptomoneda de propiedad del Lazarus Group[168].

[165] Véase www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023.
[166] Véase https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/has-a-sanctioned-bitcoin-mixer-been-resurrected-to-aid-north-korea-s-lazarus-group.
[167] Véase www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-aligned-tag-71-spoofs-financial-institutions.
[168] Véanse www.spo.go.kr/site/spo/ex/board/View.do?cbIdx=1403&bcIdx=1043403, www.chosun.com/national/2023/10/27/AY6DLNSW4FFDHAKPHVFTPP2UNE y www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20231128/122390037/1.

Recomendaciones

191. **El Grupo recomienda al Comité que considere la posibilidad de designar a:**

a) Nam Chol Ung;

b) El Lazarus Group, Andariel, BlueNoroff, ScarCruft y Kimsuky[169]**.**

192. **El Grupo reitera sus recomendaciones de que los Estados Miembros apliquen lo antes posible las orientaciones del Grupo de Acción Financiera sobre los activos virtuales y los proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales.**

193. **El Grupo alienta a los Estados Miembros, las empresas y los particulares a que presten la debida atención al aumento de la ciberhigiene, incluidas las prácticas eficaces de ciberseguridad recopiladas en el anexo 101, a fin de contrarrestar la elusión por parte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad a través de actividades cibernéticas.**

194. **El Grupo recomienda que las entidades del sector privado examinen la información publicada por los Estados Miembros y las compañías de ciberseguridad sobre las direcciones de monedas virtuales vinculadas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea y se mantengan vigilantes para evitar transacciones directas con esas direcciones o derivadas de ellas.**

195. **El Grupo recomienda que los Estados Miembros consideren la posibilidad de establecer sistemas para comunicar e intercambiar información sobre amenazas cibernéticas relacionadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea con el sector de criptomonedas y el sector privado.**

196. **El Grupo recomienda que todas las plataformas y protocolos de criptomonedas —incluidos los intercambios descentralizados y centralizados, los puentes, los servicios de intercambio instantáneo, los mezcladores y los protocolos de privacidad— apliquen programas adecuados contra el blanqueo de dinero y de conocimiento del cliente y establezcan procedimientos y mecanismos mejorados de rastreo y detección para identificar posibles transacciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, como reglas basadas en patrones de comportamiento de los usuarios y análisis de la configuración del sistema**[170]**, a fin de impedir con más eficacia que los ciberagentes ilícitos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea utilicen indebidamente estos servicios (véase también el anexo 101)**.

197. **El Grupo alienta a los Estados Miembros a realizar evaluaciones del riesgo de los activos virtuales y a incluir consideraciones relativas a la financiación de la proliferación y a la República Popular Democrática de Corea como parte de las evaluaciones.**

VI. Efectos humanitarios no deseados de las sanciones

198. El Consejo de Seguridad ha reafirmado en repetidas ocasiones que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas no tienen el propósito de acarrear consecuencias humanitarias adversas para la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y que es la responsabilidad y necesidad primordiales del país asegurar la subsistencia y satisfacer plenamente las necesidades de su pueblo. El Grupo siguió supervisando la información disponible relacionada con los efectos de las sanciones sobre la situación

[169] Dos miembros del Grupo opinan que debería investigarse más a fondo para recomendar la designación de estos ciberagentes.

[170] Además del cribado “tradicional” de transacciones basado en listas de sanciones, direcciones de monederos identificadas públicamente, etc.

humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la asistencia humanitaria al país, de conformidad con los párrafos 24 y 25 de la resolución 2397 (2017), la resolución 2664 (2022) y otras resoluciones pertinentes.

Situación humanitaria

199. El Grupo sigue reconociendo la falta de datos fiables sobre la situación humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la ausencia de una metodología que diferencie las consecuencias de las sanciones multilaterales de otros factores.

200. Las entidades de las Naciones Unidas, los Estados Miembros y las organizaciones no gubernamentales siguen considerando que la situación humanitaria está empeorando. Posiblemente se trate de una combinación de muchos factores, entre ellos las políticas socioeconómicas del país que dan prioridad a los programas de armas de destrucción masiva y misiles balísticos, las consecuencias de la pandemia de COVID-19 y el consiguiente cierre de fronteras, los desastres naturales, la escasa prioridad que el Gobierno de la República Popular Democrática de Corea concede a la asistencia humanitaria, así como los efectos no deseados de las sanciones.

201. En el segundo semestre de 2023 se observaron varios acontecimientos positivos, como la reducción de los precios de los alimentos a niveles no vistos desde 2019 como resultado de una "buena cosecha de otoño de una serie de cultivos diferentes"[171] y la "normalización" parcial de las importaciones de alimentos y bienes de consumo, así como el aumento de algunos tipos de asistencia humanitaria vital. Sin embargo, estas mejoras no se distribuyeron de manera uniforme en todo el país y alrededor de 11,3 millones de personas seguían necesitando asistencia en 2023[172].

202. Diversas fuentes[173] indican que en 2023 las autoridades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea prestaron mayor atención a los medios de subsistencia de la población, la agricultura y la producción de cereales[174]. La República Popular Democrática de Corea construyó viviendas, fábricas de bienes de consumo, invernaderos, instalaciones médicas y objetos recreativos, en particular para niños, anunció logros en la industria ligera y en la pesca y aumentó apreciablemente las importaciones de arroz, otros cultivos y fertilizantes (véase el anexo 104)[175]. El país también declaró prioritaria la mejora de la "industria de maquinaria agrícola".

203. Aunque es difícil precisar con exactitud, sobre la base de sus anteriores evaluaciones[176] y de información facilitada por Estados Miembros, agentes

[171] Un Estado Miembro estima que la cosecha fue de 4,82 millones de toneladas, un 6% más que en 2022 (véase www.rda.go.kr/board/board.do?mode=view&prgId=day_farmprmninfoEntry&dataNo=100000792230).

[172] Véase www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc3017en.

[173] Véase http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyMy0xMS0xMC1OMDMwQDE1QDJAQDBAMzA== y https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1676538621-757268758/ground-breaking-ceremony-of-kangdong-greenhouse-farm-held-respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-attends-ceremony-and-shovels-first-spadeful-of-earth/; b.

[174] En la novena reunión plenaria del Comité Central del Partido de los Trabajadores, celebrada en diciembre, se declararon "alcanzados" los "12 objetivos para el desarrollo económico nacional", entre los que, desde principios de 2023, se dio prioridad a la producción de cereales. Véanse https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1687168989-888004479/Report-on-8th-Enlarged-Plenary-Meeting-of-8th-WPK-Central-Committee y https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1704024510-989741431/Report-on-9th-Enlarged-Plenum-of-8th-WPK-Central-Committee.

[175] Véase https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korean-rice-imports-from-china-drop-amid-alleged-arms-trade-with-russia.

[176] S/2019/171, párr. 176; S/2019/691, párr. 83; S/2020/151, párr. 209; S/2020/840, párrs. 156 a 158 y 160; S/2021/211, párrs. 168 a 171; S/2021/777, párrs. 174 a 178; S/2022/132, párrs. 187 a 190; S/2022/668, párrs. 163 a 166; y S/2023/171, párrs. 179 y 180.

humanitarios y expertos independientes, el Grupo observa que, si bien la influencia relativa de las sanciones ha disminuido desde principios de 2020, no cabe duda de que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas y su aplicación han afectado involuntariamente a la situación humanitaria y a algunos aspectos de las operaciones de ayuda, lo cual ha agravado los problemas causados por las políticas económicas ineficaces e ineficientes del país. Las repercusiones podrían incluir:

a) La respuesta del país a las sanciones, mediante la cual las élites han intensificado el control económico, social y político, ha centralizado la gestión económica y deprimido la mercadización de base y el sector del mercado[177];

b) En respuesta a un descenso del 90 % de los ingresos de exportación registrados tras la aprobación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad en 2016 y 2017 (véanse los anexos 102 y 104)[178], es probable que la República Popular Democrática de Corea haya priorizado la adquisición de productos y tecnologías relacionados con el sector militar sobre las importaciones de artículos de consumo y alimentos, aunque el Grupo no dispone de los datos financieros necesarios[179, 180];

c) En el contexto de las prioridades de importación del país, las restricciones a la importación de productos básicos contribuyeron a la escasez actual de equipos agrícolas[181] y combustible, aunque esta fue menor en 2023, lo que agravó el bajo nivel de la agricultura[182];

d) La adquisición de otros artículos de maquinaria, como algunos equipos de lavado e irrigación, piezas de repuesto y materiales conexos, también puede haberse visto afectada de forma similar;

e) Las restricciones a la importación de petróleo refinado pueden haber afectado al funcionamiento de las centrales térmicas de carbón, contribuyendo posiblemente a la escasez de energía, aunque algunas estadísticas muestran una producción total de energía estable (véase el anexo 105). Las restricciones a las importaciones pueden haber afectado aún más a una capacidad de transporte ya extremadamente limitada;

f) Disminución de las fuentes de sustento de las personas empleadas en las industrias afectadas por las sanciones y persistencia del consiguiente desempleo (véase el anexo 106);

g) Perturbaciones en las cadenas de suministro de medicamentos derivadas de la disminución de los ingresos de exportación y de la prohibición directa de la

[177] S/2019/171, párr. 176; S/2019/691, párr. 83; S/2020/151, párr. 209.

[178] Por ejemplo, los ingresos procedentes de la principal materia prima de exportación, el carbón, que representaban aproximadamente la mitad de los ingresos a mediados de la década de 2010, se agotaron. Véase el anexo 103.

[179] El Grupo observa que la República Popular Democrática de Corea obtiene ingresos de fuentes distintas de las exportaciones, como las actividades cibernéticas (véanse los párrs. 180 a 190).

[180] Los cierres fronterizos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea relacionados con el COVID-19 redujeron aún más las exportaciones/ingresos del país.

[181] En 2022, la industria de las municiones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea produjo 5.500 máquinas agrícolas; en septiembre de 2023, el país anunció que la industria de las municiones y su sector de fabricación de maquinaria habían producido más de 10.000 máquinas agrícolas. Un experto señaló el uso de componentes importados en estas máquinas. (véase https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1664356199-252182552/kim-jong-un-sends-farm-machines-to-south-hwanghae-province).

[182] S/2019/171, anexos 86 y 87.

importación de metales y equipos, en el contexto de las prioridades de importación del país[183, 184].

h) En algunos casos, el exceso de celo en el cumplimiento de las sanciones por parte de algunos agentes que participan en la entrega de bienes de consumo y bienes humanitarios, incluso de bienes no restringidos por las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas.

204. Antes de la pandemia, la magnitud de la asistencia humanitaria era aproximadamente de 2 dólares anuales per cápita; tras un cese virtual de la asistencia de tres años debido al cierre de las fronteras de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, en 2023 aumentó la asistencia de las Naciones Unidas (asistencia vital a grupos que corren especial riesgo), hasta unos 0,50 dólares per cápita. Sin embargo, la República Popular Democrática de Corea se ha vuelto reacia a aceptar asistencia y, en este contexto, la asistencia humanitaria no puede aliviar completamente los efectos no deseados de las sanciones sobre la población vulnerable.

Operaciones de las organizaciones humanitarias

205. El Grupo contó con la participación de agentes de asistencia humanitaria, Estados Miembros y organismos de las Naciones Unidas, y mantuvo la práctica de enviar su cuestionario a las organizaciones humanitarias (véase el anexo 107), cuyas respuestas anonimizadas se incluyen en el anexo 108.

206. Las organizaciones humanitarias informaron de que entre los obstáculos para la prestación de asistencia humanitaria figuran la imposibilidad de que su personal entre en el país y supervise la prestación de asistencia; la falta de datos para determinar las necesidades; los efectos o el agravamiento de las sanciones, incluido el trabajo adicional para completar el proceso de exenciones; el interés reducido de los donantes; los mayores costes de adquisición y transporte; las limitaciones sobre tipos de proyectos; la eliminación del riesgo y exceso de celo en el cumplimiento de las sanciones; la ausencia continuada de canales bancarios; y las políticas y la complejidad burocrática de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

207. Algunas organizaciones comunicaron al Grupo que, en vista de las actuales restricciones fronterizas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas no tenían un efecto directo importante sobre la situación humanitaria o la prestación de asistencia. Dos organizaciones señalaron el impacto negativo combinado del cierre de fronteras y de las sanciones sobre la situación humanitaria y la prestación de asistencia. Una organización señaló que eliminación del riesgo y el exceso de celo en el cumplimiento en todas las cadenas de operaciones de asistencia representaban un problema importante. Según un Estado Miembro, la creciente militarización de la economía civil[185] complica aún más las actividades de asistencia humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

208. La mayoría de las organizaciones que respondieron no esperan poder reanudar sus operaciones en un futuro próximo.

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[183] Por ejemplo, según una organización de asistencia, la mayoría de las adquisiciones relacionadas con la salud tienen componentes metálicos y “al menos un fabricante de medicamentos vitales en un país europeo rechazó pedidos para el envío de medicamentos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea invocando las sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad” (véase el anexo 108).

[184] No se prohíbe la exportación de medicamentos y suministros médicos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, mientras que las organizaciones humanitarias se han esforzado por hacer llegar al país los suministros pertinentes mediante el proceso de exención para fines humanitarios establecido, que funciona adecuadamente.

[185] Véase, por ejemplo, www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/north-korea-debuts-rocket-launchers-that-appear-as-civilian-trucks y https://twitter.com/nknewsorg/status/1700375804902031582.

209. La mayoría de las organizaciones que respondieron siguen afirmando estar satisfechas con la mejora del proceso de exención[186]. No obstante, un Estado Miembro y varias organizaciones siguieron recomendando un período de exención más largo o prórrogas automáticas de las exenciones, la solución del problema del canal bancario y exenciones permanentes para determinados productos de bajo riesgo (una lista "blanca" o "verde").

210. En el período sobre el que se informa, el Comité concedió siete nuevas exenciones y 20 prórrogas en materia de asistencia humanitaria.

Recomendaciones

211. **El Grupo valora las sesiones informativas bianuales de las entidades competentes de las Naciones Unidas sobre los efectos no deseados de las sanciones y sigue recomendando que el Comité mantenga esa práctica.**

212. **El Grupo recomienda que el Comité siga insistiendo en la importancia de restablecer un canal bancario duradero para las operaciones humanitarias en la República Popular Democrática de Corea y recomienda que el Comité conceda prioridad a la solución de esta cuestión.**

213. **El Grupo recomienda que el Comité examine con los reguladores pertinentes posibles orientaciones para mitigar el problema de la eliminación del riesgo por parte de los bancos y otras instituciones cuando haya de por medio sanciones a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.**

214. **El Grupo recomienda que la Secretaría siga estudiando, junto con los organismos de las Naciones Unidas y las organizaciones no gubernamentales, modos de transferir fondos para sus programas de asistencia humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea tras la interrupción de un mecanismo de canal bancario.**

215. **El Grupo reitera sus recomendaciones anteriores en el sentido de que:**

- **En el contexto de la aplicación de la resolución 2664 (2022) del Consejo de Seguridad, el sistema de las Naciones Unidas, incluido el Comité, tenga en cuenta la información facilitada por los agentes humanitarios sobre la mitigación de los posibles efectos adversos de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas en la población civil y en la asistencia humanitaria a la República Popular Democrática de Corea;**
- **El Consejo de Seguridad siga ocupándose de los problemas y procesos de mitigación de posibles efectos negativos no deseados de las sanciones en la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en relación con las operaciones de asistencia humanitaria;**
- **El Comité y otras partes interesadas pertinentes continúen examinando de forma práctica la idea de eximir determinadas exportaciones actualmente sometidas a sanciones, cuyos ingresos podrían utilizarse para financiar suministros humanitarios;**
- **El Comité considere la posibilidad de establecer un contacto más activo con la sociedad civil que presta asistencia humanitaria a la República Popular Democrática de Corea para ayudar a aplicar la resolución 2664 (2022) del Consejo de Seguridad;**

[186] Que se describe en la nota orientativa núm. 7 para la aplicación de resoluciones.

- **El Comité estudie de forma práctica la idea de exenciones renovables y permanentes para los agentes de asistencia humanitaria y los productos relacionados con la asistencia humanitaria.**

VII. Informes nacionales sobre la aplicación

Situación de la presentación por los Estados Miembros de informes sobre la aplicación de las resoluciones pertinentes

216. Al 26 de enero de 2024, 66 Estados Miembros habían presentado informes sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 8 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad; 81, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 17 de la resolución 2397 (2017), 95, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2375 (2017), 90, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2371 (2017), 107, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2321 (2016), y 115, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2270 (2016). A pesar del aumento general de informes presentados, el Grupo observa que el número de Estados Miembros que no han presentado informes (127) sobre la aplicación de la resolución 2397 (2017) sigue siendo considerable.

217. El Grupo observa que solo 130 de los 193 Estados Miembros han presentado al menos un informe nacional antes de diciembre de 2023. Esto significa que casi un tercio de todos los Estados Miembros nunca han presentado un informe nacional sobre la aplicación al Consejo de Seguridad y, por lo tanto, no están cumpliendo con las obligaciones que les impone la resolución.

218. A fin de ayudar a los Estados Miembros a comprender mejor y a mejorar la presentación de informes nacionales sobre la aplicación, en diciembre de 2023, el Grupo envió cartas a 62 Estados Miembros en relación con esta obligación y les ofreció asistencia (véase el anexo 109). En el anexo 110 figuran dos respuestas a las preguntas del Grupo.

219. La tasa global de respuesta a las preguntas del Grupo dirigidas a los Estados Miembros y a las entidades y personas pertinentes sigue siendo baja. El Grupo desea recordar que el Consejo de Seguridad ha pedido a todos los Estados, órganos pertinentes de las Naciones Unidas y otras partes interesadas que cooperen plenamente con el Grupo facilitándole la información de que disponen.

VIII. Recomendaciones

220. En el anexo 112 figura una lista consolidada de las recomendaciones.

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Annex 1: IAEA Director General statement on recent developments in the DPRK's nuclear programme (21 December 2023)

In my opening statement to the Board on 22 November, I reported that we had observed increased levels of activity at, and near, the Light Water Reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon, and also – since mid-October – a strong water outflow from its cooling system. These observations were consistent with the commissioning of the LWR.

More recent observations indicate that this water discharge is warm, which is also consistent with ongoing commissioning of the LWR, a process that takes some time for any new reactor. **However, the discharge of warm water is indicative the reactor has reached criticality.** It remains the case that without access to the facility the Agency cannot confirm its operational status.

The LWR, like any nuclear reactor, can produce plutonium in its irradiated fuel, which can be separated during reprocessing, so this is a cause for concern.

Concerning the safety of the LWR, we do not have sufficient information to make an assessment. Of course, safety should always be the paramount issue when starting a new reactor. Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.


I repeat that the further development of the DPRK's nuclear programme, including the construction and operation of the LWR, is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency is ready to engage on any of the above issues, including safety.

Source: IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-statement-on-recent-developments-in-the-dprks-nuclear-programme (underlined and bolded by the Panel).

Annex 2: Activities at LWR (39° 47′ 45″ N 125° 45′ 18″ E)

*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are observations during the reporting period, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.




Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 October 2023.

1) Water discharge



Source: Planet Labs., 25 November 2023, 17 December 2023.



Source: Planet Labs., 21 December 2023, Maxar Technologies, 14 January 2024.

2) The observation of past trenching works from LWR to water discharging points

Satellite imagery analysis showed efforts of trenching works which appeared to connect LWR to multiple discharging points since between 2012 and 2013.[187] Possible earlier efforts of water discharge were detected in 2013 near current discharging point. According to the IAEA, indications of tests of cooling water system were observed occasionally since 2019.[188] The Panel reported in 2017 that hot water was discharged through the drainage channel of LWR, suggesting a possible test of the cooling water system in 2017.[189] Additional trenching works and modification of the riverbank were conducted around the current discharging points since then.



Source: Google Earth Pro, 26 January 2024.

[187] See also https://www.38north.org/2019/12/yongbyon120519/, https://fsi.stanford.edu/publication/north-korean-nuclear-facilities-after-agreed-framework, and https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/north-koreas-elwr-finally-operational-after-a-long-delay/.
[188] IAEA, GOV/2022/40-GC (66), para 46.
[189] S/2017/742, para 17.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 2 May 2023.

3) Construction activities near the reactor (39° 47′ 45″ N 125° 45′ 21″ E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 21 July 2023, 8 August 2023, 3 November 2023, 10 December 2023.

4) Construction activities at far south area of LWR (39° 47′ 33″ N 125° 45′ 13″ E)



Source: Planet Labs, 26 February 2023, Maxar Technologies, 1 April 2023, 4 June 2023, 21 July 2023, Planet Labs, 24 November 2023.

Annex 3: Activities at 5MW(e) reactor (39° 47′ 51″ N 125° 45′ 20″ E)

*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are observations during the reporting period, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.




Source: Maxar Technologies, 23 September 2023, Planet Labs, 12 October 2023.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 November 2023, Planet Labs, 6 January 2024.

Annex 4: Radiochemical Laboratory (39° 46′ 50″ N 125° 45′ 08″ E)

*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are observations during the reporting period, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.



Source: Planet Labs, 12 October 2023.

1) Smoke from thermal plant (39° 46′ 34″ N 125° 45′ 26″ E)





Source: Maxar Technologies, 21 July 2023, Planet Labs, 31 July 2023.


2) Activities at Building 500 (39° 46′ 49″ N 125° 45′ 23″ E)





Source: Maxar Technologies, 16 June 2023, 25 June 2023.

3) Trenching work between Building 500 and Reprocessing facility



Source: Maxar Technologies, 13 November 2023.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 24 October 2023, 30 October 2023, 7 November 2023, 13 November 2023.

Annex 5: Activities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant (39°46′15″N 125°44′57″E)

*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are observations during the reporting period, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 October 2023.


1) Activities at UF4 production process building (39° 46′ 09″ N 125° 44′ 55″ E)



Source: Planet Labs, 12 October 2023, Maxar Technologies, 24 October 2023.

Annex 6: Activities at Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant (Location of the possible yellowcake production building at 38° 19′ 04″ N 126° 25′ 54″ E)

*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are observations during the reporting period, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.



Source: Planet Labs, 17 December 2023.

1) Expansion of the piles of tailings at the mines (38° 19′ 57″ N 126° 27′ 21″ E)




Source: Planet Labs, 16 June 2023, 17 December 2023.

2) Railcar activities at the Plant (38° 19′ 02″ N 126° 25′ 54″ E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 30 July 2023, 2 October 2023, 17 December 2023.

3) Tailings pond of Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38° 18′ 42″ N 126° 25′ 50″ E)



Source: Planet Labs, 16 June 2023, 17 December 2023.

Annex 7: Activities at Punggye-ri nuclear test site (41° 16′ 41″ N 129° 05′ 15″ E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 14 November 2023.

1) Activities near Tunnel 3 (41° 16′ 35″ N 129° 05′ 16″ E) and administrative area (41° 16′ 41″ N 129° 05′ 15″ E)

*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are observations during the reporting period, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 March 2023.

2) Activities near Tunnel 4 (41° 16′ 46″ N 129° 05′ 08″ E)




Source: Maxar Technologies, 15 October 2023.

Annex 8: Activities at Kangson and Yongdoktong

The Panel continues to monitor activities in the vicinity of Kangson, an alleged clandestine uranium enrichment facility and Yongdoktong area, which is believed to be involved in DPRK's nuclear weapons programme, including as a nuclear weapons storage facility. The Panel observed constant presence of vehicles at Kangson. Available satellite images showed no significant activities at suspected nuclear weapons storage facility.

Kangson (38° 57′ 26″ N 125° 36′ 43″ E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 17 December 2023, 11 January 2024.

Annex 9: Ballistic missiles launches by the DPRK from 29 July 2023 to 26 January 2024

Official DPRK statements are in *italics*. / Mentions of solid propellant (SP) engines.

Launches in the year	*Date and time (local)*	*Reported type*	*Number of missiles*	*Reported launch location and trajectory*	*Reported distance travelled (km)*	*Reported apogee (km)*	*Remarks*	*DPRK reports*
14. **SP**	**30 Aug. 2023** 23:38 and 23:46	**SRBM KN-24**	2	From the Sunan International airport to Alsom island.	350 and 400 (JPN)	50 (JPN)	Appears to be a Hwasong 11Na (KN-24). Pictures show air bursts high above the target island.	*The missile unit fired two tactical ballistic missiles northeastward at Pyongyang International Airport and correctly carried out its nuclear strike mission through air bursts at a preset altitude of 400 meters.* (KCNA, 31 August 2023)
15. **SP**	**13 Sept. 2023** 11:43 to 11:53 (ROK) 11:41 and 11:51 (JPN)	**SRBM KN-23** (probable)	2	From an area in and around Sunan into the sea east of the peninsula.	650 (ROK) 400 (JPN)	50 (JPN)	Possibly "irregular" trajectory (JPN). Kim Jong Un was in the Russian Federation at the time of the launches.	No statement.
16. **SP**	**17 Dec. 2023** 22:38 (ROK) and 22:37 (JPN)	**SRBM**	2	From around the Pyongyang area towards the sea east of the peninsula.	570 (ROK) Appx. 400 (JPN)	50 (JPN)		No statement.
17. **SP**	**18 Dec. 2023** 08:24	**ICBM Hwasong-18**	2	From nearby Pyongyang to the East, falling in the sea approximately 250 kilometers northwest of the Okushiri Islands in Hokkaido.	1 000 (JPN)	6 000 (JPN)	Kim Jong Un attended. The location of the launch is slightly different from the one used on 13 April and 12 July 2023.	*The drill was aimed to review the combat readiness of the DPRK's nuclear war deterrence and confirm its mobility, combat capability and reliability.....General Jang Chang Ha, general director of the General Missile Bureau, issued a launch order to the Second Red Flag Company... The missile traveled up to a maximum altitude of 6 518.2 km and flew a distance of 1 002.3 km for 4 415s before accurately landing on the preset area in the open waters off the East Sea of Korea.* (KCNA, 19 December 2023)
1. **SP**	**14 Jan. 2024** 14:53	**Possible IRBM**		Toward the North-east, falling in the sea east of the Korean Peninsula.	50 (JPN)	1 000 (ROK) Over 500 (JPN)	Presumed to be an IRBM by the ROK JCS. The DPRK alleged it carried a maneuverable controlled warhead.	*The DPRK Missile Administration conducted a test-fire of an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile loaded with a hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead. (KCNA, 14 January 2024).*

Source: Member States, the Panel, KCNA.

Annex 10: Weapons systems shown at the 27 July 2023 military parade which use ballistic missile technology

10.1. SRBM KN-23. Also shown in 2023 at the 8 February 2023 parade. First declared test on 4 May 2019.







Source: KCTV.

SRBM Hwasong 11Ga
(or standard "KN-23")

- Solid propellant.
- Maximum range: over 600 km. Possible launches in 2022 and 2023 of Hwasong 11/Ga missiles show a range extending to 900 km.
- Unveiled at a 4 May 2019 test and presented at the military parade on 10 October 2020. Multiple launches in 2022 and 2023. On 19 March 2023, the missile fired (seemingly from a silo) was described as a "tactical ballistic missile tipped with a mock nuclear warhead".
- Four versions incl. a navalized one.
- 12 missiles shown.
- 4-axle wheeled TELs.
- See S/2023/656, para.17, 18, 20, 24, Annex 10, 13, 22
- S/2023/171, para.29, fig.5, tab.1, annexes 24 and 25,
- S/2022/668, fig.6, 12, 14, 15, 17, tab. 1, annexes 14, 18, 22, 23.
- S/2022/132, para.25, fig.10, tab.1, annex 21, fig.21-4
- S/2021/211, fig.1, annex 12
- S/2020/840, para.11, tab.1, annex 7
- S/2020/151, para.194, tab.3, annex 58

10.2. SRBM KN-24. Also shown at the 8 February 2023 parade. First declared test on 10 August 2019 (then described as "*a tactical guided weapon*").



Source: KCTV.

Probable SRBM Hwasong 11Na (or "KN-24")

- Solid propellant.
- Maximum range: 370 to 400 km.
- Last identified launch on 30 August 2023. First tested on 10 August 2019.
- Unveiled at a 10 August 2019 test and presented at the military parades on 10 October 2020, 14 January 2021 and at the missile exhibition "Self-Defence 2021" on 11 October 2021.
- 12 missiles shown in canisters carried on 4-wheeled vehicles. The Hwasong 11/Na had been displayed in the past on tracked vehicles (e.g., on 25 April 2022).
- See S/2023/171 tab.1, annex 24, 25.
- S/2022/668 fig.13, tab.1, annex 14, 18, 22, 23
- S/2022/132 para.25, fig.10, tab.1, annex 21, fig.21-4.
- S/2021/211 fig.1, annex 12.
- S/2020/840 para.11, tab.1, annex 7.
- S/2020/151 para.194, tab.3, annex 59.

10.3. *Super-large multiple rocket launcher* / SRBM KN-25. Also shown in 2023 at the parade on 8 February 2023 and the Pyongyang "Weaponry Exhibition" on 26 July 2023. First declared test on 24 August 2019.



Source: KCTV.

Super-large

multiple rocket launcher 600 mm

(or "KN-25")

- Solid propellant.
- Guided, with a range of appx. 380 km. Described by DPRK authorities as "a tactical nuclear attack means".
- Frequent launches in 2022 and 2023.
- Presented at the Pyongyang Weaponry Exhibition on 26 July 2023 by Kim Jong Un himself. First tested on 24 August 2019 test and presented at the military parade on 10 October 2020.
- 24 missiles were shown, carried on 4-axle wheeled TELs (each carrying four launch containers).
- See S/2023/656 para.17, 20, annex 10, 13.
- S/2023/171 para.28, annex 16, 24, 25.
- S/2022/668 fig.18, tab. 1, annex 22, 23.
- S/2022/132 para.25, fig.11, tab.1, annex 21, fig.21-4.
- S/2021/211 para.20, fig.3, 4, annex 12.
- S/2020/840 para.11, tab.1, annex 7.
- S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 59.

10.4. IRBM Hwasong-12Na fitted with a purported hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). Also displayed at the Pyongyang "Weaponry Exhibition" on 26 July 2023.





Picture from the Pyongyang Weaponry Exhibition on 26 July 2023





IRBM Hwasong-12Na

fitted with a purported Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)

- One stage powered by a liquid propellant engine, derived from the Hwasong-12.
- No known test to date.
- Variant of the Hwasong 12 which was first tested in 2017. Designated "Hwasong 12Na" at the Pyongyang Weaponry Exhibition on 26 July 2023.
- An alleged HGV was tested by the DPRK in 2021 and 2022.
- Four missiles were shown., carried on 6-axle wheeled TELs
- See S/2023/171, para 20 and 21.
- S/2022/668, para.20, 21, fig.10, tab.1, annex 15, 23,
- S/2022/132, para. 19-20, 23, tab.1, annex 22.

Source: KCTV, X/Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, annotations by the Panel.

10.5. ICBM Hwasong-17. Also shown in 2023 at the parade on 8 February and the Pyongyang "Weaponry Exhibition" on 26 July. First shown at a military parade on 10 October 2020 and tested on 24 March 2022.







ICBM Hwasong-17

- Two stages powered by liquid propellant engines. The first stage is powered by a variant of the RD-250 twin-combustion chamber (or "Paektusan" line engine) in a combination of two engines and four nozzles.
- Potential intercontinental range of up to 15,000 km, according to a Member State's simulation.
- Unveiled at the military parade on 10 October 2020. First possible test on 27 February 2022. Declared tested by the DPRK on 24 March 2022. Last launch on 16 March 2023.
- At least three missiles were shown in camouflage paint, carried on 11-axle wheeled TELs. Numbers include 321, 373, 379.
- Missile ㅈ 09151815 on TEL 379.
- See S/2023/656/para.15, 16, 17, fig.2, annex 10, 13.
- S/2023/171 para.26, tab.1, annex 16, 24, 25.
- S/2022/668 para.20, fig.8, tab.1, annex 13, 16, 17, 21, 23.
- S/2022/132 fig.4.
- S/2021/777 para.17.
- S/2021/211 para.17 Annex 10.

Source: KCTV.

10.6. ICBM Hwasong-18. Unveiled at the 8 February 2023 and first tested on 13 April 2023.







ICBM Hwasong-18

- Three stages powered by solid propellant motors.
- Potential intercontinental range (not established) of up to 10,000 km according to a Member State's simulation. Some experts give it a longer range.
- Unveiled at the 8 February 2023 parade. First tested on 13 April 2023. then on 12 July 2023 and 18 December 2023.
- A mock-up of a similar looking solid-fuel missile was first shown on an 8-axle wheeled TEL at a parade in Pyongyang on 15 April 2017 (see S/2017/742 para.9)
- At least three missiles were shown in camouflage paint.
- They were carried on 9-axle wheeled TEL. The numbers on the chassis include 571 and 574, 577. Numbers 571 and 574 already featured in the 8 February 2023 military parade.
- There were no visible markings on the missile bodies.
- See S/2023/656/para.12, 14, 15, 24, fig.1, annex 10, 11, 12, 13.

Source: KCTV.

Annex 11: The Hwasong-18 ICBM launch on 18 December 2023 at 8:24 KST

39°07′37″N 125°57′51″E / An agricultural field 20 km north-east of Pyongyang


Figure 11.1: Identification of the location of the launch



Source: Maxar, annotated by the Panel.




Source: KCNA, annotated by the Panel.




Source: Google Earth Pro, 26 January 2024, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 11.2: Launch marks at the tentative location



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 11.3: Trajectory of the missile



Source: Ministry of Defence, Japan, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 12: Excerpts of a January 2024 study of the Hwasong-18 ICBM by Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique[190] (translations in English by the Panel)


Cold-launch technology



1. Pyrotechnic triggering of the ejection of the in-canister holding devices.
2. Ejection of the parts of the in-canister holding devices.
3. Ejection of the nozzle protection shell of the first stage.
4. Cold launch from the tube (or "canister") with gas generator and ignition of the first stage outside of the tube.

[...]

Dimensions




SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE HS-18 TEL AND APPROXIMATE DIMENSIONING (CREDITS: C. MAIRE)

[Note: estimates based on the length of the TEL chassis and the width of the TEL cabin (3.35 m)].

[…]

[190] C.Maire, S.Delory, "Analyse de l'ICBM Hwasongpho-18 (HS-18)", *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*, 2024. https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/programme-coree-securite-diplomatie/publications/2024/012024.pdf.



FOCUS ON THE POSITION OF THE MISSILE IN THE TUBE (CREDITS: KCNA)

“Taking these observations into account, the length of the section containing the missile is 25.50 meters and the total length of the tube, including the ejection system, is 29 meters. The length of the missile could be estimated at 23.50 meters.

[…]

If we assume that the tube is rather 2.10 meters, this means that the missile could have a diameter of slightly less than 2 meters, namely 1.90 meters. In this case, the sizing of the device would lead to a total length of 22.60 meters.”

Evolution of the cap removal mechanism



PYROTECHNIC EJECTION OF THE TUBE DOOR BEFORE LAUNCH (CREDITS: KCNA)

[Panel note: 12 July 2023 launch].



LOWERING OF THE DOOR BEFORE THE ERECTION OF THE TUBE (CREDITS: KCNA)

[Panel note: 18 December 2023 launch].

“The TEL used for the launch on December 18, 2023, uses a foldable door, without a pyrotechnic device.”

Annex 13: Launches on 30 August 2023 of Hwasong-11Na SRBMs (Hwasong 11B / KN-24)

Statements by the DPRK[191]

…the KPA staged a tactical nuclear strike drill simulating scorched earth strikes at major command centers and operational airfields of the "ROK" military gangsters at night on August 30.

The tactical nuclear-armed unit of the KPA in the western region of the country conducted the relevant military activities.

The missile unit fired two tactical ballistic missiles northeastward at Pyongyang International Airport and correctly carried out its nuclear strike mission through air bursts at a preset altitude of 400 metres above the target island.

Identification of the missiles launched as Hwasong-11B/Na



Probable location of the reported air burst: Alsom Island (40° 38′ 48″ N 129° 32′ 58″ E), 365 km from Sunan International airport



[191] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1693472894-954639895/kpa-general-staff-releases-report/.

Annex 14: 2nd Malligyong-1 satellite launch on 24 August 2023 from the area of Sohae


Statements by the DPRK

The National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) of the DPRK conducted the second launch of reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 aboard the new-type carrier rocket Chollima-1 at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Cholsan County of North Phyongan Province at dawn of August 24…. The flights of the first and second stages of the rocket were normal, but the launch failed due to an error in the emergency blasting system during the third-stage flight. .... The NADA expressed the stand that it would conduct the third reconnaissance satellite launch in October after thoroughly probing the reason and taking measures.

(KCNA, 24 August 2023).

Assessment

The DPRK gave prior notice of this launch to Japan's coast guard, NAVAREA coordinator for the area where the stages were to drop. The DPRK did not warn the IMO, which it had for the first launch of a Chollima-1 launcher on 31 May 2023, nor again the ICAO or the ITU. Contrary to 31 May 2023, the DPRK did not release any picture of the launch, which happened at night, and did it provide any other data pertaining to it.



Source: Japan MoD.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) of Japan confirmed the launch of an object using ballistic missile technology on 24 August 2023 at around 3:51 (KST) from Tongchang-ri (the village next to the DPRK's current satellite launching grounds). Japan reported that the rocket separated into three pieces which all fell outside the anticipated drop areas, issued in the navigational warning:

- one piece fell approximately 300 km west of the Korean Peninsula,
- another fell in approximately 350 km southwest of the Korean Peninsula,
- the last one was estimated to have passed over between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island at around 4:00, and to have fallen in the Pacific Ocean appx. 600 km east of the Philippines at around 4:05.

The DPRK attributed the failure of the launch to an "*error in the emergency blasting system*". This could refer to a self-destruct system which would normally activate when internal sensors report irregular data or the rocket veers off course. Fitting such a system on a rocket is warranted for safety reasons but could also be meant in this instance to prevent attempts at retrieval of debris, as was the case in June and July 2023, when the ROK navy salvaged parts of the Chollima-1 rocket and the Malligyong-1 satellite launched on 31 May.

If that is the cause of the failure, then it would mean the DPRK made progress after the first launch having this time been able to conduct second stage separation, and then most probably third stage separation, notable achievements though they were first reached through the Hwasong-14 (2017), Hwasong-15 (2017), Hwasong-17 (2022) and the three-stage Hwasong-18 (2023) ICBM launches. NADA (KPe.029) was renamed National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA).

Annex 15: 3rd Malligyong-1 satellite launch on 21 November 2023 from the area of Sohae

Statements by the DPRK

The National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA) … successfully launched the new-type carrier rocket "Chollima-1" loaded with the reconnaissance satellite "Malligyong-1" at the Sohae Satellite Launching … at 22:42:28 on November 21 (2023). The carrier rocket … accurately put the reconnaissance satellite "Malligyong-1" on its orbit at 22:54:13.

NATA is to present a plan for continuing to secure the capability … by additionally launching several reconnaissance satellites in a short span of time.

Kim Jong Un…oversaw the launch on the spot. He was accompanied by Kim Jong Sik, vice department director of the WPK Central Committee, and Jang Chang Ha, general director of the DPRK General Missile Bureau.

Noting that the DPRK has finally developed and possessed aerospace reconnaissance capability by its own efforts and technologies, Kim Jong Un said that it is a great event in developing the armed forces of the Republic and coping with a new military situation in the region.

Figure 15.1: The launch and its aftermath in DPRK media



Assessment

Launch

The MoD of Japan reported that on 21 November, at around 22:4 (KST), the DPRK conducted a launch using ballistic missile technology from the Tongchang-ri area.



Source: Japan MoD.

The rocket separated into pieces:

- at around 22:50 (KST), the first one fell outside of the announced drop area (note: the drop area announced to the NAVAREA coordinator) over the East China Sea, approx. 350 km west of the Korean Peninsula.
- at around 22:55 (KST), the second one is estimated to have passed over between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island, and to have fallen in the announced drop area in the Pacific Ocean approx. 1,200 km southwest of Okinotori Island, outside Japan's EEZ, at around 22:57 (KST).

The DPRK had warned Japan's Coast Guard of the launch, but not the IMO, ICAO or ITU. The DPRK did not register the Malligyong-1 satellite with UNOOSA.

Aftermath

This launch came after failed ones on 31 May[192] and 24 August 2023. On this third attempt on 21 November, the Chollima-1 launcher did release a satellite into orbit.

The DPRK had registered an earth observation satellite after the launch of the Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite from a Unha-3 rocket on 12 December 2012[193] and another one a few weeks after the launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4 on 7 February 2016[194].

The Minister of Defense of Japan, stated on 24 November that *"[Japan] has collaborated with the United States and South Korea to progress in the analysis, and as a result, it has been confirmed that some object launched by North Korea is orbiting the Earth"*. According to public data[195], the Malligyong-1 satellite (international designation 2023-179A) was as on 26 January 2024 in a stable 512 km x 488 km orbit at an inclination of 97.43 degrees to the Equator with an orbital period of 94.65 minutes.

DPRK media reported that Kim Jong Un twice visited the General Control Center of NATA in Pyongyang after the launch, on 22 and 25 November. The DPRK claimed then and since that the satellite transmitted pictures of various locations, among which:

- The island of Guam,
- The "Norfolk Naval Station", "Newport News Dockyard" and an airfield in Virginia,
- The "San Diego Naval Base",
- The "Kadena base" in Okinawa,
- The "Hickam air-force base" in Honolulu,
- Jinhae, Pusan (Busan), Ulsan, Phohang (Pohang), Taegu (Daegu) in the ROK, allegedly between 09:59:40 and 10:02:10 (KST),
- The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, when calling in Pusan (Busan), allegedly at 10:01 (KST),
- The Suez Canal[196].

[192] S/2023/668/para 21.
[193] S/2013/337/para 30.
[194] Source UNOOSA and see S/2016/para 27, para 48, annex 5.
[195] https://www.space-track.org/.
[196] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1700962715-973234535/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-visits-nata-pyongyang-general-control-center-again-to-watch-aerospace-photos-of-enemys-major-target-region-taken-on-morning-of-november-25/ http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyMy0xMS0yOC1IMDA0QDE1QDFAQDBAMQ

Given the stated military purpose of the satellite, this messaging can be deemed aggressive and directed. It shows an intent to bolster ballistic missile targeting and damage assessment capabilities on specific locations.


The Panel took notice of a press report indicating the camera on the first Malligyong-1 satellite, which fell into the sea on 31 May 2023, carried a Japanese-made commercial digital camera[197] no longer in production.

An outside expert[198] noted that the satellite's orbit allowed it to appear over the Korean Peninsula around 10:00 and 22:00 (KST) every five days and assessed the DPRK would need an operational network of five or so satellites to ensure regular day time coverage, notwithstanding weather conditions such as cloud coverage which would require more complex radar satellites to get imagery of the ground. Kim Jong Un announced at the Plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers Party on 30 December 2023 that the DPRK plans to launch three more satellites in 2024.

Key takeaways

The bright and clear exhaust plume shows the first stage is powered by liquid-fuel engines, and the four visible nozzles (see figure below) indicate a possible combination of two two-chambered RD-250-like (or "Paektusan") engines. This combination was first tested on the Hwasong-17 ICBM. The DPRK is deemed able to manufacture by itself an engine similar to the RD-250, an engine designed in the 1960's by 'Energomash NPO' and manufactured until 1991 by the 'Yuzhmash' plant in Ukraine. This, given the number of engines used to date, and the fact it has machinery to produce critical parts, including the impeller for the turbopump[199].

Figure 15.2 Exhaust of the Chollima-1 space launch vehicle



Source: KCTV.

The 21 November 2023 launch showed good command of stage separation phases, which had not been completed during the first launch on 31 May 2023. It also shows NATA is confident in its payload release technology. The releasing of the Malligyong-1 satellite in space comes after those of the Kwangmyongsong-3 and Kwangmyongsong-4 satellites, respectively on 12 December 2012 and 7 February 2016. Lessons drawn from this repeated achievement could be applied to the DPRK's ICBM programme.

One of the posters released in December 2023 to celebrate the event shows the Malligyong-1 satellite over two ICBMs, a Hwasong-17 and a Hwasong-18 (see Figure 2) demonstrating, *inter alia*, that it is in support of the DPRK's ICBM capability. The prominent presence at the event of Kim Jong Sik (KPi.066), deputy director of the Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028) [200], and of the recently appointed head of the Missile General Bureau Jang Chang Ha (KPi.037), designated for their involvement in the DPRK's ballistic missile program, is another indication of strong crossover with the country's space program.

[197] https://www.donga.com/en/home/article/all/20231127/4580833/1.
[198] https://www.38north.org/2023/11/modest-beginnings-north-korea-launches-its-first-reconnaissance-satellite/.
[199] Panel Consultations with the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies on 11 December 2023.
[200] The Panel reported in the past on the involvement of the Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028) in the Unha-3 SLV project (S/2013/337/para 37).

Annex 16: Developments at the new Sohae satellite launch pad from May to December 2023

Preparations for the first launch in May 2023

Installation of a cover hall



Planet Labs Inc. 23 May 2023

Rail-mounted cover hall in place



Planet Labs Inc. 29 May 2023

Gathering of vehicles and equipment



Planet Labs Inc. 30 May 2023

First launch on 31 May 2023

Daytime launch (6:27 KST) on 31 May



KCNA

Debris displaced at sear from the launch exhaust



Planet Labs Inc. 31 May 2023 01:29 UTC

The cover hall kept forward after the launch.



Planet Labs Inc. 2 June 2023

Developments from June to December 2023

Equipment stored on the tarmac



Planet Labs Inc. 24 June 2023

Retraction of the cover hall revealing the support structure for the SLV (the "strongback")



Maxar 8 September 2023

Strongback as shown on 21 November

Nighttime launch (22:42 KST) on 21 Nov.



Rodong Sinmun

Note: no pictures were released of the failed nighttime launch on 24 August 2023 and there isn't any available relevant satellite imagery of the event.

Annex 17: Launching of the *841 Hero Kim Kun Ok* "*tactical nuclear attack*" submarine on 6 September 2023

Launching of the *No.841 Hero Kim Kun Ok* submarine on 6 September 2023







Source: KCNA, 8 September 2023.

Excerpts of Kim Jong Un's speech on 6 Sept. 2023 at the "Pongdae shipyard"

The historic moment has come when the first tactical nuclear attack submarine we have built wets its name and body in the blue water of our sea. .... Our intention to turn all the other existing medium-sized submarines into attack ones like this one, which can carry tactical nukes..., in addition to our development-oriented, prospective plan for building nuclear submarines.

This submarine ...is capable of carrying a large number of means for delivering nukes of various powers and of launching a preemptive or retaliatory strike.

In the past we... focused on building many small and fast submarines, true to our Navy's mission which is restricted to defending our territorial waters. But the times have changed .... I confirm that the mission of absolute importance, which no other services will be able to accomplish, will be fulfilled only when we, in five or ten years, usher in an era when our Navy changes. In this regard, the most important thing is to go nuclear.


...We should give greater impetus to the building of nuclear-powered submarine

Source: KCNA, 8 September 2023.



KCNA, 8 September 2023.

The *841* is based on a submarine of appx.76 m in length. A section with 10 hatches for vertical missile tubes was added in the middle. It was seen being built in July 2019, during a visit of Kim Jong Un.



Planet Labs, 6 September 2023 22:56 UTC.

The old north construction hall in the Sinpo south shipyard from where the *841* was launched on 6 September 2023.




Planet Labs, 6 September 2023.

Possibly the *841* moored on a pier in the Sinpo south shipyard after the ceremony.



Planet Labs, 6 September 2023.

The *841* with a submersible missile test barge berthed alongside.



Airbus D&S Pleiades. See next page for a blow-up of this picture.

The *841* entering the Sinpo South secure basin on 8 Sept. 2023
The *841* is the only DPRK submarine well over 80 m long.



Planet Labs, 6 September 2023.

A submarine still moored in the basin on 19 September. Probably as seen later the Gorae-class *8.24 Yongung*, launched in 2014.



Planet Labs, 24 September 2023.

The *841* is berthed in the west quay under a canopy. The *8.24 Yongung* temporarily left the secure basin before 24 September.



Planet Labs, 5 October 2023.

The *8.24 Yongung* having regained its position on the right.



Planet Labs, 2 January 2023.

The *8.24 Yongung* was then moved to the pier on the left. The *841* and the *8.24* remained in the basin into January 2024.

Suspected Submarine 841 Seen at Sinpo Shipyard on
8 September 2023


UN Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)



UNITED NATIONS
January 2024, Map No.4685

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Figure 17.1 Pukguksong-3 SLBM dimensions as evaluated by a Member State



Note: before its test-launch on 1 October 2019, this SLBM fit in a transport launch tube of a diameter of around 1.8 meter.

Source: Member State from KCNA & Rodong Sinmun pictures.

Note: Member States estimate its maximum range to be between 1,700 km and appx. 2,000 km.

Annex 18: Inspection of TEL production between 3 and 5 August 2023 at the March 16 Factory in Pyongsong and at the same possible location on 5 January 2024

39°16′53″N 125°52′11″E

Official reports

1st visit between 3 and 5 August 2023

Kim Jong Un learned about the production of erector launchers for major strategic weapon….

He highly appreciated the fact that the factory has built a firm foundation for production and dynamically pushed ahead with the production of erector launchers by concentrating efforts on updating production processes and increasing production capacity in line with the intention of the Party which set the production of large-sized erector launchers as the most important work for bolstering up the national defence capability[201].



Source: KCNA, KCTV.

2nd visit on 5 January 2024

Referring to the importance of producing various TELs for tactical and strategic weapons in ceaselessly bolstering the nuclear war deterrent of the country and the operational demand of our army, he [Kim Jung Un] specified the immediate plan for production of varieties of TELs, long-term production plan and task of production capacity expansion.



Source: Rodong Sinmun.

[201] http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202308/news06/20230806-01ee.html.

Assessment

- An unprecedented number of vehicles can be seen in the pictures :
  - 11-axle TELs for the Hwasong-17 ICBM
  - 9-axle TELs for the Hwasong-18 ICBM
  - Hwasong-11A/Na (KN-23) SRBM TELs
  - Hwasong-11C/Ga (KN-23 larger version) SRBM TELs
  - Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) TELs for the 600 mm system (KN-25)[202]
- The emphasis was on the improvement of manufacturing processes and production volume.
- The DPRK apparently has improved its domestic TEL manufacturing capability, including of large tires[203].

Figure 18.1: Weapons systems of the TELs displayed on 3-5 August 2023



Source: KCNA, KCTV, annotations by the Panel.

Figure 18.2: Hwasong-18 ICBMs and TELs displayed on 5 January 2024



Source: Rodong Sinmun.

[202] See T. Goo, https://twitter.com/GreatPoppo/status/1688158954663313409.
[203] They bore no foreign markings in these pictures and on some ICBM TELs in 2023 contrary to the past.

Annex 19: Inspection "*shells of super large-caliber multiple rocket launchers*" production on 3 August 2023

Possibly at the Kanggye General Tractor Plant, that Kim Jun Un had visited publicly in June 2019[204].

39°16′53″N 125°52′11″E

Official reports

The location was described as a "*factory producing the shells of super large-caliber multiple rocket launchers"*. [It] "*has improved the precision processing capability and realized automation by introducing new equipment and measuring devices on a large scale into the overall production process to create the serial production capability for the shells of ultra-precision large-caliber multiple rocket launchers.*"

Kim Jung Un learned in detail about the modernization of technology and production processes the factory carried out recently"*… he was very pleased to see that various measuring devices have been introduced to ensure scientific accuracy in the control of the quality of shells and shorten the time for heat treatment of the propulsion tube*.



Source: KCNA, KCTV, Rodong Sinmun, annotation by the Panel.

Assessment

- The *super-large-caliber multiple rocket launchers* are also known as the KN-25 SRBM system.
- DPRK missile plants seem to be flow-forming metal to manufacture rocket bodies.
- Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools are used at this plant.

[204] According to the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies. See.https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1689044152598544384 and http://www.ryongnamsan.edu.kp/univ/en/revodaily/92cc227532d17e56e07902b254dfad10

Annex 20: Inspection of SRBM production at the February 11 Plant in Hamhung on 11 or 12 August 2023

39°49′26″N 127°35′15″E

Official reports

A factory producing tactical missiles [which] perfected the scientific and technological issues arising in production, has improved *"automation and modernization"* and is *"steadily expanding its production capacity."*

Kim Jung Un… was accompanied by Jo Chun Ryong and Kim Jong Sik.

He set forth an important goal to drastically boost the existing missile production capacity on the basis of the successes already achieved by the factory so as to mass-produce missile.



Source: KCNA.

Assessment

- Many SRBM casings can be seen in pictures of the visit, seemingly of the Hwasong-11A/Ga-Da (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B/Na (KN-24) type missiles, driving the point they had entered mass production.
- The official reports stressed the use of CNC machine tool, automation, manufacturing processes.

Annex 21: Inspection of TEL production at the Sinhung Machine Factory[205] on 11 or 12 August 2023

39°39'4″N 125°21'32″E

Official reports

A "*factory producing tactical missile transporter erector launchers*".



Source: KCNA, annotations by the Panel.

Assessment

- The DPRK manufactures medium-sized tracked and wheeled TELs in large numbers. It repeatedly highlights the mobility of its short-range ballistic missile arsenal and therefore its survivability.
- The Hwasong-11B was shown on a wheeled TEL rather than a tracked TEL at the 27 July 2023 military parade and then at a launch on 30 August 2023.

Annex 21.1: Inspection of TEL production for Hwasong-11Ra SRBMs between 5 and 10 January 2024

Official reports



Assessment

- A number of Hwasong 11Ra TELs can be seen in the pictures.
- The Hwasong 11Ra, also designated Hwasong 11D, is a smaller variant of the Hwasong 11Ga (KN-23). It was first seen when fired on 16 April 2022.

[205] As identified by NK News. See https://www.nknews.org/pro/arms-odyssey-inside-kim-jong-uns-second-tour-of-weapons-factories-this-month/.

Annex 22: DPRK statements related to the use of ballistic missile technology from 29 Jul. 2023 to 26 Jan. 2024

Source: KCNA, Rodong Sinmun.

Regarding ballistic missile launches

The KPA staged a tactical nuclear strike drill simulating scorched earth strikes at major command centers and operational airfields of the "ROK"… The missile unit fired two tactical ballistic missiles northeastward at Pyongyang International Airport and correctly carried out its nuclear strike mission through air bursts at a preset altitude of 400 meters above the target island. (30 August 2023 launches).

A drill of launching ICBM Hwasongpho-18 was staged as an important military action to clearly show the DPRK's nuclear strategic forces' overwhelming counteraction will and matchless strength to the enemies….Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, watched the launching drill of an ICBM unit on the spot…. The drill was aimed to review the combat readiness of the DPRK's nuclear war deterrence and confirm its mobility, combat capability and reliability (18 Dec. 2023 launch).

Regarding engine tests

The missile industry of the DPRK has developed new-type high-thrust solid-fuel engines for intermediate-range ballistic missile again, ..., and successfully conducted the first ground jet tests of the first-stage engine and the second-stage engine on November 11 and 14 respectively…[It is] an important task of the missile industry to improve ICBM Hwasongpho-18 and IRBM. The DPRK General Missile Bureau attached great significance to the development of the new-type IRBM. (11 and 14 November 2023 tests in Maggun-Po and Sohae)

Regarding the new "*tactical nuclear attack*" submarine *841- Hero Kim Kun Ok*

The historic moment has come when the first tactical nuclear attack submarine we have built wets its name and body in the blue water of our sea. …. Our intention to turn all the other existing medium-sized submarines into attack ones like this one, which can carry tactical nukes…, in addition to our development-oriented, prospective plan for building nuclear submarines…This submarine …is capable of carrying a large number of means for delivering nukes of various powers and of launching a preemptive or retaliatory strike. (6 September 2023 speech by Kim Jung Un)

Regarding the institution of a "Missile Industry Day" to commemorate the launch of a Hwasong-17 ICBM.

The institution of the missile industry day is a manifestation of the steadfast will of the Workers' Party of Korea, the government of the DPRK and all the Korean people to eternally record November 18, Juche 111 (2022) when the might of a world-class nuclear power and the strongest ICBM possessor was demonstrated to the whole world … (5 Nov. 2023 session of the Permanent Commission of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly)

Congratulations to the Missile General Bureau and the Hwasong-18 ICBM operators

[Kim Jong Un] said that the resolute military activity conducted by the company this time true to the Party's battle order was … a clear explanation of the offensive counteraction mode and the evolution of the nuclear strategy and doctrine of the DPRK not to hesitate even a nuclear attack when the enemy provoke it with nukes. (20 December 2023 visit to


Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Meets and Congratulates Soldiers of Second Red Flag Company under General Missile Bureau

At the 9th plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers Party on 30 December 2023

The test-fires and launching drills of ICBM Hwasongpho-17 and Hwasongpho-18 were successfully conducted several times in the course of further accelerating the development of nuclear weapons. … The DPRK conducted in an offensive way major military activities including launching drills of tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles… (In report by general secretary Kim Jong Un "On the review of the implementation of the Party and state policies in 2023").

According to KCNA, "*the conclusion clarified the task for the field of space development to launch in addition three reconnaissance satellites in 2024".*

Annex 23: Launch on 14 January 2024 of a possible IRBM with a maneuvering reentry vehicle

Statements by the DPRK[206]

On the afternoon of January 14, the DPRK Missile Administration conducted a test-fire of an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile loaded with a hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead.

The test-fire was aimed at verifying the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.

It was successfully conducted.

The test-fire never affected the security of any neighboring country and had nothing to do with the regional situation.

The Missile Administration explained that the test is a part of the administration and its affiliated defence science institutes' regular activities for developing powerful weapon systems.



Source: KCNA.

Trajectory



Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan.

Note: the ROK JCS reported it appeared to be an IRBM that flew around 1,000 km.

[206] http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/64e900f5bd0353837ca02d7babcce3ad6c73263e00a38ff0e08c8c90fdb5f0b71866e0c7bc6571e831ca2182de7032d0.kcmsf

Annex 24: Website of the Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU)

FEEU has announced that Kim Jong Un has visited the university, and it explains that 43 students from DPRK are studying at the university, and that "FEFU has built long-term mutually beneficial relationships with three partner universities in North Korea: Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies and Kim Il Sung University".



FEFU Int. Admission Office:
+7 (423) 265 24 24
(ext. 2209)

FEFU 1899 FAR EASTERN FEDERAL UNIVERSITY

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English version / News / FEFU News

News in Press-centre

Sep 21, 2023 - FEFU News

President of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Jong Un, visited the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University as a part of his diplomatic visit to Russia. DPRK Leader met with FEFU President Boris Korobets, got to know the history of the creation of the leading university in the Far East, the main directions of its activities, as well as plans to expand the scientific and educational work on campus.

As Boris Korobets told Kim Jong Un, currently FEFU is one of the biggest universities in the country and a leader in education in the Far East. Around 20 thousand students from 85 regions of the country study at the university that offers 250 educational programs in technical, engineering, technological, humanitarian, natural science, medical, pedagogical, socio-economic, mathematical and IT fields. More than 100 departments, which include 12 schools and institutes, faculty of 1,800, and more than 160 laboratories of the university are open to both beginners and world-famous scientists.

"12 years ago, President Vladimir Putin identified two main objectives for the Far Eastern Federal University: social development and saturating the workforce of the Far Eastern Federal District economy, as well as developing the Far East and Primorsky Territory as a center of science and education in the Asia-Pacific direction. As a result, we have a very wide geography of admissions. Every year, more than 60% of our first-year enrollment is from outside the Primorsky Territory, and 35% come from the European part of Russia and foreign countries. We attract the best youth in the Far East and see our mission as providing the best personnel in the most dynamically developing region of our country," emphasized Boris Korobets.

Far Eastern Federal University is one of the key centers of Korean Studies in Russia and it has been for more than 120 years. FEFU has built long-term mutually beneficial relationships with three partner universities in North Korea: Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies and Kim Il Sung University. Today, 450 Russians study Korean language and culture at the university.

"It is of a great significance that in the conditions of sanctions pressure exerted on our country, and at a time when many dream of us being isolated, we have more than 3,500 international students from 89 countries studying here, including 43 students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. FEFU is a unique center for international students; we have created the best conditions for students' life and professional development: comfortable dormitories, a Pacific Ocean bay and our own beach, sports infrastructure, a modern medical center, numerous engineering centers and laboratories equipped with the latest technology. And there will only be more such opportunities - for example, we are now designing the MegaScience installation "Russian Photon Source". This is a photon radiation accelerator that will allow one to "look deeper" into the matter and conduct research to develop effective drugs, new materials, and complex chemical and physical processes. We already have a huge number of applications from international research teams who want to work on this equipment here in the Far East," noted FEFU President.

Boris Korobets emphasized that the educational process and scientific research are closely related to the needs of the largest Russian companies - leaders of economic sectors that largely shape the labor market in the Far East. FEFU actively interacts with industrial partners: for example, at the last Eastern Economic Forum a joint engineering center was opened with the RusHydro company.

"We want as many students as possible to start working in hydropower engineering – this is a promising area of development. We will be very glad if students from the DPRK can get involved in this process and develop new technological solutions that are effective for the development of our countries and preserving the environment of the planet," added FEFU President Boris Korobets in a conversation with President of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK Kim Jong Un.

Source: FEFU website.

Annex 25: Reply from the Russian Federation

Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU) does not violate the UN SC sanctions and does not facilitate any activities by the DPRK in the field of nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile or other programs related to weapons of mass destruction.

There are in fact no academic exchanges between FEFU and the DPRK. Students and professors of the Russian institution have not been to the DPRK for the last five years. Also, the DPRK scholars do not work in FEFU. There is no scientific cooperation between FEFU and North Korean institutes and organizations.

Since 2017 the overall number of the students from the DPRK in FEFU has not exceeded 20 people. A part of them has returned from Russia back home before the border's closure right after the start of the COVID pandemic. At present, there remain at the university children of the consular officers who study bachelor humanities programs such as linguistics, philology, international affairs, history and archeology. There is no scientific research made in collaboration with FEFU professors. Also, there are no North Korean masters degree holders or postgraduates in FEFU.

Annex 26: Media Report about an agreement signed between Universities of DPRK and Mexico, 30 September 2023

Agreement Signed between Universities of DPRK and Mexico

Pyongyang, September 30 (KCNA) -- An agreement on friendship and cooperation between Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering of the DPRK and Interamericana University of the United Mexican States was made in Mexico on Sept. 22.

Pang Sun Chol, rector of Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering, and Jose David Ortega, president of Interamericana University, signed the agreement. -0-

www.kcna.kp (Juche112.9.30.)

Source: KCNA, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/57633d9b44c6ddba14a2deebaeb564f6.kcmsf.

Annex 27: Friendship agreement between Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering of DPRK and Interamericana University in Mexico

CONVENIO DE COLABORACIÓN DE AMISTAD QUE CELEBRAN, POR UNA PARTE, LA UNIVERSIDAD MAQUINARIA DE PYONGYANG DE LA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DEMOCRÁTICA DE COREA Y, POR LA OTRA, LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA A.C., EN ADELANTE "LA INTER" DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

DECLARACIONES

La Universidad Maquinaria de Pyongyang de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la Universidad Interamericana de Puebla de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (en adelante se denominará AMBAS PARTES) acordaron celebrar el presente Convenio para establecer una COLABORACIÓN DE AMISTAD entre las dos Universidades y realizar la cooperación de forma mutua en el campo de la educación y la ciencia y técnica, reconociendo que:

"LA UNIVERSIDAD MAQUINARIA DE PYONGYANG":

I. Se ha fundado el Primero de Septiembre de 1959 y tiene la misión de la Universidad rectora que forma talentosos técnicos mecánicos de varias ramas de la economía nacional que poseen los conocimientos científico-técnicos de alto nivel y la capacidad mental.
II. Es una Institución que imparte estudios de nivel superior de varias ramas como ingeniería de producción maquinaria, ingeniería de materia, tecnología de información, ingeniería mecánica, ingeniería de equipos de transporte, tecnología de automatización, etc., así como diplomados, seminarios y talleres.
III. Que cuenta con domicilio oficial ubicado en el Barrio Munhung No.1, Distrito Taedongang, Pyongyang.

"LA INTER":

I. Que es una institución de Educación Superior que imparte estudios de nivel superior en sus tipos de licenciatura con reconocimiento de validez oficial de estudios otorgado por la Secretaria de Educación Pública del Estado de Puebla, y registro ante la Dirección General de Profesiones clave 21MSU8890E, así como diplomados, cursos, seminarios y talleres en diferentes áreas del conocimiento.
II. Que cuenta con domicilio fiscal ubicado en Avenida del Castillo 5933 INT 7, Colonia Lomas de Angelópolis, Puebla, Puebla, México, con Registro Federal de Contribuyentes número UIN850703TQ4.
III. Que en la misión de "LA INTER" está el ayudar en el proceso de

1

formación integral de cada uno de sus estudiantes, para que sean personas integras, excelentes profesionistas, con grandes capacidades de liderazgo y de sostener y dirigir su propia superación. Estar comprometido mediante la colaboración con otras instituciones nacionales y extranjeras para el desarrollo de programas académicos, científicos, tecnológicos, culturales y deportivos que permitan reforzar los valores de Excelencia Académica Mejoramiento Continuo, Servicio de la Comunidad y la Honestidad Profesional

IV. Ser una Asociación Civil constituida conforme a las leyes mexicanas, según consta en la escritura pública no. 12107 del volumen No. 17 de fecha del 28 de junio de 1985 ante la fe del Lic. Víctor Manuel Cortéz Leyva, Notario Público número veintinueve de Puebla Capital, México.

El presente Convenio se realizará al tenor de las siguientes cláusulas;

CLÁUSULA I

AMBAS PARTES establecen la relación de amistad con el objetivo de afianzar la cooperación en el campo de la educación y la ciencia.

CLÁUSULA II

AMBAS PARTES proveen en sus respectivas bibliotecas las publicaciones, fotos, videos y otros libros de la contraparte y promueven ser utilizados.

CLÁUSULA III

AMBAS PARTES acuerdan emprender acciones para el desarrollo de los siguientes rubros:

1. Intercambio cultural entre estudiantes, docentes y administrativos de ambas instituciones.
2. Proyectos de investigación conjunta.
3. Participación en eventos, simposios, talleres, conversatorios y otros de similares características de naturaleza científico-técnica, académica y de extensión.
4. Publicaciones conjuntas e Intercambio de información académica y científica de interés.
5. Organización de conferencias, seminarios, clases espejo y otras actividades similares.
6. Otras formas de colaboración en áreas de interés para ambas instituciones.

CLÁUSULA IV

1. AMBAS PARTES REALIZARÁN EL INTERCAMBIO DE LAS

SIGUIENTES MANERAS:


- El intercambio que se realizará será manera CULTURAL debido a que los programas de estudio que se ofertan en ambas Universidades nos son compatibles.
- Los candidatos al intercambio deberán reunir los requisitos establecidos por la institución receptora quien será la encargada de tomar la determinación final sobre la admisión de cada estudiante, docente o administrativo. Para ello, la universidad de origen asignará un responsable que asegure y filtre dichos candidatos, previo al proceso de selección.
- La Universidad de origen deberá asegurar que el estudiante adquiera un seguro de gastos médicos mayores internacional que incluya cobertura por accidente, enfermedad (menor, mayor y SARS-CoV-2), repatriación de restos y que no solicite el concepto de deducible, coaseguro ni reembolso.
- AMBAS PARTES acuerdan no brindar beneficios económicos o especie a los estudiantes, docentes o administrativos de intercambio. De tal manera que los gastos de alojamiento, manutención, libros y otro material escolar, correrán a cargo de cada estudiante.
- AMBAS PARTES se comprometen en brindar a los estudiantes, docentes o administrativos de intercambio la asesoría cultural necesaria durante su estancia.

2. AMBAS PARTES ACUERDAN ELABORAR Y AUTORIZAR PROYECTOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN, PUBLICACIONES, PARTICIPACIÓN EN EVENTOS, CLASES ESPEJO, ETC. DE LAS SIGUIENTES MANERAS:

- Elaborar una planeación previa al inicio de cada uno de los proyectos, misma donde se proyectará la logística y acuerdos de trabajo, tales como: objetivos, designación de roles y responsabilidades de cada una de las instituciones y los miembros que participan, plazos de cumplimiento, fuentes, formas de financiamiento, intercambio, participación de especialistas u otros.
- Dentro de dicha planeación se estipulará los temas de propiedad intelectual que llegarán a derivar de la ejecución de cada uno de los proyectos.
- La planeación deberá ser autorizada documentalmente por cada uno de los representantes de las Universidades involucradas.

CLÁUSULA V

AMBAS PARTES se comprometen a respetar las propiedades intelectuales preexistentes a la firma de este convenio en cualquiera de sus modalidades, así como las propiedades intelectuales que surjan de la ejecución de los proyectos, programas de investigaciones conjuntas y otros ejecutados en el marco del presente acuerdo.



CÁUSULA VI

El intercambio de estudiantes será administrado, gestionado y coordinado a través de los organismos técnicos correspondientes en ambas instituciones. En la "UNIVERSIDAD MAQUINARIA DE PYONGYANG" la unidad encargada será la Sección de Asuntos Exteriores y en "LA INTER", la unidad encargada será la Dirección de Extensión Universitaria.

Estos encargados discutirán periódicamente la ejecución de dicho Convenio y supervisará y evaluará los temas realizados dentro del marco del presente Convenio.

CLÁUSULA VII

El presente Convenio tendrá una duración de 5 años de vigencia y se prorrogará automáticamente por periodos similares a menos de que una de las Partes no presente por escrito de anular el presente Convenio con 6 meses de anticipación.

CLÁUSULA VIII

El presente Convenio entra en vigencia a partir de la fecha de suscripción.

Ambas Partes suscriben el presente Convenio al 22 del mes de septiembre del año 2023 en Pyongyang, Capital de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en dos ejemplares; en idioma coreano y en el español, de igual tenor.

[redacted]

Rector

En representación de

la Universidad Maquinaria de

Pyongyang de la República

Popular Democrática de Corea

[redacted]

Rector

En representación de

la Universidad Interamericana

de Puebla de los Estado

Unidos Mexicanos

4

Source: The Panel, annotated by the Panel.

Translated from Spanish

Agreement on friendly collaboration concluded by Pyongyang Mechanical University of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, of the one part, and the Universidad Interamericana, A.C., hereinafter "Inter", of the United Mexican States, of the other part

Representations

Pyongyang Mechanical University of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Universidad Interamericana de Puebla of the United Mexican States, hereinafter referred to as "the two parties", agree to enter into the present agreement to establish friendly collaboration between the two universities and to engage in mutual cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology, recognizing the information set out below.

"Pyongyang Mechanical University":

I. Was founded on 1 September 1959 and, as a leading university, seeks to train talented mechanical technicians of various sectors of the national economy, who possess high-level scientific and technical knowledge and mental abilities.

II. Is an institution that offers advanced studies in various fields such as machine production engineering, materials engineering, information technology, mechanical engineering, transportation equipment engineering and automation technology, as well as diploma courses, seminars and workshops.

III. Has its official domicile at Munhŭng I-dong, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang.

"Inter":

I. Is a higher-education institution that offers advanced studies leading to bachelor's degrees, which are officially recognized by the Secretariat of Public Education of the State of Puebla and are registered with the General Directorate of Professions (code 21MSU8890E), as well as diploma programmes, courses, seminars and workshops in different areas of knowledge.

II. Has its fiscal domicile at Avenida del Castillo 5933 INT 7, Colonia Lomas de Angelópolis, Puebla, Puebla, México, with Federal Taxpayer Registration number UIN850703TQ4.

III. Seeks to facilitate the comprehensive training of each of its students, to enable them to become integrated people and excellent professionals with strong capacities for leadership and for sustaining and directing their own growth. "Inter" is also committed to collaborating with other national and foreign institutions on the development of academic, scientific, technological, cultural and athletic programmes that reinforce the values of academic excellence, continuous improvement, community service and professional honesty.

IV. Is a civil association under Mexican law, pursuant to Public Deed No. 12107 of volume No. 17 dated 28 June 1985, executed before Víctor Manuel Córtez Leyva, Notary Public No. 29 of the city of Puebla, México.

The present agreement shall be implemented in accordance with the covenants set out below.

Covenant I

The two parties shall establish friendly relations in order to strengthen cooperation in the field of education and science.

Covenant II

Each party shall provide in its libraries publications, photos, videos and other materials from the other party, and shall promote their use.

Covenant III

The two parties agree to take steps to develop the following initiatives:

1. Cultural exchange between students, teachers and administrative staff of both institutions
2. Joint research projects
3. Participation in events, symposiums, workshops, talks and other similar activities focused on scientific and technical, academic and outreach-related matters
4. Joint publications and exchange of academic and scientific information of interest
5. Organization of conferences, seminars, collaborative online courses and other similar activities
6. Other forms of collaboration in areas of interest to both institutions

Covenant IV

1. The two parties shall carry out exchanges in the manner described below.

- The exchanges to be carried out shall be cultural in nature, as the programmes of study offered at the two universities are not compatible.
- Candidates for exchange shall meet the requirements established by the receiving institution, which shall be responsible for making the final determination regarding the admission of each student, teacher and administrative staff member. For this purpose, the sending university shall designate a person to vet and screen such candidates before the selection process.

- The sending university shall ensure that the student obtains international insurance for major medical events, which shall include coverage for accidents, illnesses (minor, major and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)) and the repatriation of remains, and shall not require a deductible, coinsurance or reimbursement.
- The two parties agree not to provide financial or in-kind benefits to students, teachers and administrative staff involved in exchanges. The cost of accommodation, meals, books and other school supplies shall therefore be paid by each student.
- The two parties agree to provide students, teachers and administrative staff involved in exchanges with the necessary cultural advice during their stay.

2. The two parties agree to develop and authorize research projects, publications, participation in events, collaborative online courses and other initiatives in the manner described below.

- Prepare a plan before the beginning of each project, covering logistics and work arrangements including objectives, designation of the roles and responsibilities of each of the participating institutions and members, deadlines, sources, funding methods, exchange, participation of specialists and others.
- This plan shall stipulate the intellectual property-related issues that shall arise from the implementation of each project.
- Each of the representatives of the universities involved shall draw up documents authorizing the plan.

Covenant V

Both parties agree to respect intellectual property existing before the signing of this agreement, whatever its form, as well as intellectual property arising from the implementation of projects, joint research programmes and other initiatives under the present agreement.

Covenant VI

Student exchanges shall be administered, managed and coordinated through the appropriate technical bodies at both institutions. At “Pyongyang Mechanical University”, the relevant unit shall be the Foreign Affairs Section, and at “Inter”, the relevant unit shall be the University Outreach Department.

These bodies shall periodically discuss the implementation of this agreement and shall supervise and evaluate the activities conducted under the agreement.

Covenant VII

The present agreement shall have a period of validity of five years and shall automatically be extended for similar periods unless one of the parties cancels it in writing six months in advance.

Covenant VIII

The present agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.


The two parties hereby sign the present agreement on 22 September 2023 in Pyongyang, capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in two copies, in the Korean and Spanish languages, both texts being identical in meaning.

(*Signed*) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Rector
On behalf of Pyongyang Mechanical University of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(*Signed*) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Rector
On behalf of the Universidad Interamericana de Puebla of the United Mexican States

Annex 28: Reply from Swedish Migration Agency

The Panel previously reported that two DPRK researchers from Pyongyang University of Science and Technology studying Ph.D. course at a Swedish university finished their life science research courses in 2019 and 2020. Of two the students, the Panel found that one student who had graduated from the course in 2020 was then employed by another research institute in Sweden[207].



Migrationsverket

Swedish Migration Agency
Legal Affairs Department

2023-12-27
Reference: 50-294426/12-442674
Your reference S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.28

OFFICIAL LETTER

dppa-poe1874@un.org

Dear Sir/Madam,

Please accept my sincerest apologies for our late reply in this matter.

The Swedish Migration Agency (the Agency) has received a letter from the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the request to answer questions in an attachment. The Agency has already provided the required information, this was done last year when a similar request was sent to the Swedish authorities. In this context, it may be relevant to add that both individuals to whom the inquiry refers have left Sweden.

Yours faithfully,

[redacted]

Deputy Director of Legal Affairs

Source: Member State.

[207] S/2022/668, para. 15 and annex 12.

Annex 29: Letter to the 1718 Committee from 55 Member States regarding the oil cap, their report and accompanying imagery

Excellency,

On behalf of the Permanent Missions of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, and the United States Mission to the United Nations, we have the honor to submit to the 1718 Committee a request for the Committee Secretary to take the actions described in operative paragraph 5 of Resolution 2397 because the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2023 has exceeded the annual cap of 500,000 barrels.

Attached please find a report, sponsored by the above Member States, detailing observations of illicit DPRK-refined petroleum imports, which exceed the 500,000-barrel refined petroleum cap set in UNSCR 2397. In total, we have documented 87 unreported deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports between January 1 and September 15, 2023. When aggregated, these deliveries represent 1,523,381 barrels of illicit imports. We are providing satellite imagery as evidence for all of these cases.

Specifically, we request the following actions be taken:

- We request the 1718 Committee Secretary issue a public note verbale to all UN Member States that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2023 has exceeded the cap set by the Security Council and inform Member States that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year.
- We request the Chair to issue a Committee press release to inform the general public of this information.
- We further request this note verbale and press release include a call for all Member States to immediately exercise enhanced vigilance regarding the DPRK attempting to procure additional refined petroleum products and to prevent illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to vessels owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of or working in cooperation with the DPRK.
- We further request the 1718 Committee Secretary update the website to include the illicit refined petroleum imports in our report and show the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2023 has exceeded the cap set by the Security Council using the conversion rate and other information in the report.

We request the Chair circulate our report to the 1718 Committee and our proposal for Committee action by November 21, 2023, under the regular five-day NOP process.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of our highest consideration.

[Signed]
[Permanent representatives of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

Report to the UN 1718 Committee: The DPRK's Breach of the UNSCR 2397 Refined Petroleum Cap

Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States remain gravely concerned regarding large-scale evasion of restrictions the UN Security Council has imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) import of refined petroleum products. UN Security Council resolution UNSCR 2397, operative paragraph (OP) 5, limits the DPRK to importing no more than 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum per year. Any Member State supplying, selling, or transferring refined petroleum products is required to submit reports to the UN 1718 Committee informing it of the transfer every 30 days in order to allow the Committee to maintain an accounting of the DPRK's imports.

Moreover, UNSCR 2375 OP 11 prohibits UN Member States from engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with any DPRK-flagged vessel of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK. Nevertheless, DPRK-flagged vessels continue to conduct STS transfers on a regular basis as the DPRK's primary means of importing refined petroleum. The information in this report demonstrates that the DPRK has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 annual 500,000-barrel cap for 2023.

This submission further affirms previous submissions from 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 (see S/AC.49/2018/NOTE.213, S/AC.49/2019/NOTE.134, S/AC.49/2020/COMM.254, S/AC.49/2021/NOTE.105, and S/AC.49/2022/NOTE.61) and Panel of Experts reporting (see maritime sections of S/2018/171, S/2019/171, S/2019/691, S/2020/151, S/2020/840, S/2021/211, S/2021/777, S/2022/132, S/2022/668 and S/2023/171) that exhaustively demonstrated and detailed the illicit practices employed by the DPRK to circumvent UNSCR-mandated restrictions on its ability to import refined petroleum products. As a result, this report will not seek to repeat in detail the specific information the DPRK's evasive practices outlined in previous formal submissions to the UN 1718 Committee. These practices continue unabated, but the DPRK utilizes an ever-evolving fleet of vessels under its flag or its direct control to perpetrate pervasive and ongoing sanctions evasion.

This report demonstrates that the DPRK continues to conduct UN-prohibited STS transfers and imports of refined petroleum that are not reported to the 1718 Committee as required, and again this year has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 OP 5 refined petroleum products cap of 500,000 barrels per annum. This report supplies images and import volume data for vessels that continue to make deliveries of refined petroleum into DPRK ports and in the DPRK's territorial sea, without these deliveries being reported to the UN 1718 Committee. STS transfers of any cargo are explicitly prohibited by UNSCR 2375, so the relevant Member States involved in supplying refined petroleum products to DPRK tankers fail to report these volumes to avoid self-incrimination. As a result, the UN 1718 Committee's official accounting of the DPRK's imports vastly underrepresents the volume of refined petroleum products that actually enter the DPRK.

The overarching purpose of UNSCR 2397's provision limiting the DPRK's ability to import refined petroleum products is to limit the DPRK's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, which are a threat to international peace and security and are prohibited by numerous UNSCRs. The restriction on the DPRK's refined petroleum products imports is critical to ensuring that the DPRK chooses to halt these prohibited programs and completely denuclearize. If the DPRK is able to continue evading international sanctions, it has little incentive to make such choices. As long as the DPRK continues to import refined petroleum products in excess of the UN-mandated cap with limited accountability at the UN, UNSCR 2397 OP 5 will remain ineffectual – which also undermines both the DPRK UNSCRs as well as the UN 1718 Committee.

These deliveries have significantly contributed to a substantial breach of the 500,000-barrel annual cap set by UNSCR 2397. We estimate that, this year alone, the DPRK has imported over 1,523,381 barrels via 87 confirmed tanker deliveries as of September 15, 2023. Again in 2023, refined petroleum transfers to the DPRK utilized DPRK-flagged vessels, a change from previous years when foreign-flagged delivery vessels directly unloaded petroleum at DPRK ports. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, oil was acquired by DPRK-flagged ships from foreign flagged vessels via STS, and those laden DPRK-flagged ships then underwent quarantine measures outside of the lock-gates near DPRK ports prior to delivering their petroleum cargoes.

As discussed in previous submissions on the DPRK's breach of the import cap in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, this report cannot provide an exact figure for each delivery of refined

petroleum products to the DPRK, as that information is not readily available to any UN Member State other than the DPRK. This report instead calculates how much petroleum was acquired by the DPRK based on each vessel's dead weight tonnage, with estimates for each ship at two different levels of cargo storage capacity – 90 percent and 60 percent of the vessels' dead weight tonnage. It is highly likely that DPRK tankers deployed in search of precious and limited refined petroleum and fuel via STS transfers or engaging in direct deliveries would arrive in DPRK ports with as much of their cargo capacities full (i.e., 90 percent calculation). The expenditure of scarce resources and fuel consumption by the tanker itself, the risks of tanker disruption or interdiction, and the DPRK's dependence on importing refined petroleum would not justify the tanker in question returning to port with less than 90 percent of its cargo storage capacity filled.


We are providing images that document 87 deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports, which, when aggregated, represent 1,523,381 barrels of illicit imports – constituting a clear breach of the cap imposed by UNSCR 2397 OP 5, based on the 90 percent metric. Even if each of these tankers delivered only 60 percent of their capacity in these 87 deliveries, which would be neither financially nor logistically sound, the estimated volume (1,015,588 barrels) would still represent a breach of the annual cap. Table 1 below documents each of these transfers and provides an associated volume. Table 2 below graphically depicts the DPRK's import of refined petroleum between January 1 and September 15, 2023.

Please refer to pages one through five of the attached Annex.

Given the information provided herein, we request that the 1718 Committee immediately make an official determination that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2023 has exceeded the 500,000-barrel annual cap and inform Member States that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year. Similarly, the Panel of Experts is requested to review this report's analysis and underlying information in order to make a determination in its next report on the volume of refined petroleum product imports to the DPRK and the associated implications for the implementation of UNSCR 2397's refined petroleum product import cap.

See Appendix 1 for more information on vessels that have discharged refined petroleum in 2023.

Please refer to pages five through 126 of the attached Annex.




	Port	Arrival Date	IMO	Vessel Name	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric 60% Laden	Delivery Metric 90% Laden
1	Nampo	03-JAN-23	8916293	Sin Phyong 9	1,150.0	690.0	1,035.0
2	Nampo	08-JAN-23	8848276	Po Chon	3,538.0	2,122.8	3,184.2
3	Nampo	18-JAN-23	8720436	Kum Un San	2,070.0	1,242.0	1,863.0
4	Nampo	18-JAN-23	8865121	Sin Pyong 5	3,295.0	1,977.0	2,965.5
5	Hungnam	19-JAN-23	8021579	Sin Phyong 14	949.0	569.4	854.1
6	Nampo	25-JAN-23	8660313	Chon Ma San	3,565.0	2,139.0	3,208.5
7	Nampo	27-JAN-23	8898740	Ji Song 6	1,250.0	750.0	1,125.0
8	Nampo	02-FEB-23	9129653	Paek Yang San 1	5,403.0	3,241.8	4,862.7
9	Nampo	05-FEB-23	7408873	Sam Jong 2	2,507.0	1,504.2	2,256.3
10	Nampo	05-FEB-23	8604917	Yu Jong 2	1,206.0	723.6	1,085.4
11	Nampo	08-FEB-23	8817007	Sin Phyong 2	2,105.0	1,263.0	1,894.5
12	Nampo	10-FEB-23	8610461	Kum Ryong 3	1,998.0	1,198.8	1,798.2
13	Nampo	14-FEB-23	8708684	Kum Jin Gang 2	1,988.0	1,192.8	1,789.2
14	Nampo	14-FEB-23	8791667	Chang Hae 1	4,983.0	2,989.8	4,484.7
15	Hungnam	14-FEB-23	8021579	Sin Phyong 14	949.0	569.4	854.1
16	Nampo	16-FEB-23	8711021	Chil Bo San	1,999.0	1,199.4	1,799.1
17	Nampo	19-FEB-23	7389704	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.0	1,801.8	2,702.7
18	Nampo	21-FEB-23	9066978	Paek Ma	2,250.0	1,350.0	2,025.0
19	Chongjin	23-FEB-23	8916293	Sin Phyong 9	1,150.0	690.0	1,035.0
20	Nampo	26-FEB-23	7636638	Wol Bong San	4,969.0	2,981.4	4,472.1
21	Nampo	04-MAR-23	8865121	Sin Pyong 5	3,295.0	1,977.0	2,965.5
22	Chongjin	13-MAR-23	8021579	Sin Phyong 14	949.0	569.4	854.1
23	Nampo	19-MAR-23	7303803	An San 1	3,003.0	1,801.8	2,702.7

	Port	Arrival Date	IMO	Vessel Name	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric 60% Laden	Delivery Metric 90% Laden
24	Nampo	19-MAR-23	N/A	Un Hung 8	2,733.3	1,640.0	2,460.0
25	Nampo	19-MAR-23	8817007	Sin Phyong 2	2,105.0	1,263.0	1,894.5
26	Nampo	29-MAR-23	7408873	Sam Jong 2	2,507.0	1,504.2	2,256.3
27	Nampo	29-MAR-23	8610461	Kum Ryong 3	1,998.0	1,198.8	1,798.2
28	Nampo	30-MAR-23	9132612	Nam Dae Bong	4,999.0	2,999.4	4,499.1
29	Nampo	30-MAR-23	8720436	Kum Un San	2,070.0	1,242.0	1,863.0
30	Nampo	02-APR-23	8916293	Sin Phyong 9	1,150.0	690.0	1,035.0
31	Nampo	02-APR-23	8604917	Yu Jong 2	1,206.0	723.6	1,085.4
32	Nampo	02-APR-23	8106496	Sam Ma 2	1,731.0	1,038.6	1,557.9
33	Nampo	07-APR-23	8610461	Kum Ryong 3	1,998.0	1,198.8	1,798.2
34	Nampo	07-APR-23	8691702	Yu Son	3,398.0	2,038.8	3,058.2
35	Nampo	09-APR-23	8711021	Chil Bo San	1,999.0	1,199.4	1,799.1
36	Chongjin	11-APR-23	8865121	Sin Pyong 5	3,295.0	1,977.0	2,965.5
37	Nampo	16-APR-23	8660313	Chon Ma San	3,565.0	2,139.0	3,208.5
38	Nampo	18-APR-23	8405311	Sam Jong 1	1,665.0	999.0	1,498.5
39	Nampo	20-APR-23	8817007	Sin Phyong 2	2,105.0	1,263.0	1,894.5
40	Nampo	20-APR-23	8791667	Kum Jin Gang 3	4,983.0	2,989.8	4,484.7
41	Songnim	21-APR-23	8720436	Kum Un San	2,070.0	1,242.0	1,863.0
42	Nampo	24-APR-23	9045962	Un Hung	3,685.0	2,211.0	3,316.5
43	Nampo	26-APR-23	8605026	Kwang Chon	1,966.0	1,179.6	1,769.4
44	Nampo	01-MAY-23	8708684	Kum Jin Gang 2	1,988.0	1,192.8	1,789.2
45	Nampo	01-MAY-23	8898740	Ji Song 6	1,250.0	750.0	1,125.0
46	Nampo	01-MAY-23	8691702	Yu Son	3,398.0	2,038.8	3,058.2
	Port	Arrival Date	IMO	Vessel Name	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric 60% Laden	Delivery Metric 90% Laden
47	Songnim	01-MAY-23	8720436	Kum Un San	2,070.0	1,242.0	1,863.0
48	Nampo	01-MAY-23	8604917	Yu Jong 2	1,206.0	723.6	1,085.4
49	Nampo	01-MAY-23	8610461	Kum Ryong 3	1,998.0	1,198.8	1,798.2
50	Nampo	01-MAY-23	8705539	Ryong Jon	2,889.0	1,733.4	2,600.1
51	Nampo	06-MAY-23	7408873	Sam Jong 2	2,507.0	1,504.2	2,256.3
52	Nampo	08-MAY-23	N/A	Un Hung 8	2,733.3	1,640.0	2,460.0
53	Nampo	08-MAY-23	7303803	An San 1	3,003.0	1,801.8	2,702.7
54	Nampo	11-MAY-23	8916293	Sin Phyong 9	1,150.0	690.0	1,035.0
55	Nampo	16-MAY-23	8865121	Sin Pyong 5	3,295.0	1,977.0	2,965.5
56	Nampo	16-MAY-23	7636638	Wol Bong San	4,969.0	2,981.4	4,472.1
57	Nampo	16-MAY-23	8610461	Kum Ryong 3	1,998.0	1,198.8	1,798.2
58	Nampo	19-MAY-23	8660313	Chon Ma San	3,565.0	2,139.0	3,208.5
59	Nampo	22-MAY-23	8708684	Kum Jin Gang 2	1,988.0	1,192.8	1,789.2
60	Songnim	23-MAY-23	8705539	Ryong Jon	2,889.0	1,733.4	2,600.1
61	Nampo	25-MAY-23	8405311	Sam Jong 1	1,665.0	999.0	1,498.5
62	Nampo	25-MAY-23	8312497	Song Won 2	4,999.0	2,999.4	4,499.1
63	Nampo	29-MAY-23	8708684	Kum Jin Gang 2	1,988.0	1,192.8	1,789.2
64	Nampo	29-MAY-23	8610461	Kum Ryong 3	1,998.0	1,198.8	1,798.2
65	Nampo	02-JUN-23	9054896	A Sa Bong	4,975.0	2,985.0	4,477.5
66	Nampo	02-JUN-23	8691702	Yu Son	3,398.0	2,038.8	3,058.2
67	Songnim	02-JUN-23	8720436	Kum Un San	2,070.0	1,242.0	1,863.0
68	Nampo	03-JUN-23	8122347	Nam San 8	3150.0	1,890.0	2,835.0
69	Nampo	10-JUN-23	8708684	Kum Jin Gang 2	1,988.0	1,192.8	1,789.2

	Port	Arrival Date	IMO	Vessel Name	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric 60% Laden	Delivery Metric 90% Laden
70	Nampo	15-JUN-23	8669589	A Bong 1	3,250.0	1,950.0	2,925.0
71	Nampo	16-JUN-23	8791667	Kum Jin Gang 3	4,484.7	2,690.8	4,036.2
72	Nampo	23-JUN-23	8916293	Sin Phyong 9	1,150.0	690.0	1,035.0
73	Nampo	23-JUN-23	N/A	Un Hung 8	2733.3	1,640.0	2,460.0
74	Nampo	23-JUN-23	8711021	Chil Bo San	1,999.0	1,199.4	1,799.1
75	Chongjin	23-JUN-23	8720436	Kum Un San	2,070.0	1,242.0	1,863.0
76	Nampo	27-JUN-23	8660313	Chon Ma San	3,565.0	2,139.0	3,208.5
77	Nampo	28-JUN-23	7303803	An San 1	3,003.0	1,801.8	2,702.7
78	Hungnam	28-JUN-23	8865121	Sin Pyong 5	3,295.0	1,977.0	2,965.5
79	Nampo	28-JUN-23	8604917	Yu Jong 2	1,206.0	723.6	1,085.4
80	Nampo	19-JUL-23	8691702	Yu Son	3,398.0	2,038.8	3,058.2
81	Chongjin	27-JUL-23	8817007	Sin Phyong 2	2,105.0	1,263.0	1,894.5
82	Nampo	09-AUG-23	8916293	Sin Phyong 9	1,150.0	690.0	1,035.0
83	Nampo	09-AUG-23	N/A	Un Hung 8	2,733.3	1,640.0	2,460.0
84	Hungnam	31-AUG-23	8865121	Sin Phyong 5	3,295.0	1,977.0	2,965.5
85	Songnim	31-AUG-23	8720436	Kum Un San	2,070.0	1,242.0	1,863.0
86	Nampo	08-SEP-23	8898740	Ji Song 6	1,250.0	750.0	1,125.0
87	Nampo	14-SEP-23	8312497	Song Won 2	4,999.0	2,999.4	4,499.1


03 January 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:07 E
N
20 m
AB8632221
08 January 2023
M/T PO CHON Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:06 E
N
30 m
WZ8508414
18 January 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:54 N 125:21:57 E
N
20 m
BQ4221272


18 January 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 5 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:07 E
N
30 m
NT9608840
19 January 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 14 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Hungnam Petroleum Facility
39:49:58 N 127:37:36 E
N
10 m
QU8959406
25 January 2023
M/T CHON MA SAN Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E
N
30 m
EV1685364


18 January 2023
M/T JI SONG 6 Laden Offshore
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:16 E
N
20 m
CG3099174
27 January 2023
M/T JI SONG 6 Unladen Offshore
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:53 N 125:22:19 E
N
20 m
DE6882276
02 February 2023
M/T PAEK YANG SAN 1 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E
N
20 m
FY3603876



05 February 2023
M/T SAM JONG 2 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:07 E
N
10 m
HU6252076


05 February 2023
M/T YU JONG 2 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:02 E
N
10 m
KA4118442


08 February 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 2 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:59 N 125:23:25 E
N
10 m
OW8499770



10 February 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E
20 m
JA6154996
14 February 2023
M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:56 E
20 m
PC2523744
14 February 2023
M/T CHANG HAE 1 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:07 E
20 m
TV8340692



08 February 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 14 Laden Offshore
Hungnam Petroleum Facility
39:48:41 N 127:37:39 E
N
FJ3583390
14 February 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 14 Unladen
Hungnam Petroleum Facility
39:50:01 N 127:37:20 E
N
SX9030856
16 February 2023
M/T CHIL BO SAN Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:44 N 125:17:33 E
N
VI6190797



19 February 2023
M/T RYE SONG GANG 1 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E
N
NY9746636
21 February 2023
M/T PAEK MA Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E
N
ZN5072363
23 February 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Chongjin Petroleum Facility
41:45:22 N 129:46:05 E
N
CY4412244


26 February 2023
M/T WOL BONG SAN Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E
N
30 m
IS6568221


4 March 2023
M/T SIN PYONG 5 Laden Offshore of the Nampo Petroleum Facility
North Korea
38:42:26 N 125:22:33 E
N
20 m
XA8868197


15 March 2023
M/T SIN PYONG 5 Unladen Offshore of the Nampo Petroleum Facility
North Korea
38:42:26 N 125:22:33 E
N
20 m
FW1159458


13 March 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 14 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Chongjin Petroleum Facility
41:45:22 N 129:46:06 E
AT2905681
19 March 2023
M/T AN SAN 1 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:58 E
AU6992397
19 March 2023
M/T YUN HONG 8 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:00 N 125:18:17 E
WE7919544


19 March 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 2 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:08 E
KN7549081
29 March 2023
M/T SAM JONG 2 Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:22:07 E
BD1108300
26 March 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 Laden Outside
Nampo Lockgate
38:42:20 N 125:09:09 E
QD5566090


29 March 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 Unladen Inside
Nampo Lockgate
38:42:39 N 125:21:56 E
N
30 m
JO1515960


30 March 2023
M/T NAM DAE BONG delivering refined petroleum to Nampo
Petroleum Facility
North Korea
38:41:43 N 125:17:33 E
N
20 m
BY5438897


30 March 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN delivering refined
petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:22:30 E
N
10 m
BQ3320601



02 April 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
North Korea
38:42:55 N 125:22:02 E
N
10 m
RL2934394


02 April 2023
M/T YU JONG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
North Korea
38:42:55 N 125:22:06 E
N
10 m
VU2231505


17 March 2023
M/T SAM MA 2 and Unknown Converted Bulker Conducting an STS Transfer Outside the Nampo Lockgate, North Korea
38:39:56 N 124:47:57 E
N
10 m
PX2946240


26 March 2023
M/T SAM MA 2 and M/T JHONG YOOG YOU 2
Conducting an STS Transfer Outside the
Nampo Lockgate, North Korea
38:42:37 N 125:09:03 E
N
10 m
JF6899000


02 APRIL 2023
M/T SAM MA 2 Delivering Refined Petroleum
to Nampo Petroleum Facility, North Korea
38:41:45 N 125:17:33 E
N
30 m
OY7905273


02 April 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 Laden Outside the Nampo Lockgate
North Korea
38:42:09 N 125:09:21 E
N
20 m
OQ8580217


07 April 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 Unladen Offshore of the Nampo Facility
North Korea
38:42:49 N 125:22:16 E
N
10 m
AJ5699115


07 April 2023
M/T YU SON (IMO: 8691702)
Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:54 N 125:21:57 E
N
10 m
VC2289756


07 April 2023
M/T CHIL BO SAN delivering refined petroleum
to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:09 N 125:08:57 E
N
10 m
ED6738395


09 April 2023
M/T CHIL BO SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:58 N 125:23:58 E
N
20 m
ZO2333624


11 April 2023
M/T SIN PYONG 5 delivering refined petroleum to Chongjin Petroleum Facility
41:45:21 N 129:46:05 E
N
20 m
RD6101170


16 April 2023
M/T CHON MA SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:07 E
N
10 m
IK2495254


18 April 2023
M/T SAM JONG 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:22:02 E
N
20 m
BG5285748


20 April 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:22:03 E
N
10 m
BV4262029


20 April 2023
M/T CHANG HAE 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:22:08 E
N
20 m
CO3275627


21 April 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN delivering refined petroleum to Songnim Petroleum Facility
38:44:14 N 125:37:05 E
N
10 m
NV4129159



19 April 2023
M/T UN HUNG delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:45 N 125:21:59 E
N
30 m
DC1479588


24 April 2023
M/T UN HUNG delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:30 N 125:22:14 E
N
20 m
FP3340298


24 April 2023
M/T KWANG CHON delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:34 N 125:23:34 E
N
20 m
HS8257675


26 April 2023
M/T KWANG CHON delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:50 N 125:24:42 E
N
10 m
BD6711480


27 April 2023
M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:31 N 125:17:58 E
N
20 m
HW3169319


01 May 2023
M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 (IMO: 8708684)
Unladen at Nampo Shipyard
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:45 N 125:18:02 E
EW7357373
27 April 2023
M/T JI SONG 6 (IMO: 8691702)
Laden Offshore of Petroleum Piers
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:38 N 125:18:54 E
CL9150859
1 May 2023
M/T JI SONG 6 (IMO: 8691702)
Unladen Offshore
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:54 N 125:22:22 E
RV2622410


27 April 2023
M/T YU SON (IMO: 8691702)
Laden Offshore of Petroleum Piers
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:52 N 125:19:53 E
N
20 m
QY1227295


1 May2023
M/T YU SON (IMO: 8691702)
Unladen Pier Side
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:52 N 125:19:53 E
N
30 m
SE3820019


27 April 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN (IMO: 8720436)
Laden Offshore of Petroleum Piers
Songnim Petroleum Facility
38:42:09 N 125:21:32 E
N
20 m
XA9096386


01 May 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN (IMO: 8720436)
Unladen Pier Side
Songnim Petroleum Facility
38:44:13 N 125:37:05 E
N
30 m
SZ3780950



01 MAY 2023
M/T YU JONG 2 delivering refined
petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:57 N 125:22:08 E
N
10 m
ZQ2230528



01 MAY 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 delivering petroleum
to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:58 E
N
10 m
CF8651706



01 MAY 2023
M/T RYONG JON delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:01 N 125:18:18 E
N
20 m
RS5793820


06 MAY 2023
M/T SAM JONG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:02 E
N
10 m
AW4386526


01 MAY 2023
M/T UN HUNG 8 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:19 N 125:04:43 E
N
20 m
ZJ3478121



08 MAY 2023
M/T UN HUNG 8 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:42 N 125:24:36 E
N
10 m
YD3048921
08 MAY 2023
M/T AN SAN 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:00 N 125:18:16 E
N
20 m
OX2049380
11 MAY 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:07 E
N
10 m
DF6780838



16 MAY 2023
M/T SIN PYONG 5 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:22:07 E
10 m
KE2091370
16 MAY 2023
M/T WOL BONG SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:54 N 125:21:57 E
20 m
MS2205129
16 MAY 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:43:20 N 125:26:44 E
10 m
MQ5669157



19 MAY 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:51 N 125:22:16 E
N
20 m
WE9874141



19 MAY 2023
M/T CHON MA SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:54 N 125:09:58 E
N
20 m
XI8252356


25 MAY 2023
M/T CHON MA SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:48 N 125:22:38 E
N
10 m
UQ8469895


16 MAY 2023
M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:40:57 N 125:08:38 E
N
EB9495440
22 MAY 2023
M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:45 N 125:17:34 E
N
20 m
NV1593864
23 MAY 2023
M/T RYONG JON delivering refined petroleum to Songnim Petroleum Facility
38:44:14 N 125:37:04 E
N
10 m
KC9273765


25 MAY 2023
M/T SAM JONG 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:41:15 N 125:08:32 E
20 m
WZ2534666
29 MAY 2023
M/T SAM JONG 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:43:02 N 125:24:03 E
10 m
TN9227958
25 MAY 2023
M/T SONG WON 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:41:50 N 125:04:22 E
20 m
VA6609648



29 MAY 2023
M/T SONG WON 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:58 N 125:23:24 E
N
10 m
IC7607612
29 MAY 2023
M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:43:01 N 125:22:28 E
N
10 m
ZB3557646
29 MAY 2023
M/T KUM RYONG 3 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E
N
10 m
SJ8510374


31 MAY 2023
M/T ASABONG delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:27 N 125:22:19 E
30 m
KS2143620
02 JUN 2023
M/T ASABONG delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:43:13 N 125:25:02 E
20 m
LM4057366
02 JUN 2023
M/T CHANG HAE 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:58 E
20 m
ZK7462419


29 MAY 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN delivering refined petroleum to Songnim Petroleum Facility
38:44:14 N 125:37:05 E
N
20 m
TP7411145
02 JUN 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN delivering refined petroleum to Songnim Petroleum Facility
38:44:14 N 125:37:04 E
N
10 m
EJ6506945
03 JUN 2023
M/T NAM SAN 8 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:54 N 125:21:56 E
N
20 m
RW8164387


10 JUN 2023
M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:56 N 125:22:27 E
N
20 m
PF6832928
15 JUN 2023
M/T HENG XING delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:45 N 125:17:34 E
N
20 m
DX8902608
15 JUN 2023
M/T CHANG HAE 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:40:37 N 125:10:10 E
N
30 m
WD7081925


16 JUN 2023
M/T CHANG HAE 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:59 E
BD1152994
16 JUN 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:19 N 125:09:20 E
EA5097035
23 JUN 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:15 N 125:21:16 E
KL9412515



17 JUN 2023
M/T UN HONG 8 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:42:56 N 125:22:06 E
N
10 m
XF5152866
23 JUN 2023
M/T CHIL BO SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:42:56 N 125:22:06 E
N
10 m
YO8835478
23 JUN 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN delivering refined petroleum to Songnim Petroleum Facility 38:44:14 N 125:37:03 E
N
20 m
CY9238315


23 JUN 2023
M/T CHON MA SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:54 N 125:09:45 E
PC7296850
27 JUN 2023
M/T CHON MA SAN delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:49 N 125:22:38 E
ZF9319250
28 JUN 2023
M/T AN SONG 1 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:21:58 E
TJ5328470


23 JUN 2023
M/T SIN PYONG 5 delivering refined petroleum to Hungnam Petroleum Facility
39:48:51 N 127:37:25 E
N
50 m
DQ8612665
28 JUN 2023
M/T SIN PYONG 5 delivering refined petroleum to Hungnam Petroleum Facility
39:49:58 N 127:37:36 E
N
25 m
TG6254558
23 JUN 2023
M/T YU JONG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:55 N 125:09:24 E
N
50 m
XL9011120


28 JUN 2023
M/T YU JONG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:54 N 125:21:33 E
N
20 m
DU5397214
03 JUL 2023
M/T CHANG HAE 2 conducting an STS transfer with M/T NEW KONK in the Korean Bay
38:41:03 N 124:56:56 E
N
20 m
TX6108315
19 JUL 2023
M/T CHANG HAE 2 delivering refined petroleum to Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:55 N 125:22:04 E
N
20 m
VO5381120


25 JUL 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Chongjin Petroleum Facility
41:42:53 N 129:46:23 E
WT3836479
27 JUL 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 2 delivering refined petroleum to Chongjin Petroleum Facility
41:45:22 N 129:46:05 E
GK4089103
01 AUGUST 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 (IMO: 8916293)
Laden Prior to Delivering Refined Petroleum
Outside West Sea Barrage
38:42:24 N 125:07:32 E
ED6738876


09 AUGUST 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 9 (IMO: 8916293)
Unladen After Delivering Refined Petroleum
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:12 N 125:22:08 E
N
30 ft
EJ6787368
01 AUGUST 2023
M/T UN HONG 8 (NO IMO NUMBER)
Laden Prior to Delivering Refined Petroleum
Outside West Sea Barrage
38:42:16 N 125:05:33 E
N
50 ft
JI3903033
09 AUGUST 2023
M/T UN HONG 8 (NO IMO NUMBER)
Unladen After Delivering Petroleum
Nampo Shipyard
38:41:50 N 125:18:05 E
N
50 ft
LT3159021


17 AUG 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 5 (IMO: 8865121)
Laden Offshore
Hungnam Petroleum Facility
39:48:20 N 127:37:17 E
N
20 m
PQ8575099
31 AUG 2023
M/T SIN PHYONG 5 (IMO: 8865121)
Unladen Pier Side
Hungnam Petroleum Facility
39:49:59 N 127:37:37 E
N
10 m
GF5872930
31 AUG 2023
M/T KUM UN SAN (IMO: 8720436)
Delivering Refined Petroleum
Songnim Petroleum Facility
38:44:13 N 127:37:04 E
N
10 m
ZM3037365


05 SEP 2023
M/T JI SONG 6 (IMO: 889874)
Laden Offshore
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:42:00 N 125:09:33 E
N
10 m
US2359895
08 SEP 2023
M/T SONG WON 2 (IMO: 8312497)
Laden Offshore
Nampo Petroleum Facility
38:41:22 N 125:05:04 E
N
20 m
AH7211776



Source: Member State.

Annex 30: Positions of China and the Russian Federation on the letter from 55 Member States regarding the oil cap dated 21 November 2023

Communication dated 28 November 2023 from the delegation of China to the Committee

Dear colleagues，

China takes note of the joint letter from some member states dated 20th November.

Over the years, we have witnessed several similar joint letters which contained same observations supported by unclear satellite photos from individual countries. For the content of the letter in consideration is quite the same and based on same methodology, China is still in the same position that the Committee should take actions on the basis of solid evidence and sufficient facts instead of crude estimation based on assumptive conditions. It is neither scientific nor prudent for the report to draw such a conclusion that the annual limit of refined petroleum has been exceeded.

Thus, China would like to put this proposal on hold.

Communication dated 29 November 2023 from the delegation of the Russian Federation to the Committee

Dear colleagues,

Regarding the joint letter dated 20th November on the oil cap, Russia takes note of the proposed actions by the Chair. Given the lack of the official first-hand information on the issue we oppose using controversial sources, such as unclear satellite photos, as a basis for action of the Committee.

Therefore we would like to put the proposed draft note verbale and draft press release on hold.


Annex 31: The Panel's review of the report submitted by 55 Member States[208]

1. In their report, the 55 Member States wrote "*the Panel of Experts is requested to review this report's analysis and underlying information in order to make a determination in its next report on the volume of refined petroleum product imports to the DPRK and the associated implications for the implementation of UNSCR 2397's refined petroleum product import cap*."

2. The Panel has no independent data sources to corroborate the estimates made in the Member States' letter. DPRK tankers rarely employ AIS transmissions and are thus extremely difficult to track on maritime monitoring systems, and only DPRK could confirm the exact quantity and types of refined petroleum products delivered by each tanker.

3. Deadweight tonnage (DWT) is the total of the weights of a vessel's cargo, fuel, fresh water, ballast water, provisions, and crew. According to industry standards, a vessel's estimated maximum cargo capacity is approximately 90% of its DWT (as stated on the website of the International Maritime Organization), although a vessel which was deliberately stripped back and sailing dangerously might carry more than 90% of its DWT. [One expert agrees with this review only up to this point.]

Table 1: Reported deliveries (in barrels, rounded down to nearest 10,000 barrels) of refined oil products, Nampo, Hungnam, Chonjin and Songnim, January- September 2023



Source: 55 Member States, the Panel.

[208] One expert agrees only with paras. 1-3.

4. The Member States' estimates, although based on observed deliveries in only the first nine months of the year, indicate that the oil cap was breached in February (based on cargo capacity of 90% of DWT) or April (60% of DWT). There could have been more unobserved deliveries of refined petroleum to Nampo and the other ports in this period (at night, or under cloud cover), but not fewer.[209]

5. Finally, because the Panel is currently unable to distinguish between licit deliveries of refined oil products reported to the 1718 Committee and illicit deliveries, the amounts of oil products in Figure VIII of the main text might either be a part of the estimated deliveries in table 1 above or they should be added to the estimates.

[209] One expert disagrees with the inclusion of paragraph 4.

Annex 32: *Chon Ma San* (IMO: 8660313)

Photograph of the UN-designated DPRK-flagged tanker *Chon Ma San* taken in 2020




Source: Member State.

In 2023, the DPRK-flagged *Chon Ma San* transited south into the East China Sea on a near- monthly basis, of which on three occasions (March, May and September) she transited in the Taiwan Strait in an area where multi-stage oil cargo transfers destined for the DPRK have been known to occur (see figure 1).

Satellite imagery provided by 55 Member States (annex 29) showed Chon Ma San offloading refined petroleum at Nampo port on four occasions [210], putting the relevant dates of 16 April and 19 May 2023 at Nampo within a two-week timeframe following the tanker's AIS transmissions on and around 29 March and 9 May 2023 identified in figure 1 below. This timeframe of off-load in the DPRK is consistent with past Panel investigations tracking ship-to-ship transfers, where DPRK tankers would typically stay out for longer periods of time to maximize its oil cargo loads before returning home. Previous imageries provided by a Member State of DPRK tankers at Nampo port have typically shown DPRK tankers as heavily laden. Prior to 2023, *Chon Ma San* was last recorded transmitting AIS signal on the same commercial maritime database in May 2020.

[210] *Chon Ma San* was imaged at Nampo port on: 23 January, 16 April, 19 May and 27 June 2023.

Figure 1: *Chon Ma San* transiting into a sea area in the Taiwan Strait, March, May and September 2023



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

Chon Ma San has repeatedly delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK over the years[211] despite being designated on 30 March 2018.[212] In 2021, the Panel reported[213] another ship-to-ship transfer on 8 August the same year, between *Chon Ma San* and *Diamond* 8 (IMO: 9132612) in another known transfer sea area in the DPRK's economic exclusive zone (figure 2). *Diamond* 8, another FDDV that was widely reported by the Panel, came under the DPRK's fleet as of August 2021 sailing as *Nam Dae Bong*.[214]


[211] See S/2019/961, annex 1, table 1; S/2021/151, annex 1; S/2020/840, annex 15, table 1; S/2021/211, annex 21; S/2022/132, annex 31, table 1; S/2022/668, annex 24; S/2023/171, annex 27, table 1; and S/2023/656, annex 26.

[212] https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials/1718-Designated-Vessels-List. *Chon Ma San* was designated for conducting ship-to-ship transfer with *Jin Hye* (IMO: 8518572) in December 2017. *Jin Hye* was de-flagged as of April 2018, based on IMO records.

[213] S/2022/132 paras 40.

[214] This information was retroactively updated on the IMO GISIS' website several years after the vessel had come under the DPRK's fleet.

Figure 2: *Chon Ma San* and *Diamond* 8 (currently *Nam Dae Bong*), DPRK EEZ, 8 August 2021



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 33: DPRK vessels spoofing their digital identity

The tabled list of DPRK vessels as reported by the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC)[215] partner nations. The Panel has independently tracked many of the spoofed names on a commercial maritime database platform.[216] Several have continued to spoof ship names and MMSIs they were previously registered sailing on.

Table 1: DPRK vessels spoofing their identity, 1 April to 15 September 2023

VESSEL DETAILS		Observed Spoofing Measure on AIS		
NAME	**IMO**	**Name**	**IMO**	**MMSI**
EVER GLORY	9102813	**EVER FENG**	9102813	-
		925	-	-
		CHONG SU DONG	866031300	445082000
		F. LONLINE	-	-
		LITON	-	-
		SONGMYENG2	8817007	445725000
SINPYONG 11	9154189	**RYON PUNG**	9154189	445810000
SIN PHYONG 2	8817007	**MIN HAE**	8817007	445725000
		TIAN YOU	-	-
SIN PYONG 5	8865121	**RYON PUNG**	9154189	445810000
		SINPHYONG5	8865121	445121000
NAM DAE BONG	9132612	**SHUN LI**	9298064	671291100
SIN PHYONG 14	8021579	**MADUCAN**	-	-
CHANG HAE 2	8691702	**YU SON**	445604000	-
CHON MA SAN	8660313	**CHONG SU DONG**	8660313000	445082000
CHIL BO SAN	8711021	**LITON**	-	45710600
		SINHUNG	8711021	445723000
RON PHUNG	9154189	**XIA MEN**	-	445810000
SAM JONG 1	8405311	**445308000**	-	445308000
KUM RYONG 3	8610461	**RYONG BONG 1**	8610461	445591000
CHOL BONG SAN 1	9125308	**DAEHO SUNRISE**	9125308	445290000
		MU BONG 1	-	-

Source: Member State.

[215] See https://www.state.gov/pacific-security-maritime-exchange/
[216] Windward.

Annex 34: DPRK tanker with a reconfigured cargo ship

In this imagery (figure 1), the DPRK Tanker *Sam Ma* 2 (IMO: 8106496) was observed berthed alongside a cargo ship that was re-configured to take on oil cargo. The Member State that provided the satellite imagery indicated that both vessels conducted ship-to-ship transfer. Further, the absence of venting structures, firefighting appliance and interconnected cargo piping for the said transfer meant the reconfiguration was not compliant with international regulations. The Panel separately notes that the location of the ship-to-ship transfer within the DPRK's territorial waters indicate that the cargo ship could be a DPRK ship, consistent with information reported by the Panel in 2022.[217] A similar looking reconfigured cargo ship was photographed earlier in 2020[218] (figure 2).


Figure 1: DPRK tanker conducting ship-to-ship transfer with a reconfigured cargo ship, West Sea Barrage, 17 March 2023



Source: Member State.

[217] S/2022/668, paras. 31-34 and recommendation 87.
[218] S/2023/171, annex 30.

Figure 2: Another example of a re-configured cargo ship with closeups showing likely concealed fuel tanks, East China Sea, October 2020*



*Redactions by the Panel.

In the instance of *Sam Ma*, the Member State observed the vessel in turn transferred some refined petroleum cargo to a smaller tanker without IMO number later the same month of March 2023. The small vessel in turn was assessed to have discharged her cargo to other DPRK-flagged vessels anchored within the West Sea Barrage, likely to keep their generators running (figure 3). *Sam Ma* 2 delivered its remaining oil cargo at Nampo in early April (figure 4).

Figure 3: *Sam Ma* 2 with non-IMO vessel *Jhong Yoog You* 2, Nampo, 26 March 2023



Source: Member State.

Figure 4: *Sam Ma* 2 pier side delivering refined petroleum, Nampo, 2 April 2023



Source: Member State.

Annex 35: Additional replies from Member States on trade statistics in the Panel's previous report (S/2023/656, annex 52)

Letter from the Permanent Mission of Colombia and Colombia's reply

COLOMBIA POTENCIA DE LA VIDA

Misión Permanente de Colombia ante la ONU en Nueva York

No. 23-658-E

New York, 9 August 2023

Mrs. [redacted]
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations

Mrs. [redacted]

I address you in reply to your letter S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.112 dated 15 June 2023, requesting detailed information concerning trade data from Colombia, following regulations established by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

Please find the detailed information attached to this letter, provided by Colombia's National Entities regulating trade and taxes.

The Permanent Mission of Colombia will be attentive to provide any further information should the Panel of Experts needs it.
Sincerely,

LEONOR ZALABATA TORRES
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

COLOMBIA POTENCIA DE LA VIDA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

DIRECCIÓN DE ASUNTOS POLÍTICOS MULTILATERALES
Viceministerio de Asuntos Multilaterales

RESPUESTA REQUERIMIENTO DEL PANEL DE EXPERTOS ESTABLECIDO EN VIRTUD DE LA RESOLUCIÓN 1874 (2009) DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

12 de julio de 2023

Requerimiento realizado a Colombia mediante comunicación S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.112 del 15 de junio de 2023

La siguiente información se remite, en virtud a lo respondido por la Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales de Colombia (DIAN)

EXPORTACIONES DE LA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DEMOCRÁTICA DE COREA (RPDC) A COLOMBIA (IMPORTACIONES)

1. **Confirmar si los siguientes datos son exactos. De ser inexactos presentar copias digitales de documentos originales o una explicación sobre la causa de la inexactitud.**

Tabla 1. Maquinaria (Código SA 84)

Fecha	Valor aproximado (USD)
Octubre de 2022	1.000
Noviembre de 2022	2.000
Enero de 2023	1.000

Frente a las operaciones mencionadas en la Tabla 1, se informa que revisado el sistema informático aduanero se encontró lo siguiente:

a. Octubre de 2022: Declaración de importación No. 032022001424645-0 con valor en aduana de USD 808,77; en la cual, si bien aparece la RPDC como país de origen de la mercancía (Disco separador transmisión), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a los Estados Unidos. *Esto quiere decir que, el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Estados Unidos.*

b. Noviembre de 2022: Declaraciones de importación números 412022000017644-8, 412022000017649-4, 412022000017650-2 y 412022000017659-8 con valor FOB de USD 95,90, USD 29,00, USD 47,54 y USD 6,46, respectivamente.

Se debe tener en cuenta que si bien en estas declaraciones de importación, la RPDC aparece como país de origen de la mercancía (culata de motor, filtro de aceite para vehículo, filtro de aire, filtro de gas, embrague), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Panamá. *En todos los casos el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Panamá.*

Así mismo, se encontró la declaración No. 032022001650505-6 con valor FOB de USD 1.681,73; en la cual, si bien aparece la RPDC como país de origen de la mercancía (Módulo MCU marca Hyundai), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y

el país de procedencia corresponde a los Estados Unidos. *El exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Estados Unidos. El importador tiene calidad Operador Económico Autorizado (OEA).*

Las declaraciones de importación antes mencionadas tienen un valor FOB total de USD 1.860,63.

c. Enero de 2023: Declaración de importación de 032023000086977-7 con valor en aduana de USD 758,89; en la cual, si bien aparece la RPDC como país de origen de la mercancía (Memoria RAM/repuesto sistema de tomografía computarizada), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a los *Estados Unidos*.

Tabla 2. Textiles (código SA 61)

Fecha	Valor aproximado (USD)
Noviembre de 2022	**4.000**
Diciembre de 2022	**1.000**

Respecto a las operaciones mencionadas en la Tabla 2, se informa que revisado el sistema informático aduanero se encontró lo siguiente:

a. Noviembre de 2022: Declaraciones de importación números 902022000180606-2 y 902022000200831-0 con valor FOB de USD 30,42 y USD 4.050,48; en las cuales, si bien aparece LA RPDC como país de origen de la mercancía (Medias marca polo Ralph Lauren), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Panamá. *En ambos casos el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Panamá.*

Las declaraciones de importación antes mencionadas tienen un valor FOB total de USD 4.080,90

b. Diciembre de 2022: Declaraciones de importación números 902022000205266-1, 902022000211452-1 y 902022000211454-4 con valor FOB de USD 520,20, USD 658,20 y USD 162, 84; en las cuales, si bien aparece la RPDC como país de origen de la mercancía (Medias marca polo Ralph Lauren), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Panamá. *En todos los casos el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Panamá.*

Las declaraciones de importación antes mencionadas tienen un valor FOB total de USD 1.341,24.

Aunque se encontraron operaciones que corresponden a los valores aproximados señalados por el International Trade Centre (ICT) Trade Map en las Tablas 1 y 2, es importante anotar que las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas solo indican el capítulo del Sistema Armonizado (SA) o hacen una mención general de la mercancía, por lo que de la descripción que aparece en las declaraciones de importación no se podría inferir que las mismas serán utilizadas en armamento nuclear o misiles.

Los capítulos 61 y 84 del SA comprenden una amplia gama de artículos, y en consecuencia, no todos los bienes de dichos capítulos podrían estar incluidos dentro de las prohibiciones de las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas.

De otra parte, es de resaltar que, aunque las mercancías tenían como país de origen a la RPDC, en ningún caso este fue el país exportador, de compra o de procedencia.

Igualmente, existe la posibilidad de haberse cometido un error de digitación en la casilla No. 66 del código país de origen en las declaraciones de importación, es decir, que en realidad el origen es la República de Corea (190) y no la RPDC (187). La información encontrada se remitirá para las acciones de correspondencia en el control posterior.

2. **Si los cargamentos de la RPDC a Colombia que contenían los artículos relevantes fueron inspeccionados de conformidad con el párrafo 18 de la resolución 2270 (2016), y de ser así, la razón por la cual no fueron incautados y dispuestos de conformidad con el párrafo 20 de la resolución 2397 (2017).**

Es importante tener en cuenta que el ingreso de las mercancías al país está sometido a tres etapas de control aduanero: i) previo; ii) simultáneo y; iii) posterior.

El control previo se surte en el momento en que la mercancía (carga) llega a los aeropuertos, puertos o cruces de frontera, etapa en la cual los transportadores internacionales informan a la Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN), a

través de los Sistemas Informáticos Electrónicos, los datos relacionados en los documentos de transporte, entre ellos, el país de embarque, pues no conoce el país de origen o de negociación de la mercancía. Aunque sistema de la DIAN contiene la información entregada por los transportadores, esta entidad no puede detectar si una mercancía tiene como origen la RPDC.

El control simultáneo tiene lugar cuando una vez surtida la etapa del control previo, los usuarios presentan las declaraciones de importación y solicitan el levante de las mercancías a través de los sistemas informáticos de la DIAN.

Al respecto, y acatando el Convenio de Facilitación al Comercio (AFC) de la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC), la DIAN cuenta con un sistema de selectividad y perfilamiento de riesgo, y en tal sentido las declaraciones pueden ser seleccionadas para inspección física, inspección documental u obtener levante automático. En este último caso no se hace inspección alguna.

Igualmente, en virtud de las mismas normas de facilitación, hay importadores que después de haber cumplido una serie de requisitos son reconocidos por la DIAN y otras entidades de control como *Operadores Económicos Autorizados (OEA),* cuyas operaciones de comercio exterior no representan riesgo Estos importadores tienen beneficios, entre ellos, la obtención del levante automático de las mercancías, sin que ello impida que puedan ser sometidas a acciones de control.

Por último, el control posterior corresponde a las facultades de fiscalización que ejerce la autoridad aduanera sobre las mercancías que han obtenido el levante, en virtud del cual es posible incautarlas o aplicar sanciones conforme a la normatividad aduanera vigente.

Como se indicó en el punto anterior, las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas solo se refieren al capítulo del Sistema Armonizado o hacen una mención general de la mercancía, y de la descripción que aparece en las declaraciones de importación, por lo que no se podría inferir si dichas mercancías serán utilizadas en armamento nuclear o misiles, así como

tampoco en armamento químico y biológico. *Acorde con lo anterior, las mercancías no fueron incautadas y/o eliminadas.*

Adicionalmente, conforme a la legislación interna se debe adelantar un proceso de definición de situación jurídica de las mercancías que respete al debido proceso.

3. **Cualquier otra información relevante y/o acción tomada por las autoridades colombianas con respecto a las exportaciones de la RPDC a Colombia (importaciones).**

Las operaciones de referencia tienen a *Estados Unidos y Panamá* como países de exportación, de compra o de procedencia. En tal sentido se entiende que, aunque la mercancía haya sido fabricada en la RPDC, la transacción no se adelantó con este país.

Con respecto a las medidas adoptadas, uno de los principios en que se fundamenta el Decreto 1165 de 2019, por el cual se dictan disposiciones relativas al Régimen de Aduanas de Colombia es, precisamente, el de seguridad y facilitación en la cadena logística de las operaciones de comercio exterior. Esto quiere decir que el control se cumplirá bajo un sistema de gestión de riesgo que permita neutralizar el contrabando, el lavado de activos, fortalecer la seguridad en las fronteras, así como prevenir el riesgo ambiental y la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva.

En esa línea, las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas son socializadas con las Direcciones Seccionales de la DIAN para su observancia y cumplimiento, sin desconocer los instrumentos internacionales que en materia de agilización de las operaciones de comercio exterior nos corresponde aplicar, tal como es el AFC de la OMC.

Así mismo, desde esa entidad se han expedido comunicaciones a las Direcciones Seccionales, mediante las cuales se imparten lineamientos relativos al reconocimiento de carga y de otra parte, se han realizado solicitudes de selectividad aduanera en los que se dan instrucciones para efectos de aplicación de controles.

Finalmente, es importante mencionar que en la actualidad la DIAN adelanta un proceso de modernización tecnológica que incluye el fortalecimiento del sistema de gestión de riesgos, lo que seguramente redundará en un control más efectivo.

IMPORTACIONES DE LA RPDC DESDE COLOMBIA (EXPORTACIONES)

Tabla 3. Hierro y acero (SA 72)

Fecha	Valor Aproximado (USD)
Diciembre de 2022	1.590.000

1. **Confirmar si los datos son exactos. De ser inexactos presentar copias digitales de documentos originales o una explicación sobre la causa de la inexactitud.**

Revisadas las bases estadísticas de exportaciones del mes de diciembre de 2022 https://www.dian.gov.co/dian/cifras/Paginas/Bases-Estadisticas-de-Comercio-ExteriorImportaciones-y-Exportaciones.aspx, se encontró una exportación desde Colombia, consistente en mercancía de la partida arancelaria 7202600000 (ferroníquel) por valor FOB de USD 1.589.688,33 que en la casilla del país de destino aparece la RPDC (187).

Sin embargo, luego de verificar la razón social y domicilio del destinatario se observa que la mercancía va dirigida para la empresa "M/S POSCO con dirección 6261 DONGHAEAN - RO NAM - GU POHANG- SI GYEONGSANGEUK- DO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA" ubicada en la República de Corea, según información disponible en https://www.posco.co.kr/homepage/docs/eng6/jsp/company/posco/s91a1000012c.jsp y en https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/POSCO.

Conforme a ello, se trata de un error en el diligenciamiento de la declaración de exportación en la casilla de país de destino, *por lo que el tema también será remitido al área competente del control posterior*.

2. **Si los cargamentos de Colombia a la RPDC que contenían los artículos relevantes fueron inspeccionados de conformidad con el párrafo 18 de la resolución 2270 (2016), y de ser así, la razón por la cual no fueron incautados y dispuestos de conformidad con el párrafo 20 de la resolución 2397 (2017).**

No se puede contestar esta pregunta, por cuanto la operación de exportación tiene como destino real una empresa ubicada en la República de Corea.

3. **Cualquier otra información relevante y/o acción realizada por las autoridades colombianas con respecto a las importaciones de la RPDC desde Colombia (Exportaciones).**

No se puede contestar esta pregunta, por cuanto la operación de exportación tiene como destino real una empresa ubicada en la República de Corea.

CONTROL ADUANERO

1. **Rechazo o incautación.**

En relación con cualquier caso de rechazo del despacho de aduana o incautación de mercancías que involucren a la RPDC como país de destino/consignación/origen, fabricación o tránsito, se adjunta un cuadro con la información suministrada por la DIAN correspondiente a *"los registros de las aprehensiones realizadas cuyo posible país de procedencia es la RPDC, para los años 2022 y 2023 con corte al 18 de junio de 2023, los reportes incluyen (en orden de aparición), las siguientes columnas: País de procedencia, Clasificación Arancelaria, Descripción de la mercancía aprehendida, Unidad de medida, Cantidad de mercancía aprehendida, Número de aprehensiones y valor de las aprehensiones realizadas"*.

2. **Información que pudiera considerarse pertinente para el trabajo según lo dispuesto por el Consejo de Seguridad a este respecto.**

Con miras a una implementación que permita cumplir estrictamente con las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, para Colombia, especialmente para la DIAN, sería valioso conocer las mejores prácticas internacionales que se aplican en los diferentes países encaminadas al cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas relativas a la RPDC y su articulación con las normas de facilitación de comercio, dada la dificultad para detectar que una mercancía tiene como origen la RPDC. Por ejemplo, cuando ha sido comprada en un país diferente y adicionalmente es embarcada en otro (procedencia) que no corresponde ni al de compra ni al de origen.

Colombia *(Translated from Spanish)*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia

Office of the Director of Multilateral Political Affairs

Office of the Deputy Minister of Multilateral Affairs

Reply to the request of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

12 July 2023

Request sent to Colombia through communication S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.112 of 15 June 2023

The following information is based on the reply of the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs of Colombia.

Exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Colombia (imports)

1. Confirmation as to whether the following data are accurate. If they are inaccurate, please submit digital copies of original documents or an explanation of the cause of the inaccuracy:

Table 1. Machinery (HS code 84)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
October 2022	1,000
November 2022	2,000
January 2023	1,000

Regarding the transactions in table 1, the customs computer system was consulted and the following information was found:

a. October 2022: import declaration No. 032022001424645-0, with a customs value of $808.77. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (transmission separator discs), the United States of America is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. This means that the exporter or overseas supplier is located in the United States.

b. November 2022: import declarations No. 412022000017644-8, No. 412022000017649-4, No. 412022000017650-2 and No. 412022000017659-8, with free-on-board values of $95.90, $29.00, $47.54 and $6.46, respectively.

Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (cylinder heads, vehicle oil filters, air filters, gas filters and clutches), Panama is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. In all cases, the exporter or overseas supplier is located in Panama.

Declaration No. 032022001650505-6 was also found, with a free-on-board value of $1,681.73. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (Hyundai machine control units), the United States is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. The exporter or overseas supplier is located in the United States. The importer is an authorized economic operator.

Those import declarations have a total free-on-board value of $1,860.63.

c. January 2023: import declaration No. 032023000086977-7, with a customs value of $758.89. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (random access memory (RAM)/replacement computerized tomography system), the United States is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance.

Table 2. Textiles (HS code 61)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
November 2022	4,000
December 2022	1,000

Regarding the transactions in table 2, the customs computer system was consulted and the following information was found:

a. November 2022: import declarations No. 902022000180606-2 and No. 902022000200831-0, with free-on-board values of $30.42 and $4,050.48. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (Ralph Lauren Polo brand socks), Panama is the country

of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. In both cases, the exporter or overseas supplier is located in Panama.

Those import declarations have a total free-on-board value of $4,080.90.

b. December 2022: import declarations No. 902022000205266-1, No. 902022000211452-1 and No. 902022000211454-4, with free-on-board values of $520.20, $658,20 and $162.84. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (Ralph Lauren Polo brand socks), Panama is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. In all cases, the exporter or overseas supplier is located in Panama.

Those import declarations have a total free-on-board value of $1,341.24.

Although transactions were found that correspond to the approximate values indicated in the International Trade Centre Trade Map in tables 1 and 2, the Security Council resolutions contain only the Harmonized System chapter or a general reference to the goods. As a result, from the description that appears in the import declarations, it cannot be inferred that they will be used in nuclear weapons or missiles.

Harmonized System chapters 61 and 84 comprise a wide range of items. Consequently, not all the goods in those chapters could be subject to the prohibitions in the Security Council resolutions.

Furthermore, although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was the country of origin of the goods, in no case was it the country of export, the country of purchase or the country of provenance.

It is also possible that a typographical error was made when the code for the country of origin was entered in field 66 of the import declarations and that the country of origin is in fact the Republic of Korea (190) rather than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (187). The information found will be forwarded for appropriate action during the post-clearance inspection.

2. Whether the cargoes from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Colombia containing the relevant items were inspected pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and if so, the reason why they were not seized and disposed of pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017)

The entry of goods into the country is subject to three stages of customs inspection: (i) pre-clearance; (ii) in-clearance; and (iii) post-clearance.

Pre-clearance inspections are conducted when goods (cargo) arrive at airports, ports or border crossings, at which point international shippers inform the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs, through the electronic information services, of the data related to the shipping documents, including the country of shipment, since they do not know the country of origin or brokerage of the goods. Although the Directorate's system contains the information provided by the shippers, the Directorate cannot detect whether goods originate from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In-clearance inspections are carried out when users submit import declarations and request the release of goods through the Directorate's computer systems after completion of pre-clearance inspections.

In that regard, in line with the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Facilitation, the Directorate has a system of risk selectivity and profiling in which declarations can be selected for physical inspection, documentary inspection or automatic release. In the case of automatic release, no inspection is made.

Under the same facilitation rules, there are importers that, having fulfilled a series of requirements, are recognized by the Directorate and other monitoring bodies as authorized economic operators, whose foreign trade transactions pose no risk. Those importers enjoy benefits, such as the automatic release of goods, though they can still be subject to inspections.

Lastly, post-clearance inspections are carried out pursuant to the customs authority's powers of oversight over goods that have been released and can therefore be seized or subject to penalties in accordance with the customs rules in force.

As stated above, the Security Council resolutions contain only the Harmonized System chapter or a general reference to the goods, and it cannot be inferred from the descriptions set out in the import declarations that the goods will be used in nuclear weapons or missiles, or in chemical or biological weapons. In view of the foregoing, the goods were not seized or disposed of.

In addition, under Colombian law, a procedure consistent with due process needs to be initiated in order to determine the legal status of the goods.

3. Any other relevant information and/or action taken by the Colombian authorities with respect to exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Colombia (imports)

In the above-mentioned transactions, the United States and Panama are the countries of export, purchase and provenance. Although the goods were manufactured in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, therefore, the transactions were not carried out with that country

With regard to the action taken, one of the principles underlying Decree No. 1165 of 2019, regulating the customs regime of Colombia, is precisely the security and facilitation of the logistical chain for foreign trade operations. In other words, inspections shall be conducted pursuant to a risk-management system that will prevent smuggling and asset laundering, strengthen border security, mitigate environmental risk and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In that regard, the Security Council resolutions are disseminated to the Directorate's local offices to ensure that they are observed and complied with, without prejudice to international instruments that must be applied to facilitate foreign trade operations, such as the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Facilitation.

The Directorate has also sent its local offices communications containing guidelines on cargo inspections and has issued requests for selective customs checks.

Lastly, the Directorate is currently upgrading its technology. This includes strengthening the risk management system, which will no doubt result in more effective inspections.

Imports to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Colombia (exports)

Table 3. Iron and steel (HS 72)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
December 2022	1,590,000

1. Confirmation as to whether the data are accurate. If they are inaccurate, please submit digital copies of original documents or an explanation of the cause of the inaccuracy.

During the review of the statistical databases for exports from December 2022 (https://www.dian.gov.co/dian/cifras/Paginas/Bases-Estadisticas-de-Comercio-Exterior-Importaciones-y-Exportaciones.aspx), an export from Colombia was found, consisting of goods under tariff heading 7202600000 (ferronickel) with a free-on-board value of $1,589,688.33. The field for the country of destination contains the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (code 187).

Upon verification of the registered name and address of the receiver, however, it was observed that the goods were addressed to the company Posco at 6261 Donghaean-ro, Nam-gu, Pohang-si, Gyeongsangbuk-do, Republic of Korea. That location is confirmed by the information available at https://www.posco.co.kr/homepage/docs/eng6/jsp/company/posco/s91a1000012c.js [219] and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POSCO.

An error would therefore seem to have been made when the field of the export declaration containing the country of destination was completed. The matter will also be forwarded for appropriate action during the post-clearance inspection.

2. Whether the cargoes from Colombia to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea containing the relevant items were inspected pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and if so, the reason why they were not seized and disposed of pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017).

This question cannot be answered because the actual destination of the export operation was a company located in the Republic of Korea.

3. Any other relevant information and/or action taken by the Colombian authorities with respect to imports to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Colombia (exports).

This question cannot be answered because the actual destination of the export operation was a company located in the Republic of Korea.

Customs control

1. Rejection or seizure

Regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a country of destination/consignment/origin, manufacture or transit, a table is attached with information provided by the Directorate on records of seizures of goods whose country of origin could be the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, from 1 January 2022 to 18 June 2023, including (in order of appearance) the following columns: country of provenance, tariff

[219] Translator's note: the hyperlink provided in the original does not work. For the Posco webpage containing information about the location, see https://www.posco.co.kr/homepage/docs/eng7/jsp/common/posco/s91a1000010c.jsp.

classification, description of goods seized, unit of measure, quantity of goods seized, number of seizures and value of goods seized.

2. Information that could be considered relevant to the Panel's work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard

To ensure that implementation fully complies with the Security Council resolutions, it would be useful for Colombia, in particular the Directorate, to be aware of the best international practices applied in different countries to implement Security Council resolutions related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the ways in which those resolutions relate to the rules on trade facilitation, given the difficulty of detecting that goods originate in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for example, when goods have been purchased in a different country and are also shipped from another country (of provenance) that is neither the country of purchase nor that of origin.

Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Seychelles and Seychelles' reply

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES

TO THE UNITED NATIONS
685 THIRD AVENUE, SUITE 1107, 11TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL: 212.972.1785 FAX: 212.972.1786

EMAIL: seychellesmission@sycun.org

Note No: SMUN/173/2023

New York, 22 August 2023

Dear XXXX

I have the honor to write to you in your capacity as Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and make reference to your letter dated 15 June 2023, Reference No.: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.119, regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

In endeavoring to assist the Panel in its investigation, I further have the honor to inform you that, after an extensive enquiry into the matter by the Seychelles Revenue Commission, it was found that the data published was, in fact, inaccurate. During the period in question between October 2022 and March 2023, there were three (3) imports originating from the **Republic of Korea (ROK)**:

a. BOE C27979 dated 23/11/2022 - Airport Cargo (SCAC)

Exporter:

D-I Industrial CO. Ltd

13, Namgang-R0 1367BEON-GIL, JINJU-SI, Gyeonganam-Do, Korea, 52781

Tel: +82 55 760 5520

Fax: +82 55 755 5529

The country code of the ROK is (+82). The product is made in ROK.

Port of loading: Incheon Airport, Republic of Korea

b. BOE C21539 dated 13/12/2022 - Seaport (SCPO)

Exporter:

SAMSUNG Electronic Co. Ltd

129, Samsung-RO, Yeongtong-Gu, Suwon 16677 Gyeonggi-Do, Republic of Korea

c. BOE 1674 dated 25/01/2023 - Seaport (SCPO)

Seller:

Dong Ah Fishing Industries Co., Ltd.

1100-9 Janglim-Dong, SAHA-GU,

Busan, Republic of Korea

Country of Origin: Republic of Korea (ROK) - South Korea

Country of Export: Busan, Korea

In all three cases, the Bills of Entry (BOE) presented for the clearance of those goods identified the country of export and the country of origin in boxes 15 and 16 respectively, as being the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These were erroneous entries on the part of the declarants, as can be seen from the attached copies of the original documents.

The Seychelles Revenue Commission (SRC) could not find an entry within its system dated October 2022 under HS Code 72 that is highlighted in your letter.

In concluding, I wish to convey that the review conducted by the SRC found that there is a gap in Seychelles' national legislative framework to domesticate UNSC sanction measures and that the country is embarking on a wider consultative process to address this gap.

The Seychelles Permanent Mission to the United Nations, remains at your disposal for any further clarification on this matter.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.



H.E. Mr. Ian Madeleine
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

XXXXXXXXXXX

Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts

established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

United Nations

New York

Annex 36: Comparison Table on DPRK Trade Statistics and replies provided by Member States

** Note: DPRK Trade Statistics and Member State's reply cover the six-month period of April 2023-September 2023/ Highlighted are restricted commodities.

As of 1 January 2024 / *Unit: Thousand US$

No.	Member State (MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Armenia	0	117		29 (HS Code 12) 1 (HS Code 61) 6 (HS Code 84) 8 (HS Code 85)	**Customs declarations system does not contain any information related to such import from DPRK.**
2	Aruba (territory of the Netherlands)	0	7,965		258 (HS Code 84) 5 (HS Code 85)	
3	Austria	0	734			**(Not Restricted)**
4	Barbados	0	752		390 (HS Code 72) 4 (HS Code 73) 301 (HS Code 84) 55 (HS Code 85)	
5	Belgium, Kingdom of	34	9		7 (HS Code 84)	
6	Belize	0	30		30 (HS Code 84)	
7	Brazil, Federative Republic of	0	5		4 (HS Code 58)	
8	Canada	4	0	1 (HS Code 85)		**Confirmed errors due to miscoded country variables in the customs data.**
9	China, People's Republic of	992,366	142,764	16 (HS Code 72) 50 (HS Code 73) 48 (HS Code 82) 1 (HS Code 83) 812 (HS Code 84) 295 (HS Code 85) 3 (HS Code 87)	14265 (HS Code 72) 114 (HS Code 73) 3585(HS Code 50) 4 (HS Code 58)	**Goods are items not prohibited by the relevant UNSC resolutions or for the use of international organizations in their project offices in the DPRK which did not violate UNSC resolutions.**
10	Colombia	0	180		14 (HS Code 56) 3 (HS Code 61) 1 (HS Code 73) 136 (HS Code 84) 8 (HS Code 85)	**Errors with country code as none of the cases were DPRK. Some items could not be subject to UNSC resolutions.**

No.	Member State (MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
11	Costa Rica	0	206		179 (HS Code 84)	
12	Cyprus	3	0			**(Not Restricted)**
13	Denmark, Kingdom of	112	0			**(Not Restricted)**
14	Ecuador	2	0			**(Not Restricted)**
15	Gambia	0	11			**(Not Restricted)**
16	Greece	181	17			**(Not Restricted)**
17	Guyana	0	38		1 (HS Code 84) 36 (HS Code 85)	
18	Hungary	1	0	1 (HS Code 84)		
19	India	73	314	9 (HS Code 85) 2 (HS Code 87)	7 (HS Code 56) 191 (HS Code 72) 21 (HS Code 73) 58 (HS Code 74) 8 (HS Code 84) 16 (HS Code 85)	
20	Indonesia, Republic of	138	90	138 (HS Code 84)	7 (HS Code 62) 6 (HS Code 74) 6 (HS Code 84)	
21	Italy	0	30			**(Not Restricted)**
22	Madagascar, Republic of	0	21			**(Not Restricted)**
23	Mongolia	128	247			**(Not Restricted)**
24	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	159	35		1 (HS Code 73) 1 (HS Code 85)	
25	Poland, Republic of	198	4			**(Not Restricted)**
26	Romania	0	3			**(Not Restricted)**
27	Slovenia	0	2			**(Not Restricted)**
28	South Africa, Republic of	4	10		1 (HS Code 63)	
29	Spain, Kingdom of	0	24		1 (HS Code 84) 22 (HS Code 85)	
30	Thailand, Kingdom of	0	20		19 (HS Code 85)	
31	Ukraine	0	8		3 (HS Code 54)	**Country of origin was mistakenly indicated as DPRK instead of ROK**

Source: ITC Trade Map, accessed on 1 January 2024, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 37: Imported Trucks and Agricultural equipment in DPRK

The Panel investigated the open source information[220] about possible violation of restrictions imposed by Security Council resolutions relating to transfer to DPRK of all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85) and transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89, which appeared on a number of images taken in DPRK in 2023.

In April 2023 DPRK authorities presented vehicles, to "districts administering major streets of Pyongyang" (Figure 1). NK News identified them as Chinese-made vehicles: QY16K crane truck Duolika D6 large white and green street sweeper~~,~~ MN-F2000 small single-seat street sweeper vehicles, Dragon 5 brown flatbed industrial trucks with mounted cranes.

Figure 1



Source: Rodong Shinmun.

On another occasion, authorities had presented the Ryonpho Greenhouse Farm[221] with vehicles and equipment, which, according to the same NK News analysts, included: Chinese-made industrial truck, flatbed trucks, container, walking tractors (figure. 2).

[220] http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyMy0wNC0xNS1IMDA3QDE1QDFAQDBANQ==
[221] http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/f8cf900be172eb0560855b50433301e3.kcmsf

Figure. 2



Source: NK News.



Source: NK News, comparing images from *KCTV (April 6, 2023) (right) and a Jiulin manufactured tractor (left)*[222]

[222] See *https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-koreas-display-of-new-chinese-trucks-points-to-production-issues-at-home/; and 2023http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/f8cf900be172eb0560855b50433301e3.kcmsf*

China's reply to the Panel's enquiry (OC. 231, see Annex 40 for a compilated reply)

To the Panel's request concerning this case China replied: "By November 2017, the UN Security Council had not yet listed vehicles as prohibited goods for export to the DPRK. Records were found on exports of passenger cars and trucks to the DPRK during this period, and these were normal exports. Since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2397, all vehicles exported from China to the DPRK have been for the use of international organizations in their project offices in the DPRK, and they do not involve any violations of UN Security Council resolutions".

Annex 38: List of HS Codes the Panel applies to monitor the sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list supersedes S/2018/171, annex 4, as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. This list does not include items banned by previous resolutions such as arms embargo, dual-use items and luxury goods. See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items for the complete list of prohibited goods.

a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Condensates and natural gas liquids	**2709**	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of 2375 (2017)
	2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
Industrial machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Transportation vehicles[223]	**86**	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	87	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	88	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof [224]	
	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	
Iron, steel and other metals	**72-83**		Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	72	Iron and steel	
	73	Articles of iron or steel	
	74	Copper and articles thereof	
	75	Nickel and articles thereof	
	76	Aluminum and articles thereof	

[223] Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

[224] Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

78	Lead and articles thereof
79	Zinc and articles thereof
80	Tin and articles thereof
81	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal

b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Coal	**2701**	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
Iron Ore	**2601**	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
Iron	**72**	Iron and steel (**7201-7229**)	
Iron and Steel products	**73**	Articles of Iron and steel (**7301-7326)**	
Gold	**261690**	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	7108	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	710811	Gold powder, unwrought	
	710812	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	710813	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	710820	Monetary gold	
Titanium	**2614**	Titanium ores and concentrates	
Vanadium	**2615**	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	**2612**	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [**261210** and **261220**]	
	2617	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code **261790** - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	2844	Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes etc.	
Copper	**74**	Copper and articles thereof (**7401-7419**)	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
	2603	Copper ores and concentrates	
Zinc	**79**	Zinc and articles thereof (**7901-7907**)	
	2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	**75**	Nickel and articles thereof (**7501-7508)**	

	2604	Nickel ores and concentrates	
Silver	**2616100**	Silver ores and concentrates	
	7106, 7107	Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	7114	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
Seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	**3**	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates (**0301-0308)**	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	1603	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	1604	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	1605	Crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
Lead	**78**	Lead and articles thereof (**7801-7806**)	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
Lead ore	**2607**	Lead ores and concentrates	
Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	**50-63**		Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	50	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	52	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	53	Vegetable textile fibres nesoi; yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibres nesoi and paper	
	54	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	55	Manmade staple fibres, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	57	Carpets and other textile floor covering	

	58	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	59	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	
	61	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	62	Apparel and clothing accessories; *not* knitted or crocheted;	
	63	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
Agricultural products	**07**	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	08	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
Machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
Electrical equipment	**85**	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia	**25**	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
Wood	**44**	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
Vessels	**89**	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709: crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713: refined petroleum products [cap: 500,000 barrels]

Source: The Panel.

Annex 39: Replies from Member States to the Panel's enquiries

Letter from the Permanent Mission of Armenia and Armenia's reply

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
119 East 36th Street, New York, New York 10016
Tel: 212-686-9079 Email: armenia@missionun.org

UN/3101/002/2024

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), and, with reference to the letter S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.472 dated 8 December 2023, has the honour to inform that, according to the response provided by the State Revenue Committee of the Republic of Armenia, customs declarations in Armenia are submitted to the Customs authorities of the Republic of Armenia in an electronic form. The customs declarations are subsequently registered in the system "National Single Window for Foreign Trade of the Republic of Armenia". The system does not contain any information related to the import from DPRK of items under HS Code 12, HS Code 61, HS Code 84 and HS Code 85 for the period between April 2023 and September 2023.

In case that additional data is provided regarding the transfer of above mentioned items to the Republic of Armenia, the State Revenue Committee of Armenia will conduct further investigation. The Permanent Mission of Armenia stands ready to provide any additional clarification, as needed.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 5 January 2024

The Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
New York

Letter from the Permanent Mission of Canada and Canada's reply

Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations

Mission permanente du Canada
auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

January 17, 2024

[redacted]
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Headquarters
New York, NY 10017

Dear [redacted]

Thank you for your letter of December 8, 2023, reference S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.478, with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by the referenced Security Council resolutions, in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel has written specifically "with regard to the DPRK's trade with Canada in items that are covered by the relevant sectoral sanctions provisions in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017)", based on the Panel's analysis of available trade data. Your letter also noted that the Panel seeks Canada's assistance in providing supplementary information concerning specific trade data reported by Canada that lists the DPRK as the partner country.

The Government of Canada has determined that the instances in which the DPRK is reported as the partner country are either confirmed errors or highly likely to be errors. The errors are most likely cases of miscoded country variables in the customs data.

Please note that we will be making changes within our national systems to replace miscoded references to the DPRK with the correct partner country in all these transactions. Moving forward, we will work to modify our processes to detect potential reporting errors, to reduce occurrences of trade being incorrectly attributed to the DPRK in published data.

With respect to the Panel's request for information regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods involving the DPRK as a country of destination / consignment / origin / manufacture or transit, the Government of Canada affirms that there have been no import seizures of goods from the DPRK as the country of purchase / origin.

Canada

Please be assured that the Government of Canada takes our obligations as a UN Member State with the utmost seriousness. To that end, Canada continues to stand ready to support the important work of the Panel. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you require any further clarifications.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]
d'Affaires a.i.

Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative

China's reply (see also annex 40, OC.359)

From April to September 2023, China did not import iron alloys, iron and steel products, textiles, or other goods from the DPRK prohibited by relevant UN resolutions. The goods imported from the DPRK under HS code 50 were mulberry silk and waste silk. Mulberry silk and waste silk are raw materials and do not fall under the category of textiles prohibited from export by the UN resolutions, as China has repeatedly stated to the Panel. During this period, all metal products, industrial machinery, electronic equipment, and vehicles exported from China to the DPRK were purely for the use of international organizations in their project offices in the DPRK, and did not involve any violations of UN sanctions resolutions. We urge the Panel to demonstrate its professionalism, accurately determine the scope of the resolutions and not to include any information unrelated to the resolutions in its final report.

Letter from the Permanent Mission of Colombia and Colombia's reply

Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations

S-DUSONU-24-000004

New York, January 3rd, 2024

Ms. Acting Coordinator,

I have the honour to write to you regarding your note S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.479 dated December 8, 2023, in which you request information with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) trade with Colombia in items that are covered by the relevant sectoral sanctions according to resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

In that regard, please find attached the official response by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia - Direction for Multilateral Political Affairs – to your request (1 PDF file); a copy of all the relevant import declarations (16 PDF files); and the report on the seizure of goods from the DPRK (1 excel file).

Please accept, Ms. Acting Coordinator, the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

LEONOR ZALABATA TORRES
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

To
Ms [redacted]v
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
New York

140 EAST 57TH STREET · NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022 · TEL.: (212) 355-7776 · FAX: (212) 371-2813

COLOMBIA POTENCIA DE LA VIDA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

DIRECCIÓN DE ASUNTOS POLÍTICOS MULTILATERALES
Viceministerio de Asuntos Multilaterales

Respuesta requerimiento del Panel de Expertos establecido en virtud de la Resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas

Enero 2 de 2024

Requerimiento realizado a Colombia mediante comunicación S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.479 del 8 de diciembre de 2023.

La siguiente respuesta se remite, en virtud a la información suministrada por la Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN).

EXPORTACIONES DE LA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DEMOCRÁTICA DE COREA (RPDC) A COLOMBIA (IMPORTACIONES)

1. Confirmar si los datos enumerados son exactos. De ser inexactos, presentar copias digitales de los documentos originales o una explicación sobre la causa de la inexactitud:

Tabla 1. Textiles (Código SA 56)

Fecha	Valor aproximado (USD)
Mayo 2023	14.000

Respecto a las operaciones mencionadas en la tabla 1, se informa que revisado el sistema informático aduanero se encontró lo siguiente:

a. Mayo de 2023: Declaraciones de importación números *482023000257885-1* y *482023000274837-8* con valor en aduana de USD 7.161,27 y USD 7.158.79 respectivamente, se debe tener en cuenta que si bien en estas declaraciones de importación Corea del Norte aparece como país de origen de la mercancía (rollo revelador DR44K), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Estados Unidos. En los dos casos, el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Estados Unidos.

   Las declaraciones de importación antes mencionadas tienen un valor en aduana total de USD 14.320,06.

Tabla 2. Textiles (Código SA 61)

Fecha	Valor aproximado (USD)
Mayo 2023	3.000

Respecto a las operaciones mencionadas en la tabla 2, se informa que revisado el sistema informático aduanero se encontró lo siguiente:

a. Mayo de 2023: Declaraciones de importación números *902023000080813-2* y *902023000080814-1* con valor en aduana de USD 1.872,29 y USD 678,43

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respectivamente, en las cuales, si bien aparece Corea del Norte como país de origen de la mercancía (Medias marca polo Ralph Lauren), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Panamá. En ambos casos el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Panamá.

Las declaraciones de importación antes mencionadas tienen un valor en aduana total de USD 2.550,72.

Tabla 3. Productos de Hierro y Acero (Código SA 73)

Fecha	Valor aproximado (USD)
Mayo 2023	1.000

Respecto a las operaciones mencionadas en la tabla 3, se informa que revisado el sistema informático aduanero se encontró lo siguiente:

a. Mayo de 2023: Declaración de importación número *192023000031757-7* con valor en aduana de USD 538,88, en la cual, si bien aparece Corea del Norte como país de origen de la mercancía (Cap screw – Tornillo marca Komatsu), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Estados Unidos. El exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Estados Unidos. El importador tiene calidad Operador Económico Autorizado – OEA.

Tabla 4. Maquinaria (Código SA 84)

Fecha	Valor aproximado (USD)
Abril de 2023	10.000
Mayo de 2023	16.000
Junio de 2023	110.000

Respecto a las operaciones mencionadas en la tabla 4, se informa que revisado el sistema informático aduanero se encontró lo siguiente:

a. Abril de 2023: Declaración de importación número *902023000051992-9* con valor en aduana de USD 4.559,27. Cabe anotar que si bien en la casilla del País exportador aparece Corea del Norte, tras verificar la razón social y domicilio del exportador, se identificó que la mercancía (Botonera de control para polipasto de 2 pulsadores, marca Swiko) proviene de la empresa "Gtol Corporation" con dirección "W503, SK-V1 Center, 11, Dangsan-Ro 41-Gil, Yeongdeungpo, Seoul, Korea, 150-806" ubicada en Corea del Sur, según información disponible en http://gtoic.com/home_02.asp. Conforme a ello, presumiblemente se trata de un error en el diligenciamiento de la declaración de importación en la casilla (No. 48) del código País Exportador en la declaración de importación, es decir que en realidad el país exportador es Corea del Sur (190) y no Corea del Norte (187), por lo cual la información encontrada será remitida para las acciones que correspondan en el control posterior.

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Adicional, se encontró la declaración de importación número *032023000569470-9* con valor en aduana de USD 4.991,43 en la cual, si bien aparece Corea del Norte como país de origen de la mercancía (TrialSlate Bluebird ST102 W4LAL, marca Bluebird – 6 Unds), se observa que tanto el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Reino Unido. El exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Reino Unido. El importador tiene calidad Operador Económico Autorizado – OEA.

Las declaraciones de importación mencionadas anteriormente tienen un valor en aduana total de USD 9550,70.

b. Mayo de 2023: Declaraciones de importación números *872023000056017-3* y *482023000281797-0* con valor en aduana de USD 952,36 y USD 14.937,98 respectivamente, en las cuales, si bien aparece Corea del Norte como país de origen de la mercancía (Disco duro SSD, Liner de motor), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Estados Unidos. En ambos casos el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Estados Unidos.

   Las declaraciones de importación antes mencionadas tienen un valor en aduana total de USD 15.890,34.

c. Junio de 2023: Declaración de importación número *482023000322528-3* con valor en aduana de USD $70.182,93 en la cual, si bien aparece Corea del Norte como país de origen de la mercancía (mercancía nueva de uso exclusivo en la industria petrolera), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Estados Unidos. El exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Estados Unidos. El importador tiene calidad Operador Económico Autorizado-OEA.

   Así mismo se encontró la declaración de importación número *482023000343695* con valor en aduana de USD 26.789,42 en la cual, si bien aparece Corea del Norte como país de origen de la mercancía (excavadora), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra es China. El exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en China.

   Adicional, se encontraron las declaraciones de importación números *032023000844845-6, 032023000836628-0* y *032023000836528-2* con valor en aduana de USD 9.309,83, USD 2.262,03 y USD 1.560,97 respectivamente, se debe tener en cuenta que si bien en estas declaraciones de importación Corea del Norte aparece como país de origen de la mercancía (bomba de aceite, bomba de combustible, tubo de plástico del motor – camión), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Brasil. El exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Brasil. El importador tiene calidad Operador Económico Autorizado-OEA.

   Las declaraciones de importación mencionadas anteriormente tienen un valor en aduana total de USD 110.105,18.

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Tabla 5. Equipo eléctrico (Código SA 84)

Fecha	Valor aproximado (USD)
Abril de 2023	8.000

Respecto a las operaciones mencionadas en la tabla 5, se informa que revisado el sistema informático aduanero se encontró lo siguiente:

a. Abril de 2023: Declaración de importación número *902023000051993-6* con valor en aduana de USD 2.128,64. Se resalta que, si bien en la casilla del País Exportador aparece Corea del Norte, tras verificar la razón social y domicilio del exportador, se identifica que la mercancía (Control remoto a distancia, marca KG Auto) proviene de la empresa "Gtol Corporation" con dirección "W503, SK-V1 Center, 11, Dangsan-Ro 41-Gil, Yeongdeungpo, Seoul, Korea, 150-806" ubicada en Corea del Sur, según información disponible en http://gtoic.com/home_02.asp. Conforme a ello, al parecer se trata de un error en el diligenciamiento de la declaración de importación en la casilla (No. 48) del código País Exportador en la declaración de importación, es decir que en realidad el país exportador es Corea del Sur (190) y no Corea del Norte (187), por lo cual la información encontrada se remitirá para las acciones que correspondan en el control posterior.

   Así mismo, se encontró la declaración de importación número *032023000569444-7* con valor en aduana de USD 6.321,60 en las cual, si bien aparece Corea del Norte como país de origen de la mercancía (Ediary Samsung A217M US. Android 10, Dual Sim), se observa que tanto el país exportador, como el país de compra y el país de procedencia corresponde a Reino Unido. En ambos casos el exportador o proveedor en el exterior está ubicado en Reino Unido. El importador tiene calidad Operador Económico Autorizado-OEA. Las declaraciones de importación anteriormente mencionadas tienen un valor en aduana total de USD 8.450,24.

Así las cosas y aunque se encontraron operaciones que corresponden con los valores aproximados señalados por el International Trade Centre (ICT) Trade Map en las tablas 1, 2, 3, 4 y 5, es importante anotar que las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas solo indican el capítulo del Sistema Armonizado o hacen una mención general de la mercancía, y de la descripción que aparece en las declaraciones de importación no se podría inferir que las mismas serán utilizadas en el desarrollo de armamento nuclear o misiles.

Los capítulos 56, 61, 73, 84 y 85 del SA comprenden una amplia gama de artículos/productos, en consecuencia, no todos los bienes de dichos capítulos podrían estar incluidos dentro de las prohibiciones de las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas.

De otra parte, es de resaltar que, aunque las mercancías tenían como país de origen a la RPDC, en ninguno de los casos correspondió al país exportador, de compra o de procedencia. Igualmente, existe la posibilidad de que se hayan cometido errores en la digitación de la casilla No. 48 de la Declaración de Importación en relación con el código de origen, es decir que algunas importaciones realizadas desde la República de Corea hayan sido erróneamente registradas como provenientes de la RPDC.

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2. Si los cargamentos de la RPDC a Colombia que contenían los artículos pertinentes fueron inspeccionados de conformidad con el párrafo 18 de la resolución 2270 (2016), y de ser así, el motivo por el cual no fueron incautados y dispuestos de conformidad con el párrafo 20 de la resolución 2397 (2017).

Al respecto, es importante anotar que el ingreso al país de estas, al igual que de todas las mercancías, está condicionado por tres etapas de control aduanero, a saber: previo, simultáneo y posterior.

El control previo se surte en el momento en que la mercancía (carga) llega a los aeropuertos, puertos o cruces de frontera, etapa en la cual los transportadores internacionales informan a la DIAN (a través de los Sistemas Informáticos Electrónicos) los datos relacionados en los documentos de transporte, entre ellos, el país de embarque, pues no conocen el país de origen o de negociación de la mercancía. Ahora bien, el sistema de la DIAN contiene la información entregada por los transportadores, pero la Entidad no puede detectar si una mercancía tiene como origen la RPDC.

El control simultáneo tiene lugar cuando surtida la etapa del control previo, los usuarios presentan las declaraciones de importación y solicitan el levante de las mercancías a través de los sistemas informáticos de la DIAN; sobre esto, es de tener en cuenta que acatando el Convenio de Facilitación al Comercio (AFC) de la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC), la Entidad cuenta con un sistema de selectividad y perfilamiento de riesgo, y en tal sentido las declaraciones pueden ser seleccionadas para inspección física, inspección documental u obtener levante automático, en este último caso no se hace inspección alguna.

También, en virtud de las mismas normas de facilitación, hay importadores que después de haber cumplido una serie de requisitos son reconocidos por la DIAN y otras Entidades de control como Operadores Económicos Autorizados (OEA), cuyas operaciones de comercio exterior no representan riesgo, por lo que tienen beneficios, entre ellos, la obtención del levante automático de las mercancías, sin que ello impida que puedan ser sometidas a acciones de control. Ahora, el control posterior corresponde a las facultades de fiscalización que ejerce la autoridad aduanera sobre mercancías que han obtenido levante, en virtud del cual es posible incautarlas o aplicar sanciones conforme a la normatividad aduanera vigente.

Igualmente, como se ha indicado las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas solo refieren el capítulo del Sistema Armonizado o hacen una mención general de la mercancía, y de la descripción que aparece en las declaraciones de importación no se podría inferir que las mercancías serán utilizadas en el desarrollo de armamento nuclear o misiles, así como tampoco en armamento químico o biológico.

De acuerdo con lo anterior, las mercancías no fueron incautadas/eliminadas. Adicionalmente, conforme a la legislación interna se debe adelantar un proceso de definición de situación jurídica de las mercancías que respete el debido proceso, cuestión que no fue requerido para el caso de las mercancías que son objeto de consulta.

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3. Cualquier otra información relevante y/o acción tomada por las autoridades colombianas con respecto a las exportaciones de la RPDC a Colombia (importaciones).

Es preciso destacar que las operaciones de comercio exterior que fueron objeto de revisión tienen a Estados Unidos, Panamá, Reino Unido, China y Brasil, como países de exportación, de compra o de procedencia, y en tal sentido se entiende que, aunque la mercancía haya sido fabricada en la RPDC la transacción comercial no se adelantó con este último país. Sin embargo, Colombia aplica una serie de medidas para mantener su sistema de regulación alineado con los propósitos de desarme y no proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva.

Con respecto a las medidas adoptadas, como se ha mencionado en otras ocasiones, vale decir que uno de los principios en que se fundamenta el Decreto 1165 de 2019, por el cual se dictan disposiciones relativas al Régimen de Aduanas es, precisamente, el de seguridad y facilitación en la cadena logística de las operaciones de comercio exterior; esto significa que el control se cumplirá bajo un sistema de gestión de riesgo que permita neutralizar el contrabando, el lavado de activos, fortalecer la seguridad en las fronteras, así como prevenir el riesgo ambiental y la proliferación de armas.

En esa línea, las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas son socializadas con las Direcciones Seccionales para su observancia, sin desconocer instrumentos internacionales que en materia de agilización de las operaciones de comercio exterior nos corresponde aplicar, tal como es el Acuerdo de Facilitación de Comercio de la Organización Mundial de Comercio.

Así mismo, Colombia, a través de su autoridad de aduanas ha expedido lineamientos a las Direcciones Seccionales de control aduanero relativos al reconocimiento de carga y se han realizado solicitudes de selectividad aduanera en los que se dan instrucciones para efectos de aplicación de controles. Finalmente, es importante mencionar que en la actualidad el país adelanta un proceso de modernización tecnológica de la DIAN que incluye el fortalecimiento del sistema de gestión de riesgos, lo que seguramente redundará en un control más efectivo.

CONTROL ADUANERO.

1. Rechazo o incautación

En relación con cualquier caso de rechazo del despacho de aduana o incautación de mercancías que involucren a la RPDC como país de destino/consignación/origen, fabricación o tránsito, se adjunta cuadro con la información suministrada por la Subdirección de Fiscalización Aduanera correspondiente a "*los registros de las aprehensiones realizadas cuyo posible país de procedencia es Corea del Norte, para el año 2023 a corte del 17 de diciembre, los reportes incluyen (en orden de aparición), las siguientes columnas: País de procedencia, Clasificación Arancelaria, Descripción de la mercancía aprehendida, Unidad de medida, Cantidad de mercancía aprehendida y valor de las aprehensiones realizadas*"

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COLOMBIA POTENCIA DE LA VIDA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

2. Información que pudiera considerarse pertinente para el trabajo según lo dispuesto por el Consejo de Seguridad a este respecto

Con miras a una implementación que permita cumplir estrictamente con las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, sería muy valioso contar con una compilación detallada de las medidas restrictivas al comercio exterior con la RPDC, así como una descripción completa de las mercancías involucradas, toda vez que el solo capítulo del Arancel – Sistema Armonizado (SA) – o un nombre genérico, no es suficiente para identificarlas, lo que impide saber con exactitud cuáles son los productos sobre los que recae la prohibición y por consiguiente se dificulta el control.

Así mismo, es importante conocer las mejores prácticas internacionales que se aplican en los diferentes países encaminadas al cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en las citadas resoluciones y su articulación con las normas de facilitación de comercio, dado que es muy complicado detectar que una mercancía tiene como origen la RPDC, por ejemplo, cuando ha sido comprada en un país diferente y adicionalmente es embarcada en otro (procedencia) que no corresponde ni al de compra ni al de origen.

(*Translated from Spanish)*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia

Office of the Director of Multilateral Political Affairs

Office of the Deputy Minister of Multilateral Affairs

Reply to the request of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

2 January 2024

Request sent to Colombia through communication S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.479 of 8 December 2023.

The following reply is based on the information provided by the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs.

Exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Colombia (imports)

1. Confirmation as to whether the listed data are accurate. If they are inaccurate, please submit the digital copies of original documents that can explain the cause of inaccuracy:

Table 1. Textiles (HS code 56)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
May 2023	14,000

Regarding the transactions in table 1, the customs computer system was consulted and the following information was found:

a. May 2023: import declarations No. 482023000257885-1 and No. 482023000274837-8, with customs values of $7,161.27 and $7,158.79, respectively. Although in these import declarations the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (DR44K developer roll), the United States of America is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. In both cases, the exporter or overseas supplier abroad is located in the United States.

Those import declarations have a total customs value of $14,320.06.

Table 2. Textiles (HS code 61)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
May 2023	3,000

Regarding the transactions in table 2, the customs computer system was consulted and the following information was found:

a. May 2023: import declarations No. 902023000080813-2 and No. 902023000080814-1, with customs values of $1,872.29 and $678.43, respectively. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (Ralph Lauren Polo brand socks), Panama is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. In both cases the exporter or overseas supplier is located in Panama.

Those import declarations have a total customs value of $2,550.72.

Table 3. Iron and steel products (HS code 73)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
May 2023	1,000

Regarding the transactions in table 3, the customs computer system was consulted and the following information was found:

a. May 2023: import declaration No. 192023000031757-7, with a customs value of $538.88. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (cap screw, Komatsu brand), the United States is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. The exporter or overseas supplier is located in the United States. The importer is an authorized economic operator.

Table 4. Machinery (HS code 84)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
April 2023	10,000

May 2023	16,000
June 2023	110,000

Regarding the transactions in table 4, the customs computer system was consulted and the following information was found:

a. April 2023: import declaration No. 902023000051992-9, with a customs value of $4,559.27. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears in the country of export box, after checking the exporter's company name and address it was determined that the goods (two-button hoist control, Swiko brand) came from the company GtoI Corporation, whose address is W503, SK-V1 Centre, 11, Dangsan-Ro 41-Gil, Yeongdeungpo, Seoul, Korea, 150-806, located in the Republic of Korea, according to information available at http://gtoic.com/home_02.asp. Therefore, an error was presumably made in the code of country of export (box 48) in the import declaration when it was completed; in fact, the country of export is the Republic of Korea (190) and not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (187). The information found will be forwarded for appropriate action during the post-clearance inspection.

In addition, import declaration No. 032023000569470-9 was found, with a customs value of $4,991.43. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (TrialSlate Bluebird ST102-W4LAL, Bluebird brand, six units), the United Kingdom is both the country of purchase and the country of provenance. The exporter or overseas supplier is located in the United Kingdom. The importer is an authorized economic operator.

Those import declarations have a total customs value of $9,550.70.

b. May 2023: import declarations No. 872023000056017-3 and No. 482023000281797-0, with customs values of $952.36 and $14,937.98, respectively. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (SSD hard disk, motor liner), the United States is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. In both cases, the exporter or overseas supplier is located in the United States.

Those import declarations have a total customs value of $15,890.34.

c. June 2023: import declaration No. 482023000322528-3, with a customs value of $70,182.93. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (new goods for exclusive use in the oil industry), the United States is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. The exporter or overseas supplier is located in the United States. The importer is an authorized economic operator.

In addition, import declaration No. 482023000343695 was found, with a customs value of $26,789.42. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (excavator), China is both the country of export and the country of purchase. The exporter or overseas supplier is located in China.

In addition, import declarations No. 032023000844845-6, No. 032023000836628-0 and No. 032023000836528-2 were found, with customs values of $9,309.83, $2,262.03 and $1,560.97, respectively. Although in these import declarations the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (oil pump, fuel pump and plastic pipe for a truck engine), Brazil is the country of export, the country of purchase and country of provenance. The exporter or overseas supplier is located in Brazil. The importer is an authorized economic operator.

Those import declarations have a total customs value of $110,105.18.

Table 5. Electrical equipment (HS code 84)

Date	Approximate value (United States dollars)
April 2023	8,000

Regarding the transactions in table 5, the customs computer system was consulted and the following information was found:

a. April 2023: import declaration No. 902023000051993-6, with a customs value of $2,128.64. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears in the country of export box, after checking the exporter's company name and address it was determined that the goods (wireless remote control, KG Auto brand) came from the company GtoI Corporation, whose address is W503, SK-V1 Centre, 11, Dangsan-Ro 41-Gil, Yeongdeungpo, Seoul, Korea, 150-806, located in the Republic of Korea, according to information available at http://gtoic.com/home_02.asp. Therefore, it seems that an error was made

in the code of country of export (box 48) in the import declaration when it was completed; in fact, the country of export is the Republic of Korea (190) and not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (187). The information found will be forwarded for appropriate action during the post-clearance inspection.

In addition, import declaration No. 032023000569444-7 was found, with a customs value of $6,321.60. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears as the country of origin of the goods (E-diary Samsung A217M US Android 10, Dual SIM), the United Kingdom is the country of export, the country of purchase and the country of provenance. In both cases, the exporter or overseas supplier is located in the United Kingdom. The importer is an authorized economic operator. Those import declarations have a total customs value of $8,450.24.

Although transactions were found that correspond to the approximate values indicated by the International Trade Centre Trade Map in tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, it should be noted that the United Nations Security Council resolutions give only the Harmonized System chapter or a general reference to the goods, and from the description that appears in the import declarations it could not be inferred that they will be used in the development of nuclear weapons or missiles.

Harmonized System chapters 56, 61, 73, 84 and 85 comprise a wide range of items/products. Consequently, not all the goods in those chapters could be subject to the prohibitions in the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Furthermore, it should be noted that, although the country of origin of the goods was the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in none of the cases was it the country of export, the country of purchase or the country of provenance. Furthermore, errors might have been made when the origin code was entered in box 48 of the import declaration, meaning that some imports from the Republic of Korea could have been erroneously recorded as coming from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

2. Whether the cargoes from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Colombia containing the relevant items were inspected pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and if so, the reason why they were not seized and disposed of pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017).

It should be noted that the entry into the country of these goods, and indeed all goods, is subject to three stages of customs inspections: pre-clearance, in-clearance and post-clearance.

Pre-clearance inspections are conducted when goods (cargo) arrive at airports, ports or border crossings, at which point international shippers inform the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs (through the electronic information services) of the data related to the shipping documents, including the country of shipment, since they do not know the country of origin or brokerage of the goods. Because the Directorate's system contains the information provided by the shippers, the Directorate cannot detect whether goods originate from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In-clearance inspections take place when users submit import declarations and request the release of goods through the Directorate's computer systems after completion of pre-clearance inspections. In this regard, it should be noted that in line with the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Facilitation, the Directorate has a system of risk selectivity and profiling in which declarations can be selected for physical inspection, documentary inspection or automatic release, for which no inspection is made.

Likewise, under the same facilitation rules, there are importers who, after having fulfilled a series of requirements, have been recognized by the Directorate and other monitoring bodies as authorized economic operators, whose foreign trade transactions do not pose any risk and who therefore have benefits, such as obtaining the automatic release of goods, though they can still be subject to inspections. In addition, post-clearance inspections refer to the powers of inspection exercised by the customs authority over goods that have been released and that, therefore, can be seized or subject to penalties in accordance with the customs rules in force.

Also, as mentioned above, the Security Council resolutions give only the Harmonized System chapter or a general reference to the goods, and it cannot be inferred from the descriptions set out in the import declarations that the goods will be used in the development of nuclear weapons or missiles or chemical or biological weapons.

In view of the foregoing, the goods were not seized or disposed of. Moreover, under Colombian law, a procedure consistent with due process needs to be initiated in order to determine the legal status of the goods, which was not required in the case of the goods in question.

3. Any other relevant information and/or action taken by the Colombian authorities with respect to exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Colombia.

It should be noted that the foreign trade operations that were subject to review have the United States, Panama, the United Kingdom, China and Brazil as countries of export, purchase or provenance, and in that

regard it is understood that, although the goods were manufactured in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the commercial transaction was not carried out with that country. However, Colombia applies a series of measures to keep its regulations in line with the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In connection with the action taken, as has been mentioned previously, it should be noted that one of the principles underlying Decree No. 1165 of 2019, regulating the customs regime of Colombia, is precisely to ensure the security and facilitation of the logistical chain for foreign trade operations; in other words, inspections shall be conducted pursuant to a risk-management system that will prevent smuggling and asset laundering, strengthen border security, mitigate environmental risk and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In that regard, the United Nations Security Council resolutions are disseminated to the local offices to ensure compliance, without prejudice to international instruments on the facilitation of foreign trade operations that Colombia is obliged to apply, such as the World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement.

Likewise, through its customs authority, Colombia has issued guidelines to local customs offices regarding cargo inspections, and requests for selective customs checks have been issued. Lastly, it is important to mention that the Directorate is currently upgrading its technology. This includes strengthening the risk management system, which will no doubt result in more effective inspections.

Customs inspections

1. Rejection or seizure

Regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a country of destination/consignment/origin, manufacture or transit, a table is attached with information provided by the Subdirectorate of Customs Enforcement on records of seizures made whose country of origin could be the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for the year 2023 as at 17 December, including (in order of appearance) the following columns: country of provenance, tariff classification, description of goods seized, unit of measure, quantity of goods seized and value of goods seized.

2. Information that could be considered relevant to the Panel's work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard

To ensure that implementation fully complies with the Security Council resolutions, it would be very useful to have a detailed list of the measures that restrict foreign trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a full description of the goods concerned, because the Harmonized System chapter or a generic name alone do not provide adequate identification, making it difficult to know precisely which goods are prohibited and therefore difficult to control them.

Furthermore, it is important to be aware of international best practices that different countries apply to comply with the aforementioned resolutions and how they relate to trade facilitation rules, because identifying the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as the country of origin of the goods is very complicated, for example when goods have been purchased in a different country and are also shipped from another country (of provenance) that is neither the country of purchase nor that of origin.

Letter from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine and Ukraine's reply

Постійне представництво України при Організації Об'єднаних Націй

Permanent Mission of Ukraine
to the United Nations

Mission Permanente d'Ukraine
aupres des Nations Unies

220 East 51st Street,
New York, NY 10022
(212) 759 70 03; (212) 355 94 55 (fax),
uno_us@mfa.gov.ua

№ 4132/28-194/015-12407

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to the Panel's letter of 12 December 2023, Ref. S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.489, has the honour to submit a response attached herewith.

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Attached: as stated, 1 page.

New York, 25 January 2024

Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

New York

ukraineun.org

Information
in response to the letter of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), dated 12 December 2023, Ref. S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.489

According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, on September 5, 2023, a customs declaration was submitted to the regional division of the State Customs Service of Ukraine for customs clearance of goods, including goods worth $3106.19, which, according to the Ukrainian classification of foreign economic goods, fall under the category of synthetic fabrics.

At the same time, in the declaration, the country of origin was mistakenly indicated as the DPRK instead of the Republic of Korea.

Based on the corresponding letter from the sender of the goods, corrections were made to the customs declaration, namely, the code of the country of origin of the goods was changed to the one corresponding to the correct country.

Annex 40: Letter from the Permanent Mission of China and China's replies

中华人民共和国常驻联合国代表团

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, 22 January 2024

Respected Acting Coordinator and Experts,

I am writing in response to your previous letters regarding the requests to investigate alleged violations of Security Council Resolutions on the DPRK.

China attaches great importance to and has always been fully and strictly implementing the Resolutions, and consistently and constructively supporting the work the Panel. In this regard, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted thorough investigations on the issues raised by the Panel, and responses on the investigations are enclosed herewith. There investigations are by no means easy to conduct, and a lot of efforts have been made by various competent Chinese authorities to verify the information provided by the Panel. China hopes these feedback could be reflected in the Panel's annual report in the faithful and comprehensive manner.

Panel of Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874
New York

Address:350 East 35th Street, New York, NY10016 Tel: (212)655-6100 Web: www.china-un.org

I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that China has made great efforts in implementing the Resolutions on the DPRK and sustained great losses. I count on the Panel to base its work on facts and request the Panel to carry out its assessments and analysis in line with its mandate as specified in the related Resolutions, and refrain from including unverified information in its report.

I look forward to continuing working with you to contribute to the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions and the Political solution to the Peninsula issue.

Warm regards,



Zhang Jun

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Permanent Representative

of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

China's feedback to the 1874 Panel of Experts

1. Alleged cases related to trade between the DPRK and China

（1）OC.231

By November 2017, the UN Security Council had not yet listed vehicles as prohibited goods for export to the DPRK. Records were found on exports of passenger cars and trucks to the DPRK during this period, and these were normal exports. Since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2397, all vehicles exported from China to the DPRK have been for the use of international organizations in their project offices in the DPRK, and they do not involve any violations of UN Security Council resolutions.

（2）OC.359

From April to September 2023, China did not import iron alloys, iron and steel products, textiles, or other goods from the DPRK prohibited by relevant UN resolutions. The goods imported from the DPRK under HS code 50 were mulberry silk and waste silk. Mulberry silk and waste silk are raw materials and do not fall under the category of textiles prohibited from export by the UN resolutions, as China has repeatedly stated to the Panel. During this period, all metal products, industrial machinery, electronic

equipment, and vehicles exported from China to the DPRK were purely for the use of international organizations in their project offices in the DPRK, and did not involve any violations of UN sanctions resolutions. We urge the Panel to demonstrate its professionalism, accurately determine the scope of the resolutions and not to include any information unrelated to the resolutions in its final report.

2. Alleged cases related to DPRK financial activities

（1）OC.169

According to the information provided by the Panel, China conducted thorough investigations and found no evidence that the Yantai Jinmin Industry and Trade Company mentioned in the letter, as well as Li Zhenyu and Zhang Jiashan, were engaged in any activities in China that violated UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK.

（2）OC.167

China conducted thorough investigations based on the information provided by the Panel and found no evidence that the relevant banking accounts violated UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK. The authenticity and accuracy of the information provided by the Panel could not be confirmed.

（3）OC.168

Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all

representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK.

（4）OC.173

Based on thorough investigations conducted on the information provided by the Panel and found no evidence that the relevant banking accounts violated UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK.

（5）OC.181

Based on the information provided by the Panel, China has conducted thorough investigations and found no evidence that New Elements Holdings Co.Ltd, as mentioned in the letter, was involved in activities that violated the UN Security Council resolutions. Due to incomplete information, the situation of Li Xianzhu could not be verified.

3. Alleged cases related to DPRK labor

（1）OC.385

China has always been seriously implementing the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolutions regarding

DPRK overseas workers. The working permits for DPRK workers in China have all been expired before the deadline stipulated in the relevant Security Council resolution.

（2）OC.386

China has been earnestly implementing the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolutions regarding DPRK overseas workers. The working permits for DPRK workers in China have all expired before the deadline stipulated in the relevant Security Council resolution.

4. Alleged cases of DPRK personnel conducting activities in violations of UN Security Council resolutions

（1）OC.192

Based on our investigations, Liaoning Zhongwo Petrochemical Co., Ltd was deregistered in January 2022. China has thoroughly questioned the former head of the company and found no evidence of the company's involvement in activities that violated the UN Security Council resolutions. China does not have information on the situation of Chong Hyok and Chong Sang-Hun.

（2）OC.341

Based on the information provided by the Panel and according to our thorough investigations, no information of O Yong Ho's involvement in activities in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions in China has been found.

（3）OC.356

Due to the limited information provided by the Panel, it is very difficult for China to conduct investigations. Nevertheless, We are now coordinating with relevant authorities to conduct serious investigations, and no evidence of violations of relevant Council resolutions has been found. It is hoped that the Panel will respect our efforts and refrain from including unverified information in the final report of 2023.

（4）OC.358

Based on our preliminary investigations, Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd was revoked by the Chinese market supervision department as early as in January 2018. There is no record of Choe Song Ryong or Cui Cheng Long serving as shareholders or senior executives in the registered companies in Beijing.

（5）OC.357

Based on investigations, no information about Nam Chol Ung's involvement in activities in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions in China has been found. Regarding the individuals and companies mentioned in the letter, more time is needed for further investigations. We request the Panel to respect our efforts and refrain from including unverified information in the report.

Annex 41: Media reports of luxury cars in Pyongyang

朝鲜八届九中全会：高官自驾豪车到会场

发表 2023年12 月28日

作者 / 林海东

12月上旬全国母亲大会的时候，朝媒发布的图像显示，金正恩换了新车——迈巴赫S650，同时有人从图像中发现，金正恩护卫车队的那几辆雷克萨斯似乎也都换了新。12月20日，金正恩携女儿接见导弹总局第二红旗连的时候，朝媒图像显示，他和“心爱的女儿”乘坐的是另一辆新款的迈巴赫S_级轿车。



母亲大会合影现场。迈巴赫S650





母亲大**会**合影现场。金正恩座车及其护





接见第二红旗连。又一辆新车

金正恩及其护卫队换新车，之所以会成为外界关注的一个点，是因为它违反了安理会涉朝决议—2094 号决议禁止朝鲜进口高级轿车等奢侈品，2397 号决议则禁止朝鲜进口运输工具。当然，换新车违反安理会决议这事儿，金正恩也不是第一次做，因为朝鲜是不承认这些决议的，认为其“非法”。所以，你禁你的，我换我的。2019年的时候，有美国主流大媒体对金正恩当时乘坐的豪车来源做过追踪调查，结论是“经四个月辗转五个国家秘密运进朝鲜”。这回金正恩换的新车，大致应该路数照旧，只不过现在可能比2019年那时更加方便。

不仅金正恩换了新车，朝鲜核心领导层的几位高官也都换了新车。KCTV关于八届九中全会第一天的新闻报道中，甚至特意剪辑了高官们乘车甚至自驾抵达会场时的相关镜头，且在10分25秒的总片长中占据了大约20秒左右的时长。



与会人员列队集体进入会场，此处就是朝媒经常提到的“党中央本部大楼院子”，图左建筑为主楼，图右为会场。



一辆豪华奔驰车驶入**会**场，正列队进入**会**场的人员驻足等待。



警卫人员打**开**后车门，朝鲜**“**五常**”**之一金德训下车。车牌为黑底花体白字，**牌号**为**“**7·27023**”**。



金德训在**众**人驻足注视下走向**会**场。



一辆奔驰S_级轿车驶入院子。





警卫人员打**开**车门，朝鲜**“**五常**”**之一赵甬元**从**驾驶座探身下车。这是罕见的一幕，截至目前，除了金正恩外出视察曾亲自驾车之外，高官自驾前往**会**场的情形**极**为少见。



赵甬元的车牌也是黑底花体白字，牌号为“7·278242”。停车位置紧挨着金德训的“023”号车。







另一位自驾前往会场的是朝鲜“五常”之一崔龙海。座驾也是奔驰S_级，车牌也是黑底花体白字，牌号为“7·27020”。停车位置紧挨着赵甬元的“8242”号车。虽然KCTV没有给出崔龙海自驾的镜头，但却展示了他连续两次按钥匙锁车的动作。



接下来是金才龙和朴泰成两位大老。不知道他俩是自驾还是像金德训一样由司机开车。



从目前的局内位置看，金才龙在先、朴泰成在后。由此推断，紧挨着崔龙海“020”号车停放的蓝底白字牌照、车号“7·278244”这辆奔驰属于金才龙，而正在倒车入位的那辆黑底花体白字牌照（车号模糊未辨）的奔驰属于朴泰成。

上述场景，在朝鲜的新闻图像里是极为罕见的。高层官员换新车不算事儿，但自驾到会场却相当新鲜。外界有评论说，这些新车都是违反安理会决议、非法进口的，朝鲜这么做是为了炫耀自己不惧制裁、不理会制裁。我看倒也未必尽然，因为这些场景首先是出现在KCTV的新闻图像中，第一受众是朝鲜观众，即便外界看到，知情

和影响范围也是极小的。那么，从对朝鲜国内受众传播的角度看，领导自驾大约有些“亲民”的意思隐含其中，至于领导是换新车还是吃丹东草莓，说句实话，朝鲜人民还真的不会太在意，因为等级地位使然。

Source: https://posts.careerengine.us/p/658d2cc9311dd31682755e0f?from=latest-posts-panel&type=title

Unofficial partial translation

The Ninth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of North Korea: Senior officials drove luxury cars to the venue

Published December 28, 2023

Author / Lin Haidong

At the National Mothers' Conference in early December, images released by the North Korean media showed that Kim Jong-un had changed to a new car, the Maybach S650. At the same time, some people found from the images that the Lexus that Kim Jong-un guarded the convoy also seemed to have been replaced. New. On December 20th, when Kim Jong-un brought his daughter to meet with the Second Red Flag Company of the General Missile Administration, North Korean media images showed that he and his "beloved daughter" were riding in another new Maybach S_-class sedan.

The reason why Kim Jong-un and his guards have replaced their new cars has become a point of concern to the outside world is because it violates the Security Council resolution on North Korea—Resolution 2094 prohibits North Korea from importing luxury goods such as luxury cars, and Resolution 2397 prohibits North Korea from importing means of transportation. Of course, it is not the first time that Kim Jong-un has violated Security Council resolutions by changing to a new car, because North Korea does not recognize these resolutions and considers them “illegal.” So, you change yours, I change mine. In 2019, major mainstream American media conducted a tracking survey on the source of the luxury car Kim Jong-un was riding in at the time, and the conclusion was that “it was secretly transported into North Korea after four months of moving to five countries.” The new car that Kim Jong-un changed this time should roughly be the same as usual, but it may be more convenient now than it was in 2019.

Not only did Kim Jong-un change to a new car, but several senior officials of the North Korean core leadership also changed to a new car. In KCTV's news report on the first day of the Eighth and Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, relevant footage of senior officials arriving at the venue by

car or even by car was even specially edited, and it occupied about 20 seconds of the total length of 10 minutes and 25 seconds. About 20 seconds.

The guards opened the rear car door… . The license plate is white with a flower body on a black background,

The brand name is “7·27023".

The guards opened the car. This is a rare scene. So far, except for Kim Jong-un who went out to inspect and drove in person, it is extremely rare for senior officials to drive to the venue by themselves.

…license plate is also white with a flower body on a black background, and the number plate is “7·278242".

The car is also a Mercedes-Benz S_-class, and the license plate is also in white on a black background, with the brand name "7·27020". The parking location is next to ”8242" car. Although KCTV did not give a shot of… driving by himself, it showed him pressing the key to lock the car twice in a row.

The above scenes are extremely rare in North Korean news images. It's not a big deal for high-level officials to change to a new car, but it's quite fresh to drive to the venue by yourself. There are comments from the outside world that these new cars were illegally imported in violation of Security Council resolutions. North Korea did this to show that it is not afraid of sanctions and ignores them. I don't think it's all true, because these scenes first appeared in KCTV's news images, and the first audience was the North Korean audience. Even if the outside world saw it, they knew it.

And the scope of influence is also very small. So, from the perspective of communication to the domestic audience in North Korea, the leader's self-driving car has some “people-friendly” meanings implied. As for whether the leader changes to a new car or eats Dandong strawberries, to be honest, the North Korean people really don't care too much, because of the hierarchical status.

Annex 42: Letter from the Permanent Mission of Japan and Japan's reply

PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

12 January 2024

Dear [redacted]

The Government of Japan highly values the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 (hereinafter "the Panel") as well as that of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1718 (hereinafter "the 1718 Committee"), and reaffirms its commitment to cooperate with the Panel to ensure the full and strict implementation of all relevant UNSCRs against North Korea.

Upon instructions from the capital, I have the honour to share Japan's response, as attached, to the letter dated 20 December 2023 (Reference: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.617) with respect to media publications concerning an attempted export of Lexus cars to North Korea.

The Government of Japan reaffirms its commitment to continue working closely with the Panel and the 1718 Committee. Should the Panel have any inquiries, please contact the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

Please accept the assurance of my highest esteem.

K Yamazaki

Kazuyuki YAMAZAKI
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

[redacted]
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

[Attachment]

The information in the media articles attached to your letter concerning an attempted export of Lexus cars to North Korea have not been officially publicized by the Police, and it is difficult for the Government of Japan to provide any information regarding this case because provision of such information could hinder the future investigation by the Police.

Annex 43: Toyota reply to the Panel's enquiry

HEAD OFFICE
1, TOYOTA-CHO, TOYOTA
AICHI, 471-8571, JAPAN
TEL. +81-565-28-2121

TOYOTA

TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION

TOKYO HEAD OFFICE
4-18, KORAKU 1-CHOME, BUNKYO-KU
TOKYO, 112-8701, JAPAN
TEL. +81-3-3817-7111

The United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts
The United Nations Headquarters
Siege
New York, NY 10017
dppa-poe1874@un.org

12 January 2024

Re: Response to 12 December 2023 Letter from UN Panel of Experts on North Korea
Reference: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.509

Dear [redacted]

Thank you for the letter from the UN Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) (the "Panel") to Toyota Motor Corporation ("Toyota"). Toyota is responding through this letter to the questions raised by the Panel regarding the image from November 2023 published in a news media report in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK").

Toyota is fully committed to respecting the laws and regulations of each country or region where we operate, including all applicable economic sanctions and export control laws. Toyota complies with applicable UN resolutions in relation to the DPRK and does not export, supply, sale or transfer motor vehicles directly or indirectly to the DPRK. Toyota also does not manufacture motor vehicles in or conduct other business activities in the DPRK.

The vehicle shown in the image provided by the Panel appears to be a Lexus LX600 or a Lexus LX500d. Toyota is not able to determine the particular model without viewing the name badge on the backdoor or other unique characteristics. These models were first manufactured in December 2021 and remain in production at this time. These models are manufactured only by Toyota Auto Body Co., Ltd. at its plant in Yoshiwara, Japan, which is wholly-owned by Toyota Motor Corporation. The total production number of these

models since December 2021 is more than 49,000 units. While the Lexus LX has been sold globally, the largest markets by volume are the United States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In these and other markets, Toyota generally sells its vehicles through distributors and dealers rather than directly to end-users but no Toyota distributors or dealers are authorized to sell vehicles to North Korea. Toyota is not able to confirm based on the photographs the specific market in which Toyota originally sold this particular Lexus LX. However, as noted above, it was not sold by Toyota in North Korea or for use in North Korea.

In consideration of the important work of the Panel, Toyota would like to continue to cooperate with the Panel consistent with the legal obligations of Toyota and its business partners. Toyota is willing to conduct further research in support of the Panel's inquiry if the Panel is able to provide more specific information regarding the vehicle at issue. For instance, if the Panel is able to provide the vehicle identification number (VIN), we would work to provide you with more detailed information such as model year, production date, model code and final destination for the Toyota delivery.

As noted above, Toyota is committed to complying fully with the laws and regulations of each country or region where we operate and we require our dealers and distributors to do the same. We comply fully with applicable UN resolutions in relation to the DPRK and Toyota has a strict policy of not exporting motor vehicles or related parts or components directly or indirectly to the DPRK.

We hope that the above information is helpful to your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

Secretariat, Export and Trade Security Controls Committee
Toyota Motor Corporation

I

Annex 44: Dior reply to the Panel's enquiry

DIOR

United Nations
United Nations Security Council

To the attention of:
Ms. [redacted]
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 1874 (2009)
dppa-poe1874@un.org

Paris, November 16, 2023

Your Ref: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.252

Dear [redacted]

Thank you for your letter dated October 16, 2023.

Christian Dior Couture highly values the Panel's work and is very much willing to contribute to its efforts, as compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions is of utmost importance for our Maison. We have mobilized various internal contributors to work on your questions. Unfortunately, despite our effort, we are not able to determine how the handbag shown in Fig. 1 of your letter may have been obtained by a DPRK delegation member.

Please find below our answers with regards to the four questions raised in your letter:

1. Please confirm if the item in the image is a genuine Dior product?

It is difficult, on the basis of these photos only (no close-up on the handbag and therefore not showing details), to confirm undoubtedly the authenticity of this handbag. However, it strongly appears like one of our handbag models (see next question).

2. Please confirm the make and model of the handbag in question, whether these are limited production items, and any other information insofar as it could assist the Panel in narrowing down certain specific markets where such items may have been purchased?

Based on the photos provided, this bag could be the « SAC LADY DIOR LARGE Cuir de veau Cannage ultramatte noir », bearing the M0566SLOI_M989 reference number. This model of bag was first sold on February 2019. It is part of our permanent collection, and it is commercialized worldwide (with most sales in Europe and in the US).

3. Can you share any ideas on supply channels of the item to the DPRK or suspected supply route to the DPRK?

Christian Dior Couture complies with prohibitions on the provision, sale, or transfer of luxury goods to the DPRK and has no knowledge of the supply networks which may be circumventing these prohibitions. Our boutiques and e-commerce websites do not sell outside their domestic market and we have a policy to fight against parallel markets. In this respect, we sometimes cease sales with certain customers for whom we have reason to suspect, in view of the volume and/or type of purchases, that they may be reselling our products. We also carry out verifications on our customers with regards to the sanctions measures put in place by the United Nations and other international organizations and countries (including the EU, UK, USA) against specific individuals. However, we cannot fully control the subsequent resale of our products.

4. The Panel would also welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to the Panel work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard.

We are at the Panel's disposal to carry out any helpful verification on our customer database in the event that one or several individual(s) is(are) identified by the Panel as likely to supply the DPRK with our products. In such case, we could potentially blacklist this(these) individual(s) based on the elements gathered by the Panel.

*

* *

We hope that the above information will be of nature to assist the Panel and we of course remain at your disposal for any other question you may have.

Yours sincerely,

H. Champey

[redacted]
SVP General Counsel
mchampey@christiandior.com

Annex 45: Letter from the Permanent Mission of Slovakia and Slovakia's reply

Stála misia Slovenskej republiky
pri Organizácii Spojených národov
New York

Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic
to the United Nations
New York

115674/2023

The Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to refers to the latter Note Verbale regarding the investigation claims of a Slovakian national, Mr. Ashot Mkrtychev, for having allegedly attempted to, directly or indirectly, import, export, or reexport to, into, or from the DPRK any arms or related material.

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic approached the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic as the national coordinator of the enforcement of international sanctions and the manager of the Central Coordination Group for the enforcement of international sanctions in the Slovak Republic.

Department of Finance contacted the relevant state authorities in this matter. Based on the answers received and in accordance with the information requested by the panel of experts, we state that the named person is the holder of Slovak passport no. BD3843329 (valid until April 8, 2029). We also state that the ammunition could not be transported by a naval ship registered in the Slovak Maritime Register, as currently no naval ship is registered in this register. According to the available information, after his inclusion on the OFAC sanctions list, the bank account of the named person in particular bank was cancelled (at the time of the information from the bank, the account had a zero balance and it was blocked for any transactions). No payments made from or to the DPRK, or payments connected to the mentioned case linked to this person, have been notified to the relevant authorities by the banks.

According to the available information, the person named has not been staying in the territory of the Slovak Republic for a long time and should currently be alternately located in the territory of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. The internal authorities of the Slovak Republic do not have any additional information that would allow them to further clarify the claims according to which the named person should have cooperated with representatives of the DPRK in obtaining weapons and ammunition for the Russian Federation in exchange for materials for the DPRK.

In the event that additional facts relevant to the mentioned case are discovered, the authorities of the Slovak Republic are ready to cooperate with a panel of experts.

The Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

STÁLA MISIA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY 1 NEW YORK

New York, 27 July 2023

Panel of Experts established pursuant
to the Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

801 Second Avenue, 12th floor, New York, N.Y. 10017 Phone: (212) 286-8880, Fax: (212) 286-8419

Annex 46: Ukrainian forces allegedly utilized multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) manufactured in the DPRK

War in Ukraine

Ukraine fires North Korean rockets to blast Russian positions

Artillery crews are pounding Putin's invasion forces with Pyongyang-made munitions that can 'do crazy things'



Ukrainian troops prepare the North Korean rockets for launch near Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia late last month © Serhii Mykhalchuk/Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images


Christopher Miller near Bakhmut JULY 28 2023





Soviet-era Grad multiple-launch rocket systems fire on Russian positions in Donetsk. North Korean munitions have been used in such attacks near Bakhmut in the eastern region © Sofiia Gatilova/Reuters


Source : Financial Times, 28 July 2023, accessed at https://www.ft.com/content/96e1f526-ae3d-4cff-bc37-8f9dd7d5975f. Boxed translation by the Panel.





Source: X, posted on 9 July 2023, https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1678069338266382337.


Annex 47: Member State information on alleged arms transfers from the DPRK (1)


Movements of *Angara* and *Maria* (fka *Lev Yashin*) between Rajin Port and Dunay late August 2023 – late September 2023








25 August 2023
Russian-flagged M/V ANGARA (IMO: 9179842)
Najin, North Korea
42:13:37 N 130:17:02 E
N
CHINA
Pyongyang
SOUTH KOREA
20-foot shipping containers
YO2263870


Russian-Flagged M/V ANGARA Completes Second Delivery to North Korea; First Delivery to Russia
September 2023
RUSSIA
CHINA
NOTE: Dunay is a Russian military facility.
1
1 SEP 23
M/V ANGARA departs Dunay with approximately 250 shipping containers.
Vladivostok
Dunay
3
6 SEP 23
M/V ANGARA returns to Dunay and delivers approximately 35 shipping containers.
NORTH KOREA
NOTE: Najin is a North Korean commercial port.
NOTE: M/V ANGARA is a known arms transport vessel.
NOTE: This included the first delivery of shipping containers from North Korea back to Russia.
Notional tracks
M/V ANGARA
Najin
2
2 - 4 SEP 23:
M/V ANGARA delivers shipping containers to Najin. Loaded with approximately 35 shipping containers for return delivery to Russia.
0 20 40 Nautical Miles
0 20 40 Kilometers
Projection: Transverse Mercator; UTM Zone 52N
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.


Russian-Flagged M/V ANGARA Completes Third Delivery to North Korea; Second Delivery to Russia
September 2023
RUSSIA
CHINA
NOTE: Dunay is a Russian military facility.
1
8 SEP 23
M/V ANGARA departs Dunay with approximately 200 shipping containers.
Vladivostok
Dunay
3
12 SEP 23
M/V ANGARA returns to Dunay and delivers approximately 300 shipping containers.
NORTH KOREA
NOTE: Najin is a North Korean commercial port.
Najin
NOTE: M/V ANGARA is a known arms transport vessel.
Notional tracks
M/V ANGARA
2
11 SEP 23:
M/V ANGARA delivers approximately 200 shipping containers to Najin. Loaded approximately 300 shipping containers for return delivery to Russia.
0 20 40 Nautical Miles
0 20 40 Kilometers
Projection: Transverse Mercator; UTM Zone 52N
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.


Russian-Flagged M/V LEV YASHIN Completes Probable Third Cargo Delivery from North Korea to Russia
September 2023
CHINA
RUSSIA
Russian-flagged M/V ANGARA (IMO: 9179842)
Russian-flagged M/V LEV YASHIN (IMO: 8517839)
Dunay, Russia
42.52.00 N 132.21.54 E
M/V LEV YASHIN
Shipping containers in cargo hold
Shipping containers
M/V ANGARA
3
1
8 SEP 23
M/V LEV YASHIN departs Vladivostok area with no shipping containers.
Vladivostok
NOTE: Dunay is a Russian military facility.
Dunay
3
19 SEP 23
M/V LEV YASHIN delivers approximately 140 shipping containers to Dunay.
NORTH KOREA
NOTE: Najin is a North Korean commercial port.
Najin
NOTE: This shipment only included the delivery of shipping containers to Russia. No shipping containers were delivered from Russia to North Korea.
Notional tracks
M/V LEV YASHIN
2
16 - 17 SEP 23:
M/V LEV YASHIN loads approximately 140 shipping containers at Najin.
0 20 40 Nautical Miles
0 20 40 Kilometers
Projection: Transverse Mercator; UTM Zone 52N
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.





Source: Member States.

Deliveries Between Russia and North Korea


Late August to Late September 2023

Delivery	First Russia-to-North Korea	Second Russia-to-North Korea	First North Korea-to-Russia	Third Russia-to-North Korea	Second North Korea-to-Russia	Third North Korea-to-Russia	Fourth Russia-to-North Korea
Vessel	ANGARA	ANGARA	ANGARA	ANGARA	ANGARA	LEV YASHIN	ANGARA
Quantity of 20-ft shipping containers	~250	~250	~35	~200	~300	~140	~250
Origin	Dunay (Russia)	Dunay (Russia)	Najin (North Korea)	Dunay (Russia)	Najin (North Korea)	Najin (North Korea)	Dunay (Russia)
Destination	Najin (North Korea)	Najin (North Korea)	Dunay (Russia)	Najin (North Korea)	Dunay (Russia)	Dunay (Russia)	Najin (North Korea)
Dates	21 - 25 August	1 - 2 September	2 - 6 September	8 - 11 September	11 - 12 September	16 - 19 September	22 - 23 September

Source: Member State.

Annex 48: Member State information on alleged arms transfers from the DPRK (2)

Images of the *Angara* and *Maria (fka Lev Yashin)* at Rajin Port and Konyushkovo Bay, and of *Maia-1 at* Rajin Port, Konyushkovo Bay and Vostochny Port, September 2023 – December 2023




National Centre for Geospatial Intelligence

UK OFFICIAL – FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Russia/DPRK: Transfer of Materials Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Russia

DPRK Air, Land and Sea Transfer Nodes







Defence Intelligence

UK OFFICIAL – FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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National Centre for Geospatial Intelligence

UK OFFICIAL – FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Russia/DPRK: Transfer of Materials Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Russia

Transfer of Materials From DPRK to Russia by Sea

(O). Media reporting highlighted that the Russian Federation were approaching a number of countries requesting military equipment and munitions to replace those which had been used in the Ukrainian conflict.[1, 2]

(O). Analysis of marine traffic data (confirmed on imagery dated between 21 Sep and 5 Dec 23) showed at least three Russian flagged vessels continued to transfer shipping containers between Najin Port, DPRK and the ports of Vostochny and Bukhta Konyushkova (also known as Dunay Port), Russia.[3]

(O). The three Russian vessels identified were MV MAIA 1 (IMO: 9358010), MV ANGARA (IMO: 9179842) and MV MARIA (Formerly LEV YASHIN) (IMO: 8517839), all of which have been identified at Najin Port, DPRK and then transiting to either Vostochny and/or Bukhta Konyushkova (also known as Dunay) ports, Russia.[3]











Diary of a Paratrooper

From the DPRK straight to the Grad barrels in the North Military District.

Extended-range shells for the Grad MLRS arrived in the Northern Military District zone which were kindly provided by our North Korean comrades!

English Translation


Дневник Десантника

Из КНДР прямиком в стволы Град на СВО.

В зону СВО прибыли снаряды повышенной дальности к РСЗО Град, которые любезно предоставили наши северо-корейские товарищи!

Дневник Десантника

Подписаться

2 комментария

https://t.me/s/channels/@DnevnikDesantnika - Telegram, 12 Nov. 23

(O). Although the exact contents of the shipping containers cannot be identified from satellite imagery, social media posts by Russian Forces personnel have stated the presence of DPRK produced munitions in Ukraine.[4]


(O). Assuming an average speed of 10 knots and the most direct route is taken, it would take approximately 1.2 days to conduct a return trip, not including time for loading/unloading of cargo.


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Russia/DPRK: Transfer of Materials Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Russia
MV MAIA 1 (IMO 9358010) – Offloading Shipping Containers at Najin Port Facility, DPRK
GEO: 421343N/1301714E
20 Nov 23
1. MV MAIA 1 (IMO 9358010) Vostochny Port, Russia 12 Nov 23
GEO: 424415N/1330510E
2. MV MAIA 1 (IMO 9358010) Bukhta Konyushkova (Dunay) Port, Russia 5 Dec 23
GEO: 425158N/1322152E
3. MV MAIA 1 (IMO 9358010) Bukhta Konyushkova (Dunay) Port, Russia 11 Dec 23
GEO: 425158N/1322152E
MV MAIA 1 (IMO 9358010)
(O). MV MAIA 1 (IMO 9358010) was identified on imagery docked at Vostochny Port, Russia on 12 Nov 23 [Image 1]. It was then identified preparing to load shipping containers at Najin Port, DPRK on 20 Nov 23 [Main Image] and unloading shipping containers at Bukhta Konyushkova (Dunay) Port, Russia on 5 Dec 23 [Image 2 and 3].
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Sources: Commercial Satellite Imagery
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4 of 9 | PROD: OSG-071-23 | 14 DEC 2023 | ICOD: 11 DEC 2023



National Centre for Geospatial Intelligence
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Russia/DPRK: Transfer of Materials Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Russia
MV ANGARA (IMO 9179842) – Docking at Najin Port Facility, DPRK
GEO: 421343N/1301714E
3 Sep 23
1. MV ANGARA (IMO 9179842) Bukhta Konyushkova (Dunay) Port, Russia 21 Sep 23
GEO: 425158N/1322152E
MV ANGARA (IMO 9179842)
(O). MV ANGARA (IMO 9179842) was identified on imagery docking at Najin Port, DPRK on 3 Sep 23 [Main Image] and laden with shipping containers at Bukhta Konyushkova (Dunay) Port, Russia on 21 Sep 23 [Image 1].
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Russia/DPRK: Transfer of Materials Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Russia

MV MARIA (Formally Known as MV LEV YASHIN) (IMO 8517839) Loading Shipping Containers at Najin Port Facility, DPRK



(O). MV MARIA (IMO 8517839) was identified on imagery unloading cargo at Bukhta Konyushkova (Dunay) Port, Russia between 21-22 Sep 23 [Image 1 and 2]. The vessel was also identified loading shipping containers at Najin Port Facility, DPRK on 12 Oct 23 [Main Image].

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Sources: Commercial Satellite Imagery

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
6 of 9 | PROD: OSG-071-23 | 14 DEC 2023 | ICOD: 11 DEC 2023

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DPRK Rail Transfer Node, Tomangang Railway Station, DPRK



(O). Tomangang Railway Station is located adjacent to the international border of DPRK and Russia and services the only rail link between the two countries. Media sources have reported that Russia could be exporting oil based products and cereals to the DPRK in exchange for munitions.[5] Both oil based products and cereals have been identified at Tomangang Railway Station. Analysis of imagery dated between 30 Oct and 4 Nov 23 identified the renewal of cross-border rail activity between Khasan (Russia) and Tomangang (DPRK) after a two year hiatus, highly likely due to COVID-19.

Defence Intelligence

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Sources: Commercial Satellite Imagery, Open-sources.


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Russia/DPRK: Transfer of Materials Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Russia

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Images:

20230903_054023_ssc8d2_0013_visual
20230921_003919_ssc2d3_0011_visual.tif.1,
20230922_051622_ssc11d2_0017_visual
20231012_011226_ssc2d2_0015_visual.tif,
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20231110_054051_ssc9_u0001_visual.tif
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20231211_011913_ssc1d2_0005_visual.tif

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Source: Member State.

Annex 49: Screenshot of a page from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1914400/)

Министерство иностранных дел
Российской Федерации

11.11.2023 11:57 № 2282-11-11-2023

Ответ официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой на вопрос СМИ в связи с обвинениями США и их союзников в адрес России в «военно-техническом сотрудничестве» с КНДР

Вопрос: В последнее время в адрес России и КНДР все чаще звучат обвинения в осуществлении запрещенных резолюциями Совета Безопасности ООН взаимных поставок вооружений и военных технологий. Один из последних примеров – заявление стран «Группы семи» по итогам встречи в Токио. На эту тему также неоднократно высказывался госсекретарь США Э.Блинкен, в том числе в ходе недавнего визита в Сеул. Как бы Вы могли это прокомментировать?

Ответ: Обвинения, предъявляемые «коллективным Западом» в «незаконном» военно-техническом сотрудничестве России с КНДР – голословны и бездоказательны, в излюбленном стиле «highly likely». К тому же никто не наделял Вашингтон и Токио следственными полномочиями.

Россия ответственно выполняет свои международные обязательства, включая резолюции Совета Безопасности. И это не мешает нам развивать традиционные отношения дружбы и сотрудничества с соседями, в том числе КНДР, имеющие давние исторические корни.

Что касается критиков нашей страны из числа так называемых поборников международного права, то им следует посоветовать почаще смотреть в зеркало, прежде чем учить других. Ведь именно США и их сателлиты нарушают общепринятые нормы международного права и резолюции Совета Безопасности, накачивают преступный киевский режим оружием и тем самым способствуют продолжению кровопролития.

Unofficial translation:

11.11.2023 11:57 № 2282-11-11-2023

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova's answer to a media question regarding US and its allies' accusations of "military-technical cooperation" with the DPRK

Question: Recently, Russia and North Korea have been increasingly accused of carrying out mutual deliveries of weapons and military technology, which are prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions. One of the latest examples is the statement of the G7 countries following the meeting in Tokyo. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also repeatedly spoken on this topic, including during his recent visit to Seoul. How would you comment on this?

Maria Zakharova: The accusations made by the "collective West" of "illegal" military-technical cooperation between Russia and the DPRK are unfounded and unsubstantiated, in the favourite style of "highly likely." In addition, no one gave Washington and Tokyo investigative powers.

Russia is responsibly fulfilling its international obligations, including Security Council resolutions. And this does not prevent us from developing traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with our neighbours, including the DPRK, which have long-standing historical roots.

As for the so-called critics of international law, our country, they should be advised to look in the mirror more often before lecturing others. After all, it is the United States and its satellites that violate the generally accepted norms of international law and Security Council resolutions, pump the criminal Kiev regime with weapons and thereby contribute to the continuation of bloodshed.

Annex 50: Compilation of available information on *Angara*'s movements August to December 2023 (non-exhaustive)

Date	Summary of reported activity	Source and date of information
18 August	At Dunay (Dunai) Port	NKNews 23 October
18 August	Departs Dunay	RUSI, 16 October
21 August	Departs Dunay with 250 shipping containers	Member State report
25 August	Shipping containers delivered to Rajin (Najin)	Member State report
26 August	Arrives Rajin	RUSI 16 October
28 August	Returns empty to Dunay	Member State report
1 September	Departs Dunay with 250 shipping containers	Member State report
1 September	Departs Dunay	RUSI 16 October
2-4 September	Shipping containers delivered to Rajin; loads approx. 35 shipping containers	Member States' reports
3 September	Loads and unloads cargoes at Rajin	RUSI 16 October
3 September	At Rajin Pier 2, loads containers	NKNews 16 October; 23 October
6 September	Approx 35 shipping containers delivered to Dunay	Member State report
8 September	Departs Dunay with approx. 200 shipping containers	Member State report
	Disappeared for a few days (?)	NKNews 23 October
11 September	Approx 200 shipping containers delivered to Rajin; loads approx. 300 shipping containers	Member State report
12 September	Approx 300 shipping containers delivered to Dunay	Member State report
20 September	Vessel appeared to stay at Dunay through this date	NKNews 16 October
21 September	Loaded cargo at Dunay (alongside *Maria*)	Member State report; RUSI 16 October
21 September	Departs Dunay	RUSI 16 October
22 September	Departs Dunay with approx. 250 shipping containers	Member State report
23 September	Approx 250 containers delivered to Rajin	Member State report
23 September	Anchored in waters off coast of Vladivostok	NKNews 23 October
23 September	Photos near Vladivostok: Carrying containers with logos of commercial companies.	NKNews 19 October; Marinetraffic.com
24 September	Arrives Rajin	RUSI 16 October
24 September	Unloading and possibly later loading containers	NKNews 23 October
2 October	"Ship matching Angara's profile" at Rajin Port Pier 1	NKNews 16 October

2 October	Unloading cargo at Rajin Port	RUSI 16 October
2 October	Possibly later loading containers	NKNews 23 October
Rajin restarted container trade for first time in 5 years		NKNews 14 October
6-11 October	Vostochny Port loading and possibly earlier unloading containers	NKNews 23 October
14 October	Anchored in waters off coast of Vladivostok	NKNews 23 October
14 October	Photos near Vladivostok: Carrying containers with logos of commercial companies.	NKNews 19 October; Marinetraffic.com
	At Vostochny Port (date uncertain)	NKNews 25 October
22-23 October	Rajin Port unloading and later loading containers	NKNews 23 October
23 October	Picks up containers at Rajin Port Pier 2	NKNews 31 October; CSIS, 8 December
27 October	Appears at Dunay alongside Russian naval warship	NKNews 31 October
29 October	Still at Dunay without significant change in cargo	NKNews 31 October
28 November	At Rajin Port	Member State report
First days of December	At Nakhodka commercial container port	NKNews 13 December
9 December	Unloading containers at Rajin	NKNews 13 December; Bloomberg 26 December

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NKNews 20 October, “How Russia used lookalike ships to conceal suspected North Korea arms trade”, Anton Sokolin

NKNews 23 October, “Major Russian container port tied to alleged North Korea weapons trade: Imagery”, Anton Sokolin, Colin Zwirko

NKNews 25 October, “North Korean trains in alleged Russia arms deal pass through key weapons hub”, Colin Zwirko

NKNews 31 October, “New ship joins alleged North Korea-Russia weapons trade operation: Imagery”, Colin Zwirko

NKNews 13 December, US sanctions Russian ship to ‘disrupt’ weapons trade with North Korea”, Colin Zwirko

Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 8 December, “Activity at Najin Points to Continued DPRK-Russia Arms Transfers”, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun
Bloomberg, 26 December, “Ghost Ships at Reawakened North Korea Port Put Ukraine in Peril”, Jon Herskovitz

Source: Compilation by the Panel.

Annex 51: *Angara* - Supplementary information

The Panel is investigating entities currently connected to *Angara* and the other vessels named in Table 3 of the main text.

According to maritime databases, M Leasing LLC (TIN: 9701173086, established in 2021) is the current registered owner of *Angara*. The Panel tried to contact M Leasing LLC using their published email address and telephone numbers but was unsuccessful. Investigations continue.

Marine Trans Shipping LLC (TIN: 3025037914) currently manages and operates *Angara*. mailto:The Panel wrote to Marine Trans Shipping LLC on 14 December but has not had a reply.

In addition to the four vessels whose details are listed in Table 3, reports refer also to the possible involvement of a fifth vessel *Vyacheslav Anisimov* (IMO: 9004463). According to commercial maritime databases *Vyacheslav Anisimov* visited Dunay sometime between about 6 and 15 September 2023.[225] According to a Member State, *Vyacheslav Anisimov* entered Dunai between 9 and 15 September and offloaded containers to *Angara*. The Russian Federation has not replied to the Panel's enquiry about this vessel.

The Panel wrote to the Russian Maritime Shipping Register on 15 December 2023 requesting information and documentation for the four vessels whose details are in Table 3, and the *Vyacheslav Anisimov*. The Russian Maritime Shipping Register replied that the request had been "duly forwarded to the appropriate Governmental bodies of the Russian Federation".

[225] See also: https://www.nknews.org/pro/how-russia-used-lookalike-ships-to-conceal-suspected-north-korea-arms-trade/



RUSSIAN MARITIME REGISTER OF SHIPPING

HEAD OFFICE

12.01.2024 Our ref 512-11-5014

S/AC.49/2023/PE/

Your ref OC.568 Date 15.12.2023

[redacted]
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

E-mail: dppa-poe1874@un.org

Subject: Re: Communication from Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [redacted]

Thank you for your letter of 15 December 2023.

Please be informed that your request has been duly forwarded to the appropriate Governmental bodies of the Russian Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Acting Director General [redacted]

samarina.te@rs-class.org / +7 (812) 312-35-69

A photograph of *Angara* off Vladivostok dated 22 September 2023[226] shows it was carrying shipping containers. Some of these had logos apparently of a number of different companies. In response to the Panel's enquiry of one of these companies, PJSC Transcontainer, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation sent the following response dated 25 January 2024:

> "I would like to refer to the request by the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), namely S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.563 dated 14 December 2023.
>
> In this regard, I wish to inform you of the following. PJSC Transcontainer has not previously had and does not currently have any contractual relations with Marine Trans Shipping LLC or M Leasing LLC. The organization has not leased containers to any lessees for the purpose of loading them onto vessel ANGARA. Transportation to DPRK is not included in the geographic scope of the activities of PJSC Transcontainer. The company has never carried out and does not carry out transportation from and to DPRK.

[226] MarineTraffic.com

When concluding its lease agreements, PJSC Transcontainer shows due diligence and receives assurances from the lessees that the property of PJSC Transcontainer will not be used in violations of the international obligations of the Russian Federation, including compliance with the sanctions regimes of the UN Security Council. The clients of the company undertake not to use the containers provided for temporary possession and use for the delivery, transportation, transfer, as well as transportation of goods, products and items to countries with trade restrictions in force under the UN Security Council resolutions, as well as for the benefit of persons on the sanctions list of the UN Security Council.

The photograph attached to the Panel's request of the vessel ANGARA shows that some of the containers have a trademark similar to that of PJSC Transcontainer. Belonging of containers is indicated by a unique BIC code. The images presented in the request do not allow to identify the BIC codes on the containers and establish their belonging.

Please let me know if you'd like to receive any additional clarifications or discuss any follow-up matters.”

Annex 51.1: *Angara*'s speed

Angara's service speed is 15 kn according to commercial maritime databases although in the days before *Angara* arrived at Korsakov it appears to have travelled rather more slowly, mainly between 8 and 10 kn.[227]

Estimates based on Google Earth images suggest that the direct round-trip distance between Najin and Konyushkovo Bay is approximately 440 km. The route maps in Annex 47 would suggest, however, that vessels making this journey hug the coast, perhaps in order to stay within DPRK or Russian territorial waters and thus minimizing the risk of surveillance. In this case, the round-trip distance is approximately 540 km. Approximate round-trip travel-times under these different scenarios are as follows:

Rajin to Konyushkovo Bay – approximate distance by sea	***Angara* sailing speed**	**Approximate round-trip voyage time (no account taken of port entry/exit times or loading/ unloading times)**	**Approximate round-trip voyage time (assuming the port call in the middle lasted 0.5 days)[9]**
Direct route 220 km	15 kn	16 hours	28 hours
	10 kn	24 hours	36 hours
Hugging the coast 270 km	15 kn	19 ½ hours	31 ½ hours
	10 kn	29 hours	41 hours

[227] *Source*: Windward.

Annex 51.2: Member States' Designation of *Angara*

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Controls designated the *Angara*, M Leasing LLC and Marine Trans Shipping LLC on 8 May under Section 1(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 of April 15, 2021 ("Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation"):

- ANGARA Roll-on Roll-off 8,811GRT Russia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9179842 (vessel) [RUSSIA EO14024] (Linked To: M LEASING LLC);

- M LEASING LLC, Baumanskaya Ul., D.7, Str. 1, Of. 301, Moscow 105005, Russia; Tax ID No. 9701173086 (Russia); Identification Number IMO 6246853 [RUSSIA-EO14024];

- MARINE TRANS SHIPPING LLC, Office 2, Ulitsa Naberezhnaya Reki Tsareva 1, Astrakhan 414024, Russia; Tax ID No. 3025037914 (Russia); Identification Number IMO 6183435 [RUSSIA-EO14024].

The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation of HM Treasury designated M LEASING on 19 May 2023 under The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019:

Name (non-Latin script): М ЛИЗИНГ a.k.a: M LIZING Address: Of. 301, Str. 1, D.7, Baumanskaya Ul., Moscow, Russia, 105005.Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref): RUS1850. Financial sanctions imposed in addition to an asset freeze: Trust services. Date trust services sanctions imposed: 18/05/2023. (UK Statement of Reasons):M LEASING is an involved person within the meaning of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 because 1) M LEASING is an entity carrying on business in a sector of strategic significance to the Government of Russia, namely, the transport sector; and 2) M LEASING is involved in providing financial services, or making available funds, economic resources, goods or technology, that could contribute to destabilising Ukraine or undermining or 21 threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. (Email address): svetlana-osik@mail.ru (Type of entity): Limited Liability Company (LLC) (Business Reg No):9701173086 Listed on: 19/05/2023 UK Sanctions List Date Designated: 18/05/2023 Last Updated: 19/05/2023 Group ID: 15911.

Annex 51.3: *Angara*'s history

1. Commercial maritime databases indicate that *Angara* earlier visited Konyushkovo Bay, in June, 2023.
2. A private sector organization posted the following tweet on 16 October 2023 (The Dossier Centre: https://t.me/dossiercenter/300)

Центр «Досье»

КНДР поставляет в Россию боеприпасы, убедился Центр «Досье»

Российские корабли «Мария» и «Ангара» в течение последних двух месяцев **забирали грузы в северокорейском порту** Раджин и **доставляли их на засекреченную военную базу** на Дальнем Востоке, пишет The Washington Post. Издание опирается на спутниковые снимки, исследованные RUSI. Фотографии не позволяют определить, что именно перевозили суда, но аналитики предполагают, что речь идет о **поставках боеприпасов**.

Как минимум **в одном случае это были ракеты**, выяснил Центр «Досье». В корабельных документах «Ангары», с которыми ознакомился «Досье», говорится, что **в трюме сухогруза перевозились 50,69 тонн ракет с разрывным зарядом**. В материалах ни разу не упоминается, что суда посещали КНДР. При этом нередко **в качестве пункта назначения указан залив Стрелок**, на берегу которого и располагается **российская военная база**.

Unofficial translation by the Panel

BEGINS

Dossier Centre


North Korea supplies ammunition to Russia, the Dossier Center is convinced

Over the past two months, the Russian ships Maria and Angara have been picking up cargo at the North Korean port of Rajin and delivering it to a secret military base in the Far East, The Washington Post writes. The publication is based on satellite images studied by RUSI. The photographs do not make it possible to determine what exactly the ships were transporting, but analysts suggest that we are talking about the supply of ammunition.

In at least one case, these were missiles, the Dossier Center found out. The Angara ship's documents, which the Dossier reviewed, state that 50.69 tons of missiles with an explosive charge were transported in the cargo hold. The materials never mention that the ships visited the DPRK. At the same time, Strelok Bay is often indicated as a destination, on the shores of which a Russian military base is located.

ENDS

3. The Panel has been shown alleged documentary material which it cannot independently verify. This reportedly shows inter alia that *Angara* carried in its hold 50.6887 tons of dangerous cargo described as UN Class 1 explosive material, UN No 180 Explosive Rockets when at or close to Korsakov Port in the Sakhalin Peninsula between about 6-10 August:[2]



Параметры перемещения судна

Порт: **Корсаков**
Перемещение: **Отход (Выход с текущего пункта в море. Прекращение редактирования)** Операция: **Отход**

Местоположение

Граница порта: **Участок № 1** | Причал: **Не указан** | Якорная стоянка/Участок: **Точка якорной стоянки №22**

Комиссия государственных контрольных органов: **Да**
Место проведения: **Rukor/Южный район причал №1** Дата и время проведения (местн.): **10.08.2023 19:00**

Следующий пункт

До: **МОРЕ** Страна: **RUSSIAN FEDERATION** Порт: **Nakhodka**

Параметры маршрута

Дата и время движения (местн.), начало: **10.08.2023 20:00** Лоцман: **Не нужен**
Примечание:
Осадка максимальная (макс. из осадки кормой и осадки носом): **5,2** Надводный габарит: **35,06**

Грузы

На борту - ИТОГО [т]: **58.886** из них опасных [т]: **50.69** TEUs: **0**
1. Тип груза: Прочие генеральные грузы
Кол-во [т]: 50.68871
Опасный груз: **Да**
Расположение груза: **трюм**
Класс ООН: **Класс 1 - Взрывчатые вещества**
ООН: **180 - РАКЕТЫ с разрывным зарядом**
Класс и подкласс ООН: **1** Группа упаковки:
Перевозится в таре: **Да** Масса брутто [т]: **50.6887**
Перевозится навалом: **Нет**
Перевозится наливом: **Нет**
2. Тип груза: Прочие генеральные грузы
Кол-во [т]: 8.19676
Выгрузка **нет**
Погрузка **нет**

Внёс

Никитин Петр Данилович Должность:
Исполнил: **Никитин Петр Данилович** Должность: **Государственный инспектор сектора оформления приходов и отходов судов**
Дата и время внесения: **10.08.2023 11:23**
Дата и время исполнения: **10.08.2023 20:40**

Закрыть


4. The documentary material suggests this cargo was offloaded at a destination in Strelok Bay sometime between 15 and 21 August.

5. This suggestion is supported by satellite imagery which *shows Angara* at Konyushkovo Bay (which is situated in Strelok Bay) on 18 August 2023, moored alongside a pier across from a warship:



Source: Planet Labs, 18 August 2023.


Annex 51.4: Route taken by *Angara* until 10 August, when AIS transmissions ceased to be detected



Source: Windward, accessed on 4 January 2024.

Annex 52: Konyushkovo Bay

Konyushkovo Bay, located south of Dunay, was used as a submarine base in former USSR times[228] and subsequently was used as an unloading point of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned submarines for transport to Ministry of Defense temporary storage facilities at Sysoev Bay, close to Dunay.[229] Konyushkovo Bay is still in use by Russian Navy vessels. The Panel examined available imagery of vessels in the Bay prior to August 2023 and found that it was only infrequently used by merchant vessels. Maritime databases provide examples of two military vessels in the bay in November 2023, as does a Google image dated 2020 of another military vessel:




[228] See for example, CIA report dated 9 May 1965: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78T05929A000900020013-6.pdf

[229] See for example "Environmental safety and monitoring measures in the dangerous radioactive facilities in the Far East, as well as possible responses to accidents which may happen in the facilities", Acad, Ashot Sarkisov, Advisor to Director of IBRAE (http://www.tecsec.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/tokyoseminar05_e.pdf) presented at the G8 Seminar on the Global Partnership August 2005 (http://www.tecsec.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/tokyoseminar02_e.pdf).

SPK 57150 (IMO: 4768741 / MMSI: 273212850)

Crane Vessel 52m x 22.8m by IMO at Dunai Port, November 2023



Source: International Maritime Organization database, accessed 27 November 2023.



Military ship and support vessel with crane in Konyushkovo Bay

Source: Google image, August 2020, accessed 7 November 2023.



Angara and warship

Warships are occasionally seen on satellite imagery of Konyushkovo Bay moored opposite *Angara* (as here) or *Maria*.

Source: Planet Labs, 18 August 2023.



Entrance to Konyushkovo Bay, looking south – the sign on the right indicates "Restricted Area – Entry Forbidden". The white cabin situated in the centre of the picture, just behind the red-and-white barriers across the road, is at the main entrance to the facility. It can be seen on current satellite imagery.

Source: Google Earth, July 2013.

Annex 53: *Angara*'s Movements at Konyushkovo Bay and Rajin Port

Annex 53.1: *Angara* unloading and loading containers at Konyushkovo Bay (see also image in figure XVI in the main text).

Two vessels filled with shipping containers are moored alongside the main pier: *Angara* is on the left. The majority of the containers on the vessel are blue in colour. The containers on the other vessel are multi-coloured.

Note the white cabin at the top left of the image marking the position of the main gate of the facility. A stack of mainly blue containers has been built just inside the entrance. Vehicles at main gate are probably flat-bed trucks used to move the containers.

According to the Member State information Annex 45, Angara delivered approximately 300 shipping containers on 12 September. These presumably are the shipping containers that can be observed on board Angara in the image below.

Figure 1.



Source: Planet Labs, 12 September 2023.

Angara at Konyushkovo Bay, 14 September 2023

The containers from the two vessels appear to have been unloaded. Additional blue containers (presumably from *Angara*) have been added to the stack seen on 12 September. Close-by a new stack of multi-coloured containers has been built, presumably originating from the vessel on the right of the pier.

The Panel is unable to establish independently the exact location of the approximately 300 containers delivered by *Angara* on 12 September.

Figure 2.




Source: Planet Labs, 14 September 2023.

Numbers of containers

14 September: Approximate number of containers onshore Konyushkovo Bay: 105-210, in three piles (Note that unloading from *Angara* was not completed: some containers remain in the hold):

Figure 3. Three piles of containers:



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 4. Pile 1 (90-180 containers):



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel..

Figure 5. Pile 2 (15-30 containers):



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 6. Pile 3 (70-140 containers):



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 7. Pile 3 increased in size with additional containers (approximately 20) added between 12 September and 14 September:



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

Note that the Panel has not been able to track the movement of containers in and out of the main gate of the facility by vehicle.

15 September 2023

Figure 8. *Angara* has been loaded with blue containers and the pile of blue containers seen onshore on 14 September has been reduced in size.



Source: Planet Labs, 15 September 2023.

Annex 53.2


Figure 1. *Angara* at Konyushkovo Bay 28 September



Source: Planet Labs

Note stack of containers close to main gate, and vehicular activity along the pier.

Figure 2. *Angara* at Konyushkovo Bay 30 September



Source: Planet Labs

Note stack of containers close to main gate has disappeared. Note the red-orange moveable cover (figure 2) has changed its configuration and appears to cover more of the hold(filled with containers) in comparison with 28 September.

Figure 3. *Angara* at Pier 1, Rajin Port, 2 October

The configuration of the red-orange moveable cover has changed again (partially pulled-back, perhaps in connection with container unloading, and a mix of blue and other-coloured containers can be seen in two places below).



Source: Planet Labs.

Annex 53.3

Figure 1. Rajin Port, Pier 1 is used for unloading vessels: *Angara* unloading containers there.

Angara at Pier 1 21 October 2023




Angara at Pier 1 22 October 2023



Source: Planet Labs.

Note increased size on 22 October of the seaward end (to-the-right) of the stack of containers on the pier, in comparison to the day before.

Figure 2. *Angara* at Pier 2, Rajin Port, 23 October



Source: Planet Labs.

The red/orange moveable cover over *Angara*'s hold has been pulled back and blue and other-coloured containers can be seen in the hold.

Annex 54: *Maria*'s movements at Rajin Port and Konyushkovo Bay

Figure 1.

Rajin Port, Pier 2


9 – 11 October: Containers are lined up and loaded onto the *Maria.* The changes to the alignment of the different-coloured containers demonstrates that loading is taking place on 11 October.



Source: *Planet Labs.*


Figure 2.

11 October: Containers are loaded onto *Maria*



Source: *Planet Labs.*

12 October: All containers have been loaded onto *Maria:* None left on the pier.



Source: *Planet Labs.*

Figure 3.

Konyushkovo Bay, 14 October

Maria laden with containers moored alongside pier. There were no containers onshore prior to its arrival.



16 October: Maria’s cargo hull almost empty and containers stacked near main gate of facility



Annex 55: Railway line running north from Rajin station (see figure XIX in the main text)

The Panel noted in the body of this report that about 2.5km north of Rajin Station the railway line running north from Rajin Port enters a tunnel under a mountain (summit about 520m) and exits about 3.8km on the north side of the mountain. Satellite imagery of this mountain shows multiple entrances on the south side to probable underground sites Available images indicate that the construction of these discrete entrances started before 2008.

While access to some of the entrances appear to be controlled by gates, there appear to be no stronger security measures, such as perimeter fences, around these entrances. The Panel notes, however, that there are L-shaped paths bordered by high reinforced walls in front of some of them, perhaps to conceal them, to constrain the flow of people or vehicles to the entrance to enable controls, and possibly to guard against an assault.

Annex 56: Media reports on the alleged DPRK arms and ammunitions found in Gaza Strip



Annotated image shows the likely DPRK-made F-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher | Image: IDF Spokesperson, edited by Joost Olliemans



Annotated image shows the likely DPRK-made F-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher | Image: Yoaz Vitun, YNet, edited by Joost Olliemans

Source: NK News, 13 October 2023,
accessed at https://www.nknews.org/2023/10/apparent-north-korean-weapons-used-by-hamas-but-dprk-denies/

Annex 57: Israel's reply to the Panel's enquiry

SENSITIVE/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

04 December 2023

Hamas has various AT systems, including North Korean weapon systems

1. Most of the existing AT weapon systems in the GS are indigenously produced "Al Yassin" PG-7 rockets; these rockets' are similar in appearance to the PG-7VR rockets. On October 7th 2023, during Hamas's infiltration into Israel, the operatives carried a large number of rockets of this type, differing in the main warhead type: PG-7VR with a double HEAT warhead (TANDEM); PG-7VR with a precursor warhead and a main thermobaric warhead. In addition, among the weapon systems were North Korean F-7 rockets (AP).
2. Furthermore, regarding ATGM systems, Hamas has a very limited amount of long range AT missiles, which are mostly used for operations viewed as high-quality. Apart from the KORNET system, which is the main threat to IDF in the AT systems realm, Hamas has dozens of missiles of the North Korean PHOENIX system.
3. The Annex shows the technical specifications of the North Korean AT weapon systems held by Hamas.

For your information.

[redacted]

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F-7	
Diameter (mm)	85
Launcher marking	RPG-7 or TYPE-68/TYPE-68-1
Fuse type	Inertial
Rocket type	HE-FRAG (AP)
Rocket weight (kg)	3
HE types	TNT
Firing configuration	Direct / high-trajectory
Effective range (m)	200
Maximum range (m)	500
Warhead effectiveness radius (m)	10



Fig. 1: F-7

SENSITIVE/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PHOENIX	
Guidance system	2nd Generation laser beam riding
Maximum effective range (m)	3,000
Average flight velocity (m/s)	214
Penetration capability (mm)	600
Warhead type	HEAT
Missile weight (kg)	13
Launcher weight (kg)	22



Fig. 2: PHOENIX used by Hamas


SENSITIVE/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3

Annex 58: Media reports on the alleged DPRK arms supply to the Russian Federation



Russian soldier saying “North-Korean friends” supplies 122mm rockets, having better precision and firing range than Russia’s. Screenshot from a Twitter video.

Source:
https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/11/12/north-korea-supplies-russia-with-full-range-of-artillery-ammo-including-gun-and-mortar-shells-rockets/



Source:
twitter.com/war_noir/status/1718270637079195908



Source: https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1723665663393210415

Annex 59: List of DPRK Cyberthreat actors' malicious activities monitored by the Panel in 2023, based on the information provided by cybersecurity companies, Member States, and media

DPRK cyber actor	Report Name	Case Summary	Publication Month
Kimsuky	Malware Disguised as a Manuscript Solicitation Letter (Targeting Security-Related Workers	Kimsuky distributed document-type malware targeting security experts, which uses an external object within a Word document to execute an additional malicious macro (template Injection method).	January
TA444 (Overlaps with BlueNoroff)	ta444-apt-startup-aimed-at-your-funds	A TA444 Command and Control (C2) domain sent phishing emails to targets in the U.S. and Canada including education, government, healthcare, and finance verticals. The lure emails enticed users to click a 'SendGrid URL' which redirected victims to a credential harvesting page. This was reportedly a deviation from previous TA444 operations which typically involved the direct deployment of malware.	January
Lazarus Group	疑似 APT-C-26（Lazarus）组织通过加密货币钱包推广信息进行攻击活动分析	Lazarus Group conducted an attack delivering malicious ISO files with the theme of cryptocurrency wallet promotion (Somora)	January
Kimsuky	Malware Disguised as Normal Documents (Kimsuky)	Same tactics used as in Malware Disguised as a Manuscript Solicitation Letter (Targeting Security-Related Workers; in this case, the threat actor used an image that prompts users to execute the macro.	February
Lazarus Group	Anti-Forensic Techniques Used By Lazarus Group	The Lazarus Group carried out anti-forensics to conceal their malicious activities. They transmitted a configuration file with C2 information and a PE file that communicates with the C2 server in encrypted forms to evade detection by security products. The encrypted files operate after being decrypted onto the memory by the loader file. They then receive additional files from the C2 and perform malicious actions.	February
Lazarus Group	no-pineapple-dprk-targeting-of-medical-research-and-technology-sector	The Lazarus Group targeted a manufacturer of technology used in energy, research, defense, and healthcare verticals, and the chemical engineering department of a research university between May and November 2022. The actors attacked an unnamed company that was exploited through CVE-2022-27925 and CVE-2022-37042, two bugs affecting the digital	February

		collaboration platform 'Zimbra'. The attackers used the bugs to gain access to the 'Zimbra' mail server, exfiltrating the contents of mailboxes, moved laterally to another vulnerable device on the same network and used malware to eventually steal 100GB of data.	
ScarCruft	APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations	ScarCruft has been observed using tools previously associated with other subordinate adversarial syndicates within RGB, such as the Lazarus Group. Attack chains mounted by ScarCruft involve spear-phishing emails containing tailored lures to entice victims. These messages are sent using spoofed and fraudulent personas that masquerade as key individuals within the target's area of expertise to gain their trust. ScarCruft also takes advantage of contact lists stolen from compromised individuals to identify more targets and steal cryptocurrency to fund its attack infrastructure. The stolen digital assets are then laundered using hash rental and cloud mining services to obscure the forensic trail and convert them into clean cryptocurrency.	March
Kimsuky	CHM Malware Disguised as North Korea-related Questionnaire (Kimsuky)	Kimsuky distributed a CHM file as an email attachment, purporting to be an interview request about the DPRK. Once the recipient accepts the interview request, a password-protected compressed file is sent as an attachment.	March
Kimsuky	OneNote Malware Disguised as Compensation Form (Kimsuky)	Kimsuky distributed OneNote malware disguised as a form related to compensation. Once a user clicks on the script, the malicious VBS file is created and executed under the filename personal.vbs in a temporary directory to steal user information.	March
Kimsuky	Kimsuky Group Distributes Malware Disguised as Profile Template (GitHub)	Kimsuky distributed a malicious Word file disguised as a profile template from emails impersonating a well-known professor. A malicious VBA macro is contained within the Word file; upon being activated, it connects to a C2 server via PowerShell before downloading and executing an additional script that uses the GitHub API to transmit user information to a specified repository.	March

Kimsuky	Kimsuky Group Uses ADS to Conceal Malware	Kimsuky used Alternate Data Stream (ADS) to hide their malware, an Infostealer that collects data by starting the VBScript included inside an HTML file.	March
Lazarus Group	CrowdStrike Prevents 3CXDesktopApp Intrusion Campaign	The Lazarus Group compromised 3CX's desktop applications for Windows and MacOS and bundled them with malware, which led customers of 3CX to inadvertently download malicious versions of the software and allowed the attackers to run arbitrary code on all machines where the software was installed.	March
Kimsuky	apt43-north-korea-cybercrime-espionage	Kimsuky carried out spear-phishing attacks containing tailored lures to entice victim, using spoofed and fraudulent personas that masquerade as key individuals withing the target's areas of expertise to gain their trust. Kimsuky also took advantage of contact lists stolen from compromised individuals to identify more targets and steal cryptocurrency to fund its attack infrastructure. The stolen digital assets are then laundered using hash rental and cloud mining services to obscure the forensic trail and convert them into clean cryptocurrency.	March
BlueNoroff	bluenoroff-apt-targets-macos-rustbucket-malware/	BlueNoroff targeted macOS with 'RustBucket' malware to gather system information and to allow the attackers to perform various actions on the infected machines.	April
Lazarus Group	Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supply-chain attack	The Lazarus Group created a Linux payload with a bank-themed PDF lure.	April
Lazarus Group	Following the Lazarus group by tracking DeathNote campaign | Securelist	In an October 2019 - March 2022 campaign, dubbed 'DeathNote', the Lazarus Group used social engineering lures mimicking cryptocurrency businesses and defense contractors to trick victims into interacting with macro-laced Word attachments and PDF files. When the victims opened the file, the macro installed an obfuscated VBScript that extracted payloads in the form of harmful UltraVNC with backdoor capabilities that evade detection and establish a connection to a separate C2 server.	April

Kimsuky	Kimsuky Group's Phishing Attacks Targeting North Korea-Related Personnel	Kimsuky created a webmail website that looks identical to certain national policy research institutes in the Republic of Korea to target DPRK-related business managers. When the user attempts to log into the webmail website, Kimsuky was able to harvest their account credentials.	May
Kimsuky	Kimsuky Group Using Meterpreter to Attack Web Servers	Kimsuky attacked a Windows IIS web server of a Republic of Korea construction company and executed a Powershell command that downloaded a malicious backdoor "img.dat" file, also known as Metasploit Meterpreter.	May
Lazarus Group	Lazarus Group Targeting Windows IIS Web Servers	The Lazarus Group attacked Windows IIS web servers through w3sp.exe. They placed a malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll) in the same folder as a normal application (Wordconv.exe) via the Windows IIS web server process, w3wp.exe. They then execute the normal application to initiate the execution of the malicious DLL.	May
Kimsuky	kimsuky-ongoing-campaign-using-tailored-reconnaissance-toolkit/	Kimsuky deployed a variant of the 'RandomQuery' malware via phishing emails to DPRK-focused information services, human rights activists, and DPRK defector support organizations. The Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file attached to the phishing emails downloaded 'RandomQuery' from the Kimsuky-controlled C2 server to the victim's system to collect system data.	May
Kimsuky	kimsuky-evolves-reconnaissance-capabilities-in-new-global-campaign/	Kimsuky waged a phishing campaign inviting exchanges on current geopolitical issues, to lure targets globally and deployed a new reconnaissance tool, 'ReconShark,' which collects sensitive data and bypasses security mechanisms. The 'ReconShark' malware was activated when the target opened a downloaded document and enabled macros. 'ReconShark' stole data from infected systems, such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) mechanisms and sent the stolen data to a C2 C2 server via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).	May
DPRK cyber actors (suspected Kimsuky)	https://www.police.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=d6c2795c-3930-44ab-970d-d2d7a14f9571.hwpx&rs=/viewer/202305	The National Police Agency (NPA) of the Republic of Korea announced the results of its investigations into a breach of a network of Seoul National University Hospital by DPRK cyberthreat actors. The incidents occurred between May and June 2021 and resulted in data exposure for 831,000 individuals, most of whom	May

	(see S/2023/656 Annex 65)	were patients. The NPA attributed the attack to DPRK cyber actors based on the information, including the intrusion techniques, the IP addresses that have been independently linked to DPRK threat actors, the website registration details, and the use of specific vocabulary only used in the DPRK.	
BlueNoroff	North Korea-Aligned TAG-71 Spoofs Financial Institutions in Asia and US	BlueNoroff spoofed several financial institutions and venture capital firms in Japan, Vietnam, and the United States in late 2022 and early 2023. Previous reporting also found similar activity, with DPRK cyberthreat actors spoofing domains belonging to financial firms located in a number of countries, as well as popular cloud services used by a large number of enterprises.	May
Lazarus Group	APT-C-26（Lazarus）组织使用伪造 VNC 软件的攻击活动分析	Lazarus Group was identified using fake ComcastVNC malware to launch attacks, followed by BlindingCan malware to steal user information.	June
Kimsuky	Kimsuky Strikes Again | New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence - SentinelOne	Kimsuky conducted a social engineering campaign targeting experts in DPRK issues to steal Google and subscription credentials of a reputable news and analysis service focusing on the DPRK, as well as deliver reconnaissance malware. Kimsuky also engaged in extensive email correspondence and used spoofed URLs, websites imitating legitimate web platforms and Office documents weaponized with the ReconShark malware. The activity indicates Kimsuky's growing dedication to social engineering and highlights the group's increasing interest in gathering strategic intelligence.	June
BlueNoroff	https://www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-aligned-tag-71-spoofs-financial-institutions	BlueNoroff carried out malicious cyber threat activity spoofing several financial institutions and venture capital firms in Japan, Vietnam, and the U.S. in late 2022 and early 2023.	June
Lazarus/ Kimsuky	https://www.qianxin.com/threat/reportdetail?report_id=295 https://www.qianxin.com/threat/reportdetail?report_id=292	In the first half of 2023, the Lazarus Group was ranked 7th in attacks targeting China (focused on government and finance) and controlled 6% of Chinese IP addresses and 9% of Chinese C2 servers. Kimsuky controlled 3% of Chinese IP addresses and 4% of Chinese C2 servers and was ranked 9th in attacks targeting China (focused on government, media, education, and finance).	July
ScarCruft	Detecting Ongoing STARK#MULE Attack Campaign Targeting Victims Using US Military Document Lures - Securonix	ScarCruft lured victims using U.S. military-related documents to run malware staged from legitimate compromised Republic of Korea websites. The goal seems to have been to spark the recipient's curiosity enough to have them	July

		open the attached documents and inadvertently execute the contained malware.	
BlueNoroff	https://github.blog/2023-07-18-security-alert-social-engineering-campaign-targets-technology-industry-employees/#indicators	A recent DPRK social engineering campaign perpetrated by BlueNoroff targets the personal accounts of employees of technology firms, using a combination of repository invitations and malicious npm package dependencies. Many of these targeted accounts are connected to the blockchain, cryptocurrency, or online gambling sectors.	July
DPRK cyberthreat actor	https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/north-korea-supply-chain	The DPRK actors compromised a software service provider, JumpCloud, likely through a sophisticated spearphishing campaign.	July
Kimsuky	https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/55646/	Malicious cyber actors believed to be Kimsuky are distributuing malware disguised as cryptocurrency coin exchange and investment-related content. The malicious code is distributed in the form of executable files and word documents.	July
Kimsuky	Cyber attack confirmed to have been carried out by North Korea's 'Kimsuky' targeting ROK-US joint military exercises	The Gyeonggi Police Agency in the Republic of Korea, in coordination with the U.S., uncovered malicious cyberattacks by Kimsuky targeting the ROK-U.S. combined military exercise battle simulation center. Kimsuky carried out continuous spearphishing attacks on a ROK battle simulation company engaged in virtual war games and installed malicious code on the company's system in January 2023 by hijacking the email account of an administrative employee of the company. Then the actors sent malicious emails disguised as certificates of tax withheld to the employees dispatched to the ROK-U.S. combined military battle simulation center.	August
Lazarus Group	Lazarus Group exploits ManageEngine vulnerability to deploy QuiteRAT	Lazarus Group has been targeting internet backbone infrastructure and healthcare entities in Europe and the United States. The actors exploited a ManageEngine ServiceDesk vulnerability (CVE-2022-47966) five days after PoCs for the exploit were publicly disclosed to deliver and deploy a newer malware threat "QuiteRAT."	August

Lazarus	comrades-in-arms-north-korea-compromises-sanctioned-russian-missile-engineering-company/	The Lazarus Group compromised internal IT infrastructure of NPO Mashinostroyenia, a Russian defense sector company, likely between late 2021 and May 2022. A DLL file, an OpenCarrot Windows OS backdoor used by the Lazarus Group, was identified on multiple internal NPO Mash networks.	August
Lazarus Group	https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/vmconnect-supply-chain-campaign-continues https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/vmconnect-malicious-pypi-packages-imitate-popular-open-source-modules	A Lazarus Group supply chain campaign effected by posting dozens of malicious Python packages to an open-source Python software repository, which served as a distribution point for the malware. The packages reportedly mimicked popular open-source Python tools.	August
DPRK cyber actors	Active North Korean campaign targeting security researchers	In January 2021, a DPRK cyber actor campaign was publicly disclosed, in which they used 0-day exploits to target security researchers working on vulnerability research and development. Over the past two and a half years, the campaign has continued. Recently, DPRK cyber actors were found to likely be responsible for a new, similar campaign, with at least one actively exploited 0-day being used to target security researchers in the past several weeks. DPRK threat actors used social media sites like X (formerly Twitter) to build rapport with their targets. After initial contact via X, they moved to an encrypted messaging app such as Signal, WhatsApp or Wire. Once a relationship was developed with a targeted researcher, the threat actors sent a malicious file that contained at least one 0-day in a popular software package. Upon successful exploitation, the shellcode conducts a series of anti-virtual machine checks and then sends the collected information, along with a screenshot, back to an attacker-controlled command and control domain. The shellcode used in this exploit is constructed in a similar manner to shellcode observed in previous North Korean exploits.	September
ScarCruft	threat_inteligence_report_konniapt.pdf	In one campaign, ScarCruft sent spearphishing emails with an attached compressed file that hid a LNK file inside, targeting DPRK human rights groups and people active in the unification field in the Republic of Korea. In another campaign, ScarCruft hid a LNK file inside a compressed	September

		file, named 'securitymail.zip' and purporting to be a HTML web page file, which when opened prompted users to enter their passwords into a website purporting to be a bank secure login screen with the URL of "securitymail.html."	
DPRK cyber threat actors	http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2023/09/07/2023090701108.html	DPRK hackers installed a backdoor and stole data, such as blueprints of super-mini satellite components, from Russian satellite company Sputnix OOO between January and March 2023.	September
ScarCruft	https://paper.seebug.org/3033/	ScarCruft was identified using the WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-2023-38831) to attack the cryptocurrency industry, a significant shift in the group's traditional targeting. ScarCruft used a malicious payload disguised as a wallet screenshot.	September
Lazarus Group	lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/ Lazarus-campaigns-and-backdoors-in-2022-2023.pdf	In one campaign, the Lazarus Group attacked a Spanish aerospace company, deploying several tools. Including a publicly undocumented backdoor, and obtained initial access to the company's network in 2022 through a spearphishing campaign as a fake recruiter via LinkedIn. Similarly, the Lazarus Group attacked aerospace companies in the Netherlands in October 2021 and a defense company in Poland in February 2023 via its "Operation Dream Job" campaign.	September/ October
Lazarus/ Andariel	https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/11/22/diamond-sleet-supply-chain-compromise-distributes-a-modified-cyberlink-installer/	The Lazarus Group and Andariel exploited a remote-code execution vulnerability (CVE-2023-42793) affecting the JetBrains TeamCity server, an application used for software development.	September/ October
All DPRK malicious cyber groups	north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023	DPRK's offensive cyber program continues to evolve, showing that the DPRK government is determined to continue using cyber intrusions to conduct both espionage and financial crime to project power and to finance both their cyber and kinetic capabilities. DPRK threat activity continues to adapt and change to build tailored	October

		malware for different platforms, including Linux and macOS.	
Lazarus/ Andariel/ BlueNoroff	security-insider/microsoft-digital-defense-report-2023?rtc=1	DPRK cyber threat actors pursue cyber operations to collect intelligence on the policy plans of their adversaries, gather intelligence about other countries' military capabilities to improve their own, and steal cryptocurrency to fund the state.	October
Lazarus Group	Lazarus Group's Operation Dream Magic - ASEC BLOG (ahnlab.com) 국정원 "北 보안인증 소프트웨어 '매직라인' 취약점 악용 해킹" 재경고 | 동아일보 (donga.com)	The Lazarus Group exploited vulnerable Republic of Korea websites with C2 to facilitate their attacks and implemented IP filtering for selective targeting, using the MagicLine program vulnerability. The National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea confirmed in November 2023 that the Lazarus Group attacked approximately 50 public institutions, media, defense companies, and IT companies in the Republic of Korea in June 2023.	October/ November
Kimsuky	https://medium.com/s2wblog/fastviewer-variant-merged-with-fastspy-and-disguised-as-a-legitimate-mobile-application-f3004588f95c	Kimsuky has created a FastViewer variant that induces a victim to install the app onto their mobile device by disguising the malware as a legitimate Android application (APK file), such as Google Authenticator, an anti-virus program, or a payment service application. The FastViewer malware receives commands directly from the server without downloading additional malware, and the main purpose of this FastViewer variant is to steal information from infected devices. It appears that Kimsuky has developed this malware since at least July 2023 to target Republic of Korea victims. The report further notes that the disguised applications are expected to be distributed via spearphishing emails or smishing to trick targets into running them.(Annex 59.1)	October
Lazarus	https://www.hauri.co.kr/security/security.html	The Lazarus Group created malware by modifying open source software (such as PuTTY, KiTTY, TightVNC, Sumatra PDF Reader, muPDF/Subliminal Recording) and have also pretended to be recruiters on LinkedIn in order to target victims with malware. The actors likely intend at least some of this malware to target the cryptocurrency.	October
DPRK cyberthreat actor	국정원 "北, 김정은 군함 건조 지시에 국내 조선사 해킹 시도" (chosun.com)	DPRK cyberthreat actors conducted multiple hacking attempts on shipbuilders in the Republic of Korea in August and September 2023 to steal information that could be used to strengthen the DPRK's naval military power.	October

DPRK cyberthreat actors	N. Korea tries to use artificial intelligence to write malicious software: U.S. official | Yonhap News Agency (yna.co.kr)	According to a Member State, DPRK cyber actors have been observed trying to use AI models to help accelerate writing malicious software and finding systems to exploit.	October
Lazarus Group	https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-catches-dprk-passing-out-kandykorn	A novel DPRK intrusion has been identified on a macOS system that targets blockchain engineers of a crypto exchange platform, lures them with a Python application to gain initial access, and deploys multiple complex stages of the attack, each with deliberate defensive evasion techniques.	October
Lazarus Group	APT trends report Q3 2023 | Securelist	The Lazarus Group targeted nuclear engineers and the defense industry, including manufacturers of radar system, unmanned aerial vehicles, military vehicles, ships, weaponry and maritime companies. The Lazarus Group obtained system access by manipulating job seekers on social media and messaging services, including Telegram and WhatsApp, into opening malicious apps for fake job interviews , using backdoored VNC apps and malware such as LPEClient and COPPERHEDGE.	October
Lazarus Group	A Cascade of Compromise: Kaspersky Exposes Lazarus' New Campaign Exploiting Legitimate Software | Kaspersky	The Lazarus Group carried out a persistent campaign to compromise a software vender with the likely objective of stealing valuable source code or tampering with the software supply chain, along with targeting of other software makers and attacks on victims targeted through a supply chain attack of security software. The actors deployed SIGNBT and LPEClient.	October
Lazarus/ Andariel	https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1722316019920728437	Lazarus/Andariel exploited CVE-2023-42793, a remote code execution vulnerability affecting multiple versions of the JetBrains TeamCity server and utilized different sets of tools and techniques.	November
DPRK cyber actors	보도자료 : HOME > 알림/소식 > 알림 > 보도자료 (police.go.kr)	The National Police Agency of the Republic of Korea found that DPRK cyber actors stole login information from 1,468 individuals between March and October 2023, including 57 incumbent or retired government officials in diplomacy, military, and national security. The DPRK actors attempted to steal virtual assets from 19 of the victims utilizing pilfered account credentials and engaged in cryptocurrency mining on 147 proxy servers they seized.	November
BlueNoroff	Microsoft: BlueNoroff hackers plan new crypto-theft attacks	BlueNoroff created new websites masquerading as skills assessment portals and targeted users on LinkedIn,enticing them with deceptive lures	November

		related to a skills assessment which allowed BlueNoroff to harvest victims' information.	
Lazarus	Diamond Sleet supply chain compromise distributes a modified CyberLink installer | Microsoft Security Blog	Lazarus modified a legitimate CyberLink application installer, hosted on legitimate CyberLink infrastructure and signed using a legitimate CyberLink certificate, to include malicious code. The malicious activity has impacted over 100 devices in multiple jurisdictions, including a number of countries in East Asia and North America.	November
ScarCruft	konni-campaign-distributed-via-malicious-document	ScarCruft deployed a Russian-language Word document equipped with a malicious macro, which when opened initiated VBA script that displays an article in Russian on the war in Ukraine. This campaign aims to extract information and execute commands on compromised devices.	November
BlueNoroff	bluenoroff-strikes-again-with-new-macos-malware/	A new later-stage malware variant from BlueNoroff was discovered. BlueNoroff reached out to a target claiming to be interested in partnering with or offering something beneficial under the guise of an investor or head hunter.	November
Lazarus Group	https://rt-solar.ru/events/news/3851/	The Lazarus Group was very active in the Russian Federation, attacking Russian government authorities. As of early November 2023, Lazarus Group hackers "still have access to a number of Russian systems."	November
Kimsuky	[Kimsuky] Operation Covert Stalker - ASEC BLOG (ahnlab.com)	Kimsuky distributed malware to the DPRK and foreign policy experts in the Republic of Korea over the previous 17 months. Kimsuky sent fake emails containing malicious links to these experts and hacks vulnerable websites to install remote management programs such as RDP Wrapper, Quasar RAT, Ammy RAT, AnyDesk, and/or Team Viewer in order to steal email accounts and/or information from the experts.	November
DPRK cyber actors	https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/58818/	DPRK cyber actors distributed malware (*.lnk) to experts on foreign policy and unification in the Republic of Kkorea via fake secure mail (HTML).	November
Andariel	https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/59073/	Andariel distributed malware using a specific asset management program, which installed TigerRAT, NukeSped variants, BlackRAT, and Lilith RAT.	November
Andariel	https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/59130/	Andariel exploited Apache ActiveMQ remote code execution vulnerability(CVE-2023-46604).	November

	https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/59318/		
Kimsuky	수입 신고서를 위장하여 국내 연구 기관을 노리는 Kimsuky	Kimsuky attacked research institutes in the Republic of Korea, distributing malicious JSE files disguised as realistic-looking import declarations, which installed a backdoor that the Kimsuly actors could later use to steal information.	November
DPRK cyberthreat actors, including Lazarus	https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/how-north-korea-is-compromising-supply-chains-df1532b29a49	DPRK cyber actors posed as employers to lure software developers, many linked to the cryptocurrency industry, into installing malware hosted on a GitHub repository through a job interview process.	November
Kimsuky	HWP 문서 내부에 악성 OLE 삽입 공격 FlowerPower APT 캠페인 Github C2 사용	Kimsuky distributed malware disguised as an interview invitation, where the actors attached malicious OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) in a hwp file with the FlowerPower tool.	November
DPRK cyber actors	https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters	DPRK cyber actors pose as employers, utilizing advertisements on job search platforms and potentially email, social media, or chat platforms, to lure software developers into installing malware (hosted on Github) through the interview process, providing the DPRK actors opportunity to steal intellectual property, funds, and/or other information. The investigation also identified two new malware families, BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret.	November
Lazarus Group	https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20231201000614	The Lazarus Group hacked into the computer network of the Republic of Korea judiciary and stole electronic information, including trial records and lawsuit documents, amounting to up to hundreds of gigabytes.	December
Lazarus Group	疑似 Lazarus（APT-Q-1）涉及 npm 包供应链的攻击样本分析	A batch of Lazarus Group downloader samples was recently discovered, which are loaded through multiple layers of nested PE files and ultimately download a payload from a C2 server and execute it. Of note, one of the C2 server IP addresses was used by the Lazarus Group in a software supply chain attack, in which the malware was delivered disguised as an encryption-related npm package. Several of the C2 addresses identified appear to be linked to the cryptocurrency industry.	December
Kimsuky	Kimsuky Group Uses AutoIt to Create Malware (RftRAT, Amadey)	Kimsuky continues to deploy LNK-type malware, installing remote control malware to control the infected system after gaining initial access. Malware used by the Kimsuky group not only include custom-made such as AppleSeed and PebbleDash, but also open-source or commercial malware such as XRat,	December

		HVNC, Amadey, and Metasploit Meterpreter. After gaining control,Kimsuky ultimately uses RDP or installs Google's Chrome Remote Desktop to exfiltrate information from the infected system. Amadey and RftRAT were constantly used throughout 2023 alongside XRat. However, recent types showed that they were created with AutoIt. Infostealers were additionally installed by the Kimsuky group using remote control malware. While remote control-type malware used by Kimsuky has continuously changed, the malware installed through these have not changed much in the attacks in 2023.	
BlueNoroff	bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/	New BlueNoroff malware was identified inside a ZIP archive that contained a PDF file named "Crypto-assets and their risks for financial stability."	December
Kimsuky	https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/60054/	Kimsuky continues to carry out spearphishing attacks in which the actors distribute malware (AppleSeed, developed with the Go languauge) disguised as JavaScript. Kimsuky also conducts C2communication via ChromeDP.	December
Lazarus Group	https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/f5YE12w3x3wad5EO0EB53Q https://blog.phylum.io/crypto-themed-npm-packages-found-delivering-stealthy-malware/	Lazarus Group published multiple malicious packages on a repository for the JavaScript programming language, npm package manager.	December
Kimsuky	북한 시장 물가 분석 문서 등으로 위장된 공격 사례 (genians.co.kr)	Kimsuky continues to attack via malware (OLE) disguised as HWP and HWPX files, which are widely used in the Republic of Korea. Kimsukyalso utilized LNK, DOCX, and XLSX files in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of its attacks.	December
Andariel	https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/12/103_364423.html	Andariel attacked multiple telecommunications companies, research institutions, universities, IT and defense industry and financial companies in the Republic of Korea and stole 1.2TB of information, including sensitive data on surface-to-air laser weapon system.	December

Lazarus	Operation Blacksmith: Lazarus targets organizations worldwide using novel Telegram-based malware written in DLang	The Lazarus Group has employed at least three new DLang-based malware families, including two RATs, one of which uses Telegram bots and channels for C2. The Lazarus Group used these malware families in 2023 to attack global enterprises, such as manufacturing, agricultural and physical security companies, continuing to target infrastructure through n-day exploits such as Log4j on publicly facing VMWare Horizon servers.	December

Source: Cybersecurity companies' reports, Member States, and media reports

*The Panel would like to note that this is not an exhaustive list of cases, but rather cases of interest.

Annex 59.1: Additional information on Kimsuky

According to a cybersecurity company, the IP address of the Kimsuky server hosting this malware is 144.76.109.61 and the IP address of another, related server hosting the Kimsuky-controlled domain civilarys[.]store is 27.255.81.77. Kimsuky-related email accounts associated with this campaign include luckgpu[@]gmail.com and abdulsamee7561[@]gmail.com. The malicious applications were likely distributed via spearphishing or smishing.

Source : A cyber security company

Annex 60: ROK – UK Joint Cyber Security Advisory (23 November 2023)



DPRK state-linked cyber actors conduct software supply chain attacks

Overview

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) of the United Kingdom (UK) have identified Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) state-linked cyber actors targeting software supply chain products, widely used by government organisations, financial institutions and defence industry companies globally.


The NIS and the NCSC are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to help prevent compromise and raise public awareness. It includes DPRK state-linked cyber actors' tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used in their global supply chain attacks, as well as preventative measures to help avoid such attacks.

Further Details

In recent years, supply chain attacks from DPRK state-linked cyber actors have steadily increased in volume and have become more sophisticated. The malicious actors utilise tactics including zero-day attacks and multiple exploits to attack software supply chain products, used by a number of international organisations.

1





The NIS and the NCSC consider these supply chain attacks to align and considerably assist with the fulfilment of wider DPRK state priorities. This includes revenue generation and espionage, with the theft of advanced technologies across a range of sectors, including but not limited to defence.

Supply chain attacks are a highly effective means of compromising numerous well-protected, high-profile targets. Several elements of the supply chain have proved susceptible to compromise, including software vendors, managed service providers and cloud providers. From here, an actor can indiscriminately target a number of organisations and users, and their attacks can be expanded or shifted to a ransomware attack to demand money or cause a system disruption.

It can be hard to detect these attacks as the actors are using legitimate software and hardware.

With the level of the threat likely to increase, organisations should establish and put in place relevant security measures to safely manage the security of the products and to build resilience to attacks.

Technical Details

For software supply chain attacks, DPRK state-linked cyber actors have used zero-day exploits and newly published vulnerabilities and tools, as well as exploited multiple vulnerabilities in series, to precisely attack a specific target.

Below are recent supply chain attacks conducted by DPRK-based actors, detailing their attack flow and modi operandi.




Attacks on various supply chain products, using zero-day vulnerabilities:

In March 2023, cyber actors used the software vulnerabilities of security authentication and network-linked systems in series to gain unauthorised access to the intranet of a target organisation. It used a software vulnerability of the MagicLine4NX security authentication program for the initial intrusion into an internet-connected computer of the target, and exploited a zero-day vulnerability of the network-linked system to move laterally and gain unauthorised access to information.

The attack flow below shows the procedure of serial complex attacks on two supply chain products:


Figure 1.



Attack Flow:

1. The cyber actors compromised the website of a media outlet, deployed malicious scripts into an article and created a watering hole. The malicious scripts were implemented to work when certain IP ranges were connected.

2. When victims opened the infected article from an internet-connected computer,




which was installed with the vulnerable security authentication software, the vulnerable software executed the malicious code. The victim computer then connected to the command and control (C2), and the attackers used the C2 to achieve remote control over the infected computer.

3. The actors were able to access an internet-side server from an internet-connected PC without permission through a network-linked system vulnerability, and exploit the data synchronisation function of the network-linked system to spread malicious code to the business side server. The actors then compromised the business PC with malicious code to steal information.

4. Malicious code installed on the business PC had two C2 servers, the first of which was the business side server of the network-linked system, which acts as a gateway in the middle, while the second C2 is located on the external internet. This malicious code was able to exfiltrate initial beacon data and download and execute encrypted payloads. The malicious code then attempted to move from the internal server of the network-linked solution to the external server to send the initial beacon to the C2 server, but was blocked by the security policy of the solution. If it hadn't been blocked, large amounts of information stored in the internal network could have been leaked.

See the IoC section for C2 server, MD5 hashes, encryption algorithms, and file certificates. Further detailed information on the security authentication software attack can be found on the English and Korean language blogs by Ahnlab.





Summary and Preventative Measures

The cyber actors initially employed a watering-hole attack to secure target groups, and conducted additional attacks on specific targets. The compromise of one supply chain led to the infection of another supply chain, which was a targeted attack against a specific target. The malicious actors used highly sophisticated modus operandi by exploiting an undisclosed vulnerability of the network-linked system and a legitimate function for intrusion into the intranet.

System owners should check whether a vulnerable version of software is on the list of installed programs, and update the software to the latest version.

MagicLine4NX 1.0.0.1 ~ 1.0.0.26 were vulnerable.

Organisations should make sure they control access to the administrator page of the network-linked system, and identify any unauthorised services or communications.


Further detailed information about how to check the vulnerable version can be found on the ROK NCSC website.

The compromise of 3CX

In March 2023, it was widely reported by both SentinelOne and Sophos that the Desktop App software distributed by 3CX had been compromised and contained malware affecting both macOS and Windows operating systems. This constituted a significant global supply chain attack. The security incident was later confirmed by 3CX.



Figure 2.



In June 2023 the UK NCSC published a malware analysis report on the macOS malware used in the 3CX supply chain attack, named Smooth Operator


Attack Flow Windows version

1. The cyber actors added malicious code to an executable file that shipped within a signed installer for 3CX software.

2. The application was distributed to customers via legitimate channels. It is now known that the cyber actors had compromised the 3CX network and therefore were in a position to compromise the build process of the 3CX software.

3. When the 3CX software was run, the malicious code would sleep in the background for at least 7 days and the 3CX software would continue to run as normal.

4. After the sleep period, the malicious code loaded an encrypted payload which is



appended to a DLL also packaged within the 3CX software.

5. This payload is responsible for downloading a list of actor-controlled C2 domains from a GitHub repository, then reaching out to one of them to download the next stage.

The only observed onward stage was a browser stealer, which would extract and exfiltrate basic victim system data, victim 3CX account information and browser history from the Brave, Chrome, Edge and Firefox browsers.

Further detailed information on the Windows attack can be found in the industry from ESET and Sophos.


Attack Flow macOS version

1. The cyber actors added malicious code to an executable file that shipped within the signed and notarised 3CX application.

2. The application was distributed to customers via legitimate channels. It is now known that the cyber actors had compromised the 3CX network and were therefore in a position to compromise the build process of the 3CX software.

3. When the 3CX software was run, the malicious code slept in the background for between 7 and 20 days, while the 3CX software continued to run as normal.

4. After the sleep period, the malicious code beaconed to an actor-controlled C2 server using a customised obfuscation method. The beacon contained basic victim machine information.



5. The C2 server can deliver further malicious stages to be run by the victim machine, but the only observed additional stage collects 3CX account information from a configuration file on the victim machine and exfiltrates this to an actor-controlled C2 server.

Further detail about the macOS attack can be found in the NCSC malware analysis report

Summary and Preventative Measures


In April 2023 the NCSC published advice on its website regarding the 3CX Desktop App security issue.

The negative impact was limited because the malicious update was quickly detected by endpoint detection and response solutions.

This advisory encourages organisations to follow the advice published by the vendor to uninstall the software if you are running an affected version.

Mitigation

As supply chain attacks can happen at any scale and any point, a wide range of measures should be established. The NIS and the NCSC recommend implementing the mitigations below, relating to the supply chain life cycle, as well as management and technical security measures, to deter supply chain threats.



Management Security Measures

- Raise your organisation's awareness of supply chain cyber security, and promote understanding of the issue.
- Provide training on cyber security on a regular basis to help members of your organisation spot malicious tactics and attacks, and report them.
- Identify threats to your organisation's supply chain. Determine threat priorities, and assess impacts when malicious cyber activity occurs, in order to eliminate the blind spot.
- Check the access point to critical data and identify members and supply entities who have the authority to access to minimise access privileges.

Technical Security Measures

- Make sure you install security updates to maintain the most recent version of software, operating systems and anti-virus, to mitigate threats from known vulnerabilities.
- Adopt two-factor authentication for the administration and operation login policies, to prevent unauthorised logins from unauthorised users. The UK NCSC articles Multi-factor authentication for online services and Device Security Guidance provide relevant advice.
- Monitor network infrastructure so that traffic from supply chain software applications is trusted but any anomalous traffic can be detected.
- Refer to the following articles in order to mitigate security threats posed to the





supply chain.

1. Understand of Supply Chain Attack by the ROK NCSC
2. Assess Supply Chain Cyber Security by the UK NCSC
3. Principles of Supply Chain Security by the UK NCSC
4. Securing the Software Supply Chain: Recommended Practices for Software Bill of Materials Consumption by the US CISA and NSA
5. Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) by the US NIST
6. The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) by the US NTIA


Reporting Incidents

If you suspect your organisation has been compromised:

Organisations in the ROK should contact the National Intelligence Service (NIS) (https://www.nis.go.kr; Contact number 111)

Organisations in the UK should contact the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) via
- Report a Cyber Incident (https://report.ncsc.gov.uk)





Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

Attacks on various supply chain products, using zero-day vulnerabilities


Section	IoC	Note
C2	[C2 URL]/search/sch-result3.asp	HTTPS communicaiton
Decryption key	0x0c2a351837454a2661026f162530361a394e1d143334	ChaCha20 Key1
	0x0102350423062f085c000e02	ChaCha20 Key2
MD5 hashes	316c088874a5dfb8b8c1c4b259329257	Downloader (SamsungDeviceControl.exe)
	33ca34605e8077047e30e764f5182df0	Downloader (SamsungDevicePanel.exe)
Rogue certificate	Samsung SDS Co., Ltd.	Entity
	0139981ad983bf73e9514d2d4237929e	Serial no.
	2022.12.13 ~ 2023.07.20	Start date to expiration date

The compromise of 3CX, macOS version

Section	IoC	Note
C2	https://msstorageazure[.]com/analysis	
	https://officestoragebox[.]com/api/biosync	
	https://visualstudiofactory[.]com/groupcore	
	https://azuredeploystore[.]com/cloud/images	
	https://msstorageboxes[.]com/xbox	
	https://officeaddons[.]com/quality	
	https://sourceslabs[.]com/status	
	https://zacharryblogs[.]com/xmlquery	
	https://pbxcloudeservices[.]com/network	


11





	https://pbxphonenetwork[.]com/phone	
	https://akamaitechcloudservices[.]com/v2/fileapi	
	https://azureonlinestorage[.]com/google/storage	
	https://msedgepackageinfo[.]com/ms-webview	
	https://glcloudservice[.]com/v1/status	
	https://pbxsources[.]com/queue	
	https://sbmsa[.]wiki/blog/_insert	Exfiltration URL
	msstorageazure[.]com	
	officestoragebox[.]com	
	visualstudiofactory[.]com	
	azuredeploystore[.]com	
	msstorageboxes[.]com	
	officeaddons[.]com	
	sourceslabs[.]com	
	zacharryblogs[.]com	
	pbxcloudeservices[.]com	
	pbxphonenetwork[.]com	
	akamaitechcloudservices[.]com	
	azureonlinestorage[.]com	
	msedgepackageinfo[.]com	
	glcloudservice[.]com	
	pbxsources[.]com	
	sbmsa[.]wiki	Exfiltration domain
Malicious Code (MD5)	d5101c3b86d973a848ab7ed79cd11e5a	3CX DMG
	660ea9b8205fbd2da59fefd26ae5115c	3CX dylib, libffmpeg.dylib
	5faf36ca90f6406a78124f538a03387a	Smooth Operator second-stage payload, UpdateAgent






Malicious Code (SHA1)	3dc840d32ce86cebf657b17cef62814646ba8e98	3CX DMG
	769383fc65d1386dd141c960c9970114547da0c2	3CX dylib, libffmpeg.dylib
	9e9a5f8d86356796162cee881c843cde9eaedfb3	Smooth Operator second-stage payload, UpdateAgent
Malicious Code (SHA-256)	e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec	3CX DMG
	a64fa9f1c76457ecc58402142a8728ce34ccba378c17318b3340083eeb7acc67	3CX dylib, libffmpeg.dylib
	6c121f2b2efa6592c2c22b29218157ec9e63f385e7a1d7425857d603ddef8c59	Smooth Operator second-stage payload, UpdateAgent
Etc.	.main_storage	Victim ID and sleep time file
	UpdateAgent	Second-stage payload

13



Source: National Intelligence Service website, 보도자료 상세 | 소식・정보 | NIS 국가정보원

Annex 61: National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea Press Release on DPRK Cyberthreat Actors' Attacking Shipbuilding Companies in the Republic of Korea (August 2023)



국가정보원
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

보도자료
Tel 02-3412-3412
2023. 10. 4

국정원, '북한의 조선업계 대상 해킹 확산' 주의 당부

- 북한, 해군 우력 강화 및 선박공업 발전을 중요 노선으로 제시
- 北 해킹조직의 국내 주요 조선社 대상 '수차례 해킹 시도 정황' 포착
- 업계 대상 '해킹 확산세 경고 · 불분명 이메일 열람 금지' 등 보안 강화 당부

국가정보원은 최근 북한이 해군 군사력 강화를 위해 우리 조선업체를 대상으로 집중적으로 해킹 공격을 벌이고 있다며, 관련 업계에 주의 당부에 나섰다.

국정원은 지난 8~9월간 北 해킹조직이 유수의 조선업체들을 상대로 공격을 시도한 사례를 여러 건 포착했다고 밝혔다.

北 해킹조직이 주로 사용한 해킹 수법은 △IT유지보수업체 PC를 점거, 우회 침투하거나 △내부직원 대상 피싱메일을 유포한 후 악성코드를 설치하는 것이었다.

국정원은 北 해킹조직들이 우리 조선업체를 집중 공격하는 것은 김정은의 중대형 군함 건조 지시 때문으로 판단하고, 앞으로도 北의 공격 추세는 지속될 것으로 내다보면서 주요 조선업체 및 선박 부품 제조업체 등 관련 기업 관계자들의 철저한 보안관리를 당부했다.

국정원은 현재 해당업체에 관련 사실을 통보하고 보안대책을 지원중에 있으며, 예상 공격 타깃인 주요 조선업체에도 자체 보안점검을 요청했다.

홈페이지 www.nis.go.kr 페이스북 www.facebook.com/National.Intelligence.Service

DPRK cyber actors conducted multiple hacking attempts on shipbuilding companies in the Republic of Korea in August and September 2023. The attackers sought access to the companies' systems by compromising IT maintenance suppliers and/or through spearphishing.


The NIS assessed that Kim Jong Un's order to build medium-to-large military ships was behind such an intensive campaign, warning that the cyberattacks could continue.

세부적으로 ①업무망·인터넷망 분리 ②유지보수업체·고객사간 원격 접속용 프로그램 문제점 점검 ③불분명한 이메일·웹사이트 열람 금지 등을 제시하고, 국가사이버안보센터(NCSC) 홈페이지에 게재된 예방법을 참고할 것을 덧붙였다.



Source: https://www.nis.go.kr/CM/1_4/view.do?seq=250

Annex 62[230]: Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency of the Republic of Korea Press Release on Andariel's cyberhacking campaign in December 2023



목록

北 해킹조직'안다리엘'평양發 해킹공격으로 방산기술 탈취, 북한으로 랜섬웨어 수익금 송금

- 대공무기 등 방산기술 관련 250여 개 파일 해킹당했으나, 피해조차 인지하지 못해 -
- FBI와 공조해, 해커의 교묘한 추적회피망을 뚫고 北 해킹조직 안다리엘 소행임을 규명 -
- 랜섬웨어를 볼모로 한 범죄수익금 추적결과, 자금세탁 후 북한으로 유입 정황 포착 -

□ 서울경찰청 안보수사지원과(첩단안보수사계)는,

○ 美 FBI와 공조해, 북한 해킹조직 '안다리엘'이 국내 방산업체 등을 해킹해 대공무기 등 중요 기술자료를 탈취하고, 랜섬웨어 대가로 받은 비트코인을 외국인 여성 A씨의 계좌를 통해 자금세탁 후, 북한으로 송금한 정황까지 포착해 이에 대한 전방위적 수사를 진행하고 있다.

○ 경찰은 '안다리엘'이 거점으로 사용한 국내 서버 및 가상자산거래소 압수수색, 자금이 흘러 들어간 외국인 여성 A씨 주거지 압수수색 및 휴대폰·노트북 디지털 포렌식 등 수십여 회 강제수사를 통해 더욱 치밀해진 北 해킹조직의 범죄수법을 밝혀내기 위해 다각적인 수사를 해왔다.

○ 또한 국내·외 랜섬웨어 피해업체 세 곳에 대해서는 컴퓨터 시스템 복구 대가로 4억 7천여만 원 상당의 비트코인을 강취했는데, 그 중 일부는 해외 가상자산 거래소를 거쳐 자금세탁 후, 북에 보내진 것으로 추정돼 자금세탁에 관여한 것으로 의심되는 외국인 여성 A씨에 대해 수사를 확대해 나가고 있다.

□ 사건의 특징 및 시사점

1. 해킹 IP주소는 '조선민주주의인민공화국 평양 류경동'

- 北 해킹조직 안다리엘을 추적 중이던 美 FBI와 공조해, 해커가 사용한 구글 메일 계정을 수사한 결과, 신원이 명확하지 않은 가입자에게도 서버를 임대해 주는 국내 서버임대업체를 이용해, 수사기관의 추적을 피하고자 이를 경유지 서버로 삼아 해킹의 거점으로 활용하고 '22. 12월부터 '23. 3월까지 평양 류경동에서 총 83회 접속한 사실을 밝혀냈다.

* <류경동> 북한 최고층 건물인 류경호텔과 류경정주영체육관 등이 위치해 평양 시내 명소로 꼽히는 지역으로 국제통신국과 평양정보센터 등이 자리하고 있음

2. 기업이 숨을 쉬는데도, 보안사각에 노출된 피해업체는 해킹사실조차 인지치 못해


- 해킹 경유지로 사용된 국내 임대서버와 구글 등 국내·외 이메일(서버 사용자 계정)을 압수수색하고, 서버 가입자 정보를 근거로 40여 회에 걸친 통신수사 결과, 방산업체, 연구소, 제약업체 등을 해킹해 OO대공무기 등 중요 기술자료 뿐만 아니라, 임대서버 사용자 계정의 아이디·비밀번호 등도 탈취한 것을 확인했다.

- 경찰은 중요한 기술과 자료가 담긴 것으로 추정되는 총 1.2TB 분량의 파일이 탈취된 피해사실을 밝혀내어, 해당 업체들에게 통보했으나 피해조차 인지하지 못한 곳이 있었으며, 일부는 기업 신뢰도 하락을 우려해 경찰에 피해 신고를 하지 않은 경우도 있었다.

SMPA, in coordination with FBI, found that Andariel used loosely-monitored leased servers in the Republic of Korea and accessed multiple websites of ROK companies and institutions 83 times from Pyongyang's Ryugyung-dong district from December 2022 to March 2023.

According to the investigations on the leased servers and email accounts, as well as telecommunications, the cyber actors attacked the defense industry, research institutions, and pharmaceutical companies to steal sensitive information, including anti-air weapons information and personal account information.

[230] One member of the Panel is of the view that the information in this annex should be further corroborated.



3. 랜섬웨어** 몸값으로 받은 비트코인 범죄수익금의 자금세탁 경로 규명

- 또한, 안다리엘이 유포한 악성 랜섬웨어의 몸값으로 피해업체가 지불한 비트코인의 자금 흐름에 대해서도 탑벳, 바이낸스 등 국내·외 거래소 거래내역을 압수해 분석한 결과,

- 강취된 비트코인 중 일부가 외국인 여성 A씨***의 계좌를 거쳐 중국 요녕성에 소재한 중국K은행으로 약 63만 위안(1억 천만 원 상당)이 송금됐고, 이 돈이 북·중 접경지역에 위치한 K은행 지점에서 출금된 것으로 보아 경찰은 해당 자금이 북한으로 흘러 들어간 것으로 추정하고 있다.

- 이에 A씨를 피의자로 입건하고 금융계좌, 휴대폰, 주거지 등에 대해 동시다발적으로 압수수색을 진행해 5만여 건의 파일을 압수, 안다리엘의 자금세탁에 관여했는지 여부에 대해 심층 조사 중에 있다.

** <랜섬웨어> 컴퓨터 시스템을 감염시킨 후, 이를 원점로 삼아 '접근권한을 다시 얻고 싶으면 암호화 폐해 등 몸값을 내놓으라'고 협박하는 것

*** <A씨 진술> 과거 중국 소재 원천업체 직원으로 근무시, 본의상 본인계좌를 거래에 제공해준 것일 뿐이라며 연루 여부 등 범행을 부인하고 있음

□ 피해 예방 조치 및 향후 계획

○ 서울경찰청 안보수사지원과는 이번 사건에서 확인된 해외 공격·피해지, 관련자에 대해 美 FBI 등 관계기관과 적극적으로 공조수사를 진행하는 한편, 추가 피해 사례 및 유사 해킹 시도 가능성에 대해서도 계속 수사할 계획이다.

○ 이와 병행해, 피해업체를 대상으로 보안 취약점 점검 및 최신 버전의 보안 소프트웨어 업데이트, 개인정보를 포함한 중요 전산 자료 암호화 등 추가 피해 예방을 위한 보안 조치를 강조하는 한편, 국내 서버 임대업체 등을 대상으로 △사용하지 않는 포트 접속 폐쇄 △비밀번호 패턴 변경 등을 보안 권고사항을 설명했다.

○ 아울러, 현재 신원이 명확하지 않은 가입자에게도 서버 임대가 가능해 임대 서버들이 범죄에 활용되고 있는 만큼, 관련 서버 임대업체들에 대해서도 지속적인 수사를 진행할 예정이다.

SMPA analysed the flow of Bitcoin which the compromised companies paid to Andariel after the ransomware attacks. Some of the Bitcoin had been sent to a bank account of a foreign national, from which CNY 630,000 (USD 88,700) was deposited and finally withdrawn at a bank in Liaoning Province, China. SMPA assumes that the withdrawn cash was brought back to the DPRK.

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, 서울경찰청 (smpa.go.kr)

Annex 63: Member States' publication, "Additional Guidance on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Information Technology Workers"



Alert Number: I-101823-PSA

October 18, 2023

Additional Guidance on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Information Technology Workers

The United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are updating previous warnings and guidance to the international community, the private sector, and the public to better understand and guard against the inadvertent recruitment, hiring, and facilitation of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, a.k.a. North Korea) information technology (IT) workers. In 2022, the U.S. and ROK Government issued public advisories to provide detailed information on how DPRK IT workers operate, and identified red flag indicators and due diligence measures to help companies avoid hiring DPRK freelance developers and to help freelance and digital payment platforms identify DPRK IT workers abusing their services.

This update identifies new tradecraft used by DPRK IT workers since the release of the 2022 advisories, including new indicators of potential DPRK IT worker activity and additional due diligence measures the international community, private sector, and public can take to prevent the hiring of DPRK IT workers. The hiring or supporting of DPRK IT workers continues to pose many risks, ranging from theft of intellectual property, data, and funds, to reputational harm and legal consequences, including sanctions under U.S., ROK, and United Nations (UN) authorities.

Additional Red Flag Indicators of Potential DPRK IT Worker Activity:

- Unwillingness or inability to appear on camera, conduct video interviews or video meetings; inconsistencies when they do appear on camera, such as time, location, or appearance.
- Undue concern about requirements of a drug test or in person meetings and having the inability to do so.
- Indications of cheating on coding tests or when answering employment questionnaires and interview questions. These can include excessive pausing, stalling, and eye scanning movements indicating reading, and giving incorrect yet plausible-sounding answers.
- Social media and other online profiles that do not match the hired individual's provided resume, multiple online profiles for the same identity with different pictures, or online profiles with no picture.
- Home address for provision of laptops or other company materials is a freight forwarding address or rapidly changes upon hiring.
- Education on resume is listed as universities in China, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, or other Asian countries with employment almost exclusively in the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Canada.
- Repeated requests for prepayment; anger or aggression when the request is denied.
- Threats to release proprietary source codes if additional payments are not made.
- Account issues at various providers, change of accounts, and requests to use other freelancer companies or different payment methods
- Language preferences are in Korean but the individual claims to be from a non-Korean speaking country or region.

Additional Due Diligence Measures Clients Seeking Freelance Workers Can Consider to Prevent Inadvertent or Unwitting Hiring of DPRK IT Workers:

- If using third party staffing firms or outsourcing companies, request documentation of their background check processes. If this cannot be readily provided by a company, assume it did not conduct the background check and conduct your own.
- If using a staffing company or third-party software developers for IT work, conduct due diligence checks on the individuals the company provides to you for work. Even if you conduct a background on a company, you may not fully understand their background check process.
- Do not accept background check documentation provided by untrusted or unknown authorities. Provide them a release form that allows you to conduct the background check on their behalf instead of having a background check completed by their local authorities.
- Request voided checks or certified documentation from their financial institution with their account information.
- Verify check numbers and routing numbers match an actual bank and do not belong to a money service business. Money service businesses use receiving depository financial institutions (RDFIs), which provide checking and routing information mirroring that of actual banking information.

- Keep records, including recordings of video interviews, of all interactions with potential employees.
- Prevent remote desktop protocol from being used on all company devices and prohibit using remote desktop applications for work.
- Lock down all administrative permissions and install insider threat monitoring software on company devices.
- Require signature delivery for company devices and ensure devices are not mailed to addresses other than designated work locations.
- Require notarized proofs of identity.
- During video verification, require individuals to physically hold driver's licenses, passports, or identification documents up to camera. Consider having them show their location by having the camera directed outside.
- Regularly geo-locate company laptops to verify they match the logins of employees' addresses.
- Require freelancers to shut off commercial VPNs when accessing company networks.
- Use Zero Trust and Need-to-Know policies. Avoid granting access to proprietary information, if possible.
- Use only reputable online freelance platforms that offer robust measures to verify identities and qualifications of freelance workers.
- Avoid recruiting freelance workers directly through online IT competitions and apply reinforced measures to verify their identities.

REPORTING

The FBI urges victims of DPRK IT Workers, or those who suspect they may have been victimized, to report the suspicious activity to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) at ic3.gov.

The ROK government requests suspicious activity be reported to the National Intelligence Service (www.nis.go.kr, 111) and the National Police Agency (ecrm.police.go.kr, 112).

REFERENCE

The original advisory, titled "Guidance on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Information Technology Workers," can be found here.

The original advisory issued by the ROK government can be found in English here and in Korean here.

For additional information from the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, please also see "North Korean Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Revenue Generation," found here.

Source: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2023/PSA231018 and https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=374218&page=1

Annex 64: Summary of recent DPRK IT worker tactics, techniques, and procedures[231]

A Member State reported DPRK IT workers are changing tactics,[232] and now offer to provide free services to build trust, seek long-term contracts, target small companies with fewer hiring requirements, reach out offering their skills to cryptocurrency industry companies and/or community chat rooms via social media instead of using freelance platforms, and increasingly seek lucrative web3, blockchain, smart contracts, and cryptocurrency projects. During their work, IT workers reportedly find vulnerabilities to exploit and/or build vulnerabilities into platforms and smart contracts to steal funds, and are suspected of conducting several smaller cryptocurrency heists this year (see Annexes 89-90). IT workers also reportedly monitor vulnerability reports released on platforms such as Github and/or participate in white hat competitions online to identify cryptocurrency-related vulnerabilities,[233] and then steal funds before vulnerabilities can be patched.

According to one former DPRK IT worker, the workers use local facilitators to consolidate their earnings into bank accounts in the facilitators' names, after which the money is used to purchase items requested by the regime, such as refined petroleum and computers, and sent to the DPRK. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, some IT teams reportedly transferred their cash earnings to the DPRK via diplomatic pouch.

In November234 and December235 2023, cybersecurity companies released detailed reports on DPRK IT workers seeking unauthorized employment with organizations around the world to generate revenue and engage in espionage. To do so, DPRK IT workers maintain resumes with fake identities, impersonating individuals of various jurisdictions, targeting a wide range of companies and freelance job marketplaces (see figure 1). DPRK IT workers develop multiple personas, each with accounts for email, employment websites, messaging platforms, and software development platforms. Certain aspects of online profiles can be up-to-date and have a lengthy activity history, appearing legitimate (see figure 2), although personas may lack social media accounts and details may be inconsistent across platforms (see figure 3). The IT workers have also reportedly "sought to purchase or borrow accounts with a high reputation in account seller marketplaces." 236 A freelance job platform provided the Panel with a list of email addresses associated with DPRK IT workers (see figure 4).

A freelance platform that has been used by DPRK IT workers to obtain jobs reported that DPRK IT workers are aided in establishing accounts by a number of illicit services available on the internet, including websites that generate photo-realistic identity documents, skills certifications, utility bills, and bank statements, some of which are rendered from computer-aided design (CAD) models; platform account resale services; and proxy email and SMS platforms (see figures 5 and 6). DPRK IT workers have reportedly used generative artificial intelligence (AI) to generate profile images[237] and descriptions. According to a Member State, DPRK IT workers are also using ChatGPT to develop answers to coding and other questions during job interviews, potentially among other uses (see para. 145). In 2024, the freelance platform expects to see additional uses of AI, such as real-time high-definition generative AI video avatars, face-swapping applications and full body animation.

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[231] Most DPRK IT workers are subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028). See S/2023/656 paras 133-135, S/2023/171 paras 123 and 132, S/2022/668 para 121, S/2021/211 summary and para 124, S/2020/840 paras 106-111 and 113 and Annex 47, S/2020/131 paras 120-127 and S/2019/691 paras 41-42.

[232] Partly in response to technology companies adopting stricter hiring practices such as requiring a video call or in-person interview for jobs as well as reducing the number of fully-telework positions.

[233] DPRK IT workers also reportedly participate in these competitions to increase the number of their followers, allowing them to win lucrative freelance contracts.

[234] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters/. According to Reuters, a DPRK IT worker who recently defected examined the documents and confirmed their authenticity, noting "we would create 20 to 50 fake profiles a year until we were hired." (https://www.reuters.com/technology/north-koreans-use-fake-names-scripts-land-remote-it-work-cash-2023-11-21/).


[235] https://www.nisos.com/research/dprk-it-worker-scam/.

[236] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters/.

[237] Unlike using a stock photo or stealing photos of a real person from their social media or other accounts (both of which are methods that have been employed by DPRK IT workers), AI-generated photos would not be findable through an image search – and therefore could appear completely legitimate to a company conducting know-your-customer/customer-due-diligence checks.

The freelance platform further that assessed that the overwhelming majority of 'skilled' freelance crypto programmer profiles on the internet are fake, and likely are in actuality DPRK IT workers, given that highly skilled freelance programmers with computer security and crypto experience are extremely rare. The company also suspects that smaller, crypto-specific job marketplaces that have appeared over the past several years may have been established by the DPRK actors directly to solicit crypto-related projects directly from clients without the trouble of trying to establish accounts on the major freelance platforms – or at the very least are "completely overrun" with DPRK IT worker 'mule' accounts.

Figure 1: DPRK IT worker falsified resumes and freelance job platform message





Passionate and skilled Embedded Linux Developer with High Video Streaming Tech offering 8 years of relevant experience and a proven track record of success in achieving extraordinary result. Experienced with all stages of the development cycle of any embedded video related products.
Over 8 years of IT experience in Analysis, design, and Development of various embedded software development.
Capable of excelling as part of a team or individually in a fast-paced environment. Deeply knowledgeable in video codec, media format, streaming protocol, real time system, various
protocol and standard, Android Open Source Project, and IoT.

Richard Lee

Phone:

Skill Highlights

- C/C++, Java, Rust, Go, Python, Shell script
- H.264, H.265, VP8, VP9
- MP4, 3GPP, MKV, AVI
- HLS, MPEG-DASH, RTSP, RTP
- TCP/UDP, HTTP, FTP, SNMP
- PCIe/Ethernet/ModBus/CAN/USB /SPI/I2C/I2S/RS232/UART
- Linux Kernel/Driver/RootFS
- Intel/ARM/MIPS/DSP Architecture
- React & Redux, Node.js, REST API
- Typescrypt/Javascript/React
- Electronic&Analog Circuit
- DevOps, CI/CD

Languages

English – C1

Education


Bachelor of Computer Science
Nanyang Technological University of Singapore
(2009 – 2013)

Experience

Video Engineer on Embedded Android Platform, 12/2019 – 05/2022
Jumio, USA
- Developed MPEG-DASH player using dash.js
- Designed Driver, HAL, Android System Service for use in DVB-T2 player development.
- Developed RTP streaming server with low latency on Embedded Linux of TI DM8169 platform
- Analyzed & Debugged PCR accuracy in MPEG-TS stream
- Developed demodulator and tuner driver to receive DVB-T2
- Developed transcoding module which converts from any codec to H.264 codec using Hardware Accelerator


Embedded Firmware Developer, 08/2017 – 09/2018
Airbyte, USA
- Developed real time AD convert module in STM32F407
- Tested and deployed scalable and highly available OLED interface products.
- Developed motor control system using Python on raspberry-pi board
- Documented software development methodologies in technical manuals to be used by IT personnel in future projects.
- Developed DVB-T2 receive module in DVB-T2 dongle for android.

Embedded Software Developer, 04/2014 – 07/2016
BTHRUST, Singapore
- Participated in IOT (Internet of Things) development, specializing in Smart home security systems.
- Performed high-level coding in various programming languages.
- Developed WebSocket Module in Linux OS of DM8169 processor for Camera Encoder
- Designed Redundancy System for Live Streaming Encoder.
- Developed PCIe driver in Linux system for Stream Multiplexer



Source: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters/ and https://twitter.com/pearswick/status/1726940740079739370?s=20


Figure 2: DPRK IT worker source code repository profile




Source: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters/

Figure 3: Example of DPRK IT workers' multiple personas









Source: https://www.nisos.com/research/dprk-it-worker-scam/


Figure 4: Email addresses reportedly associated with DPRK IT workers (redacted addresses are mostly gmail, Hotmail)

clark194637285@[redacted].com
fashioncstar@[redacted].com
hallecharlotte0113@[redacted].com
jsh.tiger919@[redacted].com
green.0819@[redacted].com
puma20001027@[redacted].com
luck-man0601@[redacted].com
svetlanaye85@[redacted].com
clark0613@[redacted].com
minorru.k.cg@[redacted].com
ruri528002@[redacted].com
fantastic.nero1113@[redacted].com
haranoda0714@[redacted].com
anacondadev0120@[redacted].com
topdev84210@[redacted].com
james0804180@[redacted].win
wenjie.yin970@[redacted].com
alkaasatrian79@[redacted].com
andrey0817@[redacted].com
alosya0602@[redacted].com
alexvidal.lancer@[redacted].com
webprodev003@[redacted].com
wencheng.yin533@[redacted].com
wenjie.yin89@[redacted].com
wencheng.yin@[redacted].co.jp
jinhe920129@[redacted].com
nozawa_dev0817@[redacted].com
btsm0714@[redacted].com
fullstack.sunshine@[redacted].com
ec.export5113@[redacted].com
littlemermaid0309@[redacted].com
f.ullstacksunshine@[redacted].com

Note: email addresses include the Gmail, Hotmail, Dispomail, Outlook and Syri services.


Source: Information provided to the Panel.

Figure 5: Falsified KYC/CDD photo



Source: Information provided to the Panel

Figure 6: CAD-rendered falsified utility bills



Source: Information provided to the Panel.

Annex 65[238] : Table of restaurants in China which are suspected of employing DPRK workers

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
1	Beijing	평양은반관	朝鲜平壤银畔烤肉	朝阳区神路街 39 号		1) The Panel received information that this restaurant had North Korean staff, still operating as of October 2023. 2) Reviews, April 2023	April 2023
2	Beijing	옥류관	玉流馆	朝阳区望京湖光中街 8 号		1) The Panel received information that this restaurant had North Korean staff, confirmed in October 2023 they are operating 2) Reviews, June 2023	June 2023
3	Beijing	대동강회관 (대동강식당)	大同江朝鲜料理	朝阳区元大都城垣遗址公园 6 号地 01 号	北京大东江畔餐饮管理有限公司 Beijing Dadongjiangpan Catering Management Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 911101055923335533 Incorporated 2012-03-26 Legal representative: 李锋浩 (Li Fenghao) Shareholder: 617 贸易会社 (617 Trading Company, probably DPRK company)	Reviews, January 2022	January 2022

[238] One member of the Panel is of the view that the information in this annex should be further corroborated and disagrees with the allegation of these restaurants employing DPRK workers.

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
4	Beijing	금강산	金剛山黑牛自助烤肉	西大望路 15 號外企大廈 C 座 3F		Reviews, October 2021	January 2020
5	Beijing	평양능라도	萬珍樓大飯店	北京房山区　万珍楼大飯店（良响鎮西潞南大街 12 号）			*None identified*
6	Beijing	류경해당화 (평양해당화)	柳京海棠花 (平壤海棠花)	朝阳区日坛东路甲一号			June 2023
7	Beijing	평양민들레식당	平壤民达来餐厅	朝阳区霄云路 21 号-平壤民达来		According to a Member State, this restaurant employs about 15 DPRK laborers.	June 2023
8	Shanghai	평양고려관	平壤高丽馆	上海市浦東新区松林路 357 号(通茂大酒店 1 楼)		According to a Member State, this restaurant employs about 80 DPRK laborers.	July 2023
9	Shanghai	모란봉 음악식당	牡兰峰音乐餐吧	上海市闵行区紫藤路 225 号二楼		According to a Member State, this restaurant employs about 10 DPRK laborers.	July 2023
10	Shanghai	탕랜드 (118 점/창칭점/바오산점)	湯連得温泉館	(118 店)伯士路 57 号 (長清店)上海市長清路 1200 弄森宏購物廣場 1 樓		According to a Member State, this restaurant employs about 90 DPRK laborers.	*None identified*

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
11	Shanghai	단골집 조개구이	贝臻屋海鲜碳烤&烤活鳗	(紫藤路店) 上海市闵行区紫藤路 168 弄 9 号		According to a Member State, this restaurant employs about 10 DPRK laborers.	*None identified*
12	Shanghai	상인생활수세게	上引＋	上海市静安区中华新路 396 号		According to a Member State, this restaurant employs about 50 DPRK laborers.	August 2023
13	Shanghai	상인생활수세게	上引生活水世界	(徐汇江潮水汇店) 上海市龙瑞路 28 号			*None identified*
14	Shanghai	양광록주생태주점 뷔페식당	阳光绿洲生态酒店	上海松江区通波路 50 号建设花园			*None identified*
15	Wuxi	강뚝꼬치구이전문점	河坝烧烤串城	(新区金轮星光名座总店) 江苏省前卫路 3 号金轮星光名座生活广场 A 区 2 楼		Reviews, September 2020	October 2022
16	Dalian	흥빈루은별식당	鸿賓樓	大連 开发区 9 号	大连鸿宾楼酒店有限公司 Da Lian Hong Bin Lou Jiu Dian You Xian Gong Si China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210213MACB1URLXB Registered 2001-05-25 Legal representative: 高舒 (Gao Shu)	Reviews, April 2018	March 2019

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
17	Dalian	류경식당	柳京飯店 1 部	大連市 經濟技術開發區 濱海旅遊路 49 号		Reviews, November 2022	November 2022
18	Shenyang	달맞이식당	月见草大酒店	哈尔滨路 21 号	沈阳月见草餐饮有限公司 Shenyang Evening Primrose Catering Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210100MA0TQPLFXB Incorporated 2016-12-26 Legal representative: 崔成元 (Choi Seong Won)		July 2022
19	Shenyang	평양관	平壤館	西塔街 106 号		1) The Panel received information that this restaurant had North Korean waitress as of October 2023. 2) Reviews, July 2023	July 2023
20	Shenyang	능라도 (1 부)	平壤绫罗岛餐厅	安图街号西塔兰桂坊 1 层			November 2017
21	Shenyang	평양동묘향산식당	平壤東妙香山餐厅	图们路 24-1 号 8 门			*None identified*
22	Shenyang	금평양관	金平壤饭店	兴工北街 43 号 2 门			*None identified*

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
23	Shenyang	모란관	牡丹馆	西塔街 93 号	沈阳牡丹馆餐饮有限公司 Shenyang Peony Pavilion Catering Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210100720932244N Registered 2001-06-18 Legal representative: 尹钟玉 (Yin Zhongyu) Shareholder: 朝鲜 813 贸易会社 (813 TRADING CORP.)	The Panel received information that this restaurant was operating and waitress are from DPRK as of October 2023.	August 2022
24	Shenyang	회령관 (남호춘색)	南湖春色	中兴街 38-1 号	沈阳南湖春色海鲜食府有限公司 Shenyang Nanhu Chunse Seafood Restaurant Co., Ltd. China Registration Number - 210102000061066 Registered 2010-06-01 Legal representative: 王殿军 (Wang Dianjun)		March 2019
25	Shenyang	몽금포식당	梦金浦	安图街 3 号			March 2029
26	Shenyang	아리랑화랑	阿里郎画廊珈琲	珲春路 10 号 19 间号		Reviews, November 2022	November 2022
27	Shenyang	복의식당	福义肥牛	黄河南大街 65 号	沈阳市皇姑区福义肥牛火锅城 Fuyi Fatiu Hot Pot City, Fuyi District, Huanggu District, Shenyang City China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210105MA0P4X8G3Q Registered 2016-07-06 Legal representative: 王艳萍 (Wang Yanping)	Reviews, April 2017	July 2021

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
28	Shenyang	신안동어항	新安渔东港	新隆街 18 号			October 2022
29	Shenyang	*	瑞成东万饭店	经济技术开发区沈新路 75 号			*None identified*
30	Shenyang	*	博雅轩食府	陵东街 109-4 号 1 门		Reviews, October 2021	*None identified*
31	Shenyang	*	春珲辽菜楼	白龙江街 60-3 号			August 2022
32	Shenyang	해물료리	鲜码头	金沙江街 16 号 1-7			August 2022
33	Shenyang	*	京品北京味道	黄河南大街 93 号 10 门			February 2023
34	Shenyang	*	芭黎參园	长白二街 182 号			*None identified*
35	Dandong	능라도	绫罗岛	滨江中路 128-2 号	丹东绫罗岛餐饮服务有限公司 Dan Dong Ling Luo Dao Can Yin Fu Wu You Xian Gong Si China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210600072152214F Registered 2013-06-27	Reviews, August 2017	March 2018
36	Dandong	대보산	大宝山	锦江街凤仙花酒店		Reviews, October 2019	March 2018

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
37	Dandong	류경식당	柳京酒店	滨江中路佳地广场 1-2 楼 辽宁省丹东市振兴区滨江中路 64 号佳地广场 A 座 1~2 楼(近中联酒店)	辽宁鸿宝实业发展有限公司柳京酒店 Liaoning Hongbao Industry Development Co Ltd Liujing Restaurant (Liaoning Hongbao Industrial Development Co., Ltd. Liujing Hotel) China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210600689659226P Registered 2009-06-01 Legal representative: 曲强 (Qu Qiang) liujingjiudian1234@163.com The management of the restaurant was related to KOREA NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (KPe.048).	The Panel received information that this restaurant had North Korean staff and is a China-DPRK joint venture as of mid-September 2023.	March 2018
38	Dandong	평양고려식당	丹东高丽饭店	滨江中路开发区 A 区 4 号楼 101 室	丹东市沿江高丽餐饮服务有限公司 Dandong Yanjiang Gaoli Catering Service Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210600696167529X Registered 2009-11-05 Legal representative: 贾洪生 (Jia Hongsheng) 1960958113@qq.com	Reviews, October 2021	March 2018

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
39	Dandong	단동고려식당	平壤高丽饭店	七街八纬白山小区单元 1-2 号	丹东高句丽餐饮服务有限公司 Dandong Koguryo Catering Service Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210603781605378A Registered 2005-10-27 Legal representative: 朴大勇 (Park Dayong)		November 2023
40	Dandong	고려향	高丽香	振兴区沿江开发区 D 区 35 号楼 7 幢 104 号		Reviews, September 2018	October 2019
41	Dandong	송도원	平壤松涛园酒店	振兴开发区 B 区 15 号楼 108 室(丹东市振兴区锦江街 b 区 15 号楼 108 室)	丹东松涛园餐饮服务有限公司 Dandong Songtaoyuan Catering Service Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210600734206032C Registered 2002-05-28 Legal representative: 裴金千 (Pei Jinqian) Joint Venture with Korea Victory Trading Co., Ltd. (朝鲜胜战贸易会社)	Reviews, April 2021	September 2023

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
42	Dandong	칠보산	七宝山饭店七宝山饭店	振兴区三经街 11-5 号	丹东七宝山餐饮管理有限公司 Dan Dong Qi Bao Shan Can Yin Guan Li You Xian Gong Si China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210603MA0QF8PY13 Registered 2016-08-11 Shareholder: 于凤珍 (Yu Fengzhen)		*None identified*
43	Dandong	해맞이	一兰	滨江中路 159 号 4 单元 107 室	丹东嘉苑小厨餐饮服务有限公司 Dandong Jiayuan Small Kitchen Catering Service Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210600MA0P5RJ017 Incorporated 2016-11-08 Director: 姜晓龙 (Jiang Xiaolong)		*None identified*
44	Dandong	아리랑식당	阿里郎海鲜酒店	沿江路改造小区 2 号楼 102 号		Reviews, October 2017	March 2018
45	Dandong	신안동각	新安东阁海鲜酒楼	锦江街 98 号	丹东新安东阁餐饮有限公司 Dandong Xin'an Dongge Catering Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91210600683744454H Registered 2009-03-12 Director: 单玉花 (Dan Yuhua)		*None identified*
46	Dandong	안동수산식당	安东水产海鲜餐厅	沿江开发区滨江中路新太阳島洗欲 1 层			March 2018

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
47	Dandong	호양해산	豪阳海鲜酒楼	大东区佳地花园 631 图 58 号	东港市豪阳酒店 Dong Gang Shi Hao Yang Jiu Dian China Registration Number - 210681600466325 Incorporated 2012-03-26 Legal representative: 董惠凤 (Dong Huifeng)		*None identified*
48	Yanji	매화개장집	梅花狗肉馆	光明街 47-1 号			October 2018
49	Yanji	우의식당	友谊饭店	鑫田大厦 1 楼			October 2018
50	Yanji	연향꼬치집	延香考串	局子街 2549 号 (菊花公寓一楼门市)		Reviews, September 2019	August 2023
51	Yanji	류경식당	延吉柳京饭店	延吉市新兴小学斜对面	延吉柳京饭店有限公司 Yanji Liujing Hotel Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91222401605274143K Registered 1994-06-02 Legal representative: 权阳成 (Quan Yangcheng)	Reviews, August 2020	October 2018
52	Yanji	한성식당	韩城宾馆	局子街 726-4-1 号 4001	延吉市韩城餐饮有限公司韩城饭店 Yanji City Hancheng Catering Co., Ltd. Hancheng Hotel China Uniform Social Credit Code - 91222401MA15832083 Registered 2018-05-09 Legal representative: 韩杰 (Han Jie) hch2506611@163.com		October 2018
53	Yanji	해란강돌솥밥	海兰江石锅饭	参花街水上市场 164-6 号		Reviews, July 2023	November 2021
54	Changchun	한장	韩庄朝鲜料理(旗舰店)	吉林大路 1211 号 1-3 号		Reviews, October 2018	June 2020

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
55	Changchun	한장	韩庄朝鲜料理(高新店)	高新区安联国际大厦 A 座		Reviews, February 2023	July 2022
56	Changchun	한장	韩庄朝鲜料理(净月店)	南关区新城大街与天富路交汇处巴蜀映巷底商门市房		Reviews, January 2022	April 2019
57	Changchun	한장	韩庄朝鲜料理(文化广场店)	西民主大街 1115 号			March 2019
58	Changchun	진흥조선관	真红朝鲜馆	佳园路超达创业园 14 栋 108-109 室		Reviews, January 2019	January 2019
59	Changchun	남양촌	南阳村演艺餐厅	经开区新城大街耶鲁印象一楼			*None identified*
60	Changchun	인풍각 1 호점	仁风阁(西朝阳路店)	西朝阳路 221 号	长春市仁风阁餐饮有限公司 Changchun Renfengge Catering Co., Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 912201017561597402 Registered 2004-03-12 Director: 党铁仁 (Dang Tieren) 985035100@qq.com Jonit venture with DPRK company (朝鲜慈江道仁风会社)	Reviews, March 2023	March 2019
61	Changchun	인풍각 2 호점	仁风阁(卫星广场店)	人民大街 8668 号		Reviews, April 2023	June 2020

No.	Location	Name (Korean)	Name (Local)	Address	Corporate registry information	Additional information	Date of available social media image(s)
62	Jian	묘향산식당	妙香山	集安市锦江路 99 号长城花园	集安市妙香山进出口贸易有限公司 Ji'an City Miaoxiangshan Import&Export Co.,Ltd. China Uniform Social Credit Code - 912205825846024267 Registered 2011-10-26 Legal representative: 邹德强 (Zou Deqiang)	Reviews, July 2018	June 2018
63	Tumen	아리랑식당	阿里郎饭店	友谊街 1307 号			*None identified*
64	Hunchun	훈춘묘향식당	妙香山鲜肉烤肉串城	河南街道森林山大路水岸明珠 16 号 301 室			May 2020
65	Hunchun	평양두만강불고기	豆满江烧烤	珲春市金都苑 2 号楼		Reviews, February 2022	*None identified*

Note: "*" indicates that the Panel was unable to identify a Korean name

Source: Member State, media and the Panel.

Annex 66[239]: Additional information on restaurants in China which are suspected of employing DPRK workers ***(****note: numbering is consistent with the table in Annex 65)*

This Annex includes social media images of some of the 65 restaurants employing DPRK workers. The Panel is not able to independently corroborate whether these restaurants hired DPRK nationals, however, some images and social media reviews suggested employment of DPRK nationals. The Panel's analysis of corporate registry records showed that four restaurant management companies received investments from DPRK companies up to at least 2017.

■ 2. 玉流馆 (옥류관)



Source: Naver, annotated by the Panel.

[239] One member of the Panel is of the view that the information in this Annex should be further corroborated and disagrees with the allegation of these restaurants employing DPRK workers.

3. 大同江朝鮮料理 (대동강회관 (대동강식당))



Source: YouTube, annotated by the Panel.

■ 4. 金剛山黑牛自助烤肉 (금강산)



Source: Trip.com, annotated by the Panel.

■ 6. 柳京海棠花 (平壤海棠花) (류경해당화 , 평양해당화)

- South Korean media reported that the restaurant was operating as of late-June 2023.[240]
- According to the report, this restaurant recently removed the restaurant's name in Korean language '류경해당화 (Ryugyeong Haedanghwa)' from its sign (below right). The photo (below left) was taken right after the restaurant opened has both Korean and Chinese language sign.



Source: 연합뉴스 (Yohnap News Agency), 22 June 2023, annotated by the Panel.


[240] See https://jp.yna.co.kr/view/AJP20230622001500882.

■ 7. 平壤民达来餐厅 (평양민들레식당)



Source: 西瓜视频, video was uploaded on 19 June 2023; annotated by the Panel.

■ 8. 平壤高丽馆 (평양고려관)



Source: YouTube, video was uploaded on 30 July 2023; annotated by the Panel.

■ 9. 牡兰峰音乐餐吧 (모란봉 음악식당)



Source: 携程旅行, video was uploaded on 19 July 2023; annotated by the Panel.

■ 15. 河坝烧烤串城(新区金轮星光名座总店) (강뚝꼬치구이전문점)



Source: Baidu, uploaded October 2022, annotated by the Panel.



Source: 微博, reviews were uploaded on 7 September 2020; annotated by the Panel.

■ 17. 柳京飯店 1 部 (류경식당)



Source: Baidu, uploaded 25 November 2022; annotated by the Panel.

■ 18. 月见草大酒店 (달맞이식당)



Source: Baidu, top photo was uploaded in May 2020 and bottom photo was uploaded in July 2022; annotated by the Panel.




Source: National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, annotated by the Panel.

■ 19. 平壤館 (평양관)



Source: Baidu, top photo was uploaded in October 2017 and bottom photo was uploaded in July 2021; annotated by the Panel.

- Information provided to the Panel that the restaurant was operating in October 2023 and waitresses are from DPRK.
- There have been several reviews and photos since 2017 (last review was uploaded in 2023) that DPRK nationals have been working and DPRK-origin alcoholic drinks have been served in the restaurant.




Source: 携程旅行; annotated by the Panel.

■ 23. 牡丹馆 (모란관)

- Information provided to the Panel that the restaurant was operating in October 2023 and waitresses are from DPRK.
- There have been several reviews and photos since 2014 (the last review was uploaded in 2019) that DPRK nationals have been working in the restaurant.



Source: Baidu, photo was uploaded in August 2022.



Source: 携程旅行, annotated by the Panel.

- According to the Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal (外商投资综合管理公众端), DPRK company 朝鲜 813 贸易会社 (813 TRADING CORP.) has invested in the restaurant.



Source: Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal, annotated by the Panel.

■ 26. 阿里郎画廊珈琲 (아리랑화랑)



Source: 小红书, annotated by the Panel.

■ 37. 柳京酒店 (류경식당)

- Information obtained by the Panel showed that the restaurant had staff from DPRK as of mid-September 2023 and this restaurant is a China-DPRK joint venture.
- According to the Chinese corporate registry, the management company of this restaurant is linked to 朝鲜民族保险总会社 (Korea National Insurance Corporation, KPe.048).
- The registry also indicates that the restaurant has been inviting chefs from the DPRK and displays paintings of Mansudae Art Studio (aka Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies, KPe.050), which may be a violation of paragraph 3 of resolution 2371 (2017).



Source: Baidu, photo was uploaded in March 2018, annotated by the Panel.

Information about the possible link between 柳京酒店 and Korea National Insurance Corporation (KPe.048)

- According to Chinese corporate registry data, **Ma Xiaohong (马晓红)** was a senior manager (a category comprising directors, supervisors, managers, etc.) of the company **Liaoning Hongbao Industrial Development Co., Ltd. Liujing Hotel** (辽宁鸿宝实业发展有限公司柳京酒店, China Uniform Social Credit Code 91210600689659226P). Liaoning Hongbao Industrial Development Co., Ltd. Liujing Hotel manages the restaurant 柳京酒店.

  This individual is likely the same Ma Xiaohong, who was designated by OFAC in 2016 for acting for or on behalf of Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KPe.025).



Source: 企查猫, annotated by the Panel.

- Chinese corporate registry data shows that Ma Xiaohong is also a legal representative of **Liaoning Hongbao Industry Development Co Ltd (辽宁鸿宝实业发展有限公司**, China Uniform Social Credit Code 91210600686640300D), as of November 2023. Both **Liaoning Hongbao Industry Development Co Ltd** and the abovementioned **Liaoning Hongbao Industrial Development Co., Ltd. Liujing Hotel** share the same address (**丹东市滨江路 64 号佳地广场**) and email address (liujingjiudian1234@163.com).


- Chinese registry documentation shows that Korea National Insurance Corporation (KPe.048) is one shareholder of Liaoning Hongbao Industry Development Co Ltd . This is probably the same company as **Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co Ltd (丹东鸿祥实业发展有限公司,** China Uniform Social Credit Code 91210600716432730M), which was also designated by OFAC along with Ma Xiaohong in 2016.

Figure 1



Source: Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal, annotated by the Panel.


Figure 2



Source: Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal, annotated by the Panel.


- The registry also shows that the restaurant has been inviting chefs from the DPRK and displays of paintings of Mansudae Art Studio (aka Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies, KPe.050).

Figure 3



Source: 企查猫, annotated by the Panel.

38. 丹东高丽饭店(평양고려식당)



Source: Baidu, annotated by the Panel.



Source: 携程旅行, uploaded on 30 November 2019, annotated by the Panel.



Source: National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, annotated by the Panel.

■ 41.平壤松涛酒店 (송도원)



Source: Baidu, photo was uploaded in March 2018, annotated by the Panel.



Source: Baidu, annotate by the Panel.

According to Dandong City Culture, Tourism, and Radio & Television Bureau (丹东市文化旅游和广播电视局) the restaurant appears to be renovated.





Source: Dandong City Culture, Tourism, and Radio & Television Bureau, uploaded on 21 September 2023, annotated by the Panel.

- According to Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal (外商投资综合管理公众端), DPRK company Korea Victory Trading Co., Ltd (朝鲜胜战贸易会社) is an investor in the restaurant.



Source: Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal, annotated by the Panel.

■ 51. 延吉柳京饭店 (류경식당)



Source: Baidu, Photo was uploaded in October 2018.

Source: Baidu, annotated by the Panel.


■ 53. 海兰江石锅饭 (해란강돌솥밥)



Source: 携程旅行, photo was uploaded on 29 November 2021, annotated by the Panel.

Source: 大众点评, annotated by the Panel.

■ 55. 韩庄朝鲜料理(高新店) (한장)



Source: Baidu, annotated by the Panel.


■ 56. 韩庄朝鲜料理(浄月店) (한장)



Source: Baidu, photo was uploaded in April 2019.

Source: Baidu, annotated by the Panel.

■ 58. 真红朝鲜馆 (진홍조선관)



Source: Baidu (top), 携程旅行 (bottom), annotated by the Panel.

■ 60. 仁风阁(西朝阳路店) (인풍각 1 호점)



Source: Baidu, annotated by the Panel.

- According to Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal , DPRK company CO.TRADING INPUNG.D.P.R.K (朝鲜仁风会社) is an investor in the restaurant.



中华人民共和国商务部
业务系统统一平台

外商投资综合管理 公众端

长春市仁风阁餐饮有限公司

一、外商投资企业基本信息

企业名称	长春市仁风阁餐饮有限公司
统一社会信用代码/组织机构代码	912201017561597402
成立日期	2004年3月9日
投资行业	正餐服务
经营范围	餐饮服务、会议服务、餐饮管理。
注册资本	100万元人民币
法定代表人	党铁仁

二、外商投资企业投资者基本信息

投资者名称	国别（地区）	出资金额
四平市高句丽餐饮有限公司	中国	75万元人民币
朝鲜仁风会社	朝鲜	25万元人民币

三、外商投资企业年报信息

序号	报送年度	详情
1	2017年度报告	查看
2	2016年度报告	查看
3	2015年度报告	查看
4	2014年度报告	查看
5	2013年度报告	查看
6	2012年度报告	查看

四、变更信息

序号	变更事项	变更前内容	变更后内容	变更日期
暂无变更信息数据				

二、外商投资企业投资者基本信息

投资者名称	国别（地区）	出资金额
四平市高句丽餐饮有限公司	中国	75万元人民币
朝鲜仁风会社	朝鲜	25万元人民币

Investor name
CO.TRADING INPUNG.D.P.R.K

Country (region)
DPRK

Amount of contribution
250,000 yuan

Source: Comprehensive Foreign Investment Management Public Portal, annotated by the Panel.

■ 61. 仁风阁(卫星广场店) (인풍각 2 호점)



Source: Baidu (top), 携程旅行 (bottom), annotated by the Panel.

- 62. 妙香山 (묘향산식당)



Source: Baidu, annotated by the Panel.



Source: National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, annotated by the Panel.

- 65. 豆满江烧烤 (평양두만강불고기)




Source: Baidu, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 67: Laotian Corporate Registry Records


Based on Laotian corporate registry documents, Sindat BBQ Korean Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd, Sindat BBQ Korean Restaurant 2, and Paektu Hanna Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd were registered by the same individual, Ms. Bountheung Vongpanya (Ms ບຸນເຖິງ ວົງປັນຍາ). The Panel notes that the registered addresses of the recently-incorporated 1) Sindat BBQ Korean Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd and the closed 2) Korea Pyngyang Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd appear to be the same, indicating that Korea Pyngyang Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd may have simply had its name and ownership information changed and continues to operate to the benefit of DPRK nationals.

1) Sindat BBQ Korean Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd (Vientiane)




Source: Laos National Enterprise Database, http://www.ned.moic.gov.la/index.php/en/explore-data-en/search, annotated by the Panel.

2) Korea Pyngyang Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd (Vientiane)




Source: Laos National Enterprise Database, http://www.ned.moic.gov.la/index.php/en/explore-data-en/search, annotated by the Panel.

3) Sindat BBQ Korean Restaurant 2 (Vang Vieng)



Source: Laos National Enterprise Database, http://www.ned.moic.gov.la/index.php/en/explore-data-en/search, annotated by the Panel.

4) Paektu Hanna Restaurant Sole Co., Ltd (Vientiane)



Source: Laos National Enterprise Database, http://www.ned.moic.gov.la/index.php/en/explore-data-en/search, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 68: Additional source information on suspected DPRK Restaurants

1) Sindat BBQ Restaurant (formerly the That Luang Pyongyang Restaurant)



Source: The Panel (top), Google (bottom); annotated by the Panel.



Source: The Panel; image captured July 2023.

2) **Paektu Hanna Restaurant**



Source: The Panel; images captured July 2023.


3) Tokyo Sushi & Teppanyaki





Source: The Panel; images captured July 2023.

4) Sindat BBQ Restaurant 2 (formerly Vang Vieng Pyongyang Restaurant)



Source: The Panel; images captured August 2023.

Annex 69[241] : Media report about DPRK workers in China

China's North Korean eateries refuse South Korean diners

Beijing (AFP) – South Koreans hoping to taste authentic North Korean cuisine abroad may be out of luck, with Pyongyang-run restaurants across northern China saying they will refuse to serve their capitalist compatriots.

Issued on: 06/10/2023 - 09:41Modified: 06/10/2023 - 10:44

Dotted throughout China and Southeast Asia, North Korean-run restaurants dish up culinary staples like cold noodles and kimchi pancakes to customers typically more interested in the novelty factor than the cuisine.

Staffed by waitresses hand-picked from the country's elite for loyalty -- and who often perform musical numbers for customers -- they are a major source of funds for Pyongyang.

And for South Koreans they have long offered a quirky opportunity to break bread with their longtime foe while abroad -- and enjoy some schmaltzy song and dance on the side.

But half a dozen branches in China, from restaurants in the capital Beijing to cities in the borderland, told AFP they would not serve South Koreans.

"This rule came into effect this year," said one Chinese staff member at Ryugyong restaurant in Dandong -- a stone's throw from the diplomatically isolated nation.

"We have to comply," said the staff member, who did not give their name.

"There is a regulation from the North Korean embassy: None of the North Korean restaurants in Dandong are permitted to serve South Koreans."

'Very hostile'

The rules meanwhile appear to be applied inconsistently: eateries surveyed by AFP in Shanghai, Changchun and Hanoi in neighbouring Vietnam said they had no issue with South Koreans dining there.

But others were downright hostile at the mention of South Korean guests.

"We hate them!" said one North Korean worker in Shenyang -- a hub in northeast China where North and South Koreans frequently rub shoulders.

"If you bring a South Korean friend, we will not accept them... and won't serve them."

North Korea's embassy in Beijing did not respond to a request for comment.

One former South Korean government official said he was asked to leave a North Korean restaurant in Dandong after staff heard him speaking their shared language with a friend.

[241] One member of the Panel is of the view that the information in this Annex should be further corroborated and disagrees with the allegation of these restaurants employing DPRK workers.



"The tone was very hostile," said the man, who asked not to be named.

North Korean restaurants are dotted throughout China and Southeast Asia © Nhac NGUYEN / AFP

"I felt very frustrated, awkward. I felt sorry for them."

Before visiting Dandong, he said he had heard that North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un had instructed restaurants to stop serving South Koreans.

These bans have happened before, he said -- usually when inter-Korean relations fall to a low ebb.

"But knowing it and experiencing it is different," he said.

"Being rejected to your face... that's really bad."

'Enemy state'

After a brief easing of tensions in the late 2010s helped by three summits between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korea's then-president Moon Jae-in, relations between Seoul and Pyongyang have nosedived.

In a speech last month, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol warned Pyongyang that "its regime will be brought to an end" if it ever used nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang meanwhile has repeatedly derided the "puppet" government in Seoul as it this year has conducted a record number of missile tests.

"The North's ban on South Korean visitors is in line with its aggressive posture when dealing with the South," Hong Min, at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told AFP.

"It's demonstrative of its view that South Korea is an enemy state rather than one it can cooperate with."

South Korea's unification ministry -- which manages relations with the North -- declined to comment.

"We can assume it is linked to the Yoon government and general deterioration of relations during his administration," said Chris Green, a Korea expert at the Netherlands' Leiden University.

Those tensions now mean that South Koreans looking to experience the cuisine of a neighbour cut off for over 70 years may have to look elsewhere.

"We can't do that," a woman who answered the phone at Beijing's Okryu restaurant said when asked if South Koreans could dine there.

The waitresses "will know they are South Korean as soon as they look at them".

Source: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231006-china-s-north-korean-eateries-refuse-south-korean-diners.

Annex 70: Restaurants in Russia which are suspected of employing DPRK nationals

According to Member State information and the Panel's investigations, DPRK nationals have been working in at least four restaurants in Russia: one in Moscow; two in Vladivostok; and one in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The Russian Federation replied that "no violations of the sanctions regime in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council has been identified" (annex 71).

1) Moscow

Social media images suggest that restaurant "Koryo (Корё)" appeared to be open and active as of April 2023. Russian corporate registry showed that the restaurant was managed by ООО "КОРЁ" and that at least three probable DPRK nationals have been involved as director and shareholders since its incorporation in 2009. The registry data indicate that the company was closed in September 2021. Social media indicate that there were most likely DPRK waitresses serving in the restaurant in 2023. According to the Member State's information, 13 DPRK nationals have worked for the restaurant.

The Panel notes a change in the restaurant's entrance sign between 2018 and 2022. Photos taken in May 2018 showed the name of the restaurant in both Russian and Korean, "Пхеньянский Ресторан Корё (Pyongyang Restaurant Koryo)" and "평양고려 (Pyongyang Koryo)" respectively. These signs were removed at some point after May 2018 and only the Russian name "Ресторан Корё (Restaurant Koryo)" has been displayed since then.

Figure 1: Russian Registry Information for ООО "КОРЁ"


- Company: ООО "КОРЁ", ОГРН 1097746617638
  - **Probable DPRK national КИМ ЕН ЧЕР (Kim Yong Chol), ГРН 2127746369980**
  - **Probable DPRK national КИМ Е СОН (Kim Ye Sung), ИНН 772590828585**
  - **Probable DPRK national РЁН ЧЖОН ГИР (Ryeong Jeong Gil)**
  - Russian national РАДЖАБОВ ШУХРАТ ГУЛЯМОВИЧ (Radzhabov Shuhrat Guljamovich), ИНН 771996516419

Figure 2: Comparison of entrance of Restaurant Koryo in 2018 (left) and 2022 (right)



Source: Яндекс, 2 May 2018. *Source*: Яндекс, 3 November 2022.

Figure 3: Comparison of inside of Restaurant Koryo in 2018 (left) and 2023 (right)



Source: Яндекс, 12 May 2018. Source: Яндекс, 19 June 2023.

Figure 4: Image of inside the restaurant (taken from social media)



Source: YouTube, uploaded in April 2023 (annotated by the Panel).


2) Vladivostok


1. **"Arirang (아리랑)":** Social media images suggest that Korean restaurant "Arirang (아리랑)"was open and active as of July 2023. Russian corporate registry data shows that the restaurant was managed by ООО "АРИРАНГ", with a Russian director, a DPRK shareholder, and an incorporation date of 31 October 2022.

Figure 1: Russian Registry Information about ООО "АРИРАНГ" and DPRK national and Russian national

- Company: ООО "АРИРАНГ", ГРН 1222500027100
  - **ШИН ХЕ ОК (Shin Hye Ok)**
  - ИГНАТЕНКО ИРИНА НИКОЛАЕВНА (Ignatenko Irina Nikolaevna), Russian, ИНН 253802000907


Figure 2: Photos of restaurant “Arirang (АРИРАНГ)” (see also annex 79)





Source: Yandex, uploaded on 1 July 2023 (annotated by the Panel).

Figure 3: Russian corporate registry of ООО “АРИРАНГ” (excerpt)




№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
	Наименование	
1	Полное наименование на русском языке Full Name	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "АРИРАНГ"
2	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1222500027100 31.10.2022
State Registration Number and date of the registration number for Unified State Register of Legal Entities		
3	Сокращенное наименование на русском языке	ООО "АРИРАНГ"
4	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1222500027100 31.10.2022
	Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица	
18	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2222501012920 01.12.2022
19	Фамилия Имя Отчество Last name Given name	ИГНАТЕНКО ИРИНА НИКОЛАЕВНА
20	ИНН	253802000907
21	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2222501012920 01.12.2022
22	Должность Position	ДИРЕКТОР Director
23	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2222501012920 01.12.2022
24	Пол	женский
25	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2222501012920 01.12.2022
26	Гражданство	гражданин Российской Федерации
	Сведения об участниках / учредителях юридического лица	
30	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1222500027100 31.10.2022
31	Фамилия Имя Last name Given name	ШИН ХЕ ОК
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1222500027100 31.10.2022
33	Пол	женский
34	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1222500027100 31.10.2022
35	Гражданство Nationality	иностранный гражданин Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика

Source: Russian corporate registry Unified State Register of Legal Entities (Единого государственного реестра юридических лиц).


“Cafe Pyongyang (Кафе Пхеньян)”: Social media images suggest that Korean restaurant “Cafe Pyongyang (Кафе Пхеньян)” appeared to be open and active as of July 2023. Russian corporate registry information showed that the restaurant is managed by ООО “МАКСИМ”, directed by a Russian national and a probable DPRK national. Another DPRK national is a former shareholder; this individual is currently the director of another Vladivostok-based company involved in computer software development. Photos and reviews of the restaurant were uploaded to Russian search websites as of July and August 2023, respectively, further confirming that the restaurant is active. According to a Member State, 12 DPRK national have worked for Café Pyongyang.

- **Figure 1: Russian Registry Information about ООО “МАКСИМ”** Company: ООО "МАКСИМ", ГРН 1032502269601
  - **КИМ СОНГ КУМ (Kim Song Kum)**
  - **ЗУ ЕН ЧЕЛ (Chu Yong Chol), ИНН 254001922108**
  - Russian national КОСУШКИНА МАРИНА СТЕПАНОВНА (Kosushkina Marina Stepanovna), ИНН 253811784655

Figure 2: Photos of Korean restaurant “Cafe Pyongyang (Кафе Пхеньян)” (top) and recent reviews on Russian social media (bottom)



Source: Яндекс, 18 May 2023.



(Translation)


…An authentic North Korean menu, ambiance, polite and very beautiful Korean waitress…

Source: Яндекс.

3) Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk

Social media images suggest that Korean restaurant "Pyongyang Myohyangoan (평양묘향, Пхеньян Мёхянгоан)" was open and active as of August 2023. Reviews of the restaurant were uploaded on a Russian search website in February 2023, stating that DPRK nationals were serving as waitresses in the restaurant.

Figure 1: Photos of Korean restaurant "Pyongyang Myohyangoan" (top) and recent reviews on Russian social media (bottom).





(Translation)

I was recently at lunch. Many North Koreans were there. A beautiful waitress from North Korea.

Source: 2GIS.

Annex 71: Reply from the Russian Federation

The restaurant “Koryo" was liquidated in September 2021. There is no information about its affiliation with any North Korean companies or nationals.

"Maxim" LLC was established in 2003. From 2003 to 2018 the general director of this legal entity was a DPRK citizen Chu Yong Chol (Чу Ён Чхоль). Since 2018 up to now, this position has been held by a Russian citizen. There is no information about the cases of employment of North Koreans in this organization.

"SKR-Trading" LLC was founded in 2003 by Chu Yong Chol, who served as its general director. Currently, this legal entity is in the process of liquidation and does not conduct any financial and economic activities.

The head of "Arirang" LLC, established in October 2022, is a Russian citizen.

The North Korean cuisine cafe "Pyongyang Mehyanggoan", was established in February 2019 by a Russian individual entrepreneur. This entity, under the agreement with one of the Russian institutes, conducts pastry cooking classes in accordance with the educational program for North Korean students.


Since December 2019 up to the present time all of the above-mentioned entities have not entered into labor agreements with DPRK citizens, have not applied for work permits for North Korean citizens and have not applied for forms of joint venture. There is no information on profit-making by North Koreans from the activities of these entities. Overall no violations of the sanctions regime in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council has been identified.

Source: Member State.

Annex 72: Media report about Khabarovsk-based DPRK construction company “The First Construction Company (제 1 건설회사)”

According to a media report[242] and information obtained by the Panel, at least 58 DPRK nationals were working at a Khabarovsk-based DPRK construction company “The First Construction Company (제 1 건설회사)” as of 2022. The expert consulted by the media organization confirmed that specific words in the company’s internal documentation were written in DPRK vernacular. The document explains that the number of patients has surged and treatment fees also increased accordingly which became a major problem. The company implied that their financial situation could affect implementation of [DPRK] national plan. It tried to reach out to Pyongyang on this matter, however has not received any answer. As can be seen in the response from Russian Federation (see below), Air Koryo operated seven flights from Vladivostok to Pyongyang, transporting 630 DPRK citizens with various diseases in 2023, and when crossing the state border, they carried hand luggage with personal belongings (see annex 74).

Examples of DPRK vernacular



Source: RFA, annotated by the Panel.

[242] See https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/workershealth-09202023163056.html.

Annex 73: Reply from Russian Federation

In this regard, we would like to inform the Panel that the company entitled “The First Construction Company” is not registered in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities of the Russian Federation. There is no data on the issuance by this organization of contracts with Russian contractors for the provision of migrant workers from the DPRK, nor on the opening of accounts in Russian banks. No work permits were issued to DPRK citizens for labor activities for a company entitled "The First Construction Company". No notification on the conclusion of relevant labor or civil law contracts related to provision of services have been received. In 2021-2023, no applications were submitted by employers or contractors on the need to hire foreign workers from the DPRK to fill vacant or newly created jobs.
No quota for the North Korean labor force was allocated to Khabarovsk Krai enterprises.
There are North Korean citizens with expired study visas in Khabarovsk Krai who have been unable to return to their home country since the termination of transportation channels with the DPRK. Those DPRK nationals are not engaged in labor in the region.
In 2023, North Korea's Air Koryo operated seven flights from Vladivostok to Pyongyang to transport 630 DPRK citizens with various diseases. When crossing the state border, they carried hand luggage with personal belongings.

Source: Member State.

Annex 74: Reply from the Russian Federation on repatriation of DPRK overseas workers in 2023

The Panel has enquired to the Russian Federation about the repatriation of DPRK nationals, given the partial re-opening of the DPRK border in 2023. The Russia Federation replied that “In 2023, North Korea's Air Koryo operated seven flights from Vladivostok to Pyongyang to transport 630 DPRK citizens with various diseases. When crossing the state border, they carried hand luggage with personal belongings”.

Annex 75: Russian court cases involving DPRK nationals earning income[243]

Note: Case defendants were charged under a number of Russian legal codes, including:

- *Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses, articles*
  - *15.25 ("Breach of the Currency Legislation of the Russian Federation and Acts of Currency Regulation Bodies"),*
  - *18.8 ("Violation by an Alien or a Stateless Person of the Rules for Entry into the Russian Federation or of the Regime for Staying (Living) in the Russian Federation"),*
  - *18.10 ("Unlawful Exercise by a Foreign Citizen or Stateless Person of Labour Activities in the Russian Federation "),*
  - *18.11 ("Violating Immigration Rules"),*
  - *18.15 ("Unlawful Engagement of a Foreign Citizen or Stateless Person in Labour Activities in the Russian Federation"),*
  - *20.25 ("Nonpayment of the Administrative Fine or Willful Departure from the Place of Serving the Administrative Arrest")*

- *Civil Code of the Russian Federation, article*
  - *1102 ("The Obligation to Return Unjust Enrichment")*

- *Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, articles*
  - *216 ("Violation of Safety Rules in Mining, Building, and Other Activities")*
  - *109 ("Infliction of Death by Negligence")*

- *Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens, article*
  - *13 ("Terms for Foreign Citizens' Participation in Labour Relations")*

See Annex 75.1 for excerpts of the associated court case documentation.

[243] One member of the Panel is of the view that this case should be further corroborated.

Name	Company information	Identified court cases, 2021-2023	Court Case Outcome(s)
Anfilada OOO (ООО “Анфилада”)	Address: 690011, Primorski kr., g. Vladivostok, ul. Borisenko, d. 70 kv. 26, Russian Federation OGRN: 1092537001138	• 5-10/2023 (5-1005/2022), employment of DPRK national Shin Chul Sun • 5-9/2023 (5-1004/2022), employment of DPRK national Kim Suk Il	In both cases: administrative proceedings terminated due to lack of an administrative offense
Baryshnikova, Evgeniya Andreevna (individual entrepreneur)	Address: Irkutskaya oblast, Irkutsk, Oktyabrski, Russian Federation OGRNIP: 309385011800150	• 5-43/2023, employment of DPRK national Han Yong Ho (DOB 1964) • 5-44/2023, employment of DPRK national Hwang Hu Nam (DOB 1965) • 5-45/2023, employment of a DPRK national • 5-46/2023, employment of a DPRK national • 5-47/2023, employment of DPRK national Kim Ok Chol (DOB 1979) • 5-48/2023, employment of a DPRK national with passport number 390430598	In all cases: E.A. Baryshnikova found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles.
Ciana, OOO (ООО “Циана”)	Address: 121609, g. Moskva, ul. Osennyaya, d. 17 k. 1 pom. 1 kom. 146, Russian Federation OGRN: 1157746826907	• 5-1590/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim I.Ch. • 5-1596/2021, employment of DPRK national Song I.Z.	In both cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine, in one case in the amount of 200,000 roubles and in the other case, an undisclosed amount of roubles.

SZ 'DKK-DV', OOO (ООО СЗ "ДКК-ДВ")	Address: 692760, Primorski krai, g.o. Artemovski, g Artem, ul Frunze, d. 43, ofis 1, Russian Federation OGRN: 1192536031863	• 5-10/2023 (5-1005/2022), employment of DPRK national Shin Chul-sun • 5-9/2023 (5-1004/2022), employment of DPRK national Kim Suk-il • 5-1550/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Yong-chol • 5-1523/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Yoon-chul • 5-1515/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Yoon-chol • 5-1529/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Sung-nam • 5-1531/2021, employment of DPRK national Ma Seong • 5-1520/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Myong-il • 5-1527/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Song-kook • 5-1525/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Syung-haek • 5-1518/2021, employment of DPRK national Hwang Yoon-shik • 5-1522/2021, employment of DPRK national Choe Yong Ho • 5-1517/2021, employment of DPRK national Chae Kwang-hak • 5-1534/2021, employment of DPRK national Yun Kwang-sen • 5-1533/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national “Un” • 5-1524/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national “Jin” • 5-1530/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national “Chol” • 5-1528/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national “Chen” • 5-1521/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national “Ho” • 5-1519/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national “Chen” • 5-1526/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national “Ren” • 5-1551/2021, for employing DPRK nationals, Martyanov Alexander Valerievich (INN 251107281473)	In 19 cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles. In one case (5-1551/2021): company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 25,000 roubles. In two cases (5-9/2023 and 5-10/2023): administrative proceedings terminated due to lack of an administrative offense

JSC Dzerzhinsk Garment Factory "RUS" (aka AO DSHF "RUS", АО ДШФ "РУСЬ")	Address 1: 129626, g. Moskva, prospekt Mira, d. 102 str. 27 kom. 4A, Russian Federation Address 2: 606002, Nizhegorodskaya obl., g. Dzerzhinsk, ul. Krasnoarmeiskaya, d. 21, Russian Federation OGRN: 1025201741586	• 7-755/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Hye Jong • 7-734/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Un Jong • 7-730/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Ji Hye • 7-729/2021, employment of DPRK national Yang Un Hyang • 7-728/2021, employment of DPRK national Choe Un Gum • 7-727/2021, employment of DPRK national Ji Hyang Gum • 7-725/2021, employment of DPRK national Hong Sung Jin • 7-724/2021, employment of DPRK national Kwon Un Ha • 7-700/2021, employment of DPRK national An Mi Yong • 7-699/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Kyong Ok • 7-698/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Jon Sim • 7-697/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Kyong Ok • 7-696/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Hye Jong • 7-695/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Gum Sun • 7-694/2021, employment of DPRK national Ma Jin Hyang • 7-692/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Jun Sim • 7-691/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Sung Hee • 7-689/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Jin Hyang • 7-688/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Un Sim • 7-687/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Bom Hyang • 7-686/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Un Sim • 7-685/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Bom Hyang • 7-684/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Won Hwa • 7-680/2021, employment of DPRK national Han Jin E • 7-679/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Won Hwa • 7-678/2021, employment of DPRK national Han Jin E • 7-677/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Chol Ok • 7-675/2021, employment of DPRK national Choe Un Gum • 7-674/2021, employment of DPRK national Yu Su Kyong • 7-671/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Jin Sim • 7-669/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Jin Hyang • 7-668/2021, employment of DPRK national Ma Jin Hyang • 7-667/2021, employment of DPRK national Jo Hyang Hee • 7-666/2021, employment of DPRK national Kwon Un Ha • 7-665/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Jong Ok • 12-468/2021, employment of DPRK national Paek Un Jin • 12-466/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Ryong Hee • 12-464/2021, employment of DPRK national Jung Un Sook • 12-448/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Un Hee • 12-442/2021, employment of DPRK national Jo Yun Gyong • 12-438/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Chol Ok • 12-436/2021, employment of DPRK national An Mi Yong	In all cases: the decision of a lower court is cancelled due to procedural violations and the case is returned for new consideration

		• 12-432/2021, employment of DPRK national Choe U.G. • 12-454/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Ji Hye • 12-452/2021, employment of DPRK national Ryang Un Gang • 12-446/2021, employment of DPRK national Gwon Un Ha • 12-434/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Un Jon • 12-430/2021, employment of DPRK national Choe Un Gum • 7-845/2021, employment of DPRK national Jong Sol • 7-819/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Un Hee • 7-818/2021, employment of DPRK national Yu Su Gyon • 7-815/2021, employment of DPRK national Jo Yun Gyong • 7-814/2021, employment of DPRK national Jo Hyang Hui • 7-812/2021, employment of DPRK national Ji Hyang Gum • 7-808/2021, employment of DPRK national Hong Sung Jin • 7-804/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Jong Ok • 7-800/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Un Hui • 7-799/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Jin Sim • 7-797/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Chol Ok • 7-805/2021, employment of DPRK national Jung Un Suk • 7-816/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Ji Hye • 7-806/2021, employment of DPRK national Paek Un Jin • 7-802/2021, employment of DPRK national Paek Un Jin	
Emarko OOO (OOO "ЭМАРКО")	Address: 664003, Irkutskaya obl, g.o. gorod Irkutsk, g Irkutsk, ul Krasnoarmeiskaya, d. 7, of. 1 Russian Federation OGRN: 1183850021255	• 5-5/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Yong Gun • 5-4/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Yong Il • 5-3/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Bok Rok • 5-2/2021, employment of DPRK national An Nam Il	In all cases: administrative proceedings terminated due to lack of an administrative offense
Garant-Stroy-Service OOO (OOO “Гарант-Строй-Сервис”)	Address: 690022, Primorski krai, g.o. Vladivostokski, g Vladivostok, pr-kt 100-letiya Vladivostoka, d. 178, kv. 281, Russian Fderation OGRN: 1117746527711	• 5-827/2022, employment of DPRK national Choe E.S. • 5-828/2022, employment of DPRK national An S.I. • 5-830/2022, employment of DPRK national Pak Y.H. • 12-390/2022, employment of DPRK national Ri Chol Ho	In three cases: administrative proceedings terminated due to lack of an administrative offense In one case (12-390/2022): decision canceled due to procedural violation

General Contractor OOO (OOO "Генеральный подрядчик")	Address: 690091, Primorski kr., g. Vladivostok, ul. Aleutskaya, d. 26 kv. 14, Russian Federation OGRN: 1042503712184	• 5- 156/2022, employment of DPRK national Ra K.Z. • 5- 159/2022, employment of DPRK national Yu. Ch.N. • 5- 161/2022, employment of DPRK national P. M.H. • 5- 162/2022, employment of DPRK national Paek S.G. • 5- 163/2022, employment of DPRK national Ri N.H. • 5- 165/2022, employment of DPRK national Yang T.H.	In all cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles
Ir-Stroy OOO (OOO "ИР-СТРОЙ")	Address: 690105, Primorski krai, g.o. Vladivostokski, g Vladivostok, ul Borodinskaya, d. 4A, pomeshch. 15, Russian Federation OGRN: 1192536021688	• 5-538/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national • 5-539/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national • 5-540/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national • 5-541/2021, employment of partially-named DPRK national Chun • 5-542/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Wang Chol	In all cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles
Kapital-Stroy OOO (OOO "КАПИТАЛ-СТРОЙ")	Address: 690002, Primorski kr., g. Vladivostok, prospekt Krasnogo Znameni, d. 59 ofis 607 Russian Federation OGRN: 1132543008311	• 5-664/2022, employment of DPRK national Kim K.G. • 5-667/2022, employment of DPRK national Rim H.S. • 5-668/2022, employment of DPRK national Pak Sim Hong • 5-670/2022, employment of DPRK national Chol S.M. • 5-680/2022, employment of DPRK national Kim Yong Dok • 5-682/2022, employment of DPRK national Ro Il Ho • 5-683/2022, employment of DPRK national K.H. • 5-684/2022, employment of DPRK national Ri Kwon Jo • 33-3940/2022, employment of unnamed DPRK national(s)	In eight cases: administrative proceedings terminated due to expiration of statute of limitations In one case (33-3940/2022): previous decision denying claim to recover funds is upheld
Ligastroy OOO (OOO "ЛИГАСТРОЙ")	Address: 680045, Khabarovski krai, g.o. gorod Khabarovsk, g Khabarovsk, ul Putevaya, d. 1A, kom.7 Russian Federation OGRN: 1202700021149	• 5-343/2022, employment of DPRK national Ri Myung Sam • 5-344/2022, employment of DPRK national An Yong Guk • 5-345/2022, employment of DPRK national Chen Chun Bom • 5-348/2022, employment of DPRK national Rim Yong Chun	In all cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine with a warning
Madrid OOO (OOO "МАДРИД")	Address: 672014, Zabaikalski kr., g. Chita, ul. Inzhenernaya, d. 5, Russian Federation OGRN: 1147536004549	• 5-2061/2021, employment of DPRK national Im S.N. • 5-2062/2021, employment of DPRK national Kim Y.M.	In both cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles
Primstroy DV OOO (OOO "ПРИМСТРОЙ ДВ")	Address: 692777, Primorski kr., g. Artem, s. Knevichi, per. Treti, d. 3, Russian Federation OGRN: 1192536010160	• 5-150/2022 (5-2216/2021), employment of DPRK national Pak N.H. • 5-151/2022 (5-2217/2021), employment of DPRK national Ju Gwon Men	In both cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles

SANKIR OOO (OOO "САНКИР")	Address: 680013, Khabarovski kr., g. Khabarovsk, per. Shaturski, d. 1A kv. 93, Russian Federation OGRN: 1102724007715	• 5-287/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national • 5-288/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national • 5-289/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national • 5-290/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national • 5-291/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national	In all cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of a warning
SK Kristall OOO (OOO СК "Кристалл") *(see endnote ** for company reply to the Panel)*	Address: 690087, Primorski krai, g.o. Vladivostokski, g Vladivostok, ul Sabaneeva, d. 14V, pomeshch. 14, Russian Federation OGRN: 1192536029950	• 5-827/2022, employment of DPRK national Choe E.S. • 5-828/2022, employment of DPRK national An S.I. • 5-830/2022, employment of DPRK national Pak Y.H. • 12-390/2022, employment of DPRK national Ri Chol Ho	In three cases: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles In one case (12-390/2022): decision canceled due to procedural violation
SMU-22 OOO (OOO "СМУ-22")	Address: 664022, Irkutskaya obl, g.o. gorod Irkutsk, g Irkutsk, ul Krasnykh Madyar, d. 41, ofis 305 Russian Federation OGRN: 1183850007461	• 5-43/2023, employment of DPRK national Han Yong Ho (DOB 1964) • 5-44/2023, employment of DPRK national Hwang Hu Nam (DOB 1965) • 5-45/2023, employment of a DPRK national • 5-47/2023, employment of DPRK national Kim Ok Chol (DOB 1979) • 5-48/2023, employment of a DPRK national with passport number 390430598 *note: according to the court records, SMU-22 employed 8 additional DPRK nationals, although court cases regarding those individuals could not be identified*	In all cases: see above, under E.A. Baryshnikova
SPV-Stroy OOO (OOO "СПВ-СТРОЙ")	Address: 690090, Primorski kr., g. Vladivostok, ul. Svetlanskaya, d. 51A kab. 4, Russian Federation OGRN: 1202500009315	• 5-74/2021, employment of DPRK national P. • 5-75/2021, employment of DPRK national R.K.S.	In both cases: M.V. Borisov found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 2,000 roubles

Stroika TS OOO (OOO "СТРОЙКА ТС")	Address: 680007, Khabarovski kr., g. Khabarovsk, ul. Volochaevskaya, d. 11 pom. 1 ofis 5, Russian Federation OGRN: 1172724025209	• 5-108/2021, employment of unnamed DPRK national L. • 5-109/2021, employment of DPRK national Ri Song Chol	In one case (5-108/2021): company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine with a warning In one case: company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 150,000 roubles
Stroytech OOO (OOO “Стройтех”)	Address: Primorsky Territory, Ussuriysk urban district, Ussuriysk, Russian Federation *(partially anonymized in the court record)*	• 5-287/2021, employment of DPRK national Pak Su Nam	D.V. Krivonosov found guilty of committing a crime under the Criminal Code, punished with one year six month probationary period
Technical Solutions OOO (OOO "Технические решения")	Address: 690033, Primorski krai, g.o. Vladivostokski, g Vladivostok, ul Karbysheva, d. 4, ofis 237, Russian Federation OGRN: 1142508000018	• 5-822/2022, employment of DPRK national Ri D.H.	Company found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment of an administrative fine in the amount of 125,000 roubles
Unidentified Companies		• DPRK national Ri Myong Ryol, case number 5-343/2023 • DPRK national Bae Chol Su, case numbers 5-341/2023 and 5-340/2023 • DPRK national Paek Gwan Ryong, case number 5-22/2023 • DPRK national Yun Chol Min, case number 5-21/2023 • DPRK national Pak Chol Ho, case number 5-20/2023 • DPRK national Kim Yong Dok, case number 5-33/2023 • DPRK national Kim Yong Sim, case number 5-750/2023 • DPRK national Kim Kang Ho, case number 5-244/2023 • DPRK national Kim Sung Do, case number 5-243/2023 • DPRK national Kim Un Chol, case number 5-242/2023 • DPRK national Hong Chol Un, case number 5-35/2023 • DPRK national Ho Sung Chol, case number 5-43/2023 • DPRK national Rim Gwang Su, case numbers 12-6/2023 and 5-890/2022 • DPRK national Jang Song Jon, case number 5-2330/2022 • DPRK national An Gun Chol, case number 5-1071/2022 • DPRK national Sim Hyun Suk, case number 5-1070/2022	In most cases, defendant found guilty of committing an administrative offense with punishment in the form of an administrative fine of 2,000-6,000 roubles, and in approximately 40% of the cases, along with administrative or forced deportation Several cases returned to eliminate deficiencies, terminated due to absence of administrative offense, or decision canceled due to procedural violation One criminal case/prosecution terminated

		• DPRK national Song Chol Su, case number 5-1069/2022 • DPRK national Kim Chol, case number 5-1068/2022 • DPRK national Kim Jong Nam, case number 5-1067/2022 • DPRK national Cha Chol Min, case number 5-1066/2022 • DPRK national Rim Jun Seong, case number 5-1065/2022 • DPRK national Pak Hyun, case number 5-220/2022 • DPRK national Ma Song Jeong, case number 5-739/2022 • DPRK national Han Su Yong, case number 5-738/2022 • DPRK national Kim Gwang Ho, case number 5-142/2022 • DPRK national Choe Dong Sik, case number 5-141/2022 • DPRK national Chen Jang Song, case number 5-140/2022 • DPRK national Jong Hyo Nam, case number 5-139/2022 • DPRK national Yun Song Il, case number 5-138/2022 • DPRK national Pyon Jun Song, case number 5-137/2022 • DPRK national Pak Myong Hak, case number 5-537/2022 • DPRK national Kim Myong Nam, case number 5-537/2022 • DPRK national Yun Song Chol, case number 5-537/2022 • DPRK national Song Mun Il, case numbers 5-102/2022 and 12-340/2022 • DPRK national Ri Chol U, case number 5-1011/2022 • DPRK national Kim Jin Sung, case number 5-108/2022 • DPRK national Pak In Guk, case number 5-107/2022 • DPRK national Kim Yong Chol, case number 5-106/2022 • DPRK national Jon Jung Guk, case number 5-105/2022 • DPRK national Jon Gi Chol, case number 5-104/2022 • DPRK national Ri Gwan Song case numbers 16-4128/2021, P16-183/2022, and P16-756/2022 • DPRK national Yun Jon Hyun, case number 16-10369/2021 • DPRK national Kim Chol Su, case number 16-10367/2021 • DPRK national Min Gen Sam, case number 16-10366/2021 • DPRK national Kim Yong Jin, case numbers 5-6548/2021 and 5-6780/2021 • DPRK national Hong Yong Jin, case numbers 5-6550/2021 and 5-6779/2021 • DPRK national Kim Chol Un, case numbers 5-6546/2021 and 5-6786/2021 • DPRK national Yun Song Hak, case numbers 5-6547/2021 and 5-6787/2021 • DPRK national Kim Nam Chol, case numbers 5-6549/2021 and 5-6781/2021 • DPRK national Ri Gum Sok, case numbers 5-6539/2021 and 5-6785/2021	

		• DPRK national Han Ben Nam, case number 5-6784/2021 • DPRK national So Gong Chol, case numbers 5-6540/2021 and 5-6783/2021 • DPRK national Rim Gwan Chol, case number 5-6782/2021 • DPRK national Ri Jun Suk, case numbers 5-6537/2021 and 5-6778/2021 • DPRK national Ri Hyok Chol, case numbers 5-6535/2021 and 5-6777/2021 • DPRK national Ri Gwang Hyok, case numbers 5-6538/2021 and 5-6776/2021 • DPRK national Jo Hui Sung, case numbers 5-6552/2021 and 5-6775/2021 • DPRK national Yun Ren Gil, case number 5-908/2021 • DPRK national Rim Gwang Su, case number 5-907/2021 • DPRK national Kim Won Chol, case number 5-1524/2021 • DPRK national An Chol Ho, case number 5-1522/2021 • DPRK national Ri Jin Song, case number 5-1524/2021 • DPRK national Choe Son Ho, case number 1-682/2021 • DPRK national Im Hyun Bom, case number 16-7505/2021 • DPRK national Jon Hok, case number 16-7507/2021 • DPRK national Ryang Jong Hwang, case number 16-7508/2021 • DPRK national Ri Gwan Son, case number 5-651/2021 • DPRK national Sung Nam Yong, case number 5-650/2021 • DPRK individual (name redacted), case number 5-895/2021 • DPRK Min Yun Hong, case number 5-894/2021 • DPRK national Shin Yong Dok, case number 5-1790/2021 • DPRK national Kang Chol, case number 5-1789/2021 • DPRK national Yom Son Nam, case number 5-1788/2021 • DPRK national Kim Un Mok, case number 5-1787/2021 • DPRK national Hu Shigang, case number 5-1986/2021 • DPRK national Zou Yongjun, case number 5-1984/2021 • DPRK national Xu Yuliang, case number 5-1983/2021 • DPRK national Li Yuping, case number 5-1982/2021 • DPRK national Yang Gan, case number 5-1981/2021 • DPRK national Han Huifang, case number 5-1980/2021 • DPRK national Fu Xingzhen, case number Case number 5-1979/2021 • DPRK national Ma Jian, case number 5-1978/2021 • DPRK national Chen Zhengao, case number 5-1977/2021 • DPRK national An Myong Guk, case number 5-792/2021 • DPRK national Yun Gwang Song, case number 5-931/2021 • DPRK national Choe Yong Ho, case number 5-930/2021 • DPRK national Kang Chol Hyok, case number 5-390/2021	

		• DPRK national Jin Song Jun, case number 5-389/2021 • DPRK national Kwon Sung Hyok, case number 5-388/2021 • DPRK national Choe Jun Ep, case number 5-387/2021 • DPRK national Pak Won Chol, case number 5-386/2021 • DPRK national Choe Chol Hak, case number 5-385/2021 • DPRK national Kim Gwang Su, case number 5-384/2021 • DPRK national Kim E Gyong, case number 5-119/2021	

Note: Company and individual names have been transliterated from the original Russian-language documents.

Note: As of 26 January 2024, the Panel had not received a response from the Russian Federation and received a response from one company (see directly below).

**

SK Kristall LLC informed the Panel that it "was not and is not an employer of any citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), has not and does not involve migrants from the DPRK in performing work," and further noted that the relevant court proceedings were canceled.

The Panel notes that, of the five cases (12-390/2022, 12-391/2022, 12-392/2022, 12-393/2022, and 12-394/2022) in which the proceedings were canceled, as referenced in the reply from SK Kristall LLC, the Panel is able to access one (12-390/2022), in which the prior decision of guilt was canceled due to a procedural violation (because the company was not appropriately notified of the time and place of consideration of the case), and the case was subject to termination due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Annex 76[244] – List of individuals reported by Member States to be DPRK bank representatives [245]

Resolution 2270 (2016), operative paragraph 33: "Decides that States shall prohibit in their territories the opening and operation of new branches, subsidiaries, and representative offices of DPRK banks, decides further that States shall prohibit financial institutions within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, unless such transactions have been approved by the Committee in advance, and decides that States shall take the necessary measures to close such existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices, and also to terminate such joint ventures, ownership interests and correspondent banking relationships with DPRK banks within ninety days from the adoption of this resolution;"

Resolution 2321 (2016), operative paragraph 33: "Decides that, if a Member State determines that an individual is working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial institution, then Member States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the individual's state of nationality, consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a case by case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;"

Name/Alias	Title and activities **	Location **	Date of birth DPRK passport number / expiry **	Member State response
Sim Hyon Sop (Sim Hyo'n-so'p)	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Dandong, China	DOB: 25 Nov 1983 PP No: 109484100 (expires 24 Dec 2024)	"China conducted serious and thorough investigations on the information provided by the Panel, and did not find any illegal cyber financial activities by the relevant individuals within Chinese border. China consistently and strictly combats illegal cyber financial activities by Chinese laws and regulations in an equal manner no matter if related personnel violate the Security Council Resolutions or not. Besides, the cyber activities mentioned by the Panel do not fall into the scope prohibited by the Resolutions. China requests the Panel to conduct its work according to its mandate, and do not include unrelated content into its report." (2023)

[244] Two members of the Panel are of the view that there is not enough evidence to substantiate the allegation of affiliation and sanctions violation of these individuals.
[245] The Russian Federation informed the Panel in 2019 that Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) had ceased operation in 2016.

Choe Un Hyok (Ch'oe, U'n-hyo'k)	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) (KPe.033) Representative	Moscow, Russian Federation	DOB: 19 Oct 1985 PP No: 83612287	"The Bank of Russia has not received any requests regarding the accreditation in Moscow of a representative of the Korea United Development Bank or the appointment of Choe Un Hyok as its representative. We do not have any information about bank accounts in the name of Choe Un Hyok in Russia." (2020)
Jo Myong Chol	DPRK First Credit Bank Representative	Vladivostok, Russian Federation		*The Panel has not received a response from the Russian Federation*
Kim Kyong Nam (Kim Kyo'ng-Nam)	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Moscow, Russian Federation	DOB: 11 Jul 1976	*The Panel has not received a response from the Russian Federation*
So Myong (aka Semyon Semyonovich)	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Vladivostok, Russian Federation	DOB: 02 Mar 1978 PP No: 927320285	"Upon receiving the letter […] from […], Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts, we have to share our most serious concern regarding the increasing reliance of the Panel in its work on unilateral sanctions imposed by third parties. It is deeply worrisome that the Panel has started to reference them more and more in its requests, completely disregarding the fact that such sanctions are illegitimate and obviously are out of scope of the relevant decisions of the United Nations Security Council and violate the established processes within the Council and the 1718 Committee. Moreover, we find it most regrettable that we find ourselves in the position when we have to remind the Panel of Experts of its mandate in accordance with the relevant UN SC resolutions. In these circumstances and in the interest of preserving the integrity of the Panel we, as a responsible Member of the 1718 Committee, have no other option, but to "return the letter to the sender", and express our sincere hope that the Panel will continue to fulfill its duties in accordance with its mandate, while reiterating our readiness to continue to see to the implementation of the relevant UN SC decisions." (2023)

Kim Pong Hak	Daesong Credit Development Bank (DCDB) (KPe.049) Representative	Russian Federation		*The Panel has not received a response from the Russian Federation*
O In Jun	Korea Daesong Bank (KPe.035) Representative	Vladivostok, Russian Federation		*The Panel has not received a response from the Russian Federation*
Kim Kwang Myong	DPRK Korea Mandal Credit Bank Representative	Dalian, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Jo Chol Song (Cho, Ch'o'l-so'ng) (KPi.058)	Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) (KPe.025) Representative	Dandong, China	DOB: 25 Sep.1984 PP No: 654320502 (expired September 16, 2019)	"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Ri Jin Hyok	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Zhuhai, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of

				identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Jo Song Ok	DPRK Korea Changsin Bank Representative	Dandong, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Ri Chun Song (Ri Ch'un-so'ng) (KPi.075)	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Beijing, China	DOB: 30 Oct.1965 PP No: 654133553 (expired 11 March 2019)	“China has closed all representative offices of DPRK financial institutions in China according to the Security Council resolutions. All the relevant representatives have left China. Chinese banks have always strictly implemented the targeted Security Council sanctions, and would not provide any financial services to individuals or entities designated by the Security Council. Considering its cooperative relationship with the Panel, China has overcome great difficulties and has had the commercial banks to carefully investigate the two individuals mentioned in the Panel’s letter. There is no transaction involving Ri Chun Hwan in April 2019. There is neither any Ri Chun Song involved transaction record related to the payments from accounts located in China to any Chinese or Russian companies in 2016 and 2017, or any acceptance of payments in June 2017. Certain Member State arbitrarily designated some DPRK individuals in China or even out of China as DPRK bank representatives without any concrete evidence. Such acts not only defamed China on purpose, but also caused a huge waste of energy of the Panel. Meanwhile, China firmly and

				consistently opposes the US unilateral sanctions. China hopes that the Panel does not quote any related information in the final report, bearing in mind maintaining the authority of the Security Council." (2021) "Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Kim Won Chol	DPRK Jasong Bank (JSB) Representative and the Korea Kumgang Group (KKG) Bank Representative	Beijing, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Kim Chol Song	DPRK Korea Mandal Credit Bank Representative	Shenyang, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence

				of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Kim Myong Jin	DPRK Korea Mandal Credit Bank Representative	Beijing, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Ho Yong II (Ho' Yo'ng-il)	DPRK Korea Gold Bridge Bank Representative, Hana Bank representative, associated with Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047)	Dandong, China	DOB: 09 Sep 1968	"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Pang Myong Guk	DPRK banking associate	China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)

Han Chol Man	Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative, Golden Triangle Bank Representative, and Jasong Bank Representative	China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Jang Myong Chol (Chang, Myo' ng-ch'o' l)	DPRK Koryo Commercial Bank Representative	Dandong, China	DOB: 09 Sep 1968	"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Han Hong Gil	DPRK Korea Mandal Credit Bank Representative; associate of the Koryo Commercial Bank	Dandong, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)

Om Chol Jin	DPRK banking associate	China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Ryu Jong Yong	DPRK Jasong Bank Representative	Dandong, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Ko Il Hwan (Ko Il-hwan)	Korea Daesong Bank (KPe.035) Representative	Shenyang, China	DOB: 28 Aug 1967 PP No: 927220424 (expired 12 Jun 2022)	"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)

Kim Jong Chol	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Shenyang, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Choe Chun Pom	DPRK Central Bank Representative	Beijing, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Nam Sok Chan	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Shenyang, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)

Kim Mun Chol (Kim Mun-ch'o'l) (KPi.060)	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) (KPe.033) Representative	Dandong, China	DOB: 25 Mar. 1957	"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Kim Sung Ha	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Hunchun, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)
Maeng Yong Su	Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047) Representative	Zhuhai, China		"Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK." (2024)

Choe Chol Ryong	Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) (KPe.025) Representative	*Outside of the DPRK*		
Kim Chol Ok	DPRK Korea Daesong Bank (KDB) Representative	Indonesia		*The Panel has not received a response from Indonesia*
Ri Chang Min	Dong Song Kumgang Bank Representative	Moscow, Russian Federation	DOB: 18 May 1970	"In this regard, I wish to inform you that due to insufficient identification data, it is not possible to provide the requested information regarding Ri Chang Min. The Russian competent agencies have no information about this person's connections with the activities of the bank "Dong Song Kumgang" or about his unlawful actions. No work permits for employment in the Russian Federation are issued to DPRK citizens."

**Based on Member State information or UN documents / *Sources:* Information provided to the Panel by Member States and UN documents.

Annex 77: Member State replies to Panel inquiries on entry/exit data of reported DPRK overseas banking representatives and any measures taken to expel them in accordance with the Security Council resolutions

Letter from Russia of 19 February 2024 (see also annex 75)

In this regard, I wish to inform you that due to insufficient identification data, it is not possible to provide the requested information regarding Ri Chang Min. The Russian competent agencies have no information about this person's connections with the activities of the bank "Dong Song Kumgang" or about his unlawful actions. No work permits for employment in the Russian Federation are issued to DPRK citizens.

Letter from China of 22 January 2023 (see also annex 40)

Currently, there are no branches or representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. In accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions, China has revoked all representative offices of the DPRK banks in China. The list provided by the Panel lacks key identity information. Upon name-based inquiry, a large number of identical names were found, making the investigation very difficult, and it is hard to guarantee the accuracy of the investigation. Despite such difficulties, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted serious investigations on the information provided in the letter, and found no evidence of violations of UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK.

Letter from the United Arab Emirates of 21 December 2023

- Mr. Sim Hyon Sop entered the UAE on 3 October 2016 with passport No. 109484100.
- The UAE residence visa of Mr. Sim Hyon Sop was cancelled on 21 December 2019, in compliance with the Security Council’s 1718 sanctions regime regarding the DPRK.
- Mr. Sim Hyon Sop departed the UAE on 1 December 2022, and his name was added to the UAE’s travel ban list.
- Mr. Sim Hyon Sop does not have any bank accounts or commercial companies in the UAE, in compliance with the Security Council’s 1718 sanctions regime regarding the DPRK.

Annex 78: Registration information for Epsilon Trade Development Limited (excerpt)

Epsilon Limited Trade Development (ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ЭПСИЛОН") maintains address 690074, Vladivostok, Posadskaya Street, Building 20, 9th floor, unit 901-3 and OGRN 1212500016410. Commercial databases show the company is in liquidation, as of 10 November 2023.

ВЫПИСКА

из Единого государственного реестра юридических лиц

28.12.2023 — дата формирования выписки

№ ЮЭ9965-23-177896191

Настоящая выписка содержит сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ЭПСИЛОН"

полное наименование юридического лица

ОГРН 1 2 1 2 5 0 0 0 1 6 4 1 0

включенные в Единый государственный реестр юридических лиц по состоянию на

« 28 » декабря 20 23 г.

число — месяц прописью — год

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
	Наименование	
1	Полное наименование на русском языке	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ЭПСИЛОН"
2	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
3	Сокращенное наименование на русском языке	ООО "ЭПСИЛОН"
4	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
	Сведения о наличии у юридического лица наименования на языках народов Российской Федерации и (или) на иностранных языках *(сведения указываются по Общероссийскому классификатору информации о населении (ОКИН ОК 018 – 2014 фасет 04))*	
5	Код и наименование языка народов Российской Федерации или иностранного языка	016 Английский
6	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
	Сведения о наличии у юридического лица наименования на английском языке	
7	Полное наименование на английском языке	EPSILON, LIMITED TRADE DEVELOPMENT
8	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021

Company Name

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY "EPSILON"

State Registration Number and date

9	Сокращенное наименование на английском языке	EPSILON CO.,LTD
10	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
Место нахождения и адрес юридического лица		
11	Место нахождения юридического лица	ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ, Г.О. ВЛАДИВОСТОКСКИЙ, Г ВЛАДИВОСТОК
12	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
13	Адрес юридического лица	690078, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ, Г.О. ВЛАДИВОСТОКСКИЙ, Г ВЛАДИВОСТОК, УЛ МЫС ЧУМАКА, Д. 1А, ЭТАЖ 4, ПОМЕЩ. 402
14	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2232500002030 09.01.2023
15	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи о переименовании / переподчинении адресного объекта	2232500597250 12.11.2023
Сведения о регистрации		
16	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица
17	ОГРН	1212500016410
18	Дата регистрации	08.07.2021
19	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
20	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 15 по Приморскому краю
21	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,690012,,,Владивосток г,,Пихтовая,20,,
22	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
Сведения о состоянии юридического лица		
23	Состояние	Находится в стадии ликвидации
24	Срок ликвидации общества с ограниченной ответственностью	01.11.2024
25	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2232500593818 10.11.2023

Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
26	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2232500593818 10.11.2023
27	Фамилия Имя	ЧОЙ ЧОН ГОН
28	ИНН	650114643613
29	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2232500593818 10.11.2023
30	Должность	ЛИКВИДАТОР
31	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2232500593818 10.11.2023
32	Пол	мужской
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2232500593818 10.11.2023
34	Гражданство	гражданин Российской Федерации
Сведения об уставном капитале / складочном капитале / уставном фонде / паевом фонде		
35	Вид	УСТАВНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ
36	Размер (в рублях)	10000
37	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
Сведения об участниках / учредителях юридического лица		
		1 Information on the shareholders/founders
38	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1212500016410 08.07.2021
39	Фамилия Last Name Имя Given Name	СО МЕН
40	ИНН	254342019464
41	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
42	Пол	мужской
43	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
44	Гражданство Nationality	иностранный гражданин Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика
45	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	4900
46	Размер доли (в процентах)	49

So
Myong

Foreign National
Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

47	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
	2	
48	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1212500016410 08.07.2021
49	Фамилия Last Name Имя Given Name	ЧОЙ ЧОН ГОН
50	ИНН	650114643613
51	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
52	Пол	мужской
53	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
54	Гражданство Nationality	гражданин Российской Федерации
55	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	5100
56	Размер доли (в процентах)	51
57	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1212500016410 08.07.2021
	Сведения об учете в налоговом органе	
58	ИНН юридического лица	2543158731
59	КПП юридического лица	254001001
60	Дата постановки на учет в налоговом органе	09.01.2023
61	Сведения о налоговом органе, в котором юридическое лицо состоит (для юридических лиц, прекративших деятельность - состояло) на учете	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 14 по Приморскому краю
62	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2232500002051 09.01.2023
	Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя по обязательному пенсионному страхованию	
63	Регистрационный номер	035008084950
64	Дата регистрации в качестве страхователя	11.01.2023
65	Наименование территориального органа	Отделение Фонда пенсионного и социального страхования Российской Федерации по Приморскому краю
66	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2232500006187 11.01.2023
	Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя по обязательному социальному страхованию	
67	Регистрационный номер	250300526225031

Choi
Chon Gon

Russian
Federation

Source: Russian Unified State Register of Legal Entities/Individual Entrepreneurs, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 79: Information from the Russian corporate registry on possible DPRK joint ventures/cooperative entities, potentially employing DPRK nationals earning income

The Panel investigated Russian corporate registry records of 81 companies that may be DPRK-Russian joint ventures or cooperative entities, all of which are fully or partially owned or managed by DPRK nationals, which may further be employing DPRK nationals earning income. Of the companies listed in this annex and Annex 82, the Russian Federation responded, "based on the results of the inspection it was found that 82 legal entities noted in the request do not actually operate, although they are listed in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities" and "[i]t should be noted that under the civil legislation of the Russian Federation, limited liability companies are not joint ventures or cooperative organizations." Russian Federation responses on individual companies are included in the table below.

The Panel further recalls that, on 8 January 2019, the Russian Federation informed the Panel that "... in the case of Russian companies having a sole founder who is a citizen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, such companies are registered strictly as Russian limited liability companies, rather than joint ventures or cooperative entities, making them Russian legal persons with all the legal consequences that follow therefrom. Such companies are not considered subject to the restrictions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Security Council under paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) or under current Russian law." The Russian Federation also informed the Panel on 21 January 2019 that "joint ventures (in Russian law, no such form of legal person exists)" (see S/2019/171, para. 150 and annex 74).

See **Annex 79.1** for the registration documentation of these companies.

Company Name	Owners / directors	Company location (Russian Federation)	Registration numbers	Additional information	Company (C) or Russian Federation (RF) reply
Alis, OOO (ООО "Алис")	– Kim San Man (Ким Сан Ман, DPRK national, INN 254305862059) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Babkin Andrei Valerevich (Бабкин Андрей Валерьевич, Russian national, INN 253909502547) - Director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1162536087230 INN 2543103179 KPP 254301001 OKPO 04838869		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
AMC, OOO (ООО "ЭЙ ЭМ СИ")	– An Chol Hwan (Ан Чол Хван, DPRK, INN 253612060658) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1212500005651 INN 2540259820 KPP 253601001 OKPO 47623292		C: Nationality of individual is ROK
Arirang, OOO (ООО "АРИРАНГ")	– Shin Hye Ok (Шин Хе Ок, DPRK) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Ignatenko Irina Nikolaevna (Игнатенко Ирина Николаевна, Russian, INN 253802000907) - director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1222500027100 INN 2543170087 KPP 253601001 OKPO 79549195		RF: The head of "Arirang" LLC, established in October 2022, is a Russian citizen .
ASM, OOO (ООО "АСМ", общество с ограниченной ответственностью "амурстроймастер")	– Pak Ki Hek (Пак Ки Хек, DPRK national, INN 280130120714) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Rebro Aleksandr Anatolevich (Ребро Александр Анатольевич, Russian national, INN 280721377708) - director	Svobodny	OGRN 1192801010247 INN 2807007600 KPP 280701001 OKPO 90891468		RF: The DPRK former founder of the company left the Russian Federation in the 2019-2020 period and was subsequently removed from ownership of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.

ATL Trading, OOO (ООО "АТЛ Трейдинг")	– Kim Ho (Ким Хо, DPRK, INN 254000401127) (90,000 rub., 90%) – Yun Svetlana Anatolevna (Юн Светлана Анатольевна, Russian, INN 251120175805) (10,000 rub., 10%) - director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1112540006908 INN 2540174206 KPP 254001001 OKPO 91816687		RF: There are no DPRK citizens among the founders of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.
Balchzhon, OOO (ООО "Балчжон")	– Chan Hyon Guk (Чан Хен Гук, DPRK, INN 254306287443) (5,000 rub., 50%) – Romazanov Pavel Vladimirovich (Ромазанов Павел Владимирович, Russian, INN 330902835492) (5,000 rub., 50%) - director	Lakinsk	OGRN 1133327000300 INN 3309003764 KPP 330901001 OKPO 10481118		RF: The DPRK former founder of the company left the Russian Federation in the 2019-2020 period and was subsequently removed from ownership of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.
Briz, OOO (ООО "Бриз")	– Ma Rin Jun (Ма Линьчжун, DPRK, INN 241107224895) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Zabortsev Oleg Sergeevich (Заборцев Олег Сергеевич, Russian, INN 240780191347) - director	Krasnoyarsk	OGRN 1152468064320 INN 2466168073 KPP 246601001 OKPO 41043790		RF: There are no DPRK citizens among the founders of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.
Bugan, OOO (ООО "Буган")	– Gan Sen Chin (Кан Сен Чин, DPRK, INN 526003670064) (10,000 rub., 100%) - director	Nizhny Novgorod	OGRN 1225200044200 INN 5263150929 KPP 526301001 OKPO 84164333	According to a media report, Bugan, OOO posted an advertisement to hire DPRK construction workers in 2023; advertisement was later removed.[246]	RF: The DPRK former founder of the company left the Russian Federation in the 2019-2020 period and was subsequently removed from ownership of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.

[246] https://octagon.media/istorii/severokorejcam_ne_dayut_rabotat_v_rossii_legalno.html

Camping Baza Shaman, OOO (OOO "Кемпинговая База "Шаман")	– Kim Jae Kyu (Ким Чжэ Кю, Russian, INN 254003450972) (10,000 rub., 24%) – Lee Jesok (Ли Чжесок, ROK, INN 254008871244) (10,000 rub., 24%) – Agafonenko Natalya Valerievna (Агафоненко Наталья Валериевна, Russian, INN 253717650301) (8,750 rub., 21%) – director – Ri Sun Ri (Ли Сун Ре, DPRK, INN 253611069841) (8,750 rub., 21%) – Mitskus Elena Olegovna (Мицкус Елена Олеговна, Russian, INN 253902732990) (4,166.67 rub., 10%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1212500012867 INN 2536328171 KPP 253601001 OKPO 60178891		RF: There are no DPRK citizens among the founders of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.
Chansanstroi, OOO (OOO "Чансанстрой")	– Ri En Shik (Е Ен Сик, DPRK, INN 667906101541) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Zhigera Mikhail Aleksandrovich (Жигера Михаил Александрович, Russian, INN 667415362044)- director	Ekaterinburg	OGRN 1156679003161 INN 6679066700 KPP 667901001 OKPO 25011235		RF: The DPRK former founder of the company left the Russian Federation in the 2019-2020 period and was subsequently removed from ownership of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.
Chebeoton, OOO (OOO "Чебеотон")	– Kim Sang Man (Ким Санг Ман, DPRK, *no INN*) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Polivoda Yana Vladimirovna (Поливода Яна Владимировна, Russian, INN 251115174605) - Director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1222500027606 INN 2540272806 KPP 254001001 OKPO 99340161		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Choki, OOO (ООО "Чоки")	– Jon Gil Ryon (Джон Киль Рён, DPRK, INN 972905167320) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Gavasheli Yuliya Olegovna (Гавашели Юлия Олеговна, Russian, INN 071604327171) - director	Moscow	OGRN 1197746757999 INN 9709058310 KPP 772501001 OKPO 42913571	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 15 DPRK nationals earning income ("workers") in 2023	RF: The DPRK former founder of the company left the Russian Federation in the 2019-2020 period and was subsequently removed from ownership of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.
Cholsan, OOO (ООО "Чхолсан")	– Генеральная Торговая Компания "Чхолсан" Кндр (Cholsan General Trading Company, DPRK) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Gi In Hwang (Гэ Ен Хван, DPRK, INN 540551616620) - Director	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1045401961054 INN 5405284511 KPP 540501001 OKPO 75840120	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 700 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: Since 22 December 2019 no work permits have been issued to the DPRK citizens at CHKHOLSAN, OOO and no notifications of issuance of relevant labor or civil law contracts have been received.
Cholsan, OOO (ООО "Чхолсан")	– Генеральная Торговая Компания "Чхолсан" КНДР (Cholsan General Trading Company DPRK, DPRK) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Pokholkov Anatoli Viktorovich (Похолков Анатолий Викторович, Russian, INN 381000420479) - director	Irkutsk	OGRN 1033801039865 INN 3808094534 KPP 384901001 OKPO 15011653	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 100 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: The company was liquidated in 2021 and does not conduct any activities at present. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.
Dao, OOO SK (ООО СК "Дао")	– Hao Telao (Хаотэлао, DPRK, INN 170114539570) (40,000 rub., 80%) – SARF, OOO (ООО "САРФ") (9,900 rub., 19.80%) (Russian, INN 5404018010; 100% owned by Zhubrin Oleg Ivanovich (Жубрин Олег Иванович , Russian, INN 772580232320)) – Den Yuliya Valerevna (Дэн Юлия Валерьевна, Russian, INN 540120952924) (100 rub., 0.20%)	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1195476006340 INN 5405035240 KPP 540501001 OKPO 35710146		RF: There are no DPRK citizens among the founders of the company. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.

Denkostroi, OOO (ООО "Денкострой")	– Kim In Chol (Ким Ин Чер, DPRK, INN 132612917409) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Yun Myong Bong (Юн Мен Бон, ROK, INN 165816933241) - director	Kazan	OGRN 1151690016686 INN 1658176887 KPP 166001001 OKPO 82332803		RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Dom-Master, OOO (ООО "Дом-Мастер")	– Ro Chen Nam (Ро Чен Нам, DPRK, INN 723011732388) (15,000 rub., 100%) – Sin Do Nam (Син До Нам, DPRK, INN 723021338704) - director	Tyumen	OGRN 1147232021848 INN 7203309414 KPP 720301001 OKPO 32734459	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 40 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Economic Technical Cooperation, OOO (ООО "ЭТС")	– Song Yong Nam (Сонг Ыонг Нам, DPRK, INN 254010842258) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1192536006244 INN 2537139579 KPP 253701001 OKPO 36208259		RF: The DPRK citizens who are occupied by this company are undergoing their educational internship there. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
Enisei, OOO (ООО "Енисей")	– Kim Dok Sam (Ким Док Сам) – owner – Ri In Chol (Ли Ен Чер, DPRK, INN 525801031616) - director	Krasnoyarsk	OGRN 1082468027432 INN 2466210127 KPP 246601001 OKPO 86620723	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 500 DPRK workers in 2023 According to commercial business databases, Enisei, OOO has bid on and won supply contracts for Russian State agencies, with the	RF: There is no existing company with this name. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.

				most recent being in 2017.[247]	
Enisei-K, OOO (ООО "Енисей-К")	– Ri In Chol (Ли Ен Чер, DPRK, INN 525801031616) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Gadzhiev Nadir Islam Ogly (Гаджиев Надир Ислам Оглы, Russian, INN 246202477060) - director	Krasnoyarsk	OGRN 1172468020890 INN 2466180313 KPP 246501001 OKPO 13376190		RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Epsilon, OOO (ООО "Эпсилон")	– Choi Chon Gon (Чой Чон Гон, Russian, INN 650114643613) (5,100 rub., 51%) - director – So Myong (Со Мен, DPRK, INN 254342019464,) (4,900 rub., 49%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1212500016410 INN 2543158731 KPP 254001001 OKPO 50440164	*See also para. 167(Sp Myong) and Epsilon], Annexes 71 and 72*	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Everest, OOO (ООО "Эверест")	– Weng Kwe Hui (Вэн Хуэйхуэй, DPRK, INN 713079732074) (10,000 rub., 50%) – Zhu Fuying (Чжу Фуин, Chinese, INN 713079732148) (5,000 rub., 25%) – Lyao Shoutszyun (Ляо Шоуцзюнь, Chinese, INN 713079731970) (5,000 rub., 25%) – Gorokhova Ilvira Rashitovna (Горохова Ильвира Рашитовна, Russian, INN 710600136425) - director	Tula	OGRN 1107154026320 INN 7107525684 KPP 710701001 OKPO 67624000		RF: It is known for certain that there are no DPRK citizens among the founders of this company. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.

247 For instance, see https://www.rusprofile.ru/id/4155216.

Falcon Krest Management, OOO (OOO "Фэлкон Крэст Менеджмент")	– Ri Ken Jon (Ли Кен Джон, DPRK, INN 253612825000) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1022501311601 INN 2536091557 KPP 254001001 OKPO 52112889		RF: The founder of this company is a citizen of the Republic of Korea. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
Fiton, OOO SP (OOO СП "Фитон")	– Department for the Production of Drugs of the Ministry of Health of the DPRK (Управление По Производству Корепрепаратов Министерства Здравоохранения КНДР) (80,000 rub., 40%) – Galkina Elena Yurevna (Галкина Елена Юрьевна, Russian, INN 753400453629) (69,000 rub., 34.50%) – Department of State Property and Land Relations of the Trans-Baikal Territory (Департамент Имущества Забайкальского Края, OGRN 1087536008801, INN 7536095984, KPP 753601001, OKPO 24738294) (51,000 rub., 25.50%) – Galkin Nikolai Anatolevich (Галкин Николай Анатольевич, Russian, INN 753400222389) - director	Chita	OGRN 1027501147750 INN 7536033674 KPP 753601001 OKPO 05877280		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Genstroi-Okryu, OOO (OOO "Генстрой-Окрю")	– Dobrynin Roman Germanovich (Добрынин Роман Германович, Russian, INN 666403024183) (5,100 rub., 51%) – Pak Ju Il (Пак Зу Ир, DPRK, INN 668504679775) (4,900 rub., 49%) – Bolotbek Uulu Kalnazar (Болотбек Уулу Калназар, Kyrgyzstani, INN 667807801253) - director	Ekaterinburg	OGRN 1156658013808 INN 6670315744 KPP 667801001 OKPO 51815666		RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Geonrim, OOO (OOO "Геонрим")	– Shin Song Ho (Син Сен Хо, DPRK, INN 250212857820) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Tsarev Dmitri Vladimirovich (Царёв Дмитрий Владимирович, Russian, INN 253812406286) - director	Artem	OGRN 1162536085744 INN 2502055818 KPP 250201001 OKPO 04620567		RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Good Choice Co. LTD (OOO "Гуд Чойс")	– An Hyon Jang (Ан Хё Чан, DPRK, INN 253616084233) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1122536004579 INN 2536252420 KPP 253601001 OKPO 38568826		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Gvanbok 3, OOO (OOO "Гванбок 3")	– Tishko Pavel Eduardovich (Тишко Павел Эдуардович, Russian, INN 695007619850) (108,000 rub., 90%) – director – Pak Chan Bok (Пак Чан Бок, DPRK, INN 540543017976) (12,000 rub., 10%)	Tverskaya	OGRN 1126952029973 INN 6950160236 KPP 694901001 OKPO 10826408	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 50 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Intellekt, OOO (OOO "Интеллект")	– Kozlov Sergei Mikhailovich (Козлов Сергей Михайлович, Russian, INN 638200030027) (7,000 rub., 70%) – director – Jon Jin Yong (Чон Чин Ен, DPRK, INN 773169419890) (3,000 rub., 30%)	Moscow	OGRN 1197746161711 INN 7701080141 KPP 773101001 OKPO 36481498	According to a Member State, Jon Jin Yong worked with Kozlov Sergei Mikhailovich to coordinate the use of DPRK construction workers in Russia and served as a	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

				director of one of Kozlov's companies. Jon Jin Yong reportedly led a team of DPRK information technology (IT) workers in Russia and worked with Russian nationals to obtain identification documents to validate the DPRK IT team's accounts on freelance IT work platforms. Some of the identity documents were reportedly from family members or Russian employees of Kozlov. Jon Jin Yong also reportedly coordinated a Moscow-based construction project between Intellekt LLC and a Second Academy of Natural Sciences (KPe.018) cover company.[248]	

[248] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1710

Kanson, OOO (ООО "Кансон")	– Pak Myong Chol (Пак Мыонг Чоль, DPRK, INN 502991481475) (12,000 rub., 100%) – Galman Oleg Nikolaevich (Гальман Олег Николаевич. Russian, INN 772995741974) - director	Moscow	OGRN 1145027010985 INN 5027210830 KPP 771601001 OKPO 32998632	According to a Member State, suspected of employing 2 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Konmen, OOO (ООО "Конмен")	– Choe Myong Chol (Цой Мионг Чол, DPRK, INN 540703027414) (10,000 rub., 51.02%) – Mamaev Serdar Mineevich (Мамаев Сердар Минеевич, Russian, INN 540540745374) (9,600 rub., 48.98%) – Lipovtseva Larisa Nikolaevna (Липовцева Лариса Николаевна, Russian, INN 540436326137) - director	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1135476075525 INN 5404484116 KPP 540401001 OKPO 23613068	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 100 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Konsol, PK (ПК "Консол")	– Kim Aleksei Vladimirovich (Ким Алексей Владимирович, Russian, INN 272513091350) (2,000 rub., 20%) - cooperative chair – Kim Chol Ho (Ким Чер Хо, DPRK, INN 272304014432) (2,000 rub., 20%) – Ri En Ho (Ли Ен Хо, DPRK, INN 272304015002) (2,000 rub., 20%) – Pak Won Sam (Пак Вон Сам, DPRK, INN 272410631797) (2,000 rub., 20%) – Son Jun Il (Сон Чун Ир, DPRK, *no INN*) (2,000 rub., 20%)	Khabarovsk	OGRN 1222700008376 INN 2724249405 KPP 272401001 OKPO 49382496		RF: There is no existing company with this name. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.

Korea Med Servis, OOO (OOO "Корея Мед Сервис")	– Karazhaev Mukhamed Vladimirovich (Каражаев Мухамед Владимирович, Russian, INN 260904891308) (55,000 rub., 55%) – director – Kwak San Ho (Квак Сан-Хо, DPRK, INN 772973247480) (15,000 rub., 15%) – Sakhnovski Boris Samuilovich (Сахновский Борис Самуилович, Russian, INN 773008962400) (11,000 rub., 11%) – Zyuzin Andrei Aleksandrovich (Зюзин Андрей Александрович, Russian, INN 772580660502) (11,000 rub., 11%) – Choe Ho Jin (Чой Хио Джин, *no INN*) (8,000 rub., 8%)	Zolskoe	OGRN 1140725001581 INN 0725014586 KPP 070201001 OKPO 98845232		RF: The founder of this company is a citizen of the Republic of Korea. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
Koryo Group, OOO (OOO "Корё Групп")	– Gavasheli Yuliya Olegovna (Гавашели Юлия Олеговна, Russian, INN 071604327171) (150,000 rub., 50%) – director – Han Chol Ho (Хан Чхол Хо, DPRK, INN 772992694363) (150,000 rub., 50%)	Moscow	OGRN 5177746348632 INN 7725410416 KPP 772501001 OKPO 22126701		RF: The DPRK former founder of the company left the Russian Federation in the 2019-2020 period and was subsequently removed from ownership of the company. The DPRK citizens from this company were associated with this organization within the framework of educational practice. There is no information on the profit made by the DPRK citizen from the activities of the company. No other facts were found regarding possible violations of the DPRK UN sanctions regime.

Koten, OOO (OOO "Котен")	– Koten, OOO (Russian) (9,184.43 rub., 45%) – Kim Gym Dya (Ким Гым Дя, Russian, INN 650103925944) (5,206.59 rub., 25.51%) – Ko Dong Jin (Ко Донг Чжин, DPRK, INN 651000345083) (3,977.83 rub., 19.48%) – АО «Хангуксахалинчжавонкэбаль» (ID# 1101115419886, ROK) (2,040.98 rub., 10%) – Zozulya Vladimir Anatolevich (Зозуля Владимир Анатольевич, Russian, INN 650200397979) - director	Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinski	OGRN 1116501004531 INN 6501239619 KPP 650201001 OKPO 69918846	According to business databases, Koten, OOO has bid on and won four supply contracts for Russian State agencies, as recently as late 2021.249	RF: The founder of this company is a citizen of the Republic of Korea. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
KR-Stroi, OOO (OOO "КР-Строй")	– Choe Yun Myong (Чое Юн Мыонг, DPRK, INN 250216808951) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Artemovski	OGRN 1232500005760 INN 2502071217 KPP 250201001 OKPO 95050058		RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Maiskoe, OOO (OOO "Майское")	– Chzhiyuan Ma (Чжиюань Ма, DPRK INN 246610127031) (45,000 rub., 45%) – Kordoeva Emiliya Arkadevna (Кордоева Эмилия Аркадьевна, Russian, INN 040401170277) (30,000 rub., 30%) – director – ООО "Шипуновские Закрома" (OGRN 1142468024160, Russian)) (25,000 rub., 25%)	Barnaul	OGRN 1172225021242 INN 2222858668 KPP 222501001 OKPO 10356531		RF: It is known for certain that there are no DPRK citizens among the founders of this company. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.

249 For instance, see https://www.rusprofile.ru/id/5548747.

Maru, OOO (OOO "Мару")	– Ri Songbe (Ли Сонгбэ, DPRK, INN 507505934591) (50 000 rub., 100%)	Moscow	OGRN 5157746210496 INN 7743134487 KPP 774301001 OKPO 52688081		RF: The DPRK citizens who are occupied by this company are undergoing their educational internship there. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
Medifeis, OOO (OOO "Медифейс")	– Artemenko Sergei Viktorovich (Артёменко Сергей Викторович, Russian, INN 272113166402) (5,000 rub., 50%) – Kim Sung Han (Ким Сунг Хан, DPRK, INN 272412112821) (5,000 rub., 50%) – Losik Dmitri Viktorovich (Лосик Дмитрий Викторович, Russian, INN 272405289218) - director	Khabarovsk	OGRN 1162724071135 INN 2724213470 KPP 272401001 OKPO 03243795		RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
Megatour, OOO (OOO "Мегатур")	– Kim Joo Hi (Ким Чжухи, DPRK, INN 254300253208) (9,000 rub., 90%) – Kim Tatyana Radikovna (Ким Татьяна Радиковна, Russian, INN 250811762279) (1,000 rub., 10%) – Kim Valentina Radionovna (Ким Валентина Радионовна, Russian, INN 252533452876) - director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1072508001510 INN 2508078561 KPP 254301001 OKPO 80908104		RF: The DPRK citizens who are occupied by this company are undergoing their educational internship there. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
Mire-1, OOO (OOO " Мирэ-1")	– Kim Chung Sung (Ким Чхун Сен, DPRK, INN 231132258073) (10 000 rub., 100%) – Pak Sun Sam (Пак Сун Сам, DPRK, INN 231222877751) – Director	Krasnodar	OGRN 1152312010718 INN 2312233847 KPP 231201001 OKPO 29573917		RF: There is no existing company with this name. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
Moran, OOO (OOO "Моран")	– Ro Myong Hak (Ро Мен Хак, DPRK, INN 667905580958) (100,000 rub., 100%) - director	Ekaterinburg	OGRN 1146679006891 INN 6679048370 KPP 667901001 OKPO 35162265	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 100 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

MTS, OOO (ООО "МЦ") - *Massage Center, OOO*	– Choe Myong Chol (Цой Мионг Чол, DPRK, INN 540703027414) (15,750 rub., 50%) – Jin Song In (Зен Сен Ен, China, INN 540144059124) (15,750 rub., 50%) – Kim Hyon Su - director (Ким Хен Су, DPRK, INN 540553983584)	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1125476111551 INN 5401359519 KPP 540601001 OKPO 11828386		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
My Key, OOO (ООО "Май Кей")	– Kim Hee Won (Ким Хи Вон, DPRK, INN 770373148437) (7,500 rub., 75%) – Kim Umji (Ким Умджи, *no INN*) (2,500 rub., 25%) – Novikova Violetta Anatolevna (Новикова Виолетта Анатольевна, Russian, INN 272004664292) - director	Moscow	OGRN 1207700353410 INN 9702023301 KPP 770201001 OKPO 45758941		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Nakhotek, OOO (ООО "Нахотек")	– Ryang Yon Rim (Рян Ен Рим, DPRK, INN 250822274107) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Bogdanovski Pavel Nikolaevich (Богдановский Павел Николаевич, Russian, INN 253805519345) - director	Partizansk	OGRN 1162536072412 INN 2508127000 KPP 250801001 OKPO 03165776		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Neftyanaya Stolitsa, OOO (ООО "Нефтяная Столица")	– Zhao Ying (Чжао Ин, Chinese, INN 723002840700) (38,950 rub., 50%) – Zou Yanchun (Цзоу Яньчунь, DPRK, INN 720323928310) (38,950 rub., 50%) - director	Tyumen	OGRN 1037200569768 INN 7203079263 KPP 720301001 OKPO 12480784		It was also established that among the founders of NEFTYANAYA STOLITSA, OOO there are no DPRK citizens. The Russian competent authorities have no information regarding the North Korean citizens profiting from the activities of the legal entities mentioned in the request.
Novostroi, OOO (ООО "Новострой")	– Jang Gum Chol (Чан Гым Чер, DPRK, INN 250307574563) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Choe Kwang Yong (Цой Кван Ен, DPRK, INN 250821718173) - director	Nakhodka	OGRN 1192536033997 INN 2508136679 KPP 250801001 OKPO 42010165		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Oryun, OOO (ООО "Орюн")	– Kim Hye Son (Ким Хе Сон, DPRK, INN 254300252564) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Danilyak Elena Nikolaevna (Даниляк Елена Николаевна, Zou Yanchun INN 650102300001) - director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1112540009757 INN 2540176852 KPP 253601001 OKPO 91837376	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 10 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Pioner, OOO (ООО "Пионер")	– Kim Hye Son (Ким Хе Сон, DPRK, INN 254300252564) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Danilyak Elena Nikolaevna (Даниляк Елена Николаевна, Zou Yanchun INN 650102300001) - director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1132502001664 INN 2502047408 KPP 254301001 OKPO 27869973	The Panel has previously reported on Pioner, OOO, which was and remains registered at an address (12 Nevskaya ul., Vladivostok, Russia, 690048) similar to that of the DPRK Consulate in Vladivostok (12A Nevskaya ul., Vladivostok, Russia, 690018), and "consider[ed] that [this company's] collaborative activity with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is "prohibited under paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). This also constitutes a violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) unless the company moved	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

				out before its adoption."[250]	
Primagrosoya, OOO (OOO "Примагросоя")	– Korean General Corporation "Kumgan" (Корейская Генеральная Корпорация "Кымган", DPRK) (9,900,000 rub., 50%) – Primagrosoya, OOO (Russian) (9,900,000 rub., 50%) – Korneev Yuri Aleksandrovich (Корнеев Юрий Александрович, Russian, INN 250600049710) - director	Dalnerechensk	OGRN 1122508002132 INN 2508110960 KPP 250601001 OKPO 10228187	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 5 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Pyongyang Construction Company, OOO (OOO "Пхеньянская Строительная Компания", OOO "ПСК")	– Kim Hyon Hee (Ким Хен Хи, DPRK, INN 701744227742) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Kiporenko Tatyana Vladimirovna (Кипоренко Татьяна Владимировна, Russian, INN 702203663197) - director	Tomsk	OGRN 1107017004170 INN 7017257303 KPP 701701001 OKPO 64109846	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 250 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Construction Company Rai (SK Rai), OOO (OOO"СК"Рай")	– Ri Bom Chol (Ли Бом Чхор, DPRK, INN 344409777950) (12,000 rub., 100%) – Kim Chol Song (Ким Чхоль Сон, DPRK, INN 344411719201) - director	Volgograd	OGRN 1123444003330 INN 3444193695 KPP 344401001 OKPO 09555113	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 750 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Raistroi, OOO (OOO "Райстрой")	– Kim En Chol (Ким Ен Чер, DPRK, INN 250211858050) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Ri Sen Nam (Ли Сен Нам, DPRK, INN 254305594667) - director	Artem	OGRN 1062502018072 INN 2502029889 KPP 250201001 OKPO 94933146	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 170	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

250 See S/2019/171 para 150.

				DPRK workers in 2023	
Rakvon, OOO (OOO "Раквон")	– Pak Un Hwa (Пак Ен Хва, DPRK, INN 540550342230) (12,000 rub., 100%) – Ri Kang Ho (Ли Ган Хо, DPRK, INN 540551491509) - director	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1125476063613 INN 5404459511 KPP 540401001 OKPO 38794675	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 450 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Rakvon, OOO ETS (ООО ЭТС "Раквон")	– Kim Jon Chol (Ким Чен Чер, DPRK, INN 165925271421) (20,000 rub., 100%) – Kim Evgeni Georgevich (Ким Евгений Георгевич, Russian, INN 165925589373) - director	Kazan	OGRN 1065262097779 INN 5262154409 KPP 166001001 OKPO 96650955	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 350 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: RAKVON, OOO ETS has been officially liquidated.
SP Rakvon-Rai, OOO (ООО "Сп Раквон-Раи")	– Kim Chon (Ким Чон, DPRK, INN 190210199752) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Voitov Sergei Vladimirovich (Войтов Сергей Владимирович, Russian, INN 190200219897) - director	Sayanogorsk	OGRN 1151902000249 INN 1902026425 KPP 190201001 OKPO 29634205		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Resurs DV, OOO (OOO "Ресурс ДВ")	– Pan Yong Yong (Пан Ен Ён, DPRK, INN 222261826481) (14,000 rub., 100%) – Ri Sang Ok (Ри Санг Ок, DPRK, 254341107911) - Director	Vladivostok	INN 2540178970 OGRN 1122540001055 KPP 253701001 OKPO 38559661		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Rokoms, OOO (OOO "Рокомс")	– Pak Yu Yun (Пак Ю Еун, DPRK, INN 253716783563) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1102537005724 INN 2537085316 KPP 254301001 OKPO 68543232		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Krasnoyarsk Office of the General Foreign Trading Company "Ronrado", OOO (OOO Кфгво "Рынрадо")	– Kim Se Chun (Ким Се Чун, DPRK, INN 246531378755) (12,500 rub., 100%) – Ri Hyok Chol (Ри Хек Чер, DPRK, INN 246531845791) - director	Krasnoyarsk	OGRN 1022401784679 INN 2460052058 KPP 246501001 OKPO 55434211	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 600 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Roskor, OOO (OOO "Роскор")	– Choe Myong Chol (Цой Мионг Чол, DPRK, INN 540703027414) - 50% – Peshcherov Sergei Valentinovich (Пещеров Сергей Валентинович, Russian, INN 540409542749) - 50%, director	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1125476226138 INN 5404474982 KPP 540401001 OKPO 21005585	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 50 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Ruscom, OOO (OOO "Руском")	– Ri Sun Rye (Ли Сун Ре, DPRK, INN 253611069841)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1222500013031 INN 2543166034 KPP 254301001 OKPO 48457281		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Ryn-Yarstroi, OOO (OOO "Рын-Ярстрой")	– Pak Gwang Son (Пак Гван Сен, DPRK, INN 760418687474) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Atif Karim Bashirovich (Атиф Карим Баширович, Russian, INN 760307908738) - director	Yaroslavl	OGRN 1167627098880 INN 7604315983 KPP 760601001 OKPO 05596032		The DPRK citizen who was the founder of RYN-YARSTROI, OOO left the Russian Federation and therefore was removed from the list of owners of these organizations.
Rynra, OOO (OOO "Рынра")	– Chon Dae Bom (Чон Тхэ Бом, DPRK, INN 246609295049) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Osmanov Elshad Ilkham Ogly (Османов Эльшад Ильхам Оглы, Russian, INN 246524976289)- director	Krasnoyarsk	OGRN 1152468055486 INN 2466167030 KPP 246601001 OKPO 41034651		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Construction Company Rynrado (SK Rynrado), OOO (OOO "СК РЫНРАДО")	– Ri Hak Chol (Ли Хак Чер, DPRK, INN 540312312614) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Golovlev Roman Evgenevich (Головлев Роман Евгеньевич,	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1205400041857 INN 5405057195 KPP 540501001 OKPO 46053065	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 650	It was also established that among the founders of SK RYNRADO, OOO there are no DPRK citizens. The Russian competent authorities have no information regarding the North Korean citizens profiting from the activities of

	Russian, INN 544052456256) - director			DPRK workers in 2023	the legal entities mentioned in the request.
Ryugen, OOO (OOO "Рюген")	– Shin Song Ho (Син Сен Хо, DPRK, INN 250212857820) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Tsarev Dmitri Vladimirovich (Царёв Дмитрий Владимирович, Russian, INN 253812406286) - director	Artem	OGRN 1162536084094 INN 2502055776 KPP 250201001 OKPO 04464222		RF: The DPRK citizen who used to be a founder of this company has left the Russian Federation and was subsequently removed from the lists of the founders of this organization. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in those companies.
SF Troika, OOO (OOO "СФ"Тройка")	– Ri Un Il (Ли Ен Ир, DPRK, INN 165928346330) (11,000 rub., 100%)	Kazan	OGRN 1141690028600 INN 1659144856 KPP 165901001 OKPO 47106757		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Shik, OOO (OOO "Шик")	– Kim Hyok Chol (Ким Хек Чер, DPRK, INN 251121515780) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Balobasov Dmitri Leonidovich (Балобасов Дмитрий Леонидович, Russian, INN 410101060035) - director	Ussurisk	OGRN 1142511001148 INN 2511087630 KPP 251101001 OKPO 10239191	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 750 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Sin Pen, OOO (OOO "Син Пен")	– Jong Tong Du (10,000 rub., 100%) (Жонг Тонг Ду, DPRK, INN 272304383623) – Kim Aleksei Vladimirovich (Ким Алексей Владимирович, Russian, INN 272513091350) - director	Khabarovsk	OGRN 1172724025198 INN 2723196768 KPP 272301001 OKPO 19578658		RF: There is no existing company with this name. There is no evidence concerning the profit of DPRK citizens in this company.
Staffkom, OOO (OOO "Стаффком")	– Nam Myong Chol (Нам Мен Чол, DPRK, INN 250214105463) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1127746262588 INN 7704805163 KPP 253601001 OKPO 09203199		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Stroi-P, OOO (OOO "Строй-П")	– Kim Chang Son (Ким Чанг Сон, DPRK, INN 254342151134) (50,000 rub., 100%)	Nakhodka	OGRN 1162536079111 INN 2508127642 KPP 250801001 OKPO 03865150		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Stroika-5, OOO (OOO "Стройка-5")	– Foreign Construction Company Photongan (Внешнестроительное Общество "Пхотонган") (DPRK) (6,000 rub., 60%) – Dudin Aleksandr Evlampievich (Дудин Александр Евлампиевичm, Russian, INN 381250476570) (2,000 rub., 20%) – Kulikov Daniil Danilovich (Куликов Даниил Данилович, Russian, INN 380801332222) (2,000 rub., 20%) – Pulyaevskaya Lyudmila Ivanovna (Пуляевская Людмила Ивановна, Russian, INN 381001461340) - director	Irkutsk	OGRN 1023801549133 INN 3811074231 KPP 381001001 OKPO 15018610	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 75 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: STROIKA-5 has been officially liquidated.
Stroiproekt, OOO (OOO "Стройпроект")	– Ryon Chol Jun (Рян Чхор Зун, DPRK, INN 250213051180) (10,000 rub., 100%) – O Jang Bok (О Чхан Бок, DPRK, *no INN*) - director	Artem	OGRN 1162536094710 INN 2502056152 KPP 250201001 OKPO 02681599		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Tandao, OOO (OOO "Тандао")	– Wan Hun (Ван Хун, DPRK, INN 668604995767) (8,000 rub., 80%) – Kuzko Anatoli Borisovich (Кузько Анатолий Борисович, Russian, INN 773372448056) (2,000 rub., 20%) - director	Moscow	OGRN 5157746049775 INN 7736255970 KPP 773601001 OKPO 17325568		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
TSK Daigon, OOO (OOO "ТСК "Дайгон")	– Ri Chan Hyo (Ли Чхан Хё, DPRK, INN 381119927241) (5,000 rub., 50%) – Minyaev Evgeni Yurevich (Миняев Евгений Юрьевич, Russian, INN 381019920108) (5,000 rub., 50%) - director	Irkutskaya	OGRN 1213800000083 INN 3810086682 KPP 381001001 OKPO 21799303		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Vitamin ABC, LLC (ООО "Витамин АВС")	– An Chol Hwan (Ан Чол Хван, DPRK, INN 253612060658) (30,000 rub., 100%) – Tsydendambaeva Erzhena Zhamyanovna (Цыдендамбаева Эржена Жамьяновна, Russian, INN 031002370304) - director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1182536027189 INN 2536312012 KPP 253601001 OKPO 32252341		C: Nationality of individual is ROK
VSL, ООО (ООО "ВСЛ")	– Ri Son Be (Ли Сун Ре, DPRK, INN 253611069841) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Domanskaya Nina Viktorovna (Доманская Нина Викторовна, Russian, INN 253908734400) - Director	Vladivostok	OGRN 1182536023669 INN 2536311403 KPP 253601001 OKPO 31638794		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Yaksan, ООО (ООО "ЯКСАН")	– Kim Un Sik (Ким Ун Сик, DPRK, INN 540550122516) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Novosibirsk	OGRN 1175476009466 INN 5405994208 KPP 540501001 OKPO 06513031		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
ZB-Stroi, ООО (ООО "ЗБ-Строй")	– Pak Chol San (Пак Чол Сан, DPRK, INN 246533076799) (10,000 rub., 100%) – Kirillova Natalya Rashidovna (Кириллова Наталья Рашидовна, Russian, INN 246005195355) - director	Krasnoyarsk	OGRN 1162468084294 INN 2465147306 KPP 246001001 OKPO 03050961		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Zenko-1, ООО (ООО "Зенко-1")	– Yu Yong Nam (Ю Ыонг Нам, DPRK, INN 253617535190) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Vladivostok	OGRN 1192536034338 INN 2543144464 KPP 253601001 OKPO 42067946		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Zenko-28, ООО (ООО "Зенко-28")	– Son Guk Il (Сон Кук Ир, DPRK, INN 251121515532) (11,000 rub., 100%) – Balobasov Dmitri Leonidovich (Балобасов Дмитрий Леонидович, Russian, INN 410101060035) - director	Ussurisk	OGRN 1062724056042 INN 2724093959 KPP 251101001 OKPO 95254447	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 60 DPRK workers in 2023	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Zenko-39, OOO (OOO "Зенко-39")	– Jang Chin Man (Чан Чин Мен, DPRK, INN 772995534618) (5,000 rub., 50%) – Chen Gon Chol (Чен Ген Чер, Russian, INN 231124477339) (5,000 rub., 50%) – Ryu Jung Ryong (Рю Чхун Рён, DPRK, INN 231133389520) - Director	Krasnodar	OGRN 1092308007670 INN 2308160794 KPP 231101001 OKPO 63233343	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 600 DPRK workers in 2023	RF: Since 22 December 2019 no work permits have been issued to the DPRK citizens at ZENKO-39, OOO and no notifications of issuance of relevant labor or civil law contracts have been received. The DPRK citizens who were the founders of ZENKO-39, OOO, left the Russian Federation and therefore were removed from the list of owners of these organizations.
Zolotaya Zvezda, OOO (OOO "Золотая Звезда")	– Kim Chang Bo (Ким Чхан Бо, DPRK, INN 231222189191) (10,000 rub., 100%)	Krasnodar	OGRN 1172375003382 INN 2310197801 KPP 231001001 OKPO 06383918		The DPRK citizen who was the founder of ZOLOTAYA ZVEZDA, OOO, has left the Russian Federation and therefore was removed from the list of owners of these organizations.

Note: Company and individual names have been transliterated from the original Russian-language documents.

Source: Russian Federation corporate registry records, commercial business databases, Panel investigations, Member States.

Annex 80: Russian Federation reply on So Myong, Choi Chon Gon and Epsilon Limited Trade Development

Upon receiving the letter OC.159 from […], Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts, we have to share our most serious concern regarding the increasing reliance of the Panel in its work on unilateral sanctions imposed by third parties. It is deeply worrisome that the Panel has started to reference them more and more in its requests, completely disregarding the fact that such sanctions are illegitimate and obviously are out of scope of the relevant decisions of the United Nations Security Council and violate the established processes within the Council and the 1718 Committee. Moreover, we find it most regrettable that we find ourselves in the position when we have to remind the Panel of Experts of its mandate in accordance with the relevant UN SC resolutions. In these circumstances and in the interest of preserving the integrity of the Panel we, as a responsible Member of the 1718 Committee, have no other option, but to "return the letter to the sender", and express our sincere hope that the Panel will continue to fulfill its duties in accordance with its mandate, while reiterating our readiness to continue to see to the implementation of the relevant UN SC decisions.

Annex 81: Member State information on bank accounts maintained by Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company to launder illicit revenue acquired by DPRK IT workers[251] [252]

Bank Name	Account Number	Country
[redacted]	6228480048628072976	China
[redacted]	6228480049037710000	China
[redacted]	6228480048628070000	China
[redacted]	6230520040022230000	China
[redacted]	6230520590021956972	China
[redacted]	6217850400007690000	China
[redacted]	6210810730036040000	China
[redacted]	6217000730017650000	China
[redacted]	6217000730012086852	China
[redacted]	6217682902576070	China
[redacted]	6222033301009580000	China
[redacted]	6229083491455940000	China
[redacted]	6229083491458690000	China
[redacted]	6229083491462580000	China
[redacted]	6229083491464180000	China
[redacted]	6229083491458692150	China
[redacted]	6216916502748110	China
[redacted]	6216916503395990	China
[redacted]	6216916503395992	China
[redacted]	6216916502748118	China
[redacted]	621691650339599	China
[redacted]	6217992210020837695	China
[redacted]	6217992210020830000	China
[redacted]	6223092210010290000	China
[redacted] or [redacted]	6217000730022979690	China
[redacted] or [redacted]	6212263301020748983	China
[redacted] or [redacted]	6217850400009615649	China

[251] Note: These accounts may be in the names of non-DPRK proxies whom DPRK IT workers pay for use of the proxy accounts.
[252] The lead expert on this issue does not agree with redacting the bank names of one country.


[redacted]		
[redacted]	6222033301009588325	China
[redacted]	6217000730012086845	China
CJSC ALFA-BANK	458443282159[redacted]	Russia
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation	427650002842[redacted]	Russia
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation	427650002949[redacted]	Russia
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation	427650004820[redacted]	Russia
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation	427650005390[redacted]	Russia
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation	427938067262[redacted]	Russia
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation	546950001464[redacted]	Russia
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation	546950001656[redacted]	Russia
VTB Bank OJSC	536829101381[redacted]	Russia
Tinkoff Bank	553691390605[redacted]	Russia

Annex 82[253]: Member State information on bank accounts used by Shenyang GoldenPack Technic Development Co., Ltd (沈阳金派克技术开发有限公司) to launder money on behalf of by Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company's overseas DPRK IT workers

Bank Name	Account Number	Country
[redacted]	621691650339599	China
[redacted]	6230520590021956972	China

[253] The lead expert on this issue does not agree with redacting the bank names of one country.

Annex 83: Shenyang GoldenPack Technic Development Co., Ltd and related companies



Source: Panel.

Annex 84: Member State replies to Panel enquiries on Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company-related bank accounts and Shenyang GoldenPack Technic Development Co., Ltd

China: “Based on thorough investigations conducted on the information provided by the Panel and found no evidence that the relevant banking accounts violated UN Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK.”

Russian Federation: “The research showed that VTB Bank OJSC and CJSC ALFA-BANK have not opened up to date any of the banking accounts enlisted in the request. 6 out of 8 enlisted banking accounts have not been opened by Tinkoff Bank. The other two accounts belong to Russian nationals. There has been no evidence found that these Russian nationals are related to the DPRK company Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company.”

Annex 85[254]: Member State information on bank accounts in China utilized by a Ministry of the People's Armed Forces (KPe.054; aka Ministry of Defense, Ministry of National Defense) subordinate, 53 Department (aka 53 Bureau), to remit earnings back to the control of 53 Department headquarters

Bank Name	Account Number
[redacted]	6228480651791066012
[redacted]	6228480598009645576
[redacted]	6228480598984746670
[redacted]	6228480040982962314
[redacted]	6228480405985833673
[redacted]	6228450598045896874
[redacted]	6228480040931503615
[redacted]	6228480049053963978
[redacted]	6228480049106904573
[redacted]	6228480049036571476
[redacted]	6228480048557360178
[redacted]	6228450010019377311
[redacted]	6230520660077960176
[redacted]	6228450018065928770
[redacted]	6228490048013665473
[redacted]	6228480598962490473
[redacted]	6214680052525555
[redacted]	6216610500001223590
[redacted]	6216690400000827249
[redacted]	6013820500993112899
[redacted]	6216690400000504244
[redacted]	4563510400014862906
[redacted]	6222020707000477018
[redacted]	016120101130097002
[redacted]	6212250200002118006
[redacted]	6217000180029387242
[redacted]	6222620440000830747
[redacted]	6226621906546740
[redacted]	6226681900094519
[redacted]	6226621907113672
[redacted]	6214351242416472
[redacted]	6214830207467621
[redacted]	6217000610004236907
[redacted]	6227003811740281878
[redacted]	6217002390008678804

[254] The lead expert on this issue does not agree with redacting the bank names of one country.

[redacted]	6222620440000359259
[redacted]	6230200122959740
[redacted]	6222030200014260594
[redacted]	6212260707001828995
[redacted]	6222033301010216080
[redacted]	6222030707002319547
[redacted]	6222030707000922771
[redacted]	6222084000005998631
[redacted]	6222030705000062259
[redacted]	6222080707000722071
[redacted]	9558883301000144636
[redacted]	6222620440001391533
[redacted]	6222620310008316215

Annex 86[255]: Information on Yantai Jinmin Industry and Trade Company (烟台锦旻工贸有限公司, Uniform Social Credit Code 91370600690624493F)

According to a Member State, Chinese national Li Zhenyu (DOB 8 February 1977, associated with identification number 210113197702085618), owner and legal representative of Yantai Jinmin Industry and Trade Company, is associated with the effort to establish a joint venture with Green Pine Associated Corporation (KPe.010).



Source: National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, Panel annotations.

[255]One member of the Panel is of the view that evidence in this Annex should be further corroborated.

Annex 87[256]: Information from the Russian corporate registry on possible Russia-registered DPRK companies potentially employing DPRK nationals earning income

The Panel investigated Russian corporate registry records of well as 42 Russia-registered DPRK entities, which may be employing DPRK nationals earning income. Of the companies listed in this annex and Annex 73, the Russian Federation responded, "based on the results of the inspection it was found that 82 legal entities noted in the request do not actually operate, although they are listed in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities." Russian Federation responses on individual companies are included in the table below.

Company name	DPRK owners / directors	Company location (Russian Federation)	Registration numbers	Additional information	Comments
Aisprint Konsulting, FL KOO (ФЛ КОО "Айспринт консультинг")	Kim Geng Il (Ким Генг Ил)	Saint Petersburg	INN 9909323950 OKPO 65977591		RF: Russian Federation replied that Aisprint Konsulting, FL KOO had been officially liquidated.
Aprokkan, Pred OTZ (Пред ОТЗ "Апроккань") - Korea Amnokgang Technology Development Corporation Vladivostok Representative Office	Ri Yong Tae (Ри Ыонг Тае) Hong Yong Sen	Vladivostok	INN 9909344990 KPP 253751001 OKPO 91800858	According to a commercial business database, has 7 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Korean Trading Company Changsu (Представительство Корейской торговой компании "Чансу" (КНДР) в г.Владивостоке)	Ri Song Il (Ри Сонг Иль)	Vladivostok	INN 9909404173 KPP 253651001 OKPO 31135923	According to a commercial business database, has 5 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the Export and Import Company "Chhorsanbong" (Представительство Общества По Экспорту И Импорту "Чхорсанбонг")	Rim Chol Su (Рим Чоль Су)	Vladivostok	INN 9909538875 KPP 254392001	According to a commercial business database, has 5 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Trading Company Dorasi (Торговая Компания "Дорази")	Kim Song Jim (Ким Сен Гым)	Vladivostok	INN 9909543610 KPP 254092001	According to a commercial business database, has 5 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

[256] One member of the Panel is of the view that information in this table should be further corroborated and analyzed in conjunction with information from the Russian Federation provided in Annex 79.

General Society for Export and Import of Ferrous Metals under the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of the DPRK (Пред По Эксорту И Иморту Черных Металлов (КНДР))	Cha Yong Bom (Ча Ыонг Бом)	Vladivostok	INN 9909206615 KPP 254051001 OKPO 88262162		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Korean Trading Company Yolgwan (Представительство Корейской Торговой Компании "Ёльгван")	U Yong Nam (У Ыонг Нам)	Vladivostok	INN 9909551636 KPP 254392001	According to a commercial business database, has 10 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Korean Foreign Trade Company Yonhwa (Представительство Корейского Внешнеторгового Общества "Ёнхва")	Choe In Guk (Чое Ин Гук)	Vladivostok	INN 9909537381 KPP 254392001	According to a commercial business database, has 5 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Society of Information and Technology Exchange Enphun (Представительство Общества Обмена Информацией И Технологией "Енпхунь")	Ri Kvang (Ри Кванг)	Vladivostok	INN 9909498196 KPP 254392001	According to a commercial business database, has 10 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Yenphung Company for Distribution of Mariculture (Представительство Компании "Енпхунг" По Распространению Марикультуры)	Kim Ji Song (Ким Жи Сонг)	Vladivostok	INN 9909492067 KPP 254392001	According to a commercial business database, has 10 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Air Koryo Representative Office(Представительство Авиапредприятия "Эр Корё" Во Владивостоке)	Ryu Kvang Su (Рю Кванг Су)	Artem	INN 9909087020 KPP 250251001 NZA 20150034850	According to a commercial business database, has 3 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Air Koryo Moscow Representative Office (Пред "Эр Коре")	Pak Chan Hun (Пак Чан Хун)	Moscow	INN 9909087020 KPP 773851001 OKPO 59100257 NZA 20150034872	According to a commercial business database, has 2 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

				The Panel notes that this company's address (Office 106, 72 Mosfilmovskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, Russia, 119330) is similar to that of the DPRK Embassy in Moscow (72 Mosfilmovskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, Russia, 119590) and considers that this may constitute a violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016).	
Company Feson for Export and Import of Medications (Представительство Компании "Фёсон" По Экспорту И Импорту Медикаментов)	Kim Yong Chol (Ким Ыонг Чоль)	Vladivostok	INN 9909493656 KPP 254092001 NZA 20180001534	According to a commercial business database, has 5 "foreign" employees	*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Kompaniya "Nam'yang Aloe" (Фл "Юнивера-Россия" В Г.Уссурийске)	Kim Ho (Ким Хо, INN 254000401127)	Ussurisk	INN 9909098350 OKPO 52098451		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Korean Scientific Society / Vladivostok (Влад пред Корейского Научного Общества)	Jo Se Gwan (Чо Се Гвон)	Vladivostok	INN 9900327377 OKPO 65485824		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Knde Ko. Ltd, Fl Koo (Фл Коо "Кнде Ко. Лтд")	Jon Su Pak (Джон Су Пак)	Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	INN 9909196149 OKPO 93111703		RF: The founder of KNDE KO. LTD, FL KOO is a citizen of the Republic of Korea. The Russian competent authorities have no information regarding the North Korean citizens profiting from the activities of the legal entities mentioned in the request.
'Representative Office of the Association " Korean Textile Center " (Пред Ассоциации "Корейский Текстильный Центр")	E Jon Gu (И Чжон Ву)	Moscow	INN 9909149163 KPP 773851001 OKPO 75368284		*Based on the Russian Federation's response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Representative Office of the Korean Corporation "Kyong Un" (Представительство Корейской Корпорации "Кыонг Ун")	Kim Song Il (Ким Сонг Иль)	Vladivostok	INN 9909499778 KPP 253692001 NZA 20180002502	According to a commercial business database, has 10 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Korean Corporation Korea Keumgan Group (Представительство Корейской Корпорации "Кымган Групп" (КНДР) Г. Владивосток)	Kang Jang Rim (Канг Чанг Рим)	Vladivostok	INN 9909474967 KPP 253692001 NZA 20170000895	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Korean Trading Company Geumganbong (Представительство Корейской Торговой Компании "Кымганбонг")	Son Gyong Il (Сон Кыонг Иль)	Vladivostok	INN 9909526929 KPP 254392001 NZA 20190000754	According to a commercial business database, has 10 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Ministry of Fisheries of the Dprk (Пред Мин-Ва Рыбного Хозяйства)	Ji Ryon Chol (Чи Ен Чер)	Vladivostok	INN 9909137545 KPP 253692001 OKPO 88240249 NZA 20150022321	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the 21st Pyongyang Trading Company (Представительство 21-Й Пхеньянской Торговой Компании)	Ri Jang Gwang (Ри Чанг Гванг)	Vladivostok	INN 9909500663 KPP 253692001 NZA 20180002678	According to a commercial business database, has 10 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of a Korean Medical Instrument Manufacturing Company (Представительство Корейской Компании По Изготовлению Медицинских Инструментов)	U Yong Chol (У Ыонг Чоль)	Vladivostok	INN 9909542857 KPP 253692001 NZA 20190002613	According to a commercial business database, has 10 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the Korean General Petroleum Association (DPRK) Vladivostok (Представительство Корейского Генерального	So Jun Sok (Со Жун Сок)	Vladivostok	INN 9909318559 KPP 253651001 NZA 20150038843	According to a commercial business database, has 4 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Нефтяного Объединения (КНДР) Г. Владивосток)					
Representation of the Joint Information Company of the 21st Century (Представительство Совместной Информационной Компании 21 Века)	Jang Jon Bok (Жанг Джун Бок)	Vladivostok	INN 9909552372 KPP 254392001 NZA 20190003658	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the Fishing Corporation "Raymond" (DPRK), Magadan (Представительство Рыболовной Корпорации "Раймонд" (КНДР) Г. Магадан)	Pak Jon Gil (Пак Чен Гил, INN 490916149208)	Magadan	INN 9909298084 KPP 490951001 OKPO 11219635 NZA 20160000322	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	RF: The DPRK citizen who was the founder of the representative office of the Fishing Corporation "Raymond" left the Russian Federation and therefore was removed from the list of owners of these organizations.
Branch of the General Foreign Trade Company "Rakvon" DPRK (Vladivostok) (Филиал Генерального Внешнеторгового Общества "Раквон" КНДР (Г. Владивосток))	Kan Myong Ho (Кан Мен Хо)	Vladivostok	INN 9909483760 KPP 253791001 NZA 10170001490	According to a Member State, suspected of employing approximately 150 DPRK nationals earning income in 2023 According to a commercial business database, has 50 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the Korean General Trading Company "Rynra-888" (Представительство Корейского Генерального Торгового Общества "Рынра-888")	Kim Yong Ho (Ким Ыонг Хо)	Vladivostok	INN 9909499834 KPP 254392001 NZA 20180002491	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees The Panel notes that this company’s address (12 Nevskaya ul., Vladivostok, Russia, 690048) is similar to that of the DPRK Consulate in	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

				Vladivostok (12A Nevskaya ul., Vladivostok, Russia, 690018) and considers that this may constitute a violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016).	
Representative Office of Techno-Trading Company "Sesung" DPRK (Vladivostok) (Представительство Техно-Торгового Общества "Сесунг" КНДР (Г. Владивосток))	Ri Sung Jon (Ли Сунг Хйон)	Vladivostok	INN 9909509507 KPP 253692001 NZA 20180003723	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the Korean Trading Company "Song Jin" (Представительство Корейской Торговой Компании "Сонг Жин")	Dong Rim Ho (Донг Рим Хо)	Vladivostok	INN 9909550569 KPP 253692001 NZA 20190003361	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the Korea Trading Company "Synri-Jonji" (DPRK) Vladivostok (Представительство Корейской Торговой Компании "Сынри-Чонзи" (КНДР) Г. Владивосток)	Ju Dong Sung (Жу Тонг Сунг)	Vladivostok	INN 9909401479 KPP 253651001 NZA 20160000311	According to a commercial business database, has 4 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of Corporation for Technologies "Tansim" (Представительство Корпорации По Технологиям "Тансим")	Kim Yon Jin (Ким Ыон Жин)	Vladivostok	INN 9909560292 KPP 254392001 NZA 20200000667	According to a commercial business database, has 10 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of Trading Company "Ulrim" (Представительство Торговой Компании "Ульрим")	Pak Chol Man (Пак Чоль Ман)	Vladivostok	INN 9909542840 KPP 253692001 NZA 20190002591	According to a commercial business database, has 10 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

General Enterprise for Far Sea Navigation and Management under the Ministry of Land and Sea Transport of the DPRK (Влад Пред По Дальноморскому Судоходству)	Jong Jae Son (Жонг Жае Сон)	Vladivostok	INN 9909199661 KPP 253651001 OKPO 88240120 NZA 20150032496	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Vneshugol, Pred (Пред "Внешуголь")	Kim Hong Gwan (Ким Хон Гвон)	Neryungri	OKPO 52485449		RF: The DPRK citizen who was the founder of the representative office of the Fishing Corporation "Raymond" left the Russian Federation and therefore was removed from the list of owners of these organizations.
Representative Office of the Main Department of the Forestry "Wondon Rimob" of the Ministry of Forestry of the DPRK (Представительство Главного Управления Лесной Промышленности "Вондон Римоб" Минлеспрома КНДР) (Фл Гулп "Вондон Римоб")	Ri Gwon Yong (Ри Кван Йонг) Son Chan Il (Сон Чхан Ир)	Ussurisk Khabarovsk	INN 9909077617 KPP 251192001 NZA 20180001150, 20150012355 OKPO 85105019	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative Office of the Pyongyang Foreign Trade Tobacco Company "Unha" in Vladivostok (Представительство Пхеньянского Внешнеторгового Табачного Общества "Ынха" В Г. Владивосток)	Pak Yong Jin (Пак Ыонг Жин)	Vladivostok	INN 9909461333 KPP 253692001 NZA 20160002490	According to a commercial business database, has 3 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Fl "Univera-Russia" in Ussuriysk (Фл "Юнивера-Россия" В Г.Уссурийске)	Kim Ho	Ussurisk	INN 9909098350 OKPO 52098451		*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representation of the Korean Trading Company "Green Industry" (DPRK) Vladivostok (Представительство	O In Jun (O Ин Жун)	Vladivostok	INN 9909455900 KPP 253692001 NZA 20160001906	According to a commercial business database, has 4 “foreign” employees	RF: O In Jun could be the same person as the reported Vladivostok-based Korea Daesong Bank (KPe.035) representative O In Jun (see Annex 71)

Корейской Торговой Компании "Зеленая Индустрия " (КНДР) Г.Владивосток)					
Korea General Corporation for External Construction Vladivostok Representative Office (Представительство Корейского Генерального Общества По Строительству За Рубежом "Зенко" (КНДР), Г. Владивосток)	Ko Yongil (Ко Ыонгиль)	Vladivostok	INN 9909159891 KPP 254392001 NZA 20150022387	According to a commercial business database, has 17 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Korea General Corporation for External Construction Khasan Representative Office (Корейское Генеральное Общество По Строительству За Рубежом "Зенко" (КНДР))	Kim Myong Guk (Ким Мен Гук)	Khasan	INN 9909159891 KPP 253151001 OKPO 80944608 NZA 20150028184	According to a commercial business database, has 5 “foreign” employees	*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*
Representative office of the Korean TIC "Peksan" (Представительство Корейского ТИЦ "Пэксан")	Yun Tae Dok	Vladivostok	INN 9909392520 OKPO 27868212		*Based on the Russian Federation’s response, the Panel is unable to ascertain whether the company is still operating.*

Note: Company and individual names have been transliterated from the original Russian-language documents. / Source: Russian Federation corporate registry records, commercial business databases, Panel investigations, Member States.

Annex 88: Individuals operating overseas reportedly related to Korean National Insurance Company (KPe.048) and/or its reported front/subordinate companies Polestar Insurance Company (PIC), Samhae Insurance Company (SIC), and Rainbow Intermediaries (RI)

Name	Suspected Position	Additional information	Location	Member State response
Choe Myong Chol	KNIC Representative	Status: Diplomat Designation: First Secretary (Economic and Commercial Section) Date of arrival: 25 May 2015 DPRK passport number: 481110043 Date of birth: 7 April 1974	Pakistan	"[Choe and Jon] are diplomats who have, during the last three years, travelled to China and DPRK only. No record of any commercial, rent-seeking or profitable activity is found yet… [and] no investigation or prosecution is underway"
Jon Hyon Chol	KNIC Representative	Status: Diplomat Designation: First Secretary (Economic and Commercial Section) Date of arrival: 18 January 2020 DPRK passport number: 481410050 Date of birth: 1 January 1985	Pakistan	"[Choe and Jon] are diplomats who have, during the last three years, travelled to China and DPRK only. No record of any commercial, rent-seeking or profitable activity is found yet… [and] no investigation or prosecution is underway"
Kim Yong Jin	KNIC Representative	DPRK passport number: 481410074 Date of birth: 28 September 1971	Nigeria	*No response*
Sin Jun Chol	KNIC Representative	*N/A*	Russia	"There is no evidence found regarding illegal activities relating to the Korean National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) (KPe.048)."
Mun Mi Hwa	PIC Associate	Conducted banking transaction on behalf of PIC in December 2022	Likely Nigeria	*No response*

Source: Member States, Panel investigations.

Annex 89: Information on companies reportedly assisting and/or working with the Korean National Insurance Company (KPe.048) and/or its front/subordinate companies

Company	Reported information on engagement with KNIC	Address
Fountain Court Partners	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022	No. 299, Ikorodu Road (Olatunji House), Behind Idiroko BRT Terminal 4th Floor, Left Wing, Maryland, Lagos State, Nigeria
Premium Broking House	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022	Street No. 404 – Bldg. 206 (2nd floor), Sin El Fil – Dekwaneh, PO Box: 55.659 Sin El Fil, Lebanon
Integ Partners	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022	Plot 448A Lagos Crescent, Off Ladoke, Akintola Boulevard, Garki 2, Abuja, Nigeria
BK & Associes	Assisted KNIC in recovering debts, between at least 2019 and 2022	Rue Washington, Cocody Val Doyen, 08 BP 3819 Abidjan 08 Côte d'Ivoire
Millbank Insurance Brokers, Ltd.	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022	Ground Floor, Suite 08, Bluecrest Mall, Majek, Lekki Peninsula, Lekki – Epe Expressway, P.O. Box 6629, Marina, Lagos, Nigeria
QuickLink Insurance Brokers Ltd.	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022	238, Muritala Mohammed Way, Ebute-Meta, Alagomeji, Yaba, Lagos State, Nigeria
Universal Insurance Plc	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC	8 Gbagada Expressway, Anthony 100232, Lagos, Nigeria

	headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022	
Sechuwariis Development Foundation	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022	No. 13 Amichi-Okigwe Road, Nnewi-South LGA, Anambra, Nigeria
Somitel Ventures Enterprise	Facilitates KNIC's activities in Africa, including through cryptocurrency transactions on KNIC's behalf, as of 2023	Suite B15, Road 1, Ikota Shopping Complex, VGC, Lekki, Ajah, Lagos, Nigeria
New Elements Holdings Co. Ltd (新元素控股有限公司)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022	Hong Kong
Li Xianzhu (Chinese national)	Partnered with or knowingly assisted KNIC in developing business opportunities, attempting to collect money, and/or facilitating financial transfers of funds to KNIC headquarters' control, between at least 2020 and 2022, utilizing XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX X [257](Asia) Ltd account number 718823353750	
Fairicc Survey & Loss Adjusting Co., Ltd.	Established a relationship with Samhae Insurance Company in 2019 (see Annex 85)	17/F, South Wing Huatong Plaza B, 19B, Chegongzhuangxi Rd, Beijing 100048

[257] The lead expert on this issue does not agree with redacting the bank names of one country.

Kaztec Engineering	Contracted with Samhae Insurance Company for vessel insurance between 2019 and 2020[258]	2 Oguda Close, Off Lake Chad Crescent, Maitama, Abuja FCT, Nigeria

Source: Member States, commercial business databases, company websites, media

[258] https://www.nknews.org/pro/nigerian-firm-wades-into-murky-legal-waters-with-north-korean-insurance-policy/

Annex 90: Samhae Insurance Company Website (excerpts)



ABOUT US

Samhae Insurance Company, as a specialist marine, aviation and liability risk underwriter, provides bespoke insurance solutions to fit your needs.

Samhae is fortunate to have such highly skilled underwriting teams well equipped with extensive expertise and considerable experiences over the years and they are recognized as specialists in marine and aviation field by brokers, agents, clients and partners.

Rated a corporate entity solid in financial strength and stable in creditability by the Ministry of Finance, Samhae offers financial security to its clients in various fields.

Samhae has developed business relationships with brokerage firms and other (re)insurance companies at home and abroad to conduct insurance and reinsurance business on a global scale.

Over the past 5 years since its creation, the Company has delivered customized insurance solutions to meet the clients' needs resting on specialists' expertise and rich practical experience and thus has built up a solid corporate reputation in the domestic and international market.

Clients choose to work with us because they rely on our ability to fulfil our commitments, to deliver insurance solutions that best serve their needs and to develop long-standing relationships.

삼해보험회사
SAMHAE INSURANCE COMPANY

VISION

To develop into a leading reliable insurer delivering quality insurance service tailor-made to each client's requirements with an eye to a sustainable business growth by virtue of up-to-date science and technology.

MISSION

To secure the clients against the potential risks and in the case of loss or damage immediately indemnify them to aid their speedy recovery.

VALUES

To be consistent in adhering to the principles of integrity, transparency, promptness and accuracy in insurance service relying on the professionalism and rich experience.

WHY SAMHAE INSURANCE?

The economic outlook of the Company looks quite good as it is run by the rich human resources involving the excellent insurance experts while it pursues the most effective business and management strategies in dong business.

The insurance service of the Company is readily accessible to all of our clients everywhere in the country at any time since it has built up an elaborate distribution network of a number of local branches and agents.

The information technology-oriented service level of the Company is becoming increasingly sophisticated with the help of the latest science and technology such as mobile communication technology and computer network technology.

The Company is expanding its footprint in the international insurance market and is forming a cooperative relationship with a number of market players including brokerage firms, insurers and reinsurers on the globe.

COMPANY PROFILE

DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT 6th October 2016

삼해보험회사
SAMHAE INSURANCE COMPANY

State Insurance Commission.



2017

The Company opened up 6 branch offices in the local cities.

2nd May 2018

The Company began to release its Annual Report.

1st November 2018

The Company commenced ceding marine facultative reinsurance to the foreign market for the first time since its operation.



19th December 2018

The Company opened its website on the Internet.

2018

The Company extended 4 more branch offices in the country.

25th March 2019

Samhae Insurance Company made an agreement with and Fairlcc Survey & Loss Adjusting Co., Ltd to appoint the latter as the International loss adjuster.

www.naenara.com.kp/sites/samhae/ 5/8

Source: www.naenara.com.kp/sites/samhae/, Panel annotations

Annex 91: Information on business and trade activities conducted by alleged DPRK Reconnaissance General Bureau (KPe.028) representative Nam Chol Ung

Business activity

Laos

- **According to a Member State, Nam is the owner of Mekong Development Co. Ltd., which in turn owns New Arena Sports Complex (Sisattanak District, Vientiane)**


Thailand

- **Nam is reportedly the owner of DP Law and Business Group Company Limited (บริษัท ดีพี ลอว์ แอนด์ บิสซิเนส กรุ๊ป จำกัด)**
  - Address: 299 Moo 2, Tambon Pa Phai, Amphoe San Sai, Chang Wat, Chiang Mai, 50210, Thailand
  - Thailand Company Registration Number 0505546003061

- **According to the Panel's investigations, Nam is the director of NCU Industries Company Limited (บริษัท เอ็น ซี ยู อินดัสตรีส์ จำกัด, aka Siam Sky Pattaya Co., Ltd.)**
  - Address: 44/1 Room 209 KTA Mansion Soi Samanchan-Barbos, Phra Khanong Subdistrict, Khlong Toei District, Bangkok, Thailand
  - Telephone number 02-7123400
  - Thailand Company Registration Number 0105555027833
  - DPRK investment (as of 2018)[259]

[259] The Thailand corporate registry only specifies a nationality and does not specify whether this represents a company, individual, or government/government entity.

Figure 1




Source: Thailand corporate registry, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 2



Source: Thailand corporate registry, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 3




Juristic Person Information
SIAM SKY PATTAYA CO., LTD.

Registered No :	0105555027833
Registered Type :	SIAM SKY PATTAYA CO., LTD.
Registered Date :	21/02/2012
Status :	Operating
Registered Capital (Baht) :	5,000,000.00
Industry group in registered document :	55101 : Hotels and resort hotels
Industrial group in latest financial statement :	55101 : Hotels and resort hotels
Fiscal Year (submitted financial statement) :	2565 2564 2563 2562 2561

Source: Thailand corporate registry, annotated by the Panel.

- **According to the Panel's investigations, Nam is directly associated with NCU Hospitality Company Limited (บริษัท เอ็น ซี ยู ฮอสพิโทลิตี้ จำกัด)**
  - Address: 44/1 Room 209 KTA Mansion Soi Samanchan-Barbos, Phra Khanong Subdistrict, Khlong Toei District, Bangkok, Thailand
  - Telephone number 02-7123400
  - Thailand Company Registration Number 0105556139040
  - Involved in alcohol/beverage sales and trade


Figure 4



Source: Thailand corporate registry, annotated by the Panel.

- **According to the Panel's investigations, Nam is linked to TS Ungum Company Limited (บริษัท ทีเอส อุนกุม จำกัด, aka YM Impex Co., Ltd.)**
  - Address: 44/1 Room 209 KTA Mansion Soi Samanchan-Barbos, Phra Khanong Subdistrict, Khlong Toei District, Bangkok, Thailand
  - Telephone number 02-7123400
  - Thailand Company Registration Number 0105547009627
  - DPRK investment (as of 2018)[260]


Figure 5



Source: Thailand corporate registry, annotated by the Panel.


[260] The Thailand corporate registry only specifies a nationality and does not specify whether this represents a company, individual, or government entity

Figure 6



Source: Thailand corporate registry, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 7



Juristic Person Information

YM IMPEX CO., LTD.

Registered No :	0105547009627
Registered Type :	YM IMPEX CO., LTD.
Registered Date :	21/01/2004
Status :	Operating
Registered Capital (Baht) :	6,000,000.00
Industry group in registered document :	41002 : Construction of non-residential buildings
Industrial group in latest financial statement :	46900 : Non-specialized wholesale trade
Fiscal Year (submitted financial statement) :	2565 2564 2563 2562 2561

Source: Thailand corporate registry, annotated by the Panel.

Nam's trade activities, according to a Member State and Panel investigations

1. Shipment of 1,010 cases of brandy *(see Figure 7 below)*
    - 8 April 2023
        - Seller: [Company A]
        - Buyer: [Company B]
        - Routing: [Port A], India to Laem Chabang, Thailand
    - 21 April 2023
        - Seller: [Company B]
        - Buyer: Dalian Minglian Trade Co., Ltd (大连明联贸易有限公司)[261]
        - Routing: Laem Chabang, Thailand to Dalian, China
    - 9 July 2023
        - Seller: Dalian Minglian Trade Co., Ltd
        - Buyer: Chonho Trading Corporation (DPRK)
        - Routing: Dalian, China to Nampo, DPRK

2. Shipment of lubricating oil
    - 30 May 2023
        - Seller: Topnext International Company Limited[262]
        - Buyer: Dalian Haolian International Trade Co., Ltd (大连豪联国际贸易有限公司)[263]
        - Routing: Laem Chabang, Thailand to Dalian, China
    - 9 June 2023
        - Seller: Dalian Minglian Trade Co., Ltd
        - Buyer: Sobaeksu United Corporation (DPRK; subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department, KPe.028)[264]
        - Routing: Dalian, China to Nampo, DPRK

3. Shipment of brandy *(see Figure 7 below)*
    - 16 November 2023
        - Seller: [Company A]
        - Buyer: [Company D]
            - Routing: [Port A], India to Laem Chabang, Thailand

Note: The Panel awaits replies from Dalian Minglian Trade Co., Ltd, Dalian Haolian International Trade Co., Ltd, and Topnext International Company Limited

[261] According to commercial business databases, Dalian Minglian Trading Co., Ltd's unified social credit code is 91210231MA0P5AM203 and it is located at No. 1, 8th Floor, No. 35, Boxiang North Park, Dalian High-tech Industrial Park, Liaoning Province (辽宁省大连高新技术产业园区博翔北园 35 号 8 层 1 号).

[262] According to commercial business databases, Topnext International Company Limited is a group affiliate of Thai Oil Public Company Limited and is located at address 555/1 Energy Complex Building A, 11th Floor, Vibhavadi Rangsit Road, Chatuchak, Chatuchak, Bangkok 10900, Thailand.

[263] According to commercial business databases, Dalian Haolian International Trade Co., Ltd's unified social credit code is 91210202MA0XT1BAXD and it is located at address 辽宁省大连市中山区五五路 32-1 号 1 单元 17 层 3 号.

[264] See S/2020/840 annex 46, S/2020/151 para 126 and Annex 30, S/2019/691 Annex 13, S/2017/150 paras 158-159 and Annex 14

Figure 8: Response from Company A (excerpts)

"Business Relation with Mr. Nam Chol Ung:

- During the beginning of January 2023, Mr. Nam Chol Ung, approached and expressed his desire to initiate business relations with the Company. He introduced himself as a businessman having companies in Thailand, China, and XXXXXX.[265] He requested for details of the Goods, the price list with respect to the same and the details of the port from which the Company intends to ship the Goods. Accordingly, the Company, as would respond to any business initiative from any other customer, responded to Mr. Nam Chol Ung.


- The Company has had two business transactions with Mr. Nam Chol Ung, as on date. The said business transactions were initiated by him through issuance of purchase orders on 23.02.2023 and 19.09.2023, respectively."

    - Transaction 1 *(see Figure 8 below)*:
      "Mr. Nam Chol Ung, through a company named [Company B] (Importer) and [Company C], Thailand (Consignee) … placed an order for a sum of 21030 USD on 23.02.2023. The entire consignment with respect to the said order was required to be delivered at Laemchabang Port, Thailand. The entire transaction was based on the Payment Term and accordingly, the Company received the entire payment with respect the said order in advance. The payment with respect to the aforesaid transaction was made by [Company B]…."

    - Transaction 2 *(see Figure 9 below)*:
      "Mr. Nam Chol Ung, through a company named [Company D], located at [address] … placed an order for a sum of 24111 USD on 19.09.2023. The entire consignment with respect to the said order was required to be delivered at Laemchabang Port, Thailand. The entire transaction was based on the Payment Term and accordingly, the Company received the entre payment with respect the said order in advance. The payment with respect to the aforesaid transaction was made by [Company D] …."

[265] The lead expert disagrees with this redaction.

Figure 9: Purchase Order for Transaction 1 (1,010 cases of brandy), dated 23.02.2023



[redacted] Company B

Adress: [redacted]

OFFICIAL FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER

Name & Address of the Importer / Buyer — Company B — [redacted]

Name & address of the Exporter — Company A — [redacted]

Name & address of the Manufacturer — [redacted]

Consignee — Company C — [redacted]

Order Number & Date — [redacted] Dated 23.02.2023

Shipping Method — In a 20 ft container to Laemchabang (Thailand) Port Transhipment/Partial Shipment Allowed

Date of Shipment — On or before 31.03.2023

Payments Terms — 15% payment in advance along with order Balance 85 % payment 7 days prior to container stuffing in India.

Delivery Terms — CIF Laemchabang Port (Thailand)


NAME OF THE BRAND	QUANTITY IN CASES	SIZE	ALCOHOLIC CONTENT	PRICE IN US $	TOTAL VALUE IN US $
[redacted] Brandy	510	12x750 ml	40% Vol.	19.50	9945.00
Brandy	110	24x375 ml	40% Vol.	21.00	2310.00
Brandy	390	48x180 ml	40% Vol.	22.50	8775.00
Total					21030.00

TOTAL CIF VALUE US DOLLARS TWENTY ONE THOUSAND THIRTY ONLY.

[redacted] Company B

Source: Company A, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 10: Purchase Order for Transaction 1 (1,098 cases of brandy), dated 19.09.2023



[redacted] Company D

[redacted]

Tel: [redacted] Fax: [redacted]

OFFICIAL FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER

Name & Address of the Importer / Buyer: [redacted] Company D

Name & address of the Exporter: [redacted] Company A

Name & address of the Manufacturer: [redacted]

Order Number & Date: [redacted] Dated 19.09.2023

Shipping Method: In a 20 ft container to Laemchabang (Thailand) Port Transhipment/Partial Shipment Allowed.

Date of Shipment: On or before 31.10.2023

Payments Terms: 15% payment in advance along with order. Balance 85 % payment 7 days prior to container stuffing in India.

Delivery Terms: CIF Laemchabang Port (Thailand)

NAME OF THE BRAND	QUANTITY IN CASES	SIZE	ALCOHOLIC CONTENT	PRICE IN US $	TOTAL VALUE IN US $
[redacted] Brandy	396	24x375 ml	40% Vol.	21.00	8316.00
[redacted] Brandy	702	48x180 ml	40% Vol.	22.50	15795.00
Total	1098				24111.00

[redacted] E US DOLLARS TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN ONLY

[redacted] Company D

[redacted]

Source: Company A, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 92: Information on suspected business activities conducted by DPRK official Kim Song Ho

The Panel has received information from a Member State that Kim was based in Lao PDR at least during the period between 2019 and 2021, and was involved in running several DPRK restaurants in Lao PDR, including:

- Big Sister Won's restaurant
- Koryo Restaurant, Luang Prabang
- Kumgangsan Restaurant (aka "Tokyo Sushi & Teppanyaki")


Kim is further reportedly linked to two additional companies, Lao Power Import-Export and Logistic Sole Co. Ltd (Lao PDR) and Changchun Jin Lizhu Trading Co., Ltd (China).

1. Big Sister Won's restaurant, located at 17.93016, 102.616972 (approximately 300 metres from the DPRK Embassy in Vientiane, Laos)

Kim has reportedly worked closely with Laos national Souchinda Mingboubpha to obtain work permits for DPRK nationals as well as a restaurant license and to establish a new company, and Mingboubpha registered Big Sister Won's restaurant in June 2020 on Kim's behalf. Kim has reportedly made payments to Mingboubpha for this assistance, including in July 2020.


Customer comments and photographs from Big Sister Won restaurant in 2022 and in 2023

One customer's comments were posted in March 2023, and a second customer's comments were posted approximately a year ago in November 2022. The first comment said, "Overall, plain taste"; the second comment noted, "Overall, it was good, but it seems like something is a little lacking" respectively.



Source: Excerpts of social media posting, annotated by the Panel.

Several photographs and a third customer's comments were posted approximately a year ago, noting: "Innards, kimchi, very delicious. The staff are kind. I will go back to eat cold noodles." A fourth customer noted that it was a North Korean restaurant.



Source: Excerpts of social media posting and accompany photographs, annotated by the Panel.

2. Koryo Restaurant, Luang Prabang (apparently closed as of August 2023)

Photographs of Koryo Restaurant in Luang Prabang, circa January 2020



Source: Naver.

Photo of Koryo Restaurant in Luang Prabang, circa August 2023



Source: The Panel.

3. Tokyo Sushi & Teppanyaki, Landmark Mekong Riverside Hotel, WJV8+FRR, Thatkhao Village, Sisattanak District, Vientiane (formerly Pyongyang Friendship Restaurant, Keumgansan Restaurant)




Source: The Panel; images captured July 2023.

4. Lao Power Import-Export and Logistic Sole Co. Ltd

Kim has allegedly further received assistance from Laos national Sidaphone Sithirajvongsa in operating DPRK restaurants in Laos. The Member State has also provided information that, in 2021, Kim and Sithirajvongsa cooperated in plans for Kim to buy gold, in Laos to sell in China. Sithirajvongsa reportedly allowed Kim to use their personal information and details of their company Lao Power Import-Export and Logistic Sole Co. Ltd (ບໍລິສັດ ລາວພາວເອັ້ນ'າເຂົ້າ-ສົ່ງອອກ ແລະ ຂົນສົ່ງ ຈຳກັດຜູ້ດຽວ), in order to facilitate the deal. The Panel has found that closed in August 2023.

Enterprise Registration Details

Enterprise Number	01B0012391
Lao Enterprise and Name	ບໍລິສັດ ລາວພາວເອັ້ນ'າເຂົ້າ-ສົ່ງອອກ ແລະ ຂົນສົ່ງ ຈຳກັດ ຜູ້ດຽວ
English Enterprise Name	LAO POWER IMPORT-EXPORT AND LOGISTIC SOLE CO.,LTD
Registered By	Ms ມະໄລທິບ ນາມວົງສາ
Registration Date	17-05-2021
Status	Abandoned Enterprise List
Province	Vientiane Capital
District	Xaythany
Village	Nongphagna
Tax Information Number	087150146000
Tax Registration Date	17/05/2021
Tax Status	Permanent Closure
VAT Status	Not registered



The map shows the approximate location of Nongphagna Village

Notes:

Copies of these records of this enterprise can be bought or viewed at the MoIC provincial office in Vientiane Capital.

This information is accurate as of 07-11-2023

Source: Lao National Enterprise Database.

5. Changchun Jin Lizhu Trading Co., Ltd

In 2021, Chinese company Changchun Jin Lizhu Trading Co., Ltd (长春金丽珠贸易有限公司, aka Changchun Kum Ryo Ju Trade Co., Ltd) reportedly sought to purchased gold and cooper ore with Kim's assistance. Changchun Jin Lizhu Trading Co., Ltd is associated with address Room 1206, Unit 5, Building 4, Tianqi Phoenix Area, Liberty Avenue, Erdao District, Changchun City, Jilin Province, China and China Uniform Social Credit Code number 91220105333860332Y.

Annex 93[266] : Information on suspected sanctions violation activities conducted by DPRK national Choe Song Ryong (aka Cui Chenglong, 崔成龙)

Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd (北京天池城企业管理有限公司, aka Chonji Trading Corporation)

- According to Member State information and Panel investigations, Choe is the managing director and legal representative of a DPRK company operating in China, Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd (北京天池城企业管理有限公司; aka Chonji Trading Corporation).[267] According to the Member State, as of 2021:
    - Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd maintained at least three DPRK-China joint venture restaurants in China, employing DPRK nationals.
    - At least some of these DPRK nationals lived at address Number 1101, Apartment Block 2, Area C, Fuliyou City, Huangchang South, Dougezhuang, Chaoyang District, Beijing.

- According to commercial business databases, as of 2017 Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd was owned by DPRK entity Korea Koryo Trade Association (朝鲜高丽贸易总会社).
- According to commercial business databases, Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd may no longer be operating, as of 2023.

Figure 2: Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd registration information

北京天池城企业管理有限公司 Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd

一、外商投资企业基本信息	
企业名称	北京天池城企业管理有限公司
统一社会信用代码/组织机构代码	911101053222827927 Unified social credit code: 911101053222827927
成立日期	2015年1月15日 Date of establishment: 2015-01-22
投资行业	其他组织管理服务
经营范围	企业管理；餐饮管理；经济贸易咨询；企业管理咨询；厨房设备及配件、电子产品、机械设备、五金交电的批发；会议服务；企业策划；组织文化交流活动（不含演出）；货物进出口、技术进出口（涉及配额许可证管理、专项规定管理的商品按照国家有关规定办理）。
注册资本	10万欧元
法定代表人	1

二、外商投资企业投资者基本信息

投资者名称	国别（地区）	出资金额
朝鲜高丽贸易总会社	朝鲜	10万欧元

Investor name: Korea Koryo Trade Association Country (region): North Korea Amount of contribution: 100,000 Euros

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (2017), Panel annotations

[266] One member of the Panel is of the view that information in this Annex should be further corroborated.

[267] According to commercial business databases, Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd's China Uniform Social Credit Code is 911101053222827927, its registration number is 110000450278167, and its addresses are 北京市朝阳区北京市朝阳区朝阳路十里堡甲 3 号 A 座 12 层 15E 100025 and 北京市朝阳区十里堡甲 3 号 B 座 6 层 06H. According to the Member State, as of 2021, the company also maintained identification number CN9402264069.



Source: National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 3: Recruitment website profile for Beijing Tianchicheng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd



Source: https://www.kanzhun.com/gongsi/cd4fe13d38bbd505721e79a11f75dcc5/, Panel annotations.


Beijing Green Valley Tianchi International Trade Co., Ltd（北京绿谷天池国际贸易有限公司）

- According to the same Member State, Chinese company Beijing Green Valley Tianchi International Trade Co., Ltd[268] was operating under direction from Choe.
- According to commercial business databases, Beijing Green Valley Tianchi International Trade Co Ltd is also involved in the import of DPRK-origin coal and rare earths.

Figure 3: Online marketplace profile for Beijing Green Valley Tianchi International Trade Co., Ltd



[268] Company ID CN9370705811; according to commercial databases, Beijing Green Valley Tianchi International Trade Co., Ltd maintains address Beijing, Pinggu District, Pinggu Town, 2 Fuqing West St.; according to the Chinese State Administration for Market Regulation, the company is operational and maintains Unified social credit code 91110117102963297M.



Source: https://m.atobo.com/u/09s5753305, Panel annotations.

Annex 94: Summary of certain DPRK cyberattacks on cryptocurrency-related companies in 2023, under investigation by the Panel

Sources: Information from Member States, statements by Government agencies, corporate statements, reports by cybersecurity firms, media articles and Panel investigations

Terraport Finance, 10 April 2023, $4 million

- Attacker(s) drained all of the liquidity pools on Terraport, a newly-launched decentralized exchange platform
- The attacker(s) stole the funds in two transactions, in total withdrawing 9.7 million TERRA (Terraport's native token) tokens, 15 billion Luna Classic (LUNC) tokens and 5.5 million of the Terra Classic USD stablecoin (USTC) tokens.
- A wallet involved in the Terraport launch was found to have made a series of suspicious changes to the code of three important smart contracts related to the liquidity pools, several hours before the heist was effected.

Figure 1: Terraport Finance posting




Source: https://twitter.com/_Terraport_/status/1645376363904335873

Merlin DEX, 26 April 2023, $1.8 million

- Likely a private key compromise or intentional backdoor insertion.
- The attacker(s) stole an estimated USD 1.8 million from the protocol by draining its liquidity pools as users were adding assets as part of a “liquidity Generation Event” and token launch.
- The underlying issue was overly-centralized control – namely, excessive permissions granted to the Feeto address used during liquidity pool deployment. This address had full access and permissions, enabling individual(s) controlling the address to drain the pool of assets.
- The Merlin Platform placed blame on members of their back-end development team – possibly DPRK IT workers inadvertently hired by the protocol. The Platform accused the developers of maliciously manipulating the smart contracts and exploiting the full access/approvals feature, allowing them to drain the liquidity pools.
- Attacker address (into which funds were drained): 0x2744d62a1e9ab975f4d77fe52e16206464ea79b7
- The stolen funds were bridged back to Ethereum, swapped for Ether (ETH) and transferred to other addresses.

Figure 2: Merlin Heist




Source : https://twitter.com/0xBobie/status/1651051380155744256

Atomic Wallet, 2 June 2023, $120 million+[269]

- Intrusion via a wallet software.
- More than 5,000 crypto wallets were compromised in the attack.
- The stolen assets were native currencies and tokens on Ethereum and Tron networks, including Ether and Tether (USDT).
- A Member State law enforcement agency has attributed the heist to the Lazarus Group.[270]
- Cypersecurity company Elliptic attributed the heist to the Lazarus Group with a high level of confidence, based on multiple factors, including:
    - The laundering of the stolen funds followed steps that match those employed to launder previous Lazarus Group heists.
    - The stolen assets were laundered using certain services, including the Sinbad mixer, that were used to launder previous Lazarus Group heists.
- In addition to using Sinbad, the stolen funds were also laundered through other platforms, including SWFT, SwftSwap, SunSwap, SimpleSwap Avalanche, and Garantex.
- Some addresses used to launder stolen funds were also used to launder funds from other recent Lazarus Group heists (see Figure 8).

Figure 3: Atomic Wallet heist laundering




Source: https://www.elliptic.co/blog/analysis/north-korea-linked-atomic-wallet-heist-tops-100-million

[269] See S/2023/656 para 143.
[270] https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-as-responsible-for-theft-of-41-million-from-stakecom

Alphapo, 22 July 2023, $110 million+

- A Member State law enforcement agency has attributed the heist to the Lazarus Group.[271]
- Theft was likely due to a leak of private keys, allowing access to Alphapo's hot wallets.
- The attacker(s) stole more than 6 million Tether (USDT) tokens, 108,000 USD Coin (USDC) tokens, 100 million Fasttoken (FTN) tokens, 430,000 TrueFlip (TFL) tokens, 2,500 Ether (ETH) tokens, and 1,700 Dai (DAI) tokens, 118 million TRON (TRX) tokens, and Bitcoin (BTC) tokens – all drained from hot wallets.
- The attacker(s) then swapped stablecoins and some of the other tokens for Ether (ETH), and bridged them via the Avalanche bridge to Bitcoin (BTC), as part of the laundering process.
- Some addresses used to launder stolen funds were also used to launder funds from other recent Lazarus Group heists (see Figure 8).
- Based on the timing, the Alphapo heist could have been due to the JumpCloud intrusion (see para. 136).


Figure 4: Alphapo heist laundering



Source: https://twitter.com/PeckShieldAlert/status/1683034275489382401

[271] https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-as-responsible-for-theft-of-41-million-from-stakecom

Figure 5 : Alphapo heist social media posting



Source: https://twitter.com/zachxbt/status/1683747073227624448

CoinsPaid, 22 July 2023, $44 million

- CoinsPaid announced that, based on their internal investigation, they suspected that the Lazarus Group was responsible for the heist (see Figure 6).
- A Member State law enforcement agency has attributed the heist to the Lazarus Group.[272]
- Attack methodology:
    - As part of a spearphishing campaign by the attacker(s), a CoinsPaid employee participated in an interview for a purported job from another cryptocurrency exchange.
    - During the interview process, the employee received a test assignment that required installation of an application with malicious code.
    - After the victim opened the test, the attacker(s) were able to steal profiles and keys from the employee's computer to connect with CoinsPaid's infrastructure, through which the attacker(s) took advantage of a vulnerability and opened a backdoor.
    - The attacker(s) explored the CoinsPaid system and were able to reproduce legitimate requests to withdraw funds from CoinsPaid's hot wallets. The attacker(s) did not breach Coinspaid's hot wallets or acquire private keys to access the wallets' funds directly.
- Tether (USDT), Ether (ETH), and Bitcoin (BTC) tokens were stolen and moved to new addresses within minutes.
- The heist occurred within 5 hours of the Alphapo, with the same laundering pattern
- Laundering included use of Avalanche, Sinbad, Samurai Ricochet, SwftSwap, SunSwap, SimpleSwap, UniSwap, and centralized exchanges (see Figure 7).
- Some addresses used to launder stolen funds were also used to launder funds from other recent Lazarus Group heists (see Figure 8).
- Based on the timing, the Alphapo heist could have been due to the JumpCloud intrusion (see para. 136). CoinsPaid noted that "Recruiters from crypto companies contacted CoinsPaid employees via LinkedIn and various Messengers, offering very high salaries. For instance, some of our team members received job offers with compensation ranging from 16,000-24,000 USD a month. During the interview process, the perpetrators aimed to trick the candidates into installing the JumpCloud Agent or a special program to complete a technical task."[273]

[272] https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-as-responsible-for-theft-of-41-million-from-stakecom

[273] https://CoinsPaid.com/company-updates/the-CoinsPaid-hack-explained/

Figure 6: CoinsPaid heist attack timeline



Hackers Spent 6 Months Tracking and Studying CoinsPaid


We now know that Lazarus, the supposed hacker group behind the attack, spent half a year trying to infiltrate the CoinsPaid systems and find vulnerabilities.

- **Since March 2023**, we have been registering constant unsuccessful attacks on the company of various kinds, ranging from social engineering to DDos and BruteForce.
- **On March 27, 2023**, key CoinsPaid engineers received requests from an allegedly Ukrainian crypto processing startup with a list of questions regarding technical infrastructure, as confirmed by 3 major developers of the company.
- **In April-May 2023**, we experienced 4 major attacks on our systems aimed at gaining access to the accounts of CoinsPaid employees and customers. The spam and phishing activities against our team members were constant and highly aggressive.
- **In June-July 2023**, a malicious campaign was carried out involving bribing and fake-hiring critical company personnel.
- **On July 7, 2023**, a massive, carefully planned and prepared attack was executed targeting CoinsPaid infrastructure and applications. From 20:48 to 21:42, we registered unusually high network activity: over 150,000 different IP addresses were involved.

The perpetrators' main goal was to **trick a critical employee into installing software to gain remote control of a computer for the purpose of infiltrating and accessing CoinsPaid's internal systems**. After 6 months of failed attempts, the hackers managed to attack our infrastructure on July 22, 2023, successfully.


Source: https://CoinsPaid.com/company-updates/the-CoinsPaid-hack-explained/

Figure 7: CoinsPaid Heist Laundering




Source: https://CoinsPaid.com/company-updates/the-CoinsPaid-hack-explained/

Figure 8: Overlap of laundering addresses for Harmony Bridge,[274] Atomic Wallet, Alphapo, and CoinsPaid heists



Source: https://twitter.com/zachxbt/status/1686327312843780097

[274] See S/2023/171 para 165.




Source: https://www.slowmist.com/report/2023-Blockchain-Security-and-AML-Annual-Report(EN).pdf

Steadefi, 7 August 2023, $1.16m

- The attacker(s) took control of the private keys of the hot wallet that had ownership of the contracts.
- Prior to the attack, an employee's Metamask wallet seed phrase was copied, providing access to the employee's personal wallets as well as the Steadefi hot wallet. The attacker(s) then approved an attacker-controlled wallet (0x9cf71f2ff126b9743319b60d2d873f0e508810dc) to be an approved borrower of the lending vaults, and "borrowed" all available assets from the lending vault to the attacker(s)' wallet.
- The attacker(s) obtained access by reaching out on Telegram to a Steadefi employee in mid-June 2023, pretending to be from "@manuel_trojovskky" ("Head of Crypto Investments & Research") of the Spirit Blockchain Group, a cryptocurrency fund looking for projects to invest in *(note: as of mid-January 2024, the telegram user's name had been changed to "ceo_shima," "Shima Capital Founder," and photo had been changed)* (see Figure 9).
- After establishing contact, the "fund manager" sent a malicious file that purported to be a presentation about the investment fund (see Figure 10). The file may have been a keylogger. A few days after the exploit, the attacker(s) deleted the Telegram conversation messages.
- The attacker(s) converted the stolen funds to Ether (ETH), bridged the ETH to the Ethereum mainnet, moved the ETH to another wallet (0xe10d4a5bd440775226c7e1858f573e379d0aca36), and eventually moved the funds to the Tornado Cash mixer.
- This attack is likely part of a broader Lazarus Group campaign of spearphishing on Telegram, targeting the cryptocurrency industry (see figure 11 and see para. 188).

Figure 9: Attacker's Telegram profile at time of attack (left) and as of 14 January 2024 (right)




Source: Panel.

Figure 10: Malicious file sent by attacker during conversation with the Steadefi victim



Source: Panel.

Figure 11: Attack link to Lazarus Group



Source: https://twitter.com/h2jazi/status/1661528861211860993

Stake.com, 4 September 2023, $41.3m

- Stake.com has reported that the heist was effected through a compromise of the company's payment processor (EasyGo).
- A Member State law enforcement agency has attributed the heist to the Lazarus Group.[275]
- The attacker(s) moved the stolen funds – including Ether (ETH), Tether (USDT), Dai (DAI), USD Coin (USDC), Polygon (MATIC), and BNB (BNB) tokens, and associated with the Ethereum, Binance Smart Chain (BSC), and Polygon networks – from Stake.com into various wallet addresses (see Table 1).
- Funds were initially moved to 173 intermediary wallets and then didn't move for days or weeks. ETH and BSC assets were primarily swapped into unfreezable native assets and held. MATIC tokens were swapped and bridged into stablecoins and then into Bitcoin (BTC), where they were held. These laundering moves involved a number of protocols and platforms, including ChangeNOW, MEXC, Squid Router, and Avalanche (see Figure 12).


Table 1

Address	Network		Address	Network
0x94f1b9b64e2932f6a2db338f616844400cd58e8a	Ethereum		bc1qdjmwm8q74r0yx99nghaeu33xdmz3lqnt2uspqv	Bitcoin
0xba36735021a9ccd7582ebc7f70164794154ff30e	Ethereum		bc1qrqv5f7jxhp67jcgk9wv5jx4795wlntvhdz2a7j	Bitcoin
0xbda83686c90314cfbaaeb18db46723d83fdf0c83	Ethereum		bc1q82gvk20m08uctmmr97p2mqyxtyh6xf68rwe0t9	Bitcoin
0x7d84d78bb9b6044a45fa08b7fe109f2c8648ab4e	Ethereum		bc1q8y9wc2p9444y8r77xtmswxm9qqw90nrpufkx47	Bitcoin
0xff29a52a538f1591235656f71135c24019bf82e5	BSC		bc1qqvpjgaurtnhc8smkmdtwhx9c8207m0prsyxyjx	Bitcoin
0x0004a76e39d33edfeac7fc3c8d3994f54428a0be	BSC		bc1qfcl8a4ck7uu3phgg5fj6g9servp6f85j3frcd3	Bitcoin
0xbcedc4f3855148df3ea5423ce758bda9f51630aa	BSC		bc1qqydp9muxtnxyet3ryfqc467wjtm23f0r7eh5aa	Bitcoin
0xe03a1ae400fa54283d5a1c4f8b89d3ca74afbd62	BSC		bc1qe4n22sduyylws74aewc6y6g32nglvglqu7hted	Bitcoin
0x95b6656838a1d852dd1313c659581f36b2afb237	BSC		bc1qy0ggpxu8f6lta6vf44vervr4py2uu829grj8yh	Bitcoin
0xa2e898180d0bc3713025d8590615a832397a8032	Polygon		bc1q32dzmf4t5a3xxvyxn07scgpmjznnz3kwjhw8uc	Bitcoin
0xa26213638f79f2ed98d474cbcb87551da909685e	Polygon		bc1qkrkxgvp2te3xhgn74c2azt4flf9u05y56kh3a9	Bitcoin
bc1qfesn3jj65fhmf00hh45ueql8je8jae6ep3qk84	Bitcoin		bc1q6w7qlaj3mfkgfrxwtvhw45cu86wew7xpjfqcmy	Bitcoin
bc1qtalh4l8qc0p2qw70axxjhwu9z7rm93td5sgsl3	Bitcoin		bc1qc593a4d2hznk2ext3k2zmpdrqazlhhh80m4xas	Bitcoin
bc1qlq3s8hgczfe62yt94xqasdr5ftuuyrc5kgvpwr	Bitcoin		bc1qtnuzecpqaakj0dt855n24dv7u5pme7vyct2cf2	Bitcoin
bc1qy78e6ml7f3p438jqrrlzsewx625y0sr7jsesa7	Bitcoin		bc1qvjpgxa2g3nvyw2hnclptextllu9dr4vkew8jfp	Bitcoin
bc1qqa682d2q0wtx5gfpxh4yfl9s4k00ukakl5fpk5	Bitcoin		bc1qg0qygyv3qfp8cjyy99ch9vc9dp876vl8wys67u	Bitcoin
bc1qmqgkxzzfzjqepptw9xzxy03672xg55q559fmvr	Bitcoin			

Source: https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-as-responsible-for-theft-of-41-million-from-stakecom

[275] https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-as-responsible-for-theft-of-41-million-from-stakecom

Figure 12: Stake.com heist laundering and stolen funds flows



Source: https://cointelegraph.com/news/exclusive-hackers-selling-stolen-tokens-coinex-stake

CoinEx, 12 September 2023, $70m

- Heist effected through the leak of a hot wallet private key.
- Stolen cryptocurrencies included Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), BNB Smart Chain (BSC), and TRON (TRX) tokens (see Figure 13).
- Analysis shows that some of the assets stolen from CoinEx were sent to an address that was also used by the Lazarus Group to launder funds stolen from Stake.com. The assets were then bridged to Ethereum and sent back to an address controlled by the CoinEx attacker(s) (see Figures 14 and 15).
- According to Slowmist, the laundering of the stolen funds from the CoinEx hot wallet leak incident occurred in multiple phases and exhibited different laundering behaviors across various chains, as follows:
    - Phase one comprised the transfer of TRON stolen funds, BSC stolen funds, and Solana (SOL) stolen funds the BTC Network; Funds from other chains were cross-chain exchanged through exchanges like ChangeNOW, FixedFloat, and Simpleswap.
    - Phase Two involved transferring the funds from the BTC Network to the Tron Chain and a suspected OTC, using cross-chain platforms
    - Phase Three was the withdrawal from the Sinbad Mixer, through BTC and Thorchain, to the ETH Chain.

Figure 13: CoinEx stolen assets

Chain	Asset	Chain	Asset
BTC	231 BTC	KDA	2,214,700 KDA
ETH	4,953 ETH	BCH	2,220 BCH
SOL	135,600 SOL	XDAG	229,291,485 XDAG
TRON	137,127,860 TRX	TOMO	259,494 TOMO
XRP	12,625,364 XRP	VET	42,422,648 VET
BNB	29,552 BNB	LTC	5,435 LTC
XLM	4,321,978 XLM	DOGE	16,695,400 DOGE
TON	325,430 TON	AIDOGE	5,454,650,258,018,313 AIDOGE
ETHW	124,600 ETHW	ETC	7,434 ETC

Source: https://announcement.coinex.com/hc/en-us/articles/19187420867348-Latest-Progress-of-the-Hacking-Attack-on-Sep-12-2023-Updated-on-Sep-14-

Figure 14: Suspicious addresses connected to the CoinEx heist

Chain	Suspicious Addresses
ADA	addr1qxch3q3knzn3qvnh4rzc8r2u9hemz9sn8ws49jnvp6ptsuq4jkaf
	9r8mqwu3t5h9krvlksmdfp84kmhjqwy3dag5m32q22m8y9
	addr1q9zwxfgk7rzacd8mnzywl9rfsjllp24sugh9lmh83seunsdk6cq4we
	08j69uphlxh4ku5e5v3ftwvn5rn2zuj5pzedaq2u5phl
APT	0x2a80f8be5f79fc6619cba022e38ed44cb3d1
	5d05d26fc1c2238d8f90fbff94d6
ARB	0xfEec9F846E2FE529B765d832EBa988a399Fe3cD6
	0x838c92ee71eba4fabb1c19d7403bf36c178d9002
	0x9C607136294f0541a06bb0828D6b42351bDB8e31
	0xf2f11edbfd0b7ab74be1e822f9538f4f3810065b
	0x8e585ce8181e1aaa4dd0806257609c21c0b73f2e
ATOM	cosmos16ey6wvs2ce2vq8865dsmpnmgv0tuc96xp73a48
	cosmos1f253rm4w9rdva97q4s2w0ltuc29pen0llpv4qn
	cosmos1qc54elww8yj5x3sl8xjsu24enz053ecs7h2vmk
	cosmos1ga7degxjyfx3pxydgaf2hwzk6mq8dacku2yx6j
	cosmos10xxtss5m6peaqwj64mekdsjn63jqcs8k5e2u93
AVAX	0xAE61C1262678261f78bB4c99c21648E52dE4e5C5
BCH	qrgxyhj8rzl4l7fgauu6q6vtu2grct4jeyrnaq2s75
BSC	0x6953704e753C6FD70Eb6B083313089e4FC258A20
	0xC844F7178379782eC19F3EE6E399f2EB7b2b984F
BTC	1BHNb9UJy4cWFB5wywZkTVgoNB4JbFmswH
	bc1qpwzvs544euec5eqc9xk2h9qr9885hgwqums0yp
	bc1qt7m386plw5vutvx6rx0w7rjx74zjp7lw959dst
	bc1q0nhyk3es3am9kxud0ye352lf2s59ctvcuhg4dd
	bc1q4dnx6r35hqv5jv88n4s4s6msng2l36uq2lw9rf
DOGE	DGAipZhEbf9r65QdB7WPwzdBKDpefVwwsZ
	D77Pwpnz2oxBVgWPEeZaUTYRJPwBR3Yysd
	DSBqqfauc3STDv29d8zpcLcPpuCT9hKkkS
	D7Bkx9n3KAraejFgJghNK2eHNj3ATSxwxj
	DATyQ8H92r3gKmD8EmCNcs519GjN1gt1Pg
	DCjmGZMfi25DtQ66UzghRBb6mwGkpG4BhX
DOT	1WUqwCnEpTN8cEHBqmVrFxxgDArBuBb2KBVtbKBTVFhFxAs
ETC	0x37a966ade96de7270e393b5533f46cb849398bf3
	0x7afea174b395c1cea747eaf761bb2f95f512bee7
	0x168c86825587df2e5ae659a22ad7e0b10df93b70
	0xdc35988ff5fea2b87561b30746fbb9b72b1c1628
ETH	0xCC1AE485b617c59a7c577C02cd07078a2bcCE454
	0x2118e4432d668aCFa347ddBA0efCcc6BB04DB297
	0x483D88278Cbc0C9105c4807d558E06782AEFf584
	0x1A61Df134d766f1e240FBFAEe79bBeCC04195f62


	0x8bf8cd7f001d0584f98f53a3d82ed0ba498cc3de
	0x40cBe7580168d52b7FEC884120B31115c3F7E37E
	0xce013682eddefaca8c94fe56a43a04212ebe4673
	0xae88ac9800594b43ac25a57374a5dac3d183bbc1
	0x0516063942078f5A0608eA42dDb5346cb6cf1c56
	0xcEFAB204B42aA5c532ED59F3d926AdA83c1158ba
	0x9008D19f58AAbD9eD0D60971565AA8510560ab41
ETHW	0x0F2eB0e8d8E6F5f10e76cA5Ce588e16D5F9ffdf1
FTM	0x13b4147f29e53eb85276dc01c74e8fb6b0a28b76
	0x4349fc96680bd7dd7e4db5e0d1f694e4c381074f
	0x9Ca2a3cAb7319FFA4BdE00871cB41634B91ED82f
	0xe51cdfe7f2458bcb199d877eacfc6316dcf6cbc7
	0x09305e7684d8cb4b86f7d4f2cc3da46051a54d49
	0x3b74b91360d7c1b59dc157dcfe01abae72557df2
	0xbe7dcaffc4ee6fe7df32a0249abd9d5755f55bd7
	0xEBf4FBB9C81b84dd5CF89BC75588E5d0018501b3
KAVA	kava1spv566tt3gt05n7cx9vfz47j3z878h88yywgan
KDA	k:a9f3672d7ad7a1e4592702d73b220cbc61db1fa17f
	89a56131d965bc03959913
LTC	Lcrkh5it7ndxVswms1QuRd78g7Fx8a2Ude
LUNA	terra1ynfwyv06jk86lvmf429zm7muxucjxajvjukhyx
MATIC	0x4515be0067e60d8e49b2425d37e61c791c9b95e9
	0xD4342E0277b3B9d11902FA1760F072868ECDBE2e
	0x6aa13fafb79f1b422431198dd4c810e786f192c5
	0xba23c0812480423e1bfffa297ba7b0660e7b3f73
ONE	one1gcx262juw97v73m29en5z2ny0h86s20tfal4l8
OP	0x964c192e54E5eF4176626875BB53071956579fca
	0x75497999432b8701330fb68058bd21918c02ac59
	0x4be18b9AabF1D530d2949Ed3faAE2c7Db1e37c21
	0x9113040171B1ADe54de401380a8cd4d1261111C0
SOL	G3udanrxk8stVe8Se2zXmJ3QwU8GSFJMn28mTfn8t1kq
TFUEL	0xfd67e1084282c6f9945738704c222713e0342949
THETA	0xfd67e1084282c6f9945738704c222713e0342949
TOMO	0xbbE2a100822fc7022c0f42E277b338F67371c5b0
TON	EQATuwsj4O2cXXFwaIdDRyS9Vv19Emmd6mwHy41QiiBqLH8N
TRON	TPFUjxQzG88Vwynrpj2W61ZAkQ9W2QYgAQ
	TP75t6owoqXxskLq6FB2R37PymNTmohq9L
VET	0xBcbb4cA01cF62c07DB339C985c609a67acdf1DBC
XDAG	15VY3MadZvLpXhjzFXwCUmtZcHszju6L9
XLM	GBPIDVKDSNF74OAGVBSPKLW73CSCGISBOB
	RB3ODROTMOEENZFC6WJFPN
XRP	rpQxVcjVF2fC23r3xKyJS53jw8d5SRhZQf

XTZ	tz1UH89jqhV9x9W6UKByuUQkeGhWtWgm1Fq2
	tz1bAjg8KhBjzRMuPbdLfC4EvETmdsuruynm
ZIL	zil1ntf5fv4swp9d2tns6dftsvy3apry5t4n2ydw4a


Source: https://announcement.coinex.com/hc/en-us/articles/19187420867348-Latest-Progress-of-the-Hacking-Attack-on-Sep-12-2023-Updated-on-Sep-14-

Figure 15: Overlapping consolidation address for Stake.com and CoinEx heists

Social media post



Blog post



Source: https://www.elliptic.co/blog/how-the-lazarus-group-is-stepping-up-crypto-hacks-and-changing-its-tactics

Fantom Foundation, 17 October 2023, $7.5 million


- Lazarus Group likely responsible
- Attack methodology:
    - As part of a spearphishing campaign by the attacker(s) on Telegram, a Fantom Foundation employee received a message from an individual claiming to be the founder of an established blockchain and investment fund and purporting to be located in an Asian country, who was interested in investing in Fantom Foundation and requested a video call to discuss (see Figure 16). The attacker was not pushy or forceful in setting a date for the call.
    - The attacker sent a video link to join the call that resulted in an "access restricted" message (see Figure 17); the attacker sent a troubleshooting link which automatically downloaded an Applescript file without any warnings or prompts (see Figure 18). The file contained troubleshooting instructions to run a script, which did not result in any abnormal computer processes and was not identified as malicious by antivirus software.
    - After approximately 25 minutes of "troubleshooting", the attacker agreed to meet on another, established platform, at a later date. However, the same day as the initial call attempt, the victim noticed messages disappearing from Telegram, and less than 24 hours later, wallets associated with the victim's Metamask Chrome Browser extension were being drained (both personal and those of Fantom Foundation). The extension subsequently crashed and the victim was unable to use Chrome; after a compute restart, the Chrome application disappeared completely. By the time the victim re-downloaded Chrome and Metamask and restored access to wallets, they were almost completely drained.
    - Subsequent investigation determined that malicious IP address 104.168.137.21 had gained unauthorized access to the victim's computer to effect the heist, and that the script had resulted in all of the victim's Chrome data (including Metamask wallets) being stolen.
- This attack is part of a broader Lazarus Group campaign of spearphishing on Telegram, targeting the cryptocurrency industry (see para 188).
- The attacker(s) stole 47 cryptocurrencies from the Ethereum, Optimism, Fantom, Polygon, and Arb blockchains, from 11 cryptocurrency wallets (see Figure 19). The stolen cryptocurrency was converted into Ether (ETH) using services such as Squid Router and deposited into Tornado Cash.

Figure 16: Attacker's Telegram profile



Source: Panel.

Figure 17 : Video call "access restricted" message



Source: Panel.

Figure 18: “Troubleshooting” link



Source: Panel.

Figure 19: Wallet addresses

Victim wallets

0xD2976A56cD84a91A2E83685a6dC5308315e29f15
0x4a6fF07ACd81F8d0ec7DD51f325D86b833821B1d
0xb86B137232C4e9B67F2B9BfD3d5641B77df70065
0x3CbA76E6A3298B19b77bd3B6A7BbC0B209e712b4
0x00721EE8954C5ABD6359Fb79b407549181d4b5fd
0xB0E3baEC3bA1990ebd2EDF9EEDC2f3213B381fB1
0xDc3D7bCA4C9DB233Ae10f4AF3c1BD105a5818cce
0x1bfFB3a232E06E06A5D9e93C8DF3321f768197c2
0x386aA44439e9C7181b1F0f1CAc0eFa478B623b27
0x596288A9090c9EeDf87bb5F2DA5d8e1bbC7BB935
0x48f7572cFbC4F246600CF816c668271034d81F8F

Perpetrator wallets


0x1d93c73d575b81a59ff55958afc38a2344e4f878
0x2f4f1d2c5944dba74e107d1e8e90e7c1475f4001
0x0b1f29df74a19c44745862ab018d925501fe9596
0x5cDEfFa84EE3C203FEE7a3901D90fF464EbfF801

Source: Panel.

Poloniex, 10 November 2023, $114 million

- Possibly effected by a private key leak.
- The stolen assets included dozens of coins on the Ethereum, Tron, Bitcoin, and XRP blockchains (see figure 20).
- Attack patterns similar to previous Lazarus Group heists.
- In the laundering process, the funds were distributed across various addresses, with each address handling only one type of token. Intermediate addresses were used to swap Ethereum and TRON network tokens through decentralized exchanges, after which the assets were converted into Ether (ETH) and TRON (TRX).

Figure 20: Poloniex heist stolen assets



Source: https://twitter.com/SlowMist_Team/status/1723006264693657708

HTX (fka Huobi), 22 November 2023, $30 million

- Effected through a hot wallet private key leak (see Figure 21).
- Lazarus Group suspected due to similar attack patterns.

HECO Chain (HTX Eco Chain bridge), 22 November, $86 million+

- Effected through a hot wallet private key leak.
- Lazarus Group suspected due to similar attack patterns.
- Attackers stole multiple crptocurrenies, including Tether (USDT), Ether (ETH), and Huobi BTC (HBTC), USD Coin (USDC), Chainlink (LINK), and Shiba Inu (SHIB) tokens.

Figure 21: HTX and HECO attacks




Source: https://twitter.com/ChainLight_io/status/1729530920179527720

Orbit Chain, 31 December 2023, $81 million

- The attacker(s) stole funds from Orbit Chain's Ethereum (ETH) Vault, where assets are deposited during the bridging/conversion process.
- Stolen currencies included approximately USD 30 million Tether (USDT), USD 22 million in ETH, USD 10 million in USD Coin (USDC), USD 10 million in DAI (DAI), USD 10 million in Wrapped Bitcoin (WBTC) (see Figure 22).
- Laundering involved SWFT, Avalance Bridge, Sinbad mixer.

Figure 22: Initial laundering of Orbit Chain stolen funds



Source: https://twitter.com/peckshield/status/1741613040335036513



Source: https://twitter.com/Orbit_Chain/status/1741846105149821166

Annex 95: Suspected DPRK cyberattacks on cryptocurrency-related companies (2017-2023) investigated by the Panel

2017

Victim	Date	Amount (USD equivalent)	Location
Bithumb	February	7 million (m)	ROK
Youbit/Yapizon/ Coinbin	22 April	4.8m	ROK
Bithumb	June	7m+	ROK
Coinis	September	2.19m	ROK
Youbit/Yapizon/ Coinbin	19 December	2.65m	ROK
NiceHash	December	65m	Slovenia

2018

Victim	Date	Amount	Location
Gate.io	21 April	234m	Caymen Islands
Coinrail	9 June	37m	ROK
Cypherium	18 March	8.5m	U.S.
Coinsecure	12 April	3.5m	India
Taylor	29 May	1.7m	Estonia
Bithumb	June	31.5m	ROK
Bancor	9 July	23.5m	Switzerland
[unidentified company]	August	13m	India
Indodax	1 September	24.9m	Indonesia
Zaif	14 September	60m	Japan
Trade.io	20 October	~10m	Switzerland

2019

Victim	Date	Amount	Location
Cryptopia	14 January	16m	New Zealand
Bithumb	March	16m	ROK
DragonEx	March	7m	Thailand/ Singapore/ Hong Kong, China
CoinBene	25 March	105m	Singapore
BiKi	26 March	12.3m	Singapore
UpBit	28 May	50.7m	ROK
CoinTiger	1 July	272,000	Singapore
Algo Capital	25 September	2m	Gibralter

2020

Victim	Date	Amount	Location
[financial services company]	7 August	11.8m	U.S.
Eterbase	7 September	5.4m	Slovakia
KuCoin	26 September	275m	Seychelles
Nexus Mutual	14 November	8m	UK

2021

Victim	Date	Amount	Location
EasyFi	19 April	81m	India
FinNexus	17 May	7m	British Virgin Islands
Fetch.ai	7 June	2.6m	UK
Bondly Finance (aka Forj)	14 July	5.9m	U.S.
MGNR	8 October	24.1m	*unidentified*
bzx	3 November	55m	U.S.

2022

Victim	Date	Amount	Location
Qubit Finance	January	80m	ROK
DeFiance Capital (NFT heist)	22 March	1.7m	Singapore
Sky Mavis/Ronin	23 March	620m	Vietnam / Singapore
Harmony	23 June	100m	U.S.
Nomad	August	190m	U.S.

2023

Victim	Date	Amount	Location
Terraport Finance	10 April	2m	ROK/UK
Merlin DEX *(possibly DPRK IT workers)*	26 April	1.8m	UK
Atomic Wallet	2 June	121m	Estonia
[investment platform]	11 June	17.6m	*unidentified*
Alphapo	22 July	113.5m	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
CoinsPaid	22 July	44m	Estonia
Steadefi	7 August	1.2m	British Virgin Islands
[unidentified company]	16 August	2.9m	*unidentified*
Stake.com	4 September	41.3m	Australia
CoinEx	12 September	70m	Hong Kong, China
[unidentified company]	28 September	3m	France
Fantom Foundation	17 October	7.5m	Cayman Islands
Poloniex	10 November	130m	U.S.
Uno Re Dao *(possibly DPRK IT workers)*	14 November	219,000	Estonia
HTX	22 November	30m	Seychelles
HECO Chain	22 November	86m+	*unidentified*
Orbit Chain	31 December	81m	ROK

Source: Information from Member States, statements by Government agencies, corporate statements, reports by cybersecurity firms and media articles, Panel investigations.

Annex 96: DPRK malicious cyber actors' patterns to steal funds from companies related to the cryptocurrency industry

- Attack vectors
  - Phishing lures
  - Social engineering
  - Weak code / protocols and human error
  - 3rd party (supply chain)

- Cryptocurrency laundering (layering)
  - Theft of multiple assets
  - Hundreds to thousands of intermediary addresses
  - Use of the Bitcoin Network
  - Asset swapping via decentralized and centralized exchanges[276]
  - Increasing use of chain hopping
  - Bridging[277]
  - Instant exchange services[278]
  - Mixers[279] and privacy protocols[280]
  - Moving through multiple chains, including uncommon tokens
  - Speed to prevent freezing of funds
  - Increasing reliance on services based in Russia and China

- Cashout (integration)
  - Affinity for TRON blockchain and stablecoins, especially Tether (USDT)
  - Heavy reliance on 3rd party launderers and over-the-counter brokers (high volume, high-value addresses)[281]
  - Purchased credentials and compromised accounts
  - Less reliance on centralized exchanges

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[276] Including services such as Binance, Bybit, HTX (Huobi), MEXC, Garantex, 1inch, and Uniswap

[277] Including Avalanche, SWFT, Thorchain, Squid Router, Stargate, and Across.

[278] Including Fixed Float, Simple Swap, and ChangeNow; such services generally have little or no KYC/AML procedures in place.

[279] According to one blockchain company, DPRK cyber actors have "largely abandoned" use of the Tornado Cash mixer after its 2022 designation by a Member State and are instead utilizing "more traditional Bitcoin mixers." Prior to the Member State designation, DPRK cyber actors were using Tornado Cash to launder approximately half of their stolen funds. See https://www.trmlabs.com/post/tornado-cash-volume-dramatically-reduced-post-sanctions-but-illicit-actors-are-still-using-the-mixer. In November 2023, a Member State designated the mixer Sinbad, "a key money-laundering tool" of the Lazarus Group, and seized the mixer's website. Sinbad reportedly processed millions of dollars' worth of virtual currency from Lazarus Group heists, including the Horizon Bridge and Axie Infinity heists (see S/2022/668, paras. 147 and 148, S/2023/171 para165, S/2023/656 para 139, and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0768). Industry reports have identified Sinbad.io as a replacement for Blender.io, after the latter's designation by the same Member State in 2022. DPRK cyber actors reportedly used Blender to launder over USD 25 million worth of stolen funds from the Ronin Network (Sky Mavis/Axie Infinity) and Tornado Cash to launder over $553 million stolen from the Ronin Network, Harmony Bridge, and Nomad Bridge, all of which occurred in 2022.

[280] Including Sinbad, Shielded TRON, Samurai Ricochet, YoMix Tornado Cash, CryptoMixer, and Wasabi Wallet.

[281] The Panel reported investigations into Wu Huihui and Cheng Hung Man, China-based over-the-counter traders reportedly facilitating conversion of DPRK-stolen virtual currency into fiat currency (S/2023/656 para 142). A blockchain company told the Panel in October 2023 that these individuals are still very active on the blockchain, using new wallets, and are continuing involvement in converting a large portion of DPRK-stolen cryptocurrency funds into fiat.

One cyber company emphasized that these DPRK actors are constantly seeking and using new methods to obscure their movement of stolen funds. As part of the DPRK's laundering process in 2023, the company reported that stolen cryptocurrencies will be swapped from one currency to another, and then back to the original currency, and bridged from one currency to another, and then back to the original currency. Currencies will be sent to and from mixers and privacy protocols multiple times. These methods will be used numerous times within the laundering process for the same hack to further obfuscate the source of funds. Given the significant time and transaction fees that this activity requires, there seems to be no legitimate purpose for this activity. The DPRK also reportedly utilizes automated transactions to deploy these tactics on a large scale, quickly, and in a common pattern.

According to another cybersecurity company,[282] "once cryptocurrency is stolen and converted into fiat currency, North Korean threat actors funnel the funds between different accounts to obscure the source." As part of this process, DPRK cyber actors reportedly utilize stolen account information, identities, and altered photos to register accounts at cryptocurrency exchanges pass anti-money-laundering and know-your-customer (AML/KYC) verification requirements. In addition, the DPRK has reportedly "developed an extensive money-laundering network to facilitate the movement of billions of dollars' worth of stolen cryptocurrency from when it's stolen to when it's converted to fiat currency or used to purchase goods and services" for the DPRK.

[282] https://www.recordedfuture.com/crypto-country-north-koreas-targeting-cryptocurrency.

Annex 97: Cryptocurrency wallet, email, and IP addresses associated with a late 2023 cryptocurrency service's seizure of suspected DPRK-linked cryptocurrencies[283,284]

Wallet addresses

0x02ca7a9d9bd7658786eada30a872b6975512xxxx
0x052ca778a7eddd1a007321c0ff14a375e46a xxxx
0x0572f0a350de6e597b9d06c1d52facad43f2 xxxx
0x0ac4cd26a361c3a949e5a83ad270a3a6a54c xxxx
0x0d0245f12e5e9d8e8fa5da91fa25495d26c0 xxxx
0x0d4e7e3c4d1e50fc9a9b0adcafe8b386ce18 xxxx
0x103691AAFEB0b757353F53CC08bb95F62DeE xxxx
0x122AFa7C20003F3DEd0081eCcf47fa4247A3 xxxx
0x14a82b8ae4d42b0bbc4487e121ccedeab534 xxxx
0x181EaBaB0A772bb464b71feea191E132706b xxxx
0x1a17e4603688949555f7c4d73f85ea7f04a3 xxxx
0x1aA207AA1F2B276e4Ebf3a021429643ed06F xxxx
0x1ae0b7c500c4f1babff226f82cdfa4396e81 xxxx
0x1b4eedbeb2963de5d2e7d6cbd35582260e49 xxxx
0x221a75d6ddeff3fd442333127e522fbd2140 xxxx
0x22c3D2bf754d901153D3ca4916ED226312e8 xxxx
0x24824deca26ae641e5226850edb9e26dedc1 xxxx
0x2FEB9fd9AE892fbd4E75295791E8bb2050ed xxxx
0x351394181b94dc5d191cb5fe9d080c5329c9 xxxx
0x3580c387ab00780c5a9601794aeb8fb6cbc0 xxxx
0x4272200EF626D409E9Bac681Aa0EFdB653A9 xxxx
0x468b2172815B59A392Da5cECc323F017f3f5 xxxx
0x485c1be0c316791f506875117256c4c0b6a0 xxxx
0x53c89d248ac8695309bf29c42375337bc6c0 xxxx
0x58797946fF72d85f96E04Cb09e24039832d4 xxxx
0x5b56289234b9a433a8c98b4a7623dd9941a1 xxxx
0x5e00b79ab12457ff60a1d3760668514dc2de xxxx
0x6A0488407C0765aF3C06B6bA30870cB6adAe xxxx
0x6c5582b005674c7d90b4aee236e886c938bd xxxx
0x7A29C6AA03A2b32a4a397A7916e45aC3374a xxxx
0x7b8959274a5077f62fa97e01f41dab8aa0a9 xxxx
0x88aacb0091e39a13e327f1f42bb2d1031f7b xxxx
0x8f06789ed6665152af1ba7c4ab97137461b0 xxxx
0x8f77b219830325762c57a66cd2fbcc559581 xxxx
0x9167419762448e5F78eE9b7416e2aa174bFF xxxx
0x960f50b291958c738e1ad5313262770572a6 xxxx
0x977a20277b7886bf112093eadeae66c47437 xxxx
0x9a9bbe4f8c9c9f9b9e31200ec877b28bcb89 xxxx
0x9d1b0e6996cf39b3a83b2aad856b98445e47 xxxx
0xA3D3855A3b4484202684551D2FAC61F6E19F xxxx
0xa525b1d83601e919607bf15f67c9b1f4f506 xxxx
0xA71D408643780d64dAB398C063CFaEdfbAAb xxxx
0xaCC0339F9579c0D4Aa495bf11061bA27C6F3 xxxx

[283] Seizures (freezing of funds) were carried out based on the service's analytics as well as information provided by other cryptocurrency services and engagement with a Member State's law enforcement agency.

[284] The transactions included transfers between Bitcoin (BTC), DAI (DAI), Monero (XMR), Ether (ETH), Tron (TRX), Tether (USDT), Arbitrum (ARB), and Polygon (MATIC) coins.

0xb084712e4c9a580d812851f7c2b77a52cf0b xxxx
0xB31916DfD5E086Ba212e18635e55C46C2706 xxxx
0xb8045abb99fd8ddeafff3392d638e46d3441 xxxx
0xba2511fa4416b05204b4b3068f665cd64b33 xxxx
0xbca730cef9dcd886ddfa9206a4cebf348f0d xxxx
0xC598bC132c4284dc767eF279a8d368219Fb9 xxxx
0xc5d58a08a914d46efc36a0059d98b5df8801 xxxx
0xc9aa577c1b14a884cf2543c763da61b189b4 xxxx
0xCCDD82Aa141bdF358B6F45E4C7240e9340C3 xxxx
0xcf1696b661f8ef08dcd2fee4e60f42fbf1df xxxx
0xCf9E44f42E920C77938b912218cd3163D569 xxxx
0xcFc3BA9dFd1389cfA9f6BFb208869b1171D7 xxxx
0xd6681c0c2C2173F3AD59eC3A139e3F3BC7C7 xxxx
0xD68E7C679087Db14A11779f36dde606B7475 xxxx
0xd90adc62ad4482ef085ea6c6d46fa6b4269c xxxx
0xda78219a0f87097ce7be0c4f21a4cf9941e8 xxxx
0xdaf261df6e51e81cd727a93392999432866a xxxx
0xE55cbA9D7B97F4822e1Cd4759B8f5e197d8E xxxx
0xe78db1785a5f2d4220821fceafdb226ed94e xxxx
0xe852f42bee975f96b373e72dc360f0ba0a63 xxxx
0xea855770d87017f13ffc969c8cc2b22d572e xxxx
0xee43f651352fb5d754003531738d6eeaf59d xxxx
0xf8acffd725f81e0aad5e95ce0246c318181b xxxx
0xf8d3e96a3a3ab282d4ca2354554d2400f524 xxxx
0xfcd6cab2bbf33b8dd71332f2b6aa0fe9b697 xxxx
0xff99c7ad352297ae2419c4e8b383a3b6e661 xxxx
1Fpy4NYLuiTf1LSQR1u8HDwkmPoGew xxxx
bc1q00d4svwcmrtzrvrsxn7p5gan0ayc2qzydq xxxx
bc1q08epaf6xdl7y42c7ssat5rcmzfrmju87zn xxxx
bc1q0mw3mffct83cgn4t5ghy0gykg0avln0em6 xxxx
bc1q0y3673x3cen3uhah3rwjftahexts683j3r xxxx
bc1q0yvyvxgklccpnfvpk7nvjytnv49q5p05hd xxxx
bc1q28mu7qgpvutyshq4c4j064tzvx40hxjmx xxxx
bc1q2czj7cg2dveee24yf4a6440wjpg3wjdvth xxxx
bc1q2f7a3gpaj7662nna6kt4dgjy82t9y8mjje xxxx
bc1q2xt2kmdpy7tudq4tqukmp6zk5n9fazv0cj xxxx
bc1q3a7hhsm62x2drdazcfatfr2qprhmncn3ws xxxx
bc1q3f96s5453chuycg05alt7zlphmtdddzunw xxxx
bc1q3urugm9qe8syzawq6ayees6l3n2387na4x xxxx
bc1q3xe38kxat6gtyrf6ak676je43cqd66fj4q xxxx
bc1q42xly4jv6g5naxzg73g5zc3ukkyzyxjg9p xxxx
bc1q49vxdjxc54aqz7xz04c5pdjuv0q45zem0n xxxx
bc1q4f0azvrxgl67duealn3lrp6p8sgzaf84ce xxxx
bc1q4mp8an4aw26950q5caj2vnlvkck4hawl0d xxxx
bc1q54s80g6l3ah93uyrxz08r4yuht6pvxmjw6 xxxx
bc1q597zludt6su8u0tgxlvpe9es5vphpwhwzj xxxx
bc1q5nnet6dxuz7dxgk0hadlxvpmyh50l30lmw xxxx
bc1q5pdq8ernekesh6tp25rsv7ej9rftvu3xa0 xxxx
bc1q645s35c46a00eyjuc858q7y2l7wxv0tkcz xxxx
bc1q6dk4glzjllmrtewkj8hhpn7kv5dmh5xq2 xxxx
bc1q6evlqxm79x24jfxha2wwgfsz8rhjda9rhj xxxx
bc1q6qm3w30rufxamewr0neffx6l4324jggn89 xxxx

bc1q6xa7avsu2et7emgvpzheaz6c86h2dlg3hx xxxx
bc1q6y7aspk377lr7xvca9ednuxf4gkh0nz97x xxxx
bc1q7epam2grl6g87v76zw2qkn6udygwsaez00 xxxx
bc1q7lrf9fkjghva0fz3dp2q8c2fjwvmpstqaz xxxx
bc1q7v8ax4xgywfct7686r7jatt63ehnt0s3wx xxxx
bc1q8m0n8adpxrkpjp4wkyemnmfr74vk3wp6vu xxxx
bc1q8rfcl9xsx38h7meldstrr74wy8x62dnr43 xxxx
bc1q8ztlc0kjg7stmvs25trn6xnrng6f7a00mw xxxx
bc1q95xl25dxuyeq2f7ctv70du3jymqqd5ct5u xxxx
bc1q96m02sadsphrwpa8w3a6n2dy7gvuhstsjx xxxx
bc1q9a223mralyrttcd79amcjl8uzmhfaz9lps xxxx
bc1q9hx36ygzzdp0u2yq8gmh7mag8frhud9ntv xxxx
bc1q9r9yqy3qph7gkpgtmn9v5t23hyte7gtv6u xxxx
bc1qaqdnngxul0xrjctzcrh80d0cwks06h4hu3 xxxx
bc1qayh8dcmv8t03d7zx020dke860w3nl0x485 xxxx
bc1qazyza94sh8fwcsq4vj862ayjzp95gu4r3v xxxx
bc1qc6ryywg9rjf5v9avtljwjydjjh7xd88k6v xxxx
bc1qd5qx5r0830dwd8969qs9yl5v0fud5qtlpd xxxx
bc1qe9hhzhgvw4dq9n93znvcl4zrxv7dgfmthy xxxx
bc1qeg7ryrr3zvs2m59x5pn257zekqednxs8cd xxxx
bc1qezjtulphycaqux2xju2ahw0yvtp2ztwvu8 xxxx
bc1qf589zu2jvn9qsl39fhwmaegdfymkdmfnr6 xxxx
bc1qf8r72h0jxaq08jhjgctf5zev7shkvmzj4f xxxx
bc1qfjdqtmvy3l86d3fn52dglszk37svlw8frq xxxx
bc1qgju9076p3974ys8z8vhwv6tuuvm2te5p6d xxxx
bc1qgpqgnlf42pr520a64jnhjcvqk9rrmgnmk6 xxxx
bc1qh0m6fuycat0r4rn9q0shn6aktpujseue6t xxxx
bc1qh6wztuljtfaz420x0dj3x00vshss5k2tzk xxxx
bc1qh7e9gzpy0hhasajyxl48v0my5g0zyyhh9c xxxx
bc1qhn4rmxcwmupajcr4ljcm2mjlx9e2j6ggk5 xxxx
bc1qj2u655qtxawxar2xqdme0x3t3zl0l3l2jq xxxx
bc1qj6cuyehm9ztk2950jgm8kks5za70hf362c xxxx
bc1qj9aynjq37fhhj5jpmr3mt0m5a87clnx4wt xxxx
bc1qjksnf2uc09ce8ms50vf6rwzn8h96hjzgxj xxxx
bc1qjpwpu8sgy3f5u6ehsq773htr0y0f87vau7 xxxx
bc1qjsve3dz35u830yfy78lycq6vk62dqhe0t2 xxxx
bc1qkk6v8m9n89ege3ktmz79e5275cy3u9gnlt xxxx
bc1qkufza4yh4t24yg73nnmqmm3gyrtpw8ekuz xxxx
bc1qlmmk7ckdal0j3nvy2y4t2xwefl9976fkq8 xxxx
bc1qlp3pq7tjc6zup3pxu7umj9s30yxteyarc3 xxxx
bc1qm8l8uxdgwqq5ekqgr2sfscdmglakxg5fl5 xxxx
bc1qmzlxlzvw0srp37mqnx8mymsecnju0xj6dh xxxx
bc1qn2h9dxvx3xm74hnd3jju7kdypych54vq6u xxxx
bc1qn7xym0yrhhng9hy88uqgevm46jnh0fh2lu xxxx
bc1qnfc3hz4a4j4scyg5zrt0xa7p0vrac9v8wl xxxx
bc1qnvnuyl7cg86dyzng03etkjdkjaavfu0m3n xxxx
bc1qnyje580at9apad90dm0taajudld6ev2lka xxxx
bc1qpcs26rxvsrtq9px7fpgga0etzaqu7thnc4 xxxx
bc1qpkhdfc3nwcvvq6kaczz8a67kfatpwhvjn8 xxxx
bc1qq2p2275rdl2xs3edj63c5mlks3g64g6atx xxxx
bc1qramng39n2lh4f9ml5553aa9mh4y3w2sphj xxxx
bc1qrkc7jgxmletk3ydd9e78kswx4t4tfgyn8q xxxx

bc1qrq49v9cnka6gsqf7f3vj9emezdzk7mncrp xxxx
bc1qrqdszqqsxscecl5kjatsgf5qyzfdaajkq4 xxxx
bc1qrtpwvkejcw7eyxxcspg56yqukxa7xszrjm xxxx
bc1qrwhvs2qsp0dmhk5ft007htgqajurygyjdy xxxx
bc1qs2nqutzvz3lj8g2grj0y3m7ha0lem98xrr xxxx
bc1qshcy8gcwhqrx244wqtrxppknj8dhcwya0k xxxx
bc1qt57yn6rgtpmgsfcjqqaru35arpxwy7u9g4 xxxx
bc1qtdgxeagzefl44h0dnt3jvqqg7khr72qpmm xxxx
bc1qtja7wvvtxgaftsz5tzxzzy2s2u740cqdxy xxxx
bc1qtje9p7zrhjqexvu527mu82nt7uh54rwm8t xxxx
bc1qu42tfm8t46sx7my3eecv5xlpq5gvjw2t7c xxxx
bc1qu6p60gnnmfrj6tszq6pqe6hche6ylfpd23 xxxx
bc1quy7xp3a84vw399wf8sfjltevxsxx5z99at xxxx
bc1quzchcv79rqnslmre338fyhjrhmzsm4yvtv xxxx
bc1qv2rc6c4ypqamrnjdankftmvxhftujjpq6d xxxx
bc1qv7mx9qa2amrsfd6gd38t2glkkagnaeysua xxxx
bc1qvegseajyqweeewwkjxufdslp2gc5utv2hc xxxx
bc1qvfxrp3dpctthms22emkypl7kjzf0yg9khe xxxx
bc1qvmekcz3820m7g6aeuhj7hgm3yarc83zrw8 xxxx
bc1qxxgcv3l7d7nwz3qtm00cavq0fc5ted0wpl xxxx
bc1qy8nqve0flr6yk0qvqnlqakzeu9m9n6sz73 xxxx
bc1qyfktdgjq2d5hvd2acfkzggskwu4pkdeed3 xxxx
bc1qyfpkkhrx3p5qht9vgf9fag83fx5ekktr9e xxxx
bc1qypyxu0kya5u0k2wckcgpjkcsxzxtv44r5u xxxx
bc1qz8xyjq9w9dscr288lxq8j6up2agv2vwc0n xxxx
bc1qzemylw4ewmt2xs9ruh3g2n83yhsyz6g6qu xxxx
bc1qzj9jgthhcdm3aetyzegt63dqzutm5lg70f xxxx
bc1qztelja0hf953ugt8wx3qxt5a7hqqmknuqn xxxx
bc1qzu99nu7uqy3rj6j97u3c8tx3p62ztdhyte xxxx
TADxuvmtYZJTjh2jKsevLLE4n2FdHt xxxx
TAgupBnLCH99B7wL4coQDXXJfXtE1t xxxx
TAJSvkSYjKs78HXcVjc3aUZRaj3TYw xxxx
TBJ2ZpCxhk72K8fv45BVdMbZ7EzGXr xxxx
TBk2tkNYNmthXyNNQSKCifm7ornyx2 xxxx
TD5NH3dfKHixBa9CD2gJ3MgsNxdxt6 xxxx
TDP2Wp3qZEvbvX7eymeCuiEcyFoeik xxxx
TEiP4XVuJCPjQF5HuY1WUGVF9Do6Nf xxxx
TF9c7LRiRSwZ87GBj1AjWeXwbaSCsN xxxx
TFdfbEU1uFgo4PypB5aJrcG1mRHaU2 xxxx
TG2nRs6zLKwfhQzKHsRnm5amMqa2AC xxxx
TGn1S8fY2BSuphBK4DJEJfRoYiUx5d xxxx
THFidK8JoznjC4eBTtD77xDJBnBSqJ xxxx
TKAd3q8R7JXQoTVzoAV4Co1T1oe3rB xxxx
TKHNPTssFKWMVo5ajgETYw8itNXuFk xxxx
TKZY3PjYzk8UxRRjN5uu2q3Cvu2jVx xxxx
TM2M3vghGmhNDLSVxn8shsZvaohgm4 xxxx
TM4JTYwheXMdorkwi4rGXTQXtMBSJo xxxx
TMGbCV95yZe234LuXMQZMcmUGxj9Sc xxxx
TNqZvJqHuxVijNyCagcZVBd43VjDfB xxxx
TPTmtZkFGwwxZTkBmPi8a1zty9iidX xxxx
TSefRvvpX7rGr5JjfhFCstkiTaQFMc xxxx
TSYh3nfh7efqXTzEzRiYgheELHcALd xxxx

TT2SrWWK77DoTBzxkRM4t6jqZ6WJhC xxxx
TUUPhW8Chi4mop7geAJmBQim1kZvbZ xxxx
TV1DpkjCB7C6cbTgrZRvY6E3J47rcX xxxx
TV2z9YSSLhDyvPFB681dVdVBciURp7 xxxx
TViN1Zp54GCmmpYFqDHMGZtqjZ1SYp xxxx
TVkV6R6BbCWWibkmUhA8ubq4Fq4TYi xxxx
TVmxKc7YF5DFdeC8LCR5T2vdUt35EX xxxx
TXQxmRQ5ZE9dAfyam5SivqjL9U2xHi xxxx
TXRXY7sEenLNaXUbNuyNzRZFBrKdLb xxxx
TYnC673dMhmhbktBP5DNxWiTr7Uzre xxxx
TZAgVhZk8jx56gsvxEFumjnEf8T6rs xxxx

Email addresses

Email address	Associated name (if available)
sa_lia@xxxxxx[.]com	Sa Lia *(note: email account language was set to Chinese)*
leaf20202011@xxxxxx[.]com	Mmhy Yyh *(note: email account language was set to Chinese)*
zakulasukirg@xxxxxxx[.]com	Zakula Sukir *(note: email account language was set to Chinese)*
otcmike@xxxxxxx[.]com	Mike OTC
arvinaskong21@xxxxx[.]com	Arvin
alexander_markenov@xxxxxx[.]me	
janewang[.]binance98@xxxx[.]com	Jane Wang
jayliang812@ xxxxx[.]com	Jay Liang
n65741556@ xxxxx[.]com	Nguyen Vinh
aubreylindhorst@xxxxxxx[.]com	Aubrey Lindhorst
luminar198@xxxxxxxxxx[.]com	
js382653@ xxxxx[.]com	John Smith
ravishweijer@ xxxxx[.]com	Ravish
decongingroun6f@xxx[.]com	Jimmy Lee
shaolin386@ xxxxx[.]com	Shao Lin
ton8689@ xxxxxx[.]me	*(note: email account language was set to Chinese)*
hoaleta2018@ xxxxx[.]com	Hoa Le Van *(note: email account language was set to Korean)*
xie18079861378@xxx[.]com	*(note: email account language was set to Chinese)*
yunisemgar@xxxxx[.]com	
sergeitest12@xxxxxxxxxx[.]com	
changellybrown@xxxxxxx[.]com	

alinainc111@ xxxxx[.]com	

Note: email addresses include the iCloud, Gmail, Outlook, Hotmail, Proton, GMX, 163, Skiff, Protonmail, and Yopmail services.

Transaction IP addresses

5.226.137.4
27.109.114.188
37.120.151.162
37.140.254.144
37.140.254.189
45.128.199.27
45.8.25.82
45.8.68.79
45.8.68.80
45.83.220.216
45.86.202.216
45.86.202.4
45.95.243.104
45.95.243.155
66.115.146.163
78.109.18.227
84.247.59.103
84.247.59.113
84.247.59.115
84.247.59.123
84.247.59.13
84.247.59.145
84.247.59.146
84.247.59.27
84.247.59.47
84.247.59.57
84.247.59.7
84.247.59.80
84.247.59.86
85.203.15.104
85.203.15.105
85.203.15.45
85.203.44.133
85.203.45.198
86.48.13.166
91.221.66.87
94.200.95.34
103.125.146.22
103.125.146.27
103.125.146.40
103.125.146.8
103.125.146.90

103.163.220.242
103.163.220.248
103.163.220.38
103.163.220.61
103.235.17.57
104.234.140.132
108.181.50.58
114.42.193.83
117.20.113.188
117.20.116.53
146.70.144.77
146.70.199.8
146.70.42.122
149.36.50.13
157.97.122.39
157.97.122.40
178.157.102.179
182.239.115.115
182.239.115.43
182.239.92.147
182.239.92.58
182.239.93.210
182.239.93.41
185.107.69.214
185.192.71.14
185.204.1.184
185.82.72.120
188.212.135.178
191.101.126.192
191.96.180.36
191.96.180.37
191.96.180.52
191.96.180.54
191.96.180.77
194.32.120.58
194.32.120.76
194.5.48.68
194.5.48.71
194.5.53.248
194.5.83.4
212.30.37.180
212.30.37.214
212.30.37.30

Annex 98: Kimsuky email addresses, websites and virtual currency addresses released by Member States

Email Addresses:

- hongsiao@naver[.]com
- teriparl25@gmail[.]com
- seanchung.hanvoice@hotmail[.]com
- pkurui9999@gmail[.]com
- kennedypamla@gmail[.]com
- ds1kdie@aol[.]com
- ssdkfdlsfd@gmail[.]com
- haris2022100@outlook[.]com
- bing2020@outlook[.]kr
- marksigal1001@gmail[.]com
- donghyunkim1010@gmail[.]com
- hong_xiao@naver[.]com
- sm.carls0000@gmail[.]com
- ds1kde@daum[.]net
- yoon.dasl@yahoo[.]com
- syshim10@mofa[.]lat

Websites:

- sovershopp[.]online
- onerearth[.]xyz
- mofa[.]lat
- janskinmn[.]lol
- supermeasn[.]lat
- bookstarrtion[.]online
- cdredos[.]site
- scemsal[.]site
- somelmark[.]store

Digital Currency Addresses:

- bc1qmkh9s8qju9tkk2qckcz79we2084h2ckeqxylnq
- bc1qu9303km9mnq03hxehvtf2tzchvmkqnzyzm928d

Note: Not intended to be an exhaustive list

Source: Member States.[285]

[285] https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373737&page=1 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938

Annex 99 – Select reports of DPRK cyber actors targeting the cryptocurrency industry

"Security alert: social engineering campaign targets technology industry employees," GitHub, 18 July 2023

Summary: A recent DPRK social engineering campaign perpetrated by Bluenoroff targets the personal accounts of employees of technology firms, using a combination of repository invitations and malicious npm package dependencies. Many of these targeted accounts are connected to the blockchain, cryptocurrency, or online gambling sectors. The attacks begin with the DPRK cyber actors impersonating a developer or recruiter by creating one or more fake persona accounts, or legitimate accounts that have been taken over by the DPRK actors, on GitHub and other social media providers. These fake personas have also been identified on LinkedIn, Slack, and Telegram. The DPRK actors may initiate contact on one social media platform and then attempt to move the conversation to another. After establishing contact, the DPRK actor invites the target to collaborate on a GitHub repository containing software that includes malicious npm dependencies and convinces the target to clone and execute its contents. Some software themes used by the DPRK actors include media players and cryptocurrency trading tools. The malicious npm packages act as first-stage malware that downloads and executes second-stage malware on the victim's machine. In some cases, the DPRK actor may deliver the malicious software directly on a messaging or file sharing platform.

Link: https://github.blog/2023-07-18-security-alert-social-engineering-campaign-targets-technology-industry-employees/#indicators

"Spreading malware disguised as coin and investment-related content," AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC), 31 July 2023

Summary: Malicious cyber actors believed to be Kimsuky are distributuing malware disguised as cryptocurrency coin exchange and investment-related content. The malicious code is distributed in the form of executable files and word documents, several of which have cryptocurrency-related names.

Link: https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/55646/

"Konni APT exploits WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-2023-38831) targeting the cryptocurrency industry," Chuangyu 404 Advanced Threat Intelligence Team, 14 September 2023

Summary: ScarCruft (APT 37) group has been identified using the WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-2023-38831) to attack the cryptocurrency industry, a significant shift in the group's traditional targeting. ScarCruft used a malicious payload disguised as a wallet screenshot named "wallet_Screenshot_2023_09_06_Qbao_Network.zip," likely a reference to Qbao Network, a smart cryptocurrency wallet service.

Link: https://paper.seebug.org/3033/

"Detailed Malware Analysis Report: Putty disguised as malware (Lazarus APT) (악성코드 상세분석 보고서: 악성코드로 둔갑한 Putty (Lazarus APT))," Hauri, 9 October 2023

Summary: Since June 2022, the Lazarus Group actors have been creating malware by modifying open source software (such as PuTTY, KiTTY, TightVNC, Sumatra PDF Reader, and muPDF/Subliminal Recording), and have also pretended to be recruiters on LinkedIn in order to target victims with malware. Moreover, it appears that the DPRK cyber actors intended at least some of this malware to target the cryptocurrency industry, as the C2 server identified in the report is a domain entitled "hxxps://blockchain-newtech[.]com."

Link: https://www.hauri.co.kr/security/security.html

"Elastic catches DPRK passing out KANDYKORN," Elastic Security Labs, 31 October 2023

Summary: A novel DPRK intrusion has been identified on a macOS system that targets blockchain engineers of a crypto exchange platform, lures blockchain engineers with a Python application to gain initial access, and deploys multiple complex

stages of the attack each with deliberate defensive evasion techniques. Attackers impersonated blockchain engineering community members on a public Discord frequented by members of this community. The attacker social-engineered their initial victim, convincing them to download and decompress a ZIP archive containing malicious code. The victim believed they were installing an arbitrage bot, a software tool capable of profiting from cryptocurrency rate differences between platforms. The malicious activity was attributed to the DPRK (likely the Lazarus Group), based on analysis of the techniques, network infrastructure, code-signing certificates, and custom Lazarus Group detection rules.

Link: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-catches-dprk-passing-out-kandykorn

"Crypto-Themed npm Packages Found Delivering Stealthy Malware," Phylum Research Team, 4 November 2023

Summary: On 30 October 2023 Phylum identified an unusual publication to npm called "puma-com." Upon investigation, Phylum found a very convoluted attack chain that ultimately pulled a remote file, manipulated it in place, called an exported function from that file, and then meticulously covered its tracks by removing and renaming files all along the way. Phylum identified four additional packages belonging to this campaign.

Link: https://blog.phylum.io/crypto-themed-npm-packages-found-delivering-stealthy-malware/

"BlueNoroff strikes again with new macOS malware," Jamf Threat Labs, 6 November 2023

Summary: A BlueNoroff malware variant dubbed "ObjCShellz" was discovered that shares characteristics with the previously-reported RustBucket campaign. In this campaign, the actor reaches out to a target claiming to be interested in partnering with or offering them something beneficial under the guise of an investor or head hunter. BlueNoroff often creates a domain that looks like it belongs to a legitimate crypto company in order to blend in with network activity; in this case, the malware was observed communicating with malicious domain "swissborg[.]blog." This malware was likely a late stage within a multi-stage malware delivered via social engineering.

Link: https://www.jamf.com/blog/bluenoroff-strikes-again-with-new-macos-malware

Social media post, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 8 November 2023

Summary: BlueNoroff cyber actors had, within the prior few weeks, created new websites masquerading as skills assessment portals, marking a shift in the persistent actor's tactics. As part of this, BlueNoroff is targeting users on LinkedIn and enticing them with deceptive lures related to a skills assessment, subsequently moving conversations to other platforms. The assessment portals are reportedly created to entice victims to register an account, allowing the DPRK actors to harvest their information.

Link: https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1722316019920728437

"Hacking Employers and Seeking Employment: Two Job-Related Campaigns Bear Hallmarks of North Korean Threat Actors," Palo Alto Networks, 21 November 2023

Summary: In a campaign dubbed "Contagious Interview", DPRK cyber actors are posing as employers – utilizing advertisements on job search platforms and potentially email, social media, or chat platforms – to lure software developers into installing malware (hosted on Github) through the interview process, providing the DPRK actors opportunity to steal intellectual property, funds, and/or other information. The investigation also identified two new malware families, BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. Based on some of the file names of malware deployed, the DPRK cyber actors may be impersonating legitimate AI, cryptocurrency and NFT-related companies or recruitment agencies.

Link: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters/

"DPRK Crypto Theft | macOS RustBucket Droppers Pivot to Deliver KandyKorn Payloads," SentinelOne, 27 November 2023

Summary: DPRK cyber actors have continued efforts to target macOS users associated with the cryptocurrency industry through two major campaigns in 2023, RustBucket and KandyKorn. DPRK cyber actors are 'mixing and matching' components from these two separate campaigns.

Link: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/dprk-crypto-theft-macos-rustbucket-droppers-pivot-to-deliver-kandykorn-payloads/

"BlueNoroff: new Trojan attacking macOS users," Kaspersky Lab, 5 December 2023

Summary: A recently-discovered new variety of malware targeting macOS that is linked to BlueNoroff and its ongoing campaign, RustBucket. The new malware variety was identified inside a ZIP archive that contained a PDF file named "Crypto-assets and their risks for financial stability," and appears to have been created on 21 October 2023.

Link: https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-new-macos-malware/111290/

"Analysis of North Korean Hackers' Targeted Phishing Scams on Telegram," SlowMist, 6 December 2023

Summary: The Lazarus Group has conducted a widespread phishing operation on Telegram since 2022, specifically targeting the cryptocurrency industry. The DPRK cyber actors impersonate reputable investment institutions, establishing fake Telegram accounts in these entities' names, to execute phishing scams against various cryptocurrency and decentralized finance project teams by reaching out to discuss potential investment opportunities and scheduling a video meeting. As part of this process, the DPRK actors attempt to convince the victim to download a script, falsely claiming it's necessary to enter the meeting room or otherwise providing malicious meeting links. The purpose of this malicious activity is to steal funds and/or information about the victims. [see also Annex 88]

Link: https://slowmist.medium.com/analysis-of-north-korean-hackers-targeted-phishing-scams-on-telegram-872db3f7392b

"Analysis of attack samples suspected of Lazarus (APT-Q-1) involving npm package supply chain," QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center, 7 December 2023

Summary: A batch of Lazarus Group downloader samples were recently discovered; they are loaded through multiple layers of nested PE files and ultimately download a payload from a C2 server and execute it. Of note, one of the C2 server IP addresses (IP address 91[.]206.178.125 of sample d8a8cc25bf5ef5b96ff7a64f663cbd29) identified by the Center was reportedly recently disclosed by the Phylum Research Team as used by the Lazarus Group in a software supply chain attack, in which the malware was delivered disguised as an encryption-related npm package. Other pieces of the malware code are also linked to previous Lazarus Group campaigns. Several of the C2 addresses featured in the report – including hxxps://blockchain-newtech.com/download/download[.]asp and hxxps://chaingrown.com/manage/manage[.]asp – appear to be linked to the cryptocurrency industry.

Links: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/f5YE12w3x3wad5EO0EB53Q, https://blog.phylum.io/crypto-themed-npm-packages-found-delivering-stealthy-malware/

"Update to November's Crypto-Themed npm Attack," Phylum Research Team, 5 January 2023

Summary: Updating on Phylum's 4 November 2023 report (see above) regarding a collection of npm packages involved in a complex attack chain, Phylum has identified nearly two dozen additional packages belonging to this still active campaign. Phylum further referenced the QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center report (see above), "conclusively linking it to a North Korean APT." Based on this determination and given that the package names were crypto-themed, Phylum assessed it was "increasingly apparent that the campaign's ultimate objective was likely twofold: first, to gain persistent access to the systems of developers who installed these packages, and second, to leverage this access to infiltrate the broader organization these developers belong to—likely entities within the cryptocurrency sector. Presumably the end goal, given the recent history of North Korean hacking objectives, was to steal substantial cryptocurrency assets…"

Link: https://blog.phylum.io/crypto-themed-npm-packages-found-delivering-stealthy-malware/

Annex 100 – Reported BlueNoroff financial domain spoofing

Malicious domains	Genuine company	Jurisdiction
abf-cap[.]co	ABF Capital	Tokyo, Japan
deck[.]altairvc[.]com	AltalR Capital	California, USA
down[.]altairvc[.]info	AltalR Capital	California, USA
angelbridge[.]capital	Angel Bridge	Tokyo, Japan
vote[.]anobaka[.]info	ANOBAKA	Tokyo, Japan
share[.]anobaka[.]info	Anobaka Venture Capital	Tokyo, Japan
cloud[.]anobaka[.]info	Anobaka Venture Capital	Tokyo, Japan
bankofamerica[.]tel	Bank of America	North Carolina, USA
bankofamerica[.]nyc	Bank of America	North Carolina, USA
bankofamerica[.]us[.]org	Bank of America	North Carolina, USA
beyondnextventures[.]co	Beyond Next Ventures	Tokyo, Japan
cloud[.]beyondnextventures[.]co	Beyond Next Ventures	Tokyo, Japan
cloud[.]daiwa[.]ventures	DG Daiwa Ventures	Tokyo, Japan
tet[.]dnx[.]capital	DNX Ventures	California, USA and Tokyo, Japan
cloud[.]dnx[.]capital	DNX Ventures	California, USA and Tokyo, Japan
cloud[.]espcapital[.]pro	ESP Capital	Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
down[.]espcapital[.]co	ESP Capital	Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
down[.]gpmtreit[.]co	Granite Point Mortgage Trust	New York, USA
down[.]gpmtreit[.]us	Granite Point Mortgage Trust	New York, USA
cloud[.]gpmtreit[.]co	Granite Point Mortgage Trust	New York, USA
web[.]gpmtreit[.]us	Granite Point Mortgage Trust	New York, USA
down[.]j-ic[.]com	Japan Investment Corporation	Tokyo, Japan
internal[.]j-ic[.]co	Japan Investment Corporation	Tokyo, Japan
cloud[.]j-ic[.]co	Japan Investment Corporation	Tokyo, Japan
web[.]j-ic[.]co	Japan Investment Corporation	Tokyo, Japan
cloud[.]mekongcapital[.]net	Mekong Capital	Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
mufg[.]us[.]com	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group	Japan
mufg[.]yokohama	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group	Tokyo, Japan

cloud[.]mufg[.]tokyo	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group	Tokyo, Japan
mufg[.]tokyo	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group	Tokyo, Japan
mizuhogroup[.]us	Mizuho Financial Group	Tokyo, Japan
careers[.]mizuhogroup[.]us	Mizuho Financial Group	Tokyo, Japan
smbc[.]ltd	Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation	Tokyo, Japan
smbcgroup[.]us	Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation	Tokyo, Japan
smbc-vc[.]com	Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation	Tokyo, Japan
tptf[.]us	Trans-Pacific Technology Fund	Taiwan Province of China
tptf[.]ltd	Trans-Pacific Technology Fund	Taiwan Province of China
it[.]zvc[.]capital	Z Venture Capital	Tokyo, Japan

Sources: https://www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-aligned-tag-71-spoofs-financial-institutions, https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/

Annex 101 – Compilation of cybersecurity community's effective practices

- Training:
  - Regular trainings for all organizational employees and contractors that cover basic security concepts, such as phishing, business email compromise, social engineering on social media, basic operational security, password security, etc., as well as foster an internal culture of security and cyber awareness.
  - New employees receive initial cybersecurity training shortly after onboarding.
  - Periodically conduct phishing exercises to raise awareness among employees about the risks of visiting websites, clicking on links, and opening attachments.

- Credentials:
  - Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to protect against compromised user passwords.
  - Ensure passwords are of appropriate length and complexity.
  - Revoke credentials for departing employees.
  - Require unique and separate credentials for similar services and asset access on IT and operational technology networks, such that users do not (or cannot) reuse passwords for work accounts, applications, services, etc.

- Apply Zero Trust principles to limit the impact of an attack on an organization, including:
  - Explicitly verify users and devices before allowing access to resources.
  - Only allow the access privilege that is needed for a resource and no more.
  - Assume system defenses have been breached and systems may be compromised, and constantly monitor the environment for possible attack.

- Hardware, software, networks, and data:
  - Ensure effective encryption to maintain confidentiality of sensitive data and integrity of IT and operational technology traffic.
  - Keep systems up to date, including firmware, the operating system, and applications.
  - Protect data by identifying important data, its location, and whether the right defenses are implemented.
  - Organizations should disable HTML from being used in emails and scan email attachments.
  - Implement a system-enforced policy that disables Microsoft Office macros, or similar embedded code, by default on all devices.
  - Implement an administrative policy or automated process that requires administrative approval before new hardware, firmware, or software/software version is installed or deployed.
  - All systems that are necessary for operations are regularly backed up, and backups are stored separately from the source systems.
  - Collect and store access- and security-focused logs (e.g., intrusion detection systems/intrusion prevention systems, firewall, data loss prevention, virtual private network) for use in both detection and incident response activities (e.g., forensics).

Store logs in a central system that can only be accessed or modified by authorized and authenticated users.
  - Maintain policies and processes to ensure that unauthorized media and hardware are not connected to IT and operational technology assets, such as by limiting use of USB devices and removable media or disabling AutoRun.
  - If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely.

- Detection and response:
  - Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.
  - Use extended detection and response (XDR) and antimalware to detect and automatically block attacks and provide insights to the security operations software.
  - Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan.

- Cryptocurrency-specific:
  - Only keep the necessary liquidity in hot wallet(s) and store the remainder of funds in cold/hardware wallets.
  - Implement multi-signature permissions on hot wallets along with a timed access/recovery feature.[286]
  - Enable MFA for software wallets and transactions as well as logins.
  - Validate social media accounts and check username handles for character/number substitutions or other special characters.
  - Always check URLs before clicking on a link, and watch redirects after clicking to make sure that the website is an official website, rather than a phishing site. Double-check web addresses of official websites.
  - Be cautious of contact that induces a sense of urgency to pressure victims into impulse actions and mistakes.
  - Consider anti-cryptomining and ad-blocker browser extensions that can detect and block malicious cryptomining.
  - Deploy continuous monitoring of network activities; unusual access attempts or patterns can indicate attempted attacks.
  - Conduct regular security audits to identify vulnerabilities.


Sources: Cybersecurity companies, Member State, Panel

[286] One cryptocurrency company that was the victim of a suspected DPRK heist in 2023 also recommended multi-signature permissions and a time-lock feature.

Annex 102: DPRK export earnings (registered) 2012–2023. bln USD




DPRK exports dynamics to China, 2016–2018



Source: ITC Trade Map, Custom statistics of China, the Panel.

Annex 103: DPRK coal export (2013–2023)


Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Export, mln metric tons	16706,3	15654,2	19864	22521,5	2671	##	7300	4600	500	1035	2700



Source. **Energy Information Administration** - **EIA** - Official Energy Statistics from the **U.S.** Government https://www.eia.gov https://svspb.net/norge/eksport-uglja.php?l=kndr; The Panel,


Annex 104: DPRK exports of major commodities to China and imports of Food

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral ...	1404	1154	1058	1193	414	11	11	12	17	20
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	499	622	633	497	497	0	0	0	0	0
Ores, slag and ash	415	339	205	227	187	25	21	6	1	45
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	116	143	108	190	163	0	0	0	0	0



Source: ITC World Trade Map (https://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx), Chinese Custom Statistics(http://stats.customs.gov.cn/indexEn), The Panel.

Imports of rice from China



Source: NK News

Annex 105: Estimates of DPRK energy supply




Figure 3. North Korean energy supply estimates from Statistics Korea and Nautilus Institute.

Chart: Martyn Williams / 38 North • Source: Statistics Korea and Nautilus Institute • Embed • Created with Datawrapper

Source: https://www.38north.org/2023/03/north-koreas-energy-sector-defining-the-landscape/

Annex 106[287]: Excerpts from 2023 Report on North Korean Human Rights
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, pp. 340-345

D. Impact of Sanctions

In response to North Korea's July 4 and July 28, 2017 ballistic missile launches, the United Nations adopted Resolution 2371 on August 5, 2017, which imposed stricter economic sanctions on North Korea. The resolution's restrictions and prohibitions on economic cooperation had a significant impact on the establishment and operation of North Korea-China joint ventures. In the border regions of North Hamgyong and Ryanggang Provinces, a number of North Korean-Chinese joint ventures had been established and were operating; they paid their workers on time.

According to Resolution 2371, member states shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening of new joint ventures or cooperative entities with North Korean entities or individuals, or the expansion of existing joint ventures through additional investments, unlike North Korean-run enterprises. Nevertheless, there are reports of a rise in the number of joint ventures who were shut as a result of successive sanctions. For instance, a hotel in the city of Rason operated by a joint venture primarily relied on Chinese tourists. But after the sanctions, few Chinese tourists visited, making it difficult to pay employee wages. Moreover, a mining company in North Hamgyong Province that was operated as a joint venture with China reportedly experienced difficulties with wages and company rations following the imposition of sanctions.

Additionally, the restrictions on crude oil imports appear to have had an impact. In certain instances, mines, including coal mines, were closed due to fuel and electricity shortages.

Furthermore, it became difficult to import refined oil from China via small-scale smuggling. Consequently, residents who rely on motorcycles for transportation were affected. Multiple reports from North Koreans showed that around the same time, trading companies in the border region closed operations and the local economy deteriorated.

In the border region between North Korea and China, significant portion of the local population engaged in small-scale smuggling with China. However, the economic activities of the local populations were negatively affected by the tightening sanctions against North Korea, the installation of barbed wire along the border by North Korean authorities, and the enforcement of anti-smuggling measures. Defector testimony shows that to

[287] The Ministry of Unification is publishing the 2023 North Korean Human Rights Report to inform the public the overall human rights situation in North Korea. The report is significant as it is the first report published by the ROK Government in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights Act, enacted through bipartisan cooperation in 2016. The report demonstrates the Government's determination to make further efforts to substantially improve North Korean human rights. To reveal the recent reality of North Korean human rights, the report was written based on the testimonies of North Korean defectors. The recent North Korean human rights situations that occurred from 2017 to 2022 were documented in a balanced and objective way, while concentrating on actual cases adhering to human rights as stipulated in the International Covenant. Centered on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR), women, children, and persons with disabilities are designated vulnerable groups.
(https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54278&category=&pageIdx=)

compensate for the decline in economic activity, the outsourcing industry for bond processing became more active.

The primary outsourced products were small-scale items such as summer hats, bags, wigs, and accessories. Further, reports indicate that People's Committees took the initiative, obtained permits, and operated these businesses.

Around 2014, eyelashes were the principal products of outsourcing industry in the border region. Workers were paid in Chinese Yuan based on the quantity of finished goods. After 2017, however, the form of payment was converted from cash to rice. 2.2kg of rice was paid for a summer straw hat with a brim length of 10cm, deducting 200g for each additional 1cm it fell short. Other testimony indicated that 1.5kg to 3kg of rice were paid per piece, depending on the tightness of the brim in 2019. Outsourced manufacturing also recently expanded from border regions to inland provinces, including South Pyongan and Hwanghae Provinces.

The decline in cross-border trade has also affected prices, leading to volatility. The price of fish and herbal medicines dropped because they were subject to export bans. The price of manufactured products, such as necessities and Chinese imports, rose considerably. In 2017, there was a sharp increase in the cost of food and essential necessities in Pyongyang, which locals attributed to sanctions, and they simultaneously experienced significant fluctuations in the currency exchange rate as well.

Other testimony indicated difficulty purchasing necessities due to the increased prices of Chinese imports in border regions. In 2018, after state-owned mining enterprises ceased operations in North Hamgyong Province, prices increased, making workers' lives extremely challenging. The ports of Nampo and Songlim, which were once active in trade with China, experienced a significant decrease in trade volumes.

"In the fall of 2018, the Musan Mine had to close down because there wasn't enough electricity or fuel. I don't know exactly when it was shut down, but it wasn't working when I left. So, the miners' food was cut off, and life got harder for them. Some of them made a living by using wooden boats to catch squid, or picking mushrooms in the

mountains. Also, because the sanctions stopped trade, the price of goods went up a lot. The cost of living increased, and many trading companies went out of business. Overall, Musan County became a hard place to live."

Source : https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/Publications/ronkhr/

Annex 107: Questionnaire for humanitarian organizations that have worked in the DPRK

For this reporting period, the Panel again asked questions addressing the impact of COVID-19 and the closed borders on organizational operations, as well as each group's estimate of when they expect to resume operations in DPRK.

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK since 2018, and in particular in 2023? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

2) What is your assessment of the overall consequences of COVID-19- related border closure and ongoing partial closure of the borders of the DPRK on the overall humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020, and in particular in 2023? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the future prospects of access to and within the DPRK? How are these prospects related to COVID factors, and what other factors are at play?

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response in the DPRK, in particular in 2023.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs, in particular in 2023? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of the DPRK?

6) The recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see https://undocs.org/en/S/2023/656, para.162 (b)) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions as to how this measure can be implemented, and what is your assessment of the possible effects of such a mechanism?

7) UN Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) "directs these Committees, assisted by their respective panels of experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of this resolution, including any risk of diversion", paragraph 1 of the same resolution having created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and subsequent resolutions, to permit "the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs". Are you aware of any such cases?

8) Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 "Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of the 1718 Committee (DPRK Sanctions) (IAN 7) recommends inclusion of measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used as intended purposes and not diverted for prohibited purposes in humanitarian exemption requests submitted to the Committee. The Panel would welcome any available information about possible diversion, as background to its work.

9) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK, especially within the past year, that you want to share with the Panel?

Annex 108: Responses from humanitarian organizations

The Panel has redacted humanitarian organizations' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations and in a few cases on other grounds. The Panel takes no position on the responses provided by these organizations.

Organization 1

1) *What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK since 2018, and in particular in 2023? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

The condition in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a protracted humanitarian situation characterized by chronic food insecurity and a lack of access to lifesaving essential services, including quality healthcare, with profound effects on the most vulnerable people. The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) estimated that 11.3 million people (over 4 out of 10 persons) need humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian operations in the DPRK therefore are a critical lifeline for millions of people. In addition, the country remains highly vulnerable to natural disasters including cyclones, floods, and drought, further exacerbating humanitarian needs amongst the most vulnerable. However, the effects of the UN sanctions have limited the scope and depth of the humanitarian response by the UN and other INGOs in the country. These effects manifest more in the areas of reduced access to donor funds, inability to transfer funds into the country (due to sanctions on banking channels) and restrictions on the importation of certain medical items/equipment into the country due to their inclusion in the sanctions list of prohibited items. Moreover, some manufacturers in Europe have recently refused to produce lifesaving medicines specifically for importation into the DPRK.

a. <u>Lack of cash flow in the country (Donor funding and Cash transfer into the country)</u>

Mobilization of funds has been difficult in the sanctions environment owing to the concern about inadvertently violating the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. On average, [Organization 1] requires about USD [number] million each year for its humanitarian interventions. In the past year, less than 50% of this funding was secured, resulting in reduced support for the provision of lifesaving humanitarian interventions in the country. In the same vein, it is almost impossible for UN Agencies and/or INGOs to transfer funds into the DPRK because of sanctions on international banking. UN Agencies in DPRK have stopped paying the salaries of their national personnel and meeting their rent liabilities due to the cash shortage in DPRK.

b. <u>Restriction on Procurement/Supply of equipment</u>

The UN Sanctions Committee's guidelines require that single and dual/multiple-use items containing metal components be approved for exemption by the Sanctions Committee. [Organization 1] has been diligently following the directives of the Sanctions Committee. The process of seeking clearances from the 1718 Committee for these items has resulted in delays or cancellation of procurement over the years. Prior to the implementation of sanctions on DPRK, [Organization 1] supported the strengthening of DPRK health facilities.. [Organization 1] has not been able to replenish items for these facilities, resulting in deterioration in service provision, which is having a negative impact on the health of the population in DPRK.

Furthermore, UN humanitarian programming requires a strong humanitarian needs overview. For this, generation of evidence-based data is indispensable, and this process requires the use of IT equipment to aid data capturing and analysis. In 2019, [Organization 1] was unable to implement its data-related programme due to the extended time required for obtaining exemptions of the procurement of IT equipment from the 1718 Committee and the U.S. Treasury Department for U.S. patented items (IT equipment), which was beyond the timeline of the programme. In addition, data-related support was not considered as humanitarian aid but rather as development assistance, which added further complexities for consideration by the Security Council. A ban on imports from many countries, complex licensing requirements, increased scrutiny of supplies passing through customs and logistical complexities also delay the importation and distribution of essential supplies.

2) *What is your assessment of the overall consequences of COVID-19-related border closure and ongoing partial closure of the borders of the DPRK on the overall humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the strict preventive measures including border closure and in-country mobility restrictions put in place by the Government of DPRK in January 2020, led to a significant scale down of humanitarian interventions in health, agriculture, nutrition, water, and sanitation in the country. For example, in the health sector, import of critical life-saving commodities and equipment were stuck in China for over a year and a half with UN organizations, including [Organization 1], incurring significant demurrage charges. Earlier in 2023, the country experienced stock-out of all essential life-saving medical supplies. But the situation has eased with the exceptional clearances in late 2022 and resumption of sea and land-freight services and relaxation of the quarantine and disinfection rules in early 2023. Even bi-lateral trade has resumed and as per media reporting the imports were dominated by medicines and food (https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/02/08/a-glimmer-of-hope-for-north-korea-in-2023/).

The border closure that prevented international humanitarian workers, including UN staff, from entering the country has had a direct negative impact on the ability to mobilize funds for humanitarian interventions because of the reluctance of donors to commit funding to programmes in the absence of international personnel in the country. In the case of [Organization 1], humanitarian interventions continued using internal resources although they were insufficient to respond to the significant humanitarian needs, worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic.

3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020, and in particular in 2023? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the future prospects of access to and within the DPRK? How are these prospects related to COVID factors, and what other factors are at play?*

COVID-19 related restrictions and the closure of the international borders have hampered humanitarian operations on the ground. The scope of the [Organization 1] programme has been limited to humanitarian interventions that could be implemented with minimal international presence, albeit with the adoption of some mitigation measures to reduce programme risks, including additional Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to streamline processes in the absence of international personnel and more monitoring visits with increased supporting documentation (including pictorial evidence by programme staff), among other measures. In 2022, [Organization 1] was also able to clear its humanitarian supplies that were stuck in [a third country] port for over 1.5 years because of the closure. In 2023, with the appropriate mobilization of our national personnel and adoption of some mitigation measures, we have been able to implement interventions focused on the procurement and distribution of life-saving commodities and medicines;

trainings of health personnel on key humanitarian interventions in areas within our mandate; and the printing and distribution of prior developed guidance documents and manuals that health workers need to continue to provide quality life-saving services .

All of the above actions were taken in response to the Government's request for support and our estimation of the absolute stock-out of lifesaving commodities and medicines related to our mandate in the country in the early part of the year. Other major activities have been put on hold until the border is re-opened to international UN personnel. We anticipate a high possibility of the borders being opened to the international humanitarian community, including the UN, from the first quarter of 2024. This expectation follows the Government's release of the final anti-epidemic measures on 4 December 2023. We do not know of any other factors that could delay the entry of international UN staff and personnel into the country at this time. In summary, [Organization 1] continues to be on standby for a possible re-entry of its international staff into the country to continue to provide needed services in our mandate areas to the most vulnerable. ,

4) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response in the DPRK, in particular in 2023.*

Due to the uncertain environment for importation of lifesaving goods and commodities in early 2023, [Organization 1] limited itself to the procurement of items not subjected to the UN sanctions to reduce overall transaction time. However, at least one manufacturer of lifesaving medicines in a European country refused procurement orders for shipment of medicines to DPRK citing the UN Security Council sanctions. There is a perception that the UN Security Council sanctions often lead to delays in the procurement process as even some freight forwarders refuse to take up related shipment contracts due to additional paperwork required to move goods into the DPRK. And those who accept the offers often charge higher freight costs for the shipments adding to the overall transaction costs for humanitarian service provision.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs, in particular in 2023? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of the DPRK?*

[Organization 1] appreciates the 1718 Committee for reducing the turnaround time for exemption approvals, for increasing the validity period of those exemptions and for providing flexibility in considering cases on an individual basis. To facilitate and strengthen the presence of UN organizations on the ground, it is nevertheless imperative to establish a viable banking channel for funds to be transferred into DPRK to enable the UN agencies to implement their respective programmes and respond to emerging humanitarian needs. Since early 2021, most UN organizations operating in Pyongyang have had to stop paying the salaries of national secondees, fuel costs and other office expenses due to the dearth of cash in the country. This has led to the accrual of significant debt locally. It would be helpful if the Sanctions Committee would help with an exception that supports the movement of funds into the DPRK to clear this backlog of debt owed to the national personnel and clear outstanding office rents and utilities.

In addition to the banking channel, UN organizations are required to go through the Sanctions Committee for exemption for items that have metal components, as there is a clause related to single/multiple use. Most of the health-related procurements have metal components and are classified as multiple use. Consideration for the waiver or a blanket approval, for example, for approved standardized medical kits that have been previously cleared by the inter-agency task force at UN HQs would provide more flexibility for response to humanitarian needs in the shortest possible time.

6) *The recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see https://undocs.org/en/S/2023/656, para.162 (b)) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions as to how this measure can be implemented, and what is your assessment of the possible effects of such a mechanism?*

Since the commencement of the new sanctions, the UN and other related agencies have limited support to relatively 'soft' forms of support compared to previous years. Prior to the strengthened sanctions, the UN had focused on ensuring strengthened health systems. […]

Government investments in improving the health infrastructure, upgrading equipment and other necessities have been limited thus far and we believe the recommendation made in 162 (b) is positive and may empower the government in mobilizing its own resources to prioritize and address the pressing humanitarian and development needs facing the population.

Implementing this provision would require engagement with the Government and their willingness to follow-through. There needs to be clarity on how the entire process will be executed from the start to the end, which may require developing a road map and a MOU with the National Coordination Committee (NCC) of the DPRK MOFA on the terms and conditions that would guide the process. It is not often very easy for external parties to engage in such processes in DPRK so the RC may be designated to lead the discussion in-country with support from other UN Heads of Office in the country. The actual process may also be fashioned like the current process that UN agencies go through to get approval for imports supported by a strong system of oversight and monitoring.

7) *UN Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) "directs these Committees, assisted by their respective panels of experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of this resolution, including any risk of diversion", paragraph 1 of the same resolution having created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and subsequent resolutions, to permit "the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs". Are you aware of any such cases?*

[Organization 1] is not aware of such cases being reported since the introduction of the resolution 266 4. Though it was discussed and briefed by OCHA in the UNCT, there is a need for the implication of the resolution 2664 to be well articulated and itemized so all stakeholders fully understand the opportunities it is providing to support humanitarian interventions. We do not believe this is the case currently.

8) Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 "Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of the 1718 Committee (DPRK Sanctions) (IAN 7) recommends inclusion of measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used as intended purposes and not diverted for prohibited purposes in humanitarian exemption requests submitted to the Committee. The Panel would welcome any available information about possible diversion, as background to its work.

[Organization 1] is not aware of any diversion for other uses of items procured through [Organization 1] or any other Agency.

8) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK, especially within the past year, that you want to share with the Panel?

Sensitization of donors on the wider context of humanitarian-development complementarity and its implications on the population and human development from a right-based perspective will be necessary so that donors are encouraged to support humanitarian initiatives that could lead to synergies that promote sustainable wellbeing of the people, especially the most vulnerable and hard to reach. In addition, the UN's efforts to strengthen data systems carry significant importance in identifying and understanding the humanitarian needs in the DPRK. Strengthening the data systems is crucial for effectively informing and shaping targeted strategies and interventions aimed at addressing the pressing needs of the population in the country. [Organization 1] would appreciate it if the Sanctions Committee could take this into consideration when reviewing applications for exemption approvals.

Organization 2

1) *What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK since 2018, and in particular in 2023? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

The sanctions and closure of borders have challenged and, in some cases, limited the work of [Organisation 2] and other UN Agencies and humanitarian organizations. The nonexistence of international banking channels has further led to acute liquidity crunch and severely constrained the critical in-country activities. Concomitantly, with limited in-country funds, [Organisation 2]'s focus remained in supporting and responding to humanitarian crisis and emergencies, such as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, floods and typhoons, etc. Resultantly, there is dearth of resources needed to develop strategies enabling prevention and mitigation of shocks and emergencies, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

For instance, procurement got delayed due to the closure of borders and ultimately some items could not be procured.

These challenges further cascaded when some supplies and equipment got stranded at the [neighboring country] borders and not allowed to enter the country, thus incurring huge storage/demurrage/cold chain charges.

In 2023 due to the sanctions and national restrictions at borders, there were limitation in procurement of items and such procurement was limited to items which do not require sanction clearance.

The source of information is from the list of items that have been delivered to the country.

2) *What is your assessment of the overall consequences of COVID-19- related border closure and ongoing partial closure of the borders of the DPRK on the overall humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

[See also response under 1) above]

In January 2020 the Government of DPRK closed its international borders (air, sea, and land) in an attempt to prevent the entry of the novel coronavirus into the country when WHO declared the COVID- 19 outbreak to be a pandemic. Currently, the borders are open although the movement of people is restricted to DPRK nationals and diplomats from few countries. Supply of goods via all routes (sea, rail, land and air) has resumed but still require advance approvals and greenlight. All quarantine requirements, including for people and goods have been lifted with the exception of people with symptoms of respiratory infection. This is a positive step and an indication that the country may be moving towards opening of the border to international personnel.

The strict restrictions on cross-border movement have a profound negative impact on the flow of supplies, which the DPRK population heavily relied on to supplement the government initiatives to meet needs of its vulnerable population.

To reiterate, several shipments of essential and critical equipment that [Organisation 2] procured, most of which were approved by the UN Sanctions Committee were held up at different locations incurring large expenses on storage charges and customs demurrage. Several shipments expired while being held up, costing more money to dispose such shipments. Some shipments had to be re-routed to other countries, causing an additional financial burden for [Organisation 2].

DPRK has been subject to a range of international sanctions imposed by various countries and international organizations. These sanctions have had several operational implications, Some key operational implications are:

Challenges stemming from sanctions:

Economic Isolation: DPR Korea's economy has been heavily impacted by sanctions. These measures restrict trade, foreign investment, and access to international financial institutions, leading to economic isolation.

Humanitarian Concerns: Sanctions can inadvertently affect the humanitarian situation in DPR Korea by limiting the flow of essential goods like food and medicine. There are concerns that these sanctions could harm ordinary citizens.

One of the major challenges in [Organisation 2]'s work in DPRK has been the absence of a viable banking channel to transfer much needed funds for in-country operations and programmatic implementation. This has a significant negative impact on [Organisation 2]activities, and a quick and efficient solution is required to be found. This also negatively impact international staff to meet their daily subsistence expenses like accommodation, food, and other personal expenses.

Diplomatic Standoff: Sanctions have been a point of contention between DPR Korea and the international community, leading to a diplomatic standoff and hampering efforts to engage in dialogue and negotiations.

3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020, and in particular in 2023? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the future prospects of access to and within the DPRK? How are these prospects related to COVID factors, and what other factors are at play?*

In the absence of any international staff present in the country for about three years, operations were remotely managed. There is a presence of national seconded staff, who remained distantly driven. The implementation of technical activities however, got severely impacted.

There were certain difficulties encountered as during the year 2021 and early 2022 the borders and ports were closed due to pandemic which impacted in delivering supplies to the country. Also due to the sanctions imposed on certain items, the procurements are delayed.

The preparation of the required documentation for the UN Sanctions Committee is lengthy and requires several levels of consultations.

As of now, there is no concrete information from the Government on the boarder reopening for internationals. However, with WHO's declaration of COVID-19 no longer a public health emergency of international concern, it is anticipated that the Government may consider completely opening its borders in the near future. With this assumption, the UN Agencies have already started working on a return plan. If all goes well and the physical presence of international staff is allowed, the normal operations will be resumed.

4) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response in the DPRK, in particular in 2023.*

With the decision of the Government to limit the presence of international staff, primarily due to the limitation of in-country operations as a result of the lack of an international banking channel, the capacity of [Organisation 2] was markedly reduced even before the pandemic.

Limited capacity due to suboptimal staff presence led to challenges in providing the initial emergency support to the country. This got further aggravated when all international staff had to leave the country.

In 2023 the procurement was mostly done for consumables and equipment which did not require sanction clearance.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs, in particular in 2023? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of the DPRK?*

[Organisation 2] has been able to obtain humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 committee in the past as required, generally on a fast-track process, whenever required. [Organisation 2] also appreciate the fact that the exemptions may now be provided for a period longer than 6 months (i.e., up to 18 months) for instance when the applicant provides a well-founded justification such as transportation delays. This development is very helpful and welcome. Thanks to the quick approval process used during the pandemic,

[Organisation 2] requests to procure emergency supplies were approved within 4 days, which is a positive example of the UN Sanctions Committees flexibility and understanding of the severity of the situation.

6) *The recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see https://undocs.org/en/S/2023/656, para.162 (b)) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions as to how this measure can be implemented, and what is your assessment of the possible effects of such a mechanism?*

The Panel's recommendation is a welcome move if considered. It would be good to know the selected exports under sanctions that will be considered for exemption. without which it will be difficult to comment or suggest how the proceeds for financing humanitarian supplies will be utilized.

7) *UN Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) "directs these Committees, assisted by their respective panels of experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of this resolution, including any risk of diversion", paragraph 1 of the same resolution having created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and subsequent resolutions, to permit "the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs". Are you aware of any such cases?*

We currently have no knowledge of any such instances.

8) *Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 "Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of the 1718 Committee (DPRK Sanctions) (IAN 7) recommends inclusion of measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used as intended purposes and not diverted for prohibited purposes in humanitarian exemption requests submitted to the Committee. The Panel would welcome any available information about possible diversion, as background to its work.*

There is no information available regarding any diversion of the humanitarian support provided by [Organisation 2].

9) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK, especially within the past year, that you want to share with the Panel?*

One of the major challenges in [Organisation 2]'s work in DPRK has been the absence of a viable banking channel to transfer much needed funds for in-country operations and programmatic implementation. This has a significant negative impact on [Organisation 2] activities, and a quick and efficient solution is required to be found. This also negatively impact international staff to meet their daily subsistence expenses like accommodation, food, and other personal expenses.

[Organisation 2] also appreciates the fact that the exemptions may now be provided for a period longer than 6 months (i.e., up to 18 months) for instance when the applicant provides a well-founded justification such as transportation delays. This development is very helpful and welcome.

Organization 3

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK since 2018, and in particular in 2023? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

The lack of access for international personnel to DPRK since 2020 makes it impossible to accurately assess the humanitarian situation inside the country. It has not been possible to undertake any assessments of the humanitarian situation and it would therefore be difficult to assess any impact of sanctions at this time. The continued lack of an adequate banking channel to facilitate local payments results in a need for Government willingness to accrue certain costs for future repayment on behalf of international humanitarian agencies.

2) What is your assessment of the overall consequences of COVID-19- related border closure and ongoing partial closure of the borders of the DPRK on the overall humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

As noted in the previous answer, the lack of access for international personnel to DPRK since 2020 makes it impossible to accurately assess the humanitarian situation inside the country.

The continued closure of borders for international personnel has created constraints on the ability to effectively provide comprehensive technical assistance, policy-related and strategic guidance or invest in national capacities in a fully effective manner. The ability to fully monitor implementation of humanitarian programmes has also been constrained. Specific concerns are noted in the uninterrupted availability of routine vaccines, although supply chains in this case are more affected by domestic customs regulations applied by the [neighboring country] than by constraints created by the DPRK border closures, and a shortfall in donor resources which has impacted procurement of sufficient critical supplies to treat the full target number of children and women affected by malnutrition.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020, and in particular in 2023? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the future prospects of access to and within the DPRK? How are these prospects related to COVID factors, and what other factors are at play?

Our organization has maintained a limited level of humanitarian programming despite the border closures, with a focus on provision of essential life-saving supplies in the health, nutrition and water and sanitation sectors. Implementation is overseen by seconded national staff, with technical guidance and management support provided by a small team of international personnel based outside the DPRK. Main challenges have related to independent oversight of implementation, with monitoring and reporting led by national seconded staff and Government technical partners. General easing of restrictions on importation of supplies has improved our ability to provide more systematic and timely humanitarian assistance, with reductions in risk of stockouts of key products especially in the health and nutrition sectors. Our organization is prepared and ready to return to the DPRK upon formal invitation from the Government and anticipates that it can resume full operations within

two months of such an invitation being received. Timing of such a return will be solely dependent on the willingness of the DPRK Government to extend an invitation to all UN entities to return to the country.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response in the DPRK, in particular in 2023.

The provision of life-saving supplies has not been impacted by the implementation of sanctions, however restrictions on financial transfers to the DPRK has created impediments to maintaining sufficient cash liquidity inside the country to cover operational and local programme implementation costs. Our organization has relied on agreements with the host country to provide local currency in return for payment of some of the Government's international financial obligations offshore.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs, in particular in 2023? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of the DPRK?

Our organization has experienced no challenges related to the exemption process, which has worked well and been flexible in responding to our organization's requests.

6) The recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see https://undocs.org/en/S/2023/656, para.162 (b)) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders

practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions as to how this measure can be implemented, and what is your assessment of the possible effects of such a mechanism?

Our organization has no view on this issue.

7) UN Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) "directs these Committees, assisted by their respective panels of experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of this resolution, including any risk of diversion", paragraph 1 of the same resolution having created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and subsequent resolutions, to permit "the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs". Are you aware of any such cases?

As noted in a previous answer, our organization has been able to provide a range of essential life-saving humanitarian supplies in the health, nutrition and water and sanitation sectors.

These have included routine vaccines, therapeutic food products and micronutrient supplements, TB and malaria testing, treatment and prevention supplies, equipment for maternal and neonatal facilities, essential medicines, and equipment to strengthen delivery of safe water and sanitation at community level.

8) Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 "Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of the 1718 Committee (DPRK Sanctions) (IAN 7) recommends inclusion of measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used as intended purposes and not diverted for prohibited purposes in humanitarian exemption requests submitted to the Committee. The Panel would welcome any available information about possible diversion, as background to its work.

Our organization is not aware of any diversion of humanitarian assistance. Our organization works with national partners to obtain regular field monitoring reports, supported by photographic evidence and stock reports, to account for distribution of supplies and triangulates reports with caseload information and other data to apply a limited level of monitoring assurance.

9) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK, especially within the past year, that you want to share with the Panel?

No.

Organization 4

1. What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK since 2018, and in particular in 2023? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

In the current situation of the country's self-imposed border closure and self-imposed import re- strictions, we deem that the UN sanctions currently do not have a major direct effect on the humanitarian situation. On the other hand, we can assume that the humanitarian impact of the DPRK's continued self-isolation despite the end of the COVID-19 pandemic is severe and threatens to undo some of the progress made in areas such as food security, nutrition and health. However, it has to be noted that any assessment of the impact within the DPRK of the country's border closure is based on assumptions rather than evidence at this point. No foreigner has visited the areas outside Pyongyang since 22 January 2020. Very little reliable information trickles out of the country.

2) What is your assessment of the overall consequences of COVID-19- related border closure and ongoing partial closure of the borders of the DPRK on the overall humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations' operations in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

The restricted movement of people is a concern especially for those requiring medical treatment, be it for chronic conditions, severe acute malnutrition (children) or tuberculosis. The supply of medical equipment and drugs is another concern. None of the international humanitarian actors that used to support the country's health system has been able to import and distribute any goods since June 2020. The World Food Programme informed that it has exhausted its in-country stocks in March 2021 and will only take up activities when access to the DPRK is granted to its international staff. The strict border closure further affected the livelihood of small traders and industries relying on cross-border trade and imported goods. It is unclear to what extend the rebound of trade activity with [a neighboring country] eased this situation.

3. What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020, and in particular in 2023? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the future prospects of access to and within the DPRK? How are these prospects related to COVID factors, and what other factors are at play?

The COVID-19 pandemic preventive measures taken by the DPRK Government have strongly affected the ability of [Organisaiton 4], the UN system and other international actors to deliver humanitarian goods and assistance.

[Organisaiton 4] had to put its activities in the DPRK on hold (we refer here to our previous responses from [month] 2021 for the detailed timeline). The office in Pyongyang is running with minimal staffing looking after the maintenance of the premises and other assets. The last international humanitarian worker left Pyongyang in March 2021. An independent monitoring of the situation is impossible.

A positive development has been the delivery to DPRK in [month] 2022 of a stock of PPE gear (Personal Protective Equipment) destined for hospitals. It received clearance at the [neighboring country] border, where it was blocked since August 2020. The only activity supported by [Organisaiton 4] in the DPRK is a project on strengthening essential nutrition services, implemented by UNICEF local staff.

The first and main condition to be able to resume humanitarian operations in the DPRK will be the reopening of borders. As long as they are closed and no international staff is allowed to enter into DPRK, the current minimal

activities (maintenance of the premises and other assets) will continue. As for now, there is no signal for any development in that direction or a time horizon for a potential reopening of the border. Without such a signal, it is difficult and too early to assess the level of operations that will take place once they could resume. Their feasibility and the DPRK humanitarian needs at that moment will have to be taken into account.

4. Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response in the DPRK, in particular in 2023.

As stated above, the strict border closure imposed by DPRK has had more impact on the difficulties to respond to COVID-19 than the UN sanctions. For example, the stock of PPE gear was allowed to enter into the country after waiting for clearance from the DPRK authorities for two years, meaning the humanitarian exemption from the 1718 Committee had to be extended several times.

5. If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs, in particular in 2023? What could be further improved in the ex- emption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of the DPRK?

In some cases in the past, the approval process was lengthy and required a lot of information to be collected. However, there has been a significant improvement in the approval process for humanitarian exemptions in the course of the last years. We are satisfied with the procedures, and welcome the 1718 Committee's update of the IAN7 specifying the implementation of Resolution 2664 in the context of the DPRK. We welcome the joint call to work together to sustainably resolve the banking channel. This matter has further increased in urgency, as cash-carry in the current situation is not a feasible option.

6. The recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see https://un-docs.org/en/S/2023/656, para.162 (b)) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions as to how this measure can be implemented, and what is your assessment of the possible effects of such a mechanism?

We welcome initiatives aimed at facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid, while attaching the utmost importance to the proper implementation of UN sanctions. At this stage, we do not have specific elements to share regarding the Panel of Experts' recommendation.

7. UN Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) "directs these Committees, assisted by their respective panels of experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of this resolution, including any risk of diversion", paragraph 1 of the same resolution having created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and subsequent resolutions, to permit "the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs". Are you aware of any such cases?

We are not aware of any instance in which the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities aimed at meeting basic human needs may have been carried out under UN Security Council Resolution 2664. Consequently, we cannot estimate the risks of diversion.

8. Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 "Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of the 1718 Committee (DPRK Sanctions) (IAN 7) recommends inclusion of measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used as intended purposes and not diverted for prohibited purposes in humanitarian exemption requests submitted to the Committee. The Panel would welcome any available information about possible diversion, as background to its work.

We have no information on this subject.

9. Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK, especially within the past year, that you want to share with the Panel?

There is room for improvement in the implementation of sanctions as follows:

(i) establishment of a humanitarian international banking channel, and we refer here to our letter of [month] 2022 on that matter. We need a way to legally bring cash into DPRK to be able to pay local expenses. Without being able to pay our debts, we put at risk our cooperation with local partners.

(ii) consideration of a "green list" of humanitarian goods for which multi-year exemptions could be granted (for example: water pipes, plastic sheeting for agriculture, personal protective equipment etc.).

Organization 5

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations operations in the DPRK since 2018, and in particular in 2023? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

We observe no changes.

2) What is your assessment of the overall consequences of COVID-19- related border closure and ongoing partial closure of the borders of the DPRK on the overall humanitarian situation and humanitarian organizations operations in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

We observe no changes. No updated data is available about new COVID-19 cases.

3) What has been the scope of your organizations operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020, and in particular in 2023? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the future prospects of access to and within the DPRK? How are these prospects related to COVID factors, and what other factors are at play?

No changes. Still access to information or local exchanges with counterparts are blogged. We don't expect any loosening up of present situation in the near future.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization s humanitarian response in the DPRK, in particular in 2023.

No changes, main obstacles lies with situation of our counterparts.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs, in particular in 2023? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of the DPRK?

No changes. Exemption process nor sanctions are main cause for blockage of humanitarian aid activities.

6) The recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see https:l/un-docs.orglen/S/2023/656, para.162 (b)) include a suggestion that ... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies11• Do you have any ideas or suggestions as to how this measure can be implemented, and what is your assessment of the possible effects of such a mechanism?

See above reply.

7) UN Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) directs these Committees, assisted by their respective panels of experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of this resolution, including any risk of diversion", paragraph 1 of the same resolution having created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and subsequent resolutions, to permit the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs11 Are you aware of any such cases?

We follow the principles of transparency in our humanitarian aid approach. Without possibility of a proper needs assessment and monitoring any aids on the ground we are not able to make any further decisions on humanitarian assistance.

8) Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea" of the 1718 Committee (DPRK Sanctions) (IAN 7) recommends inclusion of measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used as intended purposes and not diverted for prohibited purposes in humanitarian exemption requests submitted to the Committee. The Panel would welcome any available information about possible diversion, as background to its work.

We have experiences in the difficulties with monitoring our assistance in the past. We made clear to our counterparts that without any minimum of access to information and monitoring on the ground we cannot decide on any cooperation.

9) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK, especially within the past year, that you want to share with the Panel?

No further issues.

Annex 109: National implementation reports

List of questions enquired by the Panel to 62 Member States

To better understand and assist in facilitating NIR submissions, the Panel would be grateful for your competent authorities' responses to the following:

1. What are the reasons for your country's failure to submit NIR as required by UN sanctions resolutions?

2. What are the main difficulties and challenges your country encountered in preparing and submitting NIR?

3. Have your authorities approached the Secretariat of the Committee or the Panel of Experts requiring assistance in this process?

4. If your response is negative to Q3, please respond if your country plans to submit NIRs in the near future, to which the Panel is open to facilitating the necessary assistance for submission.

List of 62 Member States

1. Afghanistan
2. Antigua and Barbuda
3. Bahamas
4. Bangladesh
5. Barbados
6. Belize
7. Bhutan
8. Bolivia
9. Cabo Verde
10. Cameroon
11. Central African Republic
12. Chad
13. Comoros
14. Congo (RP)
15. Côte d'Ivoire
16. Democratic Republic of the Congo
17. Dominica
18. Eswatini
19. Fiji
20. Gabon
21. Gambia
22. Ghana
23. Grenada
24. Guinea
25. Guinea-Bissau
26. Haiti
27. Honduras
28. Iran
29. Jamaica
30. Kenya
31. Kiribati
32. Lesotho
33. Liberia
34. Libya
35. Malawi
36. Mali
37. Mauritania
38. Federated States of Micronesia
39. Nauru
40. Nicaragua
41. Niger
42. Palau
43. Papua New Guinea
44. Saint Kitts and Nevis
45. Saint Lucia
46. Samoa
47. São Tomé and Príncipe
48. Seychelles
49. Sierra Leone
50. Solomon Islands
51. Somalia
52. South Sudan
53. Suriname
54. Syrian Arab Republic
55. Timor-Leste
56. Tonga
57. Trinidad and Tobago
58. Tuvalu
59. United Republic of Tanzania
60. Yemen
61. Zambia
62. Zimbabwe

Annex 110: Member States' replies to the Panel's questionnaire

Email from the Permanent Mission of Kiribati and Kiribati's reply

From: Teburoro Tito <prun@
Sent: Wednesday, 06 December, 2023 5:59 PM
To: DPPA-POE1874 <dppa-poe1874@un.org>
Subject: NIRs from Kiribati on SC Sanctions on DPRK

Dear Sir/Madam
Thank you for your email regarding the above matter. On behalf of the government of the Republic of Kiribati , I would like to convey the following in response to the questions raised in your email.
1. Kiribati does not have the required staff number and expertise to handle all the reporting work that the United Nations requires from all member states.
2. Kiribati has not approached the Secretariat of the Committee or the Panel of Experts for assistance in this area.
3. The Government is currently implementing its plans to strengthen its Foreign Affairs staffing from early next year to enable the Government through the Ministry of foreign Affairs to meet its reporting obligations especially on Security Council resolutions. As part of this capacity building programme, the government request the Secretariat if it could provide an internship training programme to familiarize the staff responsible for NIR with the work of the Security Council and its reporting requirements.
Best regards.

Teburoro Tito (Mr.)
Ambassador to the US and Permanent Representative to the UN
KIRIBATI MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
685 Third Avenue, Suite 1109
New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 867-3310 Fax: (212) 867-3320

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration
www.mfa.gov.ki
Phone No: 75021342, 75021368, 75021365

Letter from the Permanent Mission of Barbados and Barbados' reply

Permanent Mission of Barbados to the United Nations

820 SECOND AVENUE, 9TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
TEL. (212) 551-4300
EMAIL: prun@foreign.gov.bb

4 January 2024

[redacted]
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Headquarters
New York, New York 10017

Dear Madam,

Reference is made to your correspondence No. S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.468 dated 6 December 2023 regarding the submission of national implementation reports of the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Forwarded for your attention is the response of the Government of Barbados. Should you wish to follow-up on the aforementioned correspondence, kindly contact Melissa Straker-Taylor (email: mtaylor@foreign.gov.bb).

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Melissa Straker-Taylor
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN TRADE
#1 Culloden Road, St Michael, Barbados
Tel: (246) 535-6620 Fax: (246) 429-6652
Website: www.foreign.gov.bb

PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
Making Barbados Work Better

In replying to this letter please quote

REF. NO.: TRA 80/119 Vol. II **January 2, 2023**

[redacted]
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Headquarters
New York, NY
10017

Dear Madam,

SUBJECT: National Implementation Reports (NIR) to the Security Council

Reference is made to your correspondence (Reference No.: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.468), dated 6 December 2023.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT) appreciates the ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The MFAFT takes cognizance of the various UN sanctions resolutions which require Member States to submit national implementation reports (NIR) to the Security Council, and that regrettably, Barbados has not yet submitted any NIR to the Security Council.

In this regard, the MFAFT wishes to submit the following responses as requested within your correspondence:

1. "What are the reasons for your country's failure to submit NIR as required by UN sanctions resolutions?"

   - **The MFAFT has received correspondence from the Panel of Experts (Ref. No.: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.110) dated 15 June 2023, indicating that trade data as reported by the International Trade**

Centre (ITC) Trade Map for the period between October 2022 and March 2023, indicates the DPRK has transferred to Barbados items in the following categories subject to the sectoral sanctions pursuant to resolution 2397 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2371 (2017): machinery, electrical equipment, textiles, iron and steel products.

- **Since this time, Barbados has been investigating the trade data of the importation of these products with a view to responding to the Security Council.**

2. "What are the main difficulties and challenges your country encountered in preparing and submitting NIR?"

   - **The main difficulty and challenge in Barbados preparing and submitting its NIR has been human resource challenges with regards to completing the investigation as outlined above.**

3. "Have your authorities approached the Secretariat of the Committee or the Panel of Experts requiring assistance in this process?"

   - **Barbados has not approached the Secretariat of the Committee or the Panel of Experts requiring assistance in this process.**

4. "If your response is negative to Q3, please respond if your country plans to submit NIRs in the near future, to which the Panel is open to facilitating the necessary assistance for submission."

   - **Barbados wishes to reaffirm its commitment to the multilateral rules based process and as such commits itself to the submission of its NIR in the near future. However, given the difficulties experienced in the completion of this task, the MFAFT wishes to open dialogue with the Panel of Experts in facilitating the necessary assistance for submission.**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade thanks you for your consideration and looks forward to your collaboration and support.

[redacted]

for Director, Foreign Trade Division

Annex 111: Updated assessment of responses to the Panel's DPRK sanctions implementation questionnaire of November 2022

1. A Questionnaire (see annex 92 of the Panel's 2023 final report, S/2023/171) was sent to all UN Member States in November 2022. A reminder was sent on 1 September 2023 to those that had not responded.
2. A preliminary assessment was included in the Panel's 2023 final report (S/2023/171, annex 94), based on 23 responses. As of 15 January 2024, the Panel had received responses from the following 52 countries:

   Algeria, Australia, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cambodia, Colombia, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Palau, Poland, Republic of Korea, South Africa, San Marino, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

3. The Panel will provide further analysis of the responses to the questionnaire in its next Report and encourages additional States to respond.
4. In the meantime, lightly edited versions of a number of responses received regarding question 3 (c) of the questionnaire are listed in the table below:

Questionnaire: 3 (c) Has your State found any of the recommendations to member States contained in the Panel's 2022 reports (S/2022/132 and S/2022/668) useful and in what way? Have they been implemented?
[MS1] [Experts] reports regularly highlight the occurrence of sanctions violations by the DPRK, including through ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned goods (particularly of DPRK imports of refined petroleum and exports of coal) and increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks from the DPRK targeting financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges. We take note of these reports, which are used to inform our policy settings on the DPRK.
[MS2] In relation to the Maritime recommendations for Flag/Ship Registries, we find recommendations useful and pay special note to implement the recommendations regarding vessel identity tampering and AIS manipulation; Single Delivery Voyage protocols; and Statement of Confirmation procedures.
[MS3] In relation to S/2022/668 Panel Report, having regard to the "Finance" section of that report and the related recommendations (i.e. annex 72), it is worth noting that the … [financial intelligence unit, FIU] is promoting awareness -rising on implementation on Sanctions related to Proliferation financing and on proper implementation of UN Sanctions. … In relation to VASPs, the national sanctions regime applies to that sector as well.
[MS4] On occasion, … [State's] Customs … tried to strengthen inspections of iron and steel (HS code 72) following the Panel's recommendation based on the "Sectoral ban monitoring list," which is included in the Annex of the Panel's report. However, the problems, such as raw material supply disruptions and delays in customs clearance, occurred since the number of items subject to strict inspection increased exponentially. Therefore, to secure the efficiency of import and export control while minimizing the impact on the domestic industry, we suggest the Panel narrow down the list using four or more units of HS code.

[MS5] [We] would like to see additional recommendations focused on the role of multilateral organizations and with respect to addressing the DPRK's malicious cyber activity.
[MS6] [State] has found that the recommendations to Member States contained in the Panel's 2022 reports (S/2022/132 and S/2022/668) informative and useful specifically: • that Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supportive material the informal list of prohibited commodities and will underscore to customs authorities the need to use the above-mentioned list to inform trading agents in the jurisdiction for due diligence purposes. • that Member States consider updating their export control lists to reflect their lists of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), but avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population or have a negative humanitarian impact once trade restarts. [State] has embraced the call of the Panel to continue to monitor borders for vessels designated by UN's Sanctions Regimes and continues to implement the needed regulatory standards and due diligence checks at all levels associated with the operation of ships and transaction of commodities, in particular those conducted in identified waters involving banned or restricted products and services.
[MS7] [T]he Panel's invaluable reporting… help[s] identify key individuals and entities that engage in illicit activity so that the international community is able to provide a robust response by designating confidently. Panel of Expert reports help strengthen the … evidence base when seeking to designate specific targets. … Reporting enables the [State] to make better informed decisions based on the evidence shared
[MS8] Risk profiles has been created in the Customs Control Circuit…. Currently there are 73 risk profiles in IMPORT from North Korea. As regards of EXPORT, 16 risk profiles are in force for Country of destination North Korea.
[MS9] The information on the DPRK's activities relating to nuclear and ballistic missile program, as set forth in the 2022 reports of the UN Panel of Experts on the DPRK (S/2022/132 and S/2022/668), as well as the recommendations of the S/2022/132 report on the inclusion in the sanctions lists of the North Korean diplomat in Russia, O Yong Ho, involved in the supply of goods with regard to the DPRK's ballistic missile program, is useful. Therefore, on the basis of the recommendations, the implementation of sanctions in the field of maritime transportation, trade embargo, ban on luxury goods, and procedures for applying sanctions to individuals is being implemented.
[MS10] The Committee's recommendations have been taken into consideration. The national institutions are adequately informed about the sanctions regime and regulatory provisions for its implementation have been adopted. For example: * With regard to the recommendations concerning trade and customs …The list of products that cannot be imported from DPRK has been duly registered in the system. * The [State's FIU], in the exercise of its responsibility to prevent, detect and eradicate money-laundering, the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conducted an intensive training programme for reporting entities in 2022. The [FIU] also has a Money-laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention System, which includes a tool for searching for matches and has been available for use by reporting entities since March 2022. When new or updated United Nations Security Council resolutions are received, they are entered into the System and reporting entities are notified by email so that they can immediately carry out the necessary review.

[MS11] The recommendations in the Panel's 2022 reports regarding export and import control lists have been implemented by all EU Member States… by Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 of 30 August 2017 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and repealing Regulation (EC) No 329/2007, as amended. This Regulation has direct effect in all EU Member States. [State] noted with interest the recommendations regarding humanitarian activities in DPRK, as it has one NGO operating there ….
[MS12] [State] has conducted a Proliferation Risk Assessment in accordance with FATF requirements. The National Risk Assessment in [State] has incorporated several of the recommendations put forth by the Panel of Experts and we are strongly committed towards implementing these recommendations across various authorities, including Customs authorities.
[MS13] Prohibitions under [the State's]… sanctions cover many of the recommendations to Members States included in the Panel's 2022 and earlier reports, such as designation of DPRK individuals and entities and preventing the transfer of prohibited goods to the DPRK. [State] is increasing outreach efforts with members of the … public, including through targeted engagements with the financial and legal sectors. [State] also conducts annual stakeholder outreach with [the State's] non-governmental organizations working to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK to gather input on the sanctions exemption process related to autonomous sanctions. Further, in our outreach with the … public, [State] consistently recommends that companies and organizations review the sanctions lists maintained by the UN, in addition to [State]'s sanctions list and that of other countries with autonomous regimes. Finally, while these sanctions are far reaching, the [State] mitigates unintended consequences of sanctions through legislated exceptions for certain activities. [State] is also looking into ways to enhance support for civil society and other stakeholders, including by providing more information on how to navigate sanctions and apply for permits, notably with respect to humanitarian activities.
[MS14] Panel of Experts (Final report) dated I March 2022: [State] was among those countries where erroneous use of country codes for DPRK and ROK was reported. It fully supports Recommendation 20 from the consolidated list of recommendations, and as an immediate measure, has removed DPRK from its drop-down list of countries from its computerized goods clearance system. In pursuance of Recommendation 22 from the consolidated list of recommendations, [State] Customs has been directed to enhance due-diligence for trading agents, who are dealing with commodities in the Korean peninsula. Panel of Experts (Midterm report) dated 7 September 2022: In pursuance of Recommendation 15 from the consolidated list of recommendations, [State entity] regularly carries out an outreach plan for all the educational and research institutions as per annual outreach programme. The modules for the outreach include export control provisions, UNSC sanctions regimes, TFS on PF, etc. Regulations pertaining to Virtual Assets and VASPs are being implemented in [State]. A comprehensive and all-encompassing implementation plan on FATF guidance on virtual assets is being prepared with special emphasis on CPF aspects.
[MS15] The Country finds the recommendation contained in the Panel's reports S/2022/132 and S/2022/668 very useful. Regarding the recommendations connected to finance, the [FIU] is in line with continuous increase of the awareness of all OE's (including VASP's registered in our country as well) for the new challenges, trends and typologies for financing of proliferation of WMD through

organizing workshops, seminars and trainings. In order to improve the capacities of the OE's for recognizing suspicious transactions and activities related to the financing of proliferation during 2022 the [FIU], in cooperation with the OE's, determined a list of "Indicators for the financing of weapons of mass destruction (Proliferation)" with which the OE's are given "red flags" to recognize suspicious transactions and proliferation financing activities and by persons not on the lists and international restrictive measures. In addition, in order to help the subjects to implement the restrictive measures against proliferation of WMD and to help them face the various challenges that they may encounter when fulfilling their obligations from the AML and LRM, the [FIU] prepared "Guidelines for dealing with financial restrictive measures against terrorism and proliferation" and it is published and available on the FIU website.
[MS16] …recommendations were useful because they include a review of the best practices in the implementation go the DPRK sanctions regime…
[MS17] The recommendations that were of particular relevance in the [State] national context are highlighted below (focusing on the recommendations of the reports S/2022/668 and S/2022/123). Report S/2022/668 Recommendations: No. 4: The Panel reiterates that flag States should possess the requisite tools available to identify and investigate suspected fraudulent use of the MMSI where it is detected and share the results of their investigation with other maritime authorities, as well as with the Panel. The [State] authorities regularly detect wrong MMSI numbers. These cases are normally linked to database errors and not to fraudulent use. If a fraudulent use is detected, the maritime authorities of the countries concerned will be informed about the results of the investigation. There have been no known cases with links to DPRK. No. 15: The Panel recommends Member States advise relevant national actors, including financial institutions, businesses, and VASPs, to adopt appropriate education, training, information sharing, and advisory materials for individuals across all levels of the workforce, from executives to part-time employees. The [State's National Bank] follows this recommendation: It has issued a (legally not binding) "Guidance on compliance with financial sanctions" which contains best practises to be observed by relevant national actors…. No. 16: The Panel recommends that Member State agencies, as well as financial institutions, businesses, and VASPs devote appropriate attention to increased cyber hygiene by requiring of all crypto users attempting access to a cryptocurrency exchange set a higher de-fault threshold, such as a two-factor authentication of transaction. This recommendation is implemented via the EU Directive on payment services in the internal market (PSD2), implemented by the [a State Act]. Payment service providers are obliged to apply a two-factor authentication. The EU-Regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), which applies from 1st January 2025, also obliges VASPs to comply with the IT security requirements. No. 17: The Panel recommends that any entity suffering a cyber-attack report this to and engage with the proper legal authorities as soon as possible, issue a public announcement of the incident, and engage with agencies relevant to the event including block chain analysis firms, in order to increase the prospects for recovery of some stolen assets. Payment Service Providers are required to notify cyber incidents under DORA (see answer to No. 16). For all other entities, the notification requirement is based on [a State Act]. From 1st January 2025, the notification requirement for financial service providers as well as VASPs will be based on the DORA-Regulation.

No. 18: The Panel recommends that Member States consider legislation or establishing directives for cyber companies to enforce "know your customer" protocols and to tighten procedures for VASP registration.
[State] has implemented the FATF travel rule via the Crypto Assets Transfer Regulation. According to [a State Act], VASPs are classified as credit institutions or financial services institutions and are thus obliged entities under [State] AML/CFT rules. They require a license. A financial service that falls fully under the VASP activities is the crypto custody business in accordance with Section 1 (1a) No. 6 KWG.
No. 19: The Panel recommends the Member States strengthen cooperation, facilitate dialogue and enhance information sharing in order to address the growing intelligence and financial threat of cybercrime.
The [State Act] as well as DORA provide for information sharing.
Report S/2022/123 Recommendations:
No. 1: The Panel recommends the designation of the following individual for his role in and support for the country's prohibited programme:
- Mr. O Yong Ho, currently based in Moscow as a DPRK diplomat, is involved in procuring items connected to DPRK's ballistic missile programme through his support to the UN-designated "Second Academy of Natural Sciences" (SANS) (aka "Academy of National De-fence Science' (ANDS)).
Mr. O Yong Ho was listed in 2022 under Annex 16 by means of an amending regulation to the EU autonomous DPRK sanctions regime (VO 2017/1509).
No. 5: The Panel recommends that the IMO urge all flag States to ensure that the requirements for the Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) are complied with, including, for such information to be updated accordingly on the IMO GISIS website.
While this recommendation is addressed at the IMO, [State] has fully implemented the requirements for the CSR in national law. Sanctions may be imposed on ships not meeting the obligation to keep and make available the original of the Continuous Synopsis Record for inspection.
No. 11: The Panel recommends that financial institutions involved in commodity trading in affected areas expand transaction monitoring programs to incorporate AIS screening for both client and counterparty vessels.
The recommendation is considered to be useful and is addressed through the [State's] "Guidance on compliance with financial sanctions" …. It requires institutions/enterprises to screen all parties discernibly involved in the respective transaction (which may include other entities such as hauliers, ships, manufacturers, banks, investors) against up-to-date sanctions lists.
During on-site inspections conducted by [State's National Bank] in the relevant institutions/enterprises, the inspections team verifies if the institutions/enterprises abide by these rules.
No. 12: The Panel recommends that flag States possess the requisite tools available to identify and investigate suspected fraudulent use of MMSIs where it is detected and share the results of its investigation with other maritime authorities, including with the Panel.
Currently, [a State entity] is responsible for maintaining the XXX database for LRIT. If a request is received by [this State entity], [the State entity] identifies ships fraudulently using a [State] MMSIs via comparing the reported ship's identity and position with the information of the LRIT database.
No. 27: The Panel underlines the urgency of concrete measures for re-establishing the banking channel.
Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 generally prohibits the transfer of funds, including clearing of funds, to and from the DPRK. However, there are various exemptions for transfers of international organizations enjoying immunity in DPRK in accordance with international law, e.g. for the transfer

of funds not exceeding a certain limit for humanitarian aid (foodstuffs, healthcare or medical equipment or for agricultural purposes), and remittances not exceeding a certain level.
These transactions are subject to enhanced due diligence measures under [State] AML/CFT-rules due to the FATF designation as a high-risk jurisdiction.

4. The Panel is grateful to those Member States which have provided responses to the 2022 questionnaire and encourages other States to do so. The Panel requires more data in order to conduct a meaningful assessment of the global state of implementation.

Annex 112: Consolidated list of recommendations

Ballistic Missiles

1. **The Panel recommends updating the designation of NADA (KPe.029) to reflect its new name: the National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA).**
2. **The Panel recommends the designation, in accordance with paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013) and paragraph 43 of resolution 2270 (2016), of the DPRK's Missile General Bureau.**
3. **The Panel recommends that Member States pursue their investigations of Choe Chol Min's and Choe Un Jong's activities and, if warranted, implement the provisions of paragraphs 13 and 14 of UNSCR 2270(2016), as applicable.**
4. **The Panel encourages Member States to redouble their efforts in preventing the supply of prohibited items to the DPRK and take into consideration the above Chart 1 when monitoring transactions that could fall under the catch-all provision of paragraph 27 of UNSCR 2270 (2016).**

Trade Statistics and Customs Issues

5. **The Panel emphasizes its previous recommendations that :**

(a) **Appropriate measures be taken by the International Organization for Standardization and Member States, including outreach activities to respective customs authorities, to prevent erroneous usage of country codes.**

(b) **Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supportive material the informal list of prohibited commodities (see Annex 38).**

(c) **Customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned list to inform trading agents in their jurisdictions for due diligence purposes, in particular when dealing with such commodities in the vicinity of sanctioned jurisdictions.**

(d) **With regards to the Member States requiring assistance with understanding and implementation of the sectoral ban, the Committee consider information outreach.**

Implementation of Luxury Goods Ban

6. **The Panel, taking into account the recently increased transhipments of luxury goods to DPRK via third countries, recommends that Member States should urge entities involved in exporting luxury and brand goods to increase vigilance when arranging shipments to the region and via entrepôt zones.**

7. **The Panel recommends that Member States encourage exporters of luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prohibit forwarding of goods to the DPRK.**

8. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States consider updating their export control lists to reflect their lists of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population or have a negative humanitarian impact.**

Overseas Workers

9. **The Panel recommends that Member States continue to exercise vigilance in checking the management and ownership of the companies employing DPRK nationals and possible obfuscation efforts.**

10. **The Panel recommends that Member States have appropriate immigration controls in place, in particular to ensure that DPRK students and tourists do not earn income and do not exceed their authorized duration of stay, in line with UNSC resolutions.**

11. **The Panel recommends that, as the DPRK further opens its borders, Member States ensure implementation of relevant resolutions concerning DPRK nationals earning income.**

Finance

12. **The Panel recommends that the Committee consider the designation of:**

    Nam Chol Ung,

    Lazarus Group, Andariel, BlueNoroff, ScarCruft, and Kimsuky

13. **The Panel reiterates its recommendations that Member States implement as soon as possible the Financial Action Task Force guidance on virtual assets and virtual asset service providers.**

14. **The Panel encourages Member States, businesses, and private individuals to devote appropriate attention to increased cyberhygiene, including effective cybersecurity practices compiled in annex 101 in order to counter DPRK's circumvention of Security Council resolutions via cyber activities.**

15. **The Panel recommends private sector entities review information released by Member States and cybersecurity companies regarding DPRK-linked virtual currency addresses and be vigilant in guarding against transactions directly with, or derived from, those addresses.**

16. The Panel recommends that Member States consider establishing systems for reporting and sharing DPRK-related cyber threat information with the cryptocurrency industry and private sector.

17. The Panel recommends that all cryptocurrency platforms and protocols – including decentralized and centralized exchanges, bridges, instant exchange services, mixers and privacy protocols – implement appropriate anti-money-laundering and know-your-customer programs and establish procedures and enhanced monitoring and detection mechanisms to identify possible DPRK transactions, such as rules based on user behavior patterns and system configuration analytics,[288] to better prevent illicit DPRK cyber actors from abusing these services (see also Annex 101).

18. The Panel encourages Member States to conduct virtual asset risk assessments and to include proliferation finance and DPRK-related considerations as part of the assessments.

Unintended Humanitarian Effects of Sanctions

19. The Panel values the biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations entities on the unintended impact of sanctions and continues to recommend that the Committee continue this practice.

20. The Panel recommends that the Committee continues to emphasize the importance of re-establishing a durable banking channel for humanitarian operations in the DPRK and recommends that the 1718 Committee prioritize addressing this issue.

21. The Panel recommends that the Committee discuss with relevant regulators possible guidance to mitigate the problem of banks and other institutions de-risking when DPRK sanctions are involved.

22. The Panel recommends that the Secretariat continues to explore ways with UN agencies and NGOs to transfer funds for their humanitarian assistance programmes in the DPRK following the breakdown of a banking channel arrangement.

[288] In addition to "traditional" transaction screening based on sanctions lists, publicly identified wallet addresses, etc.

23. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendations that:

- **In the context of the implementation of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022), the UN system, including the Committee, take into account information provided by humanitarian actors on the mitigation of the potential adverse impact of UN sanctions on the civilian population and on humanitarian assistance to DPRK.**
- **The Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impact of sanctions on the civilian population of the DPRK on humanitarian aid operations;**
- **The Committee and other relevant stakeholders continue to practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies;**
- **The Committee consider more active outreach with civil society providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK to help to implement Security Council resolution 2664 (2022); The Committee practically consider the idea of renewable and standing exemptions for humanitarian aid actors and humanitarian-related commodities.**