



Security Council

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Letter dated 15 September 2023 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 7 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council welcomed the 10 benchmarks articulated in my letter dated 15 September 2022 to the President of the Security Council to guide the Council in its review of the arms embargo measures in relation to Somalia ([S/2022/698](#)), and urged the Somali Government authorities to work together to fully meet them. In paragraph 47 (b) of that resolution, the Council also requested me to provide an update on progress against each indicator set out in the benchmarks. This is my fourth assessment on weapons and ammunition management and the arms embargo measures in relation to Somalia. (For the three previous assessments, see [S/2014/243](#), [S/2019/616](#) and [S/2022/698](#).)

Pursuant to the Council's request, an assessment team conducted a mission to Somalia (Mogadishu and Baidoa, South-West State) from 8 to 18 July 2023. The team also held consultations in Nairobi on 19 July. Led by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the team also comprised staff from the Department of Peace Operations and the Mine Action Service. With the agreement of the Federal Government of Somalia, the Panel of Experts on Somalia joined for part of the assessment.

In Mogadishu, the team held consultations with representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia: the National Security Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, his deputy and staff, including the national focal point for weapons and ammunition management and the national component of the Joint Verification Team; the Chief Policy Adviser to the President; and representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Internal Security, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Banaadir Regional Administration and the National Security Council Arms and Ammunition Steering Committee, as well as the Somali National Army, the Somali Police Force, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, and the Somali Custodial Corps. The team also met with the Minister of Women and Human Rights Development and her staff.

As in 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia organized a visit for the assessment team to the Somali Police Force headquarters, a Somali Police Force storage site and a Somali Police Force explosive ordnance disposal storage facility, as well as the Halane Central Armoury and the new ammunition storage facility in Jazeera, Mogadishu. In Baidoa, the team met with the Ministers of Internal Security and Justice of South-West State, as well as representatives of the regional security office, the Somali National Army and Somali Police Force, and visited Somali National Army and Somali Police Force armouries.



The team met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and representatives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSAM), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, virtually) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC country office), as well as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the European Union Training Mission in Somalia and the European Union Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia. The team also held consultations, in-person or virtually, with the following organizations: the HALO Trust (Somalia), the Mines Advisory Group and Conflict Armament Research. In Baidoa, the team met with the officer-in-charge of the UNSAM field office in Baidoa and the ATMIS commander of sector 3, which includes Baidoa.

In Nairobi, the team held consultations, hybrid or virtually, with the Panel of Experts on Somalia, the Regional Centre on Small Arms, the HALO Trust (Kenya) and UNODC (Global Maritime Crime Programme).

The Offices of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and on Sexual Violence in Conflict were consulted, as were the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

The team also conducted in-person and virtual consultations with Member State delegations, including Security Council members, based in New York, Mogadishu, Nairobi and Djibouti.

Following the assessment, preliminary findings were presented to the Federal Government of Somalia and to Council members.

Arms embargo and context

A general and complete arms embargo was established in relation to Somalia by the Security Council in its resolution [733 \(1992\)](#). A targeted arms embargo, applicable to individuals on the sanctions list of the relevant committee, was introduced in resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#). The territorial arms embargo was partially lifted in resolution [2093 \(2013\)](#), in order to support the development of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia and to provide security for the Somali people.

Over the past decade, the partially lifted arms embargo has been further eased by the Council. For example, in resolution [2111 \(2013\)](#), the Council introduced an exemption for Somali security sector institutions other than those of the Federal Government of Somalia. In its resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#), the Council removed the notification requirement for the provision of training to the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia. In its resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), the Council incorporated a number of exceptions, including for the delivery of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use. The Council further updated the lists of items (annex A: items subject to a no-objection process; and annex B: items requiring advance notification) intended solely for the development of the security and police institutions of Somalia.

Beginning with resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#) and renewed annually, the authorization by the Security Council for the inspection of vessels carrying arms, as well as charcoal and, later on, specific components for improvised explosive devices, being transported in violation of the sanctions regime was most recently extended in resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#).

The partially lifted arms embargo also incorporates a biannual reporting requirement for the Federal Government of Somalia, in coordination and

collaboration with the federal member states, as appropriate. The reporting requirement covers, inter alia, information on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of the security and police institutions of Somalia, and the status of regional and militia forces; post-distribution notifications that incorporate information regarding the destination unit in the Somali security forces or the place of storage upon distribution of the imported arms and ammunition; and reports of the Joint Verification Team, a mechanism established by the Federal Government of Somalia in 2015 following a recommendation made in the 2014 assessment (S/2014/243).

Between 1 September 2022 and 1 September 2023, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) cleared three exemption requests and received 31 exemption notifications, from the Federal Government of Somalia, other States and regional organizations. The Committee received 21 post-delivery notifications during the same period. According to a weapons and ammunition database continually updated by the Joint Verification Team and the Panel of Experts on Somalia, since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia has received approximately 44,000 weapons and 101 million rounds of ammunition, including around 71,000 RPG-7 rounds.

In May 2023, the Committee updated its implementation assistance notice on the arms embargo, first issued in 2016, to provide additional guidance to the Federal Government of Somalia, and to States or international, regional or subregional organizations delivering assistance, on the scope of the embargo and related procedural requirements. In Security Council resolution 2662 (2022), the Secretariat was requested to prepare a template form in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia for the approval of the Committee, which, once finalized, was expected to improve the consistency of arms embargo notifications and requests from Member States to the Committee, and to assist the verification efforts of the Joint Verification Team.

In June 2023, the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, called upon the Security Council for a total lifting of the arms embargo, a position supported by the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. President Mohamud highlighted the unwavering commitment of the Federal Government “to improving weapons and ammunition management frameworks in a coherent manner in accordance with international standards” (S/PV.9356). In Mogadishu, Federal Government authorities delivered to the assessment team a presentation on progress against the 10 benchmarks, which demonstrated the Government’s positive engagement with the benchmarking process.

Furthermore, in a position paper on the partially lifted arms embargo dated August 2023, Federal Government authorities acknowledged the role of the arms embargo in encouraging responsible weapons and ammunition management. However, they emphasized that the measure hindered the ability of Somalia to efficiently and effectively resource and equip its security forces, in particular, the Somali National Armed Forces engaged in active offensive operations to eliminate the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. Authorities of the Federal Government noted that it had made considerable progress, but acknowledged that the federal member states still required additional efforts to enhance their weapons and ammunition management capabilities, and proposed the creation of a “post-embargo coordination mechanism”, under the authority of the Office of National Security. Such a mechanism would monitor and oversee activities related to the delivery and circulation of arms in the federal member states and would support them in achieving the benchmarks and indicators.

Update on progress in relation to the benchmark indicators

Benchmark 1

Benchmark 1 concerns the strengthening of the legal and regulatory framework governing conventional weapons, ammunition and related material, with indicators focused on appropriate legislation, regulations or administrative procedures, elaboration of the procurement process requirements, and development of a national transfer control system for imports.

The presidential decree of 25 September 2018 continued to serve as the primary national policy on the control of arms and ammunition in the country. The national weapons and ammunition strategy that provides the policy road map for weapons and ammunition management in Somalia for the 2021–2025 period remains in place and will be updated in 2024. The 11 standard operating procedures issued between 2016 and 2023, which cover the management of weapons and ammunition throughout their life cycle, also remain in place. According to Federal Government authorities, the standard operating procedures have been implemented at the Federal Government level but are yet to be implemented at the federal member state level. One of these standard operating procedures is the harmonized, and updated, Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS standard operating procedure on recovered weapons, ammunition and associated materiel, signed in July 2023 and referenced as an indicator under benchmark 7.

Federal Government authorities also informed the assessment team that a firearms bill, aimed at controlling the possession, manufacture, storage and use of firearms, had been approved by the Council of Ministers on 13 July 2023 and was pending approval in the Federal Parliament. The two draft acts to regulate civilian ownership of small arms, and weapons of private security companies, referred to in my previous assessment, have yet to be adopted. Federal Government authorities indicated that the Ministry of Internal Security had applied standard operating procedures to regulate privately owned weapons.

With respect to relevant regional and international arms control instruments, Federal Government authorities highlighted that Somalia was currently a signatory, though not a State party, to the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. They further informed the assessment team that a technical team from Somalia would be participating in the ninth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty in August 2023 to hold discussions with its secretariat on the process of signature and ratification. Somalia is also not a party to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. As a State Member of the United Nations, Somalia has committed to the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, under which it submitted national reports in 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2020.

Federal Government authorities further informed the assessment team that a procurement policy for imports of weapons and ammunition and related materiel, which included an elaboration on authorized signatories for end-user certificates, was scheduled to be approved by the Council of Ministers in August 2023. The authorities also indicated that efforts were under way to strengthen the existing procedures on transfer controls through their digitalization in the weapons and ammunition database currently under development. No further information was available to the assessment

team on the development of a national transfer control system for imports, including the adoption of a control list.

Benchmark 2

Benchmark 2 relates to the continued implementation and updating of the national weapons and ammunition management strategy, indicated by the finalization and operationalization of the results-based action plan outlined in the strategy itself, which would include baselines and targets at both the Federal Government and federal member state level.

Federal Government authorities shared with the assessment team a one-year results-based action plan, covering the period from March 2023 to March 2024. A review of the action plan indicated that the activities, presented under the headings of policy and coordination, transfer controls, marking and recordkeeping, stockpile management, captured weapons, and disposal, with identification of the actors involved that would conduct such activities, were either in process or planned for completion by a future date. Federal Government authorities also informed the assessment team that in May 2023 the Federal Government had concluded an update to the country's weapons and ammunition management baseline assessment, with the assistance of UNIDIR, which could serve to inform a review of the current strategic approach for strengthening weapons and ammunition management in Somalia.

Benchmark 3

Benchmark 3 concerns the existence of a clearly defined, and functioning, national coordination mechanism for weapons and ammunition management. Associated indicators pertain to adequate resourcing and capacitating of the lead national authority in this area, including its focal point, as well as of the coordinating entities at the federal member state level, and to the frequency and regularity of weapons and ammunition management coordination and consultative meetings held.

The Office of National Security, under the leadership of the National Security Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, continued to serve as the lead national authority. Federal Government authorities indicated that an information management officer had been added to the existing team, while the composition of the regional security offices, each of which included a weapons and ammunition management focal point, remained the same. The establishment of a formal national coordination mechanism on small arms and light weapons had yet to be realized.

In March 2023, the Office of National Security convened an annual coordination conference on weapons and ammunition management, which had also been organized in March 2022. A follow-up meeting to the 2022 conference was held in September 2022 and a follow-up meeting to the 2023 conference is expected to take place in September 2023. As before, the annual conference included stakeholders at the federal member state level. A weapons and ammunition management workshop was further organized with the regional security office in Galmudug State in March 2023. Federal Government authorities also indicated to the assessment team that, in the past year, they had convened five meetings of the weapons and ammunition management working group, comprising the Office of National Security and international partners that were implementing and supporting weapons and ammunition management in Somalia.

Benchmark 4

Benchmark 4 covers functioning and effective weapons and ammunition accounting and management systems, as demonstrated by the marking of newly imported, existing and captured weapons, the recording of weapons in a central

database and the digitalization of the weapons of the Somali National Armed Forces, and the establishment of ammunition accounting and life-cycle management procedures in line with international guidelines.

The Halane Central Armoury in Mogadishu continued to serve as the main reception point for imported weapons and the main processing point for the marking, recording, initial storage and distribution of imported weapons. The assessment team visited the Halane Central Armoury and reviewed both the paper logbooks and the digital logs created through the mobile phone data collection software application referenced in the previous assessment. From November 2020 to September 2023, around 15,614 weapons were digitally registered, including approximately 7,000 weapons of the Somali National Army, 6,969 weapons of the Somali Police Force and at least 1,645 weapons of the National Intelligence and Security Agency. These figures also include weapons registered in some federal member states. The weapons and ammunition database, still under development and piloted with the Somali Police Force, is now being expanded to include the weapons of the Somali National Army. Federal Government authorities indicated that dedicated marking capacity was still needed at the federal member state level. Ammunition accounting and life-cycle management in line with international guidelines had yet to be achieved. The receipt of ammunition and its initial distribution to sector locations was logged at the Halane Central Armoury, with plans to issue a standard operating procedure solely on ammunition management with the assistance of the Mine Action Service.

Benchmark 5

Benchmark 5 relates to available, functioning and effective physical security and stockpile management of weapons and ammunition. Associated indicators relate to an audit of existing weapons armouries, a needs assessment of weapons armouries, ammunition storage areas, and associated weapons and ammunition training requirements, and the availability of sufficient armouries and ammunition storage areas to support security forces, all managed according to relevant international guidelines.

Federal Government authorities indicated that, in collaboration with international partners, they had conducted an audit of armouries across the country, excluding 77 armouries located in “Somaliland”. Of the 140 audited armouries, 70 were determined to be operational. New armouries were being constructed at the headquarters of the Somali Police Force in Mogadishu and in Baledogle, with additional armouries planned pending donor support. Many of the existing armouries required rehabilitation or enhancement.

The assessment team inspected five armouries during its visit. At least two of the five, including the Halane Central Armoury, were also used to store ammunition, including high-explosive ammunition. There are still no known facilities in use within Somalia to store and manage high-explosive ammunition, which presents a risk to populations surrounding ad hoc ammunition storage locations. While the construction of the Jazeera ammunition storage area, referenced in the previous assessment, is now complete, the storage area is currently not in use owing to the decision conveyed by the authorities to the United Nations in April 2023 in which security, protection, logistics and cost concerns were cited. The continued presence of high-explosive ammunition at the Halane Central Armoury remains a major risk to the civilian population and to critical infrastructure within the international airport area, as it poses a potential mass explosion hazard.

Physical security of weapons and ammunition is also a necessary component for reinforcement of the forward operating bases gradually being handed over by ATMIS to the Somali National Army as part of the drawdown of ATMIS, to support the defence of those sites and mitigate the risk of looting of items stored in them.

Benchmark 6

Benchmark 6 concerns the coordination, resourcing, functioning and operationalization of the Joint Verification Team, as indicated by the increased proportion of imported and notified weapons and ammunition documented and cross-referenced, and by the further broadening and deepening of joint verification coverage, including in federal member states.

The Joint Verification Team continues to comprise the Federal Government and experts from Conflict Armament Research, tasked with conducting routine inspections of the stockpiles, inventory records and supply chain of weapons of the Somali security forces for the purpose of mitigating the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside the security services of the Federal Government. As at 1 September 2023, the Joint Verification Team had documented 19,563 weapons either directly or remotely using the software application. Furthermore, it had matched, or verified, 3,057 weapons notified as delivered to the Committee. The Joint Verification Team does not yet document and verify ammunition data. In its March 2023 report, the Team noted that it was not aware of any notifications regarding ammunition that used unique batch or lot numbers that could allow for such ammunition to be subsequently identified and verified.

Benchmark 7

Benchmark 7 concerns the existence of a coordinated and context-specific system to ensure the traceability of recovered weapons. The associated indicators relate to the designation of a national focal point or focal point entity on the tracing of weapons, ammunition and related materiel recovered from the illicit sphere, in line with international instruments and standards. The associated indicators also relate to the activation of the harmonized Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS standard operating procedure on recovered weapons, including through the establishment of focal points, and the proportion of recovered weapons traced by a competent national authority or a mandated entity.

The Office of National Security serves as the national focal point on the tracing of items, but does not yet have any in-house analytical capability on tracing. An international partner conducts analytical and tracing work on behalf of the Government, and aims to deliver regular training sessions to the Office of National Security to build up its analytical capability in due course. The harmonized standard operating procedure was updated and signed by the Federal Government of Somalia and the ATMIS Head of Mission in July 2023. Focal points were also designated. Federal Government authorities have yet to receive captured weapons under the agreed procedure. The authorities provided a demonstration to the assessment team on a database for seized and recovered weapons, which is being managed by security sector personnel that have received training on that task. The database was developed with the assistance of an international partner with specialized expertise as part of a project supported by the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, managed by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, on support to the national weapons and ammunition management strategy of the Federal Government of Somalia concerning captured weapons. The expected outputs of the two-year project from 2023 to 2024 include training sessions, data collection tools (including in field operations) and action-oriented research on diversion prevention.

In April and August 2023, Federal Government authorities invited the Panel of Experts to inspect a limited number of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab and held in Mogadishu and Kismaayo.

Benchmark 8

Benchmark 8 involves the adoption of a consolidated and costed training plan, incorporating training of trainers programmes, to enable the implementation of the national weapons and ammunition management strategy, including a framework for training to implement the gender section of the strategy. The associated indicator relates to the delivery, according to the training plan, of weapons and management training to security forces, including at the federal member state level.

While a comprehensive training plan has yet to be adopted, international partners have provided individual training sessions to Somali security forces since 2017, mostly at the Federal Government level, in the areas of weapons marking and recordkeeping, physical security and stockpile management, and documentation of captured weapons and improvised explosive device components. The figures provided by the Federal Government on weapons and ammunition management training across the security forces are as follows: 30 personnel from the Somali National Army; 456 personnel from the Somali Police Force; and 7 personnel from the National Intelligence and Security Agency. Of these, 68 are women. According to Federal Government authorities, identification of a diverse pool of trainers from the various security entities is under way. The adoption and effective implementation of the comprehensive training plan will serve as a central coordination tool for the Federal Government and international partners, and will assist in promoting a unified approach to capacity-building.

Benchmark 9

Benchmark 9 concerns continued engagement with my Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, including with a view to adopting action plans to combat sexual violence in conflict, with indicators focused on the establishment and operationalization of a national sexual offenders register against which potential army and police recruits are screened and of mechanisms to hold perpetrators of sexual violence accountable, as demonstrated by the number of fully processed cases.

Federal Government authorities informed the assessment team that the establishment of a sexual offenders register was subject to the adoption of the Somali Sexual Offences Bill, which was still being drafted. The revision of the draft bill by a group of scholars – the *ulamas* – since December 2022 is ongoing. In the meantime, general screening procedures were in place for the Somali National Army and the Somali Police Force. Federal Government authorities further indicated that the Office of the Attorney-General maintained a specialized desk for handling sexual and gender-based violence cases within the army and police, which, however, did not serve as a national register.

In September 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia adopted a national action plan for the implementation of the Somali Women’s Charter and Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security, which incorporated priorities set out in the 2013 joint communiqué between Somalia and the United Nations on ending sexual violence in conflict. A stated goal of the national action plan is to ensure justice and appropriate legal protection for women and girls. Federal Government authorities informed the assessment team that the Somali Police Force had established a women and child protection unit to, *inter alia*, address sexual assault and rape cases across the country. While created as part of the implementation of the national action plan, this unit currently faces operational challenges, including with respect to funding. Federal Government authorities indicated that, in the past three months, three cases of sexual offences perpetrated by the security entities were being investigated and prosecuted.

Benchmark 10

Benchmark 10 concerns continued engagement with my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, including with a view to implementing the Somalia 2019 road map on children and armed conflict. Associated indicators relate to the establishment and operationalization of clear age-assessment and screening procedures for the Somali army and police, as well as mechanisms to hold perpetrators of grave violations against children accountable, as demonstrated by the number of fully processed cases. An associated indicator also relates to the continued application of the standard operating procedures for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups to child protection actors, with access allowed at every stage of the release and reintegration process.

The Federal Government of Somalia continued its efforts to implement its 2019 road map. In this regard, the adoption of legislation relevant to child protection, as well as its harmonization with international standards, remains important. Following the approval of the child rights bill by the Federal Government on 10 August 2023, the next stage is to present the bill to the Federal Parliament. Moreover, the juvenile justice bill was updated and approved by the Council of Ministers on 17 August 2023. When enacted, the two bills will be an important milestone for the promotion and protection of the rights of children. Federal Government authorities informed the assessment team that age-assessment and screening procedures for the army and police were in place, and that the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs had developed age-assessment guidelines. The Federal Government had endorsed those guidelines, drafted in 2019 and reviewed in June 2023 with the support of the United Nations, on 31 July 2023. When implemented, the reviewed guidelines would allow for the conduct of age assessment exercises with more consistency and with adherence to child protection standards. Federal Government authorities also reported that accountability mechanisms were in place within the army and police to hold perpetrators of grave violations against children accountable. No additional data on investigations and/or prosecutions were available to the assessment team. The Women and Child Protection Unit, established under the Somali Police Force, was an important development, but faced operational challenges as noted under benchmark 9.

Federal Government authorities conveyed to the assessment team that the standard operating procedures for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups were being applied consistently. However, a large number of children continued to be detained across the country for their alleged association with armed groups, and the length of the detention periods often exceeded the maximum of 72 hours stipulated in the standard operating procedures (see also [A/77/895-S/2023/363](#)). The assessment team noted the establishment in 2022 of a child protection screening unit in the Ministry of Internal Security to support the handover of children.

Observations

I thank the Federal Government of Somalia for its strong cooperation and active participation in the present assessment, and the state representatives in Baidoa for their inputs. I welcome the strengthened cooperation between the Federal Government and the Panel of Experts. I also wish to express my gratitude to the United Nations family in Somalia, ATMIS, Member States and regional and international organizations for their support of and engagement with the assessment team.

I encourage the Federal Government, together with the federal member states, to accelerate their efforts in making progress towards achieving the associated indicators of the 10 benchmarks. With the commencement of the ATMIS drawdown,

and further phased withdrawals toward the full exit of ATMIS from Somalia by December 2024, the security transition in Somalia is progressing. Continued improvements in weapons and ammunition management capability play an important part in this transition. With notable achievements in weapons marking and registration, and important steps taken at various stages in the weapons and ammunition management life cycle, challenges remain, including in extending weapons and ammunition management to the federal member state level. Beyond weapons and ammunition management within the country, it also remains critical to counter the illicit flow of arms and ammunition into Somalia. The Panel of Experts plays an important monitoring role in this regard.

Continued support from the international community to the Federal Government and the federal member states is essential for achieving further progress towards meeting the 10 benchmarks. This support includes providing resources and technical capacity-building, with predictable funding, in a coordinated and coherent manner.

In its resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council renamed the Committee and conveyed a clear signal that the sanctions measures, including the partially lifted arms embargo, were aimed at supporting Somalia while degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. The Council and its Committee should strengthen their public messaging, and its dissemination in the local language, in relation to the control of arms, ammunition and related materiel as applicable to the security and police institutions of Somalia. I encourage the Federal Government, together with the federal member states, to continue to meet their existing obligations under the partially lifted arms embargo, and to continue their efforts aimed at strengthening weapons and ammunition management in Somalia.

(Signed) António **Guterres**
