



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
18 October 2023

Original: English

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### **Letter dated 17 October 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

Referring to the letter by the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom dated 9 October 2023 ([S/2023/747](#)) containing baseless accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), and further to our previous communications, including letters dated 13 July 2022 ([S/2022/554](#)), 29 November 2022 ([S/2022/889](#)), 6 December 2022 ([S/2022/911](#)), 7 December 2022 ([S/2022/922](#)), 23 May 2023 ([S/2023/373](#)), 5 June 2023 ([S/2023/410](#)) and 14 June 2023 ([S/2023/440](#)), I would like to reiterate the principled position of the Russian Federation in this regard.

We strongly condemn persistent attempts by a small group of States to spread false insinuations about so-called “violations” of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) without any legal and technical ground, aimed at deliberately misleading the international community by means of identical politically driven assertions, unsubstantiated insinuations and far-fetched conclusions about the Islamic Republic of Iran allegedly being in non-compliance with the above-mentioned resolution.

As we emphasized on numerous occasions, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never possessed nuclear weapons, nor does it possess these weapons now, as regularly confirmed by the verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, nor, we expect, will it ever possess them in the future, as envisaged by its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Even more than that, the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not develop nuclear weapons is acknowledged in the documents recently published by the authorities of the United States, such as the 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022. In their turn, France, Germany and the United Kingdom do not provide any credible basis for alleging that the Islamic Republic of Iran undertakes any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We strongly reject the false and time-serving logic used by the United Kingdom, France and Germany that equates the development of space launch vehicles to the activities related to nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, thus, questions legitimate rights of space-faring States for peacefully exploring outer space.

The Russian Federation has already underlined at numerous occasions that the Missile Technology Control Regime parameters cannot be applied in the context of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Despite the fact that the Regime is an informal political understanding between 35 States on export-control issues, France, Germany and the



United Kingdom continue their attempts to misuse its criteria. The Category I parameters of the Regime Annex are a mere reference tool for exporting States and have no connection to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Therefore, the Regime criteria cannot be used to determine if specific ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the recurrent assertion that Category I systems are recognized as being “the systems of most concern” is a deliberate misstatement, as the Regime guiding principles clearly state that the Category I systems are the “items of greatest sensitivity”, which is a substantially different term.

Furthermore, the recurrent references to Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) are irrelevant in this context, since this mechanism of cooperation, rather than coercion, has no relation to the missile programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has never been aimed at imposing restrictions on it.

Moreover, the references to the report of the Panel of Experts established in accordance with the Security Council resolution [1929 \(2010\)](#) are irrelevant, as paragraph 7 (a) of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) clearly states that resolution [1929 \(2010\)](#) in its entirety has been terminated. No decisions of relevance for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have ever been taken with regard to its report.

The manipulative nature of the claims put forward by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as the lack of credible arguments, is demonstrated even by the language of the letter and the use of such phrases as “long-standing international consensus”, “widely used criteria” and “extensive crossover”.

I would like to highlight that none of the above-mentioned speculative and manipulative arguments and techniques employed by France, Germany and the United Kingdom will help to distract the international community from the plans of these States not to fulfil their obligations on lifting restrictive measures imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran that are scheduled to expire, in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), on 18 October 2023. These plans, if realized, will represent a considerable violation of this resolution that could not be hidden or justified. In this regard, we strongly urge France, Germany and the United Kingdom to reverse their actions aimed at undermining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to properly implement their obligations.

Since no viable information to the contrary has ever been provided to the Security Council, the Russian Federation continues to proceed from its previous assessment that Iran is respecting in good faith the relevant call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of Annex “B” to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

I would be grateful to have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Vassily **Nebenzia**