

The United Nations
**DISARMAMENT
YEARBOOK**



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Volume **47**

Office for Disarmament Affairs
New York, 2023

The United Nations
**DISARMAMENT
YEARBOOK
2022**

Volume **47**



COVER PHOTO: *Non-Violence* or *Knotted Gun* sculpture by Carl Fredrik Reuterswärd at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.
(Credits: UN Photo/Mark Garten (sculpture), UN Photo/Rick Bajornas (flags))

FOREWORD PHOTO: Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, briefs the Security Council meeting on the situation in the Middle East (Syrian Arab Republic) on 25 October. (Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe)

TIMELINE PHOTOS:

Tatiana Valovaya, Director General of the United Nations in Geneva, speaks on 28 February with Alicia Victoria Arango Olmos, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations Office at Geneva and President of the Conference on Disarmament. (Credit: UN Photo/Violaine Martin)

Xolisa Mfundiso Mabhongo, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations, chairs the 2022 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. (Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías)

Representatives of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons attend the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 21 June 2022.

Astronaut Edwin E. Aldrin Jr. walks on the surface of the moon near the Lunar Module in 1969. (Credit: UN Photo/National Aeronautics and Space Administration)

Izumi Nakamitsu attends the ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention on 28 November. (Credit: UN Photo/Violaine Martin)

Mine clearance personnel of the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (Credit: UN Photo/Jorge Aramburu)

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
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GUIDE to the user



The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs publishes the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* as a **concise reference tool** for diplomats, researchers, students and the general public on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues under consideration by the international community.

The Office is releasing the present **condensed version** of the 2022 *Yearbook*, available in [PDF](#) and [website](#) formats, to provide an **easy-to-read overview** of the publication earlier in the year. The **full version**, with more comprehensive chapters on the year's activities, will be published on the website **in September 2023**.

The *Yearbook* is **divided into the main multilateral issues** under consideration throughout the year. It includes **developments and trends**, a convenient issue-oriented **timeline** and explanatory **graphics** and charts. The annex on **resolutions, status of treaties and other resources** is a one-stop shop for accessing recommended databases, publications and information materials. The [Disarmament Resolutions and Decisions Database](#) contains the resolutions and decisions of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly, as well as their sponsors, voting patterns and other related information. The [Disarmament Treaties Database](#) provides the status of multilateral regulation and disarmament agreements. The information in those databases was formerly published each year within the *Yearbook*; producing it in database form offers *Yearbook* users a more interactive experience and easier access to data from previous years.



The *Yearbook* website is user-friendly — accessible on **mobile devices** and available in **multiple languages** through third-party machine translation. Official translations in the six official languages of the United Nations will be uploaded as they become available.

Because much of the background information is condensed, consulting **previous editions** for expanded historical knowledge is helpful.

Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations are referenced as **hyperlinks in the online version** of the *Yearbook*.



Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Hyperlinks to these documents are included in the online version of the *Yearbook*. Alternatively, they can be accessed, in the official languages of the United Nations, from <https://documents.un.org>.

Specific disarmament-related documents are also available from the disarmament reference collection at <https://library.unoda.org>.



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Now, for its forty-seventh volume, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is pleased to present the Yearbook in a **reimagined format**, designed to be **more accessible** and useful to practitioners and the public.

Izumi Nakamitsu

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs



FOREWORD



It gives me great pleasure to introduce this preview edition of the 2022 *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. Since 1976, the *Yearbook* has provided diplomats and other interested readers with comprehensive and objective insight into the year's developments in the field of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

Now, for its forty-seventh volume, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is pleased to present the *Yearbook* in a reimagined format, designed to be more accessible and useful to practitioners and the public. Previously published in two parts since 2008, the *Yearbook* will now be made available in its entirety on its dedicated website (<https://yearbook.unoda.org>). The website will become home to the full contents of the publication when they are released later in the year.

The Office prepared this condensed preview to share key findings from the *Yearbook* earlier and provide a concise exploration of disarmament-related developments and trends from 2022. In addition to covering the relevant activities of the United Nations and other international and regional organizations, it highlights major challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for achieving a more peaceful and secure world.

Advances in information and communications technology have afforded new opportunities

to present factual information previously featured in the *Yearbook*. The disarmament resolutions, decisions and voting patterns of the General Assembly — previously featured in Part I of the *Yearbook* — are now available through the revamped Disarmament Resolutions and Decisions Database (<https://resolutions.unoda.org>). Likewise, the latest details on current disarmament treaties and agreements can be found in the redesigned Disarmament Treaties Database (<https://treaties.unoda.org>).


In introducing a forerunner to the *Yearbook*, covering the years 1945 to 1970, Secretary-General U Thant expressed hope that the publication would contribute to a clearer understanding of disarmament issues among those who are actively engaged in seeking solutions to the problems of disarmament, security and peace. Today, it is my hope that the latest updates will further advance and expand that purpose, giving it greater reach yet. At the same time, by retaining its organization and substantive areas of focus, the *Yearbook* will provide consistent context for tackling some of our greatest global challenges.


Izumi Nakamitsu

Under-Secretary-General
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
July 2023

Highlights, 2022

MULTILATERAL disarmament timeline







2022

DEVELOPMENTS and trends



There is **only one solution** to the nuclear threat: not to have nuclear weapons at all.

António Guterres

Secretary-General of the United Nations



Developments and trends, 2022

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

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At the “Symposium on International Safeguards 2022: Reflecting on the Past and Anticipating the Future”, held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna on 31 October. (Credit: IAEA)

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT and non- proliferation

The year 2022 began on a high note when, on 3 January, the nuclear-weapon States¹ of the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](#) (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) issued a [joint statement](#) affirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The joint statement also reaffirmed those States’ commitments under the Treaty, including those related to nuclear disarmament.

Such optimism was short-lived, however, following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February. The conflict had significant negative ramifications for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Russian Federation’s veiled threats to use nuclear weapons, for example, raised the imminent danger of such use to heights not seen since the cold war. The invasion also undermined non-proliferation through a false narrative that Ukraine could have deterred Russian aggression if it had kept the nuclear weapons stationed

¹ China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

on its territory at the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Additionally, it raised the unprecedented issue of the safety and security of nuclear power plants in armed conflict, derailed bilateral arms control and risk reduction dialogue and, ultimately, was responsible for the failure of the tenth Review Conference of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the Russian Federation broke consensus over language related to Ukraine.

Compounding those negative developments were the continued fracturing of relations between States possessing nuclear weapons. That fracturing was especially apparent between the United States and China, with further allegations about Chinese nuclear expansion. Deteriorating relations were also reflected in the continued growth of global military spending; the acquisition and deployment of sophisticated conventional weapons systems, including at regional flashpoints; and armed clashes between States that possess nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, proliferation drivers accelerated in regional hotspots as States openly debated the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons or stationing allied weapons on their territory. Concerns regarding nuclear accidents and miscalculation continued to grow amid increasing military activity related to new domains in cyberspace and outer space, as well as new investments in conventional weapons systems with potential strategic capabilities. On the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Secretary-General **said**, “We can hear once again the rattling of nuclear sabres. Let me be clear. The era of nuclear blackmail must end. The idea that any country could fight and win a nuclear war is deranged. Any use of a nuclear weapon would incite a humanitarian Armageddon.”

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on

Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), the bilateral arms control agreement between the possessors of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals and the only cap on strategic nuclear forces, was not fully implemented in 2022, largely owing to disagreements over inspections. In August, the Russian Federation **advised** the United States that it would not allow inspections of its treaty-accountable weapons owing to travel restrictions imposed by the United States on Russian inspectors. A proposed meeting of the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission in December to resolve the issue was indefinitely postponed by the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation-United States bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue, **announced** in 2021, was effectively in abeyance in 2022. Although the leaders of both countries signalled their willingness to engage in negotiations on a successor framework to the New START Treaty when it expires in 2026,² no steps were taken, largely owing to ongoing tension over the conflict in Ukraine. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs consistently **called for** the Russian Federation and the United States to commence negotiations on a successor arrangement to the Treaty, noting that “time is running out to negotiate a successor, and that cannot happen without dialogue and engagement”. Separately, the war in Ukraine also froze the P5 Process, the only forum in which China had stated its willingness to participate. The process had previously received support, including as a venue for future efforts designed “to **deepen engagement** on nuclear doctrines, concepts for strategic risk reduction and nuclear arms control verification”.

The war in Ukraine raised the alarming prospect of an accident at a nuclear energy

² The White House, “[President Biden Statement Ahead of the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](#)”, 1 August 2022; Vladimir Isachenkov, “[Kremlin says nuclear arms control talks hinge on US goodwill](#)”, Associated Press, 2 August 2022.

facility with potentially catastrophic results. The occupation of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant — the largest nuclear-power-generating station in Europe — and the ongoing conflict around that facility raised concerns and spurred calls for an agreement to prevent an accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was active in attempting to avoid such an outcome through its IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya and the stationing of its experts at the plant (GOV/2022/66). Furthermore, the Agency articulated **seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict** that should be followed to prevent an accident. The Agency's Director General also called on all relevant parties to agree on establishing a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the plant. As at 31 December, discussions about such a zone were ongoing.

The nuclear risks generated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased fears within the international community about the possible use of nuclear weapons. According to one United States **poll**, for example, more than half of those surveyed worried that the United States was about to engage in nuclear war. A **review of polls** conducted within European Union States revealed similar results. Threats to use nuclear weapons received significant condemnation in 2022, including by the Group of 20, which argued that such threats were **"inadmissible"**.

The nuclear-weapon States expressed support for a world free of nuclear weapons but also continued to modernize their arsenals in ways intended to qualitatively improve their reliability, accuracy, speed and stealth. While the United States reiterated, in a new **Nuclear Posture Review**, its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and emphasized the importance of arms control, it disappointed disarmament advocates with its effective continuation of a focus on great power competition and arsenal modernization

introduced in the **preceding review**. Many advocates were concerned, in particular, about the decision to maintain the low-yield W76-2 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the failure to reduce the salience and role of nuclear weapons in the United States strategy, including through a "sole purpose" doctrine, which had been a campaign priority for President Biden. In the new Nuclear Posture Review, the United States also confirmed that it would modernize all three legs of its nuclear triad and expressed concern that increasing competition with China and the Russian Federation would impact further deliberations on arsenal reductions. Separately, the United States, backed by allies, **alleged** that China was accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal such that it could have around 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035. China strongly **rejected** the allegations and pointed to its long-standing policies of no first use and minimum deterrent. However, China also declined to engage in further **transparency initiatives** related to its nuclear arsenal or in **bilateral dialogue** on the matter. In April, the Russian Federation **tested** its new intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-28 Sarmat. It also **deployed** the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle to one regiment.

Optimism for a breakthrough in restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dissipated in 2022. The remaining parties³ to the Plan of Action and the United States were unable to produce an outcome during their talks in Vienna to facilitate a return to the Plan's full and effective implementation. Reaching an agreement was reportedly close in March⁴ but eluded the parties amid unresolved differences between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, for example on a prospective binding commitment by the United States not to withdraw.


³ China, France, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Russian Federation and United Kingdom.

⁴ The talks initially began in April 2021, and the parties met intermittently in 2022.

Figure 1.1

Nuclear development and modernization programmes, 2022

In recent years, States possessing nuclear weapons have stepped up nuclear modernization efforts, resulting in the development of new weapon systems, qualitative improvement of existing systems and the development of new nuclear-capable platforms. It has been argued that the modernization programmes of the five nuclear-weapon States identified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are inconsistent with commitments undertaken as parties to the Treaty.



● Open sources reported sustained investment in and expansion of **China's** modernization programme in 2022, including in land, sea and air-based delivery platforms. Commercial satellite imagery from 2022 appears to show the first hull section of a new submarine, allegedly the Type-095 Tang-class attack submarine (SSN) or the first Type-096 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China has allegedly equipped its six Jin-class submarines with JL-3 intercontinental missiles. China has not announced the commissioning of the JL-3. The United States Department of Defense, in its 2022 annual report to Congress, alleged that China's stockpile of operational nuclear warheads had surpassed 400.

● The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** continued its development and testing of various delivery systems and carried out a record number of launches using ballistic missile technology, including of an intermediate-range or intercontinental nature.

● **France** is continuing its planned modernization campaign for new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, third-generation ballistic missile submarines and refurbishment of ASMP-A air-launched cruise missiles. In 2022, the United Kingdom and France agreed on contracts for its joint Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon programme, which will assess a subsonic low-observable missile and a supersonic missile with high manoeuvrability.

● **India's** nuclear forces continued to be expanded and enhanced in 2022. It completed a test launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile from its first nuclear ballistic missile submarine. It also held a third test of its Agni-P missile, which showed new usage of canisterization.

● Although **Israel** is alleged to possess nuclear weapons, it neither confirms nor denies its nuclear status.

● **Pakistan** continued to expand and enhance its nuclear forces. Efforts to strengthen strategic deterrence included tests of new delivery systems such as the Shaheen-III surface-to-surface ballistic missile.

● The **Russian Federation** continued its decades-long nuclear modernization programme. In 2022, the Russian Defence Ministry announced the successful test launch of the Sarmat fixed-based intercontinental ballistic missile from a silo launcher. This new RS-28 Sarmat missile is a liquid-fuelled, silo-based, heavy intercontinental ballistic missile and is intended to be deployed by the end of 2023. The programme of state trials was completed for the Tsirkon, and in July 2022, it was announced that the Black Sea Fleet would be equipped with anti-ship hypersonic cruise missiles. The design and manufacture of a mobile launcher for the Tsirkon missiles, as part of a coastal defence missile system, are also allegedly under way. It was also announced

that a second regiment of Avangard hypersonic missiles assumed combat duty in 2022.

● The **United Kingdom** remains on track for the construction of the four planned Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines. These will replace the Vanguard-class submarines in accordance with the United Kingdom's "once-in-two-generations" modernization programme to ensure its continuous at-sea deterrence. In its 2021 Integrated Review, the United Kingdom raised the ceiling of its overall nuclear weapon stockpile to 260 warheads, a departure from the previous cap of 180 warheads. An update of the Integrated Review is ongoing.

● The **United States'** nuclear modernization of its nuclear triad continues, including the modernization and expansion of its Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the commitment to the modernization of its nuclear forces, nuclear command and control and communication systems, and production and support infrastructure. The Review cancelled the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile programme, given the deterrence contribution of the W76-2 warhead. It announced the pending deployment of the new B61-12 nuclear bomb to Europe. The Congressional Budget Office of the United States estimated that plans for nuclear forces would cost \$634 billion over the 2021–2030 period, which was \$140 billion or 28 per cent more than the 19 estimate.

MAP SOURCE: United Nations Geospatial Information Section.

NOTE: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

In 2022, IAEA continued to provide quarterly reports to its Board of Governors and the Security Council on the implementation of nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as on matters related to verification and monitoring in the country. The Agency noted in those reports that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to engage in several activities that were inconsistent with the Plan of Action, including breaching the cap on its stockpile of enriched uranium ([GOV/2022/62](#)), enriching to levels above 3.67 per cent U-235 at two sites ([GOV/INF/2022/24](#)), and operating, manufacturing and developing advanced centrifuges ([GOV/INF/2022/10](#)).

The Islamic Republic of Iran also reduced its cooperation with the IAEA verification and monitoring of its nuclear programme. In June, the Islamic Republic of Iran requested the Agency to remove all its equipment previously installed for surveillance and monitoring under the Plan of Action, a total of 27 cameras. The Agency responded that the removal of the monitoring equipment would have detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of the country's nuclear programme ([GOV/2022/62](#), paras. 64–65). In that context, in 2022, the Agency continued its efforts to obtain clarification from the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding information related to anthropogenic uranium particles found at an undeclared location in the country in early 2019, as well as possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three locations that had not been declared ([GOV/2021/15](#)). In March, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed on a series of steps to resolve the impasse. However, in his June report to the Agency's Board of Governors, the Director General stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not provided technically credible explanations ([GOV/2022/26](#), para. 36). Subsequently, the Board adopted a resolution expressing "profound concern" that the safeguards issues remained unresolved.


The situation remained at an impasse as at 31 December.

Perhaps the most anticipated nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation event of the year was the [tenth Review Conference of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](#), postponed multiple times owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic but finally held from 1 to 26 August in New York. The Conference faced a variety of challenges, ranging from the new issues — the provision of nuclear propulsion technology to non-nuclear-weapon States and the safety and security of nuclear power plants, for example — to enduring topics, such as the pace and scale of disarmament, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. States parties engaged in four weeks of active discussion across all three of the Treaty's "pillars": nuclear disarmament; nuclear non-proliferation; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The draft outcome document that emerged from deliberations contained a range of measures to strengthen all aspects of the Treaty, including the implementation of existing commitments (a core priority for non-nuclear-weapon States), risk reduction and, especially, the role of nuclear science and technology in sustainable development. Few States parties were completely satisfied with the ambition of the document, which represented limited progress in many areas. However, they were prepared to join the consensus in adopting the document in order to achieve an outcome and bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the regime it underpins. Unfortunately, on the final day of the Conference, the Russian Federation announced that it could not join the consensus on the draft document, effectively preventing its adoption. The Russian Federation's last-minute objections to language

Figure 1.2

Participation in major disarmament treaties related to weapons of mass destruction, 2012–2022



Over the past decade, membership in multilateral treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has continued to increase. In that time, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had achieved near-universal status, with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) both making significant strides towards that end. In 2020, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) reached the threshold of 50 ratifications required for its entry into force, which took effect on 22 January 2021. By the end of 2022, 68 States had joined the Treaty. Taken together, these trends indicate that, even in the face of a difficult and deteriorating global security environment, States continue to value multilateral treaties related to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and the security benefits that they provide.

related to the conflict in Ukraine did not allow time to resolve their concerns. Consequently, the Conference concluded without a final document, although the President of the Conference did submit the draft outcome as a working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77) under his authority. States parties agreed, however, to establish a working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part I), para. 23). That working group would meet before the first

Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2026 review cycle to recommend measures to the Committee to “improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty”.

A brighter spot for many States, which saw it as a counter to increasingly negative trends in nuclear disarmament, was the successful holding of the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of

Nuclear Weapons. Postponed twice owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Meeting was held from 21 to 23 June in Vienna. It was notable for its inclusivity, featuring strong roles of observers and civil society, who were present in large delegations. The Meeting emphasized the progressive elements of the Treaty, notably its concerns about victim assistance and environmental remediation and, above all, the understanding of the devastating humanitarian consequence of any use of nuclear weapons.

In the lead-up to the Meeting, States parties held extensive virtual consultations on the key areas of universalization, positive obligations, provision of scientific advice and the creation of a competent international authority to verify disarmament. Despite the limited time during the Meeting, such consultations enabled States parties to produce several progressive yet practical outcome documents: a political

declaration; and an action plan and intersessional structure for the Treaty's future implementation. Although the Meeting was held in a largely constructive manner, it too was not immune from the ramifications of the war in Ukraine, as any references — including oblique ones — had to be deleted from the declaration in order to preserve consensus.

Another positive outcome from 2022 resulted from efforts by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty** Organization to accelerate the universalization of the Treaty. As part of efforts to commemorate the Treaty's twenty-sixth year since opening for signature, six new States (Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu) ratified the Treaty, effectively bringing it into force for all of Latin America and the Caribbean and South-East Asia.

Secretary-General António Guterres holds an origami paper crane outside the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum in August. During his visit to Japan, the Secretary-General reiterated his call for world leaders to urgently eliminate nuclear-weapon stockpiles. (Credit: UN Photo/Ichiro Mae)







The **scourge of chemical weapons** should have been consigned to history by now, yet the last decade has witnessed their repeated use. ... At the same time, we are observing an **evolution in biological threats**.

Izumi Nakamitsu

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs



Developments and trends, 2022

2 Biological and chemical weapons



BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL weapons

In 2022, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continued to deliver on its mandate and commitment to ensuring the full and effective implementation of the [Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction](#) (Chemical Weapons Convention). OPCW also marked a major milestone with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on 29 April.

The situation in Ukraine increased the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Under article X of the Convention, the Technical Secretariat provided assistance and protection to Ukraine upon the country's request. Notably, OPCW conducted capacity-building courses both online and in person for Ukrainian first responders to enhance their preparedness against the threat of chemical weapons use and in case of attacks targeting chemical industrial facilities. OPCW also provided the necessary equipment for chemical detection, together with training activities.

During the capstone field exercise for the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, held in Berlin in September, participants conduct a simulated investigation of alleged biological-weapon use.

As OPCW entered its ninth year addressing the chemical weapons dossier in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Technical Secretariat again experienced delays in its activities to ensure that the Syrian Government resolved all gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that had arisen from the initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme. That was due, inter alia, to the Syrian Arab Republic's refusal to issue a visa to the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team's lead technical expert, which is not in line with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and corresponding OPCW Executive Council decisions. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission maintained its work to establish the facts surrounding allegations of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic. Likewise, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team kept up its activities to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons use in the country, pursuant to the decision of the Conference of the States Parties adopted on 27 June 2018 (decision [C-SS-4/DEC.3](#)).

Despite the lingering impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, OPCW maintained its critical work of verifying the destruction of the remaining declared chemical weapons stockpiles. It also ramped up its chemical industry inspections in line with the Convention's article VI as the evolving circumstances of the pandemic allowed. As a result of the improved COVID-19 situation, OPCW was able to hold the regular sessions of the OPCW Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties in less stringent modalities in order to meet its obligation to ensure the implementation of the Convention.

To help build capacities among States parties to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, the Technical Secretariat delivered on its international cooperation programmes by using online platforms and modules and returning to in-person events. That allowed the Technical Secretariat to assist in promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry; advancing scientific

and technological cooperation; countering the threats posed by non-State actors; and expanding partnerships with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the chemical industry and other entities.

Work on the construction of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre) advanced significantly in 2022. The facility's construction was completed while respecting the budget and the established timelines. Additionally, OPCW continued its work to universalize the Chemical Weapons Convention, urging the remaining States not party to the Convention to join without delay or preconditions.

Throughout 2022, the Secretary-General continued to underscore the imperative of identifying and holding accountable those who have used chemical weapons, both as a responsibility to the victims of such weapons and as a preventative measure against future use. The Secretary-General also continued to underline the importance of the Chemical Weapons Convention as an essential pillar of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and as a testament to the security benefits that multilateral instruments could provide. The Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to support the Secretary-General's good offices in furthering the implementation of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Office also worked with members of the Security Council in their efforts to build unity and restore adherence to the global norm against chemical weapons.


The year 2022 was also important for the [Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological \(Biological\) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction](#) (Biological Weapons Convention), which saw the rare activation of its formal provisions to address allegations of non-compliance.

Figure 2.1

Secretary-General’s Mechanism: Nominated expert consultants, qualified experts and analytical laboratories by region


(As at 31 December 2022)

562 QUALIFIED EXPERTS




Qualified experts may be called upon to actively participate as part of a team conducting an investigation into the alleged use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons.

60 EXPERT CONSULTANTS



Expert consultants may be requested to advise and assist in the overall conduct of and operation of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism, from planning and deployment to operation and reporting.

88 ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES



Analytical laboratories may be requested to test for the presence of chemical, biological or toxin agents.

The Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, established by General Assembly resolution 42/37 C, has the mandate to investigate allegations of such use when reported by a Member State. The Office for Disarmament Affairs maintains a roster of experts and laboratories, nominated by Member States, that could be requested on short notice to support an investigation. To ensure the operational readiness of the Mechanism, the Office, with support from Member States and international partners, organizes activities for experts and laboratories nominated to the roster.

In June, the Russian Federation requested to convene a formal consultative meeting under the Convention's article V — the second such meeting in the Convention's history — to consider the country's outstanding questions to the United States and Ukraine concerning the fulfilment of their respective obligations under the Convention in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine ([BWC/CONS/2022/3](#)). Subsequently, in October, the Russian Federation invoked the Convention's article VI for the first time by lodging a complaint with the Security Council about the same concerns. In November, the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation was taken up by the Security Council but not adopted (meeting coverage [SC/15095](#)).

Meanwhile, the [ninth Review Conference](#) of the Biological Weapons Convention took place in Geneva from 28 November to 16 December to review the Convention's operation.¹ The Conference also had the

mandate to review the progress of States parties in implementing the Convention and the decisions and recommendations agreed upon at its eighth Review Conference.

Considering the challenging geopolitical circumstances, many States parties went into the Review Conference aware of the obstacles to achieving a substantive outcome while still hopeful for agreement on an expanded intersessional programme. Although the decisions agreed on by consensus in the Final Document ([BWC/CONF.IX/9](#)) did not meet the highest expectations of some States parties, the modest outcome left others hopeful for the future work of the new intersessional programme, as several delegations expressed in their closing statements.


In a positive development for the Convention's universalization, Namibia acceded to it on 25 February, becoming the **184th** State party to the Convention. As at 31 December, four signatory States had not yet ratified the Convention, and nine States had neither signed nor ratified it.

¹ The Review Conference was held in accordance with article XII of the Convention.

Figure 2.2

Trends in confidence-building measures

Participation of States parties in the Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measures, 1987–2022



This graph shows the history of submission rates for reports of States parties under the Convention's confidence-building measures system introduced in 1987. While the overall level of participation in the measures has remained low over the years, a positive trend can be seen in recent years. In 2022, 98 States parties submitted confidence-building measures reports, resulting in a participation rate of more than 53 per cent, the highest so far.

“

Across regions and around the world, people have endured daily dangers and unacceptable suffering from the use of explosive weapons. For those living in crowded urban areas, the perils are multiplied. ... Parties to conflict and States must **avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas** and work to remove conflict from urban areas altogether.

António Guterres

Secretary-General of the United Nations

”



Developments and trends, 2022

3 Conventional weapons



Leaders of the Togolese national commission on small arms and light weapons, the African Union's Peace and Security Council, and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs ignite a collection of seized weapons in observance of Africa Amnesty Month in September.

CONVENTIONAL weapons



Throughout 2022, the world continued to suffer from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms, light weapons and ammunition. In various settings, armed violence continued to be driven by the ongoing movement of weapons to and between non-State actors, including in the context of organized crime and terrorism.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, world military expenditure rose by 3.7 per cent in real terms in 2022 to reach a record high of **\$2.24 trillion**, which amounts to 2.2 per cent of the total global economic output and around \$282 per capita. Factoring in the plans announced by some Member States to boost military budgets in response to the current security landscape, the global total for military expenditures is estimated to rise sharply in the coming years.

Indeed, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many States began supplying the Ukrainian armed forces with military equipment. Conventional arms transfers included heavy

weapons and military equipment such as armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft systems, artillery, helicopters, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as small arms and light weapons. The Security Council considered the issue of arms transfers twice in 2022, largely owing to that situation (S/PV.9127 and S/PV.9216).

Harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure also remained a significant concern. Most civilian casualties recorded in Ukraine were caused by explosive weapons with wide-area effects such as missiles and payloads launched from aircraft, as well as by heavy artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems. On 18 November, **83 States** adopted the new **Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas**, marking a milestone in efforts to better protect civilians from the increasing urbanization of armed conflict.


The **eighth Biennial Meeting of States** on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/CONF.192/15, para. 24) took place in New York from 27 June to 1 July.

Given the geopolitical climate at the time, many Member States saw the consensus adoption of an outcome document (A/CONF.192/BMS/2022/1) at the Meeting as an important achievement and a positive forecast for the fourth Review Conference of the Programme of Action, to be held from 17 to 28 June 2024.¹ Despite opposing views from some States, the outcome document retained earlier calls for the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in implementing small-arms programmes, as well as for enhanced international cooperation in that field. Issues such as new technologies and the inclusion of ammunition in the implementation efforts of the Programme of Action remained divisive topics. Notably, however, Member States agreed to establish a new, standing dedicated fellowship training programme on small arms and light weapons to strengthen technical knowledge and expertise related to implementing the Programme of Action and the **International Tracing Instrument**. The Office for Disarmament Affairs, which was mandated to establish the fellowship programme, will begin training sessions in 2024.

¹ The fourth Review Conference of the Programme of Action is scheduled to take place in New York from 17 to 28 June 2024.



Disarmament Today Podcast: “Explosive Weapons In Populated Areas”




Did you know that civilians account for 90 per cent of victims when explosive weapons are used in populated areas? Listen to this [podcast](#) to learn more:

- **Explosive Weapons 101.** What explosive weapons are and why their use in populated areas causes humanitarian harm
- **What's in the Declaration.** Why the [Political Declaration](#) matters and what its key components are
- **Making a difference.** How the international community can make the implementation of the Declaration a success and how young people can get involved

PANELLISTS: Mélanie Régimbal, Chief of Service of the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament • Noel White, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations Office at Geneva • Laura Boillot, Programme Manager for Article 36 and Coordinator of the International Network on Explosive Weapons • Eirini Giorgou, Legal Adviser at the Arms and Conduct of Hostilities Unit of the International Committee of the Red Cross • Aurélien Bufferler, Chief of the Policy Advice and Planning Section of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs • Juliana Helou van der Berg, Associate Political Affairs Officer at the Office for Disarmament Affairs (Moderator)

Figure 3.1

Small arms and light weapons destroyed as reported by Member States through the national reporting for the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2016–2021




Member States report biennially on their national implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument. In recent years, the Office for Disarmament Affairs received 120 reports covering the 2016–2017 implementation period, 97 reports for 2018–2019 and 92 reports for 2020–2021. Information and data contained in the national reports include the number of weapons collected, destroyed, traced or diverted to the illicit market, as well as gender-disaggregated data related to small-arms control. Reports for the Programme of Action also contribute to data collection for the Sustainable Development Goals — target 16.4 on reducing illicit arms flows, for example — and to the matching of assistance needs with available international resources.

The chart above shows, in progression, the number of small arms and light weapons destroyed by national small-arms authorities from 2016 to 2021. An aggregated total of 1.8 million small arms and light weapons were destroyed in those six years, underscoring States' strong and consistent commitment to the implementation of the Programme of Action. By providing technical and financial assistance for weapons destruction, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and its partners in the United Nations system will continue to support States' efforts to terminate the life cycle of lethal weapons.

Figure 3.2

Arms-related provisions in peace operations mandated by the Security Council



The United Nations deploys peacekeeping and special political missions in support of a particular country or region, as mandated by the Security Council or General Assembly. Currently, more than a dozen United Nations peacekeeping operations help States navigate the pathway to peace, while over 20 special political missions are engaging in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding.

An increasingly common feature of those missions is the inclusion of conventional weapons-related provisions in their mandates.

Whether through mine action and clearance activities, weapons and ammunition management, small arms and light weapons control or technical support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the United Nations has been increasingly asked to support national authorities in addressing various issues related to conventional weapons, including their illicit flow and circulation.

Weapons and ammunition management has become an especially critical component of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Settings where weaponry is not properly secured pose greater risk of outbreaks of renewed conflict and endemic crime.

In mandating peacekeeping and special political missions, States have recognized the colossal negative consequences of the illicit circulation and misuse of conventional weapons. United Nations missions have been requested to support national authorities in a range of areas, from management and storage of weapons to destruction and disposal to identification and clearance of mines.

ABBREVIATIONS: BINUH=United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; MINUSCA=United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; MINUSMA=United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MONUSCO=United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNAMA=United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNISFA=United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNITAMS=United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan; UNMHA=United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement; UNMISS=United Nations Mission in South Sudan; UNSMIL=United Nations Support Mission in Libya; and UNSOM=United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

DATA SOURCE: United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (Research and Liaison Unit).

MAP SOURCE: United Nations Geospatial Information Section.

NOTE: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

In 2022, Luxembourg acceded to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), bringing the number of **States parties** to 122. Furthermore, during the general debate of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly, China announced its decision to launch its domestic procedure to ratify the Protocol, which aims to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

The Security Council also remained seized of the challenges related to the misuse, illicit transfer and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons. It regularly addressed issues related to weapons and ammunition, especially in the context of arms embargoes, peacekeeping operations and special political missions. Through such operations, the United Nations continued implementing arms-related provisions of Security Council mandates in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Libya, Mali, South Sudan and the Sudan.

Furthermore, in 2022, a new open-ended working group was established to develop a set of political commitments as a new global framework to address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management. Concurrently, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, within the framework of the United Nations SaferGuard Programme for which it is custodian, continued to maintain the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines while encouraging States to use them to enhance the safety and security of ammunition stockpiles.

Separately, the Group of Governmental Experts on the Continuing Operation of the **United Nations Register of Conventional Arms** (UNROCA) and its Further Development concluded its work in June, following three one-week sessions held in New York and Geneva. As

of 2022, the Register had served for 30 years as a global instrument for promoting transparency in international arms transfers. The Group of Governmental Experts adopted a consensus report (A/77/126) with practical measures for the United Nations Secretariat and Member States to promote participation in and use of the Register.

The **United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation** (UNSCAR) funded eight projects. As the administrator of the Trust Facility, the Office for Disarmament Affairs provided substantive input for those projects, ensuring their alignment with the strategic thematic orientation agreed upon by the UNSCAR strategic planning group.² In response to the 2022 call for proposals, 50 applications were received.


Meanwhile, the implementation of the **Saving Lives Entity** (SALIENT) funding facility continued in Cameroon, Jamaica and South Sudan. A scoping mission was carried out in Honduras to identify levels of armed violence, illicit flows of small arms and light weapons and the country's commitment to resolving those issues in order to establish its eligibility for the SALIENT fund.

Within the framework of the Silencing the Guns initiative, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the African Union supported an additional three countries (Liberia, Togo and United Republic of Tanzania) in their efforts to reduce illegal gun ownership and illicit flows of small arms and light weapons. Activities under

² In reviewing responses to the 2022 call for proposals, priority was given to projects that included one or more of the following thematic priorities: (a) support the universalisation and/or effective implementation of relevant global instruments on arms regulation; (b) explore and establish synergies between international and regional instruments on arms regulation; (c) support activities of civil society organizations; (d) develop and implement national action plans, national/regional targets and indicators in support of the implementation of the Programme of Action and the Sustainable Development Goals; (e) promote transparency instruments, including on matters related to international arms transfers and military expenditures; and (f) promote the implementation of Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security.

Figure 3.3

Submissions to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms by Member States on international arms transfers from 2000 to 2021



This graph shows the trend in the number of Member States submitting information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms on international arms transfers from 2000 to 2021. Participating States report transfers of weapons the calendar year after they take place.

the initiative include the surrender and collection of illegally owned weapons, as well as capacity-building in the areas of awareness-raising and local outreach campaigns, community-based policing, and weapons and ammunition management.

In 2022, Malawi became the 126th High Contracting Party to the [Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects](#) (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), and the Philippines joined as the ninety-seventh High Contracting Party to the Convention's Protocol V on

explosive remnants of war. Reporting under the Convention was the highest in 2022, with 58 High Contracting Parties submitting compliance reports, representing 46 per cent of High Contracting Parties. The Convention's office holders and the Office for Disarmament Affairs also strengthened universalization efforts, organizing several well-attended workshops and seminars as part of awareness-raising and outreach for non-High Contracting Parties. In addition, the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs began activities for a new project funded by the European Union pursuant to Council decision [2021/1694](#) supporting the Convention.



As the international community faces a resurgence of threats and dangers related to the use of nuclear weapons, **nuclear-weapon-free zones remain one of the best vehicles for advancing our collective goal of nuclear disarmament** and play a fundamental role in shaping a more peaceful and stable world.

António Guterres

Secretary-General of the United Nations



Developments and trends, 2022

4 Regional disarmament



REGIONAL disarmament

In 2022, many regional organizations navigated the continued, albeit lessened, impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and increased tensions resulting from the war in Ukraine to tackle a wide range of concerns related to weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, in particular the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. While public health restrictions were gradually eased across regions, allowing a range of in-person activities to resume, virtual meeting technologies continued to provide valuable support in taking forward a range of projects and initiatives. The United Nations maintained regular engagement with regional and subregional organizations through regular policy dialogues, long-term projects and exchanges.

The war in Ukraine brought immediate implications for the regional security architecture in Europe. At the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit](#), held in Madrid on 29 June, Allied Heads of State and Government endorsed a new [Strategic Concept](#) and

Anselme Yabouri, Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, speaks to journalists on 5 September as the African Union's Peace and Security Council and the Office for Disarmament Affairs commemorate Africa Amnesty Month.

extended official invitations for Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. The war affected key operations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose member States could not find agreement to extend the mandates of its Special Monitoring Mission or Project Coordinator in Ukraine.¹

Regarding treaties on weapons of mass destruction, 14 States ratified or signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons during the year. In Africa, five States ratified the Treaty, and three signed it.² In Latin America and the Caribbean, three States ratified the Treaty, and two States signed it.³ In Asia and the Pacific, one State ratified the Treaty.⁴ Separately, six States⁵ ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Namibia acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention, and Oman and Tajikistan joined⁶ the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

States parties and secretariats of nuclear-weapon-free zones actively participated in the tenth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, including through reports on their respective activities ([NPT/CONF.2020/16](#), [NPT/CONF.2020/49](#) and [NPT/CONF.2020/64](#)). The five nuclear-weapon States of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty⁷ maintained varying positions on the relevant protocols to each of the five nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, by which the States could commit to respecting the nuclear-weapon-free status of the

corresponding regions and could undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the agreements. The five nuclear-weapon States had still not signed the [Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone](#) (Bangkok Treaty) as at the end of the year. For its part, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations saw the renewal of its [Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone](#) for the period 2023–2027. The General Assembly also adopted three resolutions related to nuclear-weapon-free zones: “[African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty](#)” ([77/34](#)); “[Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) (Treaty of Tlatelolco)” ([77/35](#)); and “[Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia](#)” ([77/70](#)).

States also continued to pursue the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, principally through efforts to create such a zone in the Middle East. At the third session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, held in New York from 14 to 18 November, the participating States, under the Presidency of Lebanon, adopted a substantive report ([A/CONF.236/2022/3](#)) in which they also laid out the agreed topics for discussion by its working committee during the forthcoming intersessional period. The participating States also reaffirmed their commitment to keeping the process open and inclusive in working towards the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

On conventional weapons, Andorra and the Philippines ratified the [Arms Trade Treaty](#), and Gabon accepted the agreement. In addition, Malawi acceded to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Meanwhile, the African Union implemented several initiatives to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light

¹ The [closure of the field operations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Ukraine](#) was announced by the organization’s Chairman-in-Office, Zbigniew Rau, and its Secretary General, Helga Maria Schmid, on 28 April and 30 June, respectively, following the Russian Federation’s refusal to join consensus on the extension of their mandates.

² Cabo Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Malawi ratified the Treaty; Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea and Sierra Leone signed it.

³ Dominican Republic, Grenada and Guatemala ratified the Treaty; Barbados and Haiti signed it.

⁴ Timor-Leste.


⁵ Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu.

⁶ Oman acceded to the Convention, and Tajikistan ratified it.

⁷ China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

Figure 4.1

World military expenditure by region, 2000–2022




This graph shows the overall increase in global military expenditures from 2000 to 2022, as well as the regional shares in such spending. Military expenditures grew in four of the five geographical regions in 2022. The largest real-term increase was recorded in Europe (+13 per cent), followed by the Middle East (+3.2 per cent), Asia and Oceania (+2.7 per cent) and the Americas (+0.3 per cent). Spending decreased in Africa (–5.3 per cent).

SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [Fact Sheet](#) and [Military Expenditure Database](#), April 2023.

Figure 4.2

Nuclear-weapon-free zones



Nuclear-weapon-free zones strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, advance the case for global nuclear disarmament, and strengthen both regional and international peace and security. In parallel, nuclear-weapon-free zones are landmark instruments that cover roughly half the world's land mass (86 million square kilometres), including 59 per cent of the United Nation's membership (113 Member States) and representing more than a third of the world population as of 2022.

weapons and to promote regional disarmament. Yet, despite new efforts at the regional and national levels to control the possession and use of small arms and light weapons, the risk of armed conflict continued to expand, particularly in the hotspots of Libya, Liptako-Gourma and neighbouring areas (across Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, the Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes region).

In 2022, the three regional centres⁸ of the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to support Member States in their respective regions and subregions in promoting the

adherence and implementation of disarmament and arms control instruments. In particular, the centres assisted Member States in building their capacities to accede to and implement treaties and other agreements by providing information and assistance related to the Arms Trade Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The regional centres also continued to promote regional dialogue and confidence-building through the hosting of conferences, such as the twenty-first United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues.

⁸ The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (Lomé); the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (Lima); and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (Kathmandu).



We are facing **extraordinary challenges to the peace and security of cyberspace**. ... In moments like these, States must recognize the critical importance of our common norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour and redouble efforts to ensure their effective implementation.

Izumi Nakamitsu

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs



Developments and trends, 2022

5 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues



From 1 to 6 August 2022, the National University of Singapore hosted 22 participants from 18 United Nations Member States for the inaugural United Nations-Singapore Cyber Fellowship. (Photo credit: National University of Singapore)

EMERGING, CROSS-CUTTING and other issues

In the 2022 sessions of various United Nations bodies, the international community continued to make progress in addressing several emerging challenges related to developments in science and technology and their implications for international peace and security.

On outer space, the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours, established pursuant to resolution [76/231](#), commenced its work and held its first two substantive sessions. At those sessions, the Working Group took stock of the existing international legal and other normative frameworks concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space. It also considered current and future threats by States to space systems, as well as actions, activities and omissions that could be regarded as irresponsible.


The General Assembly adopted a new resolution (77/41) calling on States to commit not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests, building on an initiative of the United States. By resolution 77/250, the Assembly also decided to re-establish a group of governmental experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which will meet in 2023 and 2024 to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on that issue. After a two-year hiatus, the United Nations Disarmament Commission was able to convene

its substantive session, where it restarted its efforts to prepare recommendations on the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (for more information, see chap. 7).

The new Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (2021–2025) held its second and third substantive sessions and adopted its first annual progress report. Its work was focused on emerging and potential threats to information and communications technologies security; norms, rules and

Figure 5.1


Number of space objects registered with the United Nations, 2000–2022



Total number of orbiting items by year as reflected in the [Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space](#) maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs.

Figure 5.2

Number of objects in low Earth orbit, 1957–2022



Since the launch of the first satellite in 1957, the number of objects in low Earth orbit has grown to nearly 26,000 by the end of 2022. Destructive tests of anti-satellite weapons and collisions between space objects can cause significant increases in the amount of fragmentation debris. The deployment of mega-constellations is contributing to the accelerating increase in the total number of functional satellites.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Orbital Debris Program Office

principles of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace; applicability of international law; confidence-building; capacity-building; and regular, institutional dialogue.

Building on a proposal first introduced by France and Egypt in 2021, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution on a programme of action to advance responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies in the context of international security. The initiative sought to establish a mechanism to, inter alia, discuss existing and potential threats, build national capacity to implement international commitments, and promote engagement and cooperation with non-State stakeholders.

On autonomous weapons systems, the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems reconvened in accordance with the outcome of the sixth Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Review Conference. It was able to agree to a report that included substantive conclusions and recommendations, but it was unable to reach a consensus on elements of possible measures or options for a normative and operational framework to address the legal, humanitarian, ethical and political concerns associated with autonomous weapons. Nonetheless, there continued to be increasing convergence, but not consensus, on a so-called dual-track approach comprising prohibitions and regulations (for more information, see [chap. 3](#)).

“

Failing to involve women in any part of disarmament and non-proliferation undermines half of the population's right to participate in shaping our common future and security.

Redistributing voices more equally between women and men ... is also the smart thing to do, as it brings more effective inputs and innovative outcomes.

Izumi Nakamitsu

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

”



Developments and trends, 2022

Gender and disarmament



Sama Shrestha, Programme Specialist at UN-Women, opens a training session in Nepal on how gender and small arms are linked with the women, peace and security agenda. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific organized the event, which was held on 20 April for Government officials, parliamentarians and members of civil society.

GENDER and disarmament

Connecting gender and disarmament agendas

In 2022, the cascading impact of the war in Ukraine and increasingly antagonistic relations between nuclear-armed States contributed to global and regional tensions while exacerbating humanitarian and human rights challenges. Global military spending, which hit an all-time high, brought disruptive implications for attaining the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly its targets related to women's empowerment and gender equality.

Cognizant of those worsening dynamics, several Governments, United Nations entities and civil society organizations highlighted the need to better tackle disarmament priorities within frameworks for gender equality and, likewise, to further integrate gender considerations into the work of disarmament. In their calls to better connect global disarmament and gender agendas, many supporters

recognized the role of arms control in preventing gender-based and sexual violence. For example, the United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, a network of **United Nations entities**, established arms control as a central piece of the new United Nations **Framework for Preventing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence**, in line with the Secretary-General's recommendation in his annual report to the Security Council on conflict-related sexual violence ([S/2022/272](#)).

At the same time, on a global scale, gender-based violence continued to rise with a disproportionate impact on women. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) released a **report** showing that, on average, five women and girls are killed by a family member every hour. In Latin America and the Caribbean, tackling firearms-related femicides remained a top priority. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean launched two new courses, for judges and prosecutors, on firearms investigations from a gender perspective. In addition, the Centre trained representatives from the security sector in conducting gender-sensitive firearms-related criminal investigations.¹

Meanwhile, the role of weapons in perpetrating violence and holding back women's rights gained further international attention in 2022. **Speaking at an event** of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted how increased militarization and the illicit flow of small arms each impacted the human rights of women and girls, leading to restrictions on their freedom of movement, right to health and right to education, among other rights

and freedoms. In that context, she urged the international community to integrate weapons-related issues into normative frameworks on women, peace and security at both national and global levels.

Similarly, in disarmament meetings, several States highlighted the potential of connecting the women, peace and security agenda with the implementation of instruments such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Security Council resolution **1540 (2004)**. Notably, in the **outcome document** of the eighth Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, States called for national focal points to coordinate with their counterparts for the women, peace and security agenda to share national good practices and experiences at the global level.

At the same time, the Secretary-General featured disarmament issues in his annual report on women, peace and security ([S/2022/740](#)), reiterating the United Nations' commitment to partnering with civil society organizations to advocate for governments and parliamentarians to reduce military spending and reallocate resources.

However, disarmament remained relatively absent from the Security Council's annual debate on women, peace and security. During the October exchange, only 5 (Bangladesh, Guatemala, Guyana, Malta and Namibia) of the 78 States that addressed the Council spoke on disarmament or arms control, focusing primarily on small arms and light weapons when they did so. Meanwhile, three countries² adopted national action plans on women, peace and security in 2022, resulting in 105 countries with such action plans. In Kazakhstan's action plan (2022–2025), it committed to involve women diplomatic personnel in international

¹ The Centre reached 41 security-sector representatives in Antigua and Barbuda through its specialized course on "Firearms Investigations from a Gender Perspective", offered under the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap Initiative with funding from Canada.

² Burundi adopted its third national action plan. Kazakhstan and Morocco adopted their first national action plans.

negotiations and consultations on disarmament, non-proliferation and international security.

In 2022, Switzerland and South Africa co-chaired the **fourth capital-level meeting** of the Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Network, held in Geneva in May. Participants were invited to participate in three working-group sessions, including **one on the protection of women's rights and recognizing women's agency** with a focus on linkages to small arms and light weapons.

Beyond their implementation of the women, peace and security agenda at the national level, Chile, Colombia, Germany and Liberia each announced the adoption of a **feminist foreign policy** in 2022.³ Sweden, which in 2014 became the first country to adopt such a policy, abandoned use of the term in 2022.



Advances and pushback

The year 2022 saw progress for global gender equality alongside the rollback of some earlier gains. For instance, as the erosion of democratic institutions and civic space further endangered defenders of women's rights in some countries, the Secretary-General focused on protecting such defenders in his annual report to the Security Council on women, peace and security ([S/2022/740](#)). Women activists in disarmament were also at risk; in a new **report**, the International Action Network on Small Arms highlighted threats against women working to prevent gun violence in Argentina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, the Philippines and South Africa.

³ There is no agreed definition of what constitutes a feminist foreign policy. Such policies often vow to mainstream a gender perspective in all foreign policy actions, advocate for progress in gender equality and, when relevant, assign resources to gender equality in development and humanitarian aid. At its most ambitious, such a policy should aspire to transform the practice of foreign policy to the greater benefit of women and girls.

Furthermore, to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women (25 November), the Secretary-General **called** on Governments to increase funding for women's rights organizations and movements by 50 per cent before the end of 2026.

Meanwhile, other global crises were bringing new challenges to efforts for gender equality. As the priority theme for its sixty-sixth session, the Commission on the Status of Women addressed gender equality in the context of climate change ([E/2022/27-E/CN.6/2022/16](#)). During the meetings, civil society actors called on the United Nations to develop and fund a programme for demilitarization and disarmament to help mitigate the climate crisis and ensure women's rights ([E/CN.6/2022/NGO/127](#)).

Despite some pushback, many States, international and non-governmental organizations, and researchers continued to collectively incorporate a gender perspective in all their efforts within the disarmament field, both to improve the functioning of the disarmament machinery and to strengthen international peace and security. Furthermore, many called for coordination and sharing of good practices to advance gender equality in disarmament. Within multilateral frameworks such as those of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the **Convention on Cluster Munitions**, States established focal point mechanisms to advance gender dimensions. In addition, several United Nations entities and agencies, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNIDIR and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, promoted the implementation of gender provisions in various multilateral instruments by, for example, incorporating gender in national policies and programmes for managing small arms and ammunition. In the General Assembly, States adopted a revised version of the biennial resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms

Figure 6.1

Gender perspectives in General Assembly First Committee resolutions, 2010–2022



Of 66 resolutions adopted by the General Assembly First Committee in 2022, 20 refer to gender or women, including the resolution on women. Nine of those resolutions reference both women's participation and substantive gender perspectives. One additional resolution refers to diversity and inclusion.

control (77/55),⁴ committing States to advance women's full and effective participation in disarmament while encouraging countries to address the gendered impact of armed violence. As in 2021, about one third of the General Assembly's disarmament resolutions contained references to gender, including some resolutions introduced for the first time. Furthermore, many States contributed to the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

However, increasingly divided opinions on the role that gender should play in disarmament persisted. Some States expressed their stance

that human rights and gender equality should be considered in other forums and addressed less often in disarmament discussions.


Diversity and inclusion in international disarmament forums

Noting the gaps in ensuring the meaningful participation of women, the Secretary-General continued calling for the establishment of gender quotas to accelerate women's inclusion in all areas of peace and security, including disarmament. Meanwhile, gender gaps persisted within delegations to

⁴ The measure was first introduced by Trinidad and Tobago and adopted as resolution 65/69 of 8 December 2010.

Figure 6.2

Percentage of women speaking in multilateral disarmament forums, 2021–2022



The General Assembly has agreed through its resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control (77/55), and other commitments, to achieve women’s equal, full and effective participation in disarmament decision-making. The Office for Disarmament Affairs collects gender-disaggregated data on speakers in most forums, usually through daily summaries. In 2022, the First Committee and the Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons saw slight increases (3 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively) in the proportion of women delivering statements. The 2022 meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Open-ended Working Group on ammunition registered higher increases (8 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively) in women speakers, with the Open-ended Working Group on information and communications technologies approaching gender parity. Meanwhile, in the Conference on Disarmament, the percentage of women taking the floor in 2022 decreased.

multilateral disarmament forums. Less than a third of statements to disarmament meetings, such as the First Committee of the General Assembly, were delivered by women in 2022.

However, progress in women's meaningful participation was not entirely elusive. For example, progress towards gender parity continued in the Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (2021–2025), where women delivered nearly half of the statements of the third substantive session. Initiatives such as the “Women in Cyber Fellowship”, which supported women's attendance at the Working Group and offered cyber-focused negotiation training sessions to women diplomats from across regions, promoted parity in that forum.

In addition, several States joined civil society organizations and young people in calling for international forums to broaden their discussions on gender inclusion and address intersecting perspectives such as age, disability, ethnicity or race. The Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United States held events

on diversity and inclusion on the margins of the tenth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the ninth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. In a [joint statement](#) to the General Assembly First Committee, civil society organizations focused on broadening the understanding of diversity and gender norms, noting how weapons had racialized impacts. Similarly, they called for an intersectional approach towards weapons and war, including by engaging with those most impacted by militarism to develop credible disarmament and arms control processes.

Furthermore, gender experts, States, civil society representatives and other speakers attending side events and other discussions on gender, peace and security often highlighted the need for increased focus on cultural concepts of masculinity as they related to disarmament and arms control.⁵

⁵ The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the MenEngage Alliance launched a joint [programme](#) on “Confronting Militarised Masculinities: Mobilising Men for Feminist Peace”. The International Action Network on Small Arms launched a [booklet](#), in [English](#), [French](#) and [Spanish](#), on abusive masculine behaviour and gender-based gun violence.

“

The continued fraying of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime is worrying. It is both a cause and consequence of the current geopolitical tensions and conflict. **Enduring paralysis in the multilateral disarmament machinery cannot continue** if we are to build a safer and more secure world.

Izumi Nakamitsu

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

”

Developments and trends, 2022

7 Disarmament machinery





On 7 December, the seventy-seventh General Assembly votes on resolutions and decisions endorsed by the First Committee. (Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe)

7

DISARMAMENT machinery

The year saw mixed levels of progress across the various components of the multilateral disarmament machinery. The United Nations Disarmament Commission resumed substantive work and submitted its first substantive report to the General Assembly since 2018. In the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly's First Committee, States demonstrated their engagement on disarmament-related issues through record-high numbers of interventions, resolutions and decisions. The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters convened for two sessions in 2022, tackling a new two-year programme of work on the pressing matter of global military spending. Meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament generated further frustration and discontent as it continued to be deadlocked. It could not even agree to its traditional annual report, instead adopting a one-page report containing only meeting dates for 2023. Furthermore, the General Assembly resolution entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament" was adopted by a vote for the first time.


Eased constraints from the COVID-19 pandemic allowed for a resumption of normal, in-person working methods across the disarmament machinery. The First Committee of the General Assembly returned fully to its pre-COVID-19 modes of work, convening for 32 in-person meetings. Informal consultations on draft resolutions and decisions also returned to an in-person format, a development widely welcomed by delegations. Similarly, the Disarmament

Commission held its three weeks of substantive deliberations in person, with both working groups holding 10 meetings each. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters incorporated a flexible approach in carrying out its substantive meetings for 2022. Although lingering COVID-19 concerns caused the Board's first meeting in February to be held in an adjusted, virtual format, its second meeting in June took place in person at United Nations Headquarters

Figure 7

Humanitarian disarmament in the General Assembly

Number of disarmament-related resolutions mentioning humanitarian principles, 2000–2022



Preventing unnecessary suffering in armed conflict has been a goal of international law for nearly two centuries. In recent decades, many countries have been pushing to rein in specific means and methods of warfare based on their indiscriminate or disproportionate effects — particularly on civilians. Focusing their efforts on the humanitarian impact of certain weapons, those States progressively achieved the entry into force of treaties against anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions and nuclear weapons.

During that same period, countries began referring to humanitarian principles in a growing number of General Assembly resolutions related to disarmament. Such references may reflect a growing understanding of “humanitarian disarmament” as an effective complement to approaches that pursue disarmament through measures such as strengthening confidence, trust and stability among States.

in New York. The Conference on Disarmament resumed in-person meetings at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, but it also took advantage of virtual conferencing technologies to enable the participation of experts and senior dignitaries during its high-level segment.

The Conference on Disarmament saw a promising start to its 2022 session with the establishment of subsidiary bodies on its core agenda items. However, discussions within the subsidiary bodies and the negotiation of their reports were negatively impacted by flaring geopolitical tensions, particularly the situation in Ukraine, resulting in an inability to make any substantive progress. In his statement to the seventy-seventh session of the First Committee in October, the President of the Conference, Emilio Rafael Izquierdo Miño (Ecuador), regretted that the body's final report did not reflect its work throughout the year. Moreover, he suggested that States critically reflect on the Conference's work and future. Recalling that almost all delegations had repeated their worry and frustration about the body's paralysis over more than two decades, he called on States to take urgent action.

The 2022 session of the Disarmament Commission was able to submit a substantive report (A/77/42) to the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly following a three-year hiatus. States universally welcomed the resumption of the Commission's work, underscoring its critical importance as the main deliberative component of the disarmament machinery. The Commission decided that 2022 would be the second year of its three-year cycle, picking up where it left off in 2018 and resuming consideration in two working groups on the substantive agenda items previously agreed: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; and transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space

activities.¹ Despite acrimonious exchanges over the conflict in Ukraine during the general debate, both Working Groups were able to hold in-depth discussions. Several delegations underscored that the substantive discussions in the Commission would facilitate input for the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours. States also expressed hope that the 2022 discussions would help forge a pathway to a successful outcome at the 2023 session, which would mark an end to the three-year cycle.

Deep divisions and combative exchanges punctuated the seventy-seventh session of the **First Committee** as it considered a record-setting 75 draft resolutions and decisions, adopting 74² and rejecting one. The war in Ukraine permeated all aspects of the Committee's work, from confrontational exchanges to divisive votes. The Russian Federation used the right of reply to defend its actions, and Western States, including the European Union and the United States, criticized the Russian Federation for directly contributing to the erosion of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and raising nuclear threats. Despite the harsh tenor of the exchanges, engagement in the Committee was extremely high; the general debate saw statements by 148 delegations, while the thematic discussions included 365 interventions. While participation by women delegates in the Committee continued to increase, it remained well below

¹ "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons"; "Preparation of recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities".

² The First Committee adopted 66 resolutions and 8 decisions.

parity, with only 28 per cent of interventions made by women.

At the request of the Secretary-General, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters began a two-year programme of work on the topic of global military spending. The Board considered the development of proposals to facilitate new and transformative thinking to reduce arms expenditures in the immediate, medium and long term. At its sessions in

February and June, the Board discussed topics that included the historic role of the United Nations in reducing military spending and promoting transparency; the political, economic and social drivers that had pushed military spending upwards in the last two decades; and the implications at global, regional and national levels, including socioeconomic consequences ([A/76/183](#)). The Board will present recommendations to the Secretary-General following its eightieth session in June 2023.

“

Diversity brings to us innovative and creative approaches that are so needed to tackle some of our most difficult disarmament and security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Inclusive multilateralism, based on strong partnership with diverse actors, is a smart and indeed necessary element for today's disarmament discussions.

Izumi Nakamitsu

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

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Developments and trends, 2022

Information and outreach

Was bedeuten Forschung und
Technologie für Abrüstung?

UNODA
10 YEARS VIENNA OFFICE



Rebecca Jovin, Chief of the Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, engages with visitors as the Office showcases its work during the “Long Night of Research” event at the Vienna International Centre on 20 May.

8 INFORMATION and outreach

In 2022, the General Assembly renewed two key resolutions mandating United Nations information and outreach activities in the area of disarmament: “United Nations Disarmament Information Programme” (77/87); and “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education” (77/52). Those resolutions enable the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other United Nations entities to provide Member States, the diplomatic community, non-governmental organizations and the public at large with unbiased, up-to-date and relevant information on multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

For the forty-sixth consecutive year since 1976, the Office published the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, providing a comprehensive account of developments and issues in the field of disarmament. The 2021 *Yearbook* featured a collection of explanatory graphics and charts, as well as an entire chapter on gender issues in disarmament.

Seeking to strengthen the sustainability and impact of its disarmament education efforts, the Office launched its first formal **Disarmament Education Strategy** in December. In addition to outlining important areas of disarmament education where it would strive to advance in the coming years, the Office emphasized the central role of partnerships and, moving forward, its ongoing commitment to generate and connect relevant networks in the disarmament education field.

The Office also produced a new edition of its Civil Society and Disarmament collection, entitled ***B Flat, B Sharp, Be Inspired: Voices of***

Youth. In the volume, published in December, young contributors highlighted their diverse efforts to pursue peace through disarmament in the twenty-first century.

In a new edition of its series ***Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions***, covering the period 2021–2022, the Office showcased the instrumental role of effective partnerships with donors in achieving ambitious goals in the field of disarmament.

Over the course of the year, the Office produced three publications on the Biological Weapons Convention. In a new edition of



Disarmament Explainer Videos

On 7 June, the Office for Disarmament Affairs published the **French**, **Korean** and **Spanish** versions of the #Intro2Disarmament videos, entitled “What is disarmament?”, “Disarmament in the 21st Century — An overview of the Pillars of the Disarmament Agenda”, “How does disarmament and arms control work?”, “Disarmament and the Sustainable Development Goals” and “How to engage”.

Figure 8.1

Disarmament Education Dashboard


(As at 31 December 2022)

12,991

REGISTERED **USERS**
from **185 countries**






USER EMPLOYMENT STATUS



The **TYPICAL USER** is a **female young professional** with some previous knowledge of disarmament and non-proliferation.



AVERAGE AGE
33




TOP 5 MOST POPULAR COURSES



- Cyberdiplomacy
- Introduction to Disarmament
- Gender Perspectives on Disarmament
- Security Council Resolution 1540
- Weapons of Mass Destruction

NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE MODULES AVAILABLE



SELF-PACED COURSES OPENED



The Biological Weapons Convention: An Introduction, released in March, the Office presented a comprehensive overview of the Convention, the history of the negotiations and the current state of implementation. In April, it issued *Operationalising Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention*, containing reflections on implementing the Convention's article VII. In December, the Office published the *Guide to Implementing the Biological Weapons Convention*, describing the national implementation process and obligations stemming from the Convention.

The Department of Peace Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs released *Weapons and Ammunition Dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin*, presenting key findings and recommendations to support the design and implementation of evidence-based, efficient and gender-sensitive initiatives for weapons and ammunition management and for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The main website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<https://disarmament.unoda.org>) recorded over 852,000 unique visits in 2022. During the year, the Office upgraded its main website to help improve its security, performance and reliability. Meanwhile, the Office launched a project to integrate its various databases into a portal that would serve as a repository for all disarmament-related data.

Regarding media outreach, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

participated in press briefings and more than 30 interviews with international television, radio and print reporters. She also **joined** the top officials of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Children's Fund and the International Committee of the Red Cross in urging States to support a newly agreed **declaration** on strengthening the protection of civilians from the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs continued efforts to facilitate the diverse and inclusive engagement of young people in the disarmament and non-proliferation field through its outreach initiative **#Youth4Disarmament**. In a highlight from the year, one of the United Nations Youth Champions for Disarmament¹ **addressed** the high-level plenary meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Office also launched the **#Leaders4Tomorrow Workshop Series**, which brought together 25 competitively selected young leaders. Participants attended five sessions to explore how disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control are linked with other topics related to maintaining international peace and security. As part of the programme, the participants developed their own projects to advance disarmament education as a solution for peace within their local communities and youth networks.

The United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament largely returned to its traditional, in-person format for the first time since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, training diplomats and other officials from 24 States.² Additionally, the inaugural United

OPPOSITE PAGE: The **Disarmament Education Dashboard** of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is a global online learning platform providing free training at various proficiency levels to diverse audiences. It offers interactive self-paced, instructor-led and blended courses, webinars and workshops accessible from various devices. It was launched and is managed by the UNODA Vienna Office, which regularly updates and upgrades it to reflect innovations in e-learning. By the end of 2022, it had almost 13,000 registered users from diverse backgrounds and age groups. Almost 60 per cent of them were women. With over 270 thematic modules, the Dashboard hosts courses in all key areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, as well as cross-cutting issues.

¹ Under the United Nations Youth Champions for Disarmament programme, which was launched in 2020, the Office trained 10 competitively selected Youth Champions on general principles of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control through both online courses, live webinars and in-person activities. At the same time, the Youth Champions developed and implemented projects to engage with their communities on disarmament-related issues.

² Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Cambodia, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iran



Disarmament Today Podcast: “Where next for youth in disarmament?”

audio | video



This podcast episode, which is also part of the [Vienna Conversation Series](#), aims to engage youth and amplify fresh thinking as it raises awareness about disarmament's centrality in addressing global challenges. In a dynamic exchange of views with High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu, youth representatives Kasha Sequoia Slavner and Louis Reitmann share their thoughts on ways to educate, engage and empower young people in the disarmament field. Both speakers were participants in the 2022 #Leaders4Tomorrow workshops.




Youth presentation at the United Nations

[#Leaders4Tomorrow](#) present 23 projects to advance disarmament education at an [event](#) on the margins of the General Assembly First Committee on 19 October.

Figure 8.2

Youth in the General Assembly

Percentage of resolutions mentioning youth or young people, 2000–2022



After the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution [2250 \(2015\)](#) on youth, peace and security, the General Assembly increased its number of official references to “youth” or “young people” in resolutions.

The Assembly also expanded the scope of its language in resolutions on youth, moving beyond their participation in educational activities in order to recognize their active role and contributions as advocates for disarmament. In 2019, the Assembly reaffirmed the important and positive contribution of young people in sustaining peace and security through its first-ever resolution on “Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation” ([74/64](#)), which also encouraged Member States, the United Nations, relevant specialized agencies and regional and subregional organizations to promote the meaningful and inclusive participation of young people in discussions in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In its 2021 iteration of the resolution ([76/45](#)), the General Assembly requested specific measures to promote the meaningful and inclusive participation and empowerment of youth on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, including through the effective utilization of the dedicated digital platform Youth4Disarmament and token grants and awards supported by voluntary contributions.

Nations-Singapore Cyber Fellowship was held in August to equip national authorities working on cyber strategy, policy, technology and operations with practical knowledge and skills drawing upon the United Nations-developed normative framework.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), an autonomous research institute within the United Nations, undertook

research activities under five multi-year programmes, on conventional arms and ammunition, weapons of mass destruction, gender and disarmament, security and technology, and space security. A pair of its special research projects dealt with “managing exits from armed conflicts” and the proposed Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. In addition to producing 98 publications in 2022, UNIDIR supported dialogue between disarmament stakeholders through over 130 conferences, workshops and events that attracted more than 9,500 participants.

(Islamic Republic of), Libya, Montenegro, Pakistan, Palau, Poland, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Togo, United States, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, and Yemen.

The background features a large, light blue magnifying glass with a yellow inner ring. Scattered around it are several light blue line-art icons representing documents, books, a computer mouse, and a pencil. The central text is positioned within the magnifying glass's lens.

**RESOLUTIONS,
STATUS OF TREATIES
and other RESOURCES**





DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS of the seventy-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly

Disarmament Resolutions and Decisions Database

<https://resolutions.unoda.org>

The revamped database's improved features make it simple to pinpoint specific votes and track State voting patterns. Data for previous sessions are forthcoming.





Status of multilateral arms regulation and **DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS**

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
Treaties Database

Search for a treaty name

View 1770 Disarmament Agreements including the status of multilateral arms regulation and Disarmament Agreements, arms control and export controls, treaties, arms control agreements and the status of the agreements/Disarmament.

Treaty Actions from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022

State	Instrument	Date	Treaty Action
Andorra	Arms Trade Treaty	2 December 2022	Ratification
Oman	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	21 October 2022	Accession
Malawi	Amendment to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons	23 September 2022	Accession
Equatorial Guinea	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	22 September 2022	Signatory
Sao Tome and Principe	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	22 September 2022	Ratification
Dominican Republic	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	22 September 2022	Ratification
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	22 September 2022	Ratification
Burkina Faso	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	22 September 2022	Signatory

Disarmament Treaties Database

<https://treaties.unoda.org>

The redesigned database is easy to search with new filters and a user-friendly interface.



PUBLICATIONS and other INFORMATION MATERIALS in 2022



United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs



Publications

- > *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 46 (Parts I and II): 2021 (Sales Nos. E.22.IX.5 and E.22.IX.7)
- > *B Flat, B Sharp, Be Inspired: Voices of Youth*, Civil Society and Disarmament, 2022 (Sales No. E.22.IX.6)
- > *Programmes Financed From Voluntary Contributions, 2021-2022*
- > *Disarmament Education Strategy*
- > *The Biological Weapons Convention: An Introduction*, second edition (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish and Russian)
- > *Guide to Implementing the Biological Weapons Convention*
- > *Operationalising Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention*
- > *Weapons and Ammunition Dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin* (English and French)
- > *The Non-proliferation of Biological Weapons: Challenges and Opportunities for Latin America and the Caribbean* (Spanish)
- > *Reinvigorating Gender-Responsive Small Arms Control in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Asia and the Pacific*
- > Arms Trade Treaty [text](#) and [implementation toolkit](#) (Nepali)
- > “[Women, men and the gendered nature of small arms and light weapons](#)”, Module 06.10, Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) (translation into Nepali)
- > “[Children, adolescents, youth and small arms and light weapons](#)”, MOSAIC Module 06.20 (Nepali)
- > “[National coordination mechanisms on small arms and light weapons control](#)”, MOSAIC Module 03.40 (Laotian)
- > “[Designing and implementing a National Action Plan](#)”, MOSAIC Module 04.10 (Laotian)

- > *Newsletter for Nominated Experts and Analytical Laboratories for the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for the Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, No. 3 (January 2022) and No. 4 (July 2022)
- > *UNODA Update* (online news updates): First Quarter, Second Quarter, Third Quarter and Fourth Quarter



E-learning courses

- > “[The United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism \(UNSGM\) for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Bacteriological \(Biological\) and Toxin Weapons](#)”
- > “[The United Nations SaferGuard Programme and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines](#)”
- > “[Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems](#)”
- > “[Gun-Free Zones](#)”
- > “[Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons](#)”



Podcasts

- > “[Where next for youth in disarmament?](#)”, Vienna Conversation Series, July 15 (audio)



Videos

- > Disarmament Explainer Videos ([French](#), [Korean](#) and [Spanish](#)), 7 June
- > “[Call for applications to #Leaders4Tomorrow Workshop Series](#)”, 15 February
- > “[Event: Global challenges and opportunities for multilateral disarmament](#)”, Vienna Conversation Series, 8 June
- > “[Where next for youth in disarmament?](#)”, Vienna Conversation Series, July 15 (video)
- > “[UN Messenger of Peace Michael Douglas on the International Day Against Nuclear Tests](#)”, 29 August
- > “[UN Messenger of Peace Michael Douglas commends #StepUp4Disarmament participants in video message](#)”, 30 August

- > “Congratulatory Event for Pitching Peace Youth Music Challenge”, October 21
- > “#Leaders4Tomorrow present ideas to enact change in UN First Committee Side Event”, October 27
- > “Event: Updating our vision for disarmament: inspiring action from the humanitarian approach”, Vienna Conversation Series, November 11
- > “Event: 10th Anniversary of the UNODA Vienna Office”, 6 December
- > “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2022 lookback video”, 30 December



Conventional arms and ammunition

Publications

- > *Enhancing the Protection of Civilians through Conventional Arms Control: Challenges and Opportunities for United Nations Peace Operations*
- > *Second Menu of Indicators to Measure the Reverberating Effects on Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas*
- > *Technical Guidelines to Facilitate the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 (2017) and Related International Standards and Good Practices on Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons*
- > *FAQ on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas*
- > *Exploring the Technical Feasibility of Marking Small Ammunition*
- > *Exploring the Use of Technology for Remote Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification*
- > *Weapons and Ammunition Management in Africa Insight: 2022 Update* (French)
- > *Initial Impact of Profiling Small Arms Ammunition in Armed Violence Settings: Bedfordshire, UK, Case Study* (French and Spanish)
- > *The Arms Trade Treaty: Assessing its Impact on Countering Diversion*
- > *Addressing the Linkages Between Illicit Arms, Organized Crime and Armed Conflict*
- > *Uncrewed Ground Systems: A Primer*
- > *Uncrewed Maritime Systems: A Primer*
- > *Uncrewed Aerial Systems: A Primer*

Journal and working group papers

- > “The Case for Strengthening Transparency in Conventional Arms Transfers”, Paul Holtom, Anna Edna Esi Mensah and Ruben Nicolin, *Arms Control Today*, vol. 52, No. 9 (November 2022): 12–16
- > “What role technology can play in ceasefire monitoring and verification”, Sarah Grand-Clément, *Futuring Peace*
- > “The Unintended Impacts of U.S. Weapons Supplied to Afghanistan”, Erica Mumford, *The Diplomat*

Other Publications

- > “Unpacking the EU’s dual approach to tackling proliferation of small arms”
- > “In Defence of Cities”
- > “How Can Conventional Arms Control Strengthen UN Peace Operations Efforts to Protect Civilians?”
- > “Preventing armed conflict: exploring the role of arms-related risks”
- > “What role technology can play in ceasefire monitoring and verification”
- > “The end of transparency in international arms transfers?”
- > “Addressing the proliferation of improvised and craft-produced weapons: Why should we care?”



Gender and disarmament

Publications

- > *Gender and Disarmament Resource Pack* (2022 edition)
- > *Factsheet on Arab Women in International Security and Disarmament* (Arabic)
- > *Women Managing Weapons* (French)
- > Fact sheet: “Gender and the Arms Trade Treaty”
- > Fact sheet: “Gender and Diversity in the Convention on Cluster Munitions”

Journal and working group papers

- > “From pillars to progress: gender mainstreaming in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (working paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Ireland, Mexico, Namibia, Panama, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden and UNIDIR)
- > “Gender Mainstreaming Ammunition Through-Life Management” (working paper submitted to the Open-Ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition by Panama, Small Arms Survey and UNIDIR)
- > “Operationalizing the gender provisions of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (working paper)

submitted to the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by Chile, Ireland, Mexico and UNIDIR)

Other publications

- > “The road ahead for the Chemical Weapons Convention: disarmament, diversity and equality”, *UK in the Netherlands*
- > “Lifting each other up: Feminist foreign policies and gendered approaches to arms control”, *European Leadership Network*
- > “How Weapons and Ammunition Management Can Enhance Women, Peace and Security”, *The Global Observatory*
- > “New Avenues for Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict: Addressing Weapons”, *The Global Observatory*



Security and technology

Publications

- > *Cyber Stability Conference: Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Services Across Sectors*
- > *Confidence-Building Measures for Artificial Intelligence: A Framing Paper*
- > *India's International Cyber Operations: Tracing National Doctrine and Capabilities*
- > *International Cooperation to Mitigate Cyber Operations Against Critical Infrastructure* (Arabic, Chinese and Spanish)
- > *Supply Chain Security in the Cyber Age: Sector Trends, Current Threats and Multi-Stakeholder Responses* (Arabic)
- > *Uncrewed Ground Systems: A Primer*
- > *Uncrewed Maritime Systems: A Primer*
- > *Uncrewed Aerial Systems: A Primer*
- > *A Taxonomy of Malicious ICT Incidents*
- > *Human-machine interfaces in autonomous weapon systems*
- > *Proposals Related to Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Resource Paper*
- > *Exploring the Use of Technology for Remote Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification*
- > *2021 Cyber Stability Conference: Towards a More Secure Cyberspace*
- > *Enhancing Cooperation to Address Criminal and Terrorist Use of ICTs*
- > *Non-Escalatory Attribution of International Cyber Incidents: Facts, International Law and Politics*



Weapons of mass destruction

Publications

- > *Options for International Cooperation under Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention*
- > *Exploring Options for Missile Verification*
- > *Potential Outcomes of the Ninth BWC Review Conference*
- > *Perspectives, Drivers, and Objectives for the Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Voices from the Region*
- > *The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus: Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop Series, Summary Report*
- > *Back to the Future for Verification in the Biological Disarmament Regime?*
- > *Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*
- > *Adding Novichok Nerve Agents to the CWC Annex on Chemicals: a Technical Fix and Its Implications for the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Regime*
- > *The Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Implications of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine – and What Next for Reducing Global Nuclear Dangers*
- > *Stakeholder perspectives on the Biological Weapons Convention*
- > *Assessing the SecBio Platform Proposal for the Biological Weapons Convention*

Journal and working group papers

- > *Illustrative Compendium of Past and Present Verification Practices* (background paper for the NDV Group of Governmental Experts, UNIDIR, 16 September 2022)
- > *Incorporating New Technologies: lessons from “special circumstances”*, María Garzón Maceda, Eleanor Krabill and Wilfred Wan
- > “The evolution of Article VII”, James Revill and María Garzón Maceda in *Operationalising Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention*, Jean Pascal Zanders (ed.)



Space security

Publications

- > *Norms for Outer Space: A Small Step or a Giant Leap for Policymaking?*
- > *Advancing Space Security Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviour? Webinar Summary Report*

Journal and working group papers

- > *Threats to the security of space activities and systems* (submitted by UNIDIR, United Nations working paper A/AC.294/2022/WP.16)
- > *Existing Legal and Regulatory Frameworks concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space* (submitted by UNIDIR, United Nations working paper A/AC.294/2022/WP.1)
- > “[The road to a moratorium on kinetic ASAT testing is paved with good intentions, but is it feasible?](#)”, Almudena Azcárate Ortega and Laetitia Cesari Zarkan, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique
- > “Space and Future Warfare: Are We Heading Towards ‘Star Wars’?”, Almudena Azcárate Ortega in *Future Warfare and Technology: Issues and Strategies*, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (ed.), Global Policy GP-ORF Series, 133, 136.
- > “One Step Closer to Space Security: The Role of Multilateral Discussions”, Laetitia Cesari Zarkan in *Digital Debates*, 90, Trisha Ray, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Pulkit Mohan (eds.), Global Policy GP-ORF Series



Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction

Publications

- > *Perspectives, Drivers, and Objectives for the Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Voices from the Region*
- > *Means of Delivery: A Complex and Evolving Issue in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Initiative*
- > Infographic: “[Narratives on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone: Historical accounts, drivers, and themes](#)”

Journal and working group papers

- > “[The Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the IAEA General Conference: Is There a ‘Grand Strategy’ behind the IAEA Track?](#)”, Tomisha Bino and Jasmine Auda, *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, vol. 5, No. 1 (June 2022): 86-100

Other publications

- > “[The Middle Eastern WMD-Free Zone and the NPT](#)”, Tomisha Bino, *Arms Control Today*, July 2022



Managing exits from armed conflict

Publications

- > *A Media Intervention Featuring Indirect Contact Promotes Peace in Rural Contexts Marked by Longstanding Internal Conflicts in Colombia*
- > *Current Dynamics of Child Recruitment in Colombia*
- > *Community Leaders’ Receptivity to Returning Former Boko Haram Associates: Implications for Peacebuilding*
- > *Managing Exits from Conflict in Iraq: A Case Study of Basra and Tal Afar*
- > *Public Perceptions of the Transitional Justice Components of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement: Implications for Peace* (Spanish)
- > *Perceptions of FARC Dissident Groups in Colombia: Implications for Future Peace* (Spanish)
- > *Community Security Actors and the Prospects for Demobilization in the North East of Nigeria*
- > *Security Threats Affecting People Exiting Criminal Groups in Colombia* (Spanish)
- > *Preventing Recruitment and Ensuring Effective Reintegration Efforts: Evidence from Across the Lake Chad Basin to Inform Policy and Practice* (French)
- > *Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Children from Families with Perceived ISIL Affiliation: Experiences from Iraq and Al Hol*
- > “[It’s Like Starting From Scratch](#)”: Informal Support Accessed by Individuals who Disengaged from Armed Groups as Children in Colombia (Spanish)
- > *Child Recruitment in the Lake Chad Basin*
- > *How Information Ecosystems Affect Conflict Transitions: Experiences from Al Hol and Iraq*
- > *The Road Home from Al Hol camp: Reflections on the Iraqi Experience*
- > *Recidivism Risks in the “Differential Assistance” Process for People Exiting Criminal Groups in Colombia* (Spanish)
- > *The Legal Uncertainty Affecting People Exiting Criminal Groups in Colombia* (English and Spanish) [Confidential]



EVENTS HELD ON THE MARGINS of the 2022 session of the FIRST COMMITTEE

- 11 October**
- > [Humanitarian Disarmament Education](#) (organized by the Permanent Mission of Kiribati)
 - > [Marking 20 Years of the Hague Code of Conduct](#) (organized by the European Union and the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique)
- 12 October**
- > How to address the global impact of improvised explosive devices? Key recommendations (organized by the Permanent Mission of France and Action on Armed Violence)
- 13 October**
- > Challenges and efforts in countering IEDs in West Africa (organized by the Permanent Mission of Canada and United Nations Mine Action Service)
- 14 October**
- > [Pitching Peace Youth Music Challenge Congratulatory Event](#) (organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)
- 17 October**
- > Challenges and efforts in countering IEDs in West Africa (organized by the Permanent Mission of Canada)
 - > [Disarmament Verification: From Mistrust to Cooperation](#) (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)
- 18 October**
- > [Addressing Nuclear Risks of Outer-Space Activities](#) (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)
 - > [Briefing for Member States on the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons](#) (UNSGM) (organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)
- 19 October**
- > Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund (organized by the Arms Trade Treaty secretariat)
 - > [Disarmament education as a solution to peace: Ideas of the #Leaders4Tomorrow to enact change today](#) (organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)
 - > [Introduction to Responsible AI for Peace and Security](#) (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Office for Disarmament Affairs)
 - > Emphasizing the Value of Multilateral Export Controls (organized by the Permanent Mission of the United States)
- 20 October**
- > [2022 Innovations Dialogue: AI Disruption, Peace, and Security](#) (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)
- 21 October**
- > Capacity-building in cyberspace (organized by the Permanent Mission of France)
- 25 October**
- > [The continuing importance of transparency in armaments and new developments](#) (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Office for Disarmament Affairs)
- 27 October**
- > [Gender-Responsive Small Arms Control – Lessons from National Implementation](#) (organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)
- 1 November**
- > Briefing on Biological Weapons and Disinformation (organized by the Permanent Mission of Canada and King's College London)



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