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**MEETING**

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*Lake Success, New York*

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*Chairman:* Mr. Víctor A. BELAÚNDE (Peru).

**Former Italian colonies (A/1374, A/AC.38/L.10, A/AC.38/L.15): report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya (A/1340, A/1405); reports of the administering Powers in Libya (A/1387, A/1390, A/1390/Add.1) (continued)**

[Item 21 (a) and (b)]\*

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the general discussion would continue and that the joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.15) sponsored by thirteen delegations following the consultations of the informal working group, would be considered at the next meeting of the Committee. He also reminded the Committee that only that draft resolution and the one presented by the Soviet Union (A/AC.38/L.10) remained before the Committee.
2. He invited the representative of Greece, who had presided at the consultations among the authors of the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee (A/AC.38/L.10, A/AC.38/L.12 and A/AC.38/L.13/Rev.1) to report on those negotiations.
3. Mr. KYROU (Greece) recalled that as a result of the decision taken by the Committee at its 13th meeting, the authors of the draft resolutions which had been submitted to the Committee had met unofficially in the morning of 14 October, throughout 16 October and in the morning of 17 October, in order to study the possibility of producing a combined text. The last meeting had been presided over by the Chairman of the Committee, whose presence had made the conclusion of the discussions much easier. The USSR delegation had joined those delegations in their work at only one meeting, that held on 14 October.
4. While the delegations of Canada, Chile, Ecuador and Greece were not altogether satisfied with the text elaborated in those consultations, they nevertheless regarded the new joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/

L.15) as being in keeping with the principle that it was preferable to submit draft resolutions acceptable to the vast majority if not all of the members, rather than to maintain an unbending position which precluded any compromise.

5. The adoption of the draft resolution would enable the Commissioner and the Chairman of the Council for Libya to leave with precise instructions.

6. He thanked all those who had taken part in the consultations for their co-operation. Their work could not, of course, have reached such a satisfactory conclusion without the counsel and advice of the United Nations Commissioner, the Chairman of the Council for Libya and the representative of Pakistan on that Council. He also thanked the Secretariat.

7. He then pointed out that the new joint draft (A/AC.38/L.15) was subject to certain reservations. First, some Arab States had expressed the desire for an express reference to the withdrawal of foreign troops; secondly, several of the delegations sponsoring the joint draft resolution circulated as document A/AC.38/L.13/Rev.1 had wished to emphasize that the provisional government to be set up under subparagraph 3 (b) of the new joint draft resolution was to be responsible to the National Assembly; thirdly, the delegation of Pakistan, with the support of other delegations, had expressed the view that the draft resolution should set forth the measures to be taken if the National Assembly did not succeed in setting up a provisional government within the prescribed time. Lastly, in the opinion of the United Nations Commissioner, the responsibilities of the United Nations concerning technical and economic assistance to Libya should be more precisely defined.

8. The CHAIRMAN congratulated Mr. Kyrou, who was largely responsible for the results obtained.

9. Mr. CAÑAS FLORES (Chile) said the delegations which had met unofficially in order to find com-

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

mon ground had worked very conscientiously; nothing had been left to chance. For the sake of securing acceptance by a large majority in the Committee, it had been necessary to eschew any appraisal in the draft of the work so far accomplished in Libya by the United Nations. There was, however, a regrettable tendency to overlook the measures so far taken in Libya, and secondly, to view the question from a purely political angle. That was an entirely misconceived approach. It was clear from the statements of the Commissioner, the Chairman of the United Nations Council and the representative of Pakistan on that Council that far-reaching measures had been taken which ought to be recognized by the General Assembly. The assertions of the USSR and certain other delegations regarding the political aspects of the question were really quite baseless; moreover, it was a pity that the USSR delegation had not attended all the meetings of the sponsors of the three draft resolutions.

10. The delegations of Syria and Pakistan, and others which had taken part in those meetings, had shown a great deal of good will. That had made it possible to reach a compromise which would surely meet with the approval of most of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and of the General Assembly.

11. In spite of the misgivings of some delegations regarding the question of economic and social assistance to Libya, it had also been possible, as a result of a compromise, to include provisions regarding that matter in the new draft resolution.

12. His delegation wholeheartedly supported the new draft and hoped it would be acceptable to all the delegations.

13. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) associated himself with the Chairman in commending the authors of the two joint draft resolutions (A/AC.38/L.12 and A/AC.38/L.13/Rev.1) for their efforts to produce a combined text; he reserved his delegation's right to state its views on the new joint draft resolution after the United Nations Commissioner and the Chairman of the United Nations Council for Libya had made their comments. Accordingly he would confine himself to dealing with certain general aspects of the question, with the USSR draft resolution, which was still before the Committee, and with the statement of the USSR representative (9th meeting).

14. Some speakers had already shown that the USSR draft resolution did not contain a single constructive proposal; the only object of its first paragraph was to impose a tightly centralized government on Libya. Any such decision would, however, be in conflict with the spirit as well as the letter of General Assembly resolution 289 (IV). In adopting that resolution the General Assembly had deliberately refrained from deciding upon the form which the government of the new State should take, regarding that as something to be settled by the Libyans themselves. The United Nations Commissioner had scrupulously respected the General Assembly's decision. The second paragraph of the USSR draft resolution was a warmed-over version of an old and discredited story, and an attempt to confuse the Committee by introducing extraneous matters into the debate. That proposal therefore should be rejected again, as it had been at the fourth session of the Gen-

eral Assembly.<sup>1</sup> His delegation was quite satisfied that the administering Powers in Libya had no aggressive aims.

15. In reply to the USSR representative's allegations that the United States sought to utilize Libya for aggressive purposes, he would merely say that actions speak louder than words. The United States was content to stand on its record of dealing with other peoples. It was strange to hear the Soviet Union representative speak of attempted domination or "enslavement" of the people of Libya by others, when everyone knew that the Soviet Union had swallowed up the liberties of a number of countries.

16. He entirely agreed with the representatives of Bolivia, Brazil (11th meeting) and Chile, that the statements by the representative of the USSR did not contain any constructive ideas and showed no spirit of co-operation. There was nothing to show that the USSR was prepared to co-operate with other countries in giving Libya all the assistance, and particularly the economic and social assistance, which it needed. As a matter of fact, the USSR had refused to take part in the work of the specialized agencies to which Libya would have to appeal. If the USSR had really been interested in the welfare of Libya, it would not have adopted such an attitude.

17. If the new State were to be built on firm foundations, all the Members of the United Nations would have to give it not only their political, but also their financial, economic and social support. It was certainly necessary to accelerate the training of the necessary technical personnel; but, even after that personnel had been trained, Libya would still have to receive a considerable amount of assistance from outside.

18. Because of its own history, the United States was able to understand the problems facing the people of Libya. Moreover, since the struggle it had had to wage for its own independence, the United States had always taken an interest in the efforts of other peoples to obtain their freedom and independence. The only desire of the United States was for a stable government in Libya which respected the rights and fundamental freedoms of the people and was free of all external influence. The presence of such a State in that part of the world would be a stabilizing factor.

19. In answer to a question by Mr. RIVAS (Mexico) concerning the provisional Spanish translation of the draft resolution, Mr. KYROU (Greece) said that 1 April 1951 had been set by the authors of the draft as the target date for the constitution of a provisional government after consultation with the United Nations Commissioner.

20. Mr. GOLDSTUCKER (Czechoslovakia) said the question of Libya was of two-fold importance. On the one hand, it concerned the granting of independence to an oppressed and exploited people, in itself a most important object; and on the other hand, it was the first time the United Nations had been entrusted with so important a task. The manner in which the Organization performed that task would determine the extent to which it enjoyed the confidence of the peoples throughout the world who were struggling for libera-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, First Committee*, 318th meeting.

tion and for the full enjoyment of the rights recognized by the Charter. It was in the light of those basic considerations that his delegation had considered the reports on that matter.

21. The national development of the Libyan people, which undeniably formed one single nation, had been retarded by foreign domination. When the Fascist and Nazi forces had been expelled from Libya, the occupying Powers, that is to say, the United Kingdom, France and later the United States, had had to deal with an economically weak people, backward from the point of view of education and politically very little developed. Those were always the results of foreign domination. All the available evidence went to show that the Powers which had occupied Libya after the fall of the Fascist regime had not given all the necessary assistance to the people of Libya. They had acted as if they were to stay in Libya, or in certain parts of it, indefinitely. With the assistance of the United States, they had set about dividing Libya into three parts, as though the country were a spoil of war.

22. At the second part of its third session, the General Assembly had considered the "Bevin-Sforza" plan, which was supported by the United States and France. It provided that Libya should become independent after ten years and that in the meantime it should be divided into three parts, Cyrenaica, the Fezzan and Tripolitania, to be administered by the United Kingdom, France and Italy, respectively. The "Bevin-Sforza" plan had been decisively rejected by the General Assembly<sup>2</sup> and the people of Libya itself. The Powers administering the country had pretended to defer to that decision, but were striving by surreptitious means to secure the implementation of those parts of the "Bevin-Sforza" plan which directly concerned them. The unity and independence of Libya could only suffer from such machinations. The statements of many delegations were in complete accordance with that analysis of the facts.

23. It was to be regretted that the representative of the United Kingdom had adopted the acrimonious tone resorted to by those who pleaded weak cases. He had levelled slanderous charges against Czechoslovakia and the USSR. Mr. Goldstucker would not follow him along that path, for he had no desire to digress from the subject under discussion. Moreover, a fitting reply had already been made to the statements of the representative of the United Kingdom by the representative of the USSR (13th meeting).

24. He would confine himself to refuting the United Kingdom representative's claim that colonial imperialism was dead. During the last few generations, the colonial imperialists had always repeated that assertion. Ever since colonialism had become so disreputable, the colonialists had been busy disproving its existence; but they were the only ones to make such an attempt. The statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom (11th meeting) was therefore proof that he also was a defender of colonialist imperialism. The really important opinion was that of the victims of colonialism, rather than that of its beneficiaries, and it was, therefore, the peoples of Malaya,

Vietnam or Libya who should be heard. The statements of the representative of the United Kingdom with regard to the sacrifices allegedly made by his country in connexion with the administration of Libya would not move the Committee to tears. The maintenance of armed forces on the territory of foreign countries was obviously a heavy burden on the taxpayers in the United Kingdom; but there were people who were drawing considerable profits from that business.

25. The British and other colonialists had been professing altruism for a hundred years; but the sincerity of such statements was no longer seriously believed. Although they had not fundamentally changed, the arguments used by the colonialists had been adapted to circumstances. Thus, one of the favourite excuses had been the alleged desire to extend culture and civilization to remote and backward parts of the world. Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia had been launched on such pretexts. Since that argument had ceased to be usable, the colonialists were claiming that they were animated by the desire to protect certain countries against the dangers of aggression. Having thus invented a bogey, they hastened to send to those countries, at the expense of their own taxpayers, military contingents which established land, naval and air bases there, and thus deprived the countries concerned of their independence and of the possibility of gaining it. Meanwhile, journalists and members of parliament in those self-appointed protector countries were speculating as to what part of the world they could attack from the bases established in those ostensibly protected countries. That was the meaning of the United Kingdom representative's statement that his country was in the front rank of the struggle against aggression. That point of view was also confirmed by the statement of the representative of the United States.

26. The other important matter was the responsibility of the United Nations toward Libya. For the first time, the Organization had the privilege of being called upon to transform a colonial territory into a free and independent nation. In doing so, it would establish a precedent by which its sincerity would be judged and upon which, so far as the progress of the non-self-governing peoples toward sovereignty and independence was concerned, its moral authority would depend.

27. The Czechoslovak delegation had expressed serious doubts as to the composition of the Council for Libya.<sup>3</sup> It was of the opinion that the Council as it had been constituted would not command enough authority to advise the Commissioner in such a way as to enable him to ensure that the Powers administering the country would respect the provisions of resolution 289 (IV). Those apprehensions had proved correct. If the steps toward the division of Libya were not stopped, it was very improbable that the resolution would ever be effectively implemented. It was important, therefore, to take the necessary steps to unify Libya as contemplated in the USSR draft resolution.

28. It was also necessary to withdraw all foreign troops from Libya as rapidly as possible, for those troops were an obstacle to the unification of the country and to its independence. Military bases had been

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Third Session, Part II, Plenary Meetings, 218th meeting.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Fourth Session, First Committee, 313th meeting, and *ibid.*, Plenary Meetings, 248th meeting.

established in Libya as a result of the unilateral decision of the occupying Powers, and the United Kingdom had even gone so far as to authorize the United States to establish its own bases in the country. Clearly, those Powers did not want that question to be closely scrutinized by the General Assembly, but it was nevertheless true that the presence of such bases on Libyan territory prevented the achievement of real independence. That was why it was that those military bases should be dismantled forthwith.

29. For all those reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation would support the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.10).

30. He agreed with the representative of Bolivia that the United Nations was indeed acting in the name of the United Nations Charter in Libya, but the principles of the Charter should not be used to justify the artificial division of Libya, the presence of foreign military forces and the existence of military bases set up for aggressive purposes. In fact, the Charter should not be invoked in order to trample upon its principles.

31. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) said he wished to reply to the comments which related to France's action in Libya, and more particularly in the Fezzan. He would also reply in detail to the allegations made by the delegation of the USSR. With regard to the proposals made by other delegations, he hoped that he would have an opportunity of explaining his vote in due course.

32. With reference to a criticism by the USSR representative (9th meeting) of debates that had taken place in the *Conseil de la République* some months before, he recalled that the debates of parliamentary assemblies in France were dominated by the principle of freedom of thought and of freedom of expression. The question of Libya and the Fezzan was an important one for France, both because of France's responsibilities in those regions and because of their proximity to territories administered by France. It was not surprising, therefore, that the *Conseil de la République* had concerned itself with the problem and that members had received unfavourably the solution recommended by the General Assembly. In that connexion, he recalled that his delegation had given its views unequivocally at the fourth session and that he had himself explained in a plenary meeting the reason why the French delegation had been unable to vote for the draft resolution.<sup>4</sup> It was quite proper for the French Parliament to share the views of the French Government, and it could not be criticized for expressing its opinions freely.

33. He also recalled his statement at the fourth session when he had said that, in accordance with the obligations undertaken under the Peace Treaty with Italy, France would accept the General Assembly's recommendation and would do everything in its power to give it effect. France would maintain its loyal attitude to the United Nations, and that should reassure the representative of Iraq.

34. Several delegations had spoken of a policy of the partition of Libya. The USSR delegation, in particular, had accused France of setting up a puppet government

in the Fezzan. The only French experience of a puppet government went back to the dark days of Nazi occupation. The question of the Fezzan was quite different, since that region was at peace and under the supervision of the United Nations. Conditions there were known to all and had been described in detailed reports to the General Assembly. Those circumstances were highly unfavourable for the establishment of a puppet government. In actual fact, the governmental authorities of the Fezzan had been set up with the assistance and agreement of the population.

35. The representatives of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had never questioned the legitimacy of those governmental authorities. It had been alleged that the establishment of separate governments for the three territories of Libya represented a manoeuvre to sabotage the unification of that country. It was strange to hear such an assertion from the representative of a federal State, comprising different countries each with its own government, some of which were even represented in the United Nations. Figures had been quoted in support of those arguments, but, statistically speaking, a similar position existed in a certain number of federal States, such as the USSR, the United States and Germany, where constituent parts of very different sizes were represented in the assemblies.

36. A certain delegation had also felt obliged to recall that Libya had been united under the Ottoman and Italian regimes. Yet it was a fact that as soon as the populations concerned had been given an opportunity to express their wishes, they had voted almost unanimously for the re-establishment of the regional entities dictated by historical, geographical and economic circumstances, and even by common sense. Moreover, the Government of the USSR itself had proposed Soviet Union trusteeship over Tripolitania, a solution that would hardly have led to the unification of Libya. The only objective criticism that could be made was the absence of a government in Tripolitania. That position was incomprehensible since that region was the most highly developed part of Libya. He wished to point out to the United Nations Commissioner that party rivalry in Tripolitania was creating a situation which was against the interests of the population. It was essential to establish in Tripolitania representative institutions based on popular election, and not on the choice of certain political parties.

37. He wished to point out that France shared some of the responsibility for the proposal of the Committee of Twenty-One and the proposals concerning the Libyan National Assembly. In establishing that Committee, the Commissioner had implemented literally a recommendation proposed by the representative of Pakistan and adopted by the Council for Libya by six votes in favour, with France, the United States and the United Kingdom abstaining; the representative of the Fezzan had been absent. Pakistan now seemed to have reversed its decision. When the Committee of Twenty-One had agreed on the principles which were to serve as a basis for the establishment of the National Assembly, all the decisions had been taken unanimously. The representatives of the Fezzan had yielded to the wishes of the two other delegations with regard to the appointment of delegates to the National Assembly. The French Government had not interfered in any way.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Plenary Meetings, 249th meeting.

38. He proceeded to give particulars in regard to the situation of the parts of the Fezzan which were administratively linked to Algeria and Tunisia. The Ghadames region participated fully in the political life of the Fezzan and of Libya. It had sent three delegations to the Assembly which had elected the Chief of the Territory of the Fezzan and its *caïd* was a member of the Committee of Twenty-One. The position was different in the territory of Ghat-Serdeles, which was inhabited not by Arabs or Berbers, but by Tuaregs of the Saharan region, who had refused to take part in the election of the Chief of the Territory; the United Nations Commissioner had been informed in good time and that state of affairs was to be considered in due course.
39. He then referred to the question of military forces and bases. In the Fezzan, the French forces responsible for the security of the territory did not exceed 500 men, and that in the case of a territory half as large again as France. If strategical questions arose from time to time, the reason for that was to be sought in the general insecurity of the world, for which the Western democracies could not be held responsible.
40. Referring to the draft resolutions before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, he said he would vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.10) for the reasons stated. His delegation reserved the right to explain its vote on the new joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.15); he wished to point out at once, however, that in the operative part of the draft resolution, a distinction should be drawn between provisions which restated the General Assembly resolution and the new provisions which tended to modify it.
41. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked the Chairman to give him the right of reply provided for in rule 114 of the rules of procedure.
42. The CHAIRMAN assured the USSR representative that he would have an opportunity to exercise his right.
43. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) pointed out that the word "united" in the first paragraph of the preamble of the English text of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.15) had not been translated in the French text.
44. Mr. KYROU (Greece) said he had also noted the omission, but pointed out that the French text was headed "provisional translation"; the final text had not yet been issued. He also suggested that the first operative paragraph should be corrected by replacing the words "*le représentant du Conseil*" by the words "*les membres du Conseil*". He also thought that the French text of the third paragraph of the preamble should be amended; the phrase "*serait atteint dans les délais impartis si les Puissances administrantes collaboraient plus étroitement*" etc. implied a sort of criticism of the administering Powers. He thought it would be preferable to say "*atteint dans les délais impartis moyennant collaboration des Puissances administrantes*," etc.; in that case, also, it would be advisable to wait for the final text.
45. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom), speaking on a point of order, said the first paragraph referred back to General Assembly resolution 289 (IV) in which there was no mention of a "united" State. Hence there was no reason for introducing the term into the joint draft resolution.
46. Mr. KYROU (Greece) noted that certain sponsors of the draft had insisted on inserting the word "united" into the English text.
47. SELIM Bey (Chairman of the United Nations Council for Libya) pointed out that in sub-paragraph 10 (b) of resolution 289 (IV) Libyan unity and independence were expressly mentioned. The introduction of the idea of unity into the first paragraph of the joint draft resolution accordingly added no new element.
48. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) thought it would be best to refer simply to independence and sovereignty.
49. Mr. DEJEAN (Haiti) said for the moment the draft resolution was not being discussed; the Committee was still at the stage of a general discussion.
50. The CHAIRMAN agreed with the representative of Haiti and said that discussions of the wording of the draft resolution should be postponed.
51. Mr. BARISIC (Yugoslavia) recalled that at the fourth session his delegation had supported resolution 289 (IV) with the majority. The joint draft resolution submitted as document A/AC.38/L.15 came closest to the intention expressed by the General Assembly in 1949. It was, moreover, constructive and precisely drafted. His delegation would accordingly vote in favour of the draft. It would, on the other hand, vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.10), which was merely a repetition of the Soviet Union resolution of 1949 and appeared to be intended solely for propaganda purposes without attempting to solve the Libyan problem.
52. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to reply to certain remarks made by the representative of the United States. Slander could not constitute a convincing argument. Furthermore, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was not the proper place for making speeches of the kind made by the representative of the United States. The Committee was dealing with a definite problem, namely, the Libyan question; it was not engaged in a comparative study of the respective merits of the governmental systems of the USSR and the United States. A discussion of that topic was not likely to be at all helpful in the quest for a solution to the question actually being dealt with by the Committee. His delegation would not resort to the methods of the representative of the United States, who had not wished to deal with the question of a united Libya or with that of withdrawing troops and dismantling military bases.
53. The object of the United States representative's remarks had been to distract the Committee's attention from the unfavourable criticisms of many delegations concerning the policy followed in Libya by the administering Powers. It had become quite apparent that those Powers had been attempting to encourage separatist tendencies and to set up puppet governments which would obey their orders in each of the territories administered by them, in order to perpetuate the con-



trol they exercised in Libya. Many delegations had believed that that was the first question to be dealt with, and that the existing state of affairs should be remedied.

54. It was false to say that the USSR wished to see a centralized government imposed on Libya. The only desire of the USSR delegation in the particular instance was to ensure effective implementation of General Assembly resolution 289 (IV) which expressly provided for the establishment of Libya as an independent and sovereign State. The United Kingdom representative's objections to the word "united" in the new joint draft resolution were a clear reflection of the separatist tendencies of the administering Powers. The United States representative had said nothing about those tendencies or about the criticisms to which they had given rise. That was not surprising because the United States, in collaboration with the administering Powers, was attempting to maintain its influence in Libya.

55. The United States representative had denied that his government wanted to use the military bases in Libya for purposes of aggression, but the importance of those bases to the United States and the place which they occupied in that country's policy were evident from newspaper clippings quoted by Mr. Arutiunian. The quotations had been taken from Netherlands and Egyptian newspapers, and the Netherlands and Egypt could hardly be suspected of being communist.

56. Despite the slander that had been directed at the USSR delegation, its opposition would not have been in vain. The criticisms expressed by it and by many other delegations had contributed a constructive element to the debate, a fact reflected in the new joint draft resolution presented to the Committee. Between that text and that originally submitted by Canada, Chile, Ecuador and Greece (A/AC.38/L.12) there were considerable differences. The original proposal had recommended the administering Powers to continue in Libya the policy hitherto applied by them, but that recommendation had been dropped from the new draft. Moreover, the idea of a united Libya emphasized in the draft resolution presented by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen (A/AC.38/L.13) was more forcefully expressed in the new text. That provision in the new draft constituted a realization of the force of the contention of the USSR and other delegations that the separatist policy of the administering Powers was one of the principal obstacles to the unification of Libya.

57. No doubt fresh attempts would be made to weaken the resolution to be finally adopted by the Committee and to exclude the idea of the unification of Libya. Even last year, Mr. McNeill, the United Kingdom representative, had succeeded through a last-minute intervention in securing the omission of the word "united" from the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly. Mr. Arutiunian hoped that the Committee would not again allow itself to be fooled by a manoeuvre of that kind. He was furthermore convinced that the Libyan people would be able to attain their desired ends and that a sovereign, independent and united Libya could be established in spite of the

attempts of the administering Powers to divide the country.

58. Mr. Arutiunian said he had not been able to follow the speech of the French representative and had not been in a position to reply to any remarks which that representative might have made. He would refer to the records of the meeting in order to do so if necessary.

59. Mr. MASCIA (Representative of Italy) recalled that the United Nations Commissioner in Libya had pointed out that the Preparatory Committee of Twenty-One had decided at a recent meeting that non-national minorities should not be represented in the Libyan constituent National Assembly. Mr. Mascia said he would be very grateful if the United Nations Commissioner would kindly clarify the definition "non-national minorities" and also indicate the political consequences which application of the decision of the Committee of Twenty-One might entail.

60. General Assembly resolution 289 (IV) had established that the "inhabitants" of Libya would take part in the formation of the State and of the Libyan government. It had given the minorities the right to be represented on the Council for Libya through the procedure described in sub-paragraph 6 (b) of the resolution. At the invitation of the Council for Libya, a representative of the minorities had participated in the Preparatory Committee of Twenty-One. If the recent decision of the Committee of Twenty-One were carried out, it would constitute a violation of the spirit and letter of the General Assembly resolution. Furthermore, to deprive a part of the inhabitants of Libya, namely, those of Italian, Jewish, Greek or Maltese origin, of the right to participate in the formation of the new State, would be a discriminatory measure in conflict with the General Assembly resolution and the spirit of the Charter.

61. The Chairman of the Council for Libya had most impartially outlined the problem of the minorities. The minorities had participated in the life and development of Libya and were strongly attached to the country. The discriminatory measure which it was proposed to apply to them was unjust and undeserved. Moreover, as there was no Libyan constitution, there was no Libyan nationality and no Libyan nationality law, a circumstance which further added to the hardships of the minorities.

62. In conclusion, Mr. Mascia said the Italian Government wished only to protect the rights of a large part of the Libyan population, of a peaceful and industrious minority which had always lived in friendly and harmonious relations with the Arab population.

63. Mr. PELT (United Nations Commissioner in Libya) asked in his own name and in that of the Chairman of the Council for Libya for sufficient time to prepare replies to the questions put during the debate, particularly since very important speeches had been made in the course of the meeting, which required study. For these reasons, Mr. Pelt and the Chairman of the Council for Libya preferred not to address the Committee until the following meeting.

*It was decided to grant that request.*

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.